State Institutions, Civic Associations, and Identity Demands
EMERGING DEMOCRACIES

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Dan Slater is James Orin Murfin Professor of Political Science and Director, Center for Emerging Democracies
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Introduction

Amy H. Liu and Joel Sawat Selway

Southeast Asia has been home to some of the world’s bloodiest separatist conflicts. Myanmar alone has the most simultaneous ongoing civil wars; it also has the longest ongoing conflict between the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) and the Myanmar government. Beyond Myanmar, in other parts of the region, violent ethnoregional movements continue to rage, from Western Papua (Irian Jaya) in Indonesia to Mindanao in the Philippines to the Malay-Muslim provinces of Thailand’s Deep South. Meanwhile, numerous other ethnic insurgencies across Southeast Asia have dissipated, been crushed, or been resolved, such as the Hmong guerrilla resistance in Laos and the Timorese insurgency in Indonesia.

At the same time, peaceful separatist movements also abound across Southeast Asia. In the Cordillera region of the Philippines, the government made provisions on two separate occasions for referendums on regional autonomy, though the proposal failed both times. In the Lanna region of Thailand, peaceful movements for separatism appeared briefly in 2013–14, characterized by small protests and banners being hung from bridges. In Malaysia, organizations like the Sarawak Association for Peoples’ Aspiration and the Borneo Heritage Foundation advocate for independence. And in Vietnam, the Khmer Krom and Montagnards have proposed independent states.

Some of these separatist movements have links to regional political parties. However, regional parties that champion regional interests—without advocating for separatism—are even more numerous. Examples include...
the majority of Sabah and Sarawak parties in East Malaysia. Despite their history with armed insurgent groups, many ethnic parties in Myanmar today are not demanding independence. The Mon Unity Party, for example, advocates for the representation of Mon cultural interests. This was the case both before and after the coup. Most Acehnese parties in Indonesia (Aceh being the only region not held to the national party registration requirements) likewise do not advocate for separatism. Relatedly, there are sharp divides between the North and the South in Taiwan and Thailand—with parties essentially representing one particular region even if they do not have the region in their name.

Lastly, most regions across Southeast Asia have experienced no regional movements at all. In Thailand, the Pak Tai region (South), Khorat region, and Northern Khmer area (Buriram, Sisaket, and Surin) have made no agitations; even the Isan region has had nothing as open as the separatist activities in Lanna in 2013–14. In Malaysia, Johor, Kedah, Negeri Sembilan, and Terengganu—all of which speak different vernaculars within the Malay language family—have witnessed no movements, just whispers of rumors from time to time. The same goes for the majority of the regions in the vast and diverse archipelagos of Indonesia and the Philippines. The north, central, and southern regional divides of Laos and Vietnam—despite significant historical differences, distinct cultural heritage, and clear factions within the Communist parties of their respective countries—have experienced no regional movements. Cambodia has also notably been absent from any discussion of regionalized political movements thus far.

In short, we see a remarkable amount of diversity in regional political movements across Southeast Asia, ranging from (1) nothing at all in the majority of regions to (2) the formation of regional parties targeting group-based interests, from (3) parties explicitly advocating for autonomy or independence to (4) movements inciting violent separatist rebellions. What explains why identity-based political demands emerge in some regions but not others? How do these demands transform into political movements? And what explains the form these regional movements take?

Regions, Regionalism, and Regional Movements

In this book, we use the term region as the unit of analysis rather than “ethnic group” for several reasons. First, “ethnic group” is a broader term used in the discipline to identify a group with a “myth of collective ancestry” (Horowitz 1985). This can include groups based on race, language,
religion, and region. Thus, regional groups are just one type of ethnic group. While regional groups often are differentiated by other characteristics as well, not all ethnic groups are defined by a geographic region. Many ethnic groups are not geographically concentrated—for example, the Chinese in Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia (Liu and Ricks 2022). Note that our research question is on the mobilization of nationalist causes, which by definition is political control (sovereignty) by a geographically defined territorial group—that is, a region (Gellner 1983). Thus, it makes no theoretical sense for all ethnic groups to be in our universe of cases. Instead, we should only examine the geographically concentrated ones. To consider ethnic groups regardless of their spatial spread artificially inflates the number of null cases.

Second, it is sometimes the case that regional groups are not considered ethnic until they have engaged in identity-based violence. In the United States, for example, most regions are not considered ethnic groups. Yet, if we were to consider which regions are possibly ethnic, we suspect many would say “the South” or “Texas”—based precisely on their history of secessionism and a strong cultural identity. This definitional trap is precisely what we want to avoid. Not all geographically concentrated ethnic groups turn to separatism. To consider ethnic groups only when they have mobilized ignores the null cases to the detriment of theory.

Third, it is also sometimes the case that regional movements are diverse but share one common denominator. The chapter on North Myanmar shows that the regional movement—composed of multiple linguistic groups—has mobilized under a larger Kachin identity. Yet ironically, because the identity has mobilized via the Kachin Baptist Church network, it has been so broad that the ethnic identity borders on being meaningless. Put differently, it is also possible that what would otherwise look like a monolithic ethnic movement is scuppered by the fact that the region itself is internally diverse on another dimension—as was the case of South Maluku in Indonesia. To consider only ethnic groups, then, fails to theoretically acknowledge the internal diversity of regions and the political process by which they form broader ethnic identities within the region, a process of which the conclusion is not foregone.

Finally, it is also possible that ethnic identities are endogenous to the region. It is only after the process of mobilizing for regional autonomy that a distinct ethnic identity emerges. An example of this is in the South Philippines. While there was a large Muslim population even during the Spanish period, the ethnoreligious identity did not manifest until after
independence. To consider only ethnic groups risks empirically truncating the mobilization process. In short, we believe region is theoretically and empirically the most appropriate unit of analysis.

We use the term **regionalism** to refer to the politicization of one’s regional identity. We treat region as distinct from linguistic identity, both of which can be treated as a subset of the broader way in which social scientists define ethnicity—that is, an “identity categor[y] in which membership is determined by attributes associated with, or believed to be associated with, descent” (Chandra 2006, 397). The key difference between region and language dimensions of ethnicity is, of course, the necessity of association with a place of origin. In other words, there is a geographic area that determines membership in the ethnic group. This definition, however, begs conceptual clarification due to the ex post nature in which scholars routinely treat politicized regional activity. Virtually every study on secessionism—whether it is violent separatism or peaceful independence movements—examines regions in which these phenomena have already manifested. Moreover, this literature almost exclusively treats the ethnic group as the unit of analysis. However, the very identification of a region as an ethnic group is often determined by virtue of the fact that they have made calls for independence.

Consider Thailand, for example. Thailand is generally divided into five cultural regions. There is Central Thailand and four periphery regions: North, Northeast, South, and Extreme South. While there is a huge literature on the civil war in the Extreme South, it is devoid of comparison to the other regions because of its “ethnic distinctiveness.” Indeed, the Extreme South is often labeled the Malay-Muslim region. Similarly, in the post-2001 election era—after intense protest activities unfolded throughout the Northeast region—people began labeling the Northeast region as the Isan or Thai-Lao region with a common explanation for the social unrest emphasizing linguistic distance between the Lao and Thai speakers. Then in early 2014, as protesters hung separatist banners from bridges in the North region, scholars suddenly “discovered” the Lanna ethnic group and its long history of separateness from historic “Thai” states. Thus far, the South has not been depicted so much in ethnic terms. This is not because of a lack of ethnic distinctiveness. In fact, the linguistic distance between Southern Thai and Central Thai is just as large as that between the Isan (Northeast) and Lanna (North) groups. Instead, the absence of any ethnic overtones is because the region has been largely on the same political side as the Central Thais.
In short, there is a tendency among scholars to consider a region as an ethnic group only when we witness a politicized identity. We need an empirical strategy that is free of this and the other selection biases outlined above. Specifically, we need to be able to identify ex ante which areas of land constitute a region. On the one hand, if we go too micro—for example, a city block—we are left with an infinite number of regions that give us no analytical traction. On the other hand, if we go too macro—for example, the river delta—we risk having regions that have no substantive meaning. In short, we must find some middle ground between these two extremes. But we must do so while avoiding selecting “obvious” regions where there is perceived cultural uniqueness and/or politicized regional identity.

Let us walk through an exercise as an example. In Malaysia, the East-West divide is a commonly cited geographical classification. East Malaysia is the northern part of the island of Borneo, separated by hundreds of miles from West Malaysia—a narrow strip of peninsular land extending from Thailand in the north to Singapore in the south. Government statistics are routinely calculated comparing these two areas. In East Malaysia, we have seen some political movements advocating independence, not just separately for Sabah and Sarawak—that is, the two provinces there based on historic ethnolinguistic groups—but for the entire land mass. However, to date, we have not seen such appeals based on the entirety of the more populous West Malaysia.

This raises the question of whether there is a West Malaysian regional identity. On the one hand, if we dismiss West Malaysia as a region, this brings us back to East Malaysia: Why is Sabah and Sarawak lumped together as one region? On the other hand, if we do think of West Malaysia as a region, it also ignores how the peninsula itself was divided by states based on historic, politically independent sultanates. And each one of these states constitutes a regional identity in much the same way that Sabah and Sarawak do.

And as it turns out, this discussion is not specific to the East-West divide. We see the same issue with other aggregations between single states and the entire peninsula. For example, we can talk about a Northern Peninsula Malaysia collectively: Kedah, Kelantan, and Terengganu. But does the north also include Penang? While Penang is in the north, it is different in ethnic and religious makeup, voting patterns, and history of incorporation by the British. So, if we exclude Penang and leave it as its own region, this forces us to justify why Kelantan, Terengganu, and Kedah—three separate states—are lumped together as one. In short,
what we see here is that the number of potential arrangements based on purely geographic space is infinite.

This is problematic. If we are interested in why some regions develop movements but others do not, we need to be clear on the universe of cases. Imagine if we had drawn four concentric circles from the geographic center of Malaysia and called each area a region. Not only would these regions be theoretically irrelevant, but empirically they would also be an empty set: There is no evidence or belief of association. One way to scale back the list of possible regions is to emphasize a key part of the definition: an attribute associated with, or believed to be associated with, descent.

Here, we use the term “descent” to distinguish this from selection based on ethnicity in its traditional sense. Many regions have strong identities that they would feel uncomfortable labeling an ethnic identity. Take the region of Western Thailand. This region was centered on the city-state of Phetchaburi, which maintained high levels of autonomy within Siam. Linguistically, they have a local variant of Central Thai. However, religiously and administratively they were closely aligned with the Siamese center of power. The very suggestion to people in this region that they are of a different ethnicity than those in Bangkok (the capital) would seem preposterous. Nevertheless, at some base level they identify with the idea of a Western Thai region; they recognize descent from a particular set of provinces and kinship groups within those provinces. It is precisely regions like this that get lost in an ethnically focused selection strategy. And it is possible that the likes of Western Thailand represent the majority of regions in the world, but theoretically we ignore them.

Association with descent based strictly on geography is rare. This is in part because there are often other identity attributes associated with the area—whether it is language, history (i.e., political autonomy), color, race, tribe, nationality, religion, socioeconomic status, or even partisan support. Consider the regional identities in Northeast Malaysia or South Taiwan. Both areas have long been associated politically with the political opposition. While the key is to establish association with descent based on region of origin, such claims may be hard to separate from other identity attributes. Note, however, that it is not necessary for this project that we isolate the different markers as long as the region remains the focus of the theory.

Let us return to our regions of Malaysia. While it would be difficult to classify West Malaysia—in aggregate—as a regional category, it is not wholly impossible. We could argue there is a peninsular identity based on
class (it is more metropolitan and has higher levels of wealth); likewise, a case could be made on language, race, and/or religion. What we would need is to be able to demonstrate that the peninsular identity is meaningful in some way. Here, the best evidence, though extremely weak, is to turn to linguists’ categorization of peninsular Malay languages/dialects as distinct from the Bumiputera languages on East Malaysia. Having met our minimal definition of region, however, it then becomes an empirical question why a West Malaysian identity has failed to be politically mobilized.

We can make a better case for Northeast Malaysia (minus Penang). The three states in this region (Kedah, Kelantan, and Terengganu) have a shared history as a part of the Siamese Kingdom. And as a result, their vernaculars—while each different—have Thai linguistic influences. Likewise, their brand of Islam is more conservative. And finally, they share similar voting behavior: This region is a stronghold for the Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS).

Alternatively, a strong case can be made for looking at the individual states as regions. After all, each state has its own unique Malay language, independent political histories, and associated cultures. This strategy is certainly easy and consistent; after all, every country (with the exception of Singapore) has subnational states/provinces. The challenge, however, is that these subnational states could very well be the endogenous product of some political processes—for example, tax collecting purposes.

In sum, while we may be able to identify conceivable regions at different levels of aggregation, the region must possess a minimal level of descent-based identity. Given the preceding discussion, in this volume we conduct our selection process using the most exogenous approach possible. First, we take existing lists of ethnic groups in each country and eliminate those that are not geographically concentrated. This gives us most of our groups in Indonesia, whose fairly unique archipelagic structure tends to be an exception to many of the selection biases discussed above. Next, we append to this list regional groups. We consider geographic areas in each of the nine cardinal regions in each country: north, northeast, east, southeast, south, southwest, west, northwest, and center. This is just our starting population of possible regional groups. We seek to identify some minimally verifiable basis of a regional identity, which is often related to the existence of a historic political center in the region. Where we find evidence of a regional identity, we keep it; where we do not, we remove it—leaving us with what is our working list. Note that strength of identity is not an attribute of
inclusion. Moreover, we allow regional identities to overlap; for example, Western Thais are part of the larger Central Thai region as well. We discuss our empirical strategy in greater detail below.

Given this strategy, we end up covering a variety of regions. Our sample includes an ethnoreligious region in North Sulawesi, Indonesia (Minahasan); a historical ethnonational region in South Malaysia (Singapore); an ethnoracial region in North Myanmar (Kachin); and an ethnolinguistically homogeneous region in South Taiwan. With a definition of regionalism not determined by saliency, we can select different regions in which political movements do not emerge—enabling us to build theories on regional saliency and identity politicization.

What Do We Know about Regional Movements?

There has been a lot of work done on regions that have developed movements at the extreme: violent separatist groups. The same, however, cannot be said for movements somewhere in the middle—and certainly not the case for movements that have had no identity-based demands whatsoever. In the remainder of this section, we review the literature both specific to Southeast Asia and to comparative politics more generally.

Regional Movements in Southeast Asia

Most qualitative analyses of separatist movements focus on the cases where demands are already widespread and where significant action has been taken. All the literature on separatism in Southeast Asia falls under this label. The majority of the analyses tend to focus on one single group within the country—for example, the Acehnese in Indonesia or the Moros in the Philippines. And as such, this body of scholarship is dominated by country-level units of analysis (e.g., Brown and Ganguly 2003). What this means is that explanations tend to also be at the national level.

Consider one such explanation, government ideology. Liow (2016) argues that the violence we see in Southern Thailand is because of the government’s refusal to recognize the Malay language. The refusal is because accommodation would otherwise conflict with how the government envisions the nation: one that necessarily includes the periphery. In contrast, Malaysia expanded its conceptualization of the dominant ethnic group, Bumiputera, to include those in East Malaysia, other indigenous populations, and non-Malay groups such as the Kedah Thais. This accommoda-
tion has translated into limited conflicts. Another country-level explanation focuses on the weakness of the state. Tarling argues that when states are politically stable, “citizens daily live a connection with the material rewards of their imagined community” (2004, 14). There is no reason for separatism. Weak development, however, creates fertile conditions for separatist demands.

Not all explanations are at the country level. For example, Bertrand and Laliberté (2010) look at international-level dynamics. They argue that colonialism created arbitrary boundaries that have made some subnational movements inevitable. Likewise, the Cold War, regional rivalries among the major powers, and the War on Terror have also contributed to why violent separatist conflicts emerge. While these aforementioned volumes are insightful, the focus at the country or international level does not give us the requisite leverage to explain why some regions but not others experience movements—let alone why only some regional movements evolve into violent rebellions.

Reid’s *Imperial Alchemy: Nationalism and Political Identity in Southeast Asia* (2010) is the only volume we are aware of that undertakes analysis at the subnational level comparing groups within the same country. He examines why the Acehnese—but not the Bataks—have engaged in separatist violence in Indonesia. Both groups are geographically concentrated. Yet, the Bataks have been much more mobile in the post-independence era, being transformed into “predominately urban and diasporic communities, for whom regional or ethnic separateness is no longer imaginable.” Conversely, the Acehnese have remained isolated in the northwest edge of the archipelago—where the “memory of the state” remains strong. To this end, Reid’s approach comes closest to ours. Not only does he focus on groups rather than countries, but he also includes groups with varying levels of ethnic salience.

Nevertheless, we depart from Reid in several respects. First, Reid’s focus on ethnic groups assumes a different universe of cases that potentially includes groups that are geographically dispersed (e.g., Chinese in Indonesia) and groups confined to capital cities (e.g., Indians in Bangkok). Neither of these groups is likely to engage in any of the outcomes we consider in this volume—and certainly not separatism. Second, Reid’s universe of cases risks excluding groups that may be difficult to distinguish from the majority, such as the Pak Tai in Thailand. This region has been part of Siam for hundreds of years, though highly autonomous prior to the 20th century. In part due to this shared history, but also due to being on
the same political side as the dominant Central Thai over the past three decades, it would be easy to exclude such a group from an ethnicity-based analysis. However, the Pak Tai would be identified in our selection strategy due to inhabiting the cardinal region of Southern Thailand and having an easily identifiable descent-based identity. Finally, our objective here is general theory building. We are interested in identifying necessary and/or sufficient regional movements, which was not Reid’s goal.

**General Comparative Politics Literature**

In comparative politics, the focus is almost always on the ethnolinguistic group; it is rarely about the region. Consider the literature on **secessionism**, which looks at group demands for independence: Why are there demands (Jenne 2004; Saideman 1997); what are the demands (Jenne, Saideman, and Lowe 2007; Sorens 2012); and why are some mobilization efforts successful but others are not (Englebert and Hummel 2005; Horowitz 1981; Islam 1985)? Likewise, the literature on **civil wars** finds that when groups fight over territory, the conflicts are more violent and longer in duration because land is perceived to be neither divisible nor substitutable (Vasquez 1993; Hensel and Mitchell 2005; Mitchell and Thies 2011; Gubler and Selway 2012). The attachment to the land (Sack 1986; Töuval 1972) means that even after the conflict is over, social intolerance is much more pronounced between the groups engaged in territorial conflicts (Tir and Singh 2015). And, finally, consider the literature on **ethnic accommodation** in democracies. Whether political power should be moderated through majoritarian institutions (Horowitz 1985; see Reilly 1997) or shared through consociational designs (Lijphart 1999; see Lijphart and Crepaz 1991; McGarry and O’Leary 2007), scholars champion federalism as an institution. The intuition is that by giving ethnolinguistic groups political control over cultural matters, this can facilitate democratic consolidation.

Consistent across all three bodies of literature is the focus on the group—with region only in the background as a reinforcing cleavage, as part of the underlying mechanism, or related to a solution to the conflict. This unit of analysis is partly data driven—that is, until recently there has been no datasets on regions (see Hooghe et al. 2016). That choice is itself driven by a theoretical bias that ethnolinguistic groups are where the action begins. This approach, however, ignores the constructivist literature that suggests regions may develop ethnic identities to further their cause—that is, geographical difference could precede ethnic differences.
Introduction

Additionally, theories on secessionism, civil wars, and ethnic accommodation need to develop mechanisms that emphasize and are preferably unique to geographic space. Consider the recent creation of the Telangana state in India. Formerly part of Andhra Pradesh, Telangana shares the Telugu language with the rest of Andhra Pradesh. Indeed, language was the basis for state creation at independence. However, the Telangana movement emphasized a separate history from the rest of Andhra Pradesh as part of the Hyderabad Princely State. The movement also emphasized inequalities in education and water rights. The idea of a distinct Telangana people is strongly tied to regional mechanisms rather than linguistic or cultural differences.

By focusing on groups instead of region, we risk one of two types of selection effect bias. The first is selection on the dependent variable. The tendency is to look at groups where we see demands—whether it is more cultural recognition or outright political separation. And from here, scholars try to identify some common denominator among the cases where the demands were met. This strategy, however, ignores the instances where demands were absent; it also overlooks the sample of cases where demands were made but not recognized by the national government. Failure to consider these two other scenarios means we can only identify a necessary condition at best. If the non-cases also share the explanatory variables, however, we may miss the real explanation of what is going on. Empirically, we lose valuable information on how often these demands are made and met.

The second bias is the selection of observed independent variables. Here, the strategy is to identify all groups that are ethnolinguistically distinct from the politically dominant group. One famous dataset is the All Minorities at Risk (Birnir et al. 2015), which uses secondary sources and research assistant coders; another common dataset is the Ethnic Power Relations (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010), which employs country expert surveys. With either one of these datasets, scholars can examine whether there are demands—addressing the above concern. However, a group is included in the dataset in the first place because it is considered to have a distinct identity—often because it has made an identity-related demand. Put differently, this approach cannot capture the groups that have (the potential of) a distinct identity but do not make demands.

In short, while we think of ethnolinguistic groups as countable, they are neither exogeneous nor fixed over time. To this end, we shift the analysis from the group—one presumed to be ethnolinguistically distinct—to (roughly) cardinal regions. In doing so, we can empirically address the
selection-effect biases plaguing the literature. It will also allow us to theoretically identify necessary and/or sufficient conditions.

Empirical Strategy: From Groups to Regions
To avoid the selection bias plaguing much of the literature, we start by taking existing lists of ethnic groups in each country from the All Minorities at Risk (AMAR) list. We eliminate those that are not geographically concentrated. This gives us most of our groups in Indonesia, whose archipelagic structure renders exceptions to many of the selection biases discussed above. We then append to this list regional groups. We consider nine cardinal regions (north, northeast, east, southeast, south, southwest, west, northwest, and center) in each country. This is our starting population of possible regions. We then assess whether there is any evidence of an identity in each of these cardinal regions. The evidentiary bar is quite low—for example, the use of the “we” pronouns or a reference to the “people” in the area. In places where we do not find any evidence of a regional identity, we remove the area from the list. As an example, let us walk through Thailand. We can talk meaningfully about North Thailand (Lanna), Central Thailand, and South Thailand. Moreover, there is evidence of a Northeast Thailand (Isan) and a Deep South region. While East Thailand and West Thailand are recent categories in government reporting, we cannot yet establish that the East region is a meaningful category; the West, however, passes the low evidentiary bar. Finally, there is no evidence of a Southeast Thailand, Southwest Thailand, or Northwest Thailand. And so, in this case, we remove these four areas from our population of regions.

We also use our cardinal directions framework for looking at possible regions within recognized ethnic groups. To return to Thailand, the Isan region is large and internally diverse. There is a Khmer-speaking area in the South and a Khorat region in the Southwest. Both of these were added to the universe of cases. There is another division with those who migrated before the Laotian Rebellion of 1827 and those who came afterward. However, as there is no clear geographic basis to this division, no additional region is identified based on that identity dimension.

The one country where this “within-region” or “within-ethnicity” analysis was particularly important was Indonesia. The incredible spread of the archipelago—combined with the sheer number of islands—makes references to cardinal regions irrelevant in a general sense. Instead, we start with each of the large islands or island groupings. From here, we then
apply the cardinal regions. Take Sumatra, for example, where 10 main ethnic groups live. First, we note that the Batak group (the subject of Toha’s chapter 3) has six identifiable subgroups: Mandailing, Angkola, Toba, Dairi/Pakpak Dairi, Simalungun, and Karo. It was not inevitable that a pan-Batak ethnic identity would mobilize. An ethnolinguistically closely related group, the Gayo, live to their north. Those two groups comprise a regional group that we could identify as North Sumatran. But we also examined other North Sumatran possible combinations, such as the Bataks in alliance with either the Acehnese and/or Malay groups such as the Minang. Toha—our Sumatra regional expert—found evidence of a Batak-Minang North Sumatran regional identity, which eventually became an important part of her chapter. Interestingly, while the Gayo are part of the identity, they do not mobilize—mostly due to their remoteness. The Batak-Minang regional identity would have been missed in an ethnicity-only approach. And indeed Toha finds archival evidence that the Indonesian national government referred to the mobilization in North Sumatra as the “Sumatra problem”—that is, it was afraid the mobilization might engulf the entire island.

With this exhaustive list, we then crowdsourced with Southeast Asian country experts. We asked them to verify the identified regions, and then we invited them to contribute a chapter on one or more of the regions. This strategy ensured that we had breadth in our analysis—that is, a large sample—without forfeiting depth—that is, validity of causal mechanisms. Some contributors ended up focusing on one specific cardinal region in one singular country (e.g., North Myanmar); others took a more comparative approach and looked at multiple cardinal regions (e.g., North versus South Philippines). In the end, this edited volume covers almost 20 cardinal regions in eight countries (we are missing Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam). The cases vary on the kinds of demands made and the degree to which the movement participated in (formally) institutionalized politics—for example, parties, legislatures, and judiciaries. At one end of the scale, we have regions that experienced no movement at all (e.g., Northeast Thailand). One step up from that are movements that focused on ethnic rights and resources engaging in normal politics—for example, ethnic parties or civic associations (e.g., North Sumatra). Next are parties and associations that demand increased autonomy and that engage in extra-systemic actions—for example, protests or demonstrations (e.g., North Myanmar). And at the extreme end of the scale are armed groups that seek independence (e.g., East Timor).
Organization of the Book

We do not organize this book by grouping the regions in the same country together. While it is natural to want to compare Northeast Thailand (Isan) to North Thailand or East Malaysia (Sabah and Sarawak) to South Malaysia (Singapore), doing so keeps the focus within the country. This renders the unit of analysis effectively as the country—which runs counter to our very objective: to explain the variation in regional demands. Sometimes this explanation requires looking beyond the national boundaries.

This, of course, then begs the question how we organize a collection of regions. Here, we focus on two common arguments in the literature. One is about the inclusiveness of state institutions (Birnir 2006; Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010). When institutions are exclusive, minorities are denied a formal channel for voicing their demands (e.g., legislature representation) to bring about the necessary policy changes (e.g., language recognition). The other argument is about the inclusiveness of civic associations (Putnam 1995; Varshney 2003). When religious networks and community organizations promote intra-ethnic tendencies, while they may promote civic engagement, they harden us-them distinctions.

In full disclosure, these two theoretical arguments emerged organically. This was not the vision we had for the project. We hosted a mini-conference at the 2019 American Political Science Association Annual Meeting. We were struck by the frequency in which state institutions or civic associations was the explanatory variable. This was the case regardless of the outcome—whether it ranged from no regional demands made whatsoever to demands for some sort of cultural recognition to the formation of regional parties to full-scale violence and independence. In this vein, we split the regions—that is, the chapters—into two groups based on whether the argument focuses on state institutions (part 1) or civic associations (part 2). Coincidentally, each part has six chapters. We organize the chapters by how much autonomy the national government conceded—from most to none. We emphasize this sequence to set the stage for understanding the null cases—that is, when a regional group does not make a demand.

Part 1: State Institutions

The first part focuses on the inclusiveness of state institutions. The literature posits that when state institutions are inclusive, not only are minority identities recognized by the state, but, more importantly, this renders the
institutions as legitimate by the minorities. In contrast, when state institutions are exclusive, we are more likely to see violence (Birnir 2006; Chandra 2004). The chapters in this part examine the effects of inclusiveness—or the lack thereof—in state institutions ranging from the national legislature to the education system, highlighting the importance of both descriptive and substantive accommodation.

South Malaysia. Elvin Ong’s chapter looks at Singapore’s separation from Malaysia—only one of two such occurrence in the world during the Cold War and also only one of two such events in Southeast Asia. The Chinese-dominant People’s Action Party (PAP) employed two strategies to protect regional interests—which were inclusive of Chinese ethnic interests. Frustrated with limited political representation at the national level, the PAP championed itself as the Chinese partner to be in the ruling coalition. When these overtures were rebuked, the PAP forged an alternative multiethnic coalition. The Alliance Party saw the PAP’s ability to regroup as a threat. And while the PAP was successful in extracting greater autonomy over its regional affairs, it came at an expected price: separation from the federation.

North Taiwan versus South Taiwan. Chun-Ying Wu and Amy Liu examine how the Hokkien-speaking locals (benshengren) in South Taiwan were able to extract linguistic concessions in the early 1990s from the Kuomintang (KMT) government—the same government that adopted repressive Mandarin-only policies when it arrived in Taiwan in 1949. They find that in South Taiwan (homogeneously Hokkien), democratization pulled the KMT to make linguistic concessions to its own Hokkien-speaking members. But this is only half the story. Wu and Liu also demonstrate that in North Taiwan, where the population has always been more heterogeneous, demographic shifts over several decades pushed the KMT away from repressive monolingualism.

North Sumatra, Indonesia. Risa Toha examines how a region that once engaged in pro-autonomy rebellion against Soekarno’s Java-centric government came to embrace its national identity. She argues the Bataks adopted violence as a strategy because their repeated demands were ignored by the national government. However, once the government extended favorable terms—including the placement of many high-profile Batak members in the legislative councils and the military officer corps—the armed mobilization ended. Since then, the Bataks no longer mobilize politically along parochial lines, and instead they identify strongly as Indonesians.

North Philippines versus South Philippines. Mary Anne Mendoza-
Davé looks at not just why the Muslim rebellions in South Philippines happened but why they happened so late (the 1970s). The delay is pronounced when compared to the Christians in the north. The answer has to do with accommodation in the education system—an important vehicle for identity development. In the south, very few Muslim students enrolled in public schools, and even fewer Muslims taught as instructors. Prior to independence, American officials did not challenge the preexisting structure of Islamic education. Moreover, education officials allowed for exceptions in the curricula that were tailored to differences within the Muslim population. As a result, the population remained fragmented—meaning there was no Muslim regional identity by the time the Philippines became independent. And even when faced with threats to the Muslim community, there were still no separatist rebellions. Incidentally, rebellions only happened after a seemingly banal education policy, the introduction of a pair of education scholarships—one domestic and one foreign—brought about a Muslim national identity.

**East Malaysia versus West Malaysia.** East Malaysia is geographically split from West Malaysia. Moreover, given the political dominance of the central region in the West, theoretically we should see demands for independence. And while there have been some small-scale separatist movements, absent is a distinct regional identity—at least not one for political mobilization. Mohamed Subhan and Kai Ostwald explain this null outcome. The first has to do with the central government’s particular interventions to divide the Sabah and Sarawak indigenous populations to prevent them from forming a majority Bumiputera coalition. The second explanation has to do with the central government’s general policy to co-opt the local elites and their clientelistic networks. Subhan and Ostwald demonstrate similar dynamics of co-optation with the elites in Northeast Malaysia. However, as a point of contrast, the ethnically diverse pockets of Peninsular Malaysia are noncontiguous. Their demographic limitations—lacking both numbers and concentration—have meant that secession as a region is not an option. And instead, what Subhan and Ostwald show is that individual out-migration is the only available recourse.

**Northeast Thailand.** Jacob Ricks asks why the large ethnic Lao population in Northeast Thailand has not demanded cultural concessions from the state. And, in fact, not only have the demands been absent, but most people in the region see themselves as Thai (the broader national identity) or Isan (a moniker meaning “northeast”)—as opposed to ethnically Lao. Ricks answers this puzzle by taking a step back. Histori-
Introduction

The regionally, the people in the region did see themselves as Lao. However, the Thai government employed a two-punch strategy. The first was the rapid elimination of the Lao ethnic identity from the state records around the turn of the 20th century. The second was the concerted effort to create a unified Thai identity through the national education system. The success of these two efforts manifests in the absence of demands today in spite of the group size in the region.

Part 2: Civic Associations

The second part focuses on civic associations—specifically whether they facilitate intra-ethnic communication among subgroups within a region. When such organizations exist, they allow for dialogue and cooperation, which facilitates larger pan-ethnic identities. But when such inclusiveness of associations is absent, we do not have a mechanism for diverse subgroups to come into contact or for networks that bridge subgroups to develop. Under such conditions, we see the hardening of distinct us-them differences within the region (Bracic 2000; Liu 2021; Putnam 1995; Varshney 2003). In many of the contributions to this volume, the critical actor is a religious organization. Whether the religious organization cuts across ethnic groups or within one group has implications for whether autonomy demands are made, and, if so, whether they are recognized by the national government. Several of the chapters also discuss policy-based movements and intra-ethnic civic associations.

East Timor, Indonesia. S. P. Harish looks at why Timor-Leste failed to become independent in 1974 following Portuguese decolonization—but was able to do so 25 years later. One explanation is the coherence of the social networks. In 1974, there were multiple networks, each characterized by a different set of demands. These demands ranged the full gamut—with the highly influential Catholic Church being rather agnostic toward independence. But 25 years of Indonesian occupation allowed the different networks—including that of the church—to come together under a singular umbrella. And by the late 1990s, democratic developments in Jakarta combined with the unified social network proved jointly necessary for Timorese independence.

Bali, Indonesia. Ryan Tans looks at the successful efforts in Bali to fight the reclamation of Benoa Bay. The anti-reclamation protests in Bali were demographically diverse: There were fisherfolks, students, activists, artists, academics, religious leaders, customary officials, middle-class profession-
als, and local businesses, including the tourism industry. Their interests in fighting off developers ranged from economic to environmental. This very heterogeneity should have doomed the protests—like those in Jakarta and Makassar. Yet a necessary—but not sufficient—condition differentiating Bali from the others was its ethnic homogeneity. Tans demonstrates how the customary village councils were able to mobilize numbers of people—across all demographic groups—by evoking their shared ethnic identity. Ideologically, the councils referenced the belief that Benoa Bay is a sacred site; tactically, they invoked the distinct Balinese practice of *puputan*—that is, resistance “to the end.” The result was an island-wide political mobilization based on Balinese ethnicity.

**North Myanmar.** Alexandre Pelletier looks at why independence efforts in the north of Myanmar have stalled, exposing the frailty of the Kachin ethnic identity. While the Kachin leaders boast an inclusive identity, their networks were based on one built by the Christian missionaries and the Kachin Baptist Church in the late 19th and early 20th century. As a result, the networks were dominated mostly by the Jinghpaw and to a lesser extent by the Lhaovo, Zaiwa, and Lachid. In contrast, the Rawang and Lisu were completely left out. Prior to 1994, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) was able to provide public goods and security through these networks without relying on coercion. However, the KIA would lose its position with the 1994–2011 ceasefire. And once the fighting resumed in 2011, the KIA relied on violence to generate support and compliance, which has worsened its relationship with the non-Jinhpaws—with several of these minorities calling for subregional territorial autonomy.

**Maluku, Indonesia.** Jessica Soedirgo asks why efforts by Ambonese elites to mobilize along a common ethnicity failed to materialize. She argues the answer has to do with the structure of quotidian institutions and related practices. Specifically, a salient religious cleavage meant that overtures by the Ambonese Christians to the Ambonese Muslims were insufficient. The religious differences, as a result, would undermine regional efforts for independence (1950–62).

**North Sulawesi, Indonesia.** Jeremy Menchik focuses on the Minahasans in North Sulawesi, specifically why there was no notable regional movement. He argues that while there were civic associations, competing interests at different levels rendered mobilization efforts truncated from two directions. From above, strong international links to global Christianity and disproportionate representation and integration in the colonial administration, educational institutions, and military forces meant muted
demands for independence. And likewise, parochial interests were mobilized against local rivals in alliance with Jakarta—meaning regional mobilization efforts were suppressed from below.

North Thailand. Joel Selway notes an anomaly in North Thailand. Historically, the Lanna have refrained from making strong ethnopolitical demands—despite speaking a different language and having a long history of political independence from Bangkok. Selway argues the absence of demands is the result of weak—if not absent—civic associations: from absent (early 20th century) to suppressed (1932–World War II) and from overwhelmed (1950s–1970s) to underwhelmed (1980s–1990s). Since the 2000s, however, Selway identifies the emergence of cultural civic associations in the north, which served as the background for interpreting political grievances in Lanna ethnic terms in the 2010s.

Part 3: Conclusion

The third part includes two chapters. The first is a theoretical conclusion. There is no reason to assume state institutions and civic associations are independent of each other. Likewise, the mechanisms are not mutually exclusive. Drawing on the case studies, we offer an argument that regions mobilize when (1) they are excluded from state institutions but (2) civic associations within the region are inclusive. We also situate this discussion against two alternative explanations: social structure and regime type.

The second chapter is an empirical conclusion, specifically, whether our strategy focusing on cardinal regions travels outside of Southeast Asia. To this end, Henry Hale has contributed a commentary. In 2008, Hale published The Foundation of Ethnic Politics, which looks at the regions of the Soviet Union. His objective was to explain which regions separated into independent states following the end of the Cold War. Hale argued that the saliency of the ethnic identity on the eve of the fall was not sufficient. Rather, it was about the economic stakes an ethnic region had in the union. Specifically, poorer regions had greater stakes. To the best of our knowledge, Hale’s book is the only one to systematically compare regions that did not push for separatism to those that did. And to that end, it is both theoretically and empirically fitting for him to conclude this edited volume.
PART 1

State Institutions
CHAPTER 1

State Institutions in South Malaysia

Singapore’s Entry and Exit, 1963–65

Elvin Ong

Editors’ Introduction: This chapter focuses on how Singapore’s under-representation in the Malaysian state institutions resulted in an extreme outcome. The Chinese-dominant People’s Action Party (PAP) employed two strategies to protect regional interests—which were inclusive of Chinese ethnic interests. Frustrated with limited political representation at the national level, the PAP championed itself as the Chinese partner to be in the ruling coalition. When these overtures were rebuked, the PAP forged an alternative multiethnic coalition. The Alliance Party saw the PAP’s ability to regroup in its demands as a threat. And while the PAP was successful in extracting greater autonomy over its regional affairs, it came at an expected price: separation from the federation.

Introduction

For more than five decades between 1965 and 2018, Singapore and Malaysia were among the two most robust electoral authoritarian regimes in the world (Levitsky and Way 2010; Slater 2012). In Singapore, the dominant multiethnic People’s Action Party (PAP) has never lost more than 10 percent of parliamentary seats over 12 cycles of elections. In Malaysia, the dominant Alliance/Barisan Nasional (BN) coalition1 comprising ethno-

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1. Malaysia’s dominant governing coalition was known as the Alliance from 1957 to 1973. Thereafter, it was known as the Barisan Nasional.
exclusive political parties—the United Malays National Organization (UMNO), the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA), and the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC)—has never lost executive power within the same period. Both regimes rely on their strong states to monitor citizens, distribute patronage, distort electoral rules and boundaries, selectively repress dissent and the opposition, and enact responsive, pro-growth economic policies (Crouch 1996; George 2012; Gomez 2016; Rahim and Barr 2019). Even more, they have emerged relatively unscathed through several economic crises, effectively plotted at least two leadership transitions, and successfully muffled multiple mass street protests (Pepinsky 2009; Weiss 2006).

The dominant parties and strong states in Singapore and Malaysia originated from their similar legacies of decolonization after World War II. As British colonies confronting communist and independence movements in the post–World War II decades, they encountered similarly unmanageable urban and communal conflict, leading to “elite protection pacts” forged between local elites and the governing bureaucracy (Slater 2010). In fact, political leaders across the two states found their fortunes so intertwined in the aftermath of the Japanese occupation that they initially worked toward merger into a single polity. On September 16, 1963, the Federation of Malaysia was formed through the merger of Malaya and Singapore together with the Eastern Bornean states of Sabah and Sarawak. For many ordinary people, the Federation of Malaysia was a natural union of four hitherto artificially separated states. Its emergence meant a clear break with British colonial rule and self-autonomy for its people.

But if political leaders and citizens so welcomed the merger and the creation of the federation in September 1963, why did Singapore find itself out on its own less than two years later in August 1965? The tremendous amount of literature devoted toward answering this question over the past few decades has revealed many interrelated answers. Many scholars point to the intense political competition between the Lee Kuan Yew-led PAP and the Tunku Abdul Rahman-led UMNO as the key factor in driving separation. They contend that this political rivalry was ultimately rooted in fundamental differences in ethnic demography between Singapore and Malaya, as well as in ideology between the two men and their respective political parties about the treatment of ethnicity in the new nation (Fletcher 1969; Sopiee 1974; Lau 1998; Abu Bakar 2009). In advancing this argument, they frequently refer to Lee and the PAP’s ideology of inter-ethnic equality undermining Tunku and UMNO’s brand of Malay-Muslim domi-
nant consociationalism. Violent inter-ethnic riots between Malays and the Chinese in the middle of 1964 were further illustrative of the idea that the overwhelmingly Chinese-dominant state of Singapore led by Lee was fundamentally incompatible with the Malay-Bumiputera-dominant Malaya led by Tunku. Expanding on these points, other scholars point to the failure of building a new, coherent national identity that would bring together a very diverse people (Andersen 1974). It has also been suggested that Lee Kuan Yew’s “misreading” of UMNO and the Malays led to the two countries’ inevitable separation (Barr 1997). Theoretically, these arguments corroborate Posner’s (2004) claim that the relative size of ethnic groups conditions the political salience of inter-ethnic cleavages, thereby subsequently affecting the demands for political representation and separatism.

While not completely dismissing the validity of these arguments, this chapter argues that a more careful reading of the sequence of events suggests that Singapore’s suppressed political representation in the federation’s new institutions in 1963 was the key critical antecedent motivating political actors to engage in various maneuvers that ultimately led to Singapore’s separation from Malaya in 1965 (Slater and Simmons 2010). Specifically, the 1963 terms of merger institutionalized Singapore’s political representation in the new federal legislature to only 15 seats, paling in comparison to Sabah and Sarawak’s 40 seats and mainland Malaya’s 104 seats. Even more, an institutional bifurcation in terms of franchise also emerged—Malaysian citizens who were also Singapore citizens were not allowed to stand as election candidates outside of Singapore or vote outside of Singapore. Because of such institutional restrictions, the PAP was confined to a geographical area with a limited number of seats and was unable to defend Singapore’s interests, particularly with regards to economic policymaking. Not willing to accept its restricted political destiny, the PAP then pushed back by contesting in the April 1964 general elections in Malaya, upsetting and spooking Tunku, the new federation’s prime minister. After its overall failure in these elections, the PAP rapidly cobbled together an alternative “Malaysian Malaysia” coalition with smaller parties in Sabah and Sarawak with an eye on displacing the Alliance in the following years. The visceral prospect of losing national power consequently hardened Tunku’s resolve to cleave Singapore from Malaya, effectively ensuring the Alliance’s continued dominance at the expense of the loss of Singapore from the federation.

To be sure, some scholars have indeed noted Singapore’s suppressed political representation at the beginning of the merger in 1963 (Leifer 1965; T. Y. Tan 2008). Yet, most scholars only mention this point in passing.
and quickly pivot to narrating the intense political conflict between Lee's PAP and Tunku's UMNO, placing the blame of separatism squarely on their irreconcilable ideological approaches toward managing inter-ethnic relations between the Malays in Malaya and the Chinese in Singapore (see, e.g., Abu Bakar 2009, 69–70). In other words, they see Singapore's separation as an outcome primarily caused by the relative size of ethnic groups, buttressed by ideological differences between key leaders. In contrast, this chapter's arguments place the hitherto underappreciated role of political institutions at the center of the story. It argues that the political actors in Singapore were actively seeking ways to escape the “gilded cage” of institutional restrictions imposed on them, while political actors in Malaya were actively seeking to maintain it. From this perspective, non-inclusive political institutions were the primary driver of observed separatist political behavior (Birnir 2007). In a counterfactual world whereby the federation's institutions were more accommodating of Singapore's interests, the PAP might have been less eager in expanding its influence. Consequently, they would have posed less of a threat to the Alliance's and UMNO's political dominance, and Tunku would have been allowed more time to find new arrangements to accommodate Singapore and the PAP. Under this scenario, Singapore's separatism from the Federation of Malaysia might not have taken place or might have taken place much later.

The rest of this chapter traces the sequences of events leading up to Singapore's merger with Malaysia and its subsequent separation (Ricks and Liu 2018). First, I briefly describe the ethnic demography in the different regions in the aftermath of World War II, setting the contextual background for understanding the causal processes that follow. Second, I elaborate on the reasons and process for merger between Singapore and Malaya, specifying why the reasons for securing merger on the part of the PAP led it to accept less than favorable terms for Singapore's political representation in the newly created federation. Third, I then reveal how the PAP sought to rapidly expand its influence in the aftermath of merger as a means of overcoming Singapore's limited political representation, which subsequently led to the hardening of relations between the PAP leadership and Tunku. The manner in which the PAP drove to form an alternative anti-Alliance coalition was viewed as such a threat to UMNO domination that Tunku decided it was better to have Singapore out rather than risk losing political control. A short conclusion summarizes this chapter's most salient findings.
Contextual Background

Britain’s colonial interests in peninsular Malaya and Singapore were defined by the region’s strategic importance in trade and the provision of certain raw materials. In the island city-states of Penang and Singapore, the British governed the northern and southern entrances to the Straits of Malacca. The straits were the primary maritime trade route through which European–East Asian trade passed in the 19th and 20th centuries (Mills 1966, 189). This intercontinental trade, combined with mainland Malaya’s demand for cheap labor to work in its tin mines and rubber plantations, drove inward immigration, creating an intensely plural society. Table 1.1 details the ethnic diversity of the various regions in the few years prior to merger as well as its uneven distribution. In 1957, more than three-quarters of Singapore’s population was classified as Chinese, thereby suggesting its distinctly Chinese-dominated character. In mainland Malaya, however, just over a third of the population was classified as Chinese and almost half of it was Malay-Bumiputera, thereby indicating the demographic dominance of Malays on the mainland. From this perspective purely in terms of ethnic demographics, it is clear why Tunku Abdul Rahman, Alliance leader and prime minister of the already independent Malaya, sought to include Sabah and Sarawak when discussing merger between Singapore and Malaya (Cheah 2002, 93–94; Means 1963). By including the indigenous peoples of Sabah and Sarawak into the category of “Malay-Bumiputeras,” Malay numerical dominance could be achieved and maintained. Without Sabah and Sarawak, the Chinese would outnumber the Malays.

The government authorities who conducted the census were, of course, cognizant of the crude categorizations of ethnicity and keenly aware of intra-ethnic differences. They first noted intra-ethnic differences by immigrant origins, such as the Malays from Aceh, Java, Menangkabau, or Palembang; the Chinese who were segregated into Hokkien, Cantonese, Hakka, Teochew, and Hainan; or the Indians who were Tamil, Telugu, Punjabi, Bengali, Hindustani, or Malayali (Vlieland 1931, 75–87; Del Tufo 1947, chapter 7). They also estimated certain intra-ethnic differences in birthplace (Del Tufo 1947, chapters 8 and 9). Out of the total population, 75 percent were estimated to be locally born in 1947. While 95 percent of Malays were estimated to be locally born, only some 63 percent of Chinese were locally born, while only half of the Indians were locally born.

At the eve of merger then, the Federation of Malaysia was a multi-
Table 1.1. Ethnic Demographics by Region (1957–60)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>Malays and Bumiputeras</th>
<th>Chinese</th>
<th>Indians</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Malaya (1957)</td>
<td>6,278,758</td>
<td>3,125,474 (49.8%)</td>
<td>2,333,756 (37.1%)</td>
<td>696,186 (11.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore (1957)</td>
<td>1,445,929</td>
<td>197,060 (13.6%)</td>
<td>1,090,595 (75.1%)</td>
<td>124,084 (8.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sarawak (1960)</td>
<td>744,529</td>
<td>507,252 (68.1%)</td>
<td>229,154 (30.7%)</td>
<td>2,355 (0.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sabah (1960)</td>
<td>454,421</td>
<td>310,054 (68.2%)</td>
<td>104,542 (23.0%)</td>
<td>3,180 (0.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>8,923,637</td>
<td>4,139,840</td>
<td>3,758,047</td>
<td>825,805</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Reproduced from Means (1963, 140).
Note: Percentages in parentheses calculated as a proportion of the total population of each individual region. “Bumiputera” is a Malay term used to indicate the indigenous population of the region.

Ethnic immigrant society with significant intra-ethnic divisions. In the post–World War II era, this rich soil of social diversity formed the raw material through which societal elites organized and formed mass political organizations. The ethnic Malay-based United Malays National Organization (UMNO) arose as the primary organizational vehicle through which to represent Malay interests in response to the British plans for a “Malayan Union” (Omar 2015; Slater 2010; Sopiee 1974; Stockwell 1979). The ethnic Chinese-based Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) grew from its origins as an organization devoted to the provision of social welfare to the Chinese “New Villages” into a full-fledged political party (Heng 1983; Loh 1988; Slater 2010; Soh 1960; M. I. Tan 2015; Tregonning 1979). In Singapore, leftist movements, such as effervescent workers’ unions, trade unions, and Chinese school student movements, first supported David Marshall’s Labor Front and then switched allegiances to support Lee Kuan Yew’s People’s Action Party (PAP. In the 1959 local elections in British-controlled Singapore, the Lee Kuan Yew-led PAP emerged the clear winner when it won 43 out of 51 local legislative seats.

Singapore’s Institutionalized Suppression in the 1963 Terms for Merger

On May 27, 1961, newly independent Malaya’s prime minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, unexpectedly announced that he was open to the possibility of Malaya, Singapore, Sabah, and Sarawak being “brought closer together in political and economic cooperation” (Lee 1998, 365). According to the general consensus in most historical accounts, Tunku’s primary motivation for seeking merger can be summarized as the “security
According to this standard narrative, Tunku was tremendously wary of Singapore reemerging as a “Second Cuba” due to the potential of a leftist-communist subversion of the city-state (Slater 2010, 233–36; Sopiee 1974, 142–44; Stockwell 2009, 19; T. Y. Tan 2008, chapter 2). In particular, the Lim Chin Siong–led leftist-communist mass labor movement was deemed to be extremely capable of capturing political power if Singapore was to gain independence on its own. A founding member of the PAP, Lim led the PAP’s Chinese-speaking mass activists against the PAP’s English-educated leaders led by Lee Kuan Yew. For Tunku, quashing the leftist-communist threat by taking control over Singapore’s internal security apparatus through merger was a far better choice than risking Singapore’s eventual independence and prospective communist takeover (Means 1963, 139; Tunku Abul Rahman Putra 1977, 119). Moreover, the political costs of incorporating more than one million Singaporean Chinese into Malaysia could be mitigated by incorporating the Borneo territories of Sabah and Sarawak into the federation so as to maintain overall Malay-Bumiputera numerical dominance (Sopiee 1974, 143; T. Y. Tan 2008, 68).

For Lee, merger with Malaya would not just provide political support and justification to eliminate Singapore’s leftist-communists and its leadership. It would also provide the impetus for an enlarged common market that would jump-start industrialization, reduce unemployment, and generate economic growth, thus arresting the PAP’s declining popularity since its coming to power in 1959 (Leifer 1965; Sopiee 1974, 116–20). In any case, the overall consensus was also that Singapore was far too small of a nation-state to secure independence from the British and survive on its own. Although it was a spectacular success as an entrepôt trade hub, its manufacturing industries relied on raw materials from Malaya. Socially and culturally, its peoples have extensive family network ties to the broader population in Malaya. In terms of defense and external relations, an independent, Chinese-majority, small island-nation would struggle among the far larger nation-states of Southeast Asia. Merger with Malaya was both politically advantageous for the PAP and economically, socially, and strategically sound for Singapore.

But if Tunku and Lee both saw the mutual benefits of merger, detailed compromises would still need to be forged in terms of the institutions of the newly created federation. Of key concern in this chapter is the inclusiveness of those institutions to Singapore’s interests. Given that the PAP would not be part of the Alliance’s federal cabinet, to what degree would...
the new federation’s other institutions, such as its legislature and voting rights, accommodate Singapore’s interests and those of its citizens?

On this particular question, the overwhelming empirical evidence appears to be that Singapore’s interests in the new legislature together with the voting rights of its citizens were artificially suppressed. To begin with, Singapore would only be entitled to elect 15 members to the new federal House of Representatives, which was much less than the 25 expected members if the numbers were proportionate to the size of its electorate. This was in stark contrast to Malaya’s 104 representatives, Sabah’s 16 seats, and Sarawak’s 24 seats. It meant that Singapore’s population, which would make up about 16 percent of the new federation, would only have less than 10 percent of the seats in the new legislature. In terms of average population per constituency, Malaya would have 60,372 per elected member, Singapore 96,395, Sabah 28,401, and Sarawak 31,022 (Means 1963, 148–49). This gross malapportionment meant that the weight of each vote from Sabah and Sarawak was more than three times that of the weight of a vote from Singapore.2 Apparently, Lee accepted such arrangements and viewed them as not his “main difficulty” primarily because Tunku allowed Singapore to retain and exercise autonomy in matters regarding education and labor policies (Lee 1998, 406–7). These were important policy areas for the Chinese majority in Singapore because they wanted autonomy to establish and regulate Chinese schools and the freedom to establish workers’ unions. Thus, such a quid pro quo deal was deemed to be acceptable and the best deal that Singapore could obtain from the Tunku.

But on the issue of citizenship and voting rights, another institutionalized demarcation and separation between Singapore and the new federation emerged. Even after the Tunku acceded to the request that Singapore citizens be automatically granted Malaysian citizenship (Lee 2000, 437–38; T. Y. Tan 2008, 106), there remained a clear distinction between the electoral rights of Malaysian citizens who were Singapore citizens and those who were not Singapore citizens. According to Article 31 of the Malaysia Agreement lodged with the United Nations, Malaysian citizens who were Singapore citizens could only be candidates for the 15 seats in the federal legislature allocated to Singapore or candidates for the Singapore state legislature and could only vote in Singapore.3 They were not allowed to be candidates for any other seats in the federal legislature outside of

2. My thanks to Kai Ostwald for clarifying this point.
Singapore or to be candidates for any other state legislature outside of Singapore or to vote outside of Singapore. Vice versa, Malaysian citizens who were not Singapore citizens could not become candidates for any of the 15 seats in the federal legislature allocated in Singapore or become candidates for the Singapore state legislature and could not vote in Singapore. They could only become candidates for any federal or state seat outside of Singapore and must vote outside of Singapore.

Whatever the Tunku’s motivation for proposing this bifurcated citizenship and its voting rights and whatever Lee’s motivation for accepting these proposals, the overall net effect is a clear institutionalized separation of electoral politics of the two regions, akin to a particular version of “One Country, Two Systems.” (T. Y. Tan 2008, 107). To put it more starkly, it would be equal to citizens of Florida not being able to stand as candidates or vote in New York or citizens of Manchester not being able to stand as candidates or vote in London. This institutionalized suppression of Singapore’s interests within the terms of merger thus set the stage and motivation for the PAP to launch expansionary plans across the causeway in a bid to overcome those very institutionalized limitations it accepted in the first place.

