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  2. Committees and the Decline of Lawmaking in Congress

Committees and the Decline of Lawmaking in Congress

Jonathan Lewallen 2020
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The public, journalists, and legislators themselves have often lamented a decline in congressional lawmaking in recent years, often blaming party politics for the lack of legislative output. In Committees and the Decline of Lawmaking in Congress, Jonathan Lewallen examines the decline in lawmaking from a new, committee-centered perspective. Lewallen tests his theory against other explanations such as partisanship and an increased demand for oversight with multiple empirical tests and traces shifts in policy activity by policy area using the Policy Agendas Project coding scheme.

He finds that because party leaders have more control over the legislative agenda, committees have spent more of their time conducting oversight instead. Partisanship alone does not explain this trend; changes in institutional rules and practices that empowered party leaders have created more uncertainty for committees and contributed to a shift in their policy activities. The shift toward oversight at the committee level combined with party leader control over the voting agenda means that many members of Congress are effectively cut out of many of the institution's policy decisions. At a time when many, including Congress itself, are considering changes to modernize the institution and keep up with a stronger executive branch, the findings here suggest that strengthening Congress will require more than running different candidates or providing additional resources.

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Series
  • Legislative Politics and Policy Making
ISBN(s)
  • 978-0-472-13206-5 (hardcover)
  • 978-0-472-12699-6 (ebook)
Subject
  • Political Science:American Politics
  • Political Science:Governance
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  • Table of Contents

  • Resources

  • Stats

  • Cover
  • Title Page
  • Copyright Page
  • Contents
  • Preface and Acknowledgments
  • One. Committees and Congress in the Policy Process
  • Two. Myths and Realities of Congressional Lawmaking
  • Three. The Effects of Centralized Agenda Setting
  • Four. Partisanship and Committee Activity
  • Five. Demand for Committee Oversight
  • Six. The Stratified Congress
  • Seven. The Costs of Doing (Legislative) Business
  • Appendix
  • Notes
  • References
  • Index

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The trend in the percentage of bills referred to multiple House committees from 1981 to 2016.

Figure 3-1. Multiply-Referred Bills in the House of Representatives, 1981-2016

From Chapter 3

Fig. 3.1. Multiply-Referred Bills in the House of Representatives, 1981–2016. (Source: Congressional Bills Project, calculated by the author; the 114th Congress was the last set of data available as of this writing. House Rules Committee data exclude those bills it receives for the purposes of devising a debate rule.)

The average percentage of bills referred to each House committee that also were referred to at least one other committee from 1981 to 2016.

Figure 3-2. Multiply-Referred Bills Across House Committees, 1981-2016

From Chapter 3

Fig. 3.2. Multiply-Referred Bills across House Committees, 1981–2016. (Source: Congressional Bills Project, calculated by the author; the 114th Congress was the last set of data available as of this writing. House Rules Committee data exclude those bills it receives for the purposes of devising a debate rule.)

Each House committee’s trend in the percentage of referred bills that also were referred to at least one other committee from 1981 to 2016.

Figure 3-3. Multiply-Referred Bills for Each House Committee Across Time, 1981-2016

From Chapter 3

Fig. 3.3. Multiply-Referred Bills for Each House Committee across Time, 1981–2016. (Source: Congressional Bills Project and Congress.gov, calculated by the author. House Rules Committee data exclude those bills it receives for the purposes of devising a debate rule.)

The percentage of House debate rules classified as open from 1981 to 2016.

Figure 3-4. Open Debate Rules in the House of Representatives, 1981-2016

From Chapter 3

Fig. 3.4. Open Debate Rules in the House of Representatives, 1981–2016. (Source: Sinclair 2007 [97th–108th Congresses] and Congress.gov [109th–114th Congresses]; the former calculated by Donald Wolfensberger, the latter calculated by the author. The Wolfensberger calculations only refer to “restrictive” rules that include closed, modified closed, and modified open rules in the same statistic.)

The number of cloture motions filed in the Senate from 1981 to 2018 separated by whether the motions were sponsored by party leaders and whips or not.

Figure 3-5. Senate Cloture Motions and Majority Party Leader Involvement, 1981-2018

From Chapter 3

Fig. 3.5. Senate Cloture Motions and Majority Party Leader Involvement, 1981–2018. (Source: Senate.gov, calculated by the author.)

The left panel shows the number of bills in each congress from 1981 to 2018 with resolved intercameral differences. The right panel shows the percentage of these bills resolved via conference committee.

Figure 3-6. Resolving Intercameral Differences Through Conference Committee, 1981-2018

From Chapter 3

Fig. 3.6. Resolving Intercameral Differences through Conference Committee, 1981–2018. (Source: Congress.gov, calculated by the author.)

The panels on the top row show the total number of subcommittees in each chamber from 1981 to 2018, with House subcommittees on the left and Senate subcommittees on the right. The bottom row shows the number of oversight subcommittees in each chamber, with House subcommittees on the left and Senate subcommittees on the right.

Figure 3-7. Total Subcommittees and Oversight Subcommittees in Congress, 1981-2018

From Chapter 3

Fig. 3.7. Total Subcommittees and Oversight Subcommittees in Congress, 1981–2018. (Source: Congressional Directory, history.house.gov, www.senate.gov/committees/committee_assignments.htm; compiled by the author.)

The left panel shows predicted values for House legislative hearing ratios based on multiple referral percentages before and after 1995. The right panel shows predicted values for House markups.

Figure 3-8. Predicted Values for House Legislative Activity, Multiple vs. Primary Referral Era

From Chapter 3

Fig. 3.8. Predicted Values for House Legislative Activity, Multiple vs. Primary Referral Era. (Note: Y-axes are on the logarithmic scale due to transforming beta regression results.)

The left panel shows predicted values for Senate legislative hearing ratios based on the number of cloture motions filed the previous congress. The right panel shows predicted values for Senate markups.

Figure 3-9. Predicted Values for Senate Legislative Activity from Previous Cloture Motions

From Chapter 3

Fig. 3.9. Predicted Values for Senate Legislative Activity from Previous Cloture Motions. (Note: Y-axes are on the logarithmic scale due to transforming beta regression results.)

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