

Online Appendix for *Campaigns and Voters in Developing Democracies: Argentina in Comparative Perspective*

Edited by
Noam Lupu
Virginia Oliveros
Luis Schiumerini
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Chapter 4: Why Does Wealth Affect Vote Choice? (by Noam Lupu)

Table 1. Regression model relating wealth and vote choice

	Macri/Scioli vote choice
Wealth	0.13* (0.58)
Education	0.27* (0.06)
Age	0.003 (0.005)
Gender	-0.22 (0.15)
Observations	1,179
Pseudo-R ²	0.035

Notes: Values represent coefficient estimates from multinomial logit models. * $p < 0.05$

Table 2. Regression models relating mechanisms with wealth

Dependent variable	Wealth coefficient	Standard error	Observations	R²
Inequality has grown	-0.013	0.024	1,331	0.005
Inequality too high	-0.020	0.019	1,365	0.007
Perceived inequality (ln)	-0.077	0.027	929	0.028
State ownership	-0.036	0.028	1,341	0.007
Public services	-0.011	0.023	1,358	0.002
Social spending	-0.000	0.022	1,344	0.016
Abortion	0.125	0.037	1,355	0.043
Social plan	-0.036	0.008	1,373	0.067
AUH	-0.038	0.009	1,371	0.111
Moratoria	0.003	0.005	1,357	0.017
Union member	0.020	0.009	1,377	0.029
Sold vote	-0.006	0.003	1,369	0.008
Father PJ	0.002	0.012	1,294	0.027
Father UCR	-0.010	0.009	1,294	0.032

Notes: Models include controls for education, age, and gender.

Source: APES 2015

Table 3. Multinomial logit models relating mechanisms with vote choice

Mechanism variable	Macri/Scioli coefficient	Standard error	Observations	Pseudo-R²
Inequality has grown	0.378	0.077	1,136	0.048
Inequality too high	0.017	0.080	1,163	0.038
Perceived inequality (ln)	-0.133	0.108	821	0.032
State ownership	-0.320	0.066	1,150	0.047
Public services	-0.310	0.079	1,162	0.043
Social spending	-0.151	0.077	1,158	0.036
Abortion	-0.153	0.049	1,158	0.044
Social plan	-0.636	0.231	1,170	0.038
AUH	0.509	0.196	1,169	0.037
Moratoria	-0.172	0.334	1,159	0.038
Union member	-0.231	0.218	1,175	0.038
Sold vote	-0.285	0.494	1,170	0.034
Father PJ	-0.648	0.171	1,105	0.044
Father UCR	0.381	0.290	1,105	0.033

Notes: Models include controls for wealth, education, age, and gender.

Source: APES 2015

Table 4. Structural equation models relating mechanisms with wealth and vote choice

Mechanism variable	Indirect effect of wealth on Macri/Scioli vote
Inequality has grown	0.001 (0.002)
Inequality too high	0.001 (0.019)
Perceived inequality (ln)	0.003 (0.002)
State ownership	0.001 (0.003)
Public services	0.000 (0.002)
Social spending	0.001 (0.001)
Abortion	-0.006 (0.002)
Social plan	0.004 (0.002)
AUH	0.004 (0.002)
Moratoria	0.000 (0.000)
Union member	-0.001 (0.001)
Sold vote	0.000 (0.001)
Father PJ	-0.001 (0.002)
Father UCR	-0.001 (0.002)

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Models include controls for wealth, education, age, and gender.

Source: APES 2015

Table 5. Multinomial logit models relating individual spending items with wealth and vote choice

Spending item	Wealth	Vote choice (Macri/Scioli coefficient)
Health	0.015 (0.016)	0.040 (0.107)
Education	0.033 (0.017)	-0.013 (0.106)
Transportation and energy subsidies	0.004 (0.026)	-0.244 (0.071)
Retirement	-0.029 (0.019)	-0.068 (0.096)
Social welfare	-0.125 (0.030)	-0.515 (0.068)

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Models include controls for wealth, education, age, and gender.

Source: APES 2015

Table 6. Estimates of average causal mediation effects using Imai et al. method

Mediator	Average causal mediation effect	Average direct effect
Inequality has grown	0.001 [-0.002, 0.00]	0.038* [0.021, 0.05]
Inequality too high	-0.00 [-0.00, 0.00]	0.040* [0.021, 0.06]
Perceived inequality	-0.002 [-0.04, 0.03]	0.050* [0.027, 0.07]
State ownership	0.002 [-0.001, 0.01]	0.037* [0.018, 0.05]
Public services	0.001 [-0.002, 0.00]	0.039* [0.021, 0.05]
Social spending	0.000 [-0.001, 0.00]	0.040* [0.022, 0.05]
Abortion	-0.004* [-0.008, 0.00]	0.044* [0.028, 0.06]
Social plan	0.004* [0.001, 0.01]	0.037* [0.019, 0.05]
AUH	0.003* [0.001, 0.01]	0.037* [0.019, 0.05]
Moratoria	0.000 [0.000, 0.00]	0.041* [0.024, 0.06]
Union member	-0.001 [-0.003, 0.00]	0.040* [0.023, 0.06]
Sold vote	0.001 [-0.001, 0.00]	0.039* [0.021, 0.05]
Father PJ	-0.000 [-0.003, 0.00]	0.039* [0.020, 0.05]
Father UCR	-0.001 [-0.003, 0.00]	0.039* [0.019, 0.05]

Note: Quasi-Bayesian confidence intervals in brackets. * $p < 0.05$

Source: APES 2015

Chapter 6: Explaining Support for the Incumbent in Presidential Elections

(by Carlos Gervasoni and María Laura Tagina)

Table 1: Summary Statistics (weighted)

Variable	Obs	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Vote for incumbent party candidate (wave 2)	668	0.512	0.500	0	1
Female	780	0.565	0.496	0	1
Age	780	45.2	16.9	18	91
Education	776	2.553	1.440	0	5
Wealth	780	3.097	1.454	1	5
PID Peronism	780	0.143	0.350	0	1
PID FPV	780	0.210	0.408	0	1
Economic ties to the state (wave 2)	780	0.231	0.336	0	1
Clientelism (wave 2)	773	0.020	0.141	0	1
Personal finances	776	0.476	0.341	0	1
National economy	774	0.453	0.221	0	1
Presidential approval	777	0.596	0.284	0	1
Issues K	711	0.663	0.203	0	1
Pro K media consumption	657	0.459	0.350	0.023	0.992

Notes: Unless otherwise noted, variables come from the first wave of the APES.