PAP’s Expansionary Strategy and Its Pushback, 1963–65

Following Birnir’s (2007) logic of the non-inclusion of political interests motivating political conflict, the subsequent empirical evidence leans toward Singapore’s suppressed interests motivating the PAP to undertake expansionary strategies into mainland Malaya in order to overcome Singapore’s institutional limitations contained in the terms of the merger. As Leifer (1965, 54–55) summarized,

The Singapore government, although accepting the limiting constitutional provisions of the Malaysia Agreement, was determined, despite the known objections of the Malaysian government, to move from what it regarded as a parochial setting on the national scene. And after the establishment of Malaysia, the prospect of attracting support from the mainland prompted it to take certain steps which were regarded in Kuala Lumpur not only as a challenge to the existing multi-racial alliance regime but as a Chinese challenge to the governing system whereby a Malay ruling group enjoyed an entrenched political dominance. (emphasis mine)
Two crucial expansionary “steps” that the PAP took were pivotal in stoking the fires of separatism. First, the PAP sought new supporters on peninsular Malaya by contesting the April 1964 general elections of the newly independent Malaysia, challenging the MCA directly by nominating candidates in nine predominantly urban Chinese electoral districts. In so doing, the PAP broke Lee Kuan Yew’s pre-merger promise to the Tunku of not contesting peninsular Malaya’s elections. Despite the PAP’s tireless campaigning, however, the MCA emerged victorious, winning 27 seats to contribute to the Alliance’s total tally of 89 seats out of a possible 104 parliamentary seats. The PAP’s plan to oust the MCA failed miserably after managing to win only one seat—a result that was met by the PAP leaders with “shock dismay” (Lau 1998, 118–24).

The PAP’s expansionary strategy confirmed the worst fear of Malay conservatives within UMNO—the inability to keep the PAP boxed in within Singapore. Beginning in May 1964, inter-ethnic tensions between the Chinese and Malay gradually rose such a point as to result in violent conflict on the streets and open conflict between the PAP and the Alliance (Fletcher 1969, 40–44; Lau 1998, chapter 5; Lee 1998, chapter 36; Slater 2010, 118–19; Sopiee 1974, 195–205). In a bid to try to hit back against the PAP for contesting in the Malaya elections, radical Malays within UMNO began to stoke the fires of Malay and Chinese inter-ethnic distrust and rivalry by accusing the PAP of neglecting the plight of Malays in Singapore. Despite Lee’s and the PAP’s best efforts to reassure Singaporean Malays that their welfare was well looked after, there was no letup in the attacks by UMNO radicals. Inter-ethnic rivalry soon boiled over into three days of inter-ethnic rioting in late July 1964, alongside more riots in early September 1964. Overall, the two riots led to 36 killed, more than 500 injured, and almost 6,000 detained (Lau 1998, chapter 6; Slater 2010, 119). A truce on all sides was finally agreed upon in late September 1964, which put further violent rhetoric and conflict on ice. The PAP and UMNO agreed to reduce their divisive rhetoric and, more importantly, to “both abstain from expanding their party branches and activities” in each other’s territorial strongholds (Lee 1998, 576–77).

To be clear, that the PAP contesting the April 1964 Malaya elections had the overall effect of provoking separatism sentiments is not in question. What is more empirically vague is the PAP’s decision to contest in the first place. Why did Lee Kuan Yew choose to do so if he knew the act would break his pre-merger promise with the Tunku not to interfere in Malayan politics? From Lee’s point of view, there were two interrelated
reasons. First, the PAP wanted to replace the MCA within the Alliance government to influence government policymaking (Fletcher 1969, 32–39; Lau 1998, chapter 4; Lee 1998, 540–41; Sopiee 1974, chapter 7). The PAP was unable to do so as an “equivocal” “cross-bencher” political party outside of the Alliance (Lee 1998, 518–19). The PAP’s apparent objective to attempt to build a national presence for future elections and to win enough seats to provide leverage for PAP to join the Alliance was reflected in the PAP’s party manifesto.4 Second, in Lee’s view, it was the Tunku who broke the pre-merger promise in the first place (Lee 1998, 540). In Singapore’s own elections in late September 1963 just half a year prior to Malaya’s April 1964 elections, the Tunku had come down into Singapore to campaign on behalf of the Alliance in Singapore. According to Lee (1998, 507),

The Tunku’s personal appearance to speak at Alliance rallies had been a most serious development. . . . All this meant that UMNO did not intend to allow the state to look after itself as we had agreed, and that sooner rather than later we would have to enter Malayan politics to defend our interests. I had hoped to postpone that contest for at least one election term. Now this no longer seemed possible. (emphasis mine)

This particular quote confirms the hypothesis that the PAP resolved to undertake an expansionary strategy in order to increase its influence and better defend Singapore’s interests. It even confirms that the hypothesized counterfactual existed—if the Tunku had kept to his agreement to leave Singapore to itself, then the PAP’s expansionary strategy might be delayed for at least one election cycle, thus potentially reducing antagonism between the Alliance and the PAP and the prospect of separation.

Even more, the PAP’s direct challenge against the MCA raised the ire of MCA leader and federal finance minister Tan Siew Sin, who actively sought to undermine Singapore’s economic prospects. Not only did he delay all plans for a common market, but he also rejected prospective investors in Singapore and damaged existing industries in the state. His office rejected 67 out of the 69 applications from the Singapore Economic Development Board for pioneer certificates, which were tax-free statuses for prospective

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investors (Lee 1998, 600). He also sought to take over Singapore’s textile quota to develop a new textile industry in mainland Malaya at the expense of Singapore’s existing industry (600–601). In addition, in late 1964, Tan Siew Sin tabled a budget that planned to increase taxes on gross earnings and payrolls, which would hit Singapore the hardest, and also intimated that he would look to force Singapore to increase the proportion of tax revenues it contributed to the federal government’s coffers (579–80). Even Tunku Abdul Rahman (1977, 115) himself noted Tan’s overall hostility to the PAP and Singapore, acknowledging that “what he [i.e., Tan] succeeded in getting went far beyond my idea.”

Consequently, the PAP would go on to undertake a second expansionary “step” outside of the institutional limitations of Singapore to further challenge the political dominance of UMNO and the Alliance. In January 1965, Donald Stephens, federal minister for Sabah affairs and leader of the United Pasok Momogun Kadazan Organization (UPKO) approached Lee Kuan Yew with a proposal for the PAP to merge with UPKO and win a majority in the Sabah State Assembly (Lee 1998, 603). This inspired Lee Kuan Yew to counter-propose an anti-Alliance coalition between the PAP and all the minor opposition parties in mainland Malaya, Sabah, and Sarawak. The momentum for an anti-Alliance coalition quickly accelerated with meetings in early February and early March among the anti-Alliance parties. There were representatives from the PAP and UPKO, alongside those from the Sabah United People’s Party (SUPP), the United Democratic Party (UDP) from Penang, and the People’s Progressive Party (PPP) from mainland Malaya. Beginning in March 1965, Lee Kuan Yew began to promulgate the idea of a “Malaysian Malaysia,” where meritocratic governance was based on one common national identity with equal rights for all ethnicities—a vision that openly challenged and opposed the Alliance’s model of Malay-Muslim dominant consociationalism (Sopiee 1974, 199–205; Fletcher 1969, chapter 4). The institutional and organizational vehicle for the idea of a “Malaysian Malaysia” was the Malaysia Solidarity Convention (MSC), formed in May 1965.

The MSC saw the PAP ally with the four other smaller parties—the UDP, PPP, SUPP, and Sarawak’s Machinda Party—under one single large organizational umbrella. Political leaders in UMNO and the Alliance saw


the MSC as the PAP’s strategic attempt to form an anti-Alliance political bloc that threatened to displace the Alliance as the governing coalition of the country (Fletcher 1969, 49–51; Lau 1998, 227–52; Sopiee 1974, 201–2). Indeed, in his speech to the MSC convention in June 1965, Lee Kuan Yew made sure to refer to 40–40–20, the proportion of the population that were Malays, Chinese, and Others (Lee 1998, 618). If UMNO only appealed to the Malay population, he warned, its days were numbered. His speech had the effect of further deepening the chasm between the T unku and the Alliance, on the one hand, and Lee Kuan Yew and the PAP, on the other (Lau 1998, 239–46; Sopiee 1974, 200–202). As Dr. Lim Hock Siew, a member of the Barisan Socialis, concluded, the MSC’s objective was also to strike fear into the heart of UMNO that there was a possibility that the MSC could take over power from UMNO. Because if you added the total number of MPs that came from all the parties in the MSC, that is the non-Alliance parties, then there were about twenty or so fewer than that of the Alliance MPs in the parliament. And therefore, the possibility of the MSC winning the next general elections was distinctively present. And that I think was a very decisive factor in forcing UMNO to make up its mind on what to do with the PAP. (emphasis mine)⁶

The situation was made worse in May 1965 when Lee Kuan Yew made another speech in the Federal Parliament that seemingly put down the Malay political leaders in UMNO and also questioned the efficacy of UMNO’s pro-Malay-Bumiputera policies based on the principle of Malay special rights enshrined in the constitution (Lee 1998, 610–15). In the Tunku’s (1977, 120) assessment, it was “the straw that broke the camel’s back.” Even if Lee had no intentions of undermining Malay rights or overthrowing the Alliance leadership, the manner in which he and the PAP pushed the issue of race forced the Tunku and UMNO to see no other way out than to get rid of Singapore once and for all.⁷


By late June 1965, Tunku Abdul Rahman had made his mind up. While recovering in a London hospital from a bout of shingles, he instructed his deputy Tun Razak to begin negotiations for separation (Lau 1998, 257–65; Sopiee 1974, 203–7). By early August, all the legal negotiations for separation were complete, and by August 9, 1965, Singapore was out from Malaysia as an independent country on its own. In his own book published in 1977, Tunku Abdul Rahman further confirmed the hypothesis that Singapore’s diminished political representation in the new federation was a key motivation for the PAP’s expansionary strategy, which ultimately led to spiraling conflict and separatism. He (1977, 116) recalled,

I felt that once we were enmeshed in Singapore’s day-to-day life and administration, and controlling the finance of the State, the inevitable consequence would be that the Singapore Government would want to take a full share in the Malaysian administration; and if we were not prepared to give Singapore the right, then Mr Lee Kuan Yew’s attack on Malaysia was justified. (emphasis mine)

Conclusion

The foregoing analysis vividly illustrates how Singapore’s suppressed political representation in the new Federation of Malaysia led to its separation less than two years after merger. According to the empirical evidence I have presented, separatism was less a clash of personalities, nationalist ideals, or ideological orientations toward ethnic identities and more about inequity in political representation. At the point of merger in September 1963, Singapore’s political representation in the new Federal Parliament was circumscribed while its citizens had limited franchise in influencing politics in other regions of the new nation-state, even as the PAP was excluded from the Alliance cabinet. When Lee Kuan Yew and the PAP realized that they could not displace the MCA within the overall Alliance framework, they forged the MSC as an alternative route toward greater political representation. And when the Tunku and the Alliance recognized the threat of the MSC to their continued political dominance, they decided to allow Singapore to separate.

To be sure, one can speculate about the range of possible outcomes if counterfactual conditions are considered. If Singapore’s political leader was not Lee Kuan Yew but some other less capable politician, they might have posed less of a threat to the Tunku and the Alliance’s political domi-
nance. In the scenario, Singapore’s separation from Malaysia might have been avoided. Yet, the festering sore of Singapore’s suppressed political representation would still persist, implying that separation could be delayed but might not be ultimately avoided. Similarly, if the federation had begun its life as a fully autocratic regime rather than a democratic one, then the outcome may also be different. At various times, the Tunku and UMNO’s top political leaders had considered arresting, or at least side-lining, Lee Kuan Yew in a bid to eliminate his biting rhetorical attacks and to appease UMNO’s more radical supporters (Lee 2000, chapters 36 and 40; Tunku Abul Rahman Putra 1977, 127). An autocratic Malaysian regime with fewer qualms about the cost of repression might have chosen the “arrest” option. If Lee was arrested and any subsequent civil unrest put down forcefully, Singapore might not have separated from Malaysia at all. But the Tunku ultimately did not do so because he perceived the cost of repression to be quite high. Arresting Lee might stall separation but could also provoke more civil unrest from his supporters in Singapore. As Philip Moore, the British acting commissioner in Singapore, remarked on the aftermath of Lee’s 1963 overwhelming victory in Singapore’s local elections, “The Malaysian government would either have to do business with him or put him in jail. The latter is now unthinkable” (Lee 1998, 508).

Overall, this narrative does not totally discount the differences in political ideology between Lee’s PAP and Tunku’s UMNO. Nor does it totally discount the idea that Lee Kuan Yew misread the Tunku and UMNO’s intentions in the run-up to merger and during Singapore’s marriage within the federation (Barr 1997). Lee’s PAP was insistent on a multiethnic meritocracy where all races would compete as equals, whereas the Tunku’s Alliance was built on preserving multiethnic harmony via Malay-Bumiputera dominant consociationalism and Malay-Bumiputera special rights. Yet, this clash of ideologies could have been avoided if the new federation’s institutions were more inclusive and Singapore’s interests were more equitably represented. The fact that their representation was inequitable meant that the political clash between the two political parties was unavoidable and that Singapore’s separation from the federation happened sooner rather than later, or not at all.
CHAPTER 2

State Institutions in North Taiwan versus South Taiwan

Hokkien Language Recognition

Chun-Ying Wu and Amy H. Liu

Editors’ Introduction: While the previous chapter emphasized how state exclusion resulted in separation, in this chapter, we see how political representation yielded an outcome that is less extreme. During the authoritarian period, the Kuomintang (KMT) imposed a repressive Mandarin-only policy. Yet as the country democratized in the early 1990s, the homogeneity of South Taiwan pulled the KMT to make linguistic concessions to its own Hokkien-speaking locals (benshengren). But this is only half the story. In North Taiwan, where the population has always been more heterogeneous, demographic shifts over several decades pushed the KMT away from repressive monolingualism.

Introduction

In terms of area, the island of Taiwan is small: It is slightly larger than the state of Maryland (13,974 and 12,407 square miles, respectively). At 24 million, its population is predominantly of Han Chinese descent (98%). Given the small territory size and the lack of phenotype diversity, it is no surprise that there have been no demands for regional secessionism. Yet, it is important to note that there is a strong (sub)ethnic divide—one where we see agitation for greater linguistic autonomy. There are the locals (benshengren), that is, the descendants of ancestors who originated from China prior to 1895. The vast majority of them (60%) speak Hokkien, a ver-
nacular that is mutually unintelligible from Mandarin Chinese, the official language of the Republic of China. While the Kuomintang (KMT) government afforded recognition to Hokkien in the 1990s, linguistic accommodation has not always been forthcoming. At one point, the government brutally repressed the use of Hokkien in public settings. In this chapter, we explore this linguistic pivot. Specifically, we ask: Why did the KMT recognize Hokkien?

This linguistic about-face in government position is puzzling for three reasons. First, when the KMT overthrew the Qing dynasty and founded the Republic of China, there was the notion that the modern nation-state needed one language. This one language would be Mandarin Chinese (Tsao 1999). If the modern nation-state is predicated on the ideology of one language, we cannot explain why the KMT recognized an alternative Chinese vernacular. Second, when the KMT fled to Taiwan in 1949, the government strongly vowed a return to—and an eventual reunification with—mainland China. There would be “One China.” With this vision, we cannot explain why the government made room for Hokkien. Third, upon arriving on the island, the KMT displayed tremendous brutality toward the benshengren, often with great success. If the past was any indication of future behavior, we cannot explain why the KMT shifted from a strategy of repression to one of accommodation.

There are two conventional explanations for Hokkien recognition. The first is about a demographic shift: With a declining waishengren population—that is, descendants of those who arrived in Taiwan with the KMT—we see increasing calls for multiculturalism (see Wu and Lau 2019). The second is about democratization: The introduction of opposition parties and legislative elections resulted in the recognition of Hokkien (and other vernaculars) (see Dreyer 2003; Dupré 2017). In this chapter, we contend that the two explanations each tell half a story—specifically, a regional story. The demographic shift was predominantly a northern phenomenon, where diversity of ethnicities translated into a push away from the recognition of one singular language, despite high levels of Mandarin proficiency all around. And the political changes that came with democratization had a strong southern element as the Hokkien-speaking KMT members from the area wielded the influence and pulled the party to recognizing Hokkien.

We know from Posner (2004, 2005) that whether an ethnic group is politically relevant depends not only on its size but also on its concentration. In Taiwan, the Hokkien speakers have always been the numerical majority. They are, however, spread unevenly throughout the island.
Specifically, they are dispersed in the north but highly concentrated in the south. In this chapter, we leverage this arrangement to test the heterogeneous effects of demographic shifts and democratization.

The chapter proceeds as follows. We begin with the timeline for how the KMT came to accommodate Hokkien—from a position of slight indifference (Chinese official monolingualism) to brutal repression (Mandarin-only monolingualism) to formal recognition (multiculturalism) in schools and mass media. Next, we present our argument, discussing why a focus on the north-south divide provides us with the requisite empirical leverage. After that, we process trace, drawing heavily on evidence from an archived survey. Given the empirical evidence, we then discuss the concept of regional identities in Taiwan. We conclude by highlighting the theoretical contributions of this chapter and the implications for other languages in Taiwan.

The Path to Hokkien Recognition

To process trace how the KMT came to recognize Hokkien, we begin with a timeline (see Ricks and Liu 2018). We can characterize the KMT’s language policy in three periods. The first period was Chinese official monolingualism. The goal was primarily to eliminate any legacy of the Japanese language on the island. During this period, Hokkien was left alone. The second period shifted toward Mandarin-only monolingualism, where the government aimed to eliminate Hokkien and other Chinese vernaculars. This was the time of extreme repression: There was punishment for the use of Hokkien in public spaces. The final period is one of multiculturalism, where we see the gradual restoration of Hokkien language in education and mass media.

Chinese Official Monolingualism (1946–63)

Between 1946 and 1963, the KMT enforced assimilative policies aiming to Sinicize the benshengren. To this end, the government comprehensively banned the use of Japanese in daily life and instead promoted the Speaking National Language (Mandarin) movement. Under this movement, schools had to teach strictly in Mandarin. Moreover, radio stations were highly encouraged to use only Mandarin in their programs (Chen 2009). Because Hokkien—at this time—was defined as a local dialect of the Chinese language, it was not completely prohibited. Speaking in Hokkien in schools
or on the air was tolerated. It is important, however, not to conflate this tolerance as some sort of protection of native Taiwan language rights. In fact, since Japanese had become the language of the educated Taiwanese—courtesy of 50 years of colonialization—the ban on the Japanese language meant many Hokkien elites became effectively illiterate and unemployable overnight (Chou 1995).

**Mandarin-Only Monolingualism (1963–90)**

After eradicating the Japanese language, the KMT then pivoted its attack toward the other Chinese vernaculars. In 1963, the government adopted a bill—the first of its kind—restricting the use of language in mass media: the Regulations to Guide Broadcast and TV Station Programs. The regulation reduced the proportion of Hokkien and Hakka language programming to less than 50 percent. In 1966, the government then passed the Plan for Further Enhancement of Using National Language. This new regulation empowered school officials to punish students for speaking mother tongues on campus. By this point, Hokkien was no longer seen as instrumental for helping the benshengren learn Mandarin but rather viewed as obstructive.

We see even more restrictive Mandarin-only policies in the 1970s. In 1972, the Education Ministry forbade students and teachers from speaking Hokkien on school grounds—even in private conversations. The same year, there was an executive order demanding television stations to further reduce the broadcast hours for Hokkien programs. The 1976 Radio and Television Act additionally regulated that “local dialect use should be decreased year by year.” By 1979, the government declared those unable to speak Mandarin as ineligible for a job in the civil service or in political office. And, in fact, the rhetoric was such that speaking Hokkien was construed as treason (Chen 2009).

In the early 1980s, the KMT ratcheted up their efforts to further expand the reach of Mandarin monolingualism into all public spheres. There was dissatisfaction among some circles that Mandarin had not permeated adequately into the periphery (Chen 2009, 123). In response to these calls for more radical assimilation policies, the Education Ministry drafted the Language and Word Act, thereby requiring all meetings, public speeches, conversations in public spaces, and advertisements to take place exclusively in Mandarin. But when the bill was introduced to the legislative yuan in 1985, strong opposition from civil society forced the government...
to table it (Huang 1994, 55–56). From this point on, while the government continued to deny Hokkien demands for linguistic recognition, it ceased proposing any more Mandarin-only policies (56–58).

**Taiwanese Multiculturalism (1990–)**

By the 1990s we start to see major changes. In 1989, the largest opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), established in 1986, won the mayoral election in six counties (with one DPP-sympathizing independent taking a seventh county). Following their victory, several of the DPP mayors used executive orders to restore “mother tongue classes”—that is, Hokkien and other vernaculars—in schools. Since these classes were after-school programs—as opposed to formal courses included in the national education curriculum—local governments technically did not violate official educational language policy. But for all intents and purposes, the existence of these “mother tongue classes” marked an important departure from the core principle of monolingualism. Interestingly the Education Ministry did not intervene.

The year 1992 marked the first direct legislative election in Taiwan—thereby ending the first legislative yuan session (1948–91). The second legislative yuan abolished language restrictions in media broadcasts (Huang 1994, 72). In 1993, two native Taiwanese cabinet members confessed in the legislative yuan that “it is incorrect to enact monolingual policies that disrespect mother tongue in the past” (Chen 2009, 39). The Education Ministry also announced in the same year that mother tongue classes—while an optional course—would now be formally included in the national education curriculum. By 2000, mother tongue classes would become compulsory subjects in elementary schools. And finally, between 1995 and 2000, the KMT permitted privately owned radio stations to use mostly Hokkien in their programs.

**The North-South Divide**

Having established the timeline, we now discuss the north-south divide in Taiwan. To focus on the Han Chinese as one ethnic group—because of their shared phenotype—ignores the variations in their language use and ancestral origins; it also overlooks how these subethnic groups are geographically concentrated (see Lin, Wu, and Lee 2006). When we consider subgroup fractionalization (see Selway 2011, 2015), we see four socially
relevant groups (see Birnir et al. 2015). Table 2.1 illustrates the relationship between these groups. Of the four groups, three are under the rubric of “Han Chinese”—constituting about 98 percent of the island’s population today.

There are two important ethnic cleavages among the Han Chinese. The first is linguistic. The majority speak Hokkien, a vernacular with eight tones. Hokkien shares more commonality with the vernaculars of southern China—and in some cases even northern Vietnam—than with those of northern China (i.e., Mandarin). For the most part, Hokkien and Mandarin are mutually unintelligible.

The second cleavage of importance is the ancestral origin—in terms of both when they came and where they came from. The first wave of Han Chinese migration came during the Qing dynasty starting as early as 1760. Around then, immigration restrictions were lifted, and men—mostly from the coastal area of Fujian province (where they speak Hokkien)—made the journey to Taiwan. An imperial decree, up until 1875, forbade women from leaving China. China would subsequently cede the island to Japan in 1895 following the First Sino-Japanese War. This would mark an exogenously induced cultural split between the Han Chinese in Taiwan from their co-ethnics on the mainland. During the 50 years of Japanese colonialization (1895–1945), there was substantial cultural influence from the colonial authorities—from architectural development to loan words. For example, although the Japanese initially viewed themselves as ethnically superior, by the 1930s they saw the Taiwanese as ethnically Japanese and thereby afforded the latter the privilege of fighting for the emperor (Ching 2001; Hu and Liu 2020).

When the Japanese relinquished Taiwan at the end of World War II,
the Japanese culture had spread throughout the island. More importantly, the Han Chinese on the island had no professed affinity for the KMT government in Beijing. After all, when the KMT overthrew the monarchy and proclaimed the Republic of China in 1911, Taiwan was still colonized by Japan. To the Han Chinese in Taiwan, there were questions both about China’s claim to the island and about the KMT’s legitimacy to the people. Efforts to push back against the KMT, however, were futile. By 1949, when the KMT retreated to Taiwan to escape the communist onslaught, the government brought with it an influx of outsiders. We would subsequently see a tension between them and the Han Chinese already on the island.

On the one hand, the *waishengren* (literally, people from outside the province) were from all over China and spoke Mandarin Chinese. Some spoke Mandarin as their native tongue; others spoke it as a lingua franca. These newcomers had spent considerable effort fighting both the Japanese and the communists. And while they were a numerical minority, the strength of the KMT rendered them the politically dominant—if not outright monopolistic—group. On the other hand, the Han Chinese already on the island spoke mostly Hokkien, had survived Japanese colonialization—in some cases fighting for the Japanese—and did not identify with either the Republic of China or the KMT. Despite constituting the numerical majority, the *benshengren* (literally, people of the province) were politically dominated—if not outright repressed—for multiple decades.

Given these linguistic and ancestral cleavages, we see ascriptive differences between the north and the south. When the Mandarin-speaking *waishengren* settled down in Taiwan, they were concentrated primarily in the north—specifically, Taipei City and Keelung. In 1990, 26.1 percent of the *waishengren* population lived in Taipei City alone, while 23.2 percent lived across the eight southern cities and counties combined. Put differently, the *waishengren* were a quarter of the Taipei City population—but only 10 percent of the population of the south.

Table 2.2 shows the distribution—based on a nationally representative survey (Chen 2001)—of each subethnic group population in northern and southern Taiwan. Here we see a pronounced difference in the demographic structure between the two regions. On the one hand, the north is ethnically diverse (Herfindahl Index: 0.5722). While the plurality of the island’s *waishengren* is here, they are far from the only ones. On the other hand, in the south, the ethnic population is quite homogeneous (Herfindahl Index: 0.2836). And while not all Hokkiens live in the south, 84 percent of them do. There are very few areas where the Hokkiens do not constitute the
majority. In fact, there is only one singular township in the south where the *waishengren* even reach 20 percent of the population. We see high concentrations of Hokkien-speaking *benshengren* in Changhwa, Pintung, and Tainan counties—all in the south. As it turns out, the administrative boundaries of the south have matched against not only language and ancestral origins but also the 2000 presidential elections, when the KMT would lose the presidency for the first time. These ascriptive differences suggest the importance of focusing on the north versus the south when examining the politics of Hokkien recognition.

There are two reasons why we would expect different causal stories between regions. First, regions are a social unit. They aggregate who people interact with on a regular basis—specifically, whether these other people are co-ethnics or not. We know contact with diversity can increase out-group tolerance (Oliver and Wong 2003), inclusive of their mother tongues (Liu 2015; Liu, Brown, and Dunn 2015). We also know that in linguistically diverse settings, we should see convergence on a lingua franca (Laitin 1988; Liu 2015, 2021). If the north is more diverse than the south, then we should see weakening preferences for Mandarin-only monolingual policies in this region—but also the increasing use of Mandarin Chinese as a lingua franca. In contrast, in the south where the population is homogeneously Hokkien, we should see continued preferences for the Hokkien vernacular.

Second, regions are a political unit. Elections ensure that the preferences of the district are represented. We know political parties respond strategically to the behaviors of other parties (Adams and Somer-Topçu 2009). When an opposition party is able to mobilize an electoral base, the

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**TABLE 2.2. Ethnicity of Respondent's Father (1993)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Group</th>
<th>North(^a)</th>
<th>South(^b)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Han Chinese</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Benshengren</em> Hokkien</td>
<td>58.22%</td>
<td>83.95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Hakka</em></td>
<td>15.13%</td>
<td>8.64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Waishengren</em> Mainlanders</td>
<td>25.66%</td>
<td>6.38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austronesian</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwanese aborigines</td>
<td>0.99%</td>
<td>1.03%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herfindal Index</td>
<td>0.5722</td>
<td>0.2836</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Chen (2001).

Note: One northern county (Yilan County) and one southern county (Chiayi County) were not sampled in this survey.

\(^a\) Keelung City, Taipei City, Taipei County, Taoyuan County, and Hsinchu County

\(^b\) Chiayi City, Tainan City, Tainan County, Kaohsiung County, Kaohsiung City, Pingtung County, and Penghu County
governing party must respond by co-opting opposition elites or making policy concessions (Birnir 2006; Gandhi 2008; Greene 2007; Magaloni 2006). Considering the south is typically the electoral base for the opposition, we should see the KMT make grand gestures to the Hokkien-speaking party members from the south.

Demographic Shifts, Democratization, and the North-South Divide

In this section, we provide the evidence—mostly of the hoops varietal (see Ricks and Liu 2018)—to demonstrate how the causal processes unfolded differently in the north versus the south. We will see how, in the north, demographic shifts pushed the KMT toward multiculturalism but how, in the south, it was democratization that allowed the southern-based KMT members to pull the party to Hokkien recognition.

Demographic Shifts

For the waishengren—specifically the first-generation mainlanders—the monolingual policy was no big deal. While the waishengren spoke different vernaculars at home, what is important here is that they were all proficient in Mandarin. This was because the KMT had promoted the language as a lingua franca throughout China dating back to 1920. In contrast, since the benshengren were not brought under KMT control until the government showed up on the island in 1949, their exposure to Mandarin was quite late, thereby rendering what the waishengren saw as a lingua franca a language of oppression for everyone else.

And while the first-generation waishengren were generally more supportive of the KMT’s Mandarin-only policy, it is important to recognize that their proportion of the population was small from the outset—and continued to decline over time. Between 1946 and 1955, there were just over one million waishengren (1.1 million–1.21 million) in Taiwan (Yap 2018, 16). This would make them about 20 percent of the island. However, as the island’s population grew from 9.3 million in 1956 to 20.3 million in 1990—an annual growth rate of more than 1 percent—the waishengren population would gradually decrease to an estimated 13 percent. We see this decline across all counties and cities (see fig. 2.1).

In addition to declining population numbers, the waishengren also faced higher rates of mixed marriage. Here, we return to the 1993 survey. We classify respondents into two groups: those born before 1950 and those
TABLE 2.3. Ethnicity of Each Parent (Respondents Born Pre-1950)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Father’s Ethnicity</th>
<th>Hokkien</th>
<th>Hakka</th>
<th>Aborigine</th>
<th>Waishengren</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hokkien</td>
<td>366</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(99.46%)</td>
<td>(3.39%)</td>
<td>(0%)</td>
<td>(5.88%)</td>
<td>(72.29%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hakka</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(96.61%)</td>
<td>(0.27%)</td>
<td>(96%)</td>
<td>(0%)</td>
<td>(11.24%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aborigine</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0%)</td>
<td>(0%)</td>
<td>(100%)</td>
<td>(0%)</td>
<td>(0.78%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waishengren</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.27%)</td>
<td>(0%)</td>
<td>(0%)</td>
<td>(94.12%)</td>
<td>(15.7%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>368</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>516</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(100%)</td>
<td>(100%)</td>
<td>(100%)</td>
<td>(100%)</td>
<td>(100%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Chen (2001).

TABLE 2.4. Ethnicity of Each Parent (Respondents Born Post-1950)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Father’s Ethnicity</th>
<th>Hokkien</th>
<th>Hakka</th>
<th>Aborigine</th>
<th>Waishengren</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hokkien</td>
<td>608</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>669</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(99.02%)</td>
<td>(3.67%)</td>
<td>(0%)</td>
<td>(50.89%)</td>
<td>(79.17%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hakka</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.98%)</td>
<td>(95.41%)</td>
<td>(20%)</td>
<td>(11.61%)</td>
<td>(14.79%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aborigine</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0%)</td>
<td>(0%)</td>
<td>(80%)</td>
<td>(4.46%)</td>
<td>(1.54%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waishengren</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0%)</td>
<td>(0.92%)</td>
<td>(33.04%)</td>
<td>(4.5%)</td>
<td>(4.5%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>614</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>845</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(100%)</td>
<td>(100%)</td>
<td>(100%)</td>
<td>(100%)</td>
<td>(100%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Chen (2001).

born after. Given that 86 percent of first-generation *waishengren* came to Taiwan before 1951 (Yap 2018, 15), we assume that a respondent whose father is *waishengren* and who was born before 1951 was therefore not born in Taiwan.1 The following tables show the ethnicity of each parent for respondents born pre-1950 (table 2.3) and post-1950 (table 2.4).

Note that among the 516 respondents who were born before 1950, almost all of them had parents in co-ethnic marriages (98.25%). This was the case regardless of the parents’ ethnicity. This consistency ceases when we shift our focus to those born after 1950. While Hokkiens, Hakkas, and aborigines had parents who still maintained high rates of co-ethnic marriages, for *waishengren* the number drops to 33 percent. Put differently, for every three *waishengren* men getting married, only one had a *waishengren* wife.

1. There was no respondent in the survey sample who was born in 1950 and who had a *waishengren* father.
Fig. 2.1. Declining first-generation \textit{waisbengren} population. (Data from Census Report, various years.)
The implication here is important: If 67 percent of these *waishengren* respondents were from households with a *waishengren* father but a *benshengren* mother, it means they grew up hearing and speaking Hokkien or another vernacular at home. Under such conditions, while these individuals may be considered *waishengren* because of their father’s lineage, they were less likely than their father to champion a Mandarin-only monolingual policy. And since *waishengren* were much more likely to be situated in the north (as we saw in table 2.1), what this means is a shifting attitude—but only among northerners.

Another observable implication of the diversity in the north and the homogeneity in the south is the linguistic repertoire of the individuals. While the government adopted and enforced Mandarin-only monolingualism, we still see interesting variation in the preference for language use (see table 2.5). For ethnic Hokkien respondents in the north, almost 80 percent of the interview respondents opted for Mandarin. This seems to suggest that in the north—where there is greater diversity—Mandarin served a lingua franca purpose. It was necessary for communicating across subethnic groups. But is this diversity a driver for the use of the lingua franca? We consider the counterfactual. And as it turns out, this is the south. In the south, where Hokkien was dominant, it remains so. More than half of the respondents opted for Hokkien as the medium of the interview. The homogeneity in the area has allowed—if not outright encouraged—the continued use of the mother tongue in their daily lives (see Liu 2015).

If we ignore regional differences, it would be easy to attribute the developments in the north to the whole country—for example, there was widespread diversity, and mixed marriages were common. There would also be the assumptions that the increasing tolerance for multiculturalism was widespread and that Mandarin was widely accepted as a lingua franca. But this was certainly not the case in the south. The south provided the Hokkien-speaking *benshengren* a social base that would prove instrumental for civil society. Consider the events that transpired on December 10, 1979, in Kaohsiung, the largest city in the south. On that day, an opposition magazine decided to host a demonstration on International Human Rights Day; the subsequent police crackdown resulted in the arrest of eight high-profile pro-democracy activists along with more than 50 additional individuals. This event, the Meilidao Incident, is often considered one of the key events that would galvanize Taiwanese civil society’s demands for democracy (Jacobs 2016).
Democratization

The process of democratization in the late 1980s and early 1990s also played an important role. Political liberalization included a restructured legislative yuan. The first legislative yuan (1948–91) was elected in 1948—in China. Half of the legislators (380) would subsequently flee to Taiwan in 1949. To maintain the legislature’s legitimacy of representing the entirety of China, the government put off reelection. In lieu, there were supplementary elections. In these supplementary elections, legislators were elected by direct constituency, vocational groups, and overseas Chinese. But since the KMT largely controlled the election of occupational group representatives and the president appointed the overseas Chinese representatives, the KMT always controlled the first legislative yuan. Under such conditions, the government could ignore civil society demands—including calls for Hokkien recognition.

But things would change by 1991. Calls for democratization led to constitutional reform. The 1991 amendment ended the first legislative yuan, abolished seats for vocational group representatives, and changed the election of overseas Chinese representatives into a proportional system. For the second legislative yuan, all legislators were elected by general votes. And as a result, political demands from civil society—including those mobilizing from the south—translated into policy demands by their elected officials.

We also see regional influences manifesting in KMT party politics. Within the KMT, the benshengren politicians from the south (and center) were gaining political influence. Factionalism deeply shaped Taiwanese
politics after 1945. Because the KMT had no roots on the island prior to its arrival, in 1949, it needed to establish order quickly. As a solution, the party found it more conducive to build clientelist networks (Chen 1995). At the local levels (from the cities and counties to the villages and towns), there were factions with benshengren, who had the ability to mobilize mass political support, and these individuals were able to continuously win mayoral and council elections. And as these local benshengren joined the KMT, their victories—even at the local levels—helped the party legitimize its rule throughout the island (Chen 1995, 180–81).

Although the KMT tried to reduce the influence of local factions in the 1970s, its reliance on them would increase after disastrous defeats in the 1989 local elections and the 1991 general election. The major opposition party—the DPP—proved skilled in organizing resources and coordinating candidates (Read 2012; Rigger 2001, 2002). The DPP—formally created in 1986—called for not just democratization but also multiculturalism. With the electoral setbacks, the KMT quickly learned that to defeat the DPP would require negotiations with local factions. This cooperation would result in the promotion of southern benshengren within the KMT ranks. In the second legislative yuan (1992–95), we see members from the southern factions assume key positions including speaker, deputy speaker, and party whip (Chen 1995, 233).

Identity in the South

While there is a distinct north-south divide, it is important to recognize that this cleavage is more ascriptive than ethnic in the conventional sense—that is, there is no “southern” identity. Where we see identity manifesting differently between the north and the south is with respect to China. Southerners are more inclined than their northern counterparts to identify as Taiwanese (versus Chinese). Political liberalization in the late 1980s and early 1990s coincided with increasing freedom of expression—meaning opposition elites publicly championed identification with Taiwan, a distinct Taiwanese culture inclusive of Hokkien and other vernaculars, and even Taiwanese independence from mainland China (Hsu 2014, 96). This was in stark contrast to the status quo. During the KMT’s authoritarian rule, Chinese identity—that is, identifying oneself as a Chinese and viewing Taiwan as a part of China—was predominant in educational materials and in mass media broadcasts. In contrast, Taiwanese identity was
repressed because it would otherwise suggest a different type of nationalism based on multiculturalism. In the early 1990s, national identity soon became one of the most salient issues in Taiwanese politics (Rigger 1997).

As we see in table 2.6, the proportion of Chinese identity is much higher in the north. Almost 35 percent of the respondents in the north identified as Chinese (regardless of intensity). In contrast, only 21 percent identified as Taiwanese. But once we look in the south, the pattern flips: While 28 percent identified as Chinese, almost 40 percent saw themselves as Taiwanese. Interestingly, the proportion of those who saw themselves as both Chinese and Taiwanese remained constant between the two regions (about 33%).

Of course, one possible explanation for this regional discrepancy has to do with the waishengren in the north. They are, after all, recent migrants—or children of recent migrants—from China. As such, their affinity for identifying as Chinese is to be expected. To address this possibility, we isolate the sample for only the Hokkiens. As we see in table 2.7, the results remain largely unchanged: The Taiwanese identity is much stronger in the south, where 42 percent of the respondents identified as Taiwanese. In contrast, in the north, only 28 percent answered in the same way. These differences are consistent with Wachman’s (1994) argument that “one source of frustration that resulted from KMT cultural policies and continually reinforced the Taiwanese sense of group identity is the issue of dialects” (107). In the north, where Mandarin functioned much like a lingua franca, the frustration was less prominent; but conversely, in the south, where Hokkien was the language of the supermajority, these restrictions would feed into a non-Chinese identity.
Conclusion

In this chapter we examined how the causal process leading to Hokkien recognition differed between the north and the south. Using archived survey data and process tracing, we showed that in the north, demographic shifts pushed the KMT away from repressive monolingualism. And in the south, democratization allowed the benshengren members to pull the KMT toward Hokkien recognition. By calling attention to the north-south divide, this chapter makes two contributions. The first is to Asian studies. This chapter highlights how the concentration of one group in one area provided a social and electoral base for shaping the political landscape—a legacy that we still see in the present day. The second contribution is to the field of ethnic politics. By highlighting the nuanced relationship between language, ancestral origins, and geographical region, this chapter highlights the importance of focusing on cross-cutting cleavages and subethnic fractionalization (Selway 2011, 2015).

In this chapter, the focus has been on the Hokkiens. On the one hand, this attention is warranted. It is a critical case (see Seawright and Gering 2008). The Hokkiens are the numerical majority. And during KMT’s authoritarian rule, the domination of the minority waishengren over the majority Hokkiens rendered Taiwan one of the two cases in Asia where we see such a linguistic configuration (Liu 2015). On the other hand, because of the highly unusual situation, perhaps the attention should not be on the Hokkiens but on the other languages. There is another Chinese vernacular-speaking benshengren population in Taiwan. The Hakkas are from Guangdong (also in southern China), and their ancestors also migrated to Taiwan prior to Japanese colonialization. In many ways, the...
Hakkas were subjected to two rounds of domination—a political one by the *waishengren* and then a numerical one by the Hokkiens (see Dupré 2017). The Hakkas are concentrated in northern Taiwan, specifically in Hsinchu.

The population on the island, however, is more than just Han Chinese. There are also the aborigines. There is archeological evidence to suggest that they are not only indigenous to the island but also related to many of the aborigine tribes in the Pacific islands. During the KMT rule, they too were subjected to the same assimilative policies (Kaplan and Baldauf 2003). And while the Taiwanese government’s rhetoric today—in an area of multiculturalism—talks about these four “ethnic” groups (note that the focus has shifted from subethnic to ethnic), there is another distinct fifth group that is socially but not yet politically relevant: the “new residents” from Southeast Asia (Chen 2014; Cheng 2014; Wang, Chen, and Tang 2014). As their numbers continue to grow—especially in the south—it will be important to see how regionalism affects their recognition.
CHAPTER 3

State Institutions in North Sumatra, Indonesia

National Identification of the Bataks

Risa J. Toha

Editors’ Introduction: This chapter pivots to Indonesia and examines the absence of a (North) Sumatran identity today despite pro-autonomy rebellion 60 years ago. Archival evidence suggests that the Bataks adopted violence as a strategy because their repeated demands were ignored by the national government. However, once the government extended favorable terms to the rebels—including the placement of many high-profile Batak members in the legislative councils and the military officer corps—violence dissipated and the Bataks cultivated a strong national identification. The Bataks’ shift from armed mobilization to reintegration indicates that a strong national identification can be cultivated even after violent conflict to the extent that groups are accommodated in state institutions.

Introduction

At the turn of the 20th century, the idea of an independent unitary state called Indonesia encompassing thousands of islands and hundreds of ethnic groups was a contested one. During the Dutch colonial period, ethnic groups in many parts of the archipelago did not view themselves as part of a greater nation. Even as the nationalist movement gained momentum in the 1920s, youth organizations were initially organized along ethnic or regional lines (e.g., Jong Java, Jong Celebes, and Jong Sumatranen Bond). As much as the dominant rhetoric among nationalist organizations at the time was to recognize Indonesia as one entity, those who opposed this idea
at the time lamented that “intellectuals [who] want all the peoples in the Netherlands-Indies archipelago to become one, mutually Javanese, Batak, Dayaks, Timorese, Makasarese, Ambonese as well as Papuans have to be called ‘Indonesians’ whether they like it or not” (quoted in Chauvel 1990, 141). This ambivalence continued to haunt Indonesia for years after independence, as the country grappled with armed rebellions. Despite these challenges, Indonesia celebrated the 75th anniversary of its declaration of independence in August 2020, and Indonesians today report a high level of pride in their country. Data from the fourth wave of the Asian Barometer Survey (ABS) suggest that more than 64 percent of Indonesian respondents are very proud to be citizens of their country and about 82 percent were unwilling to live in another country. In addition, 75 percent of respondents reported that they either strongly agree or agree with the statement that they are proud of their system of government. This identification is consistent across different ethnic groups. As figure 3.1 suggests, most ethnic groups fall right along the average line in levels of national identification. Indonesian respondents, regardless of ethnicity, indicate that they are very proud to be citizens of Indonesia, proud of their system of government, and unwilling to live abroad.

How did Indonesia move from a contested agglomeration of groups to a cohesive unit where the majority of its citizens are proud to consider themselves Indonesians? More importantly, how did ethnic groups that had previously mobilized violently cultivate a strong attachment to their national political community? The Bataks’ participation in the Piagam Revolucioner Rakyat Indonesia (PRRI) rebellion in Sumatra, Indonesia, presents an answer to this question. Although they were one of the main ethnic groups in Sumatra that supported this rebellion in the late 1950s, the Bataks today express a strong attachment to Indonesia. Even as the Batak ethnic identity continues to be deployed in local executive contests, violent mobilization has completely dissipated. How can we explain this shift in national identification among the Bataks, from violent mobilization against the state to a strong national identification?

1. I calculated this based on 1,550 Indonesian respondents’ answers to questions 161, 162, and 84 in the ABS survey. Question 161 asks “How proud are you to be a citizen of Indonesia? Are you?” (Options: on a 1–4 scale, 1 = very proud, 4 = not proud at all). Question 162 asks respondents: “Given the chance, how willing would you be to go and live in another country?” (Options: on a 1–4 scale, 1 = very willing, 4 = not willing at all). Question 84 asks: “Thinking in general, I am proud of our system of government” (options: on a 1–4 scale, 1 = strongly agree, 4 = strongly disagree).
Existing literature has attributed ethnic minority groups’ national identification to their political inclusion and accommodation. Excluded groups have a higher likelihood of articulating grievances against the state, having lower national identification, and resorting to violent mobilization than groups that are well represented (Birnir 2007; Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010). Conversely, well-represented groups tend to have much stronger national identification (Wimmer 2017). But what sufficient political inclusion looks like in practice and how groups shift from participating in an armed mobilization to developing a strong national identification remain less clear.

This chapter examines the rise and subsequent demobilization of the PRRI rebellion in Indonesia to trace how ethnic groups who had previously turned to violent mobilization against the state can cultivate a strong national identification. Relying on the PRRI archives, I show that the rebellion emerged because demands were consistently ignored. The government, recognizing the threat of possible disintegration, responded with both military might and accommodation. The rebels were promised pardon, targeted development efforts in Sumatra, reintegration, and the military’s commitment against the communists. After the conflict, Batak PRRI
fighters were not only quickly reintegrated into normal life but also rein-
corporated into politics, and many became elected members of councils.
Under Soeharto’s rule, many Bataks climbed to high ranks in the military,
judiciary, and civil service. In post-Soeharto Indonesia, Batak candidates
frequently run for local executive posts, with running mates from other
ethnic groups. The case of the Bataks illustrates how political inclusion
and accommodation of demands can appease even ethnic groups who had
mobilized violence against the state and can cultivate a strong national
identity among them.

Relevant Literature

National identification has been empirically examined in several ways. On
one end of the spectrum, some studies have used citizens’ self-reported
pride and attachment to their nation-state to measure national identifica-
tion (Wimmer 2017). On the other end, others have examined groups’
mobilization of violence against the state as an indicator of their disaffec-
tion (Beissinger 2002).

In multiethnic contexts, ethnic groups’ inclusion in national govern-
ments is associated with higher levels of attachment to their country (Wim-
mer 2017). In explaining why some groups mobilize violence whereas
others do not, some scholars have shown that politically well-represented
ethnic groups will be less prone to using violence because they can rely on
formal channels of political engagement to secure their preferences (Birnir
2007; Toha 2017). One implication that follows is that an ethnic group
would mobilize when it is politically excluded and remain peaceful when it
is accommodated.

In this chapter, I use archived PRRI papers from 1958 through 1962
to identify why and how PRRI emerged and ended. Following Ricks and
Liu’s (2018) guidelines for process tracing, I present a timeline tracing the
sequence of events from PRRI figures’ increasing disenchantment with
Jakarta to the mobilization of violence. Smoking-gun evidence would
include statements showing that individuals who joined PRRI did so
because the government had excluded and ignored them. Doubly deci-
sive evidence would include statements by PRRI members articulating that
rebellion was the only way they could hope to leverage their demands.
Other evidence would include statements by PRRI members agreeing to
terminate their efforts because the government had accommodated their
demands.
The Bataks: An Overview

The Bataks today are one of the largest ethnic groups in Indonesia. According to the 2010 census, the Bataks compose 3.58 percent of Indonesia’s total population and are the third largest ethnic group in the country after the Javanese (40.22%) and the Sundanese (15.50%) (Ananta et al. 2017, 78). The census further subdivided the Bataks into six subgroups: Mandailing, Angkola, Toba, Dairi/Pakpak Dairi, Simalungun, and Karo. The Bataks are the largest ethnic group in North Sumatra province (at 44.75% of the total population), with the Javanese a close second (33.40%) (Ananta et al. 2017, 103–4).

Historically, the Bataks had lived in areas surrounding Lake Toba, ensconced between today’s Aceh and West Sumatra provinces. The Batak Karo, Pakpak, and Simalungun were concentrated in the north, while the Angkolas and Mandailing were in the south. Many Batak Angkolas and Mandailing adopted Islam in the early 19th century (Reid 2010). The Batak Tobas, on the other hand, are predominantly Protestant (Hasselgren 2000). The Karos are predominantly Catholic (Aritonang and Steenbrink 2008).

The PRRI Rebellion

Emergence

The PRRI rebellion emerged during Indonesia’s turbulent years. In 1953, the Ali Sastroamidjojo cabinet overvalued the rupiah and centralized licensing measures to finance expensive national projects in Java, at the expense of export-producing regions in the outer islands (Feith 1962). Many outside of Java felt that they had not yet enjoyed the benefits of development. In the All-Sumatra Adat Congress in March 1957, a prominent Minang intellectual lamented that Sumatra contributed nearly 71 percent of the country’s exports, but the country allocated a meager 25 percent of its national budget in 1955 to islands other than Java (Alisjahbana 1957, 16–17). This perception of unequal distribution of resources contributed to growing disenchantment and support for federalism and ethnic organizations outside of Java (Feith 1962).

Another source of resentment for political actors representing the outer islands who were deeply religious was President Soekarno’s increasingly pro-communist leanings. In the country’s first national election in 1955,
the communist Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI), much to many people’s dismay, emerged as one of the top four political parties nationally.\footnote{2} Despite the PKI’s poor showing in the outer islands, the party was perceived to have the president’s ear to influence important decisions.

Soekarno’s vice president, Mohammad Hatta, whom many viewed as the representative of the outer islands at Indonesia’s highest echelon of power, resigned on December 1, 1956, less than two months after Soekarno’s public statement blaming political parties for Indonesia’s problems and calling on Indonesians to “let us now join together to bury all parties” (Feith 1962, 517). Hatta, a strong proponent of democracy and political parties, had signed the decree permitting political parties to operate in November 1945.

Frustrated with Jakarta’s continued neglect of the outer islands, several army commanders in North Sulawesi and North Sumatra took to openly smuggling large quantities of copra and rubber (Reid 2018). Colonel Maludin Simbolon, a Christian Toba Batak who had been the commanding officer in North Sumatra for years, worked with a Medan businessman and smuggled large quantities of rubber out of Teluk Nibong in mid-1956 (Smail 1968; Feith 1962).\footnote{3} The government threatened to close down Bitung, planned to restructure some military units in Sumatra, and intended to transfer a number of top officers from their posts, much to the dismay of the relevant parties (Feith 1962).

In November 1956, Colonel Ahmad Hussein formed the Banteng Council, composed mostly of soldiers in the Banteng Division, which had lost one brigade due to Jakarta’s restructuring of military units in Sumatra. Among a number of other demands, the Banteng Council pushed for “an immediate and radical improvement within the Armed Forces, . . . [and the filling of] key posts in the Sumatra Tengah provincial government by individuals who are competent, honest, creative, and revolutionary, who as far as possible should come from the region” (Rachmat et al. 1992, 73). The council broadcast its establishment and aspirations on the radio, in magazines, and in newspapers and submitted its proposal to the governor.

\footnote{2} The highest vote earners in 1955 were the nationalist Partai National Indonesia (PNI) with 22 percent of votes, the reformist Islamist Majlis Sjuro Muslimin Indonesia (Masjumi) Party with 20 percent of votes, the traditionalist Islamic Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) with 18 percent of votes, and the PKI with 16 percent of votes. PNI, NU, and PKI earned most of their votes in Java. Masjumi’s voter base, on the other hand, was in Sumatra. See Ufen (2008, 10–11).

\footnote{3} The chief public prosecutor claimed that smugglers exported nearly a third of Indonesia’s annual rubber export.
of Central Sumatra, who then forwarded it to Jakarta. On November 28, 1956, the council sent a delegation to meet with Soekarno to articulate its concerns. Although the group met with the prime minister, it did not get an audience with Soekarno, and it felt that its demands were ignored (Rachmat et al. 1992).

Frustrated with the government’s unresponsiveness, on December 20, 1956, Husein declared martial law and took over control of the civilian government in Padang, West Sumatra (Rachmat et al. 1992). Within five days, Simbolon and his Gajah Council did the same and announced a military takeover of Medan, North Sumatra. In Palembang, South Sumatra, Lieutenant Colonel Barlian declared a state of emergency in South Sumatra and announced the formation of the Garuda Division in January 1957, demanding that the central government grant autonomy to South Sumatra and that Muhammad Hatta be reinstated as vice president of Indonesia (Leirissa 1991).

Jakarta refused to recognize the authority of these councils. Instead, in February 1957, Soekarno declared that Indonesia should become a “Guided Democracy,” wherein only PKI, Masyumi, Nahdlatul Ulama, and Partai National Indonesia representatives join the cabinet. In addition, he proposed the creation of a National Council, composed of representatives of functional groups (not political parties) and led by the president himself, which would make decisions by a consensus agreement and advise the cabinet (Feith and Lev 1963). These measures were seen as further affirmation of Soekarno’s communist and authoritarian turn.

In March 1957, in support of the regional councils in Sumatra, H. V. N Sumual announced the Perjuangan Rakyat Semesta (Permesta) in Sulawesi and declared martial law over East Indonesia (Ricklefs 2008). In response, Soekarno dissolved Ali’s cabinet, formed a new one with Djuanda as prime minister, and declared martial law (Kalb 1957).

After a failed attempt on Soekarno’s life in November 1957 was linked to Masjumi figures (Kahin and Hakiem 2008), M. Natsir, Burhanuddin Harahap, and Sjafruddin Prawiranegara fled to Sumatra and joined the Sumatran military commanders in their stance against the government (Ricklefs 2008). On February 10, 1958, Husein announced a five-day ultimatum demanding that the central government dissolve the current cabinet and install Hatta and Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX to lead a new cabinet until a new election could be held (Rachmat et al. 1992). When this ultimatum was rejected within a day, the group announced the establishment of the PRRI on February 15, 1958, complete with its government...
cabinet and designated ministers for each cabinet position. The PRRI had become another addition to the string of regional uprisings that Jakarta was already facing at the time.

Disenchantment had been growing for some time. For many in the outer islands, the 1955 election did not bring about the desired results. Despite Indonesia’s democratic trappings, the government was seen to favor Java and the PKI, ignoring the outer islands’ demands for autonomy and more resources. The disgruntled army commanders had tried various ways to express their concerns before they seized the established PRRI in February 1958.

Demands

What the PRRI wanted was autonomy for local governments to manage their affairs. In his statement, Prawiranegara articulated a vision for political autonomy for the regions (PRRI Papers 13 1959):

In that manner, every region can be free to implement its programs, as per PRRI’s institutional design that is aimed to: a) govern according to the culture and sense of justice that is relevant and suitable for the people in each region, b) regions where most of the population are Muslim, such as Aceh, can govern their lives according to their aspirations and culture. This also applies to other regions such as Bali and Minahasa, that they may have a greater opportunity to govern their people according to their people’s spiritual and physical needs.

