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  2. On Parliamentary War: Partisan Conflict and Procedural Change in the U.S. Senate
2017, 1st Edition

On Parliamentary War: Partisan Conflict and Procedural Change in the U.S. Senate

James I. Wallner 2019 Edition, With a new Preface
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Dysfunction in the Senate is driven by the deteriorating relationship between the majority and minority parties. Regular order is virtually nonexistent and unorthodox parliamentary procedures are frequently needed to pass important legislation. Democrats and Republicans are fighting a parliamentary war in the Senate to steer the future of the country. James Wallner presents a bargaining model of procedural change to explain the persistence of the filibuster in this polarized environment, focusing on the dynamics responsible for contested procedural change. Wallner's model explains why Senate majorities have historically tolerated the filibuster, even when it has defeated their agendas, despite having the power to eliminate it. It also shows why the then-Democratic majority deployed the nuclear option to eliminate the filibuster for an Obama judicial nominee in 2013. On Parliamentary War's game-theory approach unveils the relationship between partisan conflict and procedural change in the Senate.
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Series
  • Legislative Politics and Policy Making
ISBN(s)
  • 978-0-472-03775-9 (paper)
  • 978-0-472-12683-5 (ebook)
Subject
  • Political Science:Governance
  • Political Science:American Politics
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  • Table of Contents

  • Resources

  • Stats

  • Cover
  • Title Page
  • Copyright Page
  • Dedication
  • Contents
  • Acknowledgments
  • Preface to the Paperback Edition
  • One. On Parliamentary War
  • Part I The Strategic Context of Procedural Change
    • Two. Parliamentary War in Theory
    • Three. The Procedural Architecture of Senate Decision-Making
  • Part II A Tale of Two Minorities
    • Four. Analyzing Minority Behavior in Parliamentary War
    • Five. The Case of a Determined Minority
    • Six. The Case of an Undetermined Minority
  • Part III Deterrence in Parliamentary War
    • Seven. In Search of a More Effective Deterrent
    • Eight. Preventing Nuclear War
    • Nine. Conclusion
  • Notes
  • Bibliography
  • Index

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Figure 7.2 Minority Amendments. The number of minority amendments offered to legislation on the Senate floor declined considerably beginning in the 110th Congress.

Minority Amendments

From Chapter 7

Fig. 7.2. Minority amendments

Figure 7.4 Filling the Amendment Tree. The instances in which the majority leader has filled the amendment tree have increased from zero in the 101st Congress to more than 25 in the 112th and 113th Congresses.

Filling the Amendment Tree

From Chapter 7

Fig. 7.4. Filling the amendment tree

Figure 7.5 Amendments 60-Vote Thresholds. Sixty-vote thresholds were required to adopt amendments six times in the 109th Congress, thirty-seven times in the 110th Congress, thirty-eight times in the 111th Congress, 111 times in the 112th Congress, and thirty-five times in the 113th Congress.

Amendments 60-Vote Thresholds

From Chapter 7

Fig. 7.5. Amendment 60-vote thresholds

Figure 7.6 Percentage of Amendments Subject to 60-Vote Thresholds. The percentage of amendments subject to 60-vote thresholds of the total number of amendments offered in a particular Congress increased from less than 2 percent in the 109th Congress to more than 6 percent in the 113th Congress.

Percentage of Amendments Subject to 60-Vote Thresholds

From Chapter 7

Fig. 7.6. Percentage of amendments subject to 60-vote thresholds

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