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Losing to Win: Why Congressional Majorities Play Politics Instead of Make Laws
Jeremy Gelman
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Most everyone, voters, political scientists, even lawmakers, think Congress is dysfunctional. Instead of solving problems, Democrats and Republicans spend their time playing politics. These days Capitol Hill seems more a place to bicker, not to pass laws. The reality is more complicated. Yes, sometimes Congress is broken. But sometimes it is productive. What explains this variation? Why do Democrats and Republicans choose to legislate or score political points? And why do some issues become so politicized they devolve into partisan warfare, while others remain safe for compromise?
Losing to Win answers these questions through a novel theory of agenda-setting. Unlike other research that studies bills that become law, Jeremy Gelman begins from the opposite perspective. He studies why majority parties knowingly take up dead-on-arrival (DOA) bills, the ideas everyone knows are going to lose. In doing so, he argues that congressional parties' decisions to play politics instead of compromising, and the topics on which they choose to bicker, are strategic and predictable. Gelman finds that legislative dysfunction arises from a mutually beneficial relationship between a majority party in Congress, which is trying to win unified government, and its allied interest groups, which are trying to enact their policies. He also challenges the conventional wisdom that DOA legislation is political theater. By tracking bills over time, Gelman shows that some former dead-on-arrival ideas eventually become law. In this way, ideas viewed as too extreme or partisan today can produce long-lasting future policy changes.
Through his analysis, Gelman provides an original explanation for why both parties pursue the partisan bickering that voters find so frustrating. He moves beyond conventional arguments that our discordant politics are merely the result of political polarization. Instead, he closely examines the specific circumstances that give rise to legislative dysfunction. The result is a fresh, straightforward perspective on the question we have all asked at some point, "Why can't Democrats and Republicans stop fighting and just get something done?"
Half Title
Series Page
Title Page
Copyright Page
Dedication
Contents
List of Figures
List of Tables
Acknowledgments
One. Introduction
Two. A Primer on Dead-on-Arrival Bills
Three. A Theory of Agenda Allocation
Four. The Strategic Timing of Dead-on-Arrival Bills
Five. Rewarding Dysfunction: Interest Groups and Intended Legislative Failure
Six. The Long-Term Consequences of Legislative Failure
Figure 3.1. Maximum Bid Offered by Interest Group Advocating for a DOA Bill Note: Interest group’s maximum bid for a DOA bill as the probability it can be enacted after the election changes. The shaded area represents when the DOA legislation wins agenda space.
Figure 3.2. Interest Groups’ Maximum Bids as Gridlock Changes Note: The dashed line is the maximum bid for the DOA bill. The solid line is the maximum bid for the enactable bill. The shaded region represents when the intended failure wins agenda space.
Figure 4.1. Monthly Count of When DOA Bills Receive Floor Consideration, 2003-2012 Note: Count of DOA bills that received agenda space by month, 2003 through 2012.
Figure 4.2. Probability DOA Bill Is Added to the Agenda as a Majority Party’s Electoral Prospects Change Note: Predicted probabilities a DOA bill receives floor consideration. The “All Bills” graph is calculated from Model 1 in Table 4.1, and the “Important Bills” graph is calculated from Model 2 in Table 4.1. Divided Government, Majority Party, Committee Member, and Committee Chair are held at 1, Subcommittee Chair and Must Pass are held at 0, and all other variables are held at their means.
Figure 4.3. Probability DOA Bill Is Added to the Floor Agenda in Unified and Divided Government Note: Predicted probabilities a DOA bill receives floor consideration. The “All Bills” graph is calculated from Model 1 in Table 4.1, and the “Important Bills” graph is calculated from Model 2 in Table 4.1. Majority Party, Committee Member, and Committee Chair are held at 1, Subcommittee Chair and Must Pass are held at 0, and all other variables are held at their means.
Figure 5.3. Predicted Probability Interest Groups Rate DOA Bill Note: Predicted probabilities that an interest group rates a bill in its legislative scorecard based on the interaction term from Model 1 in Table 5.5. Dead on Arrival is held at 1. Important Bill is held at 0 in the “All Bills” model and its mean in the “Important Bills” model. Log Total Donations is held at its mean.
Figure 5.4. Predicted Probability of When a DOA Bill Gets Rated by an Allied Interest Group Note: Predicted probability that an allied interest group rates a bill throughout a congressional term calculated using the results from Model 1 in Table 5.6. Important Bill is held at 1.