Implicit in Prawiranegara’s statement is the recognition of the regions’ ethnic and religious distinctiveness as a basis for local autonomy. The regions he cited—Aceh, Bali, and Minahasa—were ethnically and, in the case of Bali and Minahasa also, religiously distinct from Java.

The PRRI, he claimed, seeks to “embody the words of Indonesia’s motto—Bhinneka Tunggal Ika—that although Indonesia is comprised of many ethnic groups and regions often with very great differences, we are united. These are the words that to this day the government in Jakarta had not made manifest. Instead, the Soekarno government wants to erase them” (PRRI Papers 13 1959).

The then Indonesian ambassador in Rome Sutan M. Rasjid cited differences between Soekarno and Hatta, mismanagement of the state, the
concentration of power in the hands of the central government in Jakarta, poor allocations of revenues to the regions, and the spread of communist influence as some of the motivations behind Ahmad Hussein’s creation of the Banteng Council in West Sumatra and similar councils in North and South Sumatra, Sulawesi, and Maluku (PRRI Papers 42 1958).

Rasjid described that the central government had remained impervious to their various efforts to convey their frustrations:

All these events have compelled the present revolutionary people, who wanted at all costs to stop the process of destruction and disintegration, to take serious steps which may perhaps have grave consequences nationally and internationally. As a matter of fact, every [effort] has been made on the part of the revolutionary group to reach a reconciliation with the Central Government through conferences, missions, and personal contacts, but they have been doomed to failure. Before the outbreak of the civil war when weapons spoke, I hoped and prayed that the Indonesian genius for compromise might prove effective and that cold reason would prevail. It seems to me that the Djakarta government decided to use force, thereby closing any possibility of reaching a peaceful solution of the problem we are facing. The road of negotiations has been closed, [Premier Djuanda] said, even though it existed the government cannot take it. (PRRI Papers 42 1958)

He stressed that this turn to violence appeared to be the only way to leverage these demands:

Having examined the developments of the situation and the reasons operating behind it, I now declare that as of now I have tendered my resignation as representative of the Government of the Republic of Indonesia in Rome. Under the present circumstances, I consider it the only way to help the forces which in Indonesia are trying to prevent our country from falling into total anarchy and destruction. (PRRI Papers 42 1958, emphasis added)

In sum, the archives suggest that frustration over the government’s continued dismissal of demands for greater autonomy for the regions was an important factor and that the rebels believed this mobilization was the only way to capture the government’s attention.
Ethnic Profile

Although the PRRI leaders were united in their desire for greater autonomy for the outer islands, or for Sumatra in particular, the group did not adopt an ethnic name or an explicitly ethnic cause. Nonetheless, despite the lack of an explicit ethnic name and cause, the group shared a common bond of being non-Javanese or, more precisely, Sumatran.

From the top ranks of leadership to the rank-and-file soldiers, the PRRI enjoyed a high representation of ethnic Bataks and Minangs. Ordinary Minangs in West Sumatra participated and provided material and moral support during the armed conflict (Fogg 2015). The army commanders who led the rebellion were mostly Minang and Bataks. Of the 11 cabinet ministers the PRRI named in its announcement in February 1958, there were only slightly more Minang names than there were Batak names, alongside a few individuals from other ethnic groups.4

Archived correspondence between PPRI members in Sumatra and elsewhere recorded many Batak names, such as E. S. Pohan, Junus Harahap, H. Damanik, Lieutenant Colonel Nainggolan, T. K. Lubis, and Ali Harahap, further demonstrating a high representation of Bataks within the organization.5 For its rank-and-file soldiers in North Sumatra, the PRRI recruited teenagers (Straits Times 1958), Bible teachers from the Batak church, Huria Kristen Batak Protestan (Aritonang and Steenbrink 2008), and mostly Batak Toba revolutionary fighters (Reid 2010). The bond the group shared as Sumatrans was sufficiently strong that at one point the group wrote to Tunku Abdul Rahman to consider the possibility of integration with Malaysia (PRRI Papers 86 1958). The regional Sumatran and ethnic dimension of the PRRI’s identity was not lost on Jakarta either; in his statement before the Parliament on February 3, 1958, Prime Minister Djuanda referred to the PRRI as the “Sumatra problem” (persoalan Sumatra) (Rachmat et al. 1992, 72).

4. The full list of cabinet ministers was printed in the declaration of PRRI in February 1958: Sjaffruddin Prawiranegara, Maludin Simbolon, Dahlan Djambek, Burhanuddin Harahap, Sumitro Djohadikusumo, M. Sjafei, J. F. Warouw, Saladin Sarumpaet, Mochtar lintang, Saleh Lahade, and Abdul Gani Usman.

5. This rebellion involved individuals from other ethnic groups as well. There was one Minahasan and one Javanese cabinet minister. The archives also mentioned Tjia Piet Kay, an ethnic Chinese who was named assistant for special duties and liaison. See PRRI Papers 103 (1960). On May 24, 1960, he was named assistant to the chairman of the board of logistics. See PRRI Papers 102 (1960).
The Government’s Response

The government’s response to the PRRI rebellion combined a forceful military operation and accommodation of former rebels. As news of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency’s support for the rebellion surfaced (Jones 1999), and Soekarno suspected Malaysia of wanting to create an Islamic bloc with Sumatra in it (Liow 2004), a decisive military response was deemed necessary. By March 1958, government soldiers had landed and seized Pekanbaru. Then, Padang fell in April and Bukittinggi in May 1958. The conflict was focused in West Sumatra, around the rebels’ stronghold in Padang and Bukittinggi (Kahin 2012). Although some scholars have dubbed the PRRI as “history’s most civil civil war” (Feith and Lev 1963, 42), there were incidents of brutalities committed by both the PRRI and the Indonesian army. In one incident in May 1958, for example, PRRI troops burned down a schoolhouse full of leftist and PKI sympathizers they had rounded up and detained, killing 143 people (Kahin 2012). In his letter to Hatta asking him to intervene, Prawiranegara asked that Hatta “witness with your own eyes the things that Soekarno’s regime’s agents are committing in your homeland and in other areas that are in rebellion against the dictator Soekarno,” where “hundreds of villages were burned” and “children and women raped and slain” because of their support for the PRRI (PRRI Papers 34 1958). Death estimates related to this rebellion vary, ranging from 20,000 to 31,000 (Toft 2010; Feith and Lev 1963).

As rebel forces weakened and supplies declined, a number of PRRI military leaders became much more open to negotiations with the Indonesian military general A. H. Nasution, who met informally with religious leaders in Sumatra and Sulawesi in mid-1960.

Nasution promised that the army did not support communism and that economic relief for Sumatra would be forthcoming once the rebellion was over. The government promised that PRRI returnees would not be prosecuted and humiliated (Feith and Lev 1963). By February 1961, Permesta commander Laurens Saerang and his 10,000 men surrendered (Feith and Lev 1963). In June 1961, Hussein surrendered, followed by Simbolon and Nainggolan in August 1961 (Kahin 2012).

On August 17, 1961, Soekarno announced that rebels who would surrender and swear an oath of loyalty to him, his political manifesto, the state, and the constitution would be pardoned (Kahin 2012). That same day, Prawiranegara made a radio announcement and called for all PRRI members to stop fighting. Remaining PRRI leaders—Lubis, Harahap,
Asaat, Prawiranegara, and Natsir—surrendered shortly thereafter. Djambek, who refused to swear an oath of loyalty, was murdered by a communist militia in September 1961 (Kahin 2012).

The PRRI soldiers who had surrendered were described in public statements as “returning to the fold of the Revolution,” not surrendering, and they were immediately conscripted into the army (Central Intelligence Agency 1965). PRRI members were reincorporated into the civil service. Those who did not find employment received regular stipends (Central Intelligence Agency 1965). PRRI volunteers who were students resumed their studies; some won scholarships to complete postgraduate degrees (Leirissa 1991).

Although PRRI fighters and volunteers were promised amnesty, the group’s leaders were placed under house arrest and imprisoned for several years (Bangun 1996). In 1963, they were transferred to a military prison in Jakarta where they remained until their release in 1966 (Bangun 1996).

After their release, the reintegration of former PRRI fighters went relatively smoothly. Although some PRRI members faced difficulties finding work after the end of the rebellion, the military leaders of PRRI were reincorporated and assigned to various operations by the army (Kahin 2012). Simbolon, Sumual, and Husein, for example, were given a “special operation” (operasi khusus) to approach their friends and allies abroad to brief them about the 1965 attempted coup and to raise support for the New Order regime (Bangun 1996). Other PRRI members who had special ties to the Malaysian premier were asked to facilitate discussions about normalizing ties between Malaysia and Indonesia (Bangun 1996).

To facilitate the reintegration of ex-PRRI members in North Sumatra, in 1968 Simbolon negotiated with the head of the military-established organization Sentral Organisasi Karyawan Swadiri Indonesia (SOKSI) to incorporate all demobilized PRRI fighters in the province (Bangun 1996). This proposal was approved by the military and was then implemented for PRRI members in other parts of Sumatra and in Sulawesi. By 1971, SOKSI placed numerous former PRRI members in the legislative councils: two in Parliament, one in Jakarta, eight in Tapanuli Utara, three in Tapanuli Tengah, two in Sibolga, one in Tapanuli Selatan, and two in Kota Pematang.

6. Their civilian counterparts, the Masjumi figures associated with the rebellion, on the other hand, were less fortunate. Soekarno banned Masjumi in 1960 and, after another attempt on his life in 1962, arrested other Masjumi figures who had nothing to do with PRRI and sent them into prison. Soeharto’s New Order government was also suspicious of Masjumi figures; it labeled the banned party as an “extreme right” threat to the country.
Siantar local councils (Bangun 1996). Within a decade after the end of the PRRI conflict, former PRRI fighters were sufficiently integrated that they were able to win seats in local councils.

The Bataks today are politically integrated. The ABS data reports that 86 percent of Batak respondents voted in the 2014 national elections; this percentage is higher than the country’s overall 70 percent voter turnout rate (International Foundation for Electoral Systems 2014). The Bataks are also well represented in national police. According to a recent study of the Indonesian armed forces, approximately 8 percent of the elite positions in the armed forces are occupied by Batak officers, ranking the Bataks as the third most well-represented single group among the military elites after the Javanese and Sundanese (Rabasa and Haseman 2002). Former vice president Jusuf Kalla in his opening remarks at the Convention of the Batak Adat forum in 2016 stated: “Throughout the course of Indonesian history, the Bataks have always been involved. Just look at the government, there is always some Batak representation” (Kompas 2016).

Using the names of Indonesia’s cabinet ministers from 1945 through 2004 in Simanjuntak (2003), I coded ministers’ ethnic affiliations based on their last names, which signal whether or not they belong to a Batak clan (marga). In total, of the 1,314 cabinet posts in the 39 cabinets from 1945 through 2004, 77 were filled by Batak individuals. As figure 3.2 shows, ethnic Batak ministers occupied nearly 20 percent of cabinet posts in the 1945 cabinet led by Sutan Sjahrir, but this proportion declined to zero for cabinets from 1948 through 1953, except for the brief interludes during the emergency cabinet led by Prawiranegara (1948–49) and the Halim cabinet in 1950.

Prior to Harahap’s cabinet (1955–56), the average proportion of cabinet posts occupied by Batak individuals was about 4.76 percent across the 16 cabinets since independence. After Harahap’s cabinet, this average increased by about 30 percent to 6.24 percent of all cabinet posts in the data.


8. Some of these posts were occupied by Batak individuals who appeared multiple times (sometimes within the same cabinet, in different roles), such as Amir Sjarifuddin, Mananti Sitompul, and Boerhanoeddin Harahap.
The end of the PRRI rebellion led to disappointments for Minang PRRI members. The banning of the Masjumi Party and Natsir’s marginalization from politics were hurtful to his supporters. Despite Bukittinggi’s prominent position as the country’s capital for the emergency government in 1948–49 and Sjafrroeddin Prawiranegara’s role as the emergency government’s prime minister, West Sumatra shifted to “just one region” in Sumatra, as the government subdivided the large Central Sumatra province into multiple provinces (Amal 1992).

These disappointments aside, ethnic Minang today, like their ethnic Batak counterparts, also report a high level of national identification (see fig. 3.1). Minang politicians frequently decorate key positions in cabinets, political parties, and higher education institutions. At the time of this chapter’s writing, 60 Minang individuals had served as cabinet ministers in post-independence Indonesia (Harian Haluan 2019).

In sum, the rebels received sufficiently favorable accommodation that the group never resumed violent mobilization.
The Political Salience of Batak Identity Today

Although the Batak citizens of Indonesia are politically integrated, the political salience of their ethnic identity is not quite straightforward. On the one hand, politicians certainly recognize the advantage of running as ethnic Batak candidates. Most tickets in local races in North Sumatra have Batak candidates, who regularly court Batak voters directly through public statements and speeches (Toha and Cosslett 2019) or indirectly through campaign posters where candidates are seen donning ethnic clothing (Fox 2014). On the other hand, many Batak voters no longer vote primarily along ethnic lines. Instead, they seem to prioritize locality and vote accordingly.

In the 2018 North Sumatra governor’s race, Edy Rahmayadi, a half-Deli Malay and half-Javanese Muslim, and his running mate, Musa Rajecc-shah, an Arab Muslim, competed against the former Jakarta governor Djarot Syaiful Hidayat (Javanese Muslim) and Sihar Sitorus (Batak Christian). Appealing to Batak voters was still considered politically strategic in the 2018 governor’s race, as evidenced in the Djarot-Sihar pairing. Though neither candidate in the Edy-Musa ticket is Batak, the pair took extra measures to appeal to Batak voters. Seven months before the election, Musa and his wife attended a public traditional Karo ceremony and went through a ritual that conferred on him a Batak Karo clan (marga) name, incorporating him into the Batak Karo tribe. This performative exercise suggests that Edy and Musa considered it politically expedient to appeal to Batak Karo voters.

In one debate, Edy appealed to the Batak voters, promising that he would involve Batak customary leaders in his decision-making process: “I will involve the customary leaders in the area. Because we know that our laws recognize both the positive and customary laws. These two must be considered together when we address problems in North Sumatra. We know that our people in Sumatra really respect customary lands and their customary [adat] leaders. We can address our problems by involving adat leaders” (Toha and Cosslett 2019). He also challenged Djarot to describe how he would apply the Batak traditional philosophy of “Dalihan Na Tolu” in his governance, highlighting his rival’s unfamiliarity with the principle.

However, if Batak voters vote along purely ethnic lines, one would expect that the ticket with the ethnic Batak candidate (i.e., Djarot and Sihar) would win. Instead, the rhetoric around “sons of soil” (putra dae-rab) during this election season incorporated an added meaning beyond
the strict descent-based ethnic identity. Unlike Djarot and Sihar, who live outside of Sumatra, Edy and Musa capitalized on having been raised, educated, married, and employed in North Sumatra, portraying themselves as “true” Sumatran. Their campaign leader, Ahwan Asmadi, recognized in an interview that emphasizing the candidates’ locality was one of their strategies: “The people of North Sumatra are not foolish. Do we really need to import from outside when in North Sumatra we have many great people. This is one of our strategies” (Amindoni 2018).

This strategy worked. Many in Medan viewed Djarot and Sihar as “migrants” (pendatang) (Amindoni 2018) and referred to them as the “imported pair” (pasangan impor) (Siregar 2018), both because Djarot is ethnically Javanese and because Djarot and Sihar have lived their lives outside of Sumatra. One resident said in an interview: “Even if we like him, he is not Sumatran. There are many candidates who are truly Sumatran. Why not nominate a true Sumatran? That’s why a lot of people favored Edy” (Amindoni 2018). For many voters, Sihar’s Batak identity was insufficient to compensate for Djarot’s outsider status. Although Sihar is the son of a prominent Batak figure and his name is very recognizably Batak, his Batak credentials only appealed to Christian Bataks (Simandjuntak 2018). Across the 12 electoral districts in North Sumatra, Djarot and Sihar won only in four of them, most of which were Christian-majority districts (Simandjuntak 2018).

In the remaining districts, where Muslims compose the majority of the population, Edy and Musa won decisively. Even in the Batak-majority districts among them, the Edy-Musa ticket performed well, suggesting that Muslim Batak voters in North Sumatra preferred non-Batak, Muslim, local Sumatran candidates over their counterpart (Simandjuntak 2018).

The 2018 governor’s election in North Sumatra highlights an interesting dimension of identity salience among the Bataks today. Although Batak voters continue to value identity-based representation, the appeal of a shared ethnicity in a political leader is moderated by other loyalties. Representation now requires politicians to have also lived and worked in Sumatra and perhaps to share one’s religion. Having a Batak clan name alone is not sufficient.

Conclusion

Indonesia’s nation building is an experiment fraught with many challenges from the start. A vast archipelagic country with difficult terrains and mil-
lions of people identifying with various ethnic and religious groups, Indonesia has the necessary ingredients for ethnic mobilization. Yet, most Indonesians today, regardless of ethnicity, have a strong attachment to their country.

This chapter showcases that ethnic groups’ attachment to their national political community is in part influenced by their country’s accommodation of their demands. The PRRI archives were replete with mentions that this rebellion was the only way to capture the central government’s attention. When the government offered favorable terms and promised that former PRRI fighters would be reintegrated, the rebellion ended relatively quickly. Since then, the Bataks have been well represented in politics, and Batak voters today do not primarily vote along ethnic lines. This chapter shows that political accommodation can appease even groups who had previously violently mobilized and can cultivate a strong national identification.

The chapter offers several contributions. First, this case provides insights for existing works on how regimes interact with popular demands. Although democracies by definition have mechanisms for aggregating citizens’ preferences peaceably, it was under Soekarno’s nominally democratic regime that the Bataks felt that their demands were ignored and that violent mobilization was necessary. Conversely, Soeharto’s authoritarian rule saw consistent representation of ethnic Bataks in government. It is possible that the mismatched expectations between what democratic rulers ought to do and what they actually did exacerbated the urgency to use violence.

Second, this chapter paints a rich picture of how accommodation of minorities’ demands can be made manifest. Available cross-national studies on political inclusion and violence have relied on global indicators of ethnic groups’ political inclusion, which distill political inclusion into numbers. This chapter shows how Soekarno’s and Soeharto’s governments have responded to the PRRI and how their reintegration, support, and representation of ethnic Bataks effectively quelled this violent mobilization.

Third, this case illustrates the process of transforming strong regional attachments into a strong national identification. Despite the PRRI’s initially strong pan-Sumatran identity, it dissipated once the rebellion died. The government’s responses appear to have effectively redirected this attachment toward a national political community.
Editors’ Introduction: In this chapter we continue the focus on state representation, but this time with an eye on the Philippines. Moreover, the focus shifts not to why there was a rebellion but why it developed so late. The delay (late 1970s) is notable when compared to the Christians in North Philippines. The answer has to do with representation, specifically in the education system. In South Philippines, very few Muslim students enrolled in public schools and even fewer Muslims taught as instructors. Prior to independence, American officials did not challenge the preexisting structure of Islamic education. Moreover, education officials allowed for exceptions in the curricula that were tailored to differences within the Muslim population. As a result, the population remains fragmented, meaning there was no regional identity by the time the Philippines became independent. And even when faced with threats to the Muslim community, there were still no separatist rebellions. Incidentally, rebellions only happened after a pair of scholarships—one domestic and one foreign—helped unify and develop a Muslim national identity.

Introduction

The lengthy colonial history of the Philippines involves contrasting Muslim and Christian experiences. After arriving in the 16th century, Spain converted natives in the north to Christianity. Spanish colonization lasted 333 years, but the Spaniards did not succeed in conquering the Muslim
population established in the 15th century. Instead, the Spaniards drove them farther south. The divide in control resulted in Spain being less involved in the education of Muslims. The contrasted education experiences of Christians and their Muslim counterparts in the south changed the timing of each group’s identity formation and, ultimately, the onset of rebellion.

The Philippine Revolution began in 1896 after Spain discovered the Katipunan, a Christian-majority secret society advocating for independence. Despite Spain lacking total control, the entire Philippine Islands was ceded to the Americans after Spain lost the Spanish-American War in 1898. Filipino nationalists continued their rebellion. The United States refused to recognize the Philippine Declaration of Independence, and American colonization of the Philippines was eventually claimed in the name of benevolent assimilation. Their administration was uneven: Christians were under civilian rule while Muslims were under military rule. After suppressing the Katipunan, the Americans set forth with their own vision of preparing an independent Philippines. The Japanese occupation of the Philippines in 1942 interrupted American colonialism. Both Christians and Muslims served alongside American troops against the Japanese. After the war, the Philippines became independent on July 4, 1946. However, the date of Philippine independence also corresponds with what some Muslim leaders such as Nur Misuari refer to as a denial of their independence (Vice News 2016). The Muslim population did not wage a separatist rebellion until the 1970s.

In general, early seceders wage a separatist rebellion soon after independence, while late seceders “develop only after a prolonged period of frustration and conflict” (Horowitz 1981, 165). What explains variation in the onset of rebellion? Rationalist explanations focus on how wealth or opportunity affects the likelihood of rebellion. New states are more prone to violence because they are more likely to experience political instability and weakness (Fearon and Laitin 2003). Yet not all groups take advantage of windows of opportunity and rebel (Walter 2006). In focusing on opportunities or resources, rationalist theories of rebellion downplay how group perceptions of these factors influence the onset of separatist rebellion. Emotive explanations do consider perception for subjective determination and relative conditions (Ray 2016). But studies that measure perceptions of political exclusion or backwardness do not account for how groups end up in that position or why they come to this conclusion, respectively, regardless of the history of direct or self-rule (Horowitz 1981; Wimmer, Ceder-
man, and Min 2009). These perceptions are important, but these explanations miss what shapes the underlying conditions for rebellion that affect group positionality and perceptions of it.

I address the gap in both explanations by focusing on education. Christians were early seceders while Muslims were late seceders due to contrasting education policies. Christians experienced a penetrative education policy, which cultivated a shared experience and facilitated the development of a national identity. Coupled with Spanish conversion efforts in Tagalog, penetrative education policies made it easier for Christians to identify and mobilize against the threat of Spanish colonialism in 1898. On the other hand, Muslims experienced a shallow education policy, which did not have a unifying objective. Very few Muslim students enrolled in public schools and even fewer taught as instructors. American officials did not challenge the preexisting structure of Islamic education and advocated for a separate curriculum in Muslim-serving public schools. These factors maintained fragmentation rather than fostering a cohesive Muslim national identity. Without this, events that could have threatened the Muslim community were not perceived as triggers for separatist rebellion. It was not until domestic and international support for education helped develop a Muslim national identity that rebellion finally occurred in 1972.

I begin by outlining my argument and the pathway for early and late seceders. Then, I utilize the method of process tracing to illustrate the primary and secondary evidence in my cases. I conclude with a discussion of the limitations and contributions of this study along with suggestions for future work.

Argument

Contrasting education policies influence the onset of separatist rebellion in a two-step process (fig. 4.1). First, education policies influence the development of a national identity through colonial attachment and group cohesion. Penetrative education policies consist of a universal or standardized curriculum, instructors from the majority, common language, and wide enrollment. These policies facilitate the development of a national identity by strengthening in-group attachment. Shallow education policies do not strengthen association with the colonizer and instead promote fragmentation.

Second, education policies structure the likelihood of recognizing and mobilizing against threats. Extensive threats, which clearly are targeted...
based on national identity, are particularly salient catalysts. Penetrative policies make it easier for groups to perceive extensive threats because their sense of that identity is strengthened. Mobilizing is easier, since groups share a common education experience. Shallow education policies divide the education experience of groups. Without encouraging the development of a national identity, shallow educated groups are less likely to feel targeted on the basis of that identity in the first place.

The process begins with colonial education policies, which consist of formal decisions about schools serving the colonized population. This excludes decisions natives make over their own schools. I categorize two types, penetrative and shallow, which I operationalize using criteria from literature on education and conflict: curriculum, instructors, language, and enrollment (Matsumoto 2015).

Colonial education policies affect two things that are salient for group identity formation: colonial attachment and group cohesion. Colonial attachment is the relationship of the group and the colonial power. A stronger attachment makes it more likely that a group will be considered favored by the colonial power. Favored groups are more likely to be targeted, reinforcing their sense of being an other. Group cohesion is the relationship of members to each other. Stronger group cohesion bodes well for the development of a national identity.

Both colonial attachment and group cohesion shape a group’s perception of inclusion. Opportunities for social mobility, career advancement, and
political representation affect this perception. Extensive threats weaken this perception. Groups that share a common education experience are more likely to develop a national identity and thus perceive extensive threats on its basis. It is the perception of these issues that ultimately structures whether or not a minority group will be an early or late seceder (see figs. 4.2 and 4.3).

Penetrative education policies strengthen colonial attachment and group cohesion. The initial, and often main, organizer for schools is the colonial power. Penetrative policies ensure a shared experience of instruc-
tion and its content, which results in a stronger shared group identity. A stronger colonial attachment and group cohesion increase the likelihood that a group will have weaker prospects for inclusion, since they are distinct from other groups and mobilize for rebellion better. When coupled with how colonial powers can educate groups differently, differences between groups are solidified. Penetrative education policies ultimately result in early seceders if extensive threats occur.

Shallow education policies weaken colonial attachment and group cohesion. When fewer students enroll in public schools, they associate less with the colonial power. Public schools, which are sites of colonial authority, do not become places where a group benefits from the colonial administration. In addition, students cannot have a shared education experience in which they learn the same things simultaneously when there is not a critical mass enrolled. A weaker colonial attachment and group cohesion decrease the likelihood that a group will perceive an extensive threat. Thus, shallow education policies ultimately result in late seceders since their perceptions of inclusion are more likely to seem positive. The lack of colonial attachment or group cohesion does not facilitate the development of a national identity that can identify or mobilize against threats, regardless of how extensive it may be.

Education

The Spanish did not establish mass education (Grimes 1928). Instead, Spain tied its colonial conquest to converting natives to Christianity. Friars learned Tagalog to facilitate conversion (Rafael 1987). This had a homogenizing effect, elevating Tagalog and creating a common experience for Christians. Spain established a penetrative colonial education for Christians, making their education system significant for the development of a Christian, but not Muslim, national identity. In this section, I prioritize data for the Moro Province (MP)/Mindanao and Sulu (MS) for Muslims since this is where they are concentrated. For Christians, I consider their status in MP/MS or the Philippines overall, depending on the report.

The Americans established mass education, but education policies for Muslims were shallow. Unlike Spain, America established administrative control everywhere, calling the Muslim majority area the Moro Province (MP) in 1903. The Department of Public Instruction would later be responsible for when the MP became Mindanao and Sulu (MS) (Carpenter 1916). Filipinization, the process of increasing Philippine
leadership, merged the Department of Public Instruction in the Moro Province into the insular government’s Bureau of Education (BE) (Milligan 2005b). After the Department of Mindanao and Sulu integrated into the BE in 1915, enrollment records stopped differentiating between Christians and Muslims.

Enrollment

Like other colonial powers, Spain established a dual system of colonial education. Spanish schools were for Spanish children in the Philippines while catechism schools were for native converts. Natives accessed primary education through parish schools or private tutors. Secular higher education became more accessible in the 1860s through a series of royal decrees and the Superior Board of Public Instruction, which created a teacher-training institute (the Escuela Normal) in Manila and mandated public primary schools in each parish. After 1865, Dominicans at the University of Santo Tomas were tasked with supervising the centralization of higher education. Colegio de San Juan de Letran and the Ateneo Municipal were made first-class secondary schools for boys, offering the same curriculum as in Spain (Milligan 2004). More schools were elevated to this status through the century. Yet these developments mattered more for Christians and Muslims.

Christians built private schools in the 17th century. They mimicked the Spanish model of education without making them subservient to the Spanish through the education system. Thus, private schools provided a path to higher education that avoided catechism schools. However, Spain’s model was still penetrative. Even intermediate Latinities, which mimicked Spanish secondary schools, required completion in a Spanish school and an exit exam to be considered complete. Christian enrollment in catechism schools initially increased in the early 1800s and then dropped while attendance in Spanish higher education, especially the University of Santo Tomas, more than doubled (Schwartz 1971).

Overall enrollment increased by 300 percent in the first 10 years of American colonialism (Coloma 2004). Enrollment increased incrementally in the MP as more instructors were hired and more schools were built. There were 2,114 enrolled students when the Moro Province was first established. In the final school year of the MP in 1912–13, 4,535 students were enrolled (Pershing 1913, 30). Enrollment increased far more once the Filipino-controlled legislature took over education policies for MS: more than 33,000 students were enrolled in 1920 (Kalaw 1919; Milligan 2005b).
Christian Filipinos made up the majority of overall enrollment, even in the Muslim-majority MP. Thus, total enrollment among those eligible in the MP was low. Of the 2,114 students in 1903, 240 were Muslim (Wood 1914). In 1907, 17 percent of students enrolled in the MP were Muslim, despite making up 90 percent of the population. In 1909, 8 percent of the Christian population was in school but only one-tenth of 1 percent of the Muslim population was enrolled (Cameron 1909a). In 1913, 10 percent of the Christian population was enrolled in contrast to one-half of 1 percent of Muslims (Pershing 1913; Carpenter 1916). Retention rates were also low across the board. In the MP, most students enrolled were below the fifth grade (Orosa 1923).

Most importantly, the Americans did not eradicate the precolonial system of Islamic education in the Philippines. Thus, Islamic schools remained as an alternative to the colonial school system. Pandita schools were small classes that took place in a mosque or the pandita’s home. Muslim elites sent slave children to the American schools and funded pandita schools for their sons (Boransing, Magdalena, and Lacar 1987; Orosa 1923). Unlike schools for Muslims, private schools made it possible for Christians to have a common learning experience, one that solidified their national identity with each other. Muslim students did not have a common education experience, since panditas only served a few at a time. Thus, the community remained fragmented.

Instructors

Christian Filipinos were the main instructors under the Spanish and the Americans. They led catechism schools due to priest shortages, making it easier to establish their own private schools later (Schwartz 1971). The first instructors in American schools were soldiers who took over Spanish garrisons (Barrows 1995). Soon after, 600 American teachers sailed to the Philippines on the USS Thomas. The Philippine Normal School was established in 1901 to train Filipino teachers. Muslims could not teach in catechism schools. Only a few taught in American public schools, even by 1915 (Milligan 2005b). There were 74 instructors in the MP in 1904: 15 Americans, 50 Christian Filipinos, and 9 Muslims. By 1914, there were over 230, of which 15 were American and 16 were Muslim. Christians dominated school administration, with colonizers in the highest positions (Pershing 1913; Milligan 2005b). If such was the case in the MP, a Muslim majority area, the situation in Christian areas was hardly better.
The Department of Mindanao and Sulu tried to incentivize instructors in the MP by providing housing, higher salaries, and the “privilege of acquiring homesteads” (Osias 1921, 101). Few took the offer, as Americans and Christians were wary of teaching in Muslim areas without American protection (Milligan 2005a). American officials struggled to find teachers in these schools “who [were] familiar with English and Moro” (Wood and Bliss 1906, 15). The threat of more Christian Filipino instructors coming into MP/MS was not extensive. Even so, there were not enough students enrolled to perceive it as such.

**Curricula**

Spanish schools mimicked Western curricula for Spanish students while catechism schools taught Christian doctrine and minimal literacy to natives. Young men had the opportunity to continue education in Spain before returning to the Philippines. This established a familiarity with European schooling and exposed Christians to European ideals regarding independence (Moses 1905; Schwartz 1971). To access higher education, students had to take an exam on English grammar, U.S. history, geography, arithmetic, and physiology (Milligan 2005b).

These topics were covered in some Christian schools, but not to the same extent in Muslim schools, if at all. Thus, Christians were more likely to work in the civil service since they were more familiar with the content on the exams (Coloma 2004). Muslims did not have the same access or opportunities. The curricula of public schools in the MP had separate objectives. Christians were prepared for self-government while Muslims were prepared for assimilation. Supplemental vocational training, such as in agriculture, was provided to teach Muslims employable skills (Milligan 2005b).

**Language**

Christian experiences with Spain’s colonial education system facilitated the development of a national identity. Without a mass education system, few Christians spoke Spanish aside from educated elites. Less than 10 percent spoke Spanish, and fluency was poor among those who did (Pershing 1913; Moses 1905). Tagalog grew more common among Christians as friars converted natives, something that was not the case for the Muslim population. Even the elites who learned Spanish spoke Tagalog, such as President Manuel L. Quezon (Guéraiche 2008).
Individual leaders in the MP influenced language policies. Leonard Wood, the first governor of the Moro Province, called local languages “crude, devoid of literature, and limited in range” (Milligan 2005b; Wood 1904, 14–15). He also supported instruction in English (Wood 1904). This contrasted with the subsequent governor, Tasker Bliss, and Superintendents of Public Instruction Najeeb Saleeby and Charles Cameron, who all supported local language instruction (Wood and Bliss 1906). Textbooks were printed in Arabic. Moreover, Saleeby created readers for the Tausug and Maguindanao in Arabic script (Saleeby 1905; Milligan 2005b; Wood and Bliss 1906). There were other groups within the Muslim community to whom he did not tailor. American colonial officials recognized that even pandita schools were reinforcing differences within the Muslim community by facilitating reading and writing in the local dialect, which used a modified Arabic script (Cameron 1909b; Milligan 2005b).

While the goal of these accommodations was to make it easy to learn American ideas and eventually become literate in English, the actual outcome was that the Muslim community remained fragmented. Children in Moro districts received instruction in their dialects first (Saleeby 1905; Milligan 2005b; Wood and Bliss 1906). This demonstrates the importance of a unifying language or script in developing a national identity (Anderson 1983). A common language can foster trust and efficiency. Without it, groups have a harder time coordinating (Liu 2015). Pandita schools and low Muslim enrollment in public schools magnified the lack of a common education experience. Differences were reinforced not only internally through culture or language but also through uneven recognition by the American colonial apparatus.

Development of National Identity and Onset

Educated Filipinos in the late 19th century were called ilustrados (“the enlightened”). Most had the means for formal education (Gripaldo 2015). Cullinane attributes the “ilustrado consciousness” to a “common educational experience” and the ease of expressing this consciousness in the same language (2003, 39). Spain’s penetrative education system made this possible. Those excluded from this common educational experience, in this case Muslims, could not take part in the same consciousness.

Many members of the Philippine Revolution participated in the Spanish education system. The curriculum of the Colegio de San Juan de Letran in Intramuros, Manila, was modified to better complement Western edu-
cation in Europe and the United States. Among its alumni are delegates to the Malolos Congress, which first declared an independent Philippines with its own constitution in 1898; members of the revolution; and three eventual Philippine presidents involved in the revolution: Emilio Aguinaldo, Manuel Quezon, and Sergio Osmeña.

Being educated by the colonial power does not denote loyalty. This is evident in the long list of alumni involved in efforts for Philippine independence. The nationalism of Christian Filipinos eventually rejected Spanish authority in multiple aspects: in education through creating private Filipino schools that mimicked Spanish catechism schools and in religion by forming the Filipino Independent Church for Christian Filipinos rejecting the Spanish Church. Such efforts were possible because penetrative education policies laid the groundwork for the formation of a Christian national identity. Such was not the case for Muslims. Instead of creating new things for their entire community, they could avoid shallow education policies or maintain fragmentation through accommodation. A common education experience under the colonial power lowered the transaction cost of mobilization for Christians. Being educated in the same place made it easier for revolutionaries to find like-minded peers and mobilize. Moreover, a common curriculum also made it easier to coordinate in the same language. Once an extensive threat became apparent, it was easier to mobilize against it.

The Katipunan formed in 1892, but the insurrection did not begin until 1896 after Spaniards got ahold of a list of members. A national identity clearly existed, even before the Katipunan formed to overthrow Spanish rule. Its precursor, La Liga Filipina, formed in 1892 to support reforming the Spanish colonial government. Eventually, its members split: conservative members advocating for reforms formed the Cuerpo de Compromisarios while radical members advocating for rebellion formed the Katipunan (Constantino and Constantino 1975). But separatist rebellion did not occur until Spain had a list of members to target. Due to the triangle system of recruitment, in which one member only knew the two they recruited to the Katipunan, it was difficult to target the organization as a whole. Spain's possession of a membership list, even in part, was the first instance of an extensive threat (St. Clair 1902).

Mobilization against the Spanish threat was made possible by the existing national identity among Christians. Identity formation was a necessary component for mobilization against this threat. Manifestos by Katipunan leaders Bonifacio and Jacinto focused on “the Tagalogs” who made up core provinces in the Philippine Revolution. Yet there were non-Tagalog Kati-
punan members (Gripaldo 2009). This suggests that the onset of separatist rebellion required a specific national identity first before later expanding in scope. There was also conflict between ilustrados, Katipuneros, Catholics, and Aglipayans separate from rivalries between regionalists and nationalists (Sturtevant 1976). Yet none of this suggests the absence of national identity. Disagreement was not about involving Christians, or Tagalogs for that matter. Rather, it was about how to secure the national identity.

In addition, there is disagreement about the role of elites and masses in nationalism and revolution. The *ilustrados* focused on the abuses of the church in order to “stir up nationalist sentiment among the masses.” There was considerable mass involvement in Katipunan membership (Ileto 1979, 3; see also Agoncillo 2005). Bonifacio was a founding member of La Liga Filipina and the Katipunan despite not being a formally educated *ilustrado*. His brief private education and his self-education still indicate the importance of these factors. Yet his experience does not discredit the role of education, especially since several of his co-conspirators were well educated.

**Muslims**

While there were clashes between the Muslim population and American colonial officials, these were not instances of separatist rebellion in the name of self-governance on the basis of identity. Instead, revolts were in response to threats to local life and authority: collection of the cedula tax; disarmament campaigns; compulsory education in schools that did not teach *shari’ā*; payment for road construction; enforcement of monogamy; or actions of the Philippine Constabulary (Abinales 2015; Tan 1977; Che Man 1990; Gross 2007).

Colonizers labeled them as a single category, but there was a lack of cohesion within the Muslim community. There were what Tan (1973) calls “inter-Muslim conflicts” in which Muslim leaders worked against one another rather than together against the Americans. Allegiances shifted (Tan 1973; Abinales 2000, 2009). In addition, there were mixed reactions to continued American rule: “each ethnic group responded to American military occupation based on how it affected their own areas, not ‘Moro Mindanao’” (Abinales 2004, 184). The population was described as “greatly disunited” and as having a “tribal character” since a different Islamic tribe inhabited each district (Saleeby 1913, 15; de Taveras 1901).

The lack of cohesion also made it easier for Americans to subdue revolt. The Battle of Bud Dajo (1906) was an armed response to the cedula tax
Muslims in the Cotabato district complied with the tax while many in the Lanao and Sulu districts opposed it. Even when leaders such as the sultan of Sulu stopped resisting the tax, their followers did not all follow suit (Gowing 1968, 1989). Other Muslim communities, such as the Magindanaos, Maranaos, and Samals, did not participate in resistance against the tax “simply because they knew nothing of them” (Abinales 2014). In 1912, Muslims in Sulu and Lanao rebelled against a disarmament campaign. Both battles resulted in American victory with numerous Muslim casualties, even when Muslims had firearms (Gowing 1968).

There was not a national identity just yet. Without one, there could be no rebellion for self-rule either. Moreover, the limitation of information and coordination hindered the possibility of mobilizing a separatist rebellion.

Three events are identified as causes of Muslim separatist rebellion. First is the Corregidor incident/Jabidah massacre, in which Muslim recruits were killed by the armed forces of the Philippines in 1968. In one account, trainees were massacred after they wanted to back out upon realizing that their real mission was to invade Sabah, a Muslim-majority region in Malaysia, and not to fight communists (Vitug and Gloria 2000; Muslim 1994; Jubair 1999). Demonstrations broke out across the Philippines, and there were calls for President Marcos to resign, especially from prominent Muslim figures such as Congressman Rashid Lucman. Second was the violence in Lanao del Norte and Cotabato in which Christians threatened the victory of Muslim politicians. One of the most publicized was the Manili massacre involving 70 Muslim civilians who were killed in a mosque in Manili, Carmen, North Cotabato (Larousse 2001).

Both events attracted international recognition for Muslims in the Philippines. Libyan prime minister Muammar Gaddafi characterized these as genocide and brought the issue to the United Nations. Egypt, Algeria, and Morocco pledged aid to Muslims in the Philippines (Yegar 2002). While the first two events can be considered as competing hypotheses for the onset of rebellion, rebellion was not a given at that time. More than 50 percent of people did not support secession, and nearly 25 percent were not committed to the cause (George 1980). Both cases were significant galvanizing events, but they were limited in scope. Rebellion would not take place without extensive threats to Muslim identity and a group that could perceive and mobilize against it.

Separatist rebellion took place soon after the third proximate cause in which President Marcos declared martial law in 1972 (George 1980;
Buendia 2005; Noble 1976). A majority of the declaration focused on the communist threat. There was only one mention of Mindanao out of nine points determining a state of rebellion. Yet this was enough. This specified martial law as an extensive threat against Muslims since the entire state was involved. The proclamation banned political groups and restricted civilian firearms. Three weeks later, Marcos committed a division of troops to the southern Philippines. Both actions increased the clarity with which the Muslim community was being targeted. Fighting in cities across the southern Philippines started a few days before Marcos’s deadline to collect arms. While the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) did not control all of the rebels, it was the main armed separatist organization (McKenna 1998).

At this point, it is important to “[pit] competing hypotheses against one another” when multiple hypotheses hold weight (Ricks and Liu 2018, 846). The competing hypotheses focusing on how martial law triggered rebellion are incomplete. Theoretically, it is not simply that martial law was a good opportunity or that Muslims had resources. Other opportunities occurred prior, and the community had the means to rebel sooner. Empirically, the first two causes are chronologically separated from the onset. I argue that the declaration of martial law in 1972 was an extensive threat that served as a trigger for rebellion because a national identity had already developed in response to preceding changes in education policies. No amount of opportunity or resources would spur action without that development.

Rationalist explanations for rebellion are unable to account for why Muslims rebelled after martial law in 1972 but not sooner. Harsh military suppression and discrimination existed beforehand. By the early 1970s, it was evident that the Muslim community had resources. They were capable of resisting intercommunal violence against Christians. The proclamation of martial law singled out several violent incidents with the Muslim community that would not have been possible if they did not have enough resources to resist. A training program for Muslim guerilla fighters was established in 1969, demonstrating the desire and means to mobilize a rebellion (Mercado 1984; Noble 1976). But separatist rebellion did not occur until Marcos declared martial law. This is because his declaration was an extensive threat against Muslims on the basis of their identity, serving as the necessary catalyst to finally trigger the onset of separatist rebellion. Rebellion occurred in response to this threat, however, because the first conditional of a national identity had finally developed.
There are several indications that a Muslim national identity existed by 1972. The MNLF newsletter *Mabarlika* stressed Moro as a “national concept” (as cited in Gowing 1975, 32). By the mid-1970s, at least 55 percent of Muslims were in support of the MNLF and rebellion against the government. This took the form of direct membership or donations. The Corregidor incident/Jabidah massacre involved mostly ethnic Tausugs. But Maranao and Maguindanao Muslims joined in training efforts that took place in Sabah afterward (Noble 1976). This demonstrates a sense of cohesion beyond just Tausugs that stretched to the broader Muslim community in response to the Philippine government. Without the development of a national identity, the response to the extensive threat of martial law would not have been a separatist rebellion representing the entire Muslim community.

Changes in education policies after Philippine independence facilitated the development of a Muslim national identity. Congress created the Commission on National Integration (CNI) in 1957, which provided scholarships for cultural minorities (Eder and McKenna 2004). The number of Muslim college graduates increased since CNI scholarships assisted non-elites (Majul 1985; McKenna 1998). From 1955 to 1978, President Nasser of Egypt promoted scholarships as part of his pan-Islamic programs. Over 200 Muslims from the Philippines studied overseas. Many went to Al-Azhar University (McKenna 1998). Nasser’s scholarships reinforced the salience of Muslim identity through a common education experience: students were selected on the basis of being Muslim. Their peers and instructors were Muslim, and their curriculum reflected a broader Muslim identity.

Al-Azhar graduates already taught in Muslim schools in the Philippines. But they were mostly from Indonesia (George 1980). Nasser’s scholarships changed this. After being educated in Cairo, graduates returned to the Philippines and served as religious teachers for their communities. According to McKenna (1998, 144), “It was much later before the presence of indigenous Islamic teachers had a commensurate effect on popular Islamic consciousness in the Philippines.” *Pandita* schools operated on a small scale. Graduates of Al-Azhar had experience in bridging an identity gap with Muslims from other states. Finding the commonality between Muslims in the Philippines was more likely after that experience. The extensive threat of martial law made this much easier, since the state viewed Muslims as a cohesive group.
Conclusion

In this chapter, I demonstrate how colonial education policies influence the onset of separatist rebellion. Christians in the Philippines are early seceders since they developed a national identity sooner, due to penetrative education policies, and could recognize and mobilize against an extensive threat sooner. Sharing a common education experience facilitated the development of a Philippine national identity among the Christian population, which is evident in how many members of the Philippine Revolution went to the same schools. The discovery of Katipunan members triggered rebellion since this constituted an extensive threat. Muslims are late seceders since their national identity developed later, due to shallow education policies, and recognizing and mobilizing against an extensive threat was less likely. They did not have a common education experience until domestic and international scholarships made that possible. Once a broader Muslim identity spanning different groups developed, it was easier to recognize and mobilize against the extensive threat of martial law.

Martial law was an extensive threat that served as a trigger for rebellion because a national identity had already developed in response to preceding changes in education policies. No amount of opportunity or resources would spur action without that development. In some cases, groups that have developed that identity rebel regardless of opportunity or resource availability.

The scope of this study is limited to early and late seceders, not latent seceders who never rebel. In addition, the theory relies on variation in education policies between groups. Without variation, the likelihood of early seceders is minimal. This is because there is a higher likelihood of cohesion developing between groups when they are educated with the same penetrative policies.

Different groups can experience contrasting education policies under the same authority. Under the more authoritarian hand of the U.S. colonial government, Muslims experienced a shallow policy. They also experienced a shallow education policy under the Spanish. Christians had the opposite experience. Such trends are evident elsewhere: in varying degrees of control in British Southeast Asian colonies and in separate education experiences between majorities and minorities under the Soviets (Trisko-Darden 2019; Gorenburg 2000). Both Christian and Muslim experiences of education policy challenge existing research about when to expect direct or indirect rule.
There are at least two trajectories for work concerning colonial education. First, studies could look to the past. Existing studies of colonial policy address questions about why certain institutions are established in some colonies but not others. Similarly, future research could address why some colonizers establish shallow education policies while others do not or why some groups are more receptive to these policies than others. Second, future research could consider the colonial legacies of education policies on the postcolonial state.

The latter avenue provides a specific entry into consider in whether education policies vary between regime types. Efforts to implement a more penetrative policy over Muslims increased under an independent Philippines. But this had less to do with a democratic Philippines and more to do with the necessity of state building. Both authoritarian and democratic regimes also face challenges to nation building. Education policies function as one arena in which they can be effective (Darden and Mylonas 2016). Existing research suggests the democracies enroll more students and that effectiveness of rule might depend on the timing and content of mass literacy (Brown 1999; Darden and Grzymala-Busse 2006). But some regimes might be inclined to be more penetrative than others.
CHAPTER 5

State Institutions in East Malaysia versus West Malaysia

Containing Grievances in an Ethno-religious Dominant Party System

Mohamed Salihin Subhan and Kai Ostwald

Editors’ Introduction: This chapter keeps the state representation focus but moves the geographic focus to Malaysia, specifically East Malaysia versus West Malaysia—two regions split geographically by water. Despite the political dominance of West Malaysia, a distinct regional East Malaysian identity was kept in check, while numerous mechanisms prevented East Malaysian grievances from being leveraged for political mobilization, both of which inhibited credible secessionist movements. Specifically, the null outcome results from two top-down political factors. First, central government interventions inhibited the Sabah and Sarawak indigenous populations from forming a majority East Malaysian Bumiputera coalition. Second, the central government had widespread success co-opting East Malaysian elites and their clientelist networks. By contrast, potential secessionist movements in the northeast region of West Malaysia, which also has a unique identity and history, were inhibited through a greater number of cross-cutting cleavages and policy concessions.

Introduction

Malaysia is often characterized as a divided country, with its politically salient ethnic cleavages receiving the greatest attention. Yet Malaysia also has distinct regional identities shaped both by historical and post-
independence factors that profoundly affect political mobilization and electoral competition. These regions have unique religious, linguistic, and cultural attributes that have produced sometimes serious center-periphery tensions. This makes Malaysia similar to neighboring Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines. Yet unlike those countries, regionalism in Malaysia has not produced any credible secessionist movements or violence. Moreover, while political actors in the East Malaysian region occasionally make use of mild secessionist rhetoric, this does not occur in the peninsular northeast region, despite both having a frequently contentious relationship with Malaysia’s center. This raises two key questions: why have center-periphery tensions in Malaysia not produced secessionist movements similar to those that have plagued its neighbors, and what explains the intra-Malaysian variation in the manifestations of these tensions?

We argue that Malaysia’s hegemonic political party—the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO)—effectively contained the political manifestations of center-periphery tensions through a strategy of co-opting salient regional issues and regional elite. The shared centrality of Islam in the northeast and Malaysia’s center allowed UMNO to co-opt a wide range of the northeast’s Islamist political demands, with the presence of other cross-cutting cleavages further limiting grievances and the potential of secessionist appeals. By contrast, the relative dearth of major cross-cutting cleavages between East Malaysia and Malaysia’s center allowed for the greater buildup of grievances. Yet the co-optation of East Malaysian elite, who enjoyed a lucrative and mutually beneficial relationship with the center’s elite, nonetheless prevented serious secessionist movements from taking root. Divisions among the East Malaysian populations, together with demographic changes that reduced the divergence between UMNO’s nationalist agenda and local preferences, further limited the potential of secessionist appeals.

This chapter begins with a brief overview of regionalism and UMNO’s hegemonic rule in Malaysia. It then examines the northeast and East Malaysian regional identities, briefly sketching out their origins and main attributes. The final section examines the regional grievances and develops the argument that serious secessionist movements were avoided through effective co-optation of salient regional issues and regional elite by Malaysia’s political center, as well as through series of secondary measures.
Political Domination in Malaysia

The Federation of Malaya gained independence from Britain in 1957 through the amalgamation of several politically and historically disparate units on the Malay Peninsula, namely, elements of the Straits Settlements (a British Crown colony) and the Federated and Unfederated Malay States. In 1963, a merger between Malaya and the likewise politically and historically distinct territories of Singapore (on the southern tip of the Malay Peninsula) and the East Malaysian territories of Sabah and Sarawak (across the South China Sea on the island of Borneo) created the Federation of Malaysia. Singapore’s expulsion in 1965 left the Federation of Malaysia with 13 states divided between the two major land bodies.

Malaysia was long classified as some variant of a dominant party system (Gomez 2016). That is because its politics were thoroughly dominated by UMNO, which, in conjunction with several junior partners in a coalition known as the Alliance prior to 1973 and Barisan Nasional (BN) after, ruled the country without interruption from 1957 through 2018.¹ UMNO was founded in the run-up to independence to defend the interests of the majority (peninsular) Malay population, making it an ethno-religious party. While UMNO claimed to represent the broad spectrum of Malays and other non-Malay indigenous groups—collectively referred to as the Bumiputera²—in practice it drew most strongly from the areas that previously made up the (peninsular) Federated Malay States and Johor. UMNO furthermore appropriated elements of the peninsular Malay royalty into its nationalist agenda and fashioned itself in their image. In practice, both its own political culture and its conception of Malaysia’s national identity drew strongly from its peninsular heartland, which consequently assumed the role of Malaysia’s central and cardinal region.

During its six decades in power, UMNO used its hegemonic control over Malaysia’s high-capacity state to impose elements of its identity and political culture over the remainder of the country. Two features of this nation-building agenda stand out. First is the elevation of the peninsular Malay identity to a place of prominence throughout the country. Through decades of rhetoric and interventionist policies, the peninsular Malay

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¹. UMNO’s 2018 loss was almost universally unanticipated. Following a brief interlude of 22 months, UMNO re-entered government in early 2020 following the collapse of the PH government (Ostwald 2020). UMNO’s support declined further in the 2022 general election, marking a clear end to its dominance (Weiss and Suffian 2023).

². Bumiputera translates roughly as “sons of the soil.” It refers to the Malays and other non-Malay indigenous groups.
identity has become deeply entrenched as the central pillar of Malaysia’s national identity. Notably, every prime minister has identified as peninsular Malay, with UMNO and UMNO-aligned political elite regularly referring to Malaysia as Tanah Melayu (land of the Malays).\(^3\) In its crudest forms, this manifests in the ketuanan Melayu (Malay primacy or dominance) ideology, which holds that Malays should rightfully dominate over the country’s ethnic minorities, many of whom are dismissed as pendatang (immigrants) and guests rather than rightful coinhabitants of the country (Ting 2009; Chin 2018). Second and closely related, UMNO has elevated the prominence of Islam—the constitutionally mandated religion of all Malays—at the national level. The end result is a hegemonic ethno-religious identity modeled after a subset of the peninsular Malay population that both reflects and reinforces the prominence of the central region from which it draws. The force of this imposition has been strengthened by the highly centralized nature of the Malaysian state, which, despite being federal in structure, concentrates power in the federal level generally and the prime minister’s department specifically (Hutchinson 2014; Ostwald 2017).

Malaysia’s Periphery

The somewhat arbitrary nature of Malaysia’s national boundaries, in conjunction with the decentralized nature of pre-independence political entities, has produced a highly heterogeneous population containing myriad identities, in terms of both regional and ethno-religious distinctions. Even the dominant Malay identity/group is a primarily political construct comprising numerous distinct subgroups whose unity is situational in nature (Hirschman 1986; Nagata 1974). As such, any number of socially and politically salient regional identities could be identified. We follow recent work on regionalism in Malaysia, however, in focusing on two major regional identities, namely, East Malaysia and the peninsular northeast.\(^4\) East Malaysia comprises the states of Sabah and Sarawak, which are situated on the island of Borneo across the South China Sea from peninsular Malaysia. The northeast comprises the states of Kelantan and Terengganu in the northeastern part of peninsular Malaysia.\(^5\) We do not claim that

\(3\). While every prime minister to date has identified as (peninsular) Malay, each has recent ancestors from beyond the Malay Peninsula.

\(4\). See Ostwald and Oliver (2020), which distinguishes between four major regions in Malaysia, including East Malaysia and the Northeast.

\(5\). The northern states of Kedah and Perlis share many of the attributes that make Kel-
these regional identities have hard boundaries or correspond with precise territories or that the regional and central identities are static or absolute. The remainder of this section briefly sketches out the historical origins of the two peripheral regions.

Northeast Malaysia

The northeast region of Malaysia, while sharing several features with the broader peninsular region, has unique historical origins that have numerous contemporary implications. From the 13th century through the handover to the British in 1909, what are now the states of Kelantan, Terengganu, Kedah, and Perlis were vassal states of various Siamese kingdoms in what is today Thailand. The significantly differing modes of control between the Siamese and British administrations in the 19th and early 20th centuries had two lasting consequences, particularly for demographic structures and identity.