Table 2: Logit Models of Scioli Vote

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Long-term factors: Socio-demographic characteristics and political identities					
Female	0.096 (0.192)	0.148 (0.179)	0.137 (0.195)	0.296 (0.214)	0.237** (0.120)
Age	-0.005 (0.007)	-0.008 (0.007)	-0.005 (0.007)	-0.000 (0.006)	-0.000 (0.006)
Education	-0.127* (0.073)	-0.115* (0.069)	-0.099 (0.068)	-0.019 (0.081)	-0.029 (0.084)
Wealth	-0.219** (0.104)	-0.203* (0.110)	-0.169 (0.103)	-0.141 (0.120)	-0.192 (0.129)
PID Peronism		0.906** (0.428)	0.893** (0.415)	0.106 (0.391)	0.090 (0.364)
PID FPV		2.199*** (0.461)	2.210*** (0.459)	0.973** (0.473)	0.834* (0.469)
State dependence and clientelism					
Economic ties to the state (wave 2)			0.781*** (0.228)	0.598** (0.280)	0.844*** (0.302)
Clientelism (wave 2)			0.297 (0.893)	-0.002 (0.826)	1.291** (0.512)
Economic and government evaluations					
Personal finances				-0.552* (0.296)	-0.430 (0.387)
National economy				1.838*** (0.506)	1.673*** (0.612)
Presidential approval				3.437*** (0.538)	3.002*** (0.541)
Positional issues and media effects					
Issues K					0.501 (0.589)
Pro-K media consumption					0.914** (0.377)
Constant	1.25* (0.704)	0.699 (0.720)	0.211 (0.683)	-2.57*** (0.800)	-2.81*** (0.905)
Pseudo-R ²	0.031	0.142	0.153	0.261	0.284
AIC	901	803	791	688	538
Observations	665	665	660	649	511

Note: Values are unstandardized logit regression coefficients. Standard errors clustered by province are in parentheses.

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 3: Adding Ideology as an Independent Variable

Female	0.165 (0.212)
Age	-0.005 (0.007)
Education	-0.093 (0.090)
Wealth	-0.232** (0.115)
PID Peronism	1.109** (0.465)
PID FPV	2.315*** (0.518)
Ideology	0.432 (0.353)
Constant	0.307 (0.763)
<i>N</i>	551

Notes: Figures are unstandardized logit regression coefficients (standard errors clustered by province between parentheses). * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 4: Re-estimations on Model 5 Sample (N=511)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Female	-0.005 (0.134)	0.046 (0.121)	0.019 (0.108)	0.186 (0.131)	0.237** (0.120)
Age	-0.005 (0.007)	-0.008 (0.006)	-0.005 (0.006)	-0.001 (0.007)	-0.000 (0.006)
Education	-0.113 (0.074)	-0.123 (0.077)	-0.102 (0.082)	-0.041 (0.085)	-0.029 (0.084)
Wealth	-0.254** (0.108)	-0.242** (0.109)	-0.214** (0.108)	-0.189 (0.128)	-0.192 (0.129)
PID Peronism		0.933** (0.452)	0.906** (0.457)	0.138 (0.387)	0.090 (0.364)
PID FPV		2.269*** (0.586)	2.261*** (0.615)	1.032* (0.575)	0.834* (0.469)
Economic ties to state (W2)			0.918*** (0.243)	0.773*** (0.291)	0.844*** (0.302)
Clientelism (W2)			1.111 (0.749)	1.216*** (0.403)	1.291** (0.512)
Personal finances				-0.407 (0.421)	-0.430 (0.387)
National economy				1.759*** (0.621)	1.673*** (0.612)
Presidential approval				3.211*** (0.532)	3.002*** (0.541)
Issues K					0.501 (0.589)
Pro K media consumption					0.914** (0.377)
Constant	1.398** (0.569)	0.902* (0.537)	0.437 (0.535)	-2.191*** (0.702)	-2.813*** (0.905)
N	511	511	511	511	511

Notes: Figures are unstandardized logit regression coefficients (standard errors clustered by province between parentheses). * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 5: Logit Model of Presidential Vote for Sergio Massa

Female	-0.490** (0.207)
Age	0.003 (0.009)
Education	-0.256** (0.103)
Wealth	0.161 (0.126)
PID Peronism	1.344*** (0.485)
PID FPV	-0.350 (0.680)
Economic ties to state (W2)	-0.387 (0.467)
Clientelism (W2)	0.000 (0.000)
Personal finances	1.157** (0.581)
National economy	-2.658*** (0.599)
Presidential approval	-1.268 (0.850)
Issues K	-1.001 (1.277)
Pro K media consumption	-0.186 (0.422)
Constant	-0.073 (0.905)
<i>N</i>	502

Notes: Figures are unstandardized logit regression coefficients (standard errors clustered by province between parentheses). * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

Methodology and Results of the Media survey

Our measure of the political alignment of media outlets with respect to the national government of Cristina Kirchner was based on a survey of 32 experts on media and politics in Buenos Aires and most of the provinces covered by the APES sample. The questionnaire was administered by emails between February 18th and October 13th, 2016. Each media outlet was assigned the average score of all the experts that rated it. The question wording was as follows:

“Let's go back for a moment to November 2015, before the presidential ballot, when the country was still ruled by President Cristina Kirchner. Please, answer the following three questions thinking about then.”

- 1) “On a scale from 1 to 5 where "1" is very opposed to the national government and "5" very supportive, could you rate the following TV channels?” (list provided)
- 2) “On a scale from 1 to 5 where "1" is very opposed to the national government and "5" very supportive, could you rate the following NEWSPAPERS?” (list provided)
- 3) “On a scale from 1 to 5 where "1" is very opposed to the national government and "5" very supportive, could you rate the following RADIOS?” (list provided)

The following table presents results for the main media outlets classified by experts:

Table 6: Summary statistics of experts opinions about the position of media outlets regarding the national government headed by Cristina Fernández de Kirchner.

