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Electoral Incentives in Congress
Jamie L. Carson and Joel Sievert
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David Mayhew's 1974 thesis on the "electoral connection" and its impact on legislative behavior is the theoretical foundation for research on the modern U.S. Congress. Mayhew contends that once in office, legislators pursue the actions that put them in the best position for reelection. Carson and Sievert examine how electoral incentives shaped legislative behavior throughout the nineteenth century by looking at patterns of turnover in Congress; the renomination of candidates; the roles of parties in recruiting candidates and their broader effects on candidate competition; and, finally by examining legislators' accountability. The results have wide-ranging implications for the evolution of Congress and the development of legislative institutions over time.
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Cover
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Title
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Copyright
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Dedication
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Contents
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Acknowledgments
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One. Introduction
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Two. Contemporary and Historical Evidence for an Electoral Connection
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Three. Unpacking the Electoral Connection
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Four. Candidates and Competition in US House Races, 1820–88
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Five. Nomination and Turnover Patterns in the US House
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Six. Election Timing, and the Personal Vote
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Seven. Electoral Accountability in US House Elections
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Eight. Reevaluating Electoral Incentives in Congress
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Notes
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References
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Index
Citable Link
Published: 2018
Publisher: University of Michigan Press
- 978-0-472-03750-6 (paper)
- 978-0-472-13079-5 (hardcover)
- 978-0-472-12375-9 (ebook)