First, the Siamese did not enforce a division between governance and religious affairs, allowing for the proliferation of Islamic teachings across the northeast. Those teachings were deeply influenced by religious scholars who studied in the Middle East, infusing ideas that were unique in the peninsula (Noor 2014). This emergent form of Islamist ideology was disseminated via religious schools, thus displacing the local sultans’ role as the defenders of Islam and Malay tradition (Azmi Aziz and Shamsul 2004). In conjunction, this produced an Islamist tradition that was distinct from that in the rest of the peninsula. Second, the northeast did not experience the same significant inward migration of Chinese and Indian laborers that many parts of the British-controlled peninsula did, leaving the population significantly more homogenous than other areas of the peninsula. The northeast currently has a population of approximately four million, of which over 95 percent are Malay-Muslim.

The northeast’s unique environment proved to be fertile ground for the Islamist Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS), which has flourished in Kelantan and Terengganu since its founding in the early 1950s. PAS began as an Islamist faction of UMNO that broke off after rejecting what it viewed as UMNO’s more secular and modernist Islamic approach in favor of a purer and more conservative Islam; its conservative leanings have become
even more pronounced since the late 1990s (Weiss 2004; Abdullah 2018). PAS and UMNO have historically had a contentious relationship, though they have partnered at various times, including briefly in the 1970s and again from 2018 to 2022. While PAS has contested elections throughout Malaysia, its performance was typically poor beyond its peninsular northeast heartland, at least prior to a major breakthrough in the 2022 general election. While the socioeconomic implications of an urban-rural divide may not be as consequential as often suggested (Ong 2020), the northeast’s relatively low levels of urbanization and prevalence of poverty contribute to a regional character that is distinct from the rest of the peninsula.

**East Malaysia**

The historical development of East Malaysia was almost entirely distinct from that of the peninsula, at least following the arrival of colonial powers in the region. While the British controlled both territories, they did so in an indirect manner through the Brooke Raj in Sarawak and the British North Borneo Chartered Company in Sabah. The territories of present-day Sabah and Sarawak were home to a vast spectrum of small communities that predate the arrival of the Europeans in the region. The relative absence of large towns in Sabah and Sarawak where members of different communities could interact slowed the formation of broader collective identities (Milne 1965). Ultimately, the relative geographic isolation of many East Malaysian populations and the indirect manner of colonial rule led the development of ethnic consciousness and identity to occur more slowly and in more piecemeal fashion than in the peninsula.

Sabah’s and Sarawak’s incorporation into contemporary Malaysia requires brief discussion. Their inclusion into the 1963 Federation of Malaysia, six years after (peninsular) Malaya had already gained independence from the British, was driven in substantial part by peninsular Malay leaders’ desire to counterbalance Chinese-majority Singapore, which both the British and local leaders believed could not exist as an independent territory and thus required incorporation into the federation. The 1963 Malaysia agreement thus stipulated that the Federation of Malaysia would

6. PAS contested a large number of seats as a third party in the 2018 election, presumably in loose collaboration with UMNO intended to split the opposition vote. It failed to win any seats outside of the Northeast, however (Ostwald, Schuler, and Chong 2018). To much surprise, PAS secured more seats than any other party in the 2022 election, though there is disagreement about the cause of its breakthrough (Washida 2023).
be formed from the merger of four territories: Malaya, Singapore, Sabah, and Sarawak. Within that agreement, Sabah and Sarawak were to retain significant autonomy and receive political overrepresentation, which remains in the form of malapportionment (Ostwald 2013). The agreement also stipulated numerous other forms of autonomy. To this day, for example, both Sabah and Sarawak retain separate immigration controls, and Malaysians from the peninsula must present valid travel documents and can be denied entry.

While ethnic diversity in peninsular Malaysia is often reduced to an essentialized “MCIO” (Malay, Chinese, Indian, Other) model, East Malaysia’s recognized diversity is considerably more complex, with over a dozen ethnic categories used for public policy purposes. These categories often remain more fluid and contested than their peninsular counterparts. This has not stopped the formation of race-based political parties in East Malaysia, however, which coalesced in the transition to independence, spurred on by the perceived need for ethnic groups to consolidate political power and ensure that they had a voice in the Malaysian federation (Milne 1965). Despite the extension of indigenous status to East Malaysia’s original inhabitants—creating the “Malay and other indigenous groups” Bumiputera category—there remains a perceptible difference between the treatment of Muslim and non-Muslim Bumiputera on the national stage, with the latter relatively disadvantaged.

Grievances, Demands, and Containment

UMNO’s dominance both of the ruling coalition and of Malaysian politics resulted from consolidating power at critical junctures. The 1969 general election proved particularly important. UMNO and the Alliance coalition secured less than half (49.3%) of the popular vote and failed to secure a parliamentary supermajority for the first time since independence. Ethnic riots immediately following the election left at least several hundred dead and raised the specter of ongoing unrest and instability. This precipitated a national emergency that saw Parliament suspended until 1971. Factions within UMNO interpreted the unrest as evidence that the country’s Malay majority remained fundamentally discontent with their position vis-à-vis minority groups (Horowitz 1989). Restoring stability, then, required strengthening the social, economic, and political position of the Malays, which UMNO—as the political representative of the Malays—would spearhead.
UMNO further consolidated its control within the ruling coalition (renamed Barisan Nasional), leaving it the clear hegemonic leader. It also sought to impose substantially tighter control over Malaysian politics through two related means. The first was a concerted process of centralization that hollowed out the already meager autonomy of subnational political units, strengthening UMNO’s ability to impose its political will throughout the federation (Ostwald 2017). This was accompanied by the strong promotion of the Malay language in administration and education (Liu and Ricks 2012), which privileged Malay culture and tradition. Second was the formulation of the New Economic Policy (NEP) in 1971, which specified far-reaching affirmative action measures designed to empower Malays and other Bumiputera (Gomez and Saravanamuttu 2012; Lee 2012). As these were highly interventionist and penetrated nearly all areas of Malaysia’s economy, they gave the federal government vast control over local conditions, allowing it to override local preferences where politically beneficial. While the NEP formally expired in 1991, the subsequent development policies retained its core interventionist mandate and centralized structure.

UMNO’s top-down imposition of policies favoring the Malay-Muslim identity enabled the party’s power consolidation; it also fueled center-periphery tensions with regions beyond UMNO’s peninsular heartland. In the northeast, grievances with the center arose from divergent views on how Islam should shape public life and were compounded by the region’s relative underdevelopment. Three primary factors, however, contained centrifugal forces in the northeast and prevented the emergence of serious secessionist threats. First, UMNO co-opted numerous elements of the northeast’s Islamist agenda and selectively granted autonomy on contentious aspects of religious practice, reducing the divergence between federal policy and local preferences. Second, the presence of cross-cutting cleavages—namely, the Malay identity and Islam—intrinsically limited the ability of potential secessionist leaders to mobilize a base, as suggested by a body of research on cleavage structures (Selway 2011; Gubler and Selway 2012). Third, with full independence essentially inconceivable given the northeast’s small size, its only credible alternative to the Federation of Malaysia was incorporation into neighboring Thailand. While calls to return to precolonial arrangements can be politically resonant in aggrieved areas, the Buddhist nature of the Thai state and history of violent conflict in Thailand’s deep south undermine any potential appeal of this possibility in practice.
The imposition of policies perceived to favor the peninsula and its Malay-Muslim majority likewise fueled many of East Malaysia’s grievances. As with the northeast, this was exacerbated by East Malaysia’s relative underdevelopment on numerous indicators relative to the peninsula. Unlike with the almost exclusively Malay-Muslim northeast, however, East Malaysia’s diverse and substantially non-Muslim population limits the number of center-periphery cross-cutting cleavages, thereby potentially facilitating the growth of secessionist sentiments. Indeed, relative to the northeast, secessionist rhetoric is far more pronounced in East Malaysia, and secessionist agitations occur on occasion, albeit on a small scale. Several factors prevented these from becoming credible secessionist movements of the kind found in neighboring Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines. Most significantly, UMNO effectively co-opted East Malaysian political elite by granting them a substantial degree of lucrative economic autonomy in exchange for incorporation into the dominant BN coalition and at least tacit acquiescence to UMNO’s Malay-Muslim agenda. In addition, UMNO and its East Malaysian political allies effectively prevented the consolidation of East Malaysia’s fragmented groups into a unified political force (Puyok 2009). Finally, UMNO oversaw the implementation of a series of policies that changed the demographic composition of Sabah and Sarawak, effectively increasing the proportion of East Malaysia’s population that viewed UMNO’s Malay-Muslim agenda as benign, if not beneficial.

In conjunction, these explanations address the puzzle of Malaysian regionalism, specifically (1) why Malaysia does not have the same secessionist movements as neighboring Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines, despite pronounced regional differences that suggest their potential; and (2) why separatist rhetoric has been more pronounced in East Malaysia than in the northeast. The remainder of this section develops these arguments in detail, beginning with East Malaysia and then proceeding with the northeast.

**East Malaysia**

East Malaysia’s grievances emanate from real and perceived violations of the cultural, political, and economic autonomy initially granted to Sabah and Sarawak in the 1963 Malaysia Agreement (Chin 2019). Among the agreement’s 20 points, several are especially sensitive. One states that Islam’s status as the national religion, as noted in the 1957 Malayan Constitution, would not be applicable to East Malaysia. Another states that
control over immigration would be retained by state governments in East Malaysia. A third prohibits discrimination against non-Muslim East Malaysians in the civil service (which the 1957 constitution implied would provide Malays and other indigenous populations preferred access), while yet another entitles Sabah and Sarawak to revenue generated by natural resource extraction in the region, thereby diverging from the revenue generation constraints imposed on the peninsular states. While disagreement on precise points remains, there is a general sense that the protections implied by these provisions have eroded over the decades of independence. Indeed, the initial practice of referring to East Malaysia as distinct from the 11 peninsular states was ended in a 1976 constitutional amendment that collectively referred to Malaysia’s 13 states, symbolically making Sabah and Sarawak the de facto equivalents of their peninsular counterparts.

This erosion occurred through several means. First, the UMNO-led federal government actively extended the peninsular Malay brand of communal politics to East Malaysia by endorsing politicians who were amenable to their cause. These politicians in turn implemented policies to assimilate Sabah and Sarawak into the broader (and peninsula-centered) Malaysian fold. This often involved the promotion of Islam, which effectively undermined indigenous cultures and potentially contradicted the 1963 agreement. Examples abound. When Tun Mustapha—who was viewed as friendly with the UMNO-led federal government—took over as chief minister of Sabah in 1967, he sought to suppress the Kadazandusun identity in several ways, for example by reducing Kadazandusun language use in schools and radio broadcasts, pressing for Islam to be recognized as the state religion, and encouraging Sabahans to convert to Islam (Reid 1997; Kaur 1998). The same occurred in Sarawak with the pro-federal government chief minister Rahman Yakub, who made Malay the medium of instruction in schools, appointed Malay and Muslim Melanaus to key positions in state government, established shariah courts, and formed Islamic nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) (Kaur 1998; Hazis 2011).

Second, East Malaysian presence in the civil service did appear to suffer due to preferential treatment for Muslim Bumiputera (Reid 1997; Puyok 2009). Moreover, there are credible allegations that up to several hundred thousand primarily Muslim migrants from Indonesia and the Philippines were illegally granted citizenship and voting rights in Sabah. This corresponded with UMNO’s entry into Sabah politics and had the effect of significantly changing Sabah’s demographic structure, which became Muslim majority (Chin 2019).
Third, the UMNO-led federal governments were accused of exerting a form of economic neocolonialism over East Malaysia, primarily by calling for centralized control over natural resources to more efficiently promote economic development. Control over oil and gas extraction in Sarawak, for example, were ceded to the central government in exchange for 5 percent in royalties (Hazis 2011). This remains a major point of contention for East Malaysians, particularly since Sabah and Sarawak are among the least developed states in the country (Chin 2019).

Consequently, East Malaysia’s most prominent grievances manifest themselves in demands for decentralization of power away from the federal government, specifically in the form of greater East Malaysian autonomy of decision-making on matters relevant to regional identity and development. This includes greater local control over immigration, transportation, financial resources, and the education system. In bargaining with the federal government, East Malaysian political elite have occasionally used the specter of secession as a tactic to exert pressure when calling for political concessions (Cheah 2002). Bornean political parties and NGOs have also occasionally claimed greater East Malaysian autonomy as part of their platform, with fringe groups voicing support for Sabah’s and Sarawak’s departure from the federation (Hazis 2018; Chin 2019). This aligns with cases beyond Malaysia where radical regional demands can be understood as part of the center-periphery bargaining process (Jenne, Saideman, and Lowe 2007).

Despite these grievances, demands, and sometimes thinly veiled threats, East Malaysia has never seen a credible secessionist movement that had serious prospects of success. As alluded to earlier, this has several reasons. Perhaps most importantly, UMNO and BN elite were successful in co-opting East Malaysian elite over decades: as long as East Malaysian elite acquiesced on particular federal government priorities, especially around support of Malay-Muslim political dominance, their peninsular counterparts granted some measure of autonomy over the management of local affairs. This implied noninterference in the often lucrative business and natural resource ventures of many East Malaysian leaders. By contrast, leaders who openly agitated for states’ rights, for example, Donald Stephens in Sabah and Stephen Kalong Ningkan in Sarawak, found themselves sidelined by others who were more amenable to adopting federal government policies in exchange for political and economic patronage (Hazis 2015). This underscores the symbiotic relationship between the center and the periphery at the elite level. Due to its substantial number
of seats, East Malaysia is politically consequential to any coalition seeking to form the federal government. The rewards available to East Malaysian elite who work with the federal government reflect this, as do the potential risks posed to the elite who go against the federal government.

The personalistic nature of East Malaysian politics adds an additional buffer between grassroots grievances and elite demands. Examples abound of East Malaysian elite who cultivate powerful political networks with personally loyal voter bases that they are able to bring with them during elite realignments. Such a realignment was instrumental in Pakatan Harapan’s 2018 victory over the BN, which occurred through support of the Parti Warisan Sabah (Ostwald and Oliver 2020). Warisan was founded only two years earlier by former UMNO vice president Shafie Apdal following his ouster from UMNO in 2016. Shafie’s powerful political network, established during his time in UMNO and replete with loyal voters, allowed Warisan to win the second highest seat total in Sabah, thereby securing federal power for Pakatan Harapan and the coveted Sabah chief minister position for himself (Chin 2019). There is little to indicate, however, that the significant vote shift away from UMNO was driven by changing voter preferences, as opposed to stable personal loyalties and clientelistic linkages, implying a potential disconnect between grassroots preferences and elite positions.

The manipulation of local identities and demographic changes have further constrained the potential for secessionist movements. In particular, the growth of a Muslim/non-Muslim dichotomy, driven substantially by peninsular interventions, has effectively divided Sabah’s and Sarawak’s indigenous population and created a subgroup with favorable inclinations toward the peninsula’s model of Malay/Muslim-centric politics. This has undermined local efforts to form a majority Bumiputera platform (Puyok 2009). The federal government has also promoted coalition governments that mirror the Alliance/BN model in both states in order to balance the ethnic and religious group interests and undermine secessionist tendencies (Kaur 1998). Demographic changes resulting from the aforementioned illegal immigration and gerrymandering of constituencies to promote Muslim-majority seats further limited the ability of non-Muslim Bumiputera communities to control the political agenda (Chin 2019). Stated differently, the “collective action frame” needed for natural resource extraction and other forms of exploitation to drive conflict and separatism (Aspinall 2007) is hobbled by the divisions within the indigenous communities of Sabah and Sarawak.
East Malaysia has experienced significant political change since the BN’s defeat in 2018, which prompted the former BN component parties in East Malaysia to leave the coalition en masse. In retrospect, the end of UMNO’s dominance over Malaysian politics led to the decoupling of East Malaysian parties and political elite, which largely retained the loyalty of their vote bases, from their erstwhile peninsular overlords. They have embraced their newfound autonomy and exert considerable influence in the coalition-of-coalitions government that emerged following the 2022 election (Puyok and Hafizan 2023). While there have been no explicit calls for secession, East Malaysian elites have pressed for significant reforms to their positioning within the federation.

Northeast Malaysia

The northeast region’s grievances typically derive from the center’s perceived resistance toward the northeast’s conservative Islamist preferences, as well as the related perceived threats toward the autonomy of Muslims in the practice of their faith. These critiques are long-standing but became more vocal in the 1980s when PAS began to more regularly challenge UMNO’s Islamic credentials (Liow 2009). UMNO’s response was to advocate for more progressive and moderate forms of Islam, from Mahathir’s pragmatic and productivity-based Islamic ideology to Abdullah Badawi’s inclusivist Islam Hadhari (Ahmad Fauzi and Muhamad Takiyudin 2014). PAS, in turn, hardened its stance that the government’s agenda was not truly Islamist, going so far as to call UMNO leaders kafirs (nonbelievers) (Noor 2003). The government also blocked multiple attempts by PAS to introduce hudud (Islamic criminal law) at the state level in Kelantan and Terengganu. More broadly, proponents of Islamism have framed liberal and individual rights discourses, including on such things as feminism and human rights, as an attempt to undermine the ability of Muslims to practice their faith. This narrative became especially pronounced around legal challenges against shariah court rulings on issues involving Muslim conversion (Moustafa 2018). While these critiques do not come exclusively from PAS and other groups from the northeast, many draw their inspiration from the region’s dominant political and social agenda.

The relationship between PAS and UMNO has been complex and often contentious. Nonetheless, the competing claims to being true defenders of Islam have offered opportunities for mutually beneficial coopera-
tion. Several examples illustrate this. PAS had long sought the introduction of Islamic criminal law in the northeast but was repeatedly foiled by the UMNO-led federal government. In 2016, when UMNO was facing intense pressure from progressive opposition, PAS president Abdul Hadi Awang introduced RUU 355 (Private Member’s Bill 355) in Parliament, which sought to raise the severity of punishments allowed for civil and criminal offences in shariah court, effectively enabling *hudud* law. A rally in Kuala Lumpur was organized as a show of force. Wanting to galvanize UMNO’s own Malay-Muslim base, Prime Minister Najib Razak promised support for the bill (Chin 2018). While the status of *hudud* remains in limbo, UMNO’s strategic reception of such PAS maneuvers opens space for and mainstreams elements of PAS’s agenda. Several other rallies by Islamist activists with close PAS ties include the 2018 rally protesting the proposed ratification of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination (ICERD) and the 2019 Himpunan Pertahanan Kedaulatan Islam (Assembly for the Defenders of Islamic Sovereignty) in 2019 (Dettman 2020). In both cases, the rallies were in reaction to policies that were framed as threatening to Malay-Muslim primacy (Wai kar 2019). Both led to policy reversals.

More generally, the contestation over the claim to represent Muslim interests from the 1980s onward led to many of PAS’s demands being either met outright or co-opted by UMNO, thus enabling their way into the federal framework. The breadth of this was expansive. Key Islamist political leaders, including figures like Anwar Ibrahim, were co-opted into the government (Mohamed Nawab 2017). The prominence of Islam within the civil service increased significantly (Maznah Mohamed 2020), and the jurisdiction of the Shariah courts grew at the expense of civil courts (Moustafa 2018). Symbols of Muslim tradition, especially the sultans, were cemented as central elements of the national identity. A veritable mass of Muslim NGOs and activist groups including ABIM (Muslim Youth Movement) and ISMA (Malaysian Muslim Solidarity) received implicit support from the state. In short, the federal government ceded substantial ground to Islamist demands, many of which originated in the northeast. This served to mitigate many of the northeast’s grievances, even if the often incomplete incorporation of the Islamist agenda left some demands partially unfulfilled. In any case, the growing Islamization of Malaysia across state and society makes remaining within the federation unquestionably more appealing than any credible secession option, given the northeast’s small
population and the Buddhist nature of the Thai state that it borders. The nominally shared Malay-Muslim identity, despite its significant regional differences, likewise provided the cross-cutting cleavages that weakened the potential appeal of separatist agitations. Furthermore, UMNO’s sudden return to power following the 2020 constitutional crisis and the short-lived formal alliance of UMNO and PAS in the form of Muafakat Nasional made it clear that the centrality of ketuanan Melayu and ketuanan Islam will continue (Welsh 2019).

**Alternative Exit Options**

While we have focused on East Malaysia and the northeast, the remainder of the Malay Peninsula is itself highly heterogeneous. Ostwald and Oliver (2020) identify another quasi-region comprised of non-contiguous, ethnically diverse areas across the peninsula. This area suggests the existence of an additional mechanism that has limited the growth of separatism in Malaysia. Many of these diverse pockets, typically clustered in urban and peri-urban areas along the peninsula’s western coast, have roots in the globally oriented Straits Settlements and thus diverge in myriad ways from the more inward and tradition-oriented peninsular Malay UMNO heartlands. That distinct history, in conjunction with large non-Malay-Muslim populations, has long driven desires for linguistic and religious autonomy that are in tension with UMNO’s Malay-Muslim empowerment agenda.

The noncontiguous nature of this quasi-region makes secession an impossibility. It does not, however, preclude individual exit. Indeed, Malaysia’s rate of emigration is roughly twice the global average (Lim, Yap, and Krishnan 2014), with a disproportionately large share of émigrés being well-educated non-Bumiputera from the ethnically diverse areas of the peninsula. The motivation in many cases is clear: relocation abroad to a place that offers the prospect of unimpeded educational and employment opportunities as well as a greater sense of belonging (Koh 2017). The resulting brain drain has serious economic implications for Malaysia (World Bank 2011). Despite these costs, however, the high exit rate of progressive citizens had a clear upside for UMNO (and any similar successors), as it acts as a safety valve to release antiestablishment pressure.7

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7. Similar measures have been noted in other autocratic regimes around the world (Miller and Peters 2020).
While this individual exit option may be most pronounced among well-educated non-Bumiputera from diverse areas, it is by no means limited to that demographic. To the contrary, individual exit—whether from the periphery to the peninsula’s progressive cities or from those cities to locations abroad—has long been an important channel to escape the perceived overreach of hegemonic UMNO’s nation-building project.
Editors’ Introduction: In this last chapter on state representation, we focus on a case where there has been an absence of demands. In Northeast Thailand, the large ethnic Lao population has not demanded cultural concessions from the state. In fact, not only have the demands been absent, but most people in the region see themselves as Thai (the broader national identity) or Isan (a moniker meaning “northeast”)—as opposed to ethnically Lao. The absence of the Lao identity has less to do with the absence of civic associations from the bottom up than with the absence of political representation from the top down. The Thai government employed a two-punch strategy. The first was the rapid elimination of the Lao ethnic identity from the state records around the turn of the 20th century. The second was the concerted effort to create a unified Thai identity through the national education system. The success of these two efforts manifests in the absence of demands today in spite of the group size in Northeast Thailand.

Introduction

The largest community of ethnically Lao people in the world is not in Laos; numbering about 3.4 million, they compose only slightly over half the country’s population (Lao Statistics Bureau 2015). Rather, many more Lao people live across the Mekong River in Thailand. While the Thai government does not differentiate the Lao in its census, scholars have used language, one of the main identifiers of ethnicity, to identify Lao ethnics,
estimating that the number of Lao in Thailand ranges between 13 and 18 million, populating the country’s northeastern region (Draper and Peerasit 2016; Keyes 1997, 2003; Lewis, Simons, and Fennig 2015; Suwilai et al. 2004). In other words, there are potentially five times as many Lao people in Thailand as in Laos. For Thailand, then, the Lao are a significant presence, making up almost one-third of the total population. Indeed, according to some estimates, the Lao-speaking population is almost as large as the population of native Central Thai speakers, with some scholars claiming that “more people in Thailand speak Lao as their first language than central Thai” (Platt 2013, x; Smalley 1994).

With such a large Lao population geographically concentrated in northeastern Thailand, one might expect to find political movements grounded in the Lao or the northeastern regional identity, especially since the Lao suffer many systemic disadvantages, both economic and political (Draper and Selway 2019). Indeed, theories of ethnic politics predict that such movements could easily exist (Wimmer 2013, 102–4). Yet the ethnically Lao people in Thailand do not evidence any major political movements associated with their ethnic identity (Ricks 2019). Indeed, while they still refer to themselves as Lao among co-ethnics (Saowanee and McCargo 2014), many eschew the identifier of Lao when interacting with outsiders, preferring instead to be designated Thai or Isan, a term from Pali meaning “northeast” that the Thai state adopted to refer to the Lao within their borders (Iijima 2018). Pressures for regionalism have been largely bypassed or suppressed (Keyes 1967). In other words, despite some potential indicators that would favor a regional movement, the Lao in Thailand appear to have no major political movements, at least relative to other parts of Southeast Asia discussed in this volume. In that sense, they serve as a puzzling negative case.

Why have we not seen the rise of an ethnic or regional movement in northeastern Thailand? What is the propensity for ethnic mobilization today? How do the Lao view their ethnic, regional, and national identities?

I address these questions by first outlining over a century of government policies that the Thai state implemented to impress upon all parties that Lao people are Thai people, maintaining there is no significant difference between the two, either ethnically or linguistically (Grabowsky 1996; Iijima 2018; Keyes 1997). Then, utilizing original survey data as well as interviews, I underscore both underlying grievances and the potential for ethnic mobilization that still exist among Isan people. Despite this, I also present evidence suggesting that Thai nationalism has the capacity to
overpower the potential for regional movements. In short, the Thai state’s century-long nation-building strategy has largely precluded opportunities for regionalism to flourish.

This chapter, then, demonstrates the strength of government policies in shaping ethnic identities. Nationalism can trump ethnic identities. Such findings are in line with a growing body of literature on the strength of nationalism, which can change the behavior of large ethnic populations (Charnysh, Lucas, and Singh 2015; Wimmer 2018). At the same time, though, the regional identity of Isan people has become strong, raising the potential for future political action.

Unifying Thai Identity

Thailand is often considered ethnically homogenous. This perception, though, is the result of a century-long series of government policies designed to unify all people within Thailand under a single, government-approved “Thai” ethnicity (Streckfuss 2015; Selway 2007). Efforts to homogenize the nation focused on language, religion, and symbols of national unity, such as the monarchy (Thongchai 1994; Vella 1978). Portraying unity, both to external and domestic audiences, has masked a great deal of ethnic and linguistic diversity, which has been perhaps most successful in the country’s northeast, a region encompassing the Khorat Plateau, extending from the Phetchabun range in the west to the Mekong River in the east. Today the region is divided into 20 provinces and houses approximately one-third of Thailand’s population, the vast majority of whom are ethnically Lao.

The decision to turn the Lao in this region into Thais was begun under the centralization reforms during the reign of King Chulalongkorn (1868–1910). Chulalongkorn ruled as Siam’s absolute monarch during the zenith of Western colonial power in Southeast Asia, at a time when the kingdom faced significant pressures and threats. For a state that had depended upon mandala-style relationships with its vassals found across mainland Southeast Asia, the imposition of European concepts of governance and rule necessitated rapid adaptation. Western powers extracted multiple concessions from the kingdom, including unequal treaties, extraterritoriality, and the creation of new borders that constrained the Siamese, spurring feelings of national humiliation along with the threat of colonization (Thongchai.

1. The country would change its name to Thailand in 1939.
1994; Strate 2015). Chulalongkorn responded to the European menace by transforming the kingdom's system of rule, adopting an internal colonial-style bureaucratic system and seeking opportunities to stymie potential claims that the British or French might leverage to further colonize the kingdom. This included reducing the potential for ethnic tensions between the Siamese rulers and people who found themselves within the newly drawn boundaries of the state.

The Siamese government had long looked upon “the Lao as an inferior breed,” a people that had been involved in warfare and rebellion against the Siamese state (Breazele 1975, 213). As the Siamese state adjusted to its new boundaries, concerns arose that the Lao would see themselves as linked to their kin under French colonial power, which might spur the French to declare suzerainty over more land or the Lao to rebel against their Thai rulers. King Chulalongkorn expressed apprehension when considering whether the Lao would choose to support Thai claims to the area: “The bloody Lao consider themselves a separate race from us. Would they be loyal to us; or would they rise up in mutiny?” (quoted in Breazele 1975, 238–39). The differentiation of ethnics posed great danger for the Siamese palace’s claims on the west bank of the Mekong.

The palace deliberately developed a set of policies to identify the Lao and other ethnic minority groups within the Siamese boundaries as belonging to Siam through shaping and defining what it meant to be Thai. The mechanisms through which the Thai state consolidated “Thai-ness” (khwampen Thai) operated through both positive and negative reinforcement. First, on the positive side, the Thai elite, a relatively homogenous group, used their homogeneity and dominance over the political system to reward those who adopted and embraced Thai-ness. This operated through a few mechanisms, but perhaps the most influential was the creation of an ethnic and linguistic hierarchy wherein the state-approved Thai identity was granted much higher status and recognition than any other.

The identity, though, was not exclusionary. Skinner (1960) argued that in 19th-century Thailand, incentives existed that rewarded Chinese immigrants who abandoned their old ethnic identities to become Thai; indeed, there was upward social mobility for those who adopted Thai-ness. Thus, the Chinese chose to become Thai in Siam, while their counterparts in Java found no such benefits to assimilation. Similar incentives for willing assimilation were available to other ethnic groups, including the Lao (Dararat 2003), although it appears that the traditional Lao elites received fewer benefits than their Chinese-ancestry counterparts (Vickery 1970).
Kukrit Pramoj (quoted in Smalley 1994, 322–23), who served briefly as prime minister, explained the fluid nature of khwampen Thai:

A Thai is not a person who is born by blood. . . . If you do something to yourself, then you become a Thai. [This] means you accept Thai values, Thai ideals, mostly you become a Buddhist. You worship the Lord Buddha, his teaching and the holy order of monks. And you respect your parents, you respect your teachers, . . . you are loyal to the king and . . . to the Thai nation, and you accept all kinds of ceremonies, you wear amulets around your neck, figures of the Lord Buddha, you get ordained as a Buddhist monk, you add the Thai ceremonies at home whether wedding or anniversary or things like that. You enjoy life in the Thai way and you have the same sort of Thai escape mechanisms when trouble arises. . . . The Thais know each other. [We know] whether or not another person is a Thai . . . regardless of . . . skin color or religious belief. Because the various religions like Christianity and Islam have been established in this country for centuries and the people of those two religions including the Taoists from China . . . became Thai because they accepted all kinds of Thai values, ideas and customs even though their religious beliefs remain from the beginning.

Language was an important part of this hierarchy, and Central or Standard Thai became privileged above the alternative languages that served as the primary indicators of ethnicity (Ricks 2020). The Thai state sought to spread Standard Thai throughout the country, reducing the perception of the language’s exclusivity (Diller 2002). National education policies developed to carry out the endeavor, and the use of local languages was strongly discouraged with mandated use of Thai script, “so that, at a minimum, the Lao language spoken [in the North and Northeast] would be induced to become more like Thai” (Breazele 1975, 259–60). Smalley (1994, 340) noted:

The language hierarchy in Thailand is one dimension of a larger ethnic hierarchy, and language is one of the most significant elements of ethnicity there. Because people accept the linguistic and ethnic hierarchy, on the one hand, and soften its levels with porous linguistic and ethnic boundaries, Thailand’s unity in diversity becomes possible.

In sum, acting as a carrot for alternate ethnicities within the Thai geo-body, the high status of the Thai ethnicity, primarily through language, encouraged its adoption.
At the opposite end of the scale, the Thai state also carried a big stick to threaten those who might adopt alternate identities. This forced consolidation of Thai identity was developed through Chulalongkorn’s administrative system, and it was promoted especially by his brothers. Prince Damrong pushed for the adoption of a singular Thai identity by ordering provincial officials to stop referring to their subjects as Lao. He wrote, “People in Bangkok have long called [the peoples of northern and northeastern Siam] Lao. Today, however, we know they are Thai, not Lao” (quoted in Keyes 2003, 187). Government documents were modified to replace the term “Lao” with “Thai” (Iijima 2018). State schools were expanded, teaching Standard Thai. Along the way, local dialects were banned, and materials written in the tongues were destroyed (Liu and Ricks 2012, 498–99).

When Chulalongkorn died and his nationalist son took the helm, the Thai identity became even more pronounced with a focus on nation, religion, and the monarchy. Vajiravudh had been educated in England, where he gained an appreciation for the power of nationalism and the ability of the state to encourage national identity. During his 15 years on the throne (1910–25), the nature of Thai-ness became central to the creation of the nation (Vella 1978). This system of “official nationalism” reinforced social hierarchies and ensconced a Thai-centric worldview as the basis of the national identity (Anderson 1983).

After the fall of the absolute monarchy in 1932 and the rise of the military in politics, ethnicity and the potential for regionalism became an issue of national security, and the first government of Field Marshal Phibun Songkram (1938–44) adopted multiple manifestations of what it meant to be a proper “Thai,” which ranged from proper greetings, proper behavior, and proper language to culinary specialties, including the invention and spread of the popular dish *phad thai* (Kobkua 1995; see also Diller 2002). The effort at consolidating Thai-ness went so far as to change the name of the country from Siam to Thailand to better align the Thai ethnicity with the country’s boundaries. Phibun also continued the unification of a central religious identity (Ricks 2008). The Phibun government was so successful in completing the consolidation of the Thai identity that after the end of his first term as prime minister in 1944, “the establishment of Thai as the national language would never again be questioned” (Keyes 2003, 192).

The government stick, though, was not limited to forced adoption of Thai language in schools and Thai practices; it also evidenced itself as suppression of regional movements. These included the brutal quelling of the Holy Man rebellion in 1902 as well as suppression of Buddhist movements in the North under the direction of Khrupa Sriwichai (Bowie
Later in the 1950s, with the military in power, political leaders from the Northeast were murdered by the state to reduce the propensity for ethnoregionalism. These efforts, though, probably fueled rather than hindered the growth of the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) during the 1960s and 1970s. The CPT, though, never became a separatist movement. By this time, even facing massive inequalities between urban Thais in Bangkok and rural Lao in northeast Thailand, the Thai identity had sufficient rootedness that there were no calls to break away from Thailand and join Laos (Somchai 2002; Keyes 1967).

Thus, the Thai state sought to consolidate the Thai identity using both positive and negative reinforcement. Throughout the past century, successive Thai governments continued to promote a unified Thai identity to reduce the propensity for threats to the state from within, which has served to neutralize challenges from alternative ethnic groups.

### Regionalism’s Potential

Despite these assimilation policies, the Lao people of northeastern Thailand have also developed a deep sense of pride in their regional identity, which is most often publicly referred to as Isan. The Isan identity became more public during the 1990s at the same time as other regional identities throughout Thailand became more evident (Jory 1999; Draper et al. 2019). Some scholars have suggested that the identity is becoming a potential focal point for political mobilization, wherein the Lao people of Isan engage in resistance to the Thai state (McCargo and Krisdawan 2004; Saowanee and McCargo 2016, 2019). The influence of the identity has a potentially significant impact on politics, as the Thai Rak Thai Party and its successors have all found strong support throughout the northeastern provinces. Here, drawing upon results from two original surveys as well as 23 semi-structured interviews, I provide additional evidence of potential sources for regionalism in Isan.

First, people of northeastern Thailand have long been subject to deri-

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2. Information presented here draws from three sources: (1) an original online survey conducted between May 12 and June 1, 2020, among 400 Isan people; (2) an original face-to-face survey conducted among 750 Isan people in January 2016 (reported in Ricks 2020); and (3) semi-structured interviews conducted with 23 Isan people from December 2016 through July 2017 (reported in Ricks 2019). As the online survey relied on respondents who had voluntarily joined an online survey sample, we must be careful about extrapolating these survey results to a wider population.
sion by central Thais, who look down on northeasterners as lower class (Sophornthavy 2017). As I conducted interviews with Isan people in 2017, I was alerted to a meme circulating on Facebook among Isan youth, in which Thai script imposed on a rice field read, “Are you ashamed if you speak your home language and someone calls you a yokel?” The statement reflects the experience of many Isan people who have suffered slights due to their use of Isan language or a strong accent when speaking Central Thai. The sentiment was reflected in interviews. One laborer from Nakhon Phanom related his experience working in Thailand’s central plains: “When they heard us speak Isan, they would say, ‘This one is from Lao.’ And they wouldn’t like us. Usually they didn’t speak well with us. . . . Isan people must endure. . . . we have to endure their insults. We can’t respond. Just endure them” (interview, Sakon Nakhorn, July 24, 2017). Other interviewees related similar experiences, although approximately half of them reported never having personally been disparaged due to their Isan identity despite being aware of such occurrences either through friends or media.

To better gauge how widespread this sentiment is among Isan people, I included two questions in an online survey of 400 Isan people conducted in May 2020. First, I asked them whether Isan people are generally treated worse, better, or the same as most Thai people. Second, I asked them whether people from their home province are generally treated worse, better, or the same as people from Bangkok. In both cases, a significant number marked that Isan people were treated worse. In the first question, 39.6 percent (146 of 369) of those who answered the question noted that Isan people are treated worse than most Thai people. In the second question, 46.4 percent (169 of 364) responded the same regarding people from their home province in relation to people from Bangkok. Only 9.5 percent (35) and 15.7 percent (57) of respondents, respectively, marked the “better” category, with most other responses falling in “the same” category (50.9%, or 188, and 37.9%, or 138, respectively). While the survey cannot be considered completely representative of Isan people, it should be troubling that between one-third and one-half of respondents feel their group is treated poorly. Such resentments could provide fodder for ethnic mobilization.

Second, as the main identifier of regionalism in Thailand is language, I conducted two separate survey experiments, conducted four years apart, to test the impact of Isan language overtures on political opinions among Isan people. One of those experiments occurred in January 2016 and is reported

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3. In Thai: อย่าให้ใคร... หักล้มพื้นฐานวกกิ่ง แล้วมีคนบอกว่า “บ้านนอก。”
in Ricks (2020). The other, conducted via an online survey in May 2020, repeated those methods, reported in Ricks (2022). In both experiments, respondents heard a short audio clip from a political speech. Through random assignment, approximately half of respondents heard the Central Thai version of the speech, while the other half heard Isan. The substance of the speech was the same, and it was recorded by the same individual, meaning it only varied on language. The respondents then ranked their responses to a series of statements regarding the speech based on a five-point Likert scale ranked from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree.”

Comparing responses between the Central Thai language treatment group and the Isan language treatment group demonstrates that the impact of the Isan language was largely consistent across both surveys (see table 6.1). The only major difference is seen in the response to the statement “The speaker likely comes from the same social class as I do,” wherein respondents in the online experiment displayed a significant difference between the two treatment groups, while in the face-to-face survey they did not. Such a difference may have been due to different demographics, as the survey sample in the online version of the experiment exhibited higher socioeconomic status than their counterparts in the in-person survey.

The overall results demonstrate that, on average, respondents who heard the Isan language clip reported higher agreement levels to almost all statements presented to them across both surveys. The two exceptions in both surveys include perceptions of the education level of the speaker and whether respondents judged the speaker to be well prepared for national office. In both cases, we saw no significant difference in responses between the two treatment groups.

Respondents in the Isan language treatment group, in contrast, ranked the speaker higher in regard to the 12 other statements ranging across topics such as feelings of kinship, whether the speaker would be a good representative, and the speaker’s appeal measured by persuasiveness. Respondents who heard the Isan language clip were also more likely to indicate an interest in voting for the speaker if he were to campaign for office in their area. It appears that exposure to Isan language can truly impact an Isan individual’s opinion about a politician, with the language having a much more positive impact than exposure to Central Thai.

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4. For more details on the experiment, see Ricks (2020; 2022).
5. The Ricks (2020) survey used a formal bureaucratic Standard Thai linguistic treatment group as the baseline comparison group for analysis. This repeat of the experiment, though, only included two linguistic treatments, and here I use the informal Standard Thai treatment group as the base category.
Such consistency across two survey experiments conducted four years apart from each other, besides providing some scientific comfort due to receiving similar results from different populations, further suggests that a coherent Isan identity based on linguistic ties does exist and is capable of moving Isan people to action. Such potential was noted by Isan people during interviews. One interviewee explained, “When you use the local language it gives a feeling of being personal [pen kanton kaneng], and you can trust each other. There’s familiarity. There’s trust” (interview, Khon Kaen, July 19, 2017). Others noted that the use of Isan language in politi-
cal discourse would be more effective than Thai, at least at the local level. While Lao ethnics in Isan have adopted the Thai national identity and see themselves as Thai, their distinct language provides the capacity for a degree of ethnic distinction and identification that has the potential for political action (see also Saowanee and McCargo 2019).

In sum, the survey and interview data presented here suggest that the Isan identity is strong and can, through language, change people’s behavior. This is potentially linked to collective and individual experiences of exclusion at the hands of central Thais (see also McCargo and Krisadawan 2004; Saowanee and McCargo 2014), which could contribute to an aversion to being identified as Lao ethnics. Despite this, though, we have not seen the emergence of strong region-based movements in recent years, meaning the Isan identity appears constrained relative to ethnic-based violence seen in other countries or even within Thailand (McCargo 2008).

Thai Nationalism among the Lao

While the data presented above does suggest there are potential bases for the emergence of regionalism, we have additional data that shows Isan people have largely embraced their identity as Thais. I contend that this provides evidence that Thai nationalism moderates any pressure for ethnic-based regional movements.

In the online survey, I asked respondents to rank how strongly they identify with both their country and their region. In both questions, well over 90 percent responded either “strongly” or “very strongly,” suggesting that national and regional identity are both important to the group. Variation occurred between the categories, though. For the question on identification with Thailand, 53.9 percent (215 of 399) chose “very strongly,” while 38.4 percent (153 of 399) chose “strongly,” but respondents returned “very strongly” at 72.8 percent (291 of 400) and “strongly” at 24.0 percent (96 of 400) regarding Isan identity. This suggests that regional identity may have a stronger pull than national identity, but it also shows that most respondents felt strongly connected to Thailand.

Some interviewees had expressed similar sentiments, wherein they were proud of being both Thai and Isan, but the Isan identity was closer to their hearts. One native of Sisaket province living in Bangkok said, “I’d say I’m 55 percent Isan and 45 percent Thai because almost 90 percent of [Isan

6. Almost all interviewees, though, argued that using Isan language at a national level was inappropriate.
people] use Isan. And our existence is Isan. That’s stuck in ourselves. We come to Bangkok to work, but it’s just work. Our hearts are still in Isan” (interview, Bangkok, December 14, 2016). Another stated, “I think [the stronger identity] is Isan. It’s very deep in me. The Thai identity is more acceptable in society, but it’s not as close. Isan identity is part of our community, and people take it as part of the area. It’s also important for the community to pass it on. Thai symbols are always there, and they aren’t as deep, but they’re accepted. It’s more important for the community to carry on the local identity” (interview, Khon Kaen, July 19, 2017). Such opinions, combined with the survey data, suggest that for many, the Isan identity is just as strong or stronger than their Thai identity.

At the same time, though, many interviewees expressed the sentiment that there is no conflict between being Thai and being Isan. For instance, when one interviewee, an Ubon native living and working in Bangkok, was asked whether he felt prouder of being Thai or being Isan, he responded, “I have to be proud of both. Both are part of me, so I must be proud of both. Isan people are always Thai, so we can be proud” (interview, Bangkok, December 16, 2016). Similar statements came from multiple other interviewees who emphasized that Isan people are Thai people. In another interview, when the same question was posed, the respondent said, “I’m very proud of being Thai. It doesn’t matter if you were born in Isan or the north or the south. I’m proud that I was born in Thailand” (interview, Khon Kaen, April 6, 2017). While some interviewees expressed reservations about the military junta that was ruling Thailand at the time (2014–19), all interviewees confirmed that their Thai identities were a source of pride.

Large-scale surveys, conducted by the Asian Barometer and World Values Survey between 2007 and 2013, also provide evidence that Isan people feel strongly committed to their Thai national identity. On average, Isan speakers gave more positive answers about feelings of national identification than their counterparts from other regions of Thailand. Four waves of the surveys asked respondents to rank their level of pride in being a Thai person. Among the 1,761 Isan speakers across all the surveys, only nine responded that they were not proud of being Thai. The remainder ranked their response as “proud” or “very proud.” These findings suggest that Keyes (2014) was correct in his evaluation that the Lao people of northeastern Thailand have adopted a Thai identity. Indeed, “Isan people display greater commitment to the national identity than native speakers of central Thai” (Ricks 2019, 271).

The online survey provides another piece of evidence that the Thai
state’s nation-building program has been successful. Respondents were asked how they preferred to be identified. The question was posed: “Many people from Northeastern Thailand like to refer to themselves as Lao, while others prefer to use the term Isan. When you are with your family and friends, which of the following terms do you use to refer to people from the Northeast part of Thailand?” Respondents were given the choices of Lao, Isan, Thai-Lao, or no response. All 400 of the panelists responded to this question, with 19 choosing Lao (4.75 percent), 33 choosing Thai-Lao (8.25 percent), and 348 choosing Isan (87 percent). This suggests that, at least among respondents, an overwhelming majority prefer to identify by the state-endorsed moniker rather than link to their ethnic identity.

Furthermore, regional pride appears to be most associated with politically neutral indicators. Returning to the online survey, I included a set of questions meant to tease out sources of regional pride among respondents, giving us a snapshot of respondents’ sources of regional pride. This included asking respondents to rank their pride levels regarding Isan identity, traditional practices, food, language, history, leaders, and influence in Thailand. While feelings of pride were evident across most of the indicators, Isan food, language, and traditional practices evoked the strongest feelings of pride among respondents, with all three receiving over 70 percent of responses in the “very proud” category. On the other hand, regional leaders were marked relatively low, with over 30 percent of respondents indicating that they were not proud of leaders. Isan’s influence in Thailand and the history of the region also received substantially lower marks than food, language, and traditional practices. This suggests that regional pride is largely focused on relatively benign factors, while the region’s history, leaders, and influence in Thailand, which were the target of state suppression in history, have less impact.

Despite the potential impact of language on political opinions and the continued presence of grievances among the Lao against central Thais, the evidence reviewed here suggests that there is little to fear regarding the potential for Isan identity to transform into a regional movement. The Thai state’s efforts to create a Thai identity among Isan people has largely achieved its goal, imbuing them with a strong sense of Thai nationalism and nesting regional identity within a framework of nationalism. The Lao people of northeastern Thailand have thus adopted a Thai identity and become part of the Thai nation. They see themselves as Thais, and they imagine their ethnic identities as a subset of being Thai rather than an alternate ethnic group. The Thai state’s century-long efforts at top-down nation building appear to have been successful.
Conclusion

The ethnically Lao people of northeastern Thailand have experienced over a century of integration efforts by the Thai state. These policies were begun under colonial threat, which was used to justify brutal suppression of ethnic identity and regional mobilization efforts. Now, over a century later, the identity of the Lao people has evolved into a regional identification as Isan, with the people of the region expressing a strong commitment to Thai nationalism. Being Thai has become a part of their identities, but being Isan is also an important identifier nested within a Thai identity.

It is important to note that the assimilation of the Lao identity during Thai nation building occurred under authoritarian regimes, specifically the absolute monarchy and the military dictatorships that followed. The brief periods without direct military rule that followed the fall of the absolute monarchy (1933–38) and the end of World War II (1944–47) saw the rise of northeasterners to political prominence, some of whom treated ethnicity as an important political issue (Dararat 2003; Keyes 1967). In an alternate history, wherein the military had not dominated politics and crushed ethnic Lao leaders, perhaps we would have seen the rise of an Isan regional movement, but the long legacy of authoritarian rule in Thailand still hinders recognition of Lao identity.

This has a potential implication for Thai politics, wherein regional identity has the potential to be an enduring political cleavage. We already see that the Thai Rak Thai Party and its successors (People Power Party and Pheu Thai) have found a strong base of support among Isan people. While these parties do not explicitly campaign on ethnic or regional grounds, for many in Isan, the identification has become clear. For instance, a man from Mahasarakham living in Bangkok declared, “I’m Isan, so I vote Pheu Thai” ( phom khon isan, phom long phak pheu thai) (interview, Bangkok, December 15, 2016). Similar sentiments can be found throughout the region.

While such potential for mobilization may be concerning for the Thai military and Thai elites, I would suggest that the rise of any Isan-based political activities should not be seen as a threat to the Thai nation (Ricks 2019). Isan people see themselves as Thai. They are proud of their country. Isan political mobilization is, instead, about democratic engagement of a group that has long been excluded in Thailand’s growth.
PART 2

Civic Associations
Civic Associations in East Timor, Indonesia

Lessons from Timor-Leste’s Independence Bids

S.P. Harish

Editors’ Introduction: This is the first chapter of six looking at the effects of civic associations on regional movements. We start by looking at Timor-Leste—a case of successful but delayed mobilization. In 1974, following Portuguese decolonization, efforts to create an independent state failed because there were multiple networks, each characterized by a different set of demands. These demands ranged the full gamut—with the highly influential Catholic Church being rather agnostic toward independence. But 25 years of Indonesian occupation allowed the different networks—including that of the Church—to come together under a singular umbrella. And by the late 1990s, democratic developments in Jakarta combined with the unified social network proved jointly necessary for East Timorese independence.

Introduction

In April 1974, the Salazar-Caetano regime fell in the background of Portugal’s Carnation Revolution. This event unleashed a series of independence endeavors in different Portuguese colonies, including Timor. However, the Timorese bid for self-government did not succeed and culminated in the Indonesian invasion of its territory in 1975. For the next quarter of a century, Jakarta attempted and failed to Indonesian-ize the Timorese and integrate the region into the larger country. After the Indonesian transition to democracy, a referendum was held in 1999 to determine whether Timor would remain part of Indonesia. In this vote, the Timorese overwhelmingly
chose to secede, and after three years of United Nations (UN)-led transition, Timor-Leste became a newly independent nation in 2002. Why did Timor fail to become an independent country in 1974 following Portuguese decolonization but managed to do so successfully at the turn of the century?

To answer this question, I conduct a structured comparison of these two events as well as the interim time period. Applying the method of process tracing (Ricks and Liu 2018), I argue that it was a confluence of domestic and regional factors that facilitated a referendum (and later independence) in the late 1990s. In 1974, domestic social movements in Timor were divided, and their demands ranged from apathy to integration with Indonesia/Portugal and even outright independence. Moreover, regional political developments beyond Timor facilitated the Indonesian invasion in 1975 and culled the nascent Timorese nationalist movement. By contrast, in the late 1990s, social movements in Timor were far more unified with the reconciliation of the various disparate groups. One group that played a key role was the Catholic Church, which was able to rally the population and boost the international legitimacy of the second successful bid at self-government. In addition, regional political changes in the form of a democratic Indonesia also enabled Timor to become independent.

A unified nationalist movement is necessary for a successful independence bid. Lessons from countries like Vietnam and Myanmar show that successful decolonization is highly unlikely without a unified voice demanding self-government. Dissonance between different social groups results in conflicting demands, and the divisions are invariably exploited by external powers, as we shall see was the case in Timor in the mid-1970s. While unity among social groups is necessary, it is not sufficient for secession and the creation of a new country. Regional and global politics should also allow the independence bid to move forward. This dynamic was recognized by Ramos-Horta, a Nobel Peace Prize–winning figure of the Timorese independence struggle and a future prime minister/president of the country, who has said that “changes in patterns of superpower behavior leading to a negotiated settlement are necessary for successful consummation of liberation struggles” (Ramos-Horta 1996, 206, quoted in Glassman 2003, 273). In other words, just examining domestic or regional factors separately is insufficient for understanding successful secession. The stars need to align on both dimensions for the formation of new independent nations.

The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. First, I will provide a background to Timorese nationalism and identify the evolution of the key actors who will play a role in later years. Second, I will discuss the first failed
independence bid in the mid-1970s when the social movements in Timor were not united and where regional political developments facilitated the Indonesian occupation. Next, I will examine both the period of the Indonesian occupation and show how the different social movements put aside the differences and the rise of the Catholic Church as a key actor that would unify the Timorese. Lastly, I will investigate the second successful bid for independence in the late 1990s when Timorese spoke with a much more united voice and also had the requisite regional political actors on board.

Background

Situated in Southeast Asia, Timor exhibited a political structure similar to other societies in the region. Traditional leaders, known as liurai, could determine land use inside the villages under their authority and also could receive tributes (Leach 2017, 20). The liurai wielded significant autonomy, and since their authority was hereditary, it meant that their power led to the creation of influential families over many generations. The Portuguese colonization of Timor led to frictions with these local leaders. Seeking loyalty, the Portuguese adopted a policy of awarding military ranks. The liurai largely accepted the honor as the recognition helped reinforce their internal authority. However, the loyal liurai were required to pay tribute to the Portuguese, a practice that eventual led to a cycle of resistance against the colonial power (Kammen 2015; Gunn 2001).

Unlike typical experiences of war against a European colonizer, the periodic violence with the Portuguese did not inevitably lead to the formation of a Timorese national identity (Anderson 1998). Many liurai were content with the Portuguese military recognition as long as their local autonomy was not threatened. This delicate arrangement between the Portuguese and the local Timorese came to a head in the late 19th and the early part of the 20th century. The Portuguese sought to expand their power requiring many liurai to grow coffee on their lands (Leach 2017, 31). This directive was a direct usurpation of the liurai power of determining land use within their territory and led to a more direct confrontation with their colonizers. The most famous of these rebellions was the Manufahi War of 1908–12, an event sometimes identified as the turning point in the relationship between the Timor and Portuguese colonial administration (Nixon 2011).

Despite these ebbs and flows of conflict with the Portuguese, a key social movement made inroads into Timor society. The Portuguese colonial administrators utilized the Catholic Church as a way to gain loyalty of
key liurai (de Sousa 2001). The Church also provided an important public
good in the form of education and was instrumental in the creation of
a group of letrados, or literates (Leach 2017, 39), that formed the basis
of future Timorese nationalism. The success of the Church was much
more mixed among the broader population. Only about 8 percent of the
Timorese were reportedly Catholic in 1882 (Durand 2011, 5, quoted in
Leach 2017, 32), and this number reached 30 percent by the mid-1970s
(Borgerhoff 2006). There is some evidence to suggest that many of the
conversions to Christianity, at least initially, were just overt and that the
wider population was more likely to adhere to their animist religious
beliefs in private. Indeed, many local liurai continued with their traditional
governance style (de Sousa 2001), and remnants of precolonial institutions
still held sway.

In sum, the uprisings against the Portuguese at regular intervals during
the colonial period and the early spread of Catholicism had little impact
on Timorese nationalism. It was only in the last two decades of the 20th
century that the Church became an important driver of national identity
among the Timorese. The nascent nationalism witnessed in the 1970s was
due, in part, to the rise of the urban elite who were educated in Portuguese
customs and language. Their influence, however, was limited to the capital,
Dili (Dunn 1983), with much of the rest of Timor still adhering to more
traditional modes of governance. This discontinuity between the urban
and the rural elites would form the basis of the fragmented social move-
ment during the first independence bid.