	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	N
Television					
TN	1.1	0.30	1	2	32
Channel 13	1.2	0.47	1	3	32
América	2.6	0.74	1	4	29
A24	2.6	0.58	2	4	25
Channel 26	2.9	0.77	1	4	27
Telefé	2.9	0.65	1	4	32
Channel 9	3.4	0.83	1	5	29
Crónica TV	3.7	0.68	3	5	27
C5N	4.5	0.72	2	5	32
Public TV	5.0	0.18	4	5	32
Newspapers					
Clarín	1.1	0.30	1	2	32
La Nación	1.3	0.51	1	3	32
La Voz del Interior (Córdoba)	1.7	0.70	1	3	16
Perfil	2.0	0.78	1	4	28
La Gaceta (Tucumán)	2.3	1.36	1	5	12
El Cronista	2.4	0.59	2	4	19
La Capital (Rosario)	2.6	0.79	1	4	12
Ámbito Financiero	2.9	1.09	1	5	27
Crónica	3.9	0.77	3	5	21
Tiempo Argentino	4.4	1.10	1	5	29
Página12	4.7	0.60	3	5	32
Radios					
Mitre	1.1	0.30	1	2	31
LV3 Cadena 3 (Córdoba)	1.4	0.67	1	3	11
Continental	2.8	0.81	1	4	21
Rivadavia	3.4	0.81	2	5	11
América	3.4	0.96	2	5	16
Radio 10	3.8	0.83	2	5	19
Del Plata	3.9	0.75	3	5	17
Nacional	4.7	0.92	1	5	20

Experts who responded to the survey (N=32): Carlos Fara (CABA), Philip Kitzberger (CABA), Fernando Ruiz (CABA), Ignacio Ramírez (CABA), Esteban Chércoles (CABA), Marina Acosta (CABA), Marisa Ramos (Córdoba), Adriana Amado (CABA), María Esperanza Casullo (Neuquén), Lucio Guberman (Santa Fe), Aníbal Gronda (Corrientes), Jorge Dell’Oro (CABA), Alejandro Belmonte (Mendoza), Eduardo Kinen (Santa Fe), Ernesto Rojas (Sgo del Estero), Gustavo Tarragona (Entre Ríos), Martha Ruffini (Buenos Aires), Osvaldo Meloni (Tucumán), Eliana Medvedev Luna (Río Negro), Marcelo Bonaldi (La Rioja), Osvaldo Iazzeta (Santa Fe), Valeria Brusco (Córdoba), Marcelo Nazareno (Córdoba), Hernán Campos (Sgo. Del Estero), María Mercedes Tenti (Sgo. Del Estero), Hernán Pose (Río Negro), Fabio Ladetto (Tucumán),

Atilio Santillán (Tucumán), Héctor Zimmerman (Corrientes), Mirta Merlo (Chaco), Marianela Pérez (Chaco), Gregorio Luis Miranda (Chaco).

Chapter 7: Macri's Mandate: Structural Reform or Better Performance? (by Luis Schiumerini)

Table 1: Vote Share in APES vs Electoral Results

Candidate	Primaries			First round			Second round		
	Panel	Refresh	Election	Panel	Refresh	Election	Panel	Refresh	Election
Macri	17.18	25.71	30.11	32.02	38.08	34.15	40.1	44.57	51.34
Scioli	61.06	52.24	38.67	54.17	50.83	37.08	59.9	55.43	48.66
Massa	9.69	8.98	14.33	9.41	7.21	21.39			
Stolbizer	2.38	2.86	3.47	1.37	1.48	2.51			
Rodríguez Saá	0.73	2.04	2.09	0.3	0.18	1.64			
Del Caño			1.67	2.73	2.03	3.23			
De la Sota	3.66	1.63	6.25						
Altamira	1.46	2.45	1.58						
Carrió	1.46	2.04	2.28						
Other	2.38	2.04		0.18					

Table 2: Full Results from Multinomial and Binary Logistic Models of Vote Choice

	First round				Second round		First round				Second round	
	Macri	Massa	Macri	Massa			Macri	Massa	Macri	Massa		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
<u>Performance evaluations</u>												
CFK	2.79**	2.83**	2.84**	3.11***	2.51**	2.47**						
Approval	(1.15)	(1.25)	(1.11)	(1.17)	(1.14)	(1.10)						
Economic							2.64**	2.34*	2.20**	1.99*	1.95*	2.32**
evaluations							(1.17)	(1.29)	(1.11)	(1.18)	(1.10)	(1.15)
<u>Economic preferences and ideology</u>												
Left-right	1.04	0.99			1.03		1.11	1.07				1.09
ideology	(1.06)	(1.11)			(1.06)		(1.06)	(1.10)				(1.06)
Statism			1.07	0.97		1.09			1.27	1.19	1.28	
index			(1.13)	(1.20)		(1.12)			(1.12)	(1.19)	(1.11)	
<u>Party ID</u>												
PRO-UCR	1.21	1.60	1.62	4.58**	1.54	2.48	1.49	1.93	1.96	5.68***	3.03*	1.82
	(2.33)	(3.56)	(1.86)	(2.06)	(2.24)	(1.78)	(2.31)	(3.50)	(1.83)	(2.01)	(1.75)	(2.22)
FPV-PJ	0.49	1.21	0.46	0.53	0.45	0.36	0.27	0.68	0.28	0.30	0.23	0.27
	(2.57)	(3.88)	(1.97)	(2.18)	(2.42)	(1.87)	(2.53)	(3.79)	(1.94)	(2.11)	(1.84)	(2.39)
<u>Demographic controls</u>												
Education	1.12	0.78	1.15	0.88	1.06	1.09	1.15	0.81	1.21	0.95	1.15	1.08
	(1.12)	(1.22)	(1.09)	(1.13)	(1.11)	(1.08)	(1.12)	(1.21)	(1.08)	(1.13)	(1.08)	(1.11)
Age	1.01	1.00	1.00	1.01	1.01	1.00	1.01	1.00	1.01	1.02	1.01	1.01
	(1.01)	(1.01)	(1.01)	(1.01)	(1.01)	(1.01)	(1.01)	(1.01)	(1.01)	(1.01)	(1.01)	(1.01)
Female	0.57	0.43	0.77	0.66	0.62	0.81	0.50	0.39	0.70	0.62	0.74	0.54
	(1.32)	(1.58)	(1.23)	(1.35)	(1.30)	(1.21)	(1.31)	(1.58)	(1.22)	(1.34)	(1.20)	(1.29)
Wealth	1.23	1.70	1.16	1.28	1.26	1.15	1.35	1.86	1.30	1.44	1.29	1.38
	(1.12)	(1.22)	(1.08)	(1.13)	(1.11)	(1.08)	(1.12)	(1.21)	(1.08)	(1.13)	(1.08)	(1.11)
Intercept	0.01	0.004	0.02	0.003	0.02	0.03	0.005	0.002	0.01	0.002	0.01	0.01
	(1.98)	(3.12)	(1.70)	(2.21)	(1.89)	(1.63)	(2.23)	(3.77)	(1.82)	(2.47)	(1.75)	(2.10)
N	521		622		507	604	520		622		604	506

Notes: Entries are odds ratios and standard errors (in parenthesis) from multinomial logistic or logistic regressions of vote choice on individual characteristics. The baseline category in all specifications is Scioli. The analysis only includes respondents who declare having voted for Macri, Massa or Scioli in the relevant round. * $p < .1$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$. Source: APES 2015.

