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  2. "The infantry cannot do with a gun less": the place of the artillery in the British Expeditionary Force, 1914-1918

"The infantry cannot do with a gun less": the place of the artillery in the British Expeditionary Force, 1914-1918

Sanders Marble 2008 © Columbia University Press
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Series
  • Gutenberg-e
ISBN(s)
  • 9780231502191 (ebook)
Subject
  • European: 1800-present
Citable Link
  • Table of Contents

  • Resources

  • Stats

  • Cover
  • Title Page
  • Copyright and Permissions
  • List of Illustrations
    • Figures
    • Maps
  • Acknowledgments
  • Abbreviations
  • 1 Introduction
    • [Intro]
    • Elements of Battle
    • Focus of the Study
    • Two Schools of Thought?
    • Why not Revolutionaries?
    • Source Material
    • Other Technical Branches
    • A Combat Arm?
    • New Ideas
  • 2 Background through the end of 1914
    • Introduction
    • The Legacy of the Boer War
    • Postwar Reforms
    • Foreign Influences
    • Organizational Structure
    • Chain of Command
    • Aggressive Use of Artillery
    • Field Artillery Tactics
    • Field Artillery Equipment
    • The Royal Garrison Artillery
    • Siege Artillery in the Field
    • Conclusions: The Pre-war Artillery
    • 1914 The Test of Battle
  • 3 Preparing the Attack: Part I, 1914-1916
    • Introduction
    • 1914
    • The First Trench-warfare Attack
    • 1915 Neuve Chapelle
    • Another View on Tactics
    • The Next Attacks: Aubers Ridge and Festubert
    • Loos
    • The Search for a Formula
    • GHQ's Role
    • Haig Takes Over
    • 1916 The Somme: Planning
    • Density of the Bombardment
    • Wire-cutting
    • Ammunition Supply
    • Course of the Battle
    • Conclusion
  • 4 Preparing the Attack, Part II: 1917-1918
    • Introduction
    • Arras: The Planning
    • Arras: The Battle
    • Messines Ridge
    • Third Ypres: Planning
    • Third Ypres: The Battle
    • Smaller Operations
    • Cambrai
    • Reviewing 1917
    • 1918 Early Attacks
    • 1918 Amiens
    • 1918 The Hundred Days
    • Conclusion
  • 5 The "Counter Blaster" and Counter-Battery Work
    • Introduction
    • Pre-war Conditions
    • 1914 Experience from Battle
    • 1915 Shortage of Materiel
    • 1916 Grappling with Organization
    • 1917 The Problems Solved
    • 1918 Maturation of the System
    • Conclusion
  • 6 Supporting the Attack: Barrages and Direct Fire
    • Introduction
    • 1914
    • 1915
    • 1916
    • 1917
    • 1918
    • Conclusion
  • 7 Artillery in Defense
    • Introduction
    • 1914
    • Trench Warfare, 1914-1916
    • 1917
    • 1918
    • Conclusion
  • 8 Training and Schools
    • Introduction
    • Before the War
    • Initial Wartime Problems
    • Training Officers
    • What to Teach
    • Larkhill
    • Within the System
    • Conclusion
  • 9 Command and Staff Arrangements
    • Introduction
    • The Battery
    • The Brigade
    • The Division
    • The Corps
    • Corps Heavy Artillery
    • Army Level Artillerymen
    • Gunners at GHQ
    • Conclusion
  • 10 Conclusion: The Artilleryman's Place
  • Appendices Archival Documents
    • [Intro]
    • Appendix 1 Record of work carried out by the Artillery Branch of the Headquarter Staff, South African War
    • Appendix 2 "Practice Camps, 1912, and the Lessons to be Learnt from Them"
    • Appendix 3 "Lessons to be Learnt from the 1913 Practice Camps"
    • Appendix 4 GHQ Notes on Artillery in the Present War
    • Appendix 5 Memorandum on the Possibility of Undertaking Offensive Operations
    • Appendix 6 1st Army Methods for the Attack, 13 April 1915
    • Appendix 7 SS24, "Object and Conditions of Combined Offensive Action," June 1915
    • Appendix 8 CDS 50, Tactical Notes, July 1915