First Independence Bid

The fall of the Salazar-Caetano regime in the 1970s led many Portuguese
colonies like Mozambique and Angola colonies to claim independence.
Timor also followed suit and decided to make its first independence bid.
However, the timing of this endeavor was not favorable. Domestic social
movements in Timor were divided, and their demands ranged from apathy
to integration with Indonesia/Portugal and even outright independence.
The fractured domestic social movements hindered a unified voice for
an independent Timor. Moreover, regional political developments also
impeded the bid for self-governance. Importantly, Indonesia remained
steadfast in its opposition to Timorese independence and also received the
tacit approval of global powers before its eventual annexation in 1975.
There were four key social movements in Timor at this time. First, the União Democratizada Timorense (Timorese Democratic Union, UDT) advocated for continuing links with Portugal. They enjoyed support among the more traditional liurai of Timor as well as bureaucrats, especially those who owed their positions to the Portuguese. The elite links formed during the colonial period meant that the UDT directly benefited from continued integration with Portugal. They pushed for Timorese unity under the “shadow of the Portuguese flag” (Taylor 1999, 27, quoted in Leach 2017, 56), favoring the use of the colonial language rather than the more indigenous Tetum, a reflection of the latter’s lower status among the bureaucratic elite at the time (Leach 2017, 56).

The second key group that was also formed around the same time was the Associação Popular Democratizada Timorense (Timorese Popular Democratic Association, Apodeti). Led by Guilherme Gonçalves, an influential liurai whose ancestral heritage boasted of rebellions against the Portuguese (Kingsbury 2009, 45), the Apodeti favored integration with Indonesia. They contended that there were more historical links between West Timor and East Timor than Portugal and advocated for Bahasa Indonesia as the lingua franca in the Timorese schools. Unsurprisingly, the Indonesian government favored Apodeti (compared to the other social movements), claiming that they represented the “true” Timorese voice (Jolliffe 1978).

Third, the Associação Social-Democrata Timorense (Timorese Social Democratic Association, ASDT) was formed around the same time as the UDT and was led by people like Jose Ramos-Horta, Nicolau Lobato, and Mari Alkatiri. It favored outright independence for Timor and was very clear that federations with either Portugal or Indonesia would not work for Timor. The ASDT renamed itself the Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste Independente (Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor, Fretilin) once it became apparent that a revolution was necessary for Timorese independence. Initial rapprochements with Jakarta and Canberra failed, and soon Indonesia labeled Fretilin as a communist organization.

1. In this chapter, I focus on four significant social movements. Smaller movements like Klibur Oan Timor Aswa’in (Sons of the Mountain Warriors, Kota), the Partido Trabalhista (Labor Party), and the Democrata Integração Timor-Leste Australia (Democratic Association for the Integration of East Timor with Australia, Aditla) did not make significant inroads in terms of getting support from the broader population.

2. They initially called for a confederation with Portugal but then in early 1975 decided to adopt a stance that favored independence. This was a case of too little, too late for Timorese nationalism.
Not all of the Timorese got favors from the colonial Portuguese administration, and so UDT’s call for retaining links with Portugal did not resonate with the general populace. Unlike the elitist UDT, Fretilin embarked on a strategy of gaining support of the masses through a focus on reforms in education, health, agriculture, and the bureaucracy. Importantly, they called for including Timorese into the administrative structure, advocated for Tetum as the lingua franca, and stressed the importance of adopting traditional justice systems (Leach 2017, 59). While Fretilin’s literacy campaign was central to the formation of Timorese nationalism, their position on other issues gave the movement a social-democratic character.

The fourth key social movement in Timor was the Catholic Church. Much of the existing literature has ignored this actor at this time of Timorese history because the Church was generally apathetic about independence or integration with Portugal/Indonesia. Yet, the Church would become a key institution 25 years later when Timor made a second bid for independence. To that extent, understanding the position of the Church is critical to understanding the disunity of the Timorese nationalist movement.

During the 1960s, the Catholic Church in Timor attempted to limit its association with the Second Vatican Council and engaged in nascent attempts to translate rites into Tetum (Leach 2017, 46). Despite this localization effort, the papal religion was not yet prominent in Timorese society with the number of Catholics hovering around 30 percent (Borgerhoff 2006, 108). Moreover, the Church saw the political movements, especially Fretilin, as a threat to its influence. According to Capizzi, Hill, and Macey (1976), the Church engaged in “extreme hostility and provocation” (392) against Fretilin, even though the latter favored the development of local culture. Bridging this difference would turn out to be key 20 years later.

Which of these groups represented the Timorese? Given that there was no election or referendum at the time, the answer to this question is not immediately clear. Many scholars have pointed out that UDT initially had quite some backing, but this support eventually eroded toward the Fretilin (Joliffe 1978; Leach 2017; Kingsbury 2009). The Apodeti remained on the fringes, and the Catholic Church was yet to become a dominant movement in Timorese society. In sum, Timorese nationalism was, at best, fledgling at this time. Given that the idea of what it means to be Timorese was nascent

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3. Fretilin’s literacy campaigns were modeled on the ideas of the Brazilian educator and philosopher Paolo Freire (Glassman 2003, 271).
under the Portuguese, the end of the colonial period led to a fractured response. The four movements outlined above provided clashing visions of the future of Timor. While the Apodeti favored integration with Indonesia, and the UDT advocated for maintaining links with Portugal, the Fretilin called for outright independence, and the Catholic Church was largely agnostic to the outcome. The lack of a unified social movement was a key stumbling block to Timorese independence.

Regional political developments also did not favor an independent Timor in the mid-1970s, and it, in fact, facilitated the 1975 Indonesian invasion. The Indonesian leader, Suharto, was tentative about annexing Timor because of a possible international backlash. It was his military generals who saw value in the invasion (Ricklefs 2002, 387, quoted in Kingsbury 2009, 60; see also Glassman 2003). The possibility of any international repercussions was alleviated when the United States and Australia gave their tacit approval to the invasion (Kingsbury 2009, 48).4 Not only was Indonesia a key ally in the fight against communism, but she was also a recipient of key military aid. There was also economic gains for the United States and Australia from the invasion. Timor was the site of considerable oil and gas resources, and the possibility of controlling these exports made these countries give their implicit support to the invasion. Indeed, till the late 1980s, Timor was governed as a “military fiefdom” (Kingsbury 2009, 50) where exports were closely controlled.5 Since Suharto’s own survival depended on the military, he acquiesced to the invasion, and the Indonesian military rolled into Dili on December 7, 1975.

It is unlikely that Timor could have become independent even if the Indonesian invasion had not occurred. As discussed earlier, the social movements in Timor had divergent aims and were considerably fractured. Indeed, the UDT staged a preemptive coup before the Indonesian invasion but failed to oust the Fretilin, who had the support of the Portuguese-trained army. Moreover, Indonesia was surreptitiously supporting Apodeti well before the invasion. Operation Komodo, as the Indonesian invasion has been termed, included military generals who controlled both the intelligence and the special operation functions. According to Kingsbury (2009, 48), the operation involved propaganda from West Timor and

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4. According to Glassman (2003, 272), U.S. president Gerald Ford and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger visited Jakarta the day before the invasion.

5. Some scholars have identified a company called P. T. Denok Hernandes International that played a key role in how the Indonesian military benefited from the Timorese invasion (see, e.g., Taylor 1999).
support for Apodeti. The covert initiative also included feeding disinformation to UDT about Fretilin being a communist organization and was done with the explicit aim of creating disunity between the different social movements.

The first independence bid in Timor failed due to two reasons. First, social movements were divided: while Fretilin advocated for Timorese independence, the UDT and Apodeti favored maintaining links with Portugal and Indonesia, respectively. Significantly, the Catholic Church remained on the sidelines and did not overtly support any independence initiatives. The discord between the different groups also meant that they could not set aside their differences and speak in unison. Regional political developments also hindered the Timorese independence bid. Indonesia worked fervently to prevent the rise of Fretilin, even though it was one of the more popular social movements. When they realized that the Apodeti did not have enough support in Timor, Indonesia invaded Timor and would occupy the country for the next 24 years.

Indonesian Occupation

Indonesia embarked on both a military and an educational strategy in Timor throughout the period of occupation. On the one hand, the Indonesian armed forces, Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI), used brutal methods to prevent Fretilin from mounting an armed response to the invasion. Though the violence decreased significantly in the 1980s, it was excessive in the initial periods of the occupation and culminated with the 1992 Santa Cruz massacre. On the other hand, Jakarta also attempted to “Indonesianize” the Timorese through the introduction of Bahasa Indonesia in the education system as well as the adoption of the Pancasila system. In addition, Jakarta also tried to assimilate Timorese by forcibly relocating people to other parts of Indonesia (van Klinken 2012). The dual-pronged strategy failed to achieve its objectives and only helped to reinforce Timorese identity and unify the different Timorese social movements (Anderson 2001).

Soon after the invasion, the TNI embarked on a massive operation to root out Fretilin from Timor, forcing the latter to retreat to the hills. The military superiority of the TNI was clearly visible in the rather one-sided violence that prevailed during this period. The conflict with the TNI led Fretilin to realize that it was not possible to single-handedly defeat the TNI militarily. So Xanana Gusmão, the leader of the Fretilin, embarked on the formation of an umbrella grouping (Conselho Nacional da Resistencia
Maubere, or National Council of Maubere Resistance) that allowed reconciliation between the UDT and Fretilin. The formation of this organization is significant because it also allowed the Catholic Church, a place of refuge for many Timorese during the occupation (Glassman 2003), to join forces against the Indonesian occupation. In effect, the military response did not wipe out the Fretilin as it had intended but instead served to unify the disparate groups in their opposition against Jakarta.

Jakarta’s nonmilitary integration strategy also helped reinforce Timorese nationalism. Suharto faced twin dilemmas when it came to integrating Timor into the larger Indonesian nation (Anderson 2001). First, given Timor’s history as a Portuguese colony, Jakarta could not play up any experience of resistance to Dutch colonization. Second, historical links with Wehale were also limited, and claims that the East Timorese were actually Indonesian were also weak, especially given the rudimentary support of Apodeti in the 1970s.

The Indonesian approach to integration of Timor was also complicated by the fact that the constitutional basis for national unity was Pancasila, with one of the requirements that all Indonesians adhere to one of the five major religions. For Timorese, who were mostly animists at the start of the occupation, this meant adopting Catholicism. The turn toward the Church had significant ramifications for Timorese nationalism. First, it provided a place of shelter for Timorese during the occupation (CAVR 2005). By being an overt member of the Church but perhaps retaining their animist beliefs, Timorese were protected from Indonesian state institutions. Second, the “Church community” began to form the basis of Timorese nationalism and acted as a substitute to Anderson’s (1983) print-capitalist nationalism.

Though the Church was an agnostic actor before the Indonesian invasion, it began to adopt a more assertive stance in the Timorese resistance during the occupation. The Church’s adoption of Tetum as its liturgical language (rather than Bahasa Indonesia) was a significant development (Leach 2017, 80), as it highlighted the cultural distinction of Timor and also gave prominence to a key Timorese language that the Fretilin had popularized in its national literacy campaigns of the 1970s. In addition to the use of Tetum, another strategy helped reorient the Church (Kingsbury 2009, 29): the Church blended its teachings with existing local religious

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6. The five principles of the Indonesian state are belief in one God, humanitarianism, national unity, consensual democracy, and social justice.
beliefs. For example, the use of local stories and conceptualizations similar to that of Jesus Christ and Mother Mary helped animistic Timorese turn to the Church for spiritual guidance. It unified the Timorese at the community level and reinforced the Church as the site of the resistance during the occupation.

By the end of the occupation, the number of Christians in Timor was up to 90 percent (Borgerhoff 2006). But the Timorese who joined the Church did not just adopt its apathetic stance—they managed to change the orientation of the Church about the occupation (Glassman 2003). The inclusion of the Church as a social movement in the demand for independence was a significant development. In the past, the Church was agnostic to the invasion, but with an increasing number of Timorese facing the brunt of the occupation, the Church adopted a more active stance in unifying the Timorese voice. In addition to providing shelter, the schools and the seminars that were organized by the Church created alumni who were key in resisting the Indonesian “cultural assimilation” (Borgerhoff 2006, 109).

Toward the end of the 1980s, with violence levels at a low, Indonesia allowed foreigners to visit Timor. In October 1989, the Church played a key role in inviting the Pope to Timor, who visited the main cathedral in Dili and also held an open-air mass for around 10,000 people (Kingsbury 2009, 60). Timorese students used the opportunity to unfurl a protest flag against the occupation, leading to another military crackdown. Around this time, the Catholic Church took on a role to internationalize the Timorese occupation, with Bishop Carlos Belo emerging as a key figure in the effort (Glassman 2003). These efforts increased the prominence of the Timorese situation internationally and culminated in the Nobel Peace Prize in 1996 for Bishop Belo and Jose Ramos-Horta.

In sum, social movements in Timor were far more unified with the reconciliation of the various disparate groups in the 1980s. Fretilin and UDT joining forces with the Church was an important development during this phase. Though the social movements at this time managed to come together and make a unified call for independence, successful secession was still not feasible as regional factors were not yet in place. The regional dynamics began to change in November 1991 when TNI killed almost 300 unarmed protestors at a funeral of a young boy who had been killed by Indonesian security forces a few days earlier. The funeral, held at the Santa

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7. There is some evidence that violence in East Timor followed the Indonesian electoral cycle (Kammen 2012).
Cruz cemetery, was attended by more than 2,000 people and included banners of “Viva Timor-Leste!” (Kingsbury 2009, 61). The TNI did not take lightly to the provocation, blocked the cemetery entrance, and opened fire on the protestors. The footage was captured by an activist journalist who was at the scene and led to the internationalization of the event. The Santa Cruz massacre, as the event is now typically referenced, was a major setback to Jakarta’s rhetoric that the situation in Timor was under control. It was also a key moment when regional political factors would begin to change, eventually allowing for successful Timorese independence.

**Second Independence Bid**

The Santa Cruz massacre set the stage for changing regional developments. The broadcasting of the killing of unarmed civilians meant that Indonesia did not have international support for the occupation anymore. But it was not until the Asian Financial Crisis hit Indonesia that accelerated political developments ultimately led to successful Timorese independence. The financial crisis contributed to Suharto’s fall and transitioned Indonesia from an authoritarian regime to a fledgling democracy. Jusuf Habibie, Suharto’s successor, called for a referendum in Timor, and by an overwhelming majority, the Timorese chose to secede from Indonesia. Even though it took more bloodshed and another three years of United Nations (UN) mandate in the country before Timor could officially become independent, the stars were aligned in the late 1990s for successful secession.

The killings at the Santa Cruz cemetery began the process of changing the regional and international aspects of the conflict. A Western audience was now able to witness the brutality of the Indonesian occupation. Up until that point, Indonesia had kept a tight lid on the reporting of events from Timor. Jakarta had also cultivated an international reputation and had argued that violence in Timor had decreased since the early 1970s (which indeed was the case) and that its educational strategy was working to assimilate the Timorese into the larger Indonesian nation. But the graphic violence at Santa Cruz demonstrated that the TNI wielded the sword in Timor and that the occupation remained as ruthless as before.

In addition to the Santa Cruz massacre, the end of the Cold War was also a critical marker for regional political developments. During the Cold War period, the United States had turned a blind eye to authoritarian regimes in return for support against communism. This was one of the key reasons for the tacit American approval for the Indonesian invasion in
1975. But with the end of the Cold War, the international community was much more critical of the political and economic structures in countries such as Indonesia. Specifically, there was increased scrutiny on countries where development was intertwined with the state and the adoption of the free market was minimal. Together with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the United States began to pressure many Asian countries to adopt more liberal economic policies that allowed greater capital flows as well as more competition in various industries.

The Asian Financial Crisis was a harbinger of political changes in Southeast Asia. What began as a currency crisis in Thailand became a financial crisis in Malaysia and ended up being a social and political crisis in Indonesia. The IMF demanded that Indonesia reduce its expenditure on state-led projects, especially ones that were benefiting Suharto’s family. When Suharto stalled in the implementation of reforms, it led to a social crisis. As there was considerable cronyism in the country, the government wanted to remain central to economic development (Hadiz and Robison 2013), but the IMF had demanded changes that would erode its dominance. The deepening crisis led to massive demonstrations against Suharto, and in 1998 Suharto stepped down as the leader of Indonesia, bringing an end to 31 years of autocratic rule.

In addition to these political changes, regional economic changes also contributed to the Timorese cause. Suharto had undertaken steps in the 1980s and 1990s to rid himself and his family of their dependence on the TNI. Recall that his dependence on the military for his political survival was one of the key reasons why Suharto acquiesced to the Timor invasion in 1975. So state-led development, while it ultimately led to Suharto’s fall, also led to a rise of an industrialist class in Indonesia. Foreign investment into the country allowed various groups to enter the manufacturing sector and benefit from the regional supply chain (Hadiz and Robison 2013). What this change meant was that, unlike in the 1970s when Suharto’s political future was dependent on the military, his successor, Habibie, was not limited about his options in Timor. Indeed, Habibie had clashed with the military’s *dwifungsi* structure that had dominated Indonesia for many decades (Kingsbury 1998).

These regional changes were, one could say, independent of the Timorese issue, but the new fledgling Indonesian democracy brought posi-

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8. The *dwifungsi* or the “dual function” structure of the Indonesian military was a doctrine that allowed leaders of the TNI to acquire nonmilitary interests (Crouch 2007; Jenkins 1983).
tive changes for the demands of the social movements in Timor. There was an increased clamor for independence, and this time they spoke with a unified voice, unlike in the 1970s. In addition to the political and economic changes in Indonesia, other international developments also helped the Timorese with their demands for secession. When Bishop Belo and Ramos-Horta received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1996, the chairman of the Norwegian Nobel Committee remarked at the award ceremony that the Timorese struggle for independence was a “forgotten conflict” but that these two individuals had repeatedly strived to “reconcile and mediate and lessen confrontation”; he also alluded to a referendum that was the way forward for Timor: “Ask them whether they want to be Indonesians, Portuguese, or independent” (Sejersted 1996). These efforts helped publicize the plight of the Timorese under the occupation and pressured Jakarta to hold an independence vote in Timor.

As mentioned earlier, Habibie was much more independent of the military than Suharto. It was in this context that Habibie decided to allow a referendum in Timor in January 1999. While he had the incentive to move differently on Timor than the military, there is some speculation on his precise actions and whether these revolved around his own political ambitions (Kingsbury 2009). The referendum was framed around the issue of special autonomy that Habibie has proposed for the region, which was the extent to which Indonesia was willing to negotiate.9 Acceptance of the special autonomy proposal meant that Timor would remain within Indonesia and rejection would automatically lead to secession. Unsurprisingly, the Indonesian military leaders led by General Wiranto were outraged at the option given to the Timorese to choose independence. Militias attempted to intimidate the Timorese voters, and there was a marked rise in pre-referendum killing in the region.10

Despite the intimidation, the Timorese overwhelmingly rejected special autonomy, with 78 percent voting for the separation of Timor from Indonesia. However, secession was not immediate. The violence continued even after the referendum, with the Indonesian military attempting

9. The options that were presented to the Timorese were “Do you accept the proposed special autonomy for East Timor within the unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia?” and “Do you reject the proposed special autonomy for East Timor, leading to East Timor’s separation from Indonesia?”

10. It is worth noting that even with the rise in violence before the referendum, neither the United States nor Australia called for international intervention or investigation into Jakarta’s actions (Chomsky 2001; Nairn 2001, both quoted in Glassman 2003, 275).
to block the separation of Timor (Kammen 2012). It took a concerted effort of a unified Timorese independence movement and the regional and international community to achieve eventual secession. According to Glassman (2003, 275), workers in Australia boycotted Indonesian cargo, and international organizations like the World Bank and the IMF began to withhold aid from Jakarta. It was only after the intervention of UN secretary-general Kofi Annan as well as U.S. president Bill Clinton that the Indonesian military withdrew from Timor. The UN voted to form the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), which helped keep the peace for three years. And it was finally in 2002 that Timor could claim to be completely independent. Xanana Gusmão, the leader of Fretilin, became the country’s first president, and Ramos-Horta, the Nobel Peace Prize winner, was appointed as the country’s first foreign minister (and later was also elected president).

In the late 1990s, the stars were aligned for successful Timorese independence. On the one hand, domestic social movements were unified and Timorese nationalism was at the forefront of the independence bid. The Catholic Church played a key role in providing a place of refuge for the Timorese from Indonesian occupation and also bridged its differences with Fretilin. It reversed its earlier agnostic stance toward independence, and under Bishop Belo it was critical in the internationalization of the Timorese issue. On the other hand, regional political developments allowed the holding of a referendum and eventual secession. It is unlikely that just a democratic Indonesia alone would have led to successful independence. If the Timorese social movements had been fractured in 1999, it is likely that they would have collapsed under the weight of the militia-led violence. In effect, both aspects—a unified social movement and a favorable regional environment—were necessary for independence.

Conclusion

Many countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America became independent after World War II. Their freedom was not guaranteed at the time it happened. Indeed, a typical narration of an independence movement is one of struggle. Using the Timorese example as a case study, this chapter has attempted to learn from a comparison of a failed and a successful attempt to gain independence. It helps us understand which factors were important for successful secession. I have argued that just examining domestic or regional factors separately is insufficient for this purpose. The stars need to align on both dimensions for the formation of new independent nations.
In the Timorese case, the failed attempt at independence in the mid-1970s exposed factitious social movements with aims ranging from apathy to integration with Indonesia/Portugal. In addition, regional politics did not also favor independence. In the end, this bid ended with the Indonesian invasion of Timor. The 1980s was an important decade for Timorese nationalism. The different social movements put aside their differences and joined forces against the Indonesian occupation. The Catholic Church played an important role in this endeavor, becoming a place of refuge for Timorese who sought to escape from the violence. In the 1990s, regional political factors in the form of a democratic Indonesia helped the Timorese in their second independence bid. After another wave of violence, and three more years of UN transitional administration, Timor-Leste was born as a new country.

Moving forward, the social movements that formed the basis of Timorese nationalism and the successful secession continued to play an important role. While the leaders of the Fretilin have occupied important political positions, the Church has continued to mobilize the masses. Over the past 20 years, the relationship between the state and the Church has continued to determine the character of Timorese nationalism. While the country’s eventual secession from Indonesia has been successful, whether Timor will emerge as a strong independent nation critically hinges on a unified social movement.
Editors’ Introduction: In Bali, the ability to cultivate along an island-wide identity is no trivial matter, especially when the population is demographically diverse: fisherfolk, students, activists, artists, academics, religious leaders, customary officials, middle-class professionals, and local businesspeople. In this chapter, we see the importance of civic associations in mobilizing a Bali identity, with a particular focus on the fight to reclaim Benoa Bay. While there was a shared interest in fighting off developers, the heterogeneity of interests should have doomed the protests—like what had happened in Makassar and Manado. Yet, a necessary—but not sufficient—condition differentiating Bali from the others was its ethnic homogeneity. We see how customary village councils were able to mobilize numbers of people, across all demographic groups, by evoking their shared ethnic identity. Ideologically, the councils referenced the belief that Benoa Bay is a sacred site; tactically, they invoked the distinct Balinese practice of puputan—that is, resistance “to the end.”

Introduction

The proposed reclamation of Bali’s Benoa Bay provoked massive, recurring protests that began in 2013 and were still continuing in 2020. At the height of the protests in 2016, thousands of people demonstrated almost every weekend in solidarity with customary villages that opposed the project. The size and persistence of the protests have been “unprecedented” in Bali’s recent history (Bräuchler 2018).
The protests are expressed—ideologically, organizationally, and tactically—in an unmistakably ethnic idiom. The opposition justifies its resistance not in economic terms but with reference to the belief that Benoa Bay is a sacred site (Wardana 2019). Customary village councils, more than any other organization, are responsible for mobilizing the massive numbers of people who participate in the protests (Wiranata and Siahaan 2019). And most sensationally, protesters consistently invoke the distinctly Balinese practice of puputan, or resistance “to the end” (Dewi 2015).

What explains ethnic mobilization as a response to reclamation in Bali? Controversy over reclamation is common in Indonesia, but protesters at other sites rarely adopt the language of ethnicity. For example, opposition to reclamation in both Makassar and Jakarta initially focused on economic harm to fisherfolk (Padawangi 2019). Later, Jakarta’s opposition to reclamation became intertwined with the religious appeals of Anies Baswedan’s 2017 gubernatorial campaign. Other opposition movements emphasize environmental protection. In contrast, protesters in Bali primarily frame their concerns in ethnic terms, even though the reclamation of Benoa Bay also threatens economic and environmental harm.

In this chapter, I argue that Bali’s opposition movement uses ethnic appeals to maintain an otherwise unruly coalition of disparate interests. Opposition to the reclamation of Benoa Bay extends far beyond the 14 villages that encircle the bay, encompassing fisherfolk, students, activists, artists, academics, religious leaders, customary officials, middle-class professionals, and local businesspeople, including those in the tourism industry. The interests of this diverse coalition are too disparate to support economic or environmental claims, but the members share in common a Balinese cultural identity. Thus, ethnicity is the one identity that can unite them in protest.

To support my argument, I present a case study of Bali’s opposition movement, led by the Forum Rakyat Bali Tolak Reklamasi (Balinese People’s Forum against Reclamation, ForBALI). I draw on the Bali Post archive and other press sources to document the key organizations and interests that animate the opposition movement and to describe its origin and evolution. I find that the public case against reclamation changed over time to accommodate the diversity of the anti-reclamation coalition and to acquire the means to influence reclamation policy.

The case of Bali poses something of a conundrum for dominant approaches to subnational identity movements. In Bali, ethnic identity encompasses a supermajority of citizens that far exceeds conventional
expectations of minimum winning coalitions (Supriatma 2016a). The developer has sought to exclude local participation in decisions about the project by appealing to national ministries in Jakarta, yet Indonesia’s decentralized system of governance prevents him from freezing out provincial and local officials (Wardana 2019). And the lead organizer of the opposition, ForBALI, is not an ethnic association but a civic association encompassing students, activists, musicians, artists, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), customary youth councils, and customary villages (ForBALI 2020b). Yet, an ethnic protest movement nevertheless emerged.

The case of ethnic mobilization in Bali is thus theoretically puzzling and empirically rare. In this chapter, I resolve the puzzle by extending Posner’s (2004) logic that ethnic groups only mobilize around identities that define minimum winning coalitions. Specifically, even though it delineates a supermajority of Balinese society, ethnic identity still represents the smallest possible coalition given the particularities of Balinese social structure and institutional context (Selway 2015).

**Reclamation and the Puzzle of Ethnic Mobilization**

Coastal reclamation describes the creation of new land by extending coastlines or building artificial islands in locations that were previously underwater. It entails a dramatic transformation of the physical environment for human use and produces similarly transformative changes to the cities that execute it. At a minimum, coastal reclamation reshapes environments, economies, and communities (Bisaro 2019). Environmentally, reclamation destroys the marine and wetlands ecosystems that it replaces and can alter ocean currents or river discharge in ways that hasten sedimentation and coastal erosion. Economically, reclamation creates valuable new land, often in prime locations for development, which in turn generates new government revenue through property taxes. Socially, reclamation reshapes communities by displacing some residents and attracting others.

The most salient political issues associated with reclamation arise from potential economic and environmental harm. Environmental damage to coastal ecosystems and economic dislocation in the fishing industry are highly visible, obviously linked to reclamation, and significantly disruptive. In contrast, reclamation does not obviously infringe upon ethnic, religious, or other forms of identity, unless newcomers with one identity are displacing coastal communities with a different identity. Outside of that important subset of cases, however, the costs of reclamation are mostly orthogonal to
identity. Thus, resistance to reclamation often emphasizes environmental or economic threats rather than threats to identity.

Regional identity movements would seem to be ill-suited political responses to the environmental and economic threats posed by reclamation. A regional identity movement is a set of political actions undertaken in the name of a group of people defined by their “association with a place of origin” (Liu and Selway, introduction, this volume). The association with a particular place need not overlap with other distinctive characteristics, such as language, ethnicity, or religion, although it often does. Regional identity movements, where they occur, vary with respect to “the kinds of demands made and the degree to which the movement participated in (formally) institutionalized politics” (Liu and Selway, introduction, this volume). Movement actions range from civic participation to mass mobilization to armed separatism.

Yet, the proposed reclamation of Bali’s Benoa Bay provoked precisely such a movement. In the case of Bali, the reclamation opposition invoked a “pan-Balinese” identity to mobilize massive, recurring protests (Wiranata and Siahaan 2019), making Bali a case of ethnic mobilization. The movement’s identity was pan-Balinese in the sense that it drew on religious, cultural, and institutional features common throughout Balinese society. The movement’s actions emphasized mass demonstrations, after initially attempting to block reclamation through formal litigation (Bräuchler 2018).

Ethnic Mobilization as a Minimum Winning Coalition

What explains ethnic mobilization as a response to reclamation in Bali? This outcome is empirically rare and theoretically puzzling. Empirically, only Bali, among several similarly situated movements in Indonesia, generated ethnic mobilization. Theoretically, reclamation’s highly salient environmental and economic effects should undermine identity-based opposition.

This chapter resolves this puzzle and accounts for the Balinese case by developing the argument that Bali’s ethnic mobilization was in fact the smallest possible coalition that could encompass the diverse interests that opposed reclamation. Specifically, reclamation’s opponents included environmental advocates, students, fisherfolk, coastal communities, and local businesspeople. As a result, the anti-reclamation coalition cut across class, occupation, social position, and age, making it impossible to sustain economic or environmental appeals without splitting the coalition. Eth-
Ethnic identity, by contrast, reinforced the coalition, because it was the one characteristic that every member shared in common. The chapter further argues that the anti-reclamation movement deployed mass demonstrations as a tool to make reclamation politically insupportable for the provincial government only after it failed by other means to persuade the national government to block the project.

One of the fundamental puzzles of identity is why some identities acquire political salience while others do not. Posner's (2004) classic resolution to this puzzle claims that political salience is determined by group size, relative to the broader political arena. Identities that delineate viable political coalitions will acquire political salience, while those that delineate groups too small to influence political outcomes will not. However, the high costs of building and maintaining political coalitions will ensure that politically salient identity groups remain as small as possible above the threshold to influence politics. In other words, Posner expects that ethnic identity will only become politically salient when it represents minimum winning coalitions.

However, Posner's theory does not yield specific hypotheses about which groups represent minimum winning coalitions without further specification of (1) the set of possible group identities and (2) the size of the broader political arena. These variables are crucially important because they operationalize the concept of a minimum winning coalition. The minimum size of a coalition depends on the possible permutations of identity, while a winning formula depends on the size and institutional context of the broader political arena. For example, in a society where two similarly sized ethnic groups contest majoritarian elections, the group that can turn out the most voters constitutes a minimum winning coalition. However, in more socially and institutionally complex societies, minimum winning coalitions may look quite different.

Selway (2015) provides a conceptual framework to evaluate the set of possible identities. Specifically, groups are defined by the interaction between ethnic diversity and economic inequality. In some societies, these characteristics reinforce one another and create rigid social hierarchies. In these cases, single identities are likely to command sufficient numbers of people to acquire political significance. In other societies, ethnicity and class cut across one another, creating a multitude of fluid identities. In these cases, coalition building is essential because no single identity will be sufficiently large to acquire political significance.

Ethnically homogeneous societies constitute a special subset of cases in
which class cuts across a single ethnic identity. In these cases, ethnic identity encapsulates a supermajority, discouraging political organizing on this basis. Instead, class cleavages structure political competition. If a particular issue transcends class, however, by attracting supporters across economic strata, then ethnicity might be the only identity that subsumes all of the groups in the coalition. In such circumstances, ethnicity would constitute a minimum coalition with respect to that issue, even though it also encapsulates a supermajority.

The broader political arena depends on (1) the government authority with decision-making jurisdiction over the policy being contested and (2) the institutional mechanisms available to influence that government. Political actors will seek to achieve their goals by influencing the smallest possible government unit, because coalition building is more costly over larger territories. However, lower-level governments are more likely to be overruled by superordinate authorities in many policy areas, so political actors must elevate their demands to levels of government with autonomous decision-making authority.

Political actors must also undertake actions appropriate to the institutional context. They will naturally prefer to achieve their goals by means of less costly actions, but only if those actions are effective, given the political context. For example, consider the following four actions, in rough order of costliness: litigation, voting, protest, and armed struggle. In certain institutional contexts, such as under authoritarian regimes, litigation and voting are not effective strategies because of the political manipulation of courts and elections. Thus, political actors may face a trade-off between the cost and effectiveness of particular actions.

In sum, I expect that a political coalition will adopt the class or ethnic identity that encompasses all members of the coalition but as few others as possible and that it will adopt the least costly actions that nevertheless influence the level of government with autonomous decision-making authority.

The Case of Ethnic Mobilization in Bali

This chapter advances the claim that ethnic mobilization represented the smallest possible winning coalition with respect to reclamation in Bali by

1. A few skilled lawyers can wage a successful litigation campaign. Voting in elections is an easy task, but it requires coordination among many people. Demonstrations and armed struggle are costly actions that require many people to put themselves in harm’s way.
tracing the evolution of opposition to reclamation in Bali, a movement known as Bali Tolak Reklamasi (Bali Against Reclamation). The unique trajectory of Bali’s movement, which alone among similarly situated movements culminated in ethnic mobilization, offers a valuable opportunity to examine the sources of ethnic mobilization. I treat Bali as a “deviant case” with respect to the conventional expectation that nonethnic cleavages should order politics in ethnically homogenous societies, especially in cases of reclamation that raise highly salient environmental and economic concerns (Gerring 2007, 105). In line with Lijphart’s observation that a “deviant case study refines and sharpens existing hypotheses” (1971, 692), I use the case study to develop the proposition that the nature of a minimum winning coalition depends on the social relationship between class and ethnicity and the institutional channels available for political action.

In Bali, decades of rapid development based on tourism created significant economic inequality, where many people practice traditional farming and fishing occupations side by side with five-star tourist resorts. In contrast, Balinese society is ethnically homogenous. Language, religion, and ethnicity are all reinforcing identities in Bali, where large majorities speak Balinese, practice Hinduism, and participate in customary rituals and institutions. Thus, Bali exhibits high economic inequality and low ethnic diversity, implying that class differences cut across a large ethnic majority. As I will show, opposition to reclamation transcended class difference but not ethnic identification.

The institutional context of reclamation was complex, because Indonesia’s decentralized, unitary government structure created ambiguities over policy authority (Wardana 2019). For example, the government of Indonesia, province of Bali, district of Badung, and city of Denpasar all issued conflicting spatial planning documents to regulate the use of Benoa Bay. And while the central government had clear authority to block the reclamation project (e.g., by enforcing the bay’s status as a maritime conservation area), authority to approve the project was fragmented across multiple levels and agencies of government. As a result, the political arena itself became a point of contention. Supporters of reclamation wielded greater influence at the national level, forcing their opponents to redirect their efforts toward the provincial government.

While supporters, especially the developer Tomy Winata, enjoyed access to the presidential palace, opponents mobilized protest at the village level. Specifically, the opposition movement sought to enlist the support of customary villages (desa adat, previously desa pakraman). These villages are the traditional custodians of cultural ritual in Bali, and they exist side by
side with administrative villages (desa dinas) that oversee local government functions. They are directed by a village head (bendesa adat), who is chosen via community deliberation and who convenes the community (paruman desa adat) at least once per year to reach communal decisions (Bali Governor 2019). All decisions taken by any customary village with respect to reclamation would have been a product of this community decision-making process.

In the account that follows, I show that economic and environmental concerns dominated the early history of the opposition but left the movement fragmented and ineffective. The strategy of ethnic mobilization was then undertaken as an adaptation to the institutional context. Movement leaders responded to their initial failures to sway the central government by constructing an ethnic claim with sufficient cultural resonance to mobilize customary villages against the provincial government. In doing so, they constructed an ethnic supermajority, which represented the smallest possible winning coalition under the circumstances.

The case study draws on press sources and academic accounts, written in English and Indonesian, as well as primary sources published by supporters and opponents of reclamation. Most importantly, I document changes within the opposition movement over time using a digital archive of Bali Post, which I obtained in 2016 from the newspaper’s head office in Denpasar. The archive is complete between the dates of January 2, 2010, and June 30, 2016, a period of time that spans the origins of the movement in July and August 2013, its steady expansion, and its transformation into ethnic mobilization in January 2016.

Protest and Puputan

Initially, Bali’s reclamation debate resembled similar controversies in Jakarta, Makassar, and Manado, among other places (BBC 2016; Padawangi 2019). These battles typically pitted environmental advocates and coastal communities against provincial governments and national developers anxious to execute the project. Just such a cleavage was evident in Bali when news broke that Benoa Bay was to be reclaimed (Bali Post 2013h). The project was initiated when Governor I Made Mangku Pastika secretly issued a permit for the “utilization, development, and management” of Benoa Bay to the developer PT Tirta Wahana Bali International (TWBI).² TWBI was a subsidiary of Artha Graha, a Jakarta-based developer owned by the tycoon Tomy Winata.

². Surat Keputusan No. 2138/02-C/HK/2012.
TWBI envisioned constructing 10 or more artificial islands over a total area of 838 hectares as part of a US$2 billion “revitalization” of the bay. TWBI promised that the project would yield widespread social, environmental, and spiritual benefits. For example, the project was projected to create 200,000 new jobs, address the bay’s long-standing problems with pollution, expand the mangrove forest, reduce sedimentation, restore Pudut Island, home to sea turtles, and reconstruct Pudut Island’s temple complex (Adityanandana and Gerber 2019; Pastika 2013).

Meanwhile, a consortium of environmental NGOs, students, and artists mobilized to spearhead popular opposition to the project. The Balinese chapter of Walhi, a respected national NGO dedicated to protecting the environment, joined with several other civil society organizations to found the umbrella organization ForBALI. Under the leadership of longtime democracy activist and human rights lawyer I Wayan “Gendo” Suardana, ForBALI led a complex and highly effective campaign opposing reclamation. They coordinated the responses of dozens of civil society organizations, mobilized grassroots resistance, and mounted legal challenges against the project. Even so, it was only after ForBALI ceded public leadership of the opposition to customary village leaders that the movement reached its full potential.

Initial similarities notwithstanding, Bali’s movement steadily diverged from analogous movements elsewhere in Indonesia in at least three important ways. Bali’s movement grew larger than any of its counterparts; it was the only movement to frame its opposition to reclamation in ethnic terms; and ultimately, it achieved more success than any comparable movement in Indonesia.

First, the ability of Bali’s opposition movement to mobilize large demonstrations grew steadily over time (table 8.1). A few dozen people attended the two earliest demonstrations organized by Walhi, its allies, and ForBALI, but 2,000 people protested just one year later to oppose a presidential regulation intended to clear the way for reclamation (Apriando 2014; Bali Post 2013b, 2013a). Another early protest, organized on August 2, 2013, to express the more local demands of the village of Tanjung Benoa, mobilized a few hundred people and dozens of boats (Bali Post 2013j).

Second, opposition to reclamation increasingly emphasized Balinese identity. Protest surged after customary village leaders began to mobilize demonstrations. In demonstrations on February 28, 2016 that “far exceeded any previous action” (Bali Post 2016e), 19 customary villages mobilized approximately 10,000 people to block the Bali Mandara Toll...
Road interchanges and 500 boats to sail the bay (Walhi 2016). These protests were enduring as customary leaders, in collaboration with ForBALI, continued to mobilize thousands of people for subsequent demonstrations throughout 2016 (Pasopati 2016).

As customary leaders gained prominence, the movement increasingly framed its opposition to reclamation in terms specific to Balinese culture and religion. Most importantly, the movement adopted the position that Benoa Bay was home to 70 “sacred sites” according to the Hindu religion as practiced by the Balinese, including both temples and locations with mystical

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Occasion</th>
<th>Organizer</th>
<th>Size</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>July 31, 2013</td>
<td>Governor’s Office, Denpasar</td>
<td>Opposition to the governor’s permit</td>
<td>Walhi and others</td>
<td>dozens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2, 2013</td>
<td>Benoa Bay, on the water</td>
<td>Residents of Tanjung Benoa demonstrate opposition</td>
<td>GEMPAR Teluk Benoa</td>
<td>hundreds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 15, 2013</td>
<td>Bali Provincial Assembly</td>
<td>Criticizing the provincial assembly’s response</td>
<td>ForBALI</td>
<td>dozens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 27, 2014</td>
<td>Governor’s Office, Denpasar</td>
<td>Publication of Presidential Regulation No 51/2014</td>
<td>ForBALI</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 8, 2014</td>
<td>Governor’s Office, Denpasar</td>
<td>Presidential Regulation No 51/2014</td>
<td>ForBALI</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 23, 2015</td>
<td>Governor’s Office, Denpasar</td>
<td>Presidential Regulation No 51/2014</td>
<td>ForBALI</td>
<td>thousands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 29, 2016</td>
<td>Governor’s Office, Denpasar</td>
<td>Public hearing on environmental impact assessment (EIA)</td>
<td>ForBALI</td>
<td>thousands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 28, 2016</td>
<td>Mandara Toll Road interchanges</td>
<td>Customary villages’ dissatisfaction with the EIA public hearing</td>
<td>ForBALI and customary villages</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 20, 2016</td>
<td>Ngurah Rai Park Roundabout, Tuban</td>
<td>First demonstration of customary village association</td>
<td>Customary villages</td>
<td>thousands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 10, 2016</td>
<td>Lapangan Lagoon, Nusa Dua</td>
<td>Opposition to an extension of the reclamation permit</td>
<td>Customary villages</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
significance (Bräuchler 2018). Reclamation was impermissible in light of this claim because of the disturbance it would visit upon sacred sites.

Collective memories of Bali’s colonial experience informed opposition actions, too. The movement embraced the spirit of *puputan*, or resistance “to the end.” The practice hearkens back to colonial-era conflicts between Balinese royal houses and the Dutch military, when the rulers of Badung and Klungkung led their entire households, including women and children, to certain death on the battlefield instead of surrendering to Dutch forces (Creese 2006). Protesters adopted “key markers of puputan as a practice” by, for example, promising unyielding resistance, wearing white, and carrying krises (Weiner 1999).¹

Third, Bali’s opposition movement has largely succeeded, in contrast to opposition movements elsewhere. While the critical presidential regulation that underpins reclamation remains in place, the movement secured a provincial law and a Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries resolution designating Benoa Bay a conservation area, making future reclamation less likely (Tribun Bali 2019; Amindoni 2019). In addition, public opinion shifted so decisively against reclamation that Governor Pastika himself disavowed the project, saying, “Here it is, so that people understand: reclamation is not a Mangku Pastika project” (Bali Post 2016c).

These victories are all the more striking in contrast to the failings of similar efforts elsewhere. In Makassar, for example, the Center Point of Indonesia project proceeded with minimal interruption, despite the opposition of coastal communities and local NGOs, including Walhi (Hajramurni 2015). In Jakarta, Governor Anies Baswedan suspended new reclamation projects in Jakarta Bay after taking office in 2017 but allowed islands already under construction to proceed (Padawangi 2019). Only Bali’s opposition movement has successfully prevented reclamation altogether.

In sum, Bali’s opposition to reclamation followed a trajectory unlike any other reclamation opposition movement in Indonesia. What began as a familiar alliance between coastal communities and environmental advocates was eventually transformed into a mass movement focused on Balinese identity and capable of mobilizing tens of thousands of protestors. As a result, reclamation became less politically supportable in Bali than anywhere else in Indonesia, and the proposed project was delayed indefinitely.

¹ On certain occasions, ritual dancers enacted something akin to *puputan* by stabbing themselves with krises in a ritual known as *ngurek* (Muhajir 2014b; Suriyani 2018).
Evolution of a Movement

Bali’s opposition to reclamation is notable for its abrupt transformation from an activist coalition focused on environmental harm to a mass movement focused on Balinese identity. The transformation can be dated with remarkable precision: it was initiated on January 26, 2016, culminated on February 28, 2016, and formalized on March 16, 2016. The transformation was initiated when the customary village head of Kuta announced his village’s opposition to reclamation, just days after he refused to take a position (Bali Post 2016d). Within days, 10 other villages followed suit, and within a month 19 customary villages had publicly stated their opposition to reclamation. The cascade of announcements culminated on February 28 in a day of massive demonstrations (Bali Post 2016e). More customary villages subsequently joined the movement, and 26 customary villages formalized their opposition on March 16 by founding an Association of Customary Villages Against the Reclamation of Benoa Bay (Pasubayan Desa Pakraman Tolak Reklamasi Teluk Benoa) (Bali Post 2016a). In time, 39 customary villages, representing many thousands of people, would join the association.

However, the transformation that burst into view in January 2016 was the product of a yearslong process. While the movement gradually coalesced around the claim that Benoa Bay was sacred and reclamation therefore impermissible, it started out as a collection of groups fragmented by distinct concerns.

Initial Opposition

Bali’s opposition to reclamation was complex and highly diverse and included fisherfolk, students, activists, artists, academics, religious leaders, customary village leaders, middle-class professionals, and local businesspeople, as well as organizations such as environmental NGOs, Balinese cultural associations, and the provincial party organization of the dominant Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan. In addition, many of these groups were split internally between opponents and supporters of reclamation. Nevertheless, this chapter, like Wardana (2019), stylizes the opposition as comprising three broad groups: environmental advocates, coastal communities, and local businesses. This simplification clarifies the distinct interests in conflict with reclamation.

Environmental advocates, whom Bräuchler (2020, 626) calls the “loud” opposition, were perhaps the most prominent opponents of reclamation.
They included not only Balinese NGOs dedicated to environmental conservation, like Walhi Bali, but also student groups, musicians, artists, and democracy activists who shared their concern for the environment. What tied these individuals together, and arguably what motivated their environmentalism, was youth. Young themselves, they recruited many customary youth councils (sekaa taruna-taruni) to their cause, often using popular and traditional music, art, and theater to dramatize the struggle against reclamation. These activists founded ForBALI in August 2013 to coordinate actions across the many organizations that sympathized with them, and the group quickly became the face of the anti-reclamation movement. Walhi Bali was instrumental in these efforts, and its director, Gendo Suardana, assumed the role of director of ForBALI (Bali Post 2013a; Erviani 2013).

ForBALI (2014) memorialized its initial case against reclamation in a poster citing “13 Reasons to Reject Reclamation” (table 8.2). The focus of the list is squarely on environmental protection. The first seven reasons, and eight in total, warn against environmental harm such as increased flooding, coastal abrasion, and damage to coral reefs. An additional four reasons warn against misgovernment and economic inequality. The final reason philosophically warns that Bali’s tourism industry will betray its very raison d’être if it chooses profit over principles. On the other hand, the sanctity of Benoa Bay is buried as a subpoint in the elaboration of the first reason. The idea that would eventually animate mass mobilization was still an afterthought at this point in the evolution of the movement.

Coastal communities undoubtedly had the most at stake in the contest over reclamation, and none were as exposed to reclamation’s effects as Tanjung Benoa, a village located on the peninsula separating Benoa Bay from the Indian Ocean. Tanjung Benoa was a popular destination for watersports, and many villagers’ livelihoods were tied to the bay by tourism and fishing. Numerous organizations spoke in the name of Tanjung Benoa, both to support and to oppose reclamation, but customary village leaders were probably the most authoritative representatives of the village. Notably, the proposal to reclaim Benoa Bay was not Tanjung Benoa’s first experience with reclamation. The community has been plagued by coastal erosion since 1994 when reclamation at nearby Serangan Island altered currents in the bay. Twenty years later, village beaches have given way to seawalls, and Pudut Island, home to sea turtles, is disappearing (Wardana 2019).

For the most part, villagers in Tanjung Benoa assessed reclamation with respect to its direct effects on the village. For example, some villagers, such
as I Wayan Dibia Adnyana, the chair of Tanjung Benoa’s customary advisory council (sabha desa), feared that Tanjung Benoa would be altogether lost to the sea (Zachri, Hasan, and Heri 2013). His concerns were informed by the village’s continuing struggles against coastal erosion and based on the public expectation that reclaimed land would be elevated to six meters above sea level, three meters higher than Tanjung Benoa (Bali Post 2013i).

Other villagers, such as an organization of Tanjung Benoa youths calling itself GEMPAR, feared economic harm (Bali Post 2013g). During a demonstration on August 2, 2013, the group issued five statements against reclamation portraying the bay as a vital source of livelihoods and reclamation as a threat to village tourism enterprises (table 8.3). In addition, GEMPAR linked reclamation to Tanjung Benoa’s continuing campaign to protect Pudut Island. While they differ in the details, Dibia and GEMPAR share a hyperlocal preoccupation with threats to their village.

Although local businesses have been somewhat overlooked in accounts of the controversy, they too opposed reclamation. Bali’s business community is tightly intertwined with the tourism sector and includes hoteliers, restauranteurs, tour operators, and souvenir retailers, among others. Balinese businesses are well organized, and two of the most important industry representatives are the Indonesian Hoteliers and Restauranteurs Association (Perhimpunan Hotel dan Restoran Indonesia, PHRI) and the Bali Tourism Board.4 However, businesses are divided by ownership. Local hoteliers compete against luxury resorts owned by Jakarta-based develop-

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4. The Bali Tourism Board is known in Indonesian as Gabungan Industri Pariwisata Indonesia Bali, or GIPI Bali.

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ers and foreign corporations. Exacerbating the rivalry, the hotel sector in southern Bali was experiencing a crisis of oversupply in the early 2010s (Bali Post 2013f). As a result, an undercurrent of protectionism colors the politics of many local businesses (Wardana 2019).

Both PHRI and the Bali Tourism Board opposed reclamation on the grounds that new resort developments in Benoa Bay would compete against local tourist enterprises (Bali Post 2013d; Rhismawati 2013). These business leaders insisted that, in principle, they did not oppose new development. Rather, their protectionist impulses motivated arguments about where and in what form new developments should proceed. The Bali Tourism Board argued that developers should invest in less developed regions of Bali, to “equalize” development across the island, while PHRI argued that tourism development should emphasize Balinese culture and eschew “artificial” attractions. Of course, the reclamation of Benoa Bay did not meet either condition, in the view of these associations.

In sum, each of these three groups stated their opposition in parochial terms during the early days of opposition. ForBALI focused on the threat to the environment; villagers in Tanjung Benoa feared that they would lose their homes and livelihoods; and business leaders warned of increased competition and bankrupt hotels.

**Countermobilization**

The initial opposition to reclamation won two important victories that substantially delayed the project. First, Governor Pastika rescinded his secret letter authorizing reclamation and issued in its place a more limited decision, dated August 16, 2013, authorizing TWBI to conduct a
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project feasibility study (Bali Post 2013c). Second, Udayana University determined that the project was “not feasible” based on an environmental impact assessment that it conducted on behalf of TWBI (Bali Post 2013c; Wardana 2019). These setbacks prevented TWBI from creating facts on the ground that would allow the government to achieve a fait accompli, as happened in the case of Jakarta Bay.

After ForBALI’s initial success, however, its political strategy lost effectiveness. ForBALI won those early victories by combining demonstrations and litigation. The group created pressure on crucial provincial institutions by reporting Governor Pastika to the Indonesian ombudsman and requesting the rector of Udayana University to prohibit faculty from participating in project feasibility studies (ForBALI 2013, 2020a). However, the governor and his pro-reclamation allies parried ForBALI’s strategy by changing venues, as it were.

The pro-reclamation strategy comprised three goals, designed in different ways to exploit the parochial character of the opposition. First, supporters sought to elevate the legal battle over reclamation to the central government in Jakarta, where ForBALI lacked influence. Second, they mobilized a coalition of supporters that as much as possible mirrored the opposition. And third, they sought to exaggerate support for reclamation while belittling the opposition as “just a few people.”

At the outset of the project, the bay’s classification as a marine conservation area supposedly prohibited reclamation, providing a strong legal basis for opposition to the project (Wardana 2019). In response, Governor Pastika prevailed upon the president to reclassify certain parts of the bay to remove this obstacle. On December 23, 2013, the governor formally requested that the National Zoning Coordination Board reclassify the bay as a “general use area” (kawasan pemanfaatan umum) (Ilmie 2014). In an expedited process, the relevant ministries quickly approved the request in principle, and the government immediately commenced the process of collecting expert assessments and holding public hearings. On May 30, 2014, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono issued Presidential Regulation No. 51/2014 reclassifying the bay, and on August 25, 2014, the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries granted TWBI a location permit for reclamation in Benoa Bay (Suriyani 2018).

Back in Bali, supporters moved quickly to press their new advantage. Governor Pastika implied that reclamation was both inevitable and

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5. Surat Keputusan No. 1727/01-B/HK/2013.
beyond his control, portraying his role in the affair as that of a public servant merely executing national policy “as faithfully and fairly as possible” (Metro Bali 2014a). Meanwhile, his supporters began to organize counter-demonstrations, both to highlight genuine support for the project and to create an impression that the opposition represented only a minority of Balinese people.

It seems clear in hindsight that reclamation never commanded broad public support. In the moment, however, and especially during the years 2013–15, pro-reclamation forces mobilized demonstrations equal to or exceeding the size of ForBALI’s demonstrations. In late 2013, for example, ForBALI was still just turning out dozens of people. In contrast, a pro-reclamation group calling itself Forum Bali Harmoni mobilized several hundred people, including many villagers from Tanjung Benoa, to protest on multiple occasions (Suparta 2013). The next year, pro-reclamation demonstrations grew to 500 people and then to 3,000 on April 20, 2015 (Divianta 2014; Metro Bali 2015).

In a mirror image of the opposition coalition, the organizations behind these demonstrations encompassed environmentalist groups, coastal community members, and professional associations. This diversity was always on display at public hearings, as sympathetic officials scrupulously awarded speaking time to representatives of each group (Bali Post 2014, 2016i). Yet, many of these groups had direct ties to TWBI or Governor Pastika in the form of funding, employment, or contracts (Bräuchler 2018; Wardana 2019). Furthermore, the numbers at demonstrations were likely inflated by the participation of parastatal youth organizations, such as Forbara and Laskar Bali, which strongly supported Governor Pastika (Supriatma 2016b; Rhismawati 2017).

In response, perhaps, to their weak credibility, reclamation supporters exaggerated the breadth of their coalition and belittled their opponents. Specifically, they sought to entice opponents to defect to their side (Wardana 2019); impersonated ForBALI to sow confusion (Muha-jir 2014a); christened their coalition with multiple, overlapping names to create the impression of proliferating support (Republika Online 2015; Metro Bali 2015); and, when all else failed, claimed the support of impressively named but nonexistent organizations (Trisakti and Nawacita Defense Team 2015). Meanwhile, they continually characterized their opponents as “just a few people” (segelintir orang) (Metro Bali 2014b; Ber-ita Satu 2014; Fajar 2015).
The pro-reclamation strategy was effective regardless of the true level of public support for reclamation. The strategy shifted the contest to Jakarta, where supporters of reclamation possessed a significant political advantage and created an impression of two evenly matched coalitions, encompassing similar cross-sections of society, divided only by their views on reclamation. With the next gubernatorial election years away, it is likely that this status quo would have provided sufficient political cover for the project to break ground. It needed to hold only long enough for the Ministry of Environment and Forestry to issue a favorable environmental impact assessment, expected at the time in early 2016 (Langenheim 2016). However, the status quo did not hold. Instead, the opposition was transformed in January 2016 from a loose association of parochial groups into an ethnic movement.