Table 3: Two-Wave Tests Assessing Whether Performance Masks Ideology or Issue Positions.

	Dependent variable							
	<i>Economic evaluations (OLS)</i>		<i>First round vote choice</i>				<i>Second round vote choice</i>	
			Macri	Massa	Macri	Massa	Macri/Scioli	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<u><i>Economic preferences and ideology</i></u>								
Left-right ideology	0.97 (1.02)		0.97 (1.04)	0.90 (1.07)			0.96 (1.04)	
Statism index		1.07 (1.05)			1.30 (1.11)	1.20 (1.18)		1.30 (1.11)
<u><i>Party ID</i></u>								
PRO-UCR	1.52 (1.27)	1.38 (1.26)	2.44 (1.79)	4.63** (2.21)	2.40 (1.80)	7.01*** (1.97)	3.13* (1.74)	3.61** (1.73)
FPV-PJ	0.65 (1.30)	0.66 (1.28)	0.17 (1.92)	0.41 (2.30)	0.22 (1.90)	0.24 (2.07)	0.18 (1.84)	0.18 (1.81)
<u><i>Demographic controls</i></u>								
Education	1.00 (1.04)	1.04 (1.03)	1.14 (1.09)	0.92 (1.14)	1.23 (1.08)	0.95 (1.12)	1.09 (1.08)	1.17 (1.08)
Age	1.00 (1.00)	1.00 (1.00)	1.00 (1.01)	1.01 (1.01)	1.00 (1.01)	1.02 (1.01)	1.00 (1.01)	1.01 (1.01)
Female	1.24 (1.09)	1.22 (1.08)	0.84 (1.22)	0.49 (1.39)	0.86 (1.20)	0.72 (1.33)	0.83 (1.21)	0.88 (1.19)
Wealth	0.97 (1.03)	0.96 (1.03)	1.26 (1.08)	1.50 (1.14)	1.23 (1.08)	1.36 (1.12)	1.28 (1.08)	1.24 (1.07)
Intercept	32.92*** (1.23)	21.35*** (1.20)	0.26 (1.62)	0.06 (2.24)	0.11 (1.54)	0.03 (1.98)	0.32 (1.58)	0.12 (1.51)
N	520	622	520	520	622	622	520	622

Notes: Entries represent coefficients from linear regression in models 1 and 2 and odds ratios from multinomial logistic (3-6) and logistic (7 and 8) regressions. Standard errors (in parenthesis) from multinomial logistic or logistic regressions of vote choice on individual characteristics. The baseline category in all specifications is Scioli. The analysis only includes respondents who declare having voted for Macri, Massa or Scioli in the relevant round. * $p < .1$;

** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$

Source: APES 2015.

Table 4: Directional Classification of Parties' Positions.

Vote choice	Placement of PRO				Placement of FPV				Placement of PJ			
	Left	Center	Right	DK	Left	Center	Right	DK	Left	Center	Right	DK
All	24	15	47	14	31	20	36	13	24	22	41	12
Cambiamos	14	16	62	8	46	19	26	9	31	28	33	8
FPV	32	13	45	9	24	21	48	7	24	21	47	7
FR	26	18	47	9	39	18	35	9	14	30	47	9
	Placement of UCR				Placement of FR				Placement of FAP			
	Left	Center	Right	DK	Left	Center	Right	DK	Left	Center	Right	DK
All	24	15	47	14	31	20	36	13	24	22	41	12
Cambiamos	27	16	48	10	28	22	35	15	34	25	23	18
FPV	38	18	34	9	38	19	30	14	41	19	23	17
FR	31	26	33	10	20	29	39	12	40	22	22	16


Notes: This table uses a “directional” criterion to classify voters’ perceptions of the ideological space. It pools data from both survey waves to classify voter placements of each party by discrete ideological quadrants –ie: left, right or center. These percentages are not strictly comparable, for there are more categories available for right (6-10) and left (0-4) than for center, which corresponds to 5. It also shows the percentage of respondents who fail to place the parties. The classifications are presented for the full sample (“All voters”) as well as disaggregated by vote choice among supporters of the main three parties. There is fairly low proportion of respondents that fails to classify every political party. The most remarkable aspect is that a sizable share of respondents has an incorrect perception of the ideological placement of the main parties.

Table 5: Determinants of Effective Placements

	Placement of...					
	PRO	FPV	PJ	UCR	FR	FAP
FPV voter	0.002 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.03)
FR voter	-0.01 (0.03)	0.001 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.02 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)
Knowledge	0.04*** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.07*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)
PRO ID	-0.01 (0.07)	0.04 (0.06)	0.04 (0.06)	0.04 (0.07)	0.01 (0.08)	0.06 (0.09)
PJ ID	0.03 (0.07)	-0.04 (0.07)	-0.04 (0.07)	-0.03 (0.07)	0.01 (0.09)	-0.04 (0.09)
Education	0.01 (0.01)	0.01** (0.01)	0.01* (0.01)	0.01* (0.01)	-0.002 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Age	-0.0001 (-0.001)	0 (-0.001)	0.0001 (-0.001)	-0.0003 (-0.001)	-0.001 (-0.001)	-0.001 (-0.001)
Female	-0.03** (0.02)	-0.03* (0.02)	-0.03** (0.02)	-0.04** (0.02)	-0.04** (0.02)	-0.06** (0.02)
Intercept	0.81*** (0.04)	0.82*** (0.04)	0.82*** (0.04)	0.80*** (0.04)	0.74*** (0.05)	0.73*** (0.05)
N	1146	1146	1146	1146	1146	1146

Notes: Coefficients from OLS regression. Dependent variable is a binary measure coded 1 for respondents who volunteer a left-right placement for the relevant political party and zero otherwise.

