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On Parliamentary War: Partisan Conflict and Procedural Change in the U.S. Senate

James I. Wallner 2019
Dysfunction in the Senate is driven by the deteriorating relationship between the majority and minority parties. Regular order is virtually nonexistent and unorthodox parliamentary procedures are frequently needed to pass important legislation. Democrats and Republicans are fighting a parliamentary war in the Senate to steer the future of the country. James Wallner presents a bargaining model of procedural change to explain the persistence of the filibuster in this polarized environment, focusing on the dynamics responsible for contested procedural change. Wallner's model explains why Senate majorities have historically tolerated the filibuster, even when it has defeated their agendas, despite having the power to eliminate it. It also shows why the then-Democratic majority deployed the nuclear option to eliminate the filibuster for an Obama judicial nominee in 2013. On Parliamentary War's game-theory approach unveils the relationship between partisan conflict and procedural change in the Senate.
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Series
  • Legislative Politics and Policy Making
ISBN(s)
  • 978-0-472-03775-9 (paper)
  • 978-0-472-12683-5 (ebook)
Subject
  • Political Science:American Politics
  • Political Science:Governance
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  • Table of Contents

  • Resources

  • Stats

  • Cover
  • Title Page
  • Copyright Page
  • Dedication
  • Contents
  • Acknowledgments
  • Preface to the Paperback Edition
  • One. On Parliamentary War
  • Part I The Strategic Context of Procedural Change
    • Two. Parliamentary War in Theory
    • Three. The Procedural Architecture of Senate Decision-Making
  • Part II A Tale of Two Minorities
    • Four. Analyzing Minority Behavior in Parliamentary War
    • Five. The Case of a Determined Minority
    • Six. The Case of an Undetermined Minority
  • Part III Deterrence in Parliamentary War
    • Seven. In Search of a More Effective Deterrent
    • Eight. Preventing Nuclear War
    • Nine. Conclusion
  • Notes
  • Bibliography
  • Index

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Figure 7.1 Cloture Motions. The number of cloture motions filed and corresponding cloture votes has increased from fewer than 50 in the 101st Congress to more than 250 in the 113th Congress.

Cloture Motions

From Chapter 7

Fig. 7.1. Cloture motions

Figure 7.2 Minority Amendments. The number of minority amendments offered to legislation on the Senate floor declined considerably beginning in the 110th Congress.

Minority Amendments

From Chapter 7

Fig. 7.2. Minority amendments

Figure 7.3. Share of Cloture Motions Filed, by Day of Floor Consideration. The instances in which cloture has been utilized during the early stages of a bill’s consideration on the Senate floor have increased dramatically since 2001.

Share of Cloture Motions Filed, by Day of Floor Consideration

From Chapter 7

Fig. 7.3. Share of cloture motions filed, by day of floor consideration

Figure 7.4 Filling the Amendment Tree. The instances in which the majority leader has filled the amendment tree have increased from zero in the 101st Congress to more than 25 in the 112th and 113th Congresses.

Filling the Amendment Tree

From Chapter 7

Fig. 7.4. Filling the amendment tree

Figure 7.5 Amendments 60-Vote Thresholds. Sixty-vote thresholds were required to adopt amendments six times in the 109th Congress, thirty-seven times in the 110th Congress, thirty-eight times in the 111th Congress, 111 times in the 112th Congress, and thirty-five times in the 113th Congress.

Amendments 60-Vote Thresholds

From Chapter 7

Fig. 7.5. Amendment 60-vote thresholds

Figure 7.6 Percentage of Amendments Subject to 60-Vote Thresholds. The percentage of amendments subject to 60-vote thresholds of the total number of amendments offered in a particular Congress increased from less than 2 percent in the 109th Congress to more than 6 percent in the 113th Congress.

Percentage of Amendments Subject to 60-Vote Thresholds

From Chapter 7

Fig. 7.6. Percentage of amendments subject to 60-vote thresholds

Figure 7.7 Cloture on Motions to Proceed. The number of cloture motions filed on the motion to proceed to legislation increased from 13 in the 101st Congress to 43 in the 112th Congress and 36 in the 113th Congress.

Cloture on Motions to Proceed

From Chapter 7

Fig. 7.7. Cloture on motions to proceed

Figure 8.1 Civilian Nominations Confirmed by Recorded Vote. The number of recorded votes to confirm presidential nominees to fill civilian non-list positions rose from 24 in the 101st Congress to 187 in the 113th Congress.

Civilian Nominations Confirmed by Recorded Vote

From Chapter 8

Fig. 8.1. Civilian nominations confirmed by recorded vote

Figure 8.2 Civilian Nominations by Method of Confirmation. The Senate confirmed more civilian nominations by voice vote and unanimous consent than by recorded vote in each Congress from the 101st through the 113th.

Civilian Nominations by Method of Confirmation

From Chapter 8

Fig. 8.2. Civilian nominations by method of confirmation

Figure 8.3 Time Spent on Nomination Votes. The Senate conducted 486 recorded votes in the 112th Congress for an approximate total time of 121.5 hours. Of these recorded votes, 82 were confirmation votes on nominations, for an approximate total time of 20.5 hours.

Time Spent on Nomination Votes

From Chapter 8

Fig. 8.3. Time spent on nomination votes

Figure 8.4 Measures Passed by Recorded Vote. The number of measures passed by recorded vote declined by more than 50 percent from the 101st Congress to the 113th Congress.

Measures Passed by Recorded Vote

From Chapter 8

Fig. 8.4. Measures passed by recorded vote

Figure 8.5 Measures by Method of Passage. The Senate passed most measures without a recorded vote (by voice vote and unanimous consent) in every Congress between the 101st and 113th.

Measures by Method of Passage

From Chapter 8

Fig. 8.5. Measures by method of passage

Figure 8.6 Differences in Recorded Vote Times. The Senate’s workload as measured by the time it takes to pass measures would increase significantly if the minority forced recorded votes on those measures previously passed by voice vote or unanimous consent.

Differences in Recorded Vote Times

From Chapter 8

Fig. 8.6. Differences in recorded vote times

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