    • Appendix 9 CDS 93, Report on Experimental Firing with 18-pr. Shrapnel and H.E. at Calais, November 1915
    • Appendix 10 Minutes of MGsRA Conference, 24 December 1915
    • Appendix 11 SS98/4, Artillery Notes Number 4, Artillery in Offensive Operations, April 1916
    • Appendix 12 SS109, Training of Divisions for Offensive Action, May 1916
    • Appendix 13 Notes on Artillery, June 1916 (Compiled by the General Staff.)
    • Appendix 14 Report on Visit to III Corps, c. June 1916
    • Appendix 15 Artillery Notes Number 5, Wire Cutting, June 1916
    • Appendix 16 Letters from Major General Birch, June-July 1916
    • Appendix 17 Birch's report on the Somme Bombardment, 9 July 1916
    • Appendix 18 Artillery Lessons Drawn From The Battle Of The Somme, c. December 1916
    • Appendix 19 SS139/4, Artillery in Offensive Operations, March 1917
    • Appendix 20 SS157, Report on the Overseas Artillery School, Salisbury Plain, May 1917
    • Appendix 21 Internal GHQ memo on limited attacks, 26 June 1917
    • Appendix 22 Attack Barrages As Modified By The Enemy's Latest Tactics, 25 August 1917
    • Appendix 23 General Principles on which the Artillery Plan will be drawn, August-September 1917
    • Appendix 24 SS592, Catechism for Heavy and Siege Artillery Subalterns, October 1917
    • Appendix 26 Lessons from the 1917 Battle Fighting of the Fifth Army from an Artillery Point of View, December 1917
    • Appendix 27 Remarks on "Notes on the work of a Counter Battery Office," c. late 1917 (XV Corps)
    • Appendix 29 Fifth Army winter artillery guidelines, 1917-18, 27 December 1917
    • Appendix 30 Birch's Report on Artillery in Defense, 10 February 1918
    • Appendix 31 SS139/3, Artillery Notes Number 3, "Counter-Battery Work," February 1918
    • Appendix 32 SS139/7, Artillery Notes Number 7, "Artillery in Defensive Operations," February 1918
    • Appendix 33 Extract from the report on the Organization etc. of the IX Corps Artillery during the Operations from 10th to 21st April, 1918; May 1918
    • Appendix 34 Fourth Army Artillery in the Battle of Amiens, 26 August 1918
    • Appendix 35 Fourth Army Artillery in the Attack on the Hindenburg Line, c. October 1918
    • Appendix 36 "The Development of Mobile Artillery, 1914-1918," 1919
    • Appendix 37 Anon., "Artillery and the General Staff," 1919
    • Appendix 38 "Artillery Development in the Great War," October 1920
    • Appendix 39 C. N. F. Broad, "Artillery Intelligence and Counter Battery Work," 1922
    • Appendix 40 "The Coming of the Creeping Barrage," 1931
    • Appendix 41 Memo from MGRA at GHQ for Haig's conference with Army Commanders, 9 June 1918
    • Appendix 42 Draft memo from MGRA, GHQ to GS, GHQ, 23 August 1916
  • Notes
    • 1 Introduction
    • 2 Background through the end of 1914
    • 3 Preparing the Attack: Part I, 1914-1916
    • 4 Preparing the Attack, Part II: 1917-1918
    • 5 The "Counter Blaster" and Counter-Battery Work
    • 6 Supporting the Attack: Barrages and Direct Fire
    • 7 Artillery in Defense
    • 8 Training and Schools
    • 9 Command and Staff Arrangements
    • 10 Conclusion: The Artilleryman's Place
    • Appendix 1 Record of work carried out by the Artillery Branch of the Headquarter Staff, South African War
  • Glossary of Useful Terms
  • Bibliography
    • Unpublished Primary Sources
      • Public Record Office, Kew
      • Churchill College, Cambridge
      • House of Lords Record Office
      • Imperial War Museum
      • Liddell Hart Centre, King's College London
      • National Army Museum
      • Royal Air Force Museum
      • Royal Artillery Institution
      • Staff College, Camberley
    • Published Primary Sources
      • Books
      • Articles
      • Other Journals
    • Secondary Sources
  • Links
  • Chronological Index
  • About the Author

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Source: IWM photo Q5095.