ForBALI and its allies spent more than a year quietly laying the groundwork for ethnic mobilization. In an essay published in late 2014, Sugi Lanus, expert reader of palm-leaf manuscripts and curator of Bali’s Lontar Museum, reinterpreted the cultural practice of *puputan* to apply to the case of reclamation (Lanus 2014). In his essay, he cast customary villages as the rightful leaders of the struggle. He argued that the customary right of villagers to salvage ocean wreckage (*hak tawan karang*) implied a kind of village sovereignty over the sea that reclamation would violate. Therefore, Lanus enjoined customary villages to reassert salvage rights against reclamation, just as a dispute over those same salvage rights led to *puputan* against the Dutch in 1906.

In addition, the opposition took practical steps to win the support of customary villages. From early on, ForBALI indirectly pressured customary villages to take a stand by organizing among customary youth councils. These youth councils organized demonstrations, hung banners, and otherwise lobbied their neighbors, elders, and families to speak out against reclamation (Bräuchler 2018). Yet, while many village leaders privately sympathized with the demands of the youth councils, they were reluctant to issue public pronouncements on matters beyond the scope of customary affairs (Wiranata and Siahaan 2019).

Thus, the decisive factor for many customary villages was a list, and accompanying map, of sacred sites in Benoa Bay. The list was created between May 2015 and April 2016 by a ForBALI research team led by Sugi

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6. Lanus’s essay appeared simultaneously on his personal blog and on the ForBALI website.
Lanus. Lanus compiled references to the bay found in ancient palm-leaf manuscripts, and a team of six urban planning students interviewed local religious leaders, cultural elders, and fisherfolk with knowledge of the bay. Sacred sites were determined according to criteria established in a 1994 decision of Parisada Hindu Dharma Indonesia (PHDI), the formal governing body for Hinduism in Indonesia. The research project ultimately identified 70 sacred sites and produced a map indicating the precise locations of each one (Bali Post 2016f).

The list dramatically reshaped the debate over reclamation. The obligation to protect sacred sites became the focal point of opposition almost as soon as Sugi Lanus publicly presented the research (Bali Post 2015). For example, the business community wholeheartedly endorsed the findings. When an alliance of cultural and economic elites gathered at the Bali Tourism Board office to sign a petition opposing reclamation, their first provision objected to the threat against the sacred sites (Bali Post 2016b). Meanwhile, the community news website BaleBengong published the map with an open letter, written in English, appealing to the international community to recognize the rights of Balinese people as elaborated in the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (BaleBengong Editors 2016). Most importantly, customary village councils embraced the obligation to protect sacred sites. The customary village head of Tanjung Benoa, a village that announced its opposition prior to publication of the map, said, “Our commitment remains as before . . . to guard the sanctity of Benoa Bay” (Bali Post 2016g). When Kuta became the first customary village outside of Tanjung Benoa to oppose reclamation, it based its decision on “the work to preserve sacred places” (Bali Post 2016d).

Wiranata and Siahaan (2019), in a fascinating article, explain why the list of sacred sites was so decisive in the effort to mobilize customary villages against reclamation. The authors report that I Wayan Swarsa, the customary village head of Kuta, personally opposed reclamation but that the customary village council could not act against reclamation without a justification based on Balinese culture or the Hindu religion. However, Wayan Swarsa immediately recognized the list of sacred sites as evidence that fell within the purview of customary villages. Sacred sites constitute an especially powerful claim within Balinese customary institutions. They may not be moved, and the duty to protect them is one of the most ancient.

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7. At the time of the initial presentation on November 6, 2015, the team had enumerated 60 sacred sites.
mandates of customary villages. Thus, not only was Wayan Swarsa himself persuaded, but he also marshalled the map of sacred sites to persuade many of his counterparts to join the opposition. In doing so, he triggered the cascade of village announcements that catalyzed ethnic mobilization against reclamation.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have argued that ethnicity provided the only identity that could encompass the diverse, cross-class coalition of interests that opposed reclamation in Bali. When litigation could not prevent the central government from accelerating the project, the leaders of the opposition shifted focus to make reclamation politically unsupportable for the provincial government. To this end, they inflected reclamation with ethnic importance, enlisted the support of customary village institutions, and mobilized mass demonstrations.

At first glance, ethnic mobilization in the case of Bali seems like a puzzling outcome, because ethnic identity rarely delineates a minimum winning coalition in ethnically homogeneous societies. I resolve this puzzle by drawing attention to the cross-cutting relationship between class and identity in Bali and to the institutional context of decentralized Indonesia. Under these conditions, ethnicity represented the only identity that could encompass the entire opposition coalition, and mass mobilization provided the least costly means to pressure the provincial government to withdraw its support for the project. Ethnic mobilization thus constituted a minimum winning coalition in the sense that it activated the smallest possible coalition that could execute effective political actions.
Civic Associations in Northern Myanmar

Pan-Ethnic Nationalism and Sub-Ethnic Mobilization in Kachin State

Alexandre Pelletier

Editors’ Introduction: This chapter focuses on the Kachin mobilization efforts in Northern Myanmar, which have yielded mixed outcomes. We see the high overlap—but not necessarily the complete congruence—between regionalism and ethnic identity. On the one hand, we can talk meaningfully of a Kachin state as a regional unit. During colonial times, it was an administrative category for the area around the Kachin Hills. Likewise, in the post-independence era, prior to 1994, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) provided goods and security throughout the region without coercion. On the other hand, the Kachin ethnic group is neither homogeneous nor coherent. While Kachin leaders boast an inclusive identity, their efforts were based on the networks built by Christian missionaries in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. And as a result, the Kachin identity has been dominated by the Jinghpaw and, to a lesser extent, by the Lhavo, Zaiwa, and Lachid. In contrast, the Rawang and Lisu were completely left out. We see these tensions play out post-2011 when fighting resumes.

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Introduction

Secessionist minorities almost always contain their own minorities. In Myanmar, secessionist conflicts have traditionally opposed the main ethnic nationalities to the state in a struggle to gain independence or greater autonomy (see Bertrand et al., 2022). In recent years, however, inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic tensions have increasingly flared up across Myanmar, opposing smaller “nested minorities” to larger ethnonationalist groups. The adoption of a new constitution in 2008 and the democratization of the regime between 2011 and 2021 have undoubtedly accelerated nested minorities’ demands for recognition and accommodation, demands that are increasingly questioning the unity of larger traditional “ethnonational” groups. But we know little about why and when some nested minorities decide to mobilize while others do not. This chapter examines the case of nested minorities in the Kachin state and seeks to identify the conditions that explain why some have mobilized against pan-Kachin nationalism while others have not.

Myanmar is one of the most ethnically diverse countries in Asia. The main groups are the Chin, Kachin, Shan, Kayah, Karen, Mon, and Rakhine. Today, each of these groups has a state that more or less perfectly corresponds to what the group envisions as its national homeland. Yet none of these states are homogeneous, and none of these ethnic groups are homogeneous. Pan-ethnic groups are umbrella identities for numerous subgroups such as clans, tribes, and linguistic groups with more or less affinity. For instance, the name “Karen” is a collective term for approximately 20 ethnic subgroups that speak at least 12 mutually unintelligible but related dialects (see Harriden 2002; South 2007). The pan-Kachin ethnonationality, which is the focus of this chapter, is a grouping of at least 6 (sometimes 7 or 12) tribes: Jinghpaw, Lawngwaw (Maru, Lhaovo), Zaiwa (Atsi), Lachik (Lashi), Rawang (Nung-Rawang), and Lisu.

Pan-Kachin nationalist leaders have made tremendous efforts to create and mobilize a pluralist and inclusive identity, and they have, for the most part, succeeded. The idea of an inclusive pan-Kachin identity—one that comprises six equal tribes—is very successful compared to other ethnonational groups with similar plural identities, such as the Karen. Despite these efforts, however, we find resistance to pan-Kachin nationalism

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1. This chapter defines “nested minorities” as minorities living within secessionist regions. These minorities have also been called “second-order minorities,” “residual subnational minorities,” and “non-dominant minorities” (see Barter 2015; Wise 2018).
among some tribes, particularly Lisu and Rawang. This chapter seeks to explain why Rawang and Lisu, in contrast to the other tribes, have long tried to assert a more independent identity, separate from and at times in opposition to the broader pan-Kachin identity.

The chapter argues that two key factors shape the mobilizational potential of nested minorities, in this case, Lisu and Rawang. First, nested minorities are more likely to mobilize if they have strong organizational capacities, facilitating the crystallization of a distinct identity and, later on, collective action. In Kachin, Lisu and Rawang inherited stronger organizational capacities than other tribes, thanks to the colonial legacy of Christian missions, churches, and networks. Second, nested minorities are more likely to mobilize if they are disconnected from the main pan-ethnic nationalist networks, even if they share a common identity or similar political objectives. Weak intergroup networks make intergroup interaction and coordination more difficult and sometimes violent as a result, which may trigger grievances against pan-ethnic leaders. In Kachin, Lisu and Rawang have always been more peripheral to core Kachin networks, making relations with the Kachin Independence Organization and the Kachin Baptist Church more difficult, thus strengthening a sense of distinct identity among Lisu and Rawang.

Explaining Sub-Ethnic Mobilization

Why do some nested minorities— but not others— develop into subnational movements? A first set of explanations focuses on demographics and political incentives. Daniel N. Posner (2004) argues that the political relevance of an identity depends on the size of the group. If the group is large enough, the identity will become politically salient, and ethnic political entrepreneurs will seek to mobilize the groups. But if the group is too small, the identity may still exist, but it will not become politically relevant (see also Selway 2015).

In Myanmar, the threshold of political relevance is extremely low. The government officially recognizes 135 ethnic groups and provides various direct and indirect incentives for groups to seek political recognition. For instance, in 2014, nearly 100 groups requested recognition in the census in addition to the existing 135 ethnic groups (Myint 2016). Many groups mobilized for census “recognition” because the potential benefits were significant. The 2008 constitution created the position of national race affairs ministers, a form of special representation, for groups with 0.1 percent
TABLE 9.1. Ethnic Groups in North Myanmar (Kachin State)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Jinghpaw</th>
<th>Zaiwa</th>
<th>Lawngwaw</th>
<th>Lachik</th>
<th>Lisu</th>
<th>Rawang</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>630,000</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td>90,000–120,000</td>
<td>25,000–49,000</td>
<td>340,000</td>
<td>60,000–70,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Author’s estimates based on various sources.

of the country’s population or more (roughly 51,400 people). In Kachin state, the new constitution provided ministers to Rawang and Lisu but not to Lawngwaw, Lachik, and Zaiwa, although they may have qualified for one. The constitution also created self-administered zones/divisions, a new form of political autonomy, for groups representing a majority in two adjacent townships. The current zones have populations as small as 110,000 people. Lisu and Rawang leaders have repeatedly asked for a self-administered zone in northern Kachin state but have failed so far to obtain one. Although some are smaller than others, every Kachin nested minority is above or close to the threshold of political relevance (see table 9.1).

In addition to the 2008 constitution, the semi-democratic regime of 2011–2021 offered more space for mobilization and demands for recognition. During that period, most ethnic groups, even those with only a few thousand people, formed their own “literature and culture” committees to preserve their language and customs. Moreover, Myanmar’s electoral system also did not discourage the formation of ethnic political parties. No less than 51 ethnic political parties took part in the 2015 elections and subsequent by-elections (48 in the 2020 elections), which included parties for minorities as small as Kaman (50,000 people), Daingnet (80,000), and Mro (80,000). In Kachin state, Lisu and Lawngwaw both formed political parties in 2015, but only the former won a handful of seats.

A second set of explanation focuses on the role played by the state and its military in mobilizing nested minorities. A common strategy for states faced with secessionist mobilization is to encourage ethnic fragmentation through defection and countermobilization (Kalyvas 2008; Staniland 2012).

In Myanmar, the government and its military have repeatedly used “divide-and-rule” tactics to undermine secessionist minorities. The official recognition of 135 ethnic groups and the creation of national race affairs ministers and self-administered zones are, in fact, attempts by the government to weaken the legitimacy of the seven pan-ethnic identities (Chin, Kachin, Shan, Karen, Kayah, Mon, and Rakhine). Pan-Kachin nationalist leaders see the granting of national race affairs ministers to Lisu and Rawang by the 2008 constitution as an attempt to fragment Kachin state.
unity. Similarly, they see the recognition of 12, not 6 or 7, Kachin tribes by the 2014 census as a deliberate attempt to divide Kachin into smaller, politically irrelevant groups (Pakao 2020). The Tatmadaw has repeatedly encouraged the splintering of ethnic armed organizations along sub-ethnic lines by signing ceasefires with disgruntled leaders and factions and setting up numerous local (ethnic) militias to oppose ethnic armed organizations (Buchanan 2016).

While useful, these two main approaches tend to assume that nested minorities are already well constituted and self-conscious and that they have the capacity to mobilize or the willingness to be co-opted by the state. We know little about why some nested minorities decide not to mobilize or why some majorities find some minorities more difficult to integrate into a larger collective identity.

This chapter highlights the organizational drivers of sub-ethnic mobilization. First, political entrepreneurs from nested minorities are far more likely to mobilize when they have strong organizational capacities. Political entrepreneurs can build such capacities during mobilization itself, but it is much easier to work through preexisting institutions to build a common identity and facilitate collective action. Second, political entrepreneurs from nested minorities are far more likely to develop grievances or motivations prompting subnational mobilization when they are isolated or excluded from key nationalist networks. When strong, these networks play two main roles, which are especially crucial when secessionism turns into armed struggle: they provide information and facilitate credible commitments. Where social networks are weak, nationalist leaders and insurgent groups find it harder to generate support, garner information, and obtain resources and compliance from nested minorities without using violence or coercion (Lilja and Hultman 2011). Coercion against nested minorities can damage intergroup relations, create grievances, and strengthen nested minorities’ identities (Kalyvas 2012, 660). Where social networks are weak, credible commitments between the nationalist elite and its nested minorities are also much harder. A lack of regular interaction between groups, or the use of coercion in these interactions, can generate fear and insecurities about future interactions or the status of a minority in a future independent state. These fears, outcomes of a “commitment problem,” are known to trigger minority countermobilization and intergroup conflict (Posen 1993; Fearon 1995; Lake and Rothchild 1996).

In Kachin state, nested minorities all met the threshold of political relevance and were exposed to similar political and material incentives to join
Myanmar military side. As the rest of this chapter shows, Lisu and Rawang inherited stronger organizational capacities from the colonial period than Lawngwaw, Lachik, and Zaiwa. Lisu and Rawang were also much more isolated from the core pan-Kachin nationalist networks, which meant that interactions with the key nationalist vehicles (the Kachin Independence Organization and the Kachin Baptist Church) were always more difficult and fraught. These two factors combined explain why Lisu and Rawang developed a more assertive identity than the other Kachin tribes.

**Kachin Nationalism: The Core and the Periphery**

The Kachin nation is an “imagined community” but not an imaginary one (see Pelletier 2021). The etymology of the term “Kachin” remains unclear, but it most likely predates the British colonial administration. Burmese and Shan seemingly used the word to designate the Jinghpaw, today’s largest Kachin tribe. Under the British colonial administration, however, the name was expanded and used as a general administrative category to refer to all non-Shan and non-Burmese people in the Kachin hills. Because of the need to develop criteria for categorizing communities in the official census, the British colonial administration began to formalize Kachin’s subcategories by using language as a referent at the turn of the 20th century (Sadan 2007, 47). There were important inconsistencies in the development of Kachin subgroups, however: some groups classified as Kachin were not linguistically, ethnically, or racially related to the other groups (48). Thus, it became unclear whether the term “Kachin” referred to “one community and one language, many communities but one language, [or] a geographical place or space” (48).

Over the years, however, the term “Kachin” achieved more than a classificatory meaning. Centuries of contacts between Kachin tribes have led to sociocultural convergence and the rise of an actual Kachin “social space” (Müller 2018). Today, Kachin subgroups share marriage and burial rituals, various festivals, an overarching clan system, common traditions and cultural values, a common religion, the same kinship system, and myths of common origin and descent (Müller 2018, 126–27).

Christianity was a key driver of the development of a common Kachin identity in the early 20th century (Sadan 2007, 50). As it happened with the Karen community, the organizational skills, proselytization efforts, and use of contemporary printing technologies by Christian churches played a pivotal role in giving rise to a distinct Kachin public sphere. The development
of educational institutions also helped create an educated Kachin elite, which started to aspire to and promote a “multi-group Kachin nationalist identity” (50). Christian elites and Christian educational institutions also contributed to the representation of a uniform Kachin history, mostly exalting the success of religious conversions in the Kachin Hills (53).

The Kachin secessionist conflict started in 1962, triggered by the government’s intention to make Buddhism the state religion. During the war, the leading proponent of a single Kachin identity became the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) and its armed wing, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA). During the conflict, the creation of a single Kachin community became necessary for the KIA to legitimize the conflict and bolster the claim that the KIA was its (sole) authoritative voice (Sadan 2013, 339). In 1963, the KIA destroyed the traditional authority system in Kachin state, ending the dispersion and fragmentation of power of the aristocratic elites (Robinne 2007, 216). The KIA replaced this system of local chiefs by a single centralized military-administrative infrastructure designed primarily for the conflict.

During the war, pan-Kachin nationalist elites made deliberate efforts to represent diversity while celebrating unity. In particular, Kachin elites popularized the manau festival as a symbol of the unity of the Kachin peoples and the manau posts as their emblem. Manau dance festivals are one-day, secular, community dances performed around a set of six manau posts that are said to represent the six Kachin tribes. The KIO held a historic manau festival in 1961, which became a symbol of unity and of the armed struggle that followed (Sadan 2005, 233). Nationalist elites also made vigorous attempts to rearticulate the term “Kachin,” historically associated with one of the six Kachin groups, the Jinghpaw, through the more neutral and inclusive local term “Wunpawng” (Sadan 2007, 61). As with the name Kachin, however, the inclusion of six ethnic groups under the Wunpawng umbrella is and remains a political construct.

The Core: Jinghpaw

Jinghpaw is the largest of the six Kachin tribes and has always occupied a dominant position in pan-Kachin nationalism. The Jinghpaw language is now spoken as a lingua franca in most of Kachin state, and Jinghpaw generally occupies significant positions of power and wealth in society and the nationalist movement (Robinne 2007, 64–65).

The centrality of Jinghpaw in pan-Kachin nationalism is linked to the
size of the group but also to the strength of its organizational resources inherited from the work of Christian missionaries and the Baptist Church. The Jinghpaw language was the first to be transcribed into Roman character, as devised by the missionary Ola Hanson in 1895 (Brenner 2019, 86). The translation of the Bible into Jinghpaw was completed in 1927 and ensured that Jinghpaw played a key role in the native Christian networks. These networks formed the basis of a Kachin public sphere, one in which (Jinghpaw) Christian sermons and publications had “a significant impact on the construction of a coherent nationalist identity” (Sadan 2007, 52).

The codification of the language and the creation of theological colleges also allowed the emergence of a (Jinghpaw) educated elite, which became the spearhead of the pan-Kachin nationalist movement. While the (Jinghpaw) nationalist elite promoted a multigroup identity, it was in fact often unintentionally promoting a Jinghpaw version of Kachin identity. The KIO and the Kachin Baptist Church (KBC) used Jinghpaw as a sort of official language, without much attention to other languages, and often inadvertently spread Jinghpaw cultural symbols as “Kachin.” Throughout the war, Jinghpaw maintained a dominant position in the KIO and KBC, while (Jinghpaw) Baptist networks formed the only public sphere amid official government censorship and unofficial KIO censorship.

Christianity and nationalism have always been tightly connected in the Kachin context. Christianity “offered a remedy for the most profound problem KIO leaders faced, namely, uniting the six major ethnic subgroups within Kachin state” (Brenner 2019, 86). The interests of the KIO and the KBC were always convergent, a situation that contributed to strengthening Jinghpaw’s stronghold over Kachin nationalism. During the first Kachin conflict (1961–94), the KIO offered a cover for the KBC to expand. In the 1970s, the KBC organized a large campaign of missionizing in areas under KIO’s control, with its protection. Since the conflict resumed in 2011, the KIO has seemed to benefit from the KBC as well. Baptist churches have become a bastion of nationalism, displaying Kachin flags behind the pulpit, teaching kids the national anthem at Sunday schools, and promoting in their sermons the notion of Wunpawng. The KIO, too, has become more religious, as soldiers are asked to pray and to abstain from having sex and

2. Interview with a leader of the Shan-ni Army, Myitkyina, Kachin state, February 2019.
3. Interview with a Kachin reverend, Myanmar Institute of Theology, Yangon, November 2018.
4. Interview with a Kachin reverend, Myanmar Institute of Theology, Yangon, November 2018.
drinking alcohol.\textsuperscript{5} A close observer of the Kachin conflict summarized it this way: “Today, if you want to hear about God, you go to the KIO; if you want to hear about fighting, you go to the church.”\textsuperscript{6}

\textit{The Periphery: Lisu and Rawang}

Lisu and Rawang have long asserted a distinct identity, separate from the notion of a single pan-Kachin community. Two key factors help explain this situation. First, Lisu and Rawang, like Jinghpaw, have inherited stronger organizational capacities from the colonial era, which allowed the articulation and expression of their identity much earlier in comparison to Lawngwaw, Lachik, and Zaiwa. Second, Lisu and Rawang are much less embedded in core (Jinghpaw) Baptist networks and institutions than Lawngwaw, Lachik, and Zaiwa. This peripheral status has made interaction with pan-Kachin nationalist elites much more fraught and, in turn, has fueled grievances and countermobilization.

\textbf{Organizational Capacities}

The peripheral status of Lisu and Rawang is both sociocultural and structural. In contrast to Lawngwaw, Lachik, and Zaiwa, Lisu and Rawang have had fewer contacts with core Kachin groups because of their geographical remoteness. They are located mostly along the border with China and in the Putao region in northern Kachin state. As late as the 1990s, the absence of decent roads and civilian air transport meant that traveling from the Kachin state capital (Myitkyina) to Putao involved a trip of up to six weeks on foot (Williams 2017, 130). As a result, only a small part of the Rawang and Lisu population speaks Jinghpaw, and only those in close contact with other Kachin share the same kinship and clan systems (Müller 2016, 35). Moreover, most Lisu came into Kachin state very late, through a wave of migration from China from the late 1940s to the early 1970s. Lisu fled China’s forced collectivization of agriculture and industry during the Great Leap Forward (1958–62) and the excesses of the Cultural Revolution (1966–76) (Zack 2017, 215).

Structurally, Lisu and Rawang occupy a peripheral status in (Jinghpaw) Kachin Christian networks. As with other groups, Christian missionaries had a long-lasting impact on local identities by transcribing languages,

\textsuperscript{5} Interview with a Kachin reverend, Myanmar Institute of Theology, Yangon, November 2018.

\textsuperscript{6} Interview with a Kachin community leader, Yangon, June 2015.
establishing literacy centers, and translating some biblical texts into local languages. Lisu and Rawang had earlier access to an orthography than Lawngwaw, Zaiwa, and Lachik. The Anglican missionary James O. Fraser transcribed the Lisu language as early as 1918. He then translated portions of the Scriptures as early as 1921 and, with the help of colleagues, completed a Lisu version of the New Testament by 1936 (the Bible was translated entirely by 1968) (Joshua Project 2019). For Lisu, the “writing system [that] missionaries provided [offered] a potent unifying force” (Zack 2017, 217). Literacy enabled Lisu leaders to develop, maintain, and support their institutions early on, including a professional clergy, churches, and Bible schools to attract new converts (217).

Similarly, the American missionary Robert H. Morse developed the Rawang orthography in 1962–63 based on the Mvtwang dialect, which has become the norm for communication between Rawang groups (LaPolla 2008; Morse 1963). A translated version of the New Testament was completed around 1974 and the Bible around 1986. Early access to orthography and a complete vernacular Bible helped create distinct Christian networks and a greater sense of identity among Lisu and Rawang.

In contrast to Rawang and Lisu, Lawngwaw, Zaiwa, and Lachik peoples are closer, culturally and linguistically, to the Jinghpaw core (La Raw 1967, 132), in part because they inherited weaker organizational capacities from the colonial era. In particular, these three groups have had access to orthography and a complete vernacular Bible much later, which slowed down the emergence of autonomous networks and counter-public spheres. Lawngwaw got their language the earliest, around 1900–1910, but the New Testament was fully translated before 1985 and a complete version of the Bible before 2009. Zaiwa was codified in the 1930s, but there is still no complete Bible in that language. It is unclear when Lachik language was codified, but it seems that a translated Bible was not available before the 2010s (Joshua Project 2019). The absence of vernacular Bibles helped the (Jinghpaw) Baptist Church achieve a position of symbolic and organizational dominance.

It is only recently that these groups have started to revive their culture and language. In the past, the Kachin Baptist Convention, with its focus on Jinghpaw, has often resisted efforts by smaller tribes to create or revive their literary languages. For instance, it had successfully blocked Lawngwaw’s attempts to get formal recognition by the Myanmar Baptist Convention. In the new semi-democratic context, each Kachin tribe has founded its own “literature and culture” committee to promote its language and
cultural practices. These committees have tried to “purify” their languages by replacing commonly used Jinghpaw words with newly coined words in their language (Müller 2016, 34). They have also started to codify their language and, in some cases, to translate the Bible, with the help of international expertise and donors.

**Intergroup Networks**

Lisu and Rawang, in contrast to the other tribes, are also much less embedded into core Kachin networks. Christian missionaries’ efforts generally focused on hill people who, unlike Theravada Buddhists in the valley, had animist beliefs and no scriptural tradition that facilitated conversion (Schendel 1999, 66). Yet, Baptist missionaries in Kachin state generally left the northern region around Putao, where most Lisu and Rawang live, underserved. In the 1930s, evangelical churches like the Church of Christ, the Assemblies of God, and the Seventh-day Adventist filled the vacuum in the north. Northern Kachin state became “a patchwork of disaggregated religious identities that tended to map onto historically disaggregated social and political identities too” (Sadan 2013, 338). These churches were particularly attractive to Lisu and Rawang communities due to the various development projects they initiated. The Church of Christ, in particular, organized a malaria eradication campaign in the region (spraying DDT and providing medicine, mosquito nets, and public education). It also worked with farmers on improving nutrition by expanding crop portfolios and improving agricultural techniques. In the 1950s, American donors were able to purchase and transport a Massey Ferguson tractor to Putao. The tractor was used for a vast land-clearing effort that opened approximately 6,000 acres of prime land for agriculture available for Lisu migrants (Zack 2017, 234).

Baptist missions and institutions also made little room for Lisu communities, which also helped strengthened Lisu’s collective identity. In contrast to Lisu in northern Kachin, many Lisu around Myitkyina are Baptists (Zack 2017, 261). Yet the Kachin Baptist Convention denied recognition of Lisu’s cultural and linguistic specificity (Robinne 2007, 239). The convention tended to treat Lisu as just one subgroup of the Jinghpaw majority rather than a community and did not bother translating biblical texts into Lisu, so most of the church’s activities took place in Jinghpaw. In the north, fewer Lisu are Baptists, as many are part of evangelical churches and are thus disconnected from core Kachin (Jinghpaw) networks.
Rawang Mobilization

Many Rawang identified with pan-Kachin nationalism at first. Rawang shared the colonial history of military recruitment in which a collective Kachin identity emerged. “Rawang contemporaries did feel some sense of kinship with other Kachin groups, though this was more Gesellschaft than Gemeinschaft: the Rawang lived in Kachin state, therefore they were Kachins” (Williams 2017, 130). As Christians, Rawang felt as outraged as the other Kachin at Rangoon’s efforts to make Buddhism the national religion in the early 1960s (130). When the first KIA troops reached the Putao area in 1962, Rawang communities welcomed them in the spirit of Christian solidarity.

The peripheral status of Rawang in pan-Kachin networks made interactions with Kachin nationalist elite and organizations difficult. During the first Kachin war (1961–94), the KIA had to work hard to ensure minimal cooperation for the insurgency. In Putao, “the public put up stiff resistance to the KIA’s demands” (Williams 2017, 129–30). The KIA was initially popular among individual Rawang, but the tribe never officially joined the KIO. Instead, Rawang formed local militias that the KIA could call upon for reinforcements (131). KIA’s access to information in the area remained much more difficult, however. The KIA could not rely on the Kachin Baptist Church’s networks and churches in the area, since most Rawang were members of decentralized Christian congregations, such as the Assemblies of God. The government also took swift action to counter the KIA’s incursion in the area. Ne Win settled retired Burmese army veterans, some of them Rawang, who set up their militias. Rapidly, “the KIA found itself facing unusually stiff competition, both on the battlefield and in the fight for the loyalty of the Rawang public” (131).

In the absence of strong networks, KIA operatives (mostly Jinghpaw) in northern Kachin state were increasingly suspicious about Rawang’s loyalty. The KIA reportedly put to death some Rawang suspected of being double agents. This episode sparked an escalating conflict between the Rawang and the Jinghpaw-dominated KIA. This suspicion then spread to more and more people and then to entire villages, which were assumed to be collaborating with the Tatmadaw (Williams 2017, 132). Violence against Rawang helped strengthen a sense of identity among themselves. The KIO also got caught up in a local communal conflict between Lisu and Rawang communities. The KIO sided with the local Lisu, convinced that the Rawang
were the stooges of Rangoon. Clashes erupted between the KIO and the Rawang, leading to hundreds of casualties. While many Rawang had sided with the KIA, support from many Rawang for the rebellion collapsed in the late 1960s, largely because of those civilian abuses.

Rangoon skillfully exploited the animosity that existed between the Rawang and the Jinghpaw. In the late 1960s, community elders declared the Putao area a “white zone,” demanding an end to the violence and warning the KIA not to enter the territory. In practice, this meant support for Rangoon. After the massacre of Rawang by the KIA, Rawang communities turned to the central state for protection (Williams 2017, 121–22). Local recruitment stopped, and the KIA lost ground. The area north of Putao remained the Tatmadaw’s only stronghold in the Kachin state during most of the first phase of the conflict (Lintner 1997, 138). The Rangoon government tapped on Rawang’s grievances against the Jinghpaw to sponsor home-guard units, mobilized to protect the area from KIA incursions.

During the ceasefire, the Tatmadaw has continued to exploit Rawang’s resentment and insecurities to consolidate its links with the Rawang in northern Kachin state. The Rebellion Resistance Force (RRF) was established around 2007 amid efforts by the KIO to improve its relationship with the Rawang communities by building a power plant in Putao, among other efforts. The RRF was set up by a small breakaway faction of the New Democratic Army–Kachin, itself a breakaway faction of the KIA formed in 1968 and made up mostly of non-Jinghpaw Kachin (Brenner 2019, 78). The Tatmadaw seized the opportunity and turned the group into a pro-government militia. It conducted a mass recruitment campaign among Rawang and Lisu tribes, providing salaries, weapons, and training, even airlifting hundreds of recruits to Naypyidaw. Based southeast of Putao, the RRF is active and given access to economic resources in areas inhabited mainly by Lawngwaw, Lachik, and Zaiwa (Farelly 2007). With the RRF, the military sought to create tensions among Kachin groups, targeting particularly these three “core” Kachin groups that have remained closer to the Kachin identity and the KIA.

Lisu Mobilization

Like Rawang, Lisu’s solidarity with pan-Kachin nationalism was both political and religious at first. Lisu shared a history of military recruitment with other Kachin, and many identified with the political goal of greater autonomy during the early years of the war (Zack 2017, 261). Lisu were
also Christian and, like other Kachin, resented the central government’s intention to make Buddhism the state religion.7

But tensions between Lisu and (Jinghpaw) pan-Kachin nationalist leaders led to a growing and irreversible gap. Lisu’s marginal status in the Kachin Baptist networks and churches generated grievances and became a driver of countermobilization. In the 1970s, Lisu leaders increasingly called for an independent Lisu Baptist Convention, which they finally obtained in 1977. Lisu demands for an autonomous religious congregation went beyond spiritual matters; they were demands for political recognition in response to the subaltern status of Lisu in the Kachin Baptist Convention (Robinne 2007, 239). This separation weakened the pan-Kachin nationalist movement and Kachin Baptist Convention’s claim to represent all Kachin. Lisu now interacted on an equal footing with the Jinghpaw-dominated Kachin Baptist Convention. As François Robinne argues, “The pan-Lisu Christian movement was built not against but at the expense of the pan-Kachin movement” (242).

Lisu’s cooperation was easier to obtain, at least among Baptist Lisu mostly located mostly around the state capital Myitkyina. Baptist Lisu were more integrated into Kachin networks than Rawang and non-Baptist Lisu, located further north from the capital. The solidarity between Lisu and Jinghpaw started to unravel only in the late 1970s when the Lisu seceded from the Kachin Baptist Convention and created the Lisu Baptist Convention. The destruction of the Baptist networks connecting Jinghpaw to Lisu made the KIA’s work increasingly difficult among Lisu. After they left, Jinghpaw leaders started to dominate the KIO more clearly, and Lisu leaders were driven out of the rebel organization. Jinghpaw domination over pan-Kachin nationalism, however, tended to keep Lisu in a subaltern position. Lisu were not top-ranking officials in the KIA, but mostly low-ranking foot soldiers. Some Lisu continued to support the armed group, but others increasingly resisted recruitment. By the time the 1994 ceasefire was signed, many Lisu were, in fact, unwilling conscripts (Zack 2017, 261).

Tensions with Lisu have been growing since the conflict resumed in 2011 (see fig. 9.1). The KIA used to control most of the Kachin state, but the ceasefire has dramatically diminished both its territorial control and its administrative capacity (see Brenner 2019). The system that the KIO had spent decades building was in ruins across much of the Kachin state in the

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For many Kachin, “KIO schools and hospitals, KIO taxes and laws, KIO protection and investment—[were] all nothing but a fading memory” (228). The biggest loser of the ceasefire was the KIO’s armed wing, the KIA, which was now scattered, outnumbered, and outgunned (Brenner 2015, 351).

Since 2011, the conflict occurs mostly along the China border and in southern Kachin state, where Jinghpaw are mixed with other groups. The area around Bhamo accounts for a third of all the clashes reported in the early 2010s (Williams 2017, 227).
Kachin state since 2011. The second most violent region is around Tanai and Hpakan township, two regions rich in amber and jade. Although originally Jinghpaw, “Hpakan has become a cosmopolitan area.” The region is now home to half a million migrants, mostly Lisu, Shan, and Rakhine, working in illegal mining. The third most conflict-affected area is around Mytkyina, the state capital, also a multicultural area, and around Lake Indawgyi, an area with by Shan and Shan-ni populations.

Where they lack territorial control, insurgent organizations like the KIA need to rely on social networks to ensure civilian cooperation. However, when such networks are lacking, armed groups must resort to coercion to sustain their operations and recruitment efforts. Since 2011, the KIO has lacked territorial control and social networks among the local communities where the conflict is occurring. Hence, it is not surprising to witness a growing number of accounts detailing arbitrary arrests, killings, and forced recruitment of Lisu by the KIA. Lisu villagers reported that they live in insecurity because numerous mines were planted in the outskirts of the villages where people work and live, creating severe security problems (see also Fishbein 2019). Similar stories of forced recruitment and extortion have emerged among Lawngwaw.

These tensions have strengthened Lisu mobilization and have provided an opportunity for state actors to intervene. The Tatmadaw has approached Lisu communities, offering uniforms, training, and the ability to control small territories and protect their villages against the KIA. According to their representatives, once they formed a militia, the KIA stopped trying to get into the village. The Tatmadaw has then used these troops to conduct offensives against the KIA, especially in KIA’s mining territories. The Lisu militia, for instance, has been mostly active in the mining region of Tanai (UNHRC 2018, 79). As it is becoming increasingly visible, the mobilization of Lisu will continue to undermine the prospect of a cohesive pan-Kachin identity in the future.

8. Interview with a Kachin leader, Yangon, June 2015.
10. Interview with a Baptist reverend, Lisu community leader, Myitkyina, Kachin state, February 2019.
11. Interview with a member of the Shan Traditional literature and Cultural Organization, Myitkyina, Kachin state, February 2019.
12. Interview with an assistant pastor in Mansi, Bhamo, Kachin state, June 2015.
13. Interview with a Kachin leader, Yangon, June 2015.
Conclusion

This chapter has tried to understand why some nested minorities develop identity demands and movements within secessionist minorities while others do not. Myanmar, an “ethnocracy” (Brown 1994), does not lack political incentives for the mobilization of ethnicity. The 2008 constitution and the 2011–2021 democratization period provided the mechanisms and the space for ethnic representation that reward sub-ethnic rather than pan-ethnic mobilization. Despite these incentives, only some nested minorities have mobilized. This chapter identified two key institutional drivers of subnational movements. First, it argued that nested minorities’ organizational capacities shape the salience of group boundaries and facilitate leadership and collective action by ethnic political entrepreneurs. In Kachin state, the organizational capacities inherited from Christian missionaries and churches helped the emergence of a pan-Kachin identity. Unsurprisingly, this pan-Kachin identity failed where those networks and institutions were absent or weak, such as Lisu and Rawang. Second, it argued that intergroup networks shape majority-minority interactions, which may generate grievances that serve to reinforce the identity of nested minorities. Interactions between pan-Kachin nationalists and the Lisu and Rawang were always more difficult as they shared weak networks or were not part of the same networks. Lisu and Rawang, more so than other tribes, develop more substantial grievances against the Jinghpaw majority, which motivates countermobilization.

This chapter, along with this book, has questioned the salience and boundaries of regional identities. It has taken a different perspective, however, by going below the subnational level. The case of northern Myanmar shows that we can only truly understand regional identities if we take them apart and study their concrete institutional foundations. In doing so, it called attention to the heterogeneity of the Kachin as a group—and, therefore, to the need to focus on the region as the unit of analysis as opposed to the ethnic-claimed “group.”
Civic Associations in Maluku, Indonesia

Explaining the Failure of the South Maluku Republic Movement

Jessica Soedirgo

Editors’ Introduction: While civic associations mattered for cross-cutting mobilization in Timor-Leste, Bali, and even North Myanmar, in this chapter we will how these same associations impeded the development of a larger regional identity in South Maluku. While Ambo- nese elites tried to mobilize along a common ethnicity, efforts failed to materialize. This was because of the structure of quotidian institutions and related practices. Specifically, a salient religious cleavage meant that overtures by the Christians to the Muslims were insufficient. The religious differences, as a result, would undermine regional efforts for independence (1950–62).

Introduction

In 1950, the newly created Republic of Indonesia faced its first secessionist challenge. This challenge came from the South Maluku Republic (Republik Maluku Selatan, RMS), a nationalist movement that laid claim over parts of what is now the province of Maluku. The RMS movement emerged out of disagreements about the fundamental nature of the postcolonial state, particularly around the status of religious minorities and fears of political dominance by the ethnic Javanese. However, the nationalist movement was unable to generate support from a broad segment of the population. As a result, the movement quickly lost momentum and was easily quashed by the Indonesian army.
The RMS secessionist movement (1950–62) failed because it was unable to shake its Christian image and generate support from Maluku’s Muslim community. This was the case even as RMS elites made efforts to mobilize on the basis of a pan-Ambonese identity, highlighting how the new Indonesian state utilized ethnicity as a marker of exclusion. Despite efforts to cultivate ethnic solidarity, participation in the movement—or lack thereof—unfolded along religious lines.

Why were efforts to mobilize along ethnic lines by RMS elites ultimately unsuccessful? I argue that mobilization patterns in the RMS secessionist movement unfolded along religious cleavages—not ethnic ones—due to the structure of everyday institutions and practices at the level of civil society during the colonial era. Quotidian institutions and practices are important because they determine levels of emotional attachment to larger identity categories and are the sites where political information is processed and collectively interpreted. As a consequence, the distribution of different kinds of micro-level institutions and practices shapes who is seen as a threat, what the demands of mobilization are, and who ultimately participates.

By showing the ways that quotidian institutions and practices shaped mobilization in the South Maluku Republic, this chapter makes two broader, related points. Theoretically, this chapter highlights that focusing solely on the state yields only a partial account of patterns of intergroup mobilization. In the Maluku case, the Ambonese were politically and economically excluded on both ethnic and religious lines. However, ethnic exclusion by the state was not a sufficient condition for ethnic mobilization. Practically, it points to the sites where identity and therefore the bases for mobilization are maintained and where they can be negotiated.

Quotidian Institutions, Everyday Practices, and Patterns of Mobilization

Why do movements occur along religious, ethnic, or national lines at some times and in some places but not in others? Why do some identity-based calls for mobilization lead to mass participation while others do not? Understanding why conflicts take ethnic, religious, or nationalist forms has ani-

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1. Maluku’s indigenous people are ethnically Alifuru, descendants of people who originate from the mountains of Seram island (Bartels 1977, 6). Commonly, Alifuru peoples are known as being “Ambonese.” While the term technically only refers to the people of Ambon Island, Lease Islands, and the southern coast of West Seram, it has evolved into an all-encompassing term for people from the Maluku region (Lee 1999, 40).
mated a significant portion of the scholarship on mobilization (Smith 2003; Devotta 2004; Posner 2005). It remains an important topic: How a conflict is understood and the cleavages along which mobilization unfolds shape who the targets are and who is most likely to participate. As such, it shapes who is—and who is not—particularly vulnerable as conflicts develop.

For decades, scholars have largely looked to the state to answer questions about the broad contours of conflict. Among others, Marx (1998), Jung (2000), and Posner (2005) have persuasively argued that mobilization occurs along cleavages institutionalized by the state, as these are the categories used to mediate access to political, social, and economic resources. People have emotional attachments to these identity categories because they determine what jobs one can get, where one can live, and how long one will live. In other words, the experience of inclusion and exclusion is deeply personal. According to this line of argumentation, then, when political elites invoke these categories for the purposes of mobilization, these calls resonate with ordinary people who subsequently make the choice to participate in movements.

While I am not discounting the importance of state institutions in shaping the overarching contours of mobilization, I do argue that their explanatory power is overstated. After all, individuals are simultaneously included and excluded by the state along multiple dimensions of identity (Crenshaw 1991; Posner 2005). Yet, not all these identity categories become politically salient, and attempts to mobilize on the basis of institutionalized markers of inclusion and exclusion are not equally successful. Class, for example, continues to significantly shape aspects of life such as education, health outcomes, and more. Yet, in Western nations around the world, the salience of economic class on political behavior—including on mobilization—seems to be on the decline (Houtman, Achterberg, and Derks 2017). While state institutions are necessary factors for determining the lines along which mobilization occurs, they are not sufficient factors for explaining why some state markers of inclusion and exclusion make for more successful bases of mobilization than others.

In addition to the state, then, understanding why mobilization occurs along some lines of identity and not others requires widening the analytical lens to the level of civil society.2 There are at least two ways that

2. Although I draw inspiration from Varshney’s (2002) classic text in this chapter, we ask different questions. Varshney’s book explores how the structure of civic associations shapes the presence or absence of ethnic conflict. In contrast, this chapter explores how civic associations shape the cleavages along which movements unfold.
micro-level institutions and practices shape how conflict is understood and how mobilization unfolds: (1) levels of emotional attachments to larger political categories and (2) the process of threat perception. First, ordinary institutions, routines, and practices shape levels of emotional attachments to larger identity categories (Bonikowski 2016). Associations and practices within civil society facilitate what Simmons (2016, 7) calls quotidian communities—communities “that are built through routine [and] face-to-face interactions.” Though seemingly innocuous, these mundane institutions and practices underpin lived experiences of belonging. As such, quotidian communities are deeply personal and deeply meaningful.

Emotions tying individuals to quotidian communities can translate to deeper attachments to larger ethnic, national, or religious categories (Anderson 1983, 52–53; Simmons 2016). For example, the annual, repeated process of parading by Protestants in Northern Ireland works to cultivate and express sectarian solidarities (Blake 2019). Similarly, routine agricultural practices bond citizens in Bolivia and Mexico to the nation (Simmons 2016). The logic of these pathways is plain. Going to church services every week reinforces emotional ties to quotidian Christian communities through the cultivation of personal relationships and the shared practice of religious rituals like communion. It also can increase a sense of belonging to larger Christian communities, as one recognizes that other Christian communities around the world are also engaging in group prayer or singing. Certainly, not all quotidian communities align with categories used by the state. However, when they do, these quotidian communities and the practices they engage in can deepen members’ emotional ties to larger political categories.

Levels of emotional attachments to different identity categories can shape the cleavages along which mobilization unfolds. It can influence how receptive people will be to certain political narratives and whether the demands made by these movements are worthy of support or action. As Shesterinina (2016, 418) shows, individuals who feel deep attachments to the group are more likely to engage in fighting because they are acting to defend the collective. If elites try to advance a nationalist agenda, a person who does not have deep attachments to her national community will likely not act to protect the nation.

Quotidian institutions also shape understandings of threat and thus individuals’ mobilization decisions at moments of uncertainty. The interpretation of political facts is, after all, a social process. When a group has a strong collective identity, this identity shapes the nature of political con-
Civic Associations in Maluku, Indonesia

Conversations in that group. Identity influences “political understanding by affecting which interests, social groups, and political principles are acceptable to the conversation” (Cramer Walsh 2004, 91). Conversations that take place within communities based on a common faith will be different from those based on a shared gender. Even if the same person has a conversation about the same political event in two different groups, the conversation will unfold in different ways depending on the group’s purpose, its demographic composition, and members’ interests. Therefore, if someone is frequently exposed to quotidian networks based on a shared religious identity, their point of view will be heavily influenced by religious collective understandings.

The importance of social structures in the interpretation of political information is amplified in the uncertain environment of conflict. While national and regional elites have an important role in framing understandings of conflict (Brass 1997; Tarrow 1998), information from the top filters down to local communities and is negotiated and adapted based on “local needs and requirements” (Fujii 2009, 12–13). This process of information transmission and interpretation is heavily shaped by the social structures one is embedded in (Shesterinina 2016). Even in ordinary times, quotidian bonds already shape what information will be transmitted and how this information will be interpreted. In the context of deep uncertainty, the importance of attaining trustworthy information is paramount. As such, information and interpretations communicated by acquaintances, friends, and kin—relations developed in quotidian communities—are accorded significant weight (418).

This process of looking to local leaders and friends for information leads to a situational, collective political sense making. This collective threat interpretation process fundamentally shapes mobilization outcomes. The basis of action or inaction is an understanding of what the threat is, who poses it, and what kinds of options—whether to fight, to disengage, or to flee—are available in the face of this threat. It is through this process of collective threat interpretation that individuals decide to participate in a movement or to not participate (Shesterinina 2016, 425).

Given the role of quotidian communities in shaping emotional attachments to larger categories and in structuring how political events are even understood, variation in the density and distribution of different types of civic associations and practices will shape patterns of mobilization. Not all group categories used by the state to mediate resource access will be reinforced by the same number of quotidian institutions and practices.
If an individual’s lived experience revolves around everyday Christian institutions—churches, schools, sport leagues—and not class-based ones, then it is likely that she will have a greater emotional attachment to the Christian identity and that these quotidian networks will shape how she understands the world. Some calls to mobilization will therefore resonate more than others, and some kinds of collective interpretations will be more likely to be taken up than others.

Process Tracing: A Note on Method

I use process-tracing methods to evaluate the theory forwarded in this chapter, specifically in the case of the failed RMS movement. Drawing on Ricks and Liu (2018), I evaluate the explanatory power of two hypotheses about the cleavages on which conflict occurs: explanations that focus on the state and those that focus on civic associations. I discuss the expected outcomes of each hypothesis and how the sequences ultimately unfolded in the case. I show how an exclusive focus on state-imposed identity categories and the instrumentalization of these categories cannot fully explain patterns of mobilization. I then show that expanding the analytical lens to include the structures of quotidian institutions and practices can better help us explain why mobilization unfolded the way it did in the Maluku case.

The Failure of the South Maluku Republic

The RMS declared their independence on April 25, 1950, asserting authority over the territories of the islands of Ambon, Buru, and Seram in what is now Maluku province (see fig. 10.1). Although the movement was officially defeated in 1962, the active phase of the conflict was short-lived (Higgins 2010, 163–64). There were some attempts by the Indonesian government and foreign delegates to negotiate with the RMS, but the Indonesian National Army (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, TNI) was quickly sent in to quash the regional rebellion. Within a few months, the RMS movement was forced to retreat to the mountainous terrain of Seram island, where they waged a guerilla war. Ultimately, the movement’s leaders either were captured by the TNI or fled to the Netherlands, where they established an exile government that remains today (Bartels 1977, 12).

The RMS was the first secessionist movement to challenge the newly formed Indonesian state, emerging during the transition to the nominal liberal democracy of the early Sukarno era, which radically transformed exist-
ing political orders in Indonesia. Like other internal conflicts taking place at this time (e.g., the Darul Islam rebellion), the RMS movement emerged out of disagreements around the fundamental nature of the postcolonial state. The major point of disagreement between the RMS movement and the Republic of Indonesia was the issue of a federal versus a unitary state structure. The RMS had a strong preference for the Dutch-designed federal arrangement (the Republic of the United States of Indonesia), where Maluku would have a considerable level of autonomy (Chauvel 1990, 352). However, leaders of other regions in the former Dutch East Indies were in favor of a unitary arrangement. They saw the federal structure as a relic of colonial rule and thought a unitary state would be less vulnerable to breakdown (Kahin 1970, 464). Thus, most regional leaders willingly relinquished their control to the Republic of Indonesia, led by Sukarno and Hatta. When it became clear that Indonesia would be a unitary state, the RMS declared independence (Ricklefs 2008, 270).

The RMS were against a unitary arrangement for two primary reasons. First, they feared marginalization on a regional—and thus ethnic—basis. As the original source of cloves and nutmeg, Maluku was an integral part of the spice trade (Bartels 1977, 9). Consequently, the region—and its
people—held a privileged position in the colonial state (Sidel 2006, 169). Power in the new Republic of Indonesia, however, would radiate from the island of Java. RMS leaders and supporters feared that they would be excluded from state resources given the new Java-dominated system (Ricklefs 2008, 285).

In addition to regional marginalization, many Ambonese Christians were concerned about their status as religious minorities in the new Indonesia. Maluku is one of the few areas where Christians outnumbered their Muslim counterparts. As such, Ambonese Christians were gravely concerned about their place in a Muslim-majority country. While traditional Muslim elites were also beneficiaries of colonial rule, Ambonese Christians had disproportionate access to jobs in the colonial administration, educational institutions, and the economic sector (Sidel 2006, 169). Many Ambonese Christians were thus afraid of losing these privileges or even being shut out of the state altogether (Turner 2003, 247n36).

RMS leaders used both religious and ethnic rhetoric to mobilize support for their secessionist efforts (Chauvel 1990, 369). The Christian elements in their mobilization strategy were obvious. In addition to the fact that the majority of the RMS leadership were Christian, some of the movement’s rhetoric was fairly perceived as disparaging toward Islam. Soumokil, the leader of the RMS, for example, tried to mobilize support for the RMS by framing the Republic of Indonesia as an Islamic state (370–71).

Still, it was clear to RMS leaders that the nationalist movement would only succeed with the support of the Ambonese Muslim community. Therefore, a lot of effort was directed toward cultivating Ambonese ethnic solidarity for the purposes of nationalist mobilization. These efforts were not merely empty gestures. As Chauvel (1990, 367) notes, several RMS leaders were explicitly driven to create an independent state because they believed in the Ambonese nationalist project. Furthermore, Alex Nanlohy, a top RMS leader,3 was deeply committed to an Ambonese state based on adat (indigenous systems of governance).

At least two strategies were used to mobilize on the basis of ethnicity. First, the RMS sought to have Muslim representation in the leadership ranks by gaining support from chiefs (raja) of Muslim villages. For example, Ohorella, the raja of Tulehu village, was a part of the RMS government (Chauvel 1990, 361, 366). Some Muslim rajas were willing to support the

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3. Christiaan Soumokil, Johan Alvarez Manusama, and Alex Nanlohy were the three men seen as being critical to the RMS project (see Chauvel 1990, 366).
RMS because they too were concerned that they would lose the privileges they had enjoyed under Dutch colonial rule. In fact, many of the RMS’s political opponents—members of the Indonesian nationalist organizations Insulinde and Sarekat Ambon—were opponents of the raja system (88–99). As figureheads of adat, rajas simultaneously commanded high levels of respect and were symbols of Ambonese traditions. RMS leaders thought that getting rajas on board with the nationalist project would bring support from Muslim villagers.

In addition to increasing Muslim representation in leadership ranks, RMS leaders sought to (re)frame the nationalist movement in ethnic terms. RMS leaders utilized ethnic symbols and rhetoric in an attempt to cultivate a sense of ethnic “we-ness” so that Ambonese Muslims would also support their demands for an independent state. For example, the symbol used in the RMS flag was the personal sign of Pattimura (Thomas Matulesia), the anti-colonial hero who led the revolt against the Dutch regime in 1817. Nanlohy would often weave the theme of Pattimura’s struggle when speaking at RMS flag-raising ceremonies (Chauvel 1990, 367). Along the same lines, RMS leaders often emphasized the shared ethnic heritage between Muslims and Christians in Ambon in their speeches. For example, in a speech broadcasted on Radio Ambon, an RMS spokesperson articulated the following:

The RMS is based solely on South Moluccan nationalism. . . . The RMS is neither Islamic or Christian, because in the Moluccas the relationship between Islam and Christianity is like that of brothers, not only the pela relationship, both [communities] have the same family names and share the same adat-istiadat and culture. (Chauvel 1990, 371)

The use of anticolonial symbols in their campaign and the quote from the radio speech above are just some concrete examples of efforts to (re)define RMS nationalism in ethnic terms.

As seen, ethnic cleavages were institutionalized by the state, and RMS elites invoked these categories to mobilize support for the nationalist movement. If these factors could sufficiently explain the cleavages along which participation unfolded, we would expect to see these ethnic claims to have at least some success in mobilizing support from members of the broader Ambonese community. However, despite these efforts to mobilize on the basis of ethnicity, the RMS were unable to shed their image
as a “Christian” movement (Chauvel 1990, 370; Bertrand 2004, 116). As a result, outside of the traditional Muslim elite, the movement attracted little support from the Ambonese Muslim community. This inability to attract support from a cross-section of Maluku’s population meant that the RMS movement was easily defeated.

How Quotidian Institutions and Practices Shaped Participation in the RMS Movement

Why did support for the RMS unfold the way it did? Why did calls for regional autonomy and ethnic solidarity not resonate for Ambonese Muslims? Mobilization in the RMS uprising ultimately unfolded along religious cleavages—not ethnic ones—due to the structure of everyday institutions and practices at the level of civil society. During the colonial era, quotidian communities in Maluku were predominantly based on shared religious identities. While institutions and practices based on shared ethnic identities did exist, they mostly operated on the margins of everyday life. As a result, most Ambonese were more deeply embedded—and more deeply attached—to religious categories over ethnic ones.

