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Party Competition and Responsible Party Government: A Theory of Spatial Competition Based Upon Insights from Behavioral Voting Research
James Adams
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In countries with multiparty political systems, we assume--if the system is going to work--that parties have relatively stable positions on policy, that these positions diverge, and that voters make choices based on policy preferences. Yet much of the research on voter behavior and party competition does not support these assumptions.
In Party Competition, James Adams applies the insights of behavioral research to an examination of the policy strategies that political parties (and candidates) employ in seeking election. He argues that vote-seeking parties are motivated to present policies that appeal to voters, whose bias toward these policies is based in part on reasons that have nothing to do with policy. He demonstrates that this strategic logic has profound implications for party competition and responsible party government.
Adams's innovative fusion of research methodologies presents solutions to issues of policy stability and voter partisanship. His theory's supported by an in-depth analysis of empirical applications to party competition in Britain, France, and the United States in the postwar years.
Party Competition and Responsible Party Government will appeal to readers interested in the study of political parties, voting behavior and elections, as well as to scholars specializing in French, British, and American politics.
James Adams is Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of California, Santa Barbara.
In Party Competition, James Adams applies the insights of behavioral research to an examination of the policy strategies that political parties (and candidates) employ in seeking election. He argues that vote-seeking parties are motivated to present policies that appeal to voters, whose bias toward these policies is based in part on reasons that have nothing to do with policy. He demonstrates that this strategic logic has profound implications for party competition and responsible party government.
Adams's innovative fusion of research methodologies presents solutions to issues of policy stability and voter partisanship. His theory's supported by an in-depth analysis of empirical applications to party competition in Britain, France, and the United States in the postwar years.
Party Competition and Responsible Party Government will appeal to readers interested in the study of political parties, voting behavior and elections, as well as to scholars specializing in French, British, and American politics.
James Adams is Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of California, Santa Barbara.
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Cover
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Title
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Copyright
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Dedication
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Contents
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List of Figures
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List of Tables
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Acknowledgments
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Part I. Party Competition under the Basic Partisan Spatial Model
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1. Political Representation and Responsible Party Government
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2. Policy Stability, Policy Divergence, and the Pressure for Responsible Parties in a Three-Party System: The Case of Britain
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3. Party Policy Trajectories in the Absence of Long-Term Equilibrium: Temporal Aspects of Party Competition in Three-Party Elections
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4. Party Competition in Postwar France under the Partisan Vote Model
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Part II. Extensions of the Basic Partisan Vote Model
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5. Party Competition in Postwar France, Part II: Party Policies since the Mid-1980s
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6. Extensions to Probabilistic Voting
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7. Extensions to Two-Party Competition in American Elections: A Sketch of a Partisan Spatial Model with Variable Voter Turnout
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8. Directions for Future Research
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Appendixes
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Appendix A. Description of the Simulation Procedures
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Appendix B. On Using Election Surveys to Analyze Parties’ Cross-Time Policy Trajectories
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Appendix C. Party Policy Strategies and Equilibrium Results for a Generalized Multivariate Probabilistic Voting Model
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Appendix D. Proof of Theorem 7.1
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Notes
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References
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Index
Citable Link
Published: 2001
Publisher: University of Michigan Press
- 978-0-472-08767-9 (paper)
- 978-0-472-02718-7 (ebook)