Source: IWM photo Q5095.

Forward observers in Cuthbert Crater, NE of Arras, April 1917. Observation posts were not always elaborate or safe. This one is at least reasonably dry for the observers and signalers of the 12th (Eastern) Division during the preparations for the battle of Arras. Source: IWM photo Q5095.

heb99014.0088-lg.jpg

heb99014.0069.jpg

heb99014.0063.jpg

Source: IWM photo E693.

These gunners, near the Ypres Salient, are presumably firing a night harassing mission. They are masked against German gas. Gas was commonly used at night because sleeping soldiers were more likely to breathe enough gas to incapacitate or kill them before they could be woken by an alarm. The British used the same logic as well.

55th Siege Battery Royal Australian Garrison Artillery, Voormezeele, 15 September 1917. The 9.2″ howitzer was an excellent weapon with good range and shell power. However, it was not very mobile; the large box at the right was part of the weapon's frame that helped hold it in place. Every time the howitzer was moved it had to be emptied of around nine tons of earth, disassembled, moved, reassembled, and refilled. In 1918, the rough estimate was that these howitzers were of no use if the front moved more than 3,000 yards per day, as the time taken in moving the weapons far outweighed their time in action. These gunners, near the Ypres Salient, are presumably firing a night harassing mission. They are masked against German gas. Gas was commonly used at night because sleeping soldiers were more likely to breathe enough gas to incapacitate or kill them before they could be woken by an alarm. The British used the same logic as well.

Source: OH 1917, vol. 3.

V Corps barrage map, Cambrai, 20 November 1917. At Cambrai the BEF fired a lifting barrage that moved straight from target to target instead of sweeping all the ground in between lines, as a creeping barrage (MAP 1) did. The smoke barrages shown here were weather-dependent, but the weather was favorable on 20 November and they were fired. However, while they were effective for their duration, that duration had been miscalculated, and German anti-tank fire became effective.

Map 9. V Corps barrage map, Cambrai, 20 November 1917. At Cambrai the BEF fired a lifting barrage that moved straight from target to target instead of sweeping all the ground in between lines, as a creeping barrage (MAP 1) did. The smoke barrages shown here were weather-dependent, but the weather was favorable on 20 November and they were fired. However, while they were effective for their duration, that duration had been miscalculated, and German anti-tank fire became effective.

Source: http://www.dean.usma.edu/departments/history/web03/atlases/WorldWarOne/index.htm.

Western Front, Allied offensives, 1918. This map shows the outlines of the Allied, including British, offensives in 1918.

Map 10. Western Front, Allied offensives, 1918. This map shows the outlines of the Allied, including British, offensives in 1918.

Source: Rawlins Papers, RAI.

Planning map for a creeping barrage, Messines Ridge area, June 1917. This map shows the creeping barrage planned for IX Corps (see Map 4) at Messines Ridge. Maps like this would have been distributed to every field artillery brigade involved in the operation.

Map 1. Planning map for a creeping barrage, Messines Ridge area, June 1917. This map shows the creeping barrage planned for IX Corps (see Map 4) at Messines Ridge. Maps like this would have been distributed to every field artillery brigade involved in the operation.

Source: H. A. Bethell, Modern Artillery in the Field.

Source: H. A. Bethell, Modern Artillery in the Field.