Religious institutions mediated the lives of both Ambonese Christians and Muslims during the colonial era. The privileging of Ambonese Christians by the Dutch regime led to the proliferation of Christian quotidian communities. These institutions became an embedded feature of everyday life due to routine experiences with these organizations and practices. For example, almost every village (negeri) in Ambon island had a church, and the institution was important for “Ambonese [Christian] identity and community solidarity” (Chauvel 1990, 154–55). Less is known about the structures of civil society mediating Ambonese Muslim lives during this period, as they had little contact with colonial institutions beyond the security apparatus and the collection of taxes (Bartels 1977, 11). However, Islamic religious institutions and practices were also the sites where quotidian communities developed. Unlike Ambonese Christians and Muslims in other parts of Indonesia, schools were not an important mechanism of community building.4 However, everyday communities did center around village mosques. The Hatuhaha federation—consisting of the villages of Rohomoni, Kabauw, Kailolo, Pelauw, and Hulaliu5—is illustrative. One of

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4. Islamic boarding schools (pesantren) were only established in Maluku in the late colonial period (Chauvel 1990, 35).
5. Hulaliu would later convert to Christianity and remains a Christian village today.
the oldest Muslim settlements in Maluku, villagers were deeply committed to their syncretic form of Islam. They prayed at the mosque weekly and celebrated important religious holidays there (Bräuchler 2010, 70–71).

Repeated social interaction in places like mosques and workplaces led Christian and Muslim Ambonese to develop emotional attachments to larger religious categories. The Christian Ambonese soldiers in the Royal Netherlands–Indies Army (Koninklijk Nederlandsch–Indisch Leger, KNIL) are a good example of this process. With the soldiers privileged by the regime to offset the numerically superior Javanese and living away from their hometowns across the Dutch East Indies, a unique Ambonese barracks culture with its own songs, games, and slang soon emerged (Chauvel 1990, 39). On a day-to-day basis, Ambonese soldiers and their families studied the Bible together (49), received pork in their rations (67), and taught their children Dutch nursery rhymes instead of Indonesian ones (51). These routine practices and bonds worked to increase emotional attachments to the Dutch crown and to the Christian category. In fact, Ambonese soldiers in the KNIL referred to themselves as “Black Dutchmen,” signaling their sense of belonging to the colonial empire (Bartels 1977, 3). Their attachment to Christianity was similarly strong. A training manual for colonial administrators stated that “the Ambonese follow the Christian religion and it is for the officer especially important to keep in mind because he [the Ambonese] is very proud of it” (Chauvel 1990, 89). Loyalties to Dutch and Christian categories were mutually reinforcing. The closer Ambonese soldiers felt to the Dutch category, the closer they felt to the Christian category, as religion was what tied the members of these two categories together.

Muslim quotidian communities also worked to reinforce commitments to larger religious categories. This was especially true as advances in technology and increases in economic migration flows led to greater interaction with Muslims from other parts of the colony (Sidel 2006, 70). These increasing interactions changed Ambonese Muslims’ religious practices, which were originally quite syncretic (Bartels 1977, 293). As Ambonese Muslims became more aware of the greater Muslim community in the Dutch East Indies, they purposely realigned their religious practices with their counterparts (Chauvel 1990, 163). For example, when adat was a strong influence on Islam in Hatuhaha, Muslims only prayed once a week and the village mosque was only opened on Fridays. However, in the 1930s, they established and fulfilled practices that aligned more closely with Islamic orthodoxy, including praying five times a day and having the
village mosque open daily (166–67). This shift toward orthodoxy suggests a growing understanding of, and identification with, a larger Muslim community at the national level. This sense of community was reinforced during the Japanese interregnum, when there was a growth in the associational life of Ambonese Muslims (185). The routine nature of Muslim associations helped reinforce commitments to a larger religious community.

If religious institutions, practices, and social ties pervaded everyday life in colonial Maluku, their ethnic counterparts were more marginal. Certainly, there were ethnic-based institutions and practices that were significant to Ambonese culture. The most important is undoubtedly pela. Meaning “brotherhood” and pre-dating the arrival of both Islam and Christianity, pela is seen as the practice that unites all Ambonese together (Bartels 1977, 178). Some Ambonese even consider the institution as constituting Maluku culture itself (Hohe and Remijsen 2004, 136).

Pela refers to a ritualized system of alliance making, where two villages make an oath to enter in a relationship of mutual help and defense (Pelletier and Soedirgo 2017, 338n66). The kind of pela relationship that villages enter into—pela keras/tuni, pela gandong, or pela tempat sirih—depends on whether the villagers believe themselves to be biologically related. Regardless, villages in any kind of pela relationship essentially enter into a bond of consanguinity. These familial ties are taken quite literally: people from different pela villages are forbidden from dating, much less marrying. As a perceived family unit, villages in a pela relationship are also forbidden from engaging in violence against one another. They are also called upon to provide hospitality and aid when requested. For example, a visitor from a pela village must be provided a meal and a place to stay. Similarly, villages will often help their pela partners after a natural disaster or help with building community sites like mosques and churches (Bartels 1977, 27). Violations of pela requirements lead to punishments meted out by ancestral spirits (nenek moyang).

Outside of the co-opted system of raja governance and succession, pela was one of the few adat institutions and practices that was preserved through the colonial era. Although the institution was adapted in the face of growing religious orthodoxy (Bartels 1977, 291–312), it remained a cen-

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6. Interview with Ambonese Raja, by Jessica Soedirgo and Alexandre Pelletier, May 2014, Ambon, Maluku.
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cultural component of what it meant to be Ambonese. In the colonial period, pela obligations were taken quite seriously, with transgressions—for example, the refusal to share food with a visitor from a pela village—widely shared and disparaged (219).

Pela as an institution can potentially be a mechanism for building ethnic solidarity. By bringing people from different villages together, pela rituals can facilitate the building of personal ties—whether at the common feast when a pela bond is first established or when pela partners engage in mutual aid. Further, as all Ambonese—even those in the diaspora—are in pela relationships through their kinship ties, participating in the different rituals of pela can help one feel more connected to both the quotidian community of the pela village partner and the larger Moluccan community. As Bartels (1977, 242) argues, “In the ritual of heating up the alliance, traditional social ties are reaffirmed. But far beyond that, the values of Ambonese society are solemnly restated and reasserted.”

Yet, despite the cultural significance of pela, pela institutions and practices did not cultivate attachments to ethnic categories to the same degree as religious institutions and practices did to religious categories. This was the case because pela is not a quotidian institution or practice. While Ambonese people have knowledge about pela as an institution and what alliances they are a part of, it is not an institution that pervades everyday life. Pela ceremonies are true occasions and occur infrequently. After the original oath-taking ceremony, even the most dedicated will only reaffirm pela relationships through renewal ceremonies “every four to seven years” (Bartels 1977, 240). More commonly, renewal ceremonies are only carried out when the bond is seen to be at risk, most often due to an accumulation of pela infractions (241). Even the more mundane pela obligations were not carried out routinely. Bartels noted that “visits to one’s pela village [were] not a common everyday occurrence, but occur[ed] on a quite irregular basis in most alliances” (219). Furthermore, the gap between requests for mutual aid tended to be between several years to several decades (219). Therefore, while pela may promote a feeling of ethnic “we-ness,” this feeling is not regularly reinforced.

The distribution of micro-level religious and ethnic institutions not

8. There were exceptions to this general trend, such as the pela partnership between Kaibobo village on Seram Island and Waai village on Ambon Island. The interaction was more frequent between this pair because Kaibobo villagers would need to pass through the port near Waai to go to the provincial capital (Bartels 1977, 220).
only shaped emotional ties to identity categories but also shaped how political information was processed. This process of interpretation influenced the kinds of demands that were salient to the Moluccan people. The lack of embeddedness of ethnic institutions and practices meant that ordinary people were not processing political events and concerns at these institutions. As such, they were not interpreting the incorporation of Maluku into the Republic of Indonesia or the RMS movement through an ethnic or regional lens. As a result, the RMS’s message that the Republic of Indonesia was a threat to all Ambonese did not resonate with ordinary people.

Moluccans were having political conversations in the places and with the people that featured in their everyday lives. In colonial Maluku, these sites and places were religious. Admittedly, there is very little data available about how Muslim communities responded to the RMS beyond lack of participation. However, the process of collective interpretation can be seen in the responses of Ambonese Christian communities. Three networks were particularly important in cultivating the initial support for the RMS: the raja network, the ex-KNIL soldier network, and the network of Ambonese returnees who spent significant time in other parts of the Dutch East Indies (Chauvel 1990, 351–53). The soldiers and the returnees had been privileged in the colonial system and had a particular experience of the political turmoil of the revolutionary period. As such, they “bought back with them a hatred of the Republic, which had a considerable influence on public opinion in Ambon” (207). Statements made by RMS leaders would filter through local leadership and then to ordinary Ambonese. For example, when Soumokil stated that the Indonesian government would force all Christians to convert to Islam and that churches would be destroyed, the message was conveyed to soldiers, pastors, and government officials. These messages would then be passed on to “ordinary people” in their networks (Teu Lususina 1980, 132, quoted in Chauvel 1990, 361). The leaders of these Christian quotidian networks were generally primed to see the Republic of Indonesia as a threat, leading to a collective interpretation of threat that prompted Christians in Ambon to support the RMS and participate in the movement.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have argued that the structure of civic associations in colonial Maluku explains why efforts to mobilize on the basis of ethnicity were
unsuccessful. The predominance of religious quotidian institutions and practices meant that ordinary Ambonese felt stronger attachments to their religious communities compared to ethnic communities. Their embeddedness in religious communities also shaped what kinds of information was transmitted to individuals and how threat was collectively interpreted. In contrast, ethnic associations and practices—notably pela—did not feature in everyday life. Ethnic solidarity, therefore, was not routinely reinforced, and the process of collective interpretation was not taking place within ethnic institutions and networks. As such, although the state used both ethnicity and religion to mediate access to resources, the RMS movement was understood as religious.

By highlighting the role of micro-level institutions and practices in shaping patterns of mobilization, this chapter has implications for both theory and practice. Theoretically, my work echoes Bonikowski’s (2016) call to look at the role of the mundane in shaping groups and group cleavages. While states remain important actors in the formation and maintenance of identity categories, they are far from the only actors to play a role. Focusing on quotidian institutions and practices explains the depths of emotional attachment, or lack thereof, to particular group categories. It also further elaborates on the process—identified years ago by Brass (1997)—of how individual episodes of violence become understood as ethnic or religious. This process of interpretation is very much shaped by the kinds of institutions and practices that are routinely encountered in day-to-day life.

My work also has implications for practitioners in Maluku. The dynamics of political mobilization in the RMS continues to characterize conflict in Maluku. This was the case during the sectarian violence that engulfed Maluku between 1999 and 2002. Like RMS elites before them, Maluku's elites in the 1999–2002 period sought to frame the conflict through an ethnic lens, but violence ultimately unfolded—once again—along religious lines (Schulze 2017; Krause 2018). In the aftermath of the violence, there is a sense of urgency in Maluku of the need to bridge religious divides and build a pan-Moluccan identity to render religious violence obsolete (Hohe and Remijsen 2004). As such, there has been a great deal of investment in revitalizing the pela system.

However, this chapter suggests that efforts to cultivate ethnic solidarities in Maluku need to be undergirded by quotidian institutions and practices that reinforce attachments to ethnic categories. Although adat systems like
pela can contribute to the de-escalation of conflict if local elites have vested interests in maintaining these systems (Pelletier and Soedirgo 2017), pela activities occur too infrequently for ethnic ties to gain emotional weight and will not be the network that people will turn to at times of uncertainty. For pela to change patterns of mobilization in Maluku, practitioners must work to transform it into a quotidian institution and practice.
Civic Associations in North Sulawesi, Indonesia

*Ethnic Politics and the Level of Mobilization Problem for Bangsa Minahasa*

Jeremy Menchik

Editors’ Introduction: This chapter continues to highlight how regional mobilization can be undermined by subgroup-level civic associations. We see this in North Sulawesi, where parochial interests were mobilized against local rivals in alliance with Jakarta. However, this chapter also calls attention to how civic associations do not always impede regional mobilization from below. Instead, we can see pressures from the transregional or even international levels. From above, strong international links to global Christianity and disproportionate representation and integration in the colonial administration, educational institutions, and military forces meant limited opportunities for the development of a regional identity and thus independence.

Introduction

Minahasans have an unusual history compared to other ethnic groups in Indonesia. During the Java War (1825–30), Minahasa chiefs sent 1,400 volunteers to fight alongside the Dutch, more than nine times greater than the 150 troops sent by neighboring Gorontalo (Kimura 2007, 73). Those fighters returned to the region as heroes with full Dutch insignia, and their descendants are today still the aristocrats of the region (Liwe 2010, 34). I am grateful to Ibu Sundari for hosting me in Manado in the summer of 2007 and to the late J. David Singer, who first introduced me to the social scientific study of international relations and opened the door to a joyous intellectual journey.
The colonial powers had massive success in converting the indigenous population to Christianity. By 1880, 80,000 Minahasans, or 75 percent of the population, had been baptized (Henley 1996, 53), compared to an estimated 0.7 percent Christian population across the entire archipelago (Streenbrink and Aritonang 2008, 131). By 1930, over 95 percent of Minahasans were Christian (Harvey 1977, 21). Minahasans were also unusually well educated, with the highest student-to-population ratio in the Netherlands East Indies and with literacy rates five to 10 times higher than elsewhere in the archipelago (22). As a result, Minahasans were vastly overrepresented in the Dutch colonial civil and military services.

With some prominent exceptions such as Gerungan Saul Samuel Jacob Ratulangie, Minahasan support for the Dutch continued through the late colonial period. Even after independence, Minahasan supporters of the “twelfth province” political party identified more with the Dutch than with the country’s nascent leadership in Jakarta. And regardless of whether they envisioned a capital in Amsterdam or Jakarta, Minahasans strongly identified with their ethnic group: “The enduring strength of Minahasa as an ethnic and regional identity in modern Indonesia is well known. Indeed, internal unity is probably a more conscious ideal among Minahasans than any other regional group” (Henley 1996, 19).

Given that Minahasan identity was so strong at independence, why did it not develop into a regional movement? Scholars of ethnic politics would expect high levels of regional mobilization. For example, Donald L. Horowitz’s canonical book *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* argues that such economically advanced ethnic groups in economically backward regions are prone to secession (2000, 234). Yet, since independence, Minahasan regionalism has been weak. This is most apparent by the lack of a sustained secessionist movement in comparison to regions with similarly divergent ethnic and colonial histories such as Aceh, East Timor, and West Papua. Even during Indonesia’s peak periods for regional rebellions—in the late parliamentary democracy period of the 1950s and during the transition to democracy after 1998—regional political movements by Minahasans have faltered.

What explains the political movements and demands of ethnic Minahasans? This chapter uses a periodization strategy embedded within comparative historical analysis and process tracing to explain patterns of political mobilization (Ricks and Liu 2018). Doing so demonstrates that despite high levels of Minahasan nationalism and ethnic identification, regional political movements have repeatedly been truncated by local, national, international, and transregional mobilization. Building on J. David Sing-
er’s canonical essay “The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations” (1961), I refer to this as the level of mobilization problem in ethnic politics.

In the precolonial period, political identities in North Sulawesi were mobilized around local chiefdoms with no unifying political institution and bilateral kindred groups similar to the barangay of the Philippines. There was no explicit concept of Minahasans as a bounded category of people. In the colonial period, the population was Christianized, integrated into the global imperial economy, and subject to extraordinary colonial administration, leading to the creation of a common “Minahasan” identity, but one with strong international links to global Christianity and disproportionate representation and integration in the colonial administration, educational institutions, and military.

As a result of that integration, subnational mobilization in the postrevolutionary period was truncated from above and below. Minahasans were too well integrated into the postcolonial institutions such as the military and administration to advocate for regionalism. Likewise, transnational links to global Christianity and transregional links to other movements in Indonesia muted demands for regionalism. Even during the peak of regionalism, during the armed rebellion of Permesta (Piagam Perjuangan Semesta Alam, Charter of Inclusive Struggle) from 1957 to 1961, the motives were less ethnic than developmental, made militarized by a transregional alliance with the Revolutionary Government of Indonesia (PRRI) rebellion in Sumatra and international support from the United States’ Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Following Permesta, mobilization was either suppressed or pitted against local rivals in Gorontalo in alliance with Jakarta. This pattern continued after the fall of Suharto even as regional movements elsewhere surged.

The case of Minahasan affirms dominant theories for regionalism, such as Henry Hale’s argument that ethnic groups only mobilize for separatism when the center is perceived as embracing exploitative strategies and lacks the clear capacity to prevail militarily (2008). Yet, this case also suggests that understanding ethnic politics requires looking beyond regional and national dynamics. At any given time, ethnic mobilization can focus on multiple levels—local, regional, transregional, national, or international. There are group interests at each level, elite interests at each level, and preexisting ideologies and civic associations already mobilized at each level. That heterogeneity in interests, ideologies, and associations accentuates the collective action problem.
Argument

Existing explanations for ethnic mobilization emphasize demographics, institutions, and exploitation. Daniel Posner argues that demographics are the preeminent factor driving the politicization of any given ethnic cleavage (2005). The ethnic cleavage that emerges as salient in political competition will be the one that serves the interests of all actors best, while being constrained by the options available and the institutional rules governing political competition. Political elites will compare the demographic size of their ethnic group (religious, linguistic, ethnic) and emphasize the identity category that puts them in the most advantageous position vis-à-vis their competitors.

As Posner would expect, the ethnic Minahasan population is too small to serve as the axis for political competition at the national level. With a population of approximately 1,237,177, ethnic Minahasans made up only .52 percent of Indonesia in 2010, a percentage similar to their share in the 1930s (BPS 2011; Harvey 1977, 18–19). The Minahasan “diaspora” further complicates regionalism, with only 82 percent of ethnic Minahasans in North Sulawesi. Additionally, within North Sulawesi, Minahasans are only 45 percent of the population, which means any secessionist appeals would have to depend on a cross-ethnic coalition (BPS 2011). While Minahasans play an outsized role in Indonesian history, Posner would rightly expect that Minahasans are too small and fragmented to have a political impact as an organized ethnic group at the national level.

That said, such demographic explanations have their limits. Acehnese, Papuan, and East Timorese regional movements have had remarkable durability and impact despite a similar demographic profile, including successful secession by the Timorese in 2002, the winning of significant regional concessions from the national government by the Acehenese Gerakan Aceh Merdeka in 2005, and the continuing demand for greater autonomy and, in some instances, outright secession by the Papuans. As table 11.1 suggests, in comparative perspective, Minahasans’ demographic size does not explain the low levels of regional mobilization.

Jóhanna Birnir argues, instead, that ethnic conflict stems from institutional exclusion (2006). When ethnic groups are excluded from political institutions, it increases the salience of their identity and can give rise to secessionist movements and violence. When ethnic groups are included, they are likely to use formal channels of political representation rather than turn to regionalism.
The inclusion of Minahansans in the institutions of the Dutch East Indies, then Indonesia, has served the population well. Under the Dutch, comparatively high levels of literacy in North Sulawesi were a product of higher levels of investment in schools. The Dutch-sponsored Minahasaraad (Council of Minahasa) created in 1919 is considered to be the most successful of the local and regional councils in the Netherlands Indies (Henley 2007, 3). Under Soekarno, North Sulawesians played influential roles in the central government (three to five ministers in the cabinet), although in the Soeharto era North Sulawesi had only a single cabinet member for a short period from 1996 to 1997 (Liwe 2010, 233; Sondakh and Jones 2003, 276).

The period of exception is the late 1950s, when, as Birnir (2006) would predict, a regional rebellion developed. Birnir’s argument dovetails with Henry Hale, who similarly argues that only when the center has not listened to the region do secessionist movements develop (2008). Hale suggests that ethnic groups mobilize in favor of regional separatism when the government center is perceived as embracing exploitative strategies and lacks the clear capacity to prevail militarily. In most other scenarios, ethnic regions will tend to embrace cooperative strategies because they benefit from the resources and separatism is costly.

The fact that the Javanese center is ethnically, linguistically, and religiously distinct from Minahasa does increase uncertainty, which helped push Minasahans toward violence in the 1950s, a period of vast uncertainty similar to the end of the Soviet Union. Yet to understand why Permesta became a violent autonomy movement, not a violent secessionist movement, we need to incorporate a missing variable in Hale’s (2008) and Birnir’s (2006) analyses, which is international support. The CIA armed the Permesta movement and pushed it in the direction of violence so as to weaken Communism. The short period of Minahasan regionalism is inexplicable without reference to international factors and cannot be explained by exclusion alone.
The above discussion affirms that existing theories of regionalism have some utility in explaining Minahasan politics. But the missing variable hints at another, overlooked question: once political mobilization comes to be organized around an ethnic cleavage, what explains the level of this mobilization, such as local, regional, transregional, or international?

Ethnic Minahasan politics have been mobilized in many forms, but predominantly not at the regional level. Local politics were of paramount importance in the precolonial period. Colonial politics took the form of international tutelage and co-optation, with the Dutch manufacturing Minahasan into an ethnic group and mobilizing them in the service of empire. During the revolution, Minahasans mobilized at multiple levels and on different sides; some were active in the nationalist movement, and the leading ethnic militia, Kebaktian Rakyat Indonesia Sulawesi (KRIS), fought against the Dutch, while some retired soldiers opposed the nationalist revolution. Later, under Sukarno and Suharto, subnational identity was systematically suppressed and the relative progress of Minahasans curtailed by the center. Christian Minahasans repeatedly allied with Jakarta and the regime’s political party, Golkar, against predominantly Islamic opposition groups (Jacobsen 2002a, 239) rather than in favor of regionalism. The most recent democratic period saw a resurgence of regionalism, including the formation of ethnic militias, tacit support for breaking off the majority-Muslim portion of the province (Gorontalo), and a flourishing of literature and monuments celebrating ethnic identity. Yet, once again, ethnic identity did not translate into support for regionalism. In sum, Minahasan political movements have focused on the local and the international levels as much as the regional, which has accentuated the collective action problem. To understand patterns of political mobilization among the Minahasa, we have to understand the level of mobilization problem in ethnic politics.

Five Periods of Mobilization in Minahasa

Precolonial

Political order in precolonial northern Celebes (later called Sulawesi) was organized around tribal communities called *walak* of a few villages, based on bilateral kindred groups similar to the barangay of the Philippines. Eighteen distinct languages were spoken across the Celebes Sea between Buol and Mindanao in the Southern Philippines. Bridge languages such as Malay were limited, which is why Spanish missionaries believed that
knowledge of local languages was a necessity (Henley 1996, 26). Tontemboan and Tomulu are closely related, while Ponoeken is linguistically similar to Mongondow (45). Three of the language groups—Tontemboan, Tomulu, and Tonsea—shared a traditional origin story; the mother and miraculously conceived son, Lumimu’ut and To’ar, are shared, providing a loose overarching religious tradition, but there was no unifying political institution, ethnicity, or language, and conflict between walak was more common than cooperation. Leadership positions were fragile and fleeting. Regionalism would have been impossible in this context, which is why a Spanish description of the region published in 1663 describes the Provincia de Manados as a land of “parties, conflicts and feuds” (35).

The Manado region was an area of rivalry between the Spanish and the Dutch East Indies Company (Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie, VOC) because of the highland’s ability to produce a rice surplus. The VOC decided to establish a fort in Manado following a request from the king of Tabukan in Sandir for conflict resolution. The Spanish were expelled from Manado by 1660 by the VOC, which unlike the Spanish came to develop systems of indirect and then direct rule. On occasion in the 1700s, the VOC gave particular chiefs more powers over their neighbors, but it never worked for more than a brief period (Henley 1996, 36). Instead, there remained a fragile balance between rival walak.

Such conflict was unappealing to the VOC since it disrupted the flow of rice to their warehouses in Manado. It is in this period of indirect rule that the term “Minahasa” first appears. The first use of the term appears in Dutch records in 1789, in reference to the landraad (council of chiefs meeting) to receive Dutch instructions and resolve disputes (Henley 1996, 34–36). The term was deliberately chosen as a reflection of the VOC need to quell infighting between walak through a centralized institution. Minahasa is translated as “united” in Tomulu, with similar cognates in Minaea, Nimahasa, and Nimaesa, the other languages of northern Celebes (34). The term “Minahasa” did not refer to people or territory. Rather, the term is a political construction used by the VOC to try and create an order that would enable more efficient extraction of resources.

Colonial

After a brief British interregnum from 1810 to 1817, the VOC returned anxious to make their outpost economically profitable. The uplands of northern Celebes were ideal for coffee production, and so in 1822 coffee
was declared a government monopoly and made a compulsory crop for all villages (Henley 1996, 38). This was an early preview of the *cultuurstelsel* (cultivation system) implemented beginning in 1830 throughout Java and heralding the true onset of Dutch colonialism.

This was also a period of revolutionary change to the economic, political, and religious order in the region, with correspondingly vast effects for conceptions of the Minahasan nation. The first complete territorial map of “Minahasa” was made available in 1821, literally demarcating the foundation for nationalism (Henley 1996, 40). As Benedict Anderson notes, beginning with the French Revolution and print capitalism, groups of people began to see themselves as connected with other people through their linguistic and cultural practices. Nationalism developed differently in post-colonial states: schools created an educated indigenous upper class; maps defined the nation’s political boundaries; the census created categories of racial groups with which to organize political institutions; and museums manufactured the truths of the nation (Anderson 1991, 163–85). Anderson neglects the centrality of religion in the production of nationalism (Menchik 2014), but otherwise provides a useful roadmap to the creation of Minahasan nationalism.

This indigenous upper class was educated in missionary schools. The number of schools nearly tripled in the four decades between 1842 and 1881, from 50 to 140. The colonial government took over many of the missionary schools in the late 1800s and built their own schools, which had an overlapping curriculum, including Minahasan geography. In the 1930 census, Minahasa had the highest literacy rate of anywhere in the Dutch East Indies (Henley 1996, 57; Kroeskamp 1974, 129). Those schools cultivated a sense of the Minahasan nation. Nicholaas Graafland, an influential Dutch missionary, promoted the idea that “Minahasa was a single *land en volk* (land and people) with a valuable history and culture of its own” (Henley 1996, 62). To do so, Graafland revised the history of the region:

[I]t is obvious that [walak] were all united at one time. Although there were differences in the ways people work their gardens and plant their crops, for instance, everybody follows the same general pattern. The same applied to language. Although the various languages are mutually incomprehensible upon first hearing, they can be understood with practice. There are also religious differences, particularly regarding sacred legends, and *poso* ceremonies, but none of these differences is profound. Upon closer inspection there is re-
ally only one religion, since each tribe also knows the legends and poso of the others. All differences in religion are in any case disappearing as people convert to Christianity, and will ultimately vanish altogether. The Christian religion will eliminate all divisions, and all Minahasans shall truly become brothers. (Graafland 1863a, 23–24, quoted in Henley 1996, 55)

Graafland’s argument is at odds with precolonial records of overlap and division between walak in matters of language, religion, and cultural recognition. But the larger point is theoretical; Graafland’s textbooks built a nation.

Those elite became civil servants: “In the eighteenth century the walak chiefs had become leaders and representatives of self-defining human communities. By the end of the nineteenth, they had become administrators of geographic territories” (Henley 1996, 39). Payment for coffee and rice, local taxes, labor services, and ranks and functions of all native officials down to the village chief were all standardized. During the Java War, the walak chiefs and their men sent 1,400 volunteers from a total population of 80,000 (Liwe 2010, 34; Schouten 1998, 76). The volunteers returned to Minahasa as heroes with full Dutch insignia, and their descendants are today still considered aristocrats. After 1850, Minahasa provided the largest number of troops from any single indigenous ethnic group to the Netherland Indies Army, which fought in the campaigns to establish Dutch control in Jambi, South Celebes, Flores, and New Guinea (Henley 1996, 88). As direct rule strengthened, the relative privilege of the Minahasans deepened, and their share of the Royal Army of the Netherlands East Indies (Koninklijk Nederlandsch-Indisch Leger, KNIL) grew from 4.5 percent of the total number of indigenous (non-European) soldiers in 1880 to 8.5 percent in 1900, 19 percent in 1920, and 20 percent in 1936 (88). The share of Minahasans in the KNIL is noteworthy given their small size in the region and given that by 1920 and especially 1936, anti-colonial nationalism was burgeoning.

The effects of direct rule were nowhere more revolutionary than in matters of religion. From 1825 to 1900 the population of Minahasa was Christianized, integrated into the colonial economy, and subject to extraordinary administration. The integration of walak chiefs in the colo-

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1. Henley records 800 Minahasans, a lower number but still substantially larger than neighboring regions (1996, 97).
nial bureaucracy reduced the importance of traditional religious ceremonies like *foso*: “In 1856 the authoritarian Resident A. J. F. Jansen banned a particular type of *foso* lasting nine days, and thereby triggered mass abandonment of traditional religion in the Tonsea area” (Henley 1996, 51). In 1845, an earthquake destroyed many existing villages that had been based on a ceremonial center with sacred stones and a compass orientation. The Dutch rebuilt the villages in a standardized arrangement, making previous religious traditions illegible and inaccessible. Mandatory coffee cultivation required 120 days of work per year, which interfered with ritual activity and the traditions that accompanied the agricultural cycle. Such rapid political and economic changes reduced the power of indigenous traditions while the influx of missionary schools incentivized conversion.

The Christianization of the region meant that Minahasan nationalism was fostered by the Dutch. Graafland imagined Minahasa to be united prior to the arrival of the VOC and then restored through international ties to Dutch Protestantism. A tutelage connection continued in the late colonial period with some of the most prominent Minahasan leaders, such as Gerungan Saul Samuel Jacob Ratulangie, marrying Europeans (Henley 2007, 10, 18).

The language of *bangsa Minahasa* was ultimately not Minahasan. It was easier for the Dutch missionaries to learn Malay than a Minahasan language and easier for the Minahasans to learn Malay than Dutch. Malay was already the language of commerce in port cities and the administrative language for the Dutch East Indies. The first local newspaper, *Tjahaja Sijang* (The Light of Day), was founded by Graafland in 1868 in Malay. The phrase *tanah air*, or homeland, appeared in reference to Minahasa in 1900 (Henley 1901, 119; Liwe 2010, 41–43). Decades later, Malay was transformed into the national language of Indonesia (*Bahasa Indonesia*) (Ricklefs 2001, 232). The revival of Minahasan tradition in this period included folk novels such as *Bintang Minahasa* (1931) and *Pahlawan Minahasa* (1935), both published in Malay (Liwe 2010, 58). Linguistically, Minahasan nationalism was thus co-imbricated with Indonesian nationalism.

Minahasan nationalism also took organizational form in this period. *Perserikatan Minahasa* (Minahasa Association) was formed by Minahasan military officers in central Java in 1909. By 1917 it had 10,000–15,000 members (Liwe 2010, 51). The *Minahasaraad* (Minahasa Council) was created in 1919 as part of the transfer of administration from Europeans to Minahasans. It was a directly elected organization responsible for public service and local taxation and, by some accounts, “the most democratic
organ of government ever created in the Dutch East Indies” (Henley 1996, 103). The first political party, Persatuan Minahasa (Unity of Minahasa), was created by the famed nationalist leaders Ratulangie and Tumbelaka in 1925 and had 27 branches and 600 members by 1936. Ratulangie supported Indonesian federalism though he made regional autonomy a precondition for Indonesian unity (132). The Minahasaarad voted for integration with the Indonesian Republic at the end of April in 1950 (Liwe 1950, 63).

That said, not everyone envisioned a future with the Indonesian Republic. In 1946, a new political party called Twapro (Twaalfde Provincie) campaigned to turn the nickname for Minahasa, the “twelfth province of the Netherlands,” into a reality. Twapro supporters included retired KNIL soldiers and government employees (Henley 1991, 270). In 1949, about half of the population backed the formation of a Minahasa Constitutional Committee (Komite Ketatanegaraan Minahasa, KKM) to advocate for Minahasan nationalism. Sources suggest that discussions within the KKM ranged from absolute separation to autonomy within a federal Indonesia (271). The KKM even sent a delegation to the 1949 sovereignty transfer negotiations in the Hague and demanded a referendum on Minahasa prior to independence.

Minahasan nationalism was created in the colonial period. Liwe argues that Minahasa emerged as a *bangsa* in the modern sense prior to Indonesia (Liwe 2010, 21), which seems correct given that the elements of nationalism—mass literacy, common language, a map, museums, a census, and common religion—were in place around 50 years prior to Indonesia. Surprisingly, however, strong Minahasan nationalism does not give rise to regionalism in subsequent periods.

**Parliamentary Democracy**

The parliamentary democracy period is crucial for understanding the level of mobilization problem. Elites who had been active in the national revolution turned their (gun)sights back on Jakarta to demand autonomy. Yet even with CIA funding, training, and weaponry, the Permesta rebellion did not advocate secession. The elites at the helm of the rebellion were educated in Java, professionalized in the Indonesian military, and exog- enously married. Permesta was not an exclusively Minahasan rebellion; other ethnic groups played leading roles. Permesta’s founding charter was written and delivered in the Indonesian national language. Permesta was in effect a transregional rebellion due to an alliance with the West Sumatran
rebellion by the PRRI. The motives of the rebellion included a mixture of center-regional tension, demands for development, anti-Communism, foreign opposition to Sukarno, and Minahasan nationalism (Liwe 2010, 1–4). The powerful Minahasan Christian Evangelical Church (Gereja Masehi Injili Minahasa, GMIM) was most influential in negotiating a resolution to hostilities rather than promoting regionalism. Regional elites’ heterogeneity in interests, ideologies, and organizations accentuated the collective action problem and demonstrates how regionalism can be truncated by local, transregional, national, and international mobilization.

Coconut cultivation was a major source of exports for Minahasan farmers in the 1950s, with copra (dried coconut) providing the major source of income for 70 percent of the population of Sulawesi and 86 percent of exports from Manado (Harvey 1977, 23). Compared to the rest of the Dutch East Indies, Minahasan peasant farmers had larger plots of land, were relatively well-off, and had more trees than anywhere else in the archipelago (Liwe 2010, 70; Fowler 1922). After independence, political integration proceeded more quickly than economic integration, much to the frustration of Java, which badly needed the tax revenue. When the central government sought to tax exporters in the outer islands, it did substantial damage to farmers. The Minahasan economy was further weakened due to a central government monopoly over copra purchase and marketing (Henley 1991, 276). Export taxes were maintained while important taxes increased dramatically, leading to a decline in living standards. Such contraction was exacerbated by foreign exchange allocation systems, which favored importers and consumers over exporters. The result was that individual producers of export crops received only one-third as much as they would have with direct barter trade (Harvey 1977, 7).

The perception in the outer islands was that policies were being made to benefit Java at the expense of the periphery. On March 2, 1957, the declaration of Permesta took place in Makassar with Herman Nicholas “Ventje” Sumual, commander of Eastern Indonesia (known as TT-VII for Tentara Territorium VII), declaring a state of emergency and installing a military government. The military was financially reliant on smuggling from copra and was suffering economically alongside the region. Lieutenant Colonel Mohammad Saleh Lahede read the charter, which was a summary of regional demands focused on economic development and political autonomy in Eastern Indonesia. A secondary concern was the fragmented and diminished command structure of TT-VII due to the creation of a new command for operations. The declaration demanded a unified command
structure with financial and supplementary support for three years. Rather than mobilizing for secession, the declaration repeatedly affirmed that the signatories were “Indonesian patriots,” “servants of the country and people of Indonesia,” and “taking over all unfinished work of the Indonesian national revolution” (Harvey 1977, 166).

Nowhere in the declaration is a mention of Minahasans. While Sumual was Minahasan, the drafter and Permesta chief of staff, Lahade, was a Muslim from South Sulawesi. Harvey records that the leadership of Permesta from 1957 to 1958 reflected the overrepresentation of Minahasans in the military and civil service; the largest ethnic group of the 51 signatories was Minahasan (13) but without being a majority due to significant participation by Buginese/Makassarese/Makassar Malay (18), Gorontalese (3), Sangirese (3), Ambonese (3), and others (11) (Harvey 1977, 168). Permesta was a rebellion by the region of Sulawesi with Minahasans in prominent roles.

It is unclear whether the Minahan leadership could have given the movement an ethnic character. Sumual’s biography is emblematic. His father was a sergeant in the KNIL, and Sumual was born in the Minahasan heartland of Lake Tondano, was educated in a Dutch-native school, and eventually attended law school in Yogyakarta, Central Java. He led the KRIS units that were incorporated into the national military in 1948 and was appointed to the Military Commission for Eastern Indonesia with primary responsibility for North Sulawesi after the war. Sumual’s first wife was Javanese, and he spent more time in the 1940s and 1950s in Java and South Sulawesi than in North Sulawesi. His career developed through the national military after it subsumed KRIS. A similar example is Daniel Julius Somba, another native son of Minahasa, who controlled the most and best armed of the Permesta troops. His first wife was Javanese, and like Sumual he rose in ranks within the Indonesian military, based on East Java, Makassar, Ambon, Bandung, and Manado. He commanded Permesta forces in Minahasa until their surrender, after which he resumed his career in the national military (Harvey 1977, 159). It is notable that none of three most prominent Minahasans in Indonesian history—G. S. S. J. Ratulangie, A. E. Kawilarang, and A. Z. R. Wenas—supported regionalism (Henley 2007).

By the last week of April 1958, the United States was convinced that disunity among the rebels was leading to a weak rebellion. Reports from everyday soldiers confirm this view. Bombings by Jakarta led to young men enlisting in Permesta to fight against Communism; Liwe describes one soldier, Joseph Ngangi, who joined Permesta in order to defend President Sukarno, not Minahasa (Liwe 2010, 194). Active duty military men simply
followed their commanding officers: “Most military men on duty in northern Sulawesi perceived Permesta as a constructive development effort and was not in contradiction with the central government” (197).

By the end of April, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, CIA Director Allen Dulles, and President Eisenhower concluded that the United States should pivot to supporting pro-U.S. elements in the national military. After the capture of the American Allen Pope on May 18, the Jakarta government used their prisoner to extract financial support and an end to U.S. support for the rebels. On June 26, Manado fell. Permesta’s headquarters were moved to Tomohon, and Permesta switched to guerilla tactics, which persisted on and off until February 1961. In April, the Indonesian National Army (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, TNI) embraced the leaders and followers of Permesta, who were then reintegrated, much like KRI S in 1948.

The GMIM played a significant role in the peace negotiation as well as in the rebuilding process, which is noteworthy because of the church’s relative absence during the rebellion. The contrast is most apparent in reference to the prominent role of Islamic leaders in regional rebellions in Aceh, South Sulawesi, and West Java. “Minahasa’s pope,” the head of the GMIM, Albertus Zacharias Roentoerambi Wenas, was close with both Sukarno and Kawilarang and saw his role as peacemaker for the betterment of “our Minahasan land” (Henley 2007, 23–26). The difference again suggests that Christian internationalism had diminished the potency of regionalism.

**Guided Democracy and the New Order**

Following Permesta, Minahasan movements were either suppressed, marginalized, or mobilized in alliance with Jakarta against local rivals in North Sulawesi. Starting in the 1970s, public discussion issues of identity were made taboo by forcing organizations to adopt the Pancasila as their ideology. The military gradually expanded to take on social and political affairs, including a parallel administrative structure described as a “dual function” (dwifungsi). While Minahasans enjoyed a prominent role in the military in the postrevolutionary period, that waned in guided democracy as Javanese were elevated and overrepresented (Horowitz 1985, 516). So, too, Minahasan representation was marginalized at the national level (Sondakh and Jones 2003, 234). Anthropologist Michael Jacobsen argues that the Permesta rebellion led to harsh consequences for the region: “The rebellion was crushed by the Indonesian nationalist army, which then turned North...
Sulawesi Province, and Minahasa regency in particular, into a political backwater during the following decades” (Jacobsen 2004, 70). Elsewhere Jacobsen refers to the region in this period as both a political and an economic backwater (2002b, 336).

Yet while mobilization was suppressed, Christian Minahasans developed both politically and economically. Christian Minahasans came to be local hegemons rather than national leaders. The GMIM thrived during this period, building up a political and administrative infrastructure that paralleled the state. In the late 1960s, 75 percent of Minahasan society belonged to the GMIM, similar to the percentage during reformasi (Steenbrink and Aritonang 2008, 439; Henley, Schouten, and Ulaen 2007, 311). As of 2007, the GMIM ran more than 800 schools and a major hospital, owned businesses and plantations, and was influential in politics. “[N]o governor of North Sulawesi, it is sometimes claimed, could attain that position without first cultivating good relations with the head of the GMIM synod” (Henley, Schouten, and Ulaen 2007, 311). Data in table 11.2 confirms this assessment with the names, ethnic identities, and membership in the GMIM of the governors of North Sulawesi from 1960 to 2000, all of whom were appointed by Jakarta. The only periods of Muslim leadership were around the mass killings from 1965 to 1966 and a brief eight-month period from 1979 to 1980.

Like dwifungsi, the organizational structure of the GMIM ran parallel to the state. The estimated 650,000 members raised at least 40 billion rupiah per year. Rather than a political backwater, “the churches of Minahasa are among the most impressive examples of non-governmental institutions in Indonesia” (Henley, Schouten and Ulaen 2007, 311).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Governor</th>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960–62</td>
<td>Governor Arnold A Baramuli</td>
<td>Christian GMIM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962–65</td>
<td>Governor Tumbelaka</td>
<td>Minahasan Christian GMIM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965–66</td>
<td>Governor Brigadier Jendral Sunandar Priyono</td>
<td>Muslim Javanese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966–67</td>
<td>Governor Abdullah Amu</td>
<td>Muslim Javanese</td>
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<tr>
<td>1967–78</td>
<td>Governor Hein Victor Worang</td>
<td>Minahasan Christian GMIM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978–79</td>
<td>Governor Willy Ghayus Alexander Lasut</td>
<td>Minahasan Christian GMIM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979–80</td>
<td>Governor Donny Rustaman</td>
<td>Muslim Javanese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980–85</td>
<td>Governor Gustaf Hendrik Mantik</td>
<td>Minahasan Christian GMIM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985–95</td>
<td>Governor Cornelis John Rantung</td>
<td>Christian GMIM</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Borkenhagen (1992, 77).
Nor did North Sulawesi become an economic backwater. In 2001, North Sulawesi had the fourth lowest poverty rate in the country after Jakarta, Bali, and Riau. That rate was even lower in urban areas (Henley, Schouten, and Ulaen 2007, 318–19). The national family program put the region in the same category as “success stories” like Singapore, Hong Kong, and Thailand. Other indicators of development such as education, household square footage, physicians, transportation infrastructure, and per capita GDP all exceeded nearby regions such as Gorontalo and in some cases were better than Java (Sondakh and Jones 2003, 279). The economic consequences of the Asian Financial Crisis were less severe than in other parts of the archipelago, owing to a stable environment for capital and making exports more profitable due to the falling value of the rupiah relative to the U.S. dollar (Henley, Schouten, and Ulaen 2007, 318–19). The economy contracted by 2.4 percent in 1998, far less than the national total of 14 percent, and also recovered faster than the rest of the country (Sondakh and Jones 2003, 283). Despite repression, Minahasans remained the dominant economic and political group in the region (Kimura 2010, 427).

Nationally, however, Minahasan Christians needed an external ally. Prior to the January 2001 split by the new Gorontalo province, the population was 50 percent Muslims, 49 percent Christians, and 1 percent other. Ethnic Minahasans made up only 30 percent of the population in North Sulawesi, slightly less than the 32 percent Gorontalese (Jacobsen 2004, 75). Christian Minahasan dominance of the province was not guaranteed, and alliance with Jakarta helped to safeguard political power. “Minahasa is a Christian country” (Henley, Schouten, and Ulaen 2007, 321), but Indonesia is not. Suharto repressed political Islam and assuaged Minahasan fears about an Islamic state.

Regionalism in this period was again truncated by preexisting ideologies and organizations. The state-society relationship that developed in the colonial period has proven remarkably durable: “During the New Order a relatively favourable experience of economic development without severe political repression served to revive that ideal and continues, alongside an idealized collective memory of the region’s unique colonial past, to colour Minahasan attitudes to the state today” (Henley, Schouten, and Ulaen 2007, 316). Ratulangi’s reputation as an Indonesian nationalist has been cemented through institutions like Sam Ratulangi International Airport and Sam Ratulangi University. Wenas’s alliance with Sukarno continued with the GMIM’s backing of Suharto. And so the GMIM’s opposition to regionalism continued.
The political opening that followed the Asian Financial Crisis was accompanied by a surge of ethnic politics in East Timor and Aceh. So, too, there was heightened mobilization of Minahasans, including the formation of ethnic militias, tacit support for breaking off the majority-Muslim portion of the province, and a revival of ethnic identity. Yet, lacking international support, this period of uncertainty did not lead to conflict. To the contrary, Minahasans saw ethnic violence in nearby Poso and Ambon as threatening to economic development, and the GMIM actively worked to combat conflict.

Gorontalo has long been economically underdeveloped compared to its northern neighbor, and Gorontalese have felt politically subjugated by Minahasans. The Minahasan revival movement occurring nearby fostered a sense of “good riddance” to the split (Kimura 2010, 429–30). Despite losing 829,948 citizens and the resulting tax revenue, Minahasans viewed Gorontalo as an underdeveloped burden (Jacobsen 2004, 74). As Posner would expect, the demographics helped, too; the percentage of the Muslim population dropped from 49.8 percent in 2000 to 28.6 percent in 2002 (Henley, Schouten, and Ulaen 2007, 320).

The ethnic revival included conferences where the speakers lambasted discussions in the national parliament about the Jakarta Charter (Amin 2017, 180). Subtle but clear was that the national introduction of Islamic law would revive calls for separatism: “If the constitution is amended to make this country an Islamic state, it will be our right to decide our own future as an independent state” (181). Conspiracy theories about Muslims mobilizing against Christians, long a mainstay of Minahasan society, peaked in this period (Henley, Schouten, and Ulaen 2007, 322) and dovetailed with real mobilization by Muslim militias in Central Sulawesi and Maluku. Minahasans created their own paramilitary organizations, including the largest and most visible, Brigade Manguni. The book Si Tou Timou Timou Tou: Refleksi Atas Evolusi Nilai-nilai Manusia (Man Lives to Educate Others: Reflection on the Evolution of Minahasan Values) was published in 2003 by Adolf Jouke Son-dakh, then the governor of North Sulawesi and formerly the dean of the Social and Political Science Department of Sam Ratulangie University, and was launched in Jakarta with the goal of increasing Minahasans’ bargaining power in national politics (Amin 2012, 334).

What remained absent, however, were influential organizations apart from the church. The GMIM’s dominance has crowded out organizations such as the Minahasan Adat Council (Majelis Adat Minahasa, MAM),
which emerged in the late 1990s to advocate for Minahasan culture. What is most notable about MAM is its relative insignificance compared to similar organizations in Sumatra or Java; the hostility of colonial missionaries toward customary leaders and the dominance of the GMIM have suffocated ethnic alternatives. While political leaders must seek and receive support from the GMIM in order to hold political office, “they never ask for any endorsement from adat leaders” (Thufail 2012, 369).

In sum, despite strong ethnic identity and a capacity for political mobilization, regionalism has remained weak in the contemporary period. The end of the New Order led to the creation in 2003 of the organization Unity of Minahasa (Persatuan Minahasa), a nongovernmental organization modeled on its 1927 predecessor, but no serious calls for secession (Henley 2007, 30–31). Minahasans have benefited political and economically from their alliance with Jakarta. Jakarta’s receptivity to Minahan concerns regarding economic development and the Jakarta Charter have diminished calls for regionalism. The decentralization program has shifted government resources from the center to the region, with some former Permesta soldiers claiming that decentralization achieved the goals of the rebellion: “You know . . . what Permesta fought for has been implemented. Permesta wanted the regional autonomy. We have the [sic] decentralization now” (Liwe 2010, 240).

Conclusion

With the Minahasans an island of Christians in a sea of Muslims, their perceived precarity incentivizes a certain political conservatism if not complicity with the dominant power in Batavia/Jakarta. This chapter has documented the strength of Minahan ethnicity and its mobilization in local, national, and international politics, as well as its surprising weakness in mobilizing for regionalism. In doing so, it has confirmed some aspects of the theories of Posner, Birnir, and Hale but has also suggested that the ethnic politics literature has paid insufficient attention to the level of mobilization problem in ethnic politics. Preexisting commitments to ideologies, interests, and associations at the local, national, and international levels have truncated the possibilities for regional mobilization for bangsa Minahasa.
CHAPTER 12

Civic Associations in North Thailand

_Cultural and Regional Movements in the Lanna Region_

Joel Sawat Selway

Editors’ Introduction: In this final chapter, we look at the role of civic associations in building a regional identity—even if it is couched through a supposed pan-ethnic identity. While the Lannas in North Thailand speak a different language and have a long history of political independence from Bangkok, they have historically refrained from making strong ethnopolitical demands. The argument rests on the strength of civic associations: from absent (early 20th century) to suppressed (1932–World War II), from overwhelmed (1950s–1970s) to underwhelmed (1980s–1990s). Interestingly, since the 2000s, there has been a growth in the number of cultural civic associations—linked not to a religious institution per se (as was the case in North Myanmar) but around the cause of the exiled former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra. The result is a nascent Lanna nationalist movement in North Thailand.

Introduction

The Lanna of Thailand, of all groups in the country (other than the Malay Muslims), are characterized by arguably the most factors normally correlated with ethnopolitical movements. First, they are geographically concentrated in Thailand’s Upper North, nestled among the striated North-South running ranges of mountains known as the Thai Highlands. This geographic isolation helped preserve Lanna’s long history of political independence; a kingdom that emerged in 1292 and whose last monarch died...
in 1939, Lanna fully incorporated into Thailand extremely recently. The Lanna also speak a different language than the majority Siamese; although kammueang is in the same language family as Central Thai, the official language of Thailand, it differs significantly in vocabulary and had its own script. Yet for all these factors, Lanna has remained relatively non-politicized up until the most recent period in Thai history—not even an ethnoregional political party has emerged, let alone the type of separatist violence that characterizes similar groups in neighboring Myanmar. In the early 2010s, however, Lanna nationalism increased, culminating in the hanging of separatist banners from bridges across the North of Thailand in 2014.

Political grievances were at the heart of the 2014 Bannergate incident. Over the preceding eight years the Lanna people had repeatedly had their democratic voice suppressed in the form of coups, party dissolutions, and military interference in the judicial system. Four prime ministers whom the majority of the region had elected were ousted by nondemocratic means. However, Lanna was not the only region that this subduing of democracy affected, yet it was the only region that expressed these political grievances in separatist terms. Thus, political grievances, albeit an important part of the story, are at most a necessary condition for the increase in Lanna nationalism. What we need to identify is a factor, or set of factors, that explains the spatial variation in Thailand.

The people of Lanna, of all the regions of Thailand bar the Malay Muslim south, have the most distinct history of political separateness from the Thai state. Annexed to the Thai state (then the kingdom of Siam) as late as 1899, Lanna has a proud royal heritage that is memorialized in its former capital city, Chiang Mai, to this day. In the center of the Old City, the Three Kings Monument places the founding monarch of the Lanna kingdom, King Mengrai, as an equal alongside the Siamese monarch, Ramkhamhaeng the Great. This historic legacy might be seen objectively as the key explanatory of the regional variation we observe in the early 2010s. However, shrewd ethnic entrepreneurs rarely care about objective comparisons of their proposed nation’s history, often rewriting history for their own purposes. Violent separatist movements have been predicated on weaker histories of independence, while regions with stronger historical legacies have seen no nationalist movements. Moreover, even if we maintain that the Lanna have the strongest history of independence, why did that only begin to matter in the 2010s? In short, the explanatory factor also needs to explain the temporal variation of Lanna nationalism.
In this chapter, I show that civic associations are key to understanding the increase in Lanna nationalism of the early 2010s. In the preceding decade, the Lanna region witnessed a surge in associational life of a particular type—cultural civic associations. Cultural civic associations (CCAs) are formal civic organizations that implicitly or explicitly recognize the ethnic group as distinct and in possession of some unique trait that motivates membership in the association. They do this by establishing a cultural focus: recognizing the language, music, dance, art, architecture, religious practices, or other cultural traditions as being distinct. The purpose of CCAs is to either preserve or celebrate those distinctive traits. They start out as nonpolitical entities but lay the groundwork for political ones to emerge in the future.

Historically, government suppression of CCAs, as well as the success of a competing mass identity, Thai nationalism, has prevented their emergence. Thus, despite political grievances in the past, Lanna nationalism has never formed as a political vehicle. Economic development in the 1980s led business associations in the Lanna region to market their cultural identity, which led to the explosion of CCAs by the 2000s. Today, there is a plethora of CCAs across the Lanna region. Against this backdrop of civic associational life fell the political divisions of the past two decades—the emergence of a new political party, Thai Rak Thai (TRT), which found high levels of support in the Lanna region, and the subsequent suppression of that party and its followers involving, among other things, a military coup in 2006. In response, TRT supporters developed civic associations known as Red Shirt organizations—a largely decentralized and loosely united network of local civic associations united by the goal of restoring democracy and the party they had voted into government. In the Lanna region, however, these Red Shirt organizations began to take on subnationalist agendas, such as preserving Lanna culture and nascent calls for separatism. I argue that Lanna CCAs were pivotal in this process by interpreting the political division in ethnic terms and providing the networks with which to build a political movement.

This chapter proceeds as follows. In the next section, I describe in more detail the distinctive nature of the Lanna ethnic group and its relationship with the Thai state. Following that, I describe the suppression of CCAs across Thailand in the early half of the 20th century. I then discuss the emergence of CCAs in the Lanna region in the 1980s. The section that follows examines the development of Red Shirt organizations into subnationalist civic associations in the 2010s. In each period, I lay out the nature of
ethnic salience, opportunities for political grievances, nascent ethnopolitical mobilizations, ethnic elites, and central government policy and actions (especially with regards to the competing Thai nationalism) and link each of these variables to CCAs, highlighting their varying strength.

The Lanna of Northern Thailand

A first-time visitor to Thailand might be forgiven for thinking that Lanna is merely the northern region of Thailand and that the Lanna people are a regional subgroup of the Thai (by which I mean the Central Thai or Siamese), that is, the Northern Thai—much like a first-time visitor to Spain might confuse the Catalan with the majority Castilian Spanish. However, like the Catalan, the Lanna possess regional characteristics that are reminiscent of independence-seeking regions across the world.

First, the Lanna are a geographically concentrated ethnic group in a region remote from the center of Thai political power, Bangkok. Lanna is nestled in the most mountainous region of Thailand, the Thai Highlands, one of the many foothills of the Himalayas. When Lanna was first annexed to Siam in 1899, travel to the area from Bangkok would have been more difficult than to any other region. This lack of infrastructure helped preserve the Lanna identity and language much further into the 20th century, especially before the rise of mass communication networks, from radio to television and most recently the internet.