Figure 1: Predicted Probability of Vote For Each Candidate by Job Approval of Cristina Fernández Evaluations, Ideology, and Issue Positions.




Notes: Each line denotes predicted probability of voting for the main presidential contenders as a function of evaluations of Cristina Fernández. Each row corresponds to one of the main presidential contenders. The different lines are estimated on different subsets of respondents on the basis of their issue positions (first column) or left-right placement (second column). Conservatives in solid red (minimum left-right placement or issue preferences), moderates in dashed blue (midpoint of left-right placement or issue preferences) and leftists in dotted green (minimum left-right placement or issue preferences). Predicted values derived from estimates from two-wave test model presented on columns 1-4 of Table 2. All control variables set at their means.

Source: APES 2015

Correcting for Differential Item Response

Chapter 7 discusses scaling techniques that can potentially correct differential item functioning (DIF) in the measures of ideological self-placement used in some models of vote choice and in the section assessing voters' perceptions about parties' placements on the left-right scale. DIF arises when voters' perceptions of external stimuli are distorted by different understandings of the latent space. Aldrich and McKelvey (1977) developed scaling methods to correct for DIF via value decomposition. The A-M method models the perceived location of political stimuli as a linear function of the true position of the stimuli, a slope or stretch term and an intercept or shift term. Figure 2 presents results from applying the A-M method.

Figure 2: Scaled Mean Voter Placements of Political Parties on a Left-Right Scale



Notes: Estimations relied on the **aldm** command included in the R **basicspace** package (Poole et al. 2016).

Figure A2 shows that scaling ideology by Aldrich-McKelvey's exaggerates the level of polarization and appears to pick up a government-opposition cleavage rather than one based on ideology. Another undesirable feature of the A-M results is that the scaled placements are highly sensitive to the stimuli set as an anchor. When FPV is set as the leftist stimuli, voters consider FPV and PJ as very far to the left, while placing all non-incumbent options at the center right. The exact reverse result arises when the center-left Progresistas is introduced as the leftist stimuli. The poor performance of A-M scaling likely occurs because these methods require accurate ordering of the stimuli so as to allow setting a leftist (or rightist) stimuli as anchor to guide the estimation. But this assumption is not met by the APES data –which neither matches nor totally challenges convention. The point estimates are almost identical when using blackbox scaling or the Bayesian extension of A-M (Hare et al. 2015).

Chapter 8: Dealigning Campaign Effects in Argentina in Comparative Perspective (by Kenneth F. Greene)

Table 1: A Model of Vote Choice in Mexico's Presidential Election, 2000

Variable	Labastida vs. Fox			Cárdenas vs. Fox		
	Coef	SE	Sig	Coef	SE	Sig
PAN ID, Feb	-1.48	0.48	***	-0.95	0.55	*
Δ PAN ID, Feb-July	-1.46	0.38	***	-1.32	0.44	***
PRD ID, Feb	3.51	0.37	***	-0.64	0.74	
Δ PRD ID, Feb-July	2.88	0.31	***	-0.98	0.69	
PRI ID, Feb	0.27	0.86		4.13	0.60	***
Δ PRI ID, Feb-July	0.02	0.72		3.01	0.47	***
Privatization policy preferences, Feb	-0.12	0.19		-0.28	0.26	
Δ Privatization policy preferences, Feb-July	-0.23	0.16		-0.19	0.21	
Democracy assessment, Feb	0.14	0.19		-0.16	0.23	
Δ Democracy assessment, Feb-July	0.11	0.15		-0.13	0.19	
Labastida (PRI) honesty, Feb	0.69	0.15	***	-0.12	0.18	
Δ Labastida (PRI) honesty, Feb-July	0.47	0.12	***	-0.10	0.13	
Fox (PAN) honesty, Feb	-0.73	0.16	***	-1.19	0.21	***
Δ Fox (PAN) honesty, Feb-July	-0.48	0.12	***	-0.53	0.15	***
Cárdenas (PRD) honesty, Feb	-0.03	0.14		0.94	0.20	***
Δ Cárdenas (PRD) honesty, Feb-July	-0.02	0.11		0.47	0.15	***
Retrospective evaluations, Feb	-0.11	0.17		0.28	0.20	
Δ Retrospective evaluations, Feb-July	-0.11	0.13		0.07	0.15	
Cárdenas probability of victory, April	0.01	0.01		-0.01	0.01	
Constant	-0.94	0.54		-1.16	0.67	

Notes: Multinomial regression models. The dependent variable is reported vote choice in the July survey. N = 932, pseudo-R² = 0.599. Fox is the excluded category. * p < .1, ** p < .05; *** p < .01, two-tailed tests.

Source: Greene (2015).

Table 2: A Model of Vote Choice in Mexico's Presidential Election, 2006

Variable	Madrazo vs. Calderón			López Obrador vs. Calderón		
	Coef	SE	Sig	Coef	SE	Sig
PAN ID, Oct	-1.84	0.96	**	-3.18	0.82	***
Δ PAN ID, Oct -July	-1.18	0.79		-2.93	0.72	***
PRD ID, Oct	1.49	1.29		2.45	0.99	**
Δ PRD ID, Oct -July	0.74	1.15		2.35	0.82	***
PRI ID, Oct	2.83	0.75	***	-1.35	0.95	
Δ PRI ID, Oct-July	3.01	0.72	***	-0.56	0.89	
Retrospective evaluations, Oct	-0.30	0.14	**	-0.31	0.14	**
Δ Retrospective evaluations, Oct-July	-0.47	0.17	***	-0.42	0.16	***
Economic policy preferences, Oct	0.18	0.13		0.04	0.12	
Δ Economic policy preferences, Oct-July	0.08	0.12		0.03	0.12	
Calderón (PAN) competence, Oct	-0.40	0.14	***	-0.32	0.14	**
Δ Calderón (PAN) competence, Oct-July	-0.23	0.12	*	-0.22	0.12	*
López Obrador (PRD) competence, Oct	0.08	0.12		0.71	0.14	***
Δ López Obrador (PRD) competence, Oct-July	0.00	0.11		0.55	0.11	***
Madrazo (PRI) competence, Oct	0.34	0.13	***	-0.02	0.12	
Δ Madrazo (PRI) competence, Oct-July	0.34	0.12	***	-0.07	0.11	
Madrazo probability of victory, Oct	1.15	1.87		0.86	2.17	
Δ Madrazo probability of victory, Oct-July	0.95	1.70		0.21	1.73	
Constant	-0.62	1.67		0.04	1.72	
% vote choices correctly predicted w/o campaign	69.9%					
% vote choices correctly predicted w/ campaign	89.3%					

Notes: The dependent variable is reported vote choice in the July survey. The percent correctly predicted without the campaign was generated by setting change scores to zero. The percent correctly predicted with the campaign from October to July was generated with the full model. Multinomial regression models. $N = 391$, pseudo- $r^2 = .695$. Calderón is the excluded category. * $p < .1$, ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$, two-tailed tests.