This shows two shells and two trajectories. "A" shows gun shrapnel, fired with high velocity and flat trajectory. These two factors cause the balls to fan out over a deep but fairly narrow area. Gun shrapnel was highly effective against men in the open, but much less effective against troops in cover or protection. "B" shows howitzer shrapnel coming down from a high trajectory. The arced trajectory limits the area covered by the balls, but also means that the balls can reach behind cover, such as a gunshield or wall. "C" shows high explosive shell penetrating cover. While clearly the most effective in these circumstances, it is also clearly less effective at covering open ground than shrapnel. Source: H. A. Bethell, Modern Artillery in the Field.

Source: IWM photo Q4036.

Source: IWM photo Q4036.

Artillery officer issuing orders based on aerial observation, near Montauban, July 1916. This wireless set had an antenna about fifty feet long, the end of which can be seen snaking upwards along the right side of the photo. Due to weight limits, aircraft could only carry transmitters (not transmitters and receivers), and to see when the battery was ready to fire the aircraft had to circle back to see what ground panels had been laid out. Source: IWM photo Q4036.

heb99014.0117-lg.jpg

Source: IWM photo Q1249.

Source: IWM photo Q1249.

New Zealand artillerymen loading limbers with ammunition, near Albert, September 1916. Every shell that was fired in World War I was handled many times on its way to the front, requiring a tremendous amount of labor, and usually many loadings and unloadings. This is one of the last stages: loading the limbers that will go forward to the gun positions, where the shells will be unloaded close to the guns. The white crosses on the end of each round are cloth handles that were secured by light metal clips; they simply made it easier to pull the rounds out of the limbers and generally made them easier to handle. Source: IWM photo Q1249.

Map 4: 3. Hollebeke Inset

Map 4: 3. Hollebeke Inset

Map 4: 3. Hollebeke Inset

heb99014.0085-lg.jpg

Source: H. A. Bethell, Modern Artillery in the Field.

Key: A. Gun tube; B. Recoil guides; C. Cradle; D. Recoil spring case; E. Upper carriage; F. Trail; G. Brake arms; H. Traversing lever; I. Spade; J. Trail eye; K. Elevating screw; L. Rocking bar sight; M. Clinometer; N. Dial sight; O. Firing lever; P. Guard (prevents crewmember from catching arm); Q. Horn connecting gun and buffer; R. Gun shield.

The 18-pounder was a very modern field gun in 1914, having only been adopted in 1909. The British had not produced enough to equip the Territorial Force with 18-pounders, having to rely on the outdated 15-pounders which did not have full pneumatic recoil. Key: A. Gun tube; B. Recoil guides; C. Cradle; D. Recoil spring case; E. Upper carriage; F. Trail; G. Brake arms; H. Traversing lever; I. Spade; J. Trail eye; K. Elevating screw; L. Rocking bar sight; M. Clinometer; N. Dial sight; O. Firing lever; P. Guard (prevents crewmember from catching arm); Q. Horn connecting gun and buffer; R. Gun shield.

heb99014.0113-lg.jpg

heb99014.0070.jpg

heb99014.0118-lg.jpg

Source: IWM photo Q9333.

Source: IWM photo Q9333.

60-pounder firing a barrage, near Moeuvres, dawn of 27 September 1918. After 1916, one of the main uses of 60-pounders was adding depth to the creeping barrage. With greater range than the 18-pounders, the 60-pounders could hit specific targets ahead of the main barrage, to suppress them, restrict the movement of German reserves, or destroy particular targets. On the right horizon a field battery is moving forward, likely to become a direct-support battery or take up an advanced position to fire a later stage of the creeping barrage, something that was possible in 1918 but would have been suicidal in 1917. Source: IWM photo Q9333.

Source: http://www.dean.usma.edu/departments/history/web03/atlases/WorldWarOne/index.htm.

Western Front 1915-1916. This map shows the sites of the main battles of 1915 on the Western Front.

Map 12. Western Front 1915-1916. This map shows the sites of the main battles of 1915 on the Western Front.

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