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  2. Economic Shocks and Authoritarian Stability: Duration, Financial Control, and Institutions

Economic Shocks and Authoritarian Stability: Duration, Financial Control, and Institutions

Victor C. Shih, Editor 2020
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Over two billion people still live under authoritarian rule. Moreover, authoritarian regimes around the world command enormous financial and economic resources, rivaling those controlled by advanced democracies. Yet authoritarian regimes as a whole are facing their greatest challenges in the recent two decades due to rebellions and economic stress. Extended periods of hardship have the potential of introducing instability to regimes because members of the existing ruling coalition suffer welfare losses that force them to consider alternatives, while previously quiescent masses may consider collective uprisings a worthwhile gamble in the face of declining standards of living.

Economic Shocks and Authoritarian Stability homes in on the economic challenges facing authoritarian regimes through a set of comparative case studies that include Iran, Iraq under Saddam Hussein, Malaysia, Indonesia, Jordan, Russia, the Eastern bloc countries, China, and Taiwan—authored by the top experts in these countries. Through these comparative case studies, this volume provides readers with the analytical tools for assessing whether the current round of economic shocks will lead to political instability or even regime change among the world's autocracies. This volume identifies the duration of economic shocks, the regime's control over the financial system, and the strength of the ruling party as key variables to explain whether authoritarian regimes would maintain the status quo, adjust their support coalitions, or fall from power after economic shocks.

 

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Series
  • Weiser Center for Emerging Democracies
ISBN(s)
  • 978-0-472-03767-4 (paper)
  • 978-0-472-13177-8 (hardcover)
  • 978-0-472-12646-0 (ebook)
Subject
  • Political Science:Governance
  • Political Science:Comparative Politics
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  • Table of Contents

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  • Cover
  • Title Page
  • Copyright Page
  • Contents
  • Acknowledgments
  • Introduction
  • One. The Domestic Political Implications of Economic Sanctions
  • Two. Economic Shocks and Communist Survival and Collapse
  • Three. Of Eggs and Stones
  • Four. Economic Shocks and Authoritarian Responses
  • Five. Crises, Coalitions, and Change in Indonesia and Malaysia
  • Six. Pathways to Stability and Instability in the Midst of Prolonged Slowdown
  • Seven. Maladjustment
  • Eight. Authoritarian Durability in East Asia’s Developmental States
  • Nine. Bread, Fear, and Coalitional Politics in Jordan
  • Conclusion
  • Contributors
  • Index

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This line graph shows that while Xi Jinping’s and Wang Qishan’s allies have increased their representation in the Communist Party’s key positions, Hu Jintao has seen reduced representation in key positions after 2013.

The Number of Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, Xi Jinping, and Wang Qishan Faction Members in Key Positions: 2007-2017

From Chapter 6

Fig. 6.3. The Number of Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, Xi Jinping, and Wang Qishan Faction Members in Key Positions, 2007–17

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