Source: Greene (2011, 2015).

Table 3: A Model of Vote Choice in Mexico's Presidential Election, 2012

Variable	Peña Nieto vs. Vásquez Mota			López Obrador vs. Vásquez Mota		
	Coef	SE	Sig	Coef	SE	Sig
PAN ID, April	-0.26	0.51		-0.57	0.59	
Δ PAN ID, April-July	-0.79	0.47	*	-1.07	0.50	**
PRD ID, April	0.87	0.80		1.92	0.73	***
Δ PRD ID, April-July	1.39	0.92		2.06	0.86	***
PRI ID, April	2.67	0.52	**	0.84	0.70	
			*			
Δ PRI ID, April-July	2.22	0.40	**	-0.48	0.54	
			*			
Economic policy preferences, April	0.09	0.10		-0.05	0.10	
Δ Economic policy preferences, April-July	0.14	0.08	*	0.05	0.10	
Vásquez Mota (PAN) competence, April	0.10	0.06	*	-0.23	0.06	****
Δ Vásquez Mota (PAN) competence, April-July	0.15	0.03	**	-0.13	0.05	***
			*			
López Obrador (PRD) competence, April	-0.01	0.05		0.50	0.07	***
Δ López Obrador (PRD) competence, April-July	-0.02	0.04		0.41	0.06	***
Peña Nieto (PRI) competence, April	-0.13	0.06	**	-0.29	0.07	***
Δ Peña Nieto (PRI) competence, April-July	-0.12	0.04	**	-0.22	0.05	***
			*			
Retrospective evaluations, April	-0.07	0.07		-0.05	0.07	
Δ Retrospective evaluations, April-July	-0.13	0.06	**	-0.03	0.08	
Drug war policy preferences, April	-0.09	0.08		-0.06	0.10	
Δ Drug war policy preferences, April-July	-0.03	0.10		0.04	0.09	
Vásquez Mota probability of victory, April	-0.15	0.66		0.69	0.73	
Constant	1.12	1.53		1.01	1.51	

Notes: Multinomial regression models using weights to adjust for demographics and panel-related attrition. Models use Taylor-linearized variance estimation. N = 724. Vásquez Mota is the excluded category. * p < .1, ** p < .05; *** p < .01, two-tailed tests.

Source: Greene (2015).

Table 4: Types of Campaign Effects in Mexico's Presidential Elections, 2000-2012

Panel Wave 1 vote intention	July vote choice			
	Consistent with pre-campaign dispositions		Inconsistent with pre-campaign dispositions	
Consistent with pre-campaign dispositions	<i>Reinforcement (home)</i>		<i>Conversion away</i>	
	2000	58.4	2000	14.8
	2006	59.3	2006	13.6
	2012	37.3	2012	17.0
	<i>Conversion home</i>		<i>Reinforcement (away)</i>	
	2000	5.8	2000	10.5
Inconsistent with pre-campaign dispositions	2006	5.9	2006	10.5
	2012	6.1	2012	17.2
Undecided	<i>Activation</i>		<i>Partial conversion</i>	
	2000	7.2	2000	3.3
	2006	5.9	2006	4.8
	2012	10.3	2012	12.1

Source: Greene (2011, 2015).

Chapter 10: Voter Perceptions of Ballot Integrity and Clientelism (by Virginia Oliveros)

Table 1: List Experiment Estimates

	All Respondents		Panel Respondents	
	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 1	Wave 2
Treatment	2.22 (0.04) N=583	2.61 (0.04) N=702	2.24 (0.05) N=396	2.60 (0.05) N=389
Control	2.11 (0.04) N=547	2.46 (0.04) N=623	2.08 (0.05) N=370	2.47 (0.05) N=349
Estimated Proportion	0.11* (0.06)	0.15*** (0.05)	0.17*** (0.07)	0.14** (0.07)
Total N	1130	1325	766	738

Notes: Two-sample t-tests with unequal variance. Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 2: Individual Determinants of Personal and Neighborhood Clientelism (Wave 1)

	Personal Clientelism		Neighborhood Clientelism	
Scioli Primary (1=Scioli)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.04 (0.04)	0.06 (0.04)
Female (1=Female)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.04 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)
Age (1-5)	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.03** (0.01)	-0.03** (0.01)
Education (0-5)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
Relative Wealth (1-5)	-0.01** (0.00)	-0.01** (0.00)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
Knowledge (0-3)		-0.01 (0.01)		-0.01 (0.02)
Ballot secrecy (1=Yes)		-0.01 (0.01)		-0.11*** (0.04)
Constant	0.11*** (0.02)	0.12*** (0.03)	0.44*** (0.07)	0.51*** (0.07)
Observations	1,082	1,052	892	869
R-squared	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.03

Notes: All models were estimated using weights for gender, age, and education. Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Results from logit models were essentially equivalent so OLS is used for simplicity.

Table 3: Individual Determinants of Personal and Neighborhood Clientelism (Wave 2)

	Personal Clientelism		Neighborhood Clientelism	
Scioli Ballotage (1=Scioli)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.03 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)
Female (1=Female)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)
Age (1-5)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)
Education (0-5)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)
Relative Wealth (1-5)	-0.01** (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.03** (0.01)	-0.02* (0.01)
Knowledge (0-3)		-0.01** (0.00)		-0.04*** (0.02)
Ballot secrecy (1=Yes)		0.01 (0.01)		-0.02 (0.03)
Constant	0.05*** (0.02)	0.06*** (0.02)	0.33*** (0.06)	0.37*** (0.06)
Observations	1,256	1,229	1,007	991
R-squared	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.02

Notes: All models were estimated using weights for gender, age, and education. Robust standard errors in parentheses
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Results from logit models were essentially equivalent so OLS is used for simplicity.

