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A Legal Theory for Autonomous Artificial Agents
Samir Chopra and Laurence F. White"An extraordinarily good synthesis from an amazing range of philosophical, legal, and technological sources . . . the book will appeal to legal academics and students, lawyers involved in e-commerce and cyberspace legal issues, technologists, moral philosophers, and intelligent lay readers interested in high tech issues, privacy, [and] robotics."
—Kevin Ashley, University of Pittsburgh School of Law
As corporations and government agencies replace human employees with online customer service and automated phone systems, we become accustomed to doing business with nonhuman agents. If artificial intelligence (AI) technology advances as today's leading researchers predict, these agents may soon function with such limited human input that they appear to act independently. When they achieve that level of autonomy, what legal status should they have?
Samir Chopra and Laurence F. White present a carefully reasoned discussion of how existing philosophy and legal theory can accommodate increasingly sophisticated AI technology. Arguing for the legal personhood of an artificial agent, the authors discuss what it means to say it has "knowledge" and the ability to make a decision. They consider key questions such as who must take responsibility for an agent's actions, whom the agent serves, and whether it could face a conflict of interest.
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Cover
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Title
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Copyright
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Dedication
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Contents
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Acknowledgments
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Introduction
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Chapter 1 / Artificial Agents and Agency
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1.1. Agency and the Intentional Stance
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1.2. Artificial Agents and Legal Agency
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1.3. The Implications of Applying Agency Doctrine to Artificial Agents
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1.4. A Note on Terminology and Scope
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Chapter 2 / Artificial Agents and Contracts
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2.1. The Contracting Problem
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2.2. Solutions to the Contracting Problem in Closed Systems
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2.3. Solutions to the Contracting Problem in Open Systems
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2.4. Evaluating the Application of Agency Doctrine to Artificial Agents
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2.5. Legislative Responses
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2.6. Bot Contracting: Register v. Verio and eBay v. Bidder's Edge
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2.7. Conclusion
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Chapter 3 / Attribution of Knowledge to Artificial Agents and Their Principals
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3.1. Attributing Knowledge to Artificial Agents
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3.2. Law's Epistemology
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3.3. Corporate Knowledge and Artificial Agents
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3.4. Applications of the Analysis and the Legal Doctrines
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3.5. Conclusion
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Chapter 4 / Tort Liability for Artificial Agents
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4.1. Navigating Analogies
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4.2. Liability Schemes for Artificial Agents Understood as Instrumentalities
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4.3. Liability Schemes for Artificial Agents Understood as Actors and Agents
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4.4. Liability of Suppliers of Artificial Agents
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4.5. Responsibility and Liability of the Artificial Agent
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4.6. Conclusion
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Chapter 5 / Personhood for Artificial Agents
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5.1. Could Artificial Agents Be Legal Persons?
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5.2. According Dependent Legal Personality to Artificial Agents
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5.3. According Independent Legal Personality to Artificial Agents
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5.4. Philosophical Objections to Personhood for Artificial Agents
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5.5. The Significance of Personhood Jurisprudence
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5.6. Recognizing Artificial Agents as Persons
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5.7. Conclusion
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Notes
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References
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Index
- 978-0-472-05145-8 (paper)
- 978-0-472-02676-0 (ebook)