Table 4: Individual Determinants of Clientelism, List Experiment Estimates (Wave 1)

		Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Control List	Treatment	0.07 (0.08)	0.36 (0.22)	0.40* (0.22)	0.38 (0.23)
	Scioli Primary (1=Scioli)	0.17** (0.08)	0.23*** (0.08)	0.21*** (0.08)	0.20*** (0.08)
	Female (1=Female)		-0.06 (0.08)	-0.04 (0.08)	-0.03 (0.08)
	Age (1-5)		0.03 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)
	Education (0-5)		0.11*** (0.03)	0.08** (0.03)	0.08** (0.03)
	Relative Wealth (1-5)		0.11*** (0.03)	0.09*** (0.03)	0.08** (0.03)
	Knowledge (0-3)			0.18*** (0.04)	0.18*** (0.04)
	Ballot secrecy (1=Yes)				0.01 (0.09)
Treatment list	Scioli (1=Scioli)	0.11 (0.12)	0.10 (0.11)	0.10 (0.11)	0.14 (0.11)
	Female (1=Female)		-0.26** (0.12)	-0.25** (0.12)	-0.26** (0.12)
	Age (1-5)		-0.00 (0.04)	0.00 (0.04)	0.00 (0.04)
	Education (0-5)		0.02 (0.05)	0.04 (0.05)	0.03 (0.05)
	Relative Wealth (1-5)		-0.07 (0.05)	-0.06 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.05)
	Knowledge (0-3)			-0.09 (0.06)	-0.09 (0.06)
	Ballot secrecy (1=Yes)				-0.03 (0.13)
	Constant	2.15*** (0.06)	1.38*** (0.15)	1.31*** (0.15)	1.33*** (0.16)
	Observations	1,090	1,084	1,084	1,054
	R-squared	0.02	0.11	0.13	0.13

Notes: OLS regressions with the list experiment counts as dependent variables estimated using weights for gender, age, and education. Treatment list: covariates interacted with treatment assignment (these coefficients estimate clientelism). Control list: Non-interacted coefficients predict answers to the control list. Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 5: Individual Determinants of Clientelism, List Experiment Estimates (Wave 2)

		Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Control List	Treatment	0.13 (0.08)	0.26 (0.22)	0.23 (0.23)	0.26 (0.25)
	Scioli Ballotage (1=Scioli)	-0.08 (0.08)	-0.02 (0.08)	-0.05 (0.08)	-0.06 (0.08)
	Female (1=Female)		-0.01 (0.08)	0.04 (0.08)	0.05 (0.08)
	Age (1-5)		0.00 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)
	Education (0-5)		0.05 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.02 (0.04)
	Relative Wealth (1-5)		0.09*** (0.03)	0.07* (0.03)	0.07* (0.04)
	Knowledge (0-3)			0.15*** (0.04)	0.15*** (0.04)
	Ballot secrecy (1=Yes)				-0.06 (0.09)
Treatment list	Scioli (1=Scioli)	0.00 (0.11)	-0.00 (0.11)	0.02 (0.11)	0.03 (0.11)
	Female (1=Female)		-0.07 (0.11)	-0.10 (0.11)	-0.13 (0.11)
	Age (1-5)		0.01 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)
	Education (0-5)		-0.04 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.05)
	Relative Wealth (1-5)		0.00 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.05)
	Knowledge (0-3)			0.00 (0.06)	0.02 (0.06)
	Ballot secrecy (1=Yes)				-0.09 (0.13)
	Constant	2.57*** (0.06)	2.09*** (0.15)	1.98*** (0.16)	2.05*** (0.17)
	Observations	1,220	1,208	1,208	1,181
	R-squared	0.01	0.04	0.06	0.06

Notes: OLS regressions with the list experiment counts as dependent variables estimated using weights for gender, age, and education. Treatment list: covariates interacted with treatment assignment (these coefficients estimate clientelism). Control list: Non-interacted coefficients predict answers to the control list. Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 6: Individual Determinants of Beliefs about Ballot Secrecy (Wave 1)

	General Perception			Personal Experience		
Scioli Primary (1=Scioli)	0.16*** (0.03)	0.16*** (0.03)	0.14*** (0.03)	0.15*** (0.03)	0.15*** (0.03)	0.16*** (0.04)
Female (1=Female)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.00 (0.04)	-0.00 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.01 (0.04)
Age by Groups (1-5)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
Education (0-5)	-0.03** (0.01)	-0.03** (0.01)	-0.03** (0.01)	-0.03** (0.01)	-0.03** (0.01)	-0.03* (0.02)
Relative Wealth (1-5)	0.03** (0.01)	0.03** (0.01)	0.03** (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)
Knowledge (0-3)	0.04*** (0.02)	0.05*** (0.02)	0.06*** (0.02)	0.04** (0.02)	0.04** (0.02)	0.05** (0.02)
Personal Clientelism (1=Yes)		-0.04 (0.08)	0.05 (0.08)		-0.08 (0.08)	-0.01 (0.08)
Neighborhood Clientelism (1=Yes)			-0.12*** (0.04)			-0.15*** (0.04)
Constant	0.50*** (0.06)	0.51*** (0.06)	0.55*** (0.07)	0.67*** (0.06)	0.69*** (0.06)	0.75*** (0.07)
Observations	1,063	1,052	862	1,012	1003	838
R-squared	0.05	0.05	0.06	0.04	0.04	0.06

Notes: All models were estimated using weights for gender, age, and education. Robust standard errors in parentheses
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Results from logit models were essentially equivalent so OLS is used for simplicity.

Table 7: Individual Determinants of Beliefs about Ballot Secrecy (Wave 2)

	General Perception			Personal Experience		
Scioli Ballotage (1=Scioli)	0.04 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.04)
Female (1=Female)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)
Age by Groups (1-5)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)
Education (0-5)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Relative Wealth (1-5)	-0.03** (0.01)	-0.03*** (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.03** (0.01)	-0.03** (0.01)	-0.02* (0.01)
Knowledge (0-3)	0.05*** (0.02)	0.05*** (0.02)	0.04** (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)
Personal Clientelism (1=Yes)		0.07 (0.09)	0.09 (0.10)		-0.16 (0.11)	-0.10 (0.12)
Neighborhood Clientelism (1=Yes)			-0.03 (0.04)			-0.10** (0.04)
Constant	0.76*** (0.06)	0.76*** (0.06)	0.71*** (0.07)	0.79*** (0.06)	0.79*** (0.06)	0.74*** (0.07)
Observations	1,239	1,229	984	1,213	1,204	958
R-squared	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.02

Notes: All models were estimated using weights for gender, age, and education. Robust standard errors in parentheses
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Results from logit models were essentially equivalent so OLS is used for simplicity.

Chapter 11: Conclusion: The Significance of Unmoored Voters (by Elizabeth J. Zechmeister)

Table 1: Predictors of Democratic Satisfaction (all 18 countries)

Switch Side	-0.006 (0.005)
Exit	-0.056*** (0.005)
Not Vote	-0.025*** (0.004)
Urban	-0.023*** (0.004)
Woman	-0.007** (0.003)
Age	0.006 (0.006)
Education	-0.043*** (0.008)
Wealth	-0.011** (0.005)
Constant	0.480*** (0.011)
<i>N</i>	23,371

Notes: Values represent coefficient estimates from a linear regression model using the `svy` command in Stata. Dummy variables for countries not shown.

* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 2: Predictors of Internal Political Efficacy in Compulsory Voting Countries

Switch Side	-0.016*
	(0.010)
Exit	-0.073***
	(0.008)
Not Vote	-0.023***
	(0.009)
Urban	-0.010
	(0.010)
Woman	0.001
	(0.006)
Age	0.020*
	(0.010)
Education	-0.006
	(0.014)
Wealth	-0.009
	(0.010)
Constant	0.348***
	(0.018)
<i>N</i>	12,096

Notes: Values represent coefficient estimates from a linear regression model using the *svy* command in Stata. Dummy variables for countries not shown.

* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 3: Predictors of External Political Efficacy in Compulsory Voting Countries

Switch Side	-0.011 (0.008)
Exit	-0.046*** (0.008)
Not Vote	-0.033*** (0.007)
Urban	0.029*** (0.008)
Woman	-0.072*** (0.005)
Age	0.087*** (0.009)
Education	0.221*** (0.013)
Wealth	0.045*** (0.009)
Constant	0.301*** (0.016)
<i>N</i>	12,159

Notes: Values represent coefficient estimates from a linear regression model using the *svy* command in Stata. Dummy variables for countries not shown.

* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 4: Predictors of Democratic Satisfaction in Compulsory Voting Countries

Switch Side	-0.021*** (0.006)
Exit	-0.064*** (0.006)
Not Vote	-0.028*** (0.006)
Urban	-0.028*** (0.007)
Woman	-0.006 (0.004)
Age	-0.001 (0.004)
Education	-0.043*** (0.011)
Wealth	-0.005 (0.007)
Constant	0.487*** (0.013)
<i>N</i>	12,036

Notes: Values represent coefficient estimates from a linear regression model using the *svy* command in Stata. Dummy variables for countries not shown.

* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 5: Predictors of Internal Political Efficacy in Non-Compulsory Voting Countries

Switch Side	-0.026*** (0.009)
Exit	-0.078*** (0.010)
Not Vote	-0.043*** (0.008)
Urban	-0.009 (0.010)
Woman	-0.014** (0.006)
Age	0.030*** (0.011)
Education	-0.042*** (0.015)
Wealth	-0.021** (0.011)
Constant	0.418*** (0.017)
<i>N</i>	11,460

Notes: Values represent coefficient estimates from a linear regression model using the *svy* command in Stata. Dummy variables for countries not shown.

* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 6: Predictors of External Political Efficacy in Non-Compulsory Voting Countries

Switch Side	-0.034*** (0.008)
Exit	-0.085*** (0.010)
Not Vote	-0.074*** (0.007)
Urban	0.015* (0.008)
Woman	-0.080*** (0.005)
Age	0.041*** (0.010)
Education	0.170*** (0.013)
Wealth	0.044*** (0.009)
Constant	0.374*** (0.013)
<i>N</i>	11,462

Notes: Values represent coefficient estimates from a linear regression model using the *svy* command in Stata. Dummy variables for countries not shown.

* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 7: Predictors of Democratic Satisfaction in Non-Compulsory Voting Countries

Switch Side	0.007 (0.006)
Exit	-0.047*** (0.007)
Not Vote	-0.021*** (0.006)
Urban	-0.018*** (0.006)
Woman	-0.008* (0.004)
Age	0.012 (0.008)
Education	-0.044*** (0.011)
Wealth	-0.016** (0.007)
Constant	0.55*** (0.011)
<i>N</i>	11,335

Notes: Values represent coefficient estimates from a linear regression model using the *svy* command in Stata. Dummy variables for countries not shown.

* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 8: Predictors of Internal Political Efficacy in Argentina (AmericasBarometer '14)

Urban	-0.103 (0.066)
Female	-0.006 (0.019)
Age	0.080** (0.032)
Education	0.080 (0.053)
Wealth	0.006 (0.032)
Not Vote	0.005 (0.030)
Exit	-0.035 (0.039)
Switch Side	0.007 (0.033)
Constant	0.419*** (0.077)
<i>N</i>	1,149

Notes: Values represent coefficient estimates from a linear regression model using the *svy* command in Stata.

* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 9: Predictors of External Political Efficacy in Argentina (AmericasBarometer '14)

Urban	0.012 (0.050)
Female	-0.075*** (0.017)
Age	0.157*** (0.030)
Education	0.269*** (0.045)
Wealth	0.126*** (0.032)
Not Vote	0.003 (0.020)
Exit	-0.014 (0.031)
Switch Side	0.046* (0.025)
Constant	-0.243*** (0.062)
<i>N</i>	1,149

Notes: Values represent coefficient estimates from a linear regression model using the *svy* command in Stata.

* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 10: Predictors of Internal Efficacy in Argentina (APES)

Switch Side	0.069 (0.124)
Exit	0.489 (0.423)
Not Voted	-0.106 (0.103)
Female	-0.059 (0.081)
Age	-0.002 (0.003)
Education	0.109*** (0.034)
Wealth	0.310 (0.202)
Constant	-0.187** (0.905)
<i>N</i>	968

Notes: Values represent coefficient estimates from an OLS model. Dummy variables for regions not shown.
 * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

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