Second, this terrain has historically helped preserve the political independence of the Lanna people, situated as they are between the two large regional superpowers of Siam and Burma. This independence began with the Lanna kingdom (1292–1775) and its successor, which lasted almost 500 years. For around 200 of those years, Lanna was a vassal state of the Burmese kingdom, enjoying varying levels of independence throughout the period. Only in 1775 did they forge closer political ties to the more ethno-linguistically related Siamese, who allowed the Lanna royalty a high degree of independence in the guise of the kingdom of Chiang Mai (1802–99) and smaller principalities that themselves enjoyed varying levels of independence from Chiang Mai, namely, Nan, Lampang, Lamphun, and Phrae. At the turn of the 20th century, all of Lanna was officially annexed to Siam, although the process of merger and centralization took many years. The Siamese allowed the Chiang Mai royal line to continue until 1939.

Third, the Lanna speak a different language from the majority Central Thai. Known as the Lanna language, or kammueang (literally, the “lan-
language of the towns”), it is as different from Central Thai as the Lao of neighboring Laos or the Shan of the neighboring Shan states in Myanmar. While all four—Central Thai, Lanna, Lao, and Shan—are branches of the larger Tai-Kadai family, they are quite distinct, and large parts of the languages are unintelligible. Another aspect of the language that contributes to an increased likelihood of conflict is its historic repression. Not long after annexation to the Siamese state, the Lanna language was pushed out of the education system and replaced with Central Thai. Additionally, the Siamese government placed bans on the language, most notably, use of the script; teaching of the script in temples was banned and books and palm-leaf manuscripts in the Lanna script were destroyed.

Fourth, the Lanna’s practice of Buddhism, stemming from long contact with the Shan and Burmese, had a completely independent tradition from Siamese Buddhism (Karlsson 2009). Lanna monks adhered to different hierarchies in terms of ordination, they had different doctrinal emphases, and they fused unique local beliefs and practices. In addition, Lanna Buddhism had developed a completely independent education system over time in its monasteries. Under the 1902 Sangha Administration Act, the Lanna sangha (monastic order) was forced to merge with that of Siam. This was not without opposition, with the most serious led by the charismatic monk Khruba Sriwichai.

Lastly, the average level of wealth among the Lanna has long been lower than that of the Central Thai, and this continues today. The 2013 National Economic and Social Development Board of Thailand (NESDB) estimates the North’s gross regional and provincial product per capita as 98,268 baht compared to 239,078 baht in the Central Western region, 430,584 baht in the Central Eastern region, and 376,463 baht in Bangkok and its environs. Only the Northeast region is lower at 74,532 baht per capita.

Lanna Identity, Regional Movements, and Cultural Civic Associations

Period 1: Early 20th Century

Soon after Lanna was officially annexed to Siam in 1899, grievances began to accumulate against their new overlords. This did not, however, develop into any kind of Lanna nationalist movement. By 1900, reports sur-

1. Schools were banned from teaching and teachers from speaking kammueang.
2. Kruba Sriwichai was jailed in part because he continued to give sermons in kammueang. Monks were not even allowed to use it in prayer.
faced of a possible uprising. The Siamese, with their highly Westernized bureaucracy, had begun categorizing peoples according to their ethnicity and referred to the Lanna people as the “Black-bellied Lao.” They thus unsurprisingly interpreted this unrest in ethnic terms: “The Lao . . . will revolt and exterminate the Siamese . . . [and] are getting together in every mueang in this monthon . . . collecting weapons,” read a secret telegram to the interior minister in August 1900 (Ongsakul 2005, 205).

The inhabitants of Lanna, however, likely did not conceive of themselves in such terms. As the modernist school of nationalism has strongly demonstrated, premodern peoples saw themselves in very local terms, connected to other peoples not by abstract national identities, or what Anderson (1983) refers to as “imagined communities,” but by hierarchical relationships. It is for this reason that the Lanna often fought alongside the much more ethnoculturally distinct Burmese against their Siamese cousins; interpersonal relationships between chiefs, lords of principalities, and royal families were what determined alliances, and ethnicity was much less fixed (Andaya and Andaya 2015).

Another complication is that, if we can argue that individuals did conceive of themselves in terms of ethnic identities, the populations of Southeast Asian kingdoms, including Lanna, were highly diverse. Bowie (2000) has written extensively on this question of ethnicity in premodern states. She concludes that in the early 19th century at least half of the population of the Northern Thai kingdoms were war captives of various ethnicities. Terwiel (1989, 254) concurs, writing that if people looked just a century later they would falsely conclude that “there is such a thing as a relatively homogenous Thai culture.”

In short, the concept of a Lanna nationalism was thin on the ground in the early 20th century. A closer look at the same secret telegram cited above reveals that the author regarded members of the Lanna royal family—the uparat (crown prince) and ratchawong (other members of the Lanna royal family)—as separate from the Lao, presumably a reference to the non-elite masses living in the North. And this is important, because the Lanna royal family, like all premodern royal families, regarded themselves not as equal members of a nation but as a separate, self-interested class. The Siamese authorities took full advantage of this by co-opting the Lanna monarchy. Side payments and the preservation of the royal family were combined with giving real administrative power to centrally appointed bureaucrats. With the power to tax taken away, the
Siamese played the long-term game to strip the Lanna elite of any real power. This also meant, however, that there were weak incentives for the Lanna monarchy to develop any form of nationalist movement. Indeed, the Lanna elite assisted with suppressing rebellions, for example, during the Phya Phap rebellion of 1899 (Tanabe 1984).

Perhaps the most well-known movement during this era was led by a monk named Khruba Sriwichai. The rebellion could be portrayed in ethnic terms, seen as a nationalist reaction to Siamese centralization of the Buddhist religion, but the most prolific writer on Sriwichai, Katherine Bowie (2014), instead argues that this rebellion resembled a millenarian movement. She is also careful in referring to his followers as the “Northern populace” rather than in ethnic terms, that is, the Lanna. How widespread was the movement and what were its goals? Bowie reports that one newspaper report at the time (1920) claimed that he had the support of over 80 percent of the populace. Thousands of people gathered wherever he went. This certainly had the potential to turn into a nationalist movement in terms of numbers and its focus. However, Sriwichai never opposed Siamese rule in general and may not have even opposed the centralization of the Sangha. Instead, Bowie argues that he was particularly concerned about “the secular state’s right to conscript monks and novices into the military” (684). Moreover, the relationship between the people and Sriwichai certainly remained vertical based on religious authority rather than Anderson’s (1983) “horizontal comradeship” that characterizes nationalism.

The Sriwichai example demonstrates that political grievances existed but that they failed to transform into a Lanna nationalist movement. Even if civic associations had existed during this period, there simply was no identity to which they could attach themselves to be characterized as cultural civic associations. Key to the emergence of national identities was the onset of modern technologies, especially print capitalism and a centralized education system. Lanna in the early half of the 20th century was far from being infiltrated by either of these technologies. Its economy was largely built on the timber industry, and slave labor was still rampant. The modernizing Siamese state had yet to establish a nationwide education system, and most Lanna people continued in the same occupations and lifestyles as they had over the preceding century. A significant population with the economic means, let alone the literacy, to consume nationalist writings in a vernacular language was simply absent (Anderson 1983).
Anderson views the translation of the Bible into European vernaculars as a key stage in the emergence of nationalism. The translation of the Tyndale Bible in 1526 began an explosion of popular writings on religion. Other topics followed, though Anderson is less concerned with the content of the writings than with the creation of what he calls “reading coalitions” (1983, 79). When did such reading coalitions emerge in Thailand, and were there competing communities between subnational vernaculars and the national official language? While the purpose of this section is not to answer this important question in detail, we can surmise that such a process had certainly occurred by 1932 when a civilian-military alliance overthrew the Siamese absolute monarchy, marking the fruition of 100 years of the printing press in Thailand.

The first printing press was established in 1836 in Bangkok by Christian missionaries. Initially the vehicle for translating Christian texts into Thai, the Siamese government quickly took advantage of this new technology to publish government proclamations. In 1858, King Mongkut established a printing press for exclusive government use, which included such documents as the Royal Gazette, but also the mass production of Pali scriptures into Thai by the Buddhist Sangha (British Library 2014). By the late 1800s, there were numerous nonreligious works translated into Central Thai, many of them translations of Western literature by British-educated Thai elite. Another accessible form of secular literature was the cremation volume. Though published by Buddhist monasteries to celebrate the life of well-to-do Thais, these volumes contained topics as far-ranging as “linguistics, literature, anthropology, culture, history and archaeology.”

By the end of the 19th century, some commercial publishing houses had begun to be established in Bangkok, with many more joining the ranks at the beginning of the 20th century (Wongtheerathorn 2008).

Scholars of Thai nationalism are familiar with the nationalist writings of King Vajiravudh and Luang Wichit Watakran (Vella 1978; Barmé 1993). However, less well known are the plethora of literature and poems penned during this era (Chaloemtiarana 2009, 2018). Newspapers, too, were an important part of the emerging print capitalism and of course dealt with political topics (Wongtheerathorn 2008). King Vajiravudh was scathingly attacked by this nascent media. The excesses of his court threatened to

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3. Topics were chosen based on the deceased’s interests or perhaps to illustrate some characteristic of the deceased.
bankrupt the nation, and his comings and goings were scrutinized by the press. The stage had been set for the 1932 revolution, which heralded a constitutional monarchy. Segments of the Thai populace had broken the psychological ties to the traditional Siamese hierarchy, both religious and monarchical, and were beginning to interpret their place in the Thai polity in new ways. Nationalism is almost always accompanied by some form of democratization or republicanism, and Siam was no different. The broader educated class in Bangkok had reached the “horizontal comradeship” that Anderson describes as the hallmark of nationalism. They were no longer subjects but citizens in a new nation-state.

Ferrara (2015) argues that this nationalist project was left unfinished, however. The monarchy’s authority was replaced with control of military leaders, many of whom fashioned themselves in the mold of past Siamese kings as benevolent dictators. The monarchy also experienced a revival and attached itself to the institution of the military. This symbiotic relationship continues to this day, with royally sanctioned coups in 2006 and 2014. More problematic to the establishment of Anderson’s “pure” nationalism, as opposed to his other category of “official,” top-down nationalism, is the role of the middle and lower classes. The former has been ambivalent to its status as subject or citizen, while the latter has been susceptible to manipulation by powerful patrons who likewise maintain a hierarchical social structure.

Missing from most accounts of the emergence of Thai nationalism is the place of ethnoregional minorities, like the Lanna and Isan. Ferrara (2015) argues that they constitute the second great obstacle to political harmony in Thailand precisely because they are still negotiating their place in this thing called the Thai nation. The Lanna were initially excluded, as illustrated by the Siamese central authorities referring to them as Lao, but the 19th-century Chakri kings quickly relabeled them as regional subgroups of the Siamese to ward off territorial encroachment from the British, who had already taken the Tai lands of what is today the Shan state in Myanmar. Thus, the Lanna were relabeled the Northern Thai in official documents, and the Lao of the Khorat Plateau were relabeled the Northeastern Thai.

But what of competing print capitalisms in these other Tai languages and thus competing nationalisms? The Presbyterians had established a printing press in the Lanna script in 1892. This was 56 years after the first printing press in Central Thai. Moreover, it was the only printing press in the Lanna language (Swanson 1988). No commercial publishing houses established themselves, so we are left with a clear set of printed materi-
als to examine the possible emergence of nationalist writings. We learn two important things about this Presbyterian printing press. First, its goal was to evangelize. Second, it was deemed necessary because “they believed that Siamese was inadequate for communicating with people of the region” (Swanson 1988, 179). In short, this means that a Lanna nationalism did not emerge from the establishment of this one printing press. It was not used by the Lanna monarchy for any purpose. There was no Lanna equivalent of King Vajiravudh and his voracious appetite for nationalist writings. Nor was it used by Buddhist authorities to translate Pali texts and religious commentaries in the vernacular. There was not anything equivalent to the cremation volumes of Central Thailand, and the amount and type of secular material were strictly controlled by the conservative Presbyterian mission. Thus, we do not see translations of Western literature or a native literature emerge in the Lanna language (182). Moreover, as part of their modernizing mission, the Presbyterian printing press published new laws promulgated by the Siamese, thus functioning as “a medium for spreading the modernizing ideology of the Siamese government” (183). Morris (2000) adds that the Presbyterians took on commercial projects from Bangkok to help fund the press, adding to the Siamification of the Lanna. Thus, ironically, a press that had started out to “reach a specifically Northern Thai audience” allowed that same cultural space to be penetrated by outside forces and ultimately allowed “complete immersion in national narratives and transnational economies” (82).

To understand the extent of the Lanna population’s exposure to nationalist writings, however, we need to know what the literacy rate was over time as well as the financial capabilities to engage in the print capitalism emanating from Bangkok. It is one thing to cite 1903 as the date that Central Thai was mandated in schools and another to know the extent of education. The literacy rate in Northern Thailand, where literacy was defined as being able to sound out at least a few words, was only 30 percent of the male population in the early 1900s (Swanson 1988, 189). Education was also simultaneously allowed to continue in the Lanna language until 1921 with the passing of the Compulsory Education Act (Charoenmuang 1995, 88). The 1932 revolution ushered in a push toward creating a literate society. By the end of this period, however, the literacy rate of the entire country was still just 50 percent and would have been lower in the Lanna region. Moreover, the majority of the educated population was in Bangkok; secondary education was scarce outside of the capital and tertiary education nonexistent (Hays 2014).

The teaching of and in the Lanna language continued in temples, which
had a quasi-civic nature. Officially, the Lanna Sangha had been incorporated into the Siamese hierarchy based in Bangkok, but temples are the center of social life across Thailand and do much more than facilitate centralized authority. Even after the state education system caused a significant decline in the number of boys enrolling in Buddhist education, the temple was still the place where the Lanna script was taught and where parents sent their children for extracurricular instruction. Moreover, temples were sites for the perpetuation of local culture more generally; locally organized Buddhist festivals were important expressions of regional culture. In the North, this included Yi Peng, the Lanna’s New Year celebration, world renowned for its floating fire lanterns. In addition to Buddhist calendrical holidays, local traditions were also orchestrated at temples, fused syncretically with Buddhism. For example, the lakmueang (city pillar) rites celebrate the founding spirits of the city thought to be housed inside the pillar itself (Tanabe 2000; Morris 2002). At the temple, Lanna culture continued in strength—with the language, dress, and music there for all to see that Bangkok did not completely dominate.

It was exactly this abundance of local civic life that the fascist military dictator Phibun Songkram sought to eradicate with his cultural mandates between 1939 and 1942. He banned traditional dress, musical instruments, and artistic performances throughout Thailand. In addition, he banned the teaching of the Lanna language in northern temples. These reforms, while not targeted at the Lanna exclusively—even Central Thai customs were attacked—had the effect of undermining the heart and soul of social life centered on the temple. Phibun banned regional epithets. In previous administrative moves, the Black-bellied Lao were renamed Northern Thai. Phibun would not even allow the use of the latter name. To him, there were only Thais. As Cultural Mandate 3 read: “Use the name ‘Thai’ to refer to all Thai people, without subdividing them.” Cultural Mandate 9 expounded on this idea: “Thai people must not consider place of birth, residence, or regional accent as a marker of division. Everyone must hold it to be true that all born as Thai people have the same Thai blood and speak the same Thai language. Place of birth or accent makes no difference.” In addition, Cultural Mandate 9 ordered all citizens not to just learn Thai (by which he meant Central Thai) but to “extol, honor and respect” it. Citizens were to encourage others to use Central Thai. This “duty” was reinforced with signs erected across the country reminding all to speak Thai.4

4. Dr. Vithi Phanichphant recollects that the signs said “This area free from local dialect.” Personal interview with the author, summer 2015.
Punishments were exacted in schools for speaking local dialects. The most extreme suppression came in the form of burning materials written in the Lanna script (Wannasai 1975).

To summarize this second period, while there had not been an emergence of Lanna nationalism, Thai nationalism became more aggressively enforced by the state. Education was now required to be in the Central Thai language, and the World War II era had witnessed the outlawing and suppression of regional dialects. While this may have ignited opposition, the effective suppression of many parts of civic life during this era signaled that such activities would be fruitless and heavily punished.

Period 3: 1950s–1970s

Under military rule, the Thai economy embraced Western capitalism in the 1950s and 1960s and was richly rewarded. Thai society began to change rapidly, and civic movements began to emerge. A Thai middle class emerged and with increased leisure time and financial resources began to look for new forms of entertainment and social causes to champion. Politics began to be of interest to this new segment of society, especially when policy choices could dramatically affect the economy, the lifeblood of their new way of life. Elections and democracy were increasingly demanded. Inequality became an especial concern of student groups across the country.

Morris argues that this period was “especially tumultuous for Chiang Mai and the surrounding provinces” (2002, 68). She points to increased rates of landlessness, underemployment, and poverty. Thus, while the Thai economy was roaring in comparative terms, it came with the price of an instability that subsistence economies were wholly unfamiliar with. This period thus marks the beginning of the destabilization of a Thai national identity of only recent invention, according to Morris. This period deals with these grievances and how they manifested themselves in the North across two movements: the communist movement and the farmers movement. In short, neither of these movements was ethnic, and they each confronted the Thai state in different ways, one through the use of violence and the other peacefully via legal channels. The outcome, however, was the same: government suppression.

The communist movement in Thailand was widespread, infiltrating 52 of the 72 provinces. At its peak, there were almost 100,000 active supporters, including 14,000 active insurgents and 12,000 village militia (Thomas 1986). Guerillas were especially apt to hide out in the jungles and
mountains bordering Laos. Not only was the terrain amenable to hiding, but they were able to easily cross the border into “friendly” territory—neighboring Laos had fallen to the communists in 1975, following more than two decades of conflict. This strategic position combined with the ethnic similarities between those populations in Thailand with the Lao led many observers to worry about ethnic separatism compounding the conflict. The violence was at its fiercest in the North, and de Beer even asserts that the entire province of Nan was controlled by the communists (De Beer 1978). The communist insurgents in Nan, however, were primarily of various Hill Tribe ethnicities, especially the Hmong. The Lanna majority in the North never took to communism in the same way that the Isan did, which likely contributed to contemporary stereotypes of the Lanna as peaceful and soft-spoken. Even among the Isan, however, a simple connection of ethnic similarity between the Isan and Lao overlooked other important factors in the communist insurgency transforming to separatism, including the Sino-Soviet split (the Communist Party of Thailand [CPT] had aligned itself with China, but the Pathet Lao had aligned with the Soviets), Thai competition with Vietnam (any breakup of Thailand would assure Vietnamese ascendancy in the region), and the CPT’s desire to control all of Thailand (Stuart-Fox 1979). While it is true that the Lao communists had irredentist designs on the Isan region, and often referenced the cultural and linguistic similarities, autonomist sentiments were stronger than separatist sentiments among the Isan (Stuart-Fox 1979, 350; Keyes 1967, 14, 33).5

A second civic movement during this period in the North was orchestrated by farmers. Fed up with high rents, severe land shortages, and the growing inability to feed their families, Northern farmers organized into the Farmers’ Federation of Thailand (FFT). FFT activists in Chiang Mai and Lamphun provinces led a struggle to update the Land Rent Control Act (LRCA) in the North. The act, passed in 1950 by Phibun Songkram, restricted rent to a maximum of 25 percent of annual yield. However, it was only applied to 18 provinces in the Central region, with landowners in the North able to convince Bangkok that the act was not required in the region. In December 1974, the FFT efforts proved successful, with the new law lowering rents and standardizing them across the country. Farmers in the North confronted

5. Today, the Din Dao movement in the Isan likewise seeks autonomy in the form of anarcho-syndicalist collectives. See Srípokangkul and Draper (2019).
landowners citing this new law, but that is where their troubles only began. Thirty-three FFT leaders were killed, another eight were seriously injured, and five “disappeared” (Haberkorn 2011).

Unlike the communist movement, the FFT movement had strong roots in the North. The movement began there in the 1950s with initial political opposition to the original LRCA’s limited application by farmers in Chiang Mai province. The FFT was also established in the North in the 1970s, and the majority of the leadership remained Northerners. Accordingly, the majority of assassinations occurred in the North and were Northerners. Nevertheless, the movement never took on ethnic tones. The FFT’s scope remained national and focused on farmers’ rights. One reason for this non-development into an ethnic movement is that many of the landowners were the former elite of the Lanna kingdom. Thus, vertical social relationships continued to characterize Lanna society. Second, as discussed in the previous section, a Lanna literary community failed to emerge during the era of print capitalism; instead, the inhabitants of the North were brought into Thai nationalism through Central Thai print capitalism as well as state efforts. The CPT’s and FFT’s national foci are thus no surprise. Third, cultural civic associations had been stamped out during the Phibun era of cultural mandates. There was thus no active ethnic material with which to frame grievances. Regardless, the central Thai state likely viewed the FFT activities in the same vein as they did any opposition to the center, including the communist insurgencies raging across the country during this era, as well as the crowds turning out in support of Kruba Sriwichai: proto-separatist. They thus dealt with the movement in the same manner—by suppressing civil society, especially any that resembles ethnic movements.

**Period 4: 1980s–1990s**

The emergence of Lanna national consciousness came from unlikely quarters, not on the heels of revolution or suppression but from capitalism and its commodification of identity. By the 1980s, Thailand’s economy was roaring and a large middle class had emerged in Bangkok. Looking for ways to spend their excess time and money, domestic tourism expanded rapidly. Commercial interests in the North responded to this financial potential and sought ways to market the North to leisure-seeking Bang-

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6. One of the two largest landowners in Chiang Mai was a direct descendent of the last king of Lanna, Jao Kaew Narawat. See Morell and Chai-anan (1981)
kokians. Their business strategy was to emphasize the unique cultural and historical characteristics of the North. They chose the term “Lanna” to market their regional culture.7

That this former independent kingdom required reinventing and even naming demonstrates the power of Thai nationalism and the various dynamics emphasized thus far, including print capitalism in the Central Thai language, state efforts to emphasize the official and acceptable form of Thai nationalism, and state suppression of civil society, especially cultural civic associations during the Phibun era. State education had especially taken off during the 1970s. By 1983, 99.4 percent of children ages 7–12 attended primary school. By the late 1980s, nearly 80 percent of the population had some formal education. I do not want to overly emphasize the penetration of Thai nationalism, however. The non-emergence of Lanna subnationalism was just as much about the suppression of the Lanna script and non-emergence of printed material in the Lanna language. Despite constituting 55 percent of the population, the North and Northeast, combined, made up just 26 percent of secondary school students (Hays 2014).

Some of the commercialization began earlier. Dr. Vithi, for example, claims that he helped start the “traditional” Lanna meal khantoke in 1972, which he says was based on a house party held by Krai Sri Nimmanhaeminda in 1953 for foreign and Thai dignitaries. But the real roots of the commodification of Lanna nationalism came on the heels of a grant that Chiang Mai University received in 1983 to establish an art department. Dr. Vithi trained an army of students who went out into local communities to catalog local customs and histories. Upon graduation, these students began consulting organizers of “local ceremonies, processions, offerings and regional cultural activities, giving advice on dress and ceremonial procedure, even on the color and texture of various ornaments, bowls, etc.” (see Farrell 2009). Local businesses noticed that this revival of local culture, including music and dance, was very attractive to Thai and foreign tourists.

Entering the 1990s, Thailand was the fastest growing economy in the world and a haven for international tourism. Northern Thailand sought to take a piece of the pie by emphasizing its culture. Dr. Vithi dates what he

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7. There was an academic interest in Northern or Lanna customs in the 1970s and 1980s, which predated this commercialization. See Morris (2002, 68), who cites Sanguan (1969, 1971a, 1971b), Mani (1986a, 1986b), and Sommai and Dore (1991). In an interview with Dr. Vithi Phanichphant, Morris also cites a flurry of activity at Chiang Mai University that he led in the Art Department in 1983. This was done with more of a framework as the North as a regional subgroup of the Thai rather than as a separate ethnic group.
calls the creation of “Lanna, Inc.,” or the mass commodification of local identity, to 1996, the 700-year anniversary of the first Lanna kingdom in 1296. The city tourist board in conjunction with local business organizations celebrated with grandeur. This celebration reintroduced the Northern tube skirt (phasin) and pushed in a host of public dance performances. There was a lot of resistance to this, but Dr. Vithi was able to convince people based on photographs and other research his art department had undertaken that this skirt was indeed worn in days gone by.

Period 5: 2000s to Present

The 1996 anniversary celebrations created broad interest in marketing Lanna culture among business associations, but developments over the next two decades would help grow a whole host of cultural civic associations. This growth was also helped by continued increases in education as well as the emergence of the internet, which lowered the cost of creating a competing Lanna nationalism. In 1997, only 17 percent of adult Thais had graduated from high school, but the Thaksin government in the early 2000s made huge efforts to improve education in poor areas (Hays 2014). From an approximately 85 percent literacy rate in the mid-1990s, Thailand shot up to 96 percent by 2010 (Oxford University 2020). Even though the people of the North were being educated in Central Thai, increased education levels combined with this new technology facilitated the creation of a literary community so vital to Anderson’s theory on the emergence of nationalism. These online groups often converse in the Lanna language rather than Central Thai, using the phonetic Thai alphabet to spell their language with the correct tones. Social media platforms made the organization of local cultural events much easier, and groups across the region have quickly come together to develop various cultural interests, from language to dance to food.

The tourist industry is the most visible user of Lanna culture. The Lanna script is on hotels and restaurants across the region. From 1996 onward, these establishments began to demand cultural performances and local art to decorate their hotels, restaurants, and businesses. The Northern lantern can now be seen everywhere, and service workers from waitresses to hotel staff to masseuses wear the phasin as standard attire. When visitors step off the plane or train in Chiang Mai, they will be inundated with Lanna art and architecture. Even shiny new malls have gotten caught up in frequent Lanna promotions or food courts to attract shoppers. What
is less visible, but more important for the reinvigoration of Lanna culture, is the revival of civic associations dedicated to teaching Lanna music, dance, and language. In a 2020 survey I conducted, I found that over 70 percent of people in the Lanna region are familiar with such associations, indicating that they are widespread.

This plethora of local civic associations have frequent opportunities to showcase their art. An increasing number of events are organized to celebrate Lanna culture. The most prominent of these is the LannaExpo, a huge annual event with entire convention centers taken up by historical, architectural, musical, and other artistic displays. Local vendors sell food, both traditional and new local creations. Other businesses, especially from the tourist industry, reinforce the Lanna culture to locals as well as market it to visitors from other parts of Thailand and to foreigners. The main hall has performances throughout the day of music, dance, and drama—again, a combination of the traditional and contemporary. One cannot help but feeling overawed with a sense of a grand culture, one that has been around for hundreds of years. As Pim Kemasingki and Thitika Tananchai, two reporters for the Chiangmai Citylife magazine, write, even a smidgeon of that awareness would mean that “you would have more knowledge about Lanna than just about anyone here did half a century ago” (2017).

One of the most amazing transformations has been the resurrection of the Lanna script. After the cultural mandates and the burning of Lanna books, reading ability had declined to a handful of the older generation and some scholars. For the first time in decades, temples began teaching the Lanna language, and not just to monks but to the Lanna population more broadly. The Lanna script had been visible at the entrances of temples for some time, but now every business wanted signs displaying the script to add to their authenticity.

An interesting group that has quickly grown in number is a Facebook group called กลุ่มอนุรักษ์อักษรภาษาล้านนา, or the Preserve the Lanna Script group.8 Founded in 2012, the group now numbers 2,600. Members showcase examples of their writing in the Lanna script, encouraging others to practice their reading and orthography. They also post links to places where people can learn the language across the North. Photos of signs in Lanna are also a regular feature. But hidden between these seemingly practical posts are nationalist themes. Some writing samples are Lanna

8. The English translation of their group they provide, however, is the Lanna Alphabet Group.
sayings, which helps keep the cultural mindset alive. Others are passages from famous Lanna figures of the past, many of whom are religious figures. Many photos of members reinforce Lanna traditional dress or statues of famous figures from around the region. Others showcase how the Lanna script is displayed in parades and festivals.

The Politicization of Lanna Ethnicity in Contemporary Thailand

How do cultural civic associations lead to the development of regional political movements? First, they create a sense of cultural assault. Consider the Facebook group cited above. The use of the word “preserve” (anurak) in their name implies that the language is in danger. It is on the verge of being lost. Members wonder why it is endangered, and they turn to history to understand what happened. They learn of the centralization in the early 20th century where books in Lanna were burned, the script was banned, and schools stopped teaching in the language. These types of groups implicitly create a sense of loss. Such sentiments then spread throughout the community. Eventually, these ideas become researched and legitimized. Prof. Dr. Tanet Charoenmuang of Chiang Mai University’s Faculty of Political Science, who is a member of the Facebook group, wrote a book chapter entitled “When the Young Cannot Speak Their Own Mother Tongue: Explaining a Legacy of Cultural Domination in Lan Na.” Using an alternate name for the Lanna language, he asserted in 2017: “Kham mueang will be gone within 30–50 years, I guarantee. The destruction of the culture is very clear” (Kemasingki and Prateepkoh 2017).9 This urgent sense of impending loss leads to calls for political action: reintroducing the language into the education system. Opponents counter that there is no practical use, so attention turns to revitalizing its use in daily life: street signs, books and magazines, products, and so forth. In short, though the original founders of such groups

9. Other comments from Thanet in this interview include, “Too little too late. . . . Today you get a student at Chiang Mai University from Nan or Phrae and they will get teased for their funny kham muaeng because it’s not the same as Chiang Mai’s kham muaeng, so they will just skip it in its entirety and speak central Thai. The only people speaking kham muaeng now are the older generations, because the young don’t believe it has any value to them. . . . I do find it sad though that the younger generations aren’t even calling themselves khon mueang anymore, they call themselves Thai.” Additionally, Vithi Panichphant is quoted in the article as saying: “It is good, I believe, that we have awareness of what we are losing. . . . At least with awareness we can preserve. By preserving our past we at least know where we came from. That’s a start.”
may have had no political aspirations and while members may simply be looking for a hobby or socializing, cultural civic associations lead to political action in the long run. It is no exaggeration to say that they are inherently political. It is perhaps no surprise, then, that the banner for the Preserve the Lanna Script Facebook group is a flag of the Lanna state with the words “Lanna state” written in the Lanna script.

While the flag of the Facebook group is not attached to a political movement, it is in this environment that movements occur. Associations require organization; they require leaders and they require members. Charismatic personalities who have both organization skills and rhetorical ability emerge as leaders. Networks are created both between leaders and members as well as among members. The most long-standing political movement in the Lanna region calls for decentralization. Although not explicitly couched in ethnic terms, the leader of the movement—the same Thanet Charoenmueang who is a member of the Preserve the Lanna Script Facebook group—certainly had ethnic goals as a primary motivation, to the extent that he changed his Facebook name to Thaenat Na Lanna. The Na part of a Thai surname usually refers to the descendants of a defunct royal line. Thus, Na Ayudhya is a surname for people with genealogy going back to any of the royal houses of the Ayudhya kingdom; Na Chiangmai is a prominent surname in the North, referring to those descended from the kingdom of Chiang Mai, one of the successors to the Lanna kingdom after Siam took control and divided it up. There is no Na Lanna surname, and Ajarn Tanet’s use of this demonstrates his role as a modern-day ethnic entrepreneur harkening back to that kingdom and attaching it to modern political movements.

Like the Farmers’ Federation of Thailand, the decentralization movement was not restricted to the Lanna region in terms of its ideological scope and official rhetoric. However, it set the tone for subsequent movements, advocating for more extreme forms of local rule, including an autonomous region and even a separate, independent state.

The Political Crisis: A Lanna View

Several events occurred in the contemporary era that increased political grievances in the North. First, Lanna is the homeland of the Shinawatra clan, two of whose members, siblings Thaksin and Yingluck, have been ejected as prime minister in military coups over the last decade. The Shinawatra clan are a wealthy family who made their money originally in the
silk trade. When Thaksin, the elder sibling was born, the Shinawatra clan could already be described as one of the richest and most influential in Chiang Mai. However, by the time Thaksin entered politics in the late 1980s, he was one of the richest men in Thailand. As such, the Shinawatra clan has many connections in Chiang Mai and, under the old patron-client system, would have had numerous clients bound to them through economic and other social ties. The Shinawatras themselves have not played up their Northern ties but when addressing crowds in Chiang Mai have spoken the Lanna language. In addition to being from the heart of the Lanna region, Chiang Mai, the majority of Thais in the Northern region, and especially the upper Northern region that corresponds with the old Lanna kingdom, voted for both siblings in democratic elections.

In addition to the Shinawatras siblings, two additional prime ministers whom the majority of Northerners voted for were ousted from power in less than democratic fashion. Samak Sundaravej came to power in the first elections following the 2006 coup. He lasted seven months in power before the Constitutional Court disqualified him from office for appearing on a TV cooking show. His successor, Somchai Wongsawat, lasted just two and a half months before being removed by the National Counter Corruption Committee for neglecting his duties in his role as permanent secretary of the Justice Department eight years earlier. In total, then, four prime ministers whom the majority of the North voted for in democratic elections were removed from power by arguably undemocratic means.

Indeed, the North voted for the same party (or de facto reincarnations of the same party) in six consecutive elections between 2001 and 2011. Since this party (originally the Thai Rak Thai Party but today the Pheu Thai Party) also received a large amount of support from other regions, we cannot label it the party of the North. However, in 2011, over 80 percent of Northerners voted for Pheu Thai, demonstrating extremely strong regional patterns.

As previously mentioned, this democratic voice has been taken away from the North on several occasions. The biggest culprit for this are the Yellow Shirt protests in Bangkok. Under the label of the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD), this mostly Bangkok-based upper-middle-class

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11. We do not know for certain who the North voted for in the 2014 elections since the results were annulled by the Election Commission, but most experts agree that they had voted for the Pheu Thai Party as in previous elections.
movement began organizing mass demonstrations in the capital starting in early 2006 and continued through the ouster of Thaksin in the September 2006 coup. PAD then dissolved, but it regrouped after Thai Rak Thai’s successor party, the People’s Power Party, won the December 2007 elections. The movement intensified when it took over the Suvarnabhumi International Airport on November 25, 2008, an occupation that lasted eight days and ended only with the Constitutional Court dissolving all three of the government coalition parties.

During the airport occupation, the army had refused to step in and remove the protestors. They were much less hesitant to use force, however, to remove Red Shirt protestors demonstrating against the Democrat Party government in 2010. A 50,000-strong security force was deployed in Bangkok prior to the planned protest of United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship—the official name of the original Red Shirt organization—for March 14, 2010. The protests ended up lasting just over two months, with the Red Shirts taking over the financial district of the capital. Security forces clashed on numerous occasions with protestors, the worst occasion being the April 10 incident in which government troops fired openly on protestors, killing 25 and injuring over 800. Most of the protestors came from the North and Northeast regions of Thailand.

Most recently, in the political crisis leading up to the 2014 coup, the People’s Democratic Reform Committee, a political pressure group led by former Democrat Party MP Suthep Thaugsuban, began a series of demonstrations in the capital against the Yingluck government, which was elected in 2011. The demonstrations lasted until Yingluck was removed by Thailand’s second coup within a decade in May 2014. Again, security forces showed restraint when dealing with Yellow Shirt protestors, adding to the perception of favoritism.

Politically Focused Ethnic Civic Associations in the North

As mentioned at the beginning of this article, there have been nascent calls for Lanna separatism, though no violent separatist movement. These activities have been linked to a couple of Red Shirt organizations, namely, Rak Chiangmai 51 and SPPL.

In late February 2014, police took down banners hung in four provinces across the North adorned with the words “This country has no justice” followed by either the words “I want to secede” or “I want to separate as the country of Lanna.” Three people were arrested on June 15, 2014,
and were eventually charged in July 2015 for the Chiang Rai banners,\(^\text{12}\) but subsequent attempts to pin the Payao, Pitsanulok, and Chiang Mai banners on them were finally dropped on January 18, 2018. No other arrests were made in conjunction with the banners, though Col Phokha Jokloy, chief of the Information Division of the 33rd Army District, filed a complaint with the Mae Ping and Muang police stations in Chiang Mai accusing Phetchawat Wattanapongsirikul, a core member of the Love Chiangmai 51 group, of hanging the banners and of separatism and insurrection. Col Phokha Jokloy linked Love Chiangmai 51 with another Northern group, the Assembly for the Defense of Democracy, which has the abbreviation Sor Por Por Lor (SPPL) in Thai. SPPL also happens to be the acronym for the People’s Democratic Republic of Laos, Thailand’s neighbor to the east. The potential for play on words led some observers to label SPPL a covert organization seeking independence for Lanna.

Indeed, there had been increased chatter about separatism at Red Shirt rallies across the country but no evidence of violent groups taking up the cause. Was there anything to these charges, and what did then prime minister Yingluck think of these groups and of the banners? Was it a coincidence that the banners coincided with her tour of the North that same week in late February, a week in which she was escorted by Love Chiangmai 51 in order to guarantee her security? Love Chiangmai 51’s core leader, Krishsanapong Prombuengram, had also in the previous week offered the city of Chiang Mai as a new headquarters for Yingluck’s government, besieged as Bangkok was by the protests.

What was Yingluck’s relationship with Rak Chiangmai 51, and what were her true feelings about separatism? Upon her return from her tour, on March 4, 2014, she made a public statement claiming that neither she nor her government supported any separatist movement. However, it was General Prayut who had earlier that day pushed the matter by calling for the arrest of anybody trying to divide the country and specifically ordering all governors in the North and Northeast to monitor the activities of Red Shirt followers. Yingluck’s language certainly did not match the fervor of Prayut on the matter. Although she stated, “We want to see Thailand as one and indivisible,” her course of action was to “warn any groups that violate the law and then let the judicial process take its course.” In response to

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\(^{12}\) One was a pedestrian bridge in front of Central Plaza shopping mall in Muang district on February 26, and another was at a market in tambon Pa Kor Dam of Mae Lao on February 28 (“Chiang Rai Provincial Court Orders [sic] 3 Arrest Warrant Over Separatism Banner,” Chiangrai Times, June 15, 2014).
another question, she said that “authorities would investigate the matter.” \(^{13}\) Prayut’s language, on the other hand, involved explicitly condemning the groups and calling for hunting down the separatists. Did he find Yingluck’s statement unconvincing or not critical enough? Did he suspect her of hiding separatist sentiments or even supporting the groups either symbolically or in more concrete ways? What we do know is that less than three months later, Prayut would oust her in a coup.

To what extent were these February events and the fear of a Lanna separatist movement fuel for Prayut’s preoccupation with protecting Thai nationalism? We may never know the answer to these questions, but one of the first actions taken after the coup was raiding the headquarters of Love Chiangmai 51. On May 23, 2014, the day after tanks rolled into Bangkok, officials entered the Waroros Grand Palace Hotel in Muang district, Chiang Mai, out of which Love Chiangmai 51 ran a community radio station. They seized a safe and a pistol. Four days later, a joint force of soldiers and police seized “documents, equipment used in rallies, five computer notebooks, seven bullets, a bullet-proof vest and some firecrackers.” \(^{14}\) The radio station was shut down, and Phetchawat Wattanaapongsirikul, who had avoided arrest over the banners incidence three months earlier, was ordered to report to the National Council for Peace and Order in Bangkok. \(^{15}\)

Since 2014, civic life with any connection to political issues has been firmly clamped down on. All political activity was completely banned for a time. Arrests of political activists and academics have been made. Reports of political murders continue to surface. All my confidants were incredibly wary of meeting with me. Locations were changed at the last minute. The climate was one of intense fear. There were no explicit confirmations of any of my hunches related to separatist goals by members of any group, but there was sufficient reading between the lines to suggest that I was on the right track. Casual conversations with locals in the Lanna region, however, confirmed my hunches. There was a feeling of frustration with both the leaders of these movements—that they pushed too far too soon—and with the military government, of course, for continuing to ignore their political grievances.

Instead, the military government, headed by General Prayut Chan-o-cha, embarked on a policy of doubling down on Thai nationalism. Two  


\(^{15}\) Numerous Red Shirt groups across the North and Northeast were similarly targeted.
months after the coup, in a speech given on July 11, 2014, Prayut provided the first hint of this: “The persisting problems in Thailand that need to be solved urgently require inclusive cooperation from people of all levels, gender and age. I suggest that we firstly define clear core values of Thai people so that we can build a strong nation. The people must first be strong.”

Prayut would then go on to introduce what became known as the “12 Core Values” (see table 12.1), two of which are “Love of nation, religion, and monarchy” and “Uphold the interest of the nation over oneself.” The 12 Core Values attempt to define what it means to be Thai in the way one behaves (respect for elderly, parents, and teachers and avoiding sin), the principles one adheres to (monarchical democracy, sufficiency economy), the characteristics one aspires to (honesty, sacrifice, etc.) and even how one feels (love of nation, religion, and monarchy). These 12 Core Values were then instructed to be taught in schools, recited in a similar vein to the American Pledge of Allegiance, Indonesia’s Pancasila, or North Korea’s juche (not that these are all one and the same).

Two years later, on August 7, 2016, a referendum was held to approve Prayut’s draft of a new constitution. What is notable about this document is its emphasis on protecting nationalism. The preamble states that the need for a new constitution was “caused by there being persons ignoring or disobeying governance rules of the country, being corrupt and fraudulent,

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17. Technically, it was drafted by a military-appointed committee headed by Meechai Ruchupan, but the process involved heavy input from Prayut’s government.
abusing power, and lacking a sense of responsibility towards the Nation.”
Section 3 states that the goal of Thailand’s institutions is “for the common
good of the Nation and the happiness of the public at large.” Section 50
states that the duties of Thai people are “to protect and uphold the Nation,
religion, and King, and the democratic regime of government with the
King as Head of State.” And Section 54 states that the goal of all education
is “to develop learners to be good, disciplined, proud of the Nation, skillful
in their own aptitudes and responsible for family, community, society and
the country.”

Theory Building: Cultural Civic Associations and Nationalism

The conclusion of this chapter, derived deductively from a multi-method
research design combining comparative historical analysis, field interviews,
traditional surveys, and survey experiments, highlights the role of ethnic
how the presence of inter-ethnic civic associations was crucial to prevent-
ing the outbreak of violence in India. The converse occurred in cities
where civic associations were primarily intra-ethnic. While the first part of
Varshney’s theory is largely inapplicable to most minority groups in Thai-
land due to their high levels of geographic isolation, the second presents
an intriguing hypothesis—could the absence (Putnam and Campbell 2012)
of intra-ethnic civic associations diminish the likelihood of ethnopolitical
movements emerging?

Civic associations have been strongly linked with a variety of politi-
cal actions, such as increased political participation and democratization,
due to their cultivation of social capital, specific “benefits that flow from
the trust, reciprocity, information, and cooperation associated with social
networks” (Putnam 2000, 21–22). However, what this social capital is used
for depends crucially on the nature of the civic associations. Putnam and
Campbell (2012) have distinguished the type of social capital created by
whether civic associations bring together members of different ethnic
groups. Civic associations that consist only of a single ethnic group are
good at creating bonding social capital, dense networks and multiplex rela-
tionships that focus on the needs and interests of the group.

What does bonding social capital do when ethnic grievances arise?
First, it provides sites where members of the ethnic group can get together
and discuss the grievance. This increases the likelihood that the grievance
will be interpreted in ethnic terms in the first place and not along some
other social cleavage, such as class. Second, it provides the organizational basis to address the grievance: the social networks that help link leaders as well as recruit into nascent movements. This same organizational basis is also a means of raising finances.

However, in countries that have high levels of ethnogeographic isolation, civic associations will almost always be intra-ethnic by default. Why then have we not seen ethnopolitical movements among the Lanna? One reason could be that civic associations are altogether absent. This perhaps explain the early 20th century, but at least since the 1970s, civil society has been active in Thai society. My findings, rather, highlight a particular type of civic association: one that has explicit ethnic goals, whether they be cultural or political. I label these ethnic civic associations (ECAs). ECAs either implicitly or explicitly recognize the ethnic group as distinct and in possession of some unique trait that motivates membership in the association. For example, ECAs with a cultural focus recognize the language, music, dance, art, architecture, religious practices, or other cultural traditions as being distinct. The ECAs purpose is to either preserve or celebrate that distinctive trait. Cultural ECAs normally develop first and serve to increase the general salience of the ethnic identity. One way in which they do this is by creating a sense that the cultural focus of the association is under threat. For example, language ECAs may lament that something is lost (absence of a dictionary or the death of a script) or dying (overtaken by the national language). ECAs attempt to raise money, and failed attempts feel like funding agencies—especially the central government—do not value the culture and therefore the ethnic group.

Cultural ECAs provide the setting in which a second kind of ECA develops, one with explicit political aims. Political ECAs are low-level manifestations of ethnopolitical mobilization and intensify the development of high-level manifestations, such as one-off protests, single-item policy movements, ethnic political parties (which agitate for multiple policy items), constitutional movements (e.g., calls for decentralization), and sovereignty movements (i.e., calls for secession, which may be nonviolent or violent). Political ECAs may take on some of the concerns of cultural ECAs, transforming them from the civil society realm to the political realm. Continuing with the example of language, political ECAs may demand official recognition by the government and specific funds set aside for preserving the language.

The research design of this project began with a comparative case study of the current period (2000s to present) in which the first manifestations
of ethnopolitical movements have been witnessed to previous periods in modern Thai history. I examine four additional periods: early 20th century, 1932–World War II, 1950s–1960s, and 1970s–1990s. In the current era, I am able to employ additional methods not available in previous eras: surveys and survey experiments. These methods helped understand how the Lanna people currently view their ethnic group in political terms, from feelings of grievance to ways they currently interpret their Thai and Lanna identities, to preferences for particular political solutions, and, finally, to what types of messages they respond to. Next, I undertook a series of field interviews to aid in interpreting these results. Listening to how confidants discussed why certain messages were activating respondents in my survey experiment first alerted me to the role of ethnic civic associations. These field interviews also highlighted the necessity of going back to previous periods: respondents repeatedly cited historic examples, couching them in terms of ethnic grievance, but were unable to explain why an ethnopolitical movement had not taken off when those flashpoints occurred. The comparative historical analysis carefully examines how sets of actors, institutions, organizations, and policies changed over time, cementing the key role of ethnic civic associations.

Conclusion

As an overview to the argument of the chapter, in the first period (early 20th century), ethnic civic associations were largely absent; in the second period (1932–World War II), they were suppressed; in the third period (1950s–1970s), they were overwhelmed by an international political movement, communism; and in the fourth period (1980s–1990s), ethnopolitical movements were underwhelmed by locally oriented political parties parochializing political demands, but cultural ECAs began to emerge. In response to the growing economy, commercial associations latched onto the idea of cultural tourism and the distinct identity of the Lanna people. Additionally, academic groups carved out a space for the study of regional language, history, and culture at the university level. These cultural ECAs helped spread Lanna consciousness across Northern Thai society. In the fifth period (2000s to present), we see many more cultural ECAs emerging, connecting disparate parts of the former Lanna kingdom. Most importantly, political ECAs emerged in this period in the form of civic associations established around the cause of the exiled former prime minister of Thailand, Thaksin Shinawatra. Unlike in other regions where support for
Thaksin is high (e.g., the Northeast), in the North, civic associations were able to latch onto the idea that Thaksin was a Lanna co-ethnic who hailed from the former capital of the Lanna kingdom, Chiang Mai. This transformed these civil society groups into ethnic civic associations.

What this chapter shows, however, is that enforcing nationalism through state channels and institutions will likely not be successful. One of the most prominent sites for enforcing the 12 Core Values has been the education system. Yet, we have seen through the case of the Thai language that schools have not been able to produce the affective ties needed to foster Thai linguistic nationalism. Thai leaders will need to find civic spaces where the Lanna can freely express Thai nationalism. Repressing ethnic civic associations for Lanna nationalism, on the flip side, can only last for so long. Will those same ethnic civic associations reemerge in a freer political climate? Lanna now has an active civic associational life, and Lanna identity and culture continue to be a popular choice of focus. The chance of political grievances being interpreted in ethnic terms, then, will continue to be high. Thus, failure to address the underlying grievances means that, if not Rak Chiangmai 51 or SPPL, other political ECAs will most likely rise, and who knows if in the future they will turn to violence?
PART 3
As we draw conclusions from these twelve context-rich chapters, we return to our theory-building efforts. As we noted in the introduction, the case studies identified two major theoretical frameworks. The first is about the inclusiveness of state institutions. When institutions are exclusive, not only does the state deny recognition to minorities, but the minorities also fail to see the state as legitimate (Birnir 2006; Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010). The second explanation is about the characteristics of civic associations. When these associations promote intra-ethnic engagement, they harden us-them distinctions (Putnam 1995; Varshney 2003).

This concluding chapter has three objectives. The first is to summarize the insights learned for each of these two theoretical frameworks. The chapters provide important insight into the process of how these things come about, change, or are inhibited. The contributions also shed light on the various forms these phenomena take. Lastly, the case studies teach us the context conditionality surrounding these factors. In some of the cases, however, both theoretical frameworks played a part.

Second, we explore our central argument: Regions mobilize when (1) they are excluded from state institutions, but (2) civic associations within the region are inclusive. We contend that, at least within Southeast Asia, these two factors jointly represent a necessary condition for successful
regional mobilization. From a methodological standpoint, only research designs that include all regions are capable of identifying necessary conditions. This finding makes an important contribution to the ethnic politics literature.

In the third and final section, we explore and discuss two alternative explanations. One is about the underlying social structure: Is it simply a necessary background condition, or does it shape the nature of state institutions and the ability of civic associations to form? The other explanation is about regime type: Does democracy—with its regularized elections and associated protections for human rights—enhance political inclusion and encourage a vibrant civic society?

Summarizing Theoretical Insights: Process, Forms, and Context Conditionality

Inclusiveness in State Institutions

The contributions to this volume identify different aspects of state institutions that mattered. In Singapore, core constitutional elements including voting laws were at the heart of exclusion. In Taiwan and Thailand, language policy was key. In the Philippines, in contrast, it was education policy that was paramount. Lastly, in Malaysia, informal institutions governing interactions between the central government and local elites in East Malaysia prevented a host of exclusionary government policies from leading to secession. In short, while we can say that state inclusiveness matters, the political institutions take on a variety of forms—for example, formal and informal, constitutional and legislative.

Even when the case studies identify the same area of state exclusion, the same outcome is not always inevitable. Take language policy, for example. In Taiwan, Thailand, and Malaysia, the central government imposed a particular language on peripheral regions: Mandarin, Central Thai, and Malay, respectively. Ricks’s account of Thailand shows that this had a unifying effect, encouraging the people of the Isan region to adopt Central Thai in order to acquire economic and social opportunities. Central Thai was also the vehicle for the powerful Thai nation-building project. Taiwan’s imposition of Mandarin, however, did not have the same effect. Instead, the language policy—seen as repressive by the more numerous Hokkien and Hakka speakers—became the site of discontent. Likewise, in East Malaysia, Malay was imposed in both Sabah and Sarawak, but the
central government relied on other mechanisms to prevent secessionist movements. What explains the different outcomes? The key seems to be inclusion in other arenas of government. In Taiwan, the more numerous Hokkien speakers became an important faction in the ruling KMT party. Conversely, in order to access government opportunities in Thailand and Malaysia, adopting the imposed language was key. Nevertheless, overarching identities were inclusive in Thailand and Malaysia. Any individual could be Thai if they adopted the Thai language. The Bumiputera (indigenous) ethnic category played a similar role in Malaysia, tying the Sabah and Sarawak populations to Malays.

This tension between inclusion and exclusion is subtle. The Spanish did not “include” the Muslims in South Philippines in the national education project. Mendoza-Davé argues that this actually placated the Moro region, however. In contrast, when the American administration sought to “include” the Moro region in a national education system, the seeds of the current conflict were sown. Perhaps a better concept than inclusion, then, is accommodation. All the cases demonstrate some level of inclusion, but the places where no regional movements developed all demonstrate some kind of accommodation. This is most glaring in East Malaysia, which suffered a host of exclusionary policies. Per Subhan and Ostwald, these policies contribute to minor secessionist agitations. Including East Malaysian elites in economic spoils, however, in exchange for tacit acceptance of the negative policies was key to keeping those agitations in check.

We do not see a similar buyout of elites from Northeast Thailand (Isan). Seemingly, the mere prospect of social and economic advancement via the Thai national identity has been enough, at least according to Ricks’s accounts. In other countries, however, very specific targets of inclusion were necessary. Toha outlines the percentage of Bataks from North Sumatra that were included in the army, police, and cabinet. We see similar explicit inclusion into the dominant political party in other countries: the Hokkien into the KMT in Taiwan and East Malaysians into Barisan Nasional in Malaysia.

In short, what we have called “state institutions” run the gamut from ruling parties to bureaucratic jobs. As long as the region feels that the center is reaching out to them in some arena, this forestalls regional movements. Inclusiveness, then, ranges from imposing national policies to allowing more local control. What seems to connect these various accounts is economic opportunity. If the inclusiveness leads to financial spoils in some manner, regional movements seem to be forestalled.
The one exception to this seems to be exclusion woven into the constitution. The population size of Singapore suggests that it should have gotten closer to 34 seats in the Malaysia Federal Legislature, compared to the 15 it was assigned. We observe similar constitutional exclusion in the country with the highest number and longest duration of violent regional movements: Myanmar. At independence, the Karen claimed to be 25 percent of the population. They were not, however, even invited to independence negotiations; the ensuing number of legislative seats that Karen regions were awarded was far off this target. Other regions of Myanmar likewise took issue with unkept promises contained in the Panglong Agreement, such as the ability of certain regions (like the Shan states) to secede after 10 years. Constitutional exclusion, therefore, seems to be impossible to overcome. Nevertheless, even in the Singapore case, if additional voting laws had not made it doubly difficult for the PAP to gain representation, or if the Alliance had reached out to them and included the PAP in its coalition government, we might not have seen Singapore leave the union.

Inclusiveness in Civic Associations

The civic associations described in this volume include rebel groups, social movements, religious organizations, and cultural associations. The inclusiveness of these associations in terms of uniting intraregional factions matters for the success of the movement. We see this in East Timor, where only in the late 1990s did social movements unify across the diverse groups within East Timor to finally push for independence from Indonesia. In Bali, the social movement to oppose the Benoa Bay project was only successful when it invoked the Balinese identity, uniting the disparate protest groups. Bali is an interesting case because the regional movement developed in opposition not to the national government but to the Balinese provincial government. In North Myanmar, Christian churches played key roles. The Kachin Baptist Church was the largest and most organized; however, omitted, decentralized Christian congregations, such as the Assemblies of God, stymied the regional movement. In South Maluku, the Republik Maluku Selatan secessionist movement was unable to shake its Christian image and thus failed to garner the support of Maluku’s Muslim community. In North Sulawesi, Minahasan civic associations were truncated by local, national, international, and transregional movements, preventing a regional movement from emerging. In the Lanna region of Thailand, in contrast, cultural
Civic associations helped create a modern mass identity from the embers of a premodern kingdom, uniting the disparate provinces of the region.

The key logic of how inclusive civic associations lead to regional movements is both organizational and psychological. The organizational mechanism is best summarized by Pelletier in his chapter on the Kachin state: “Where social networks are weak, nationalist leaders and insurgent groups find it harder to generate support, garner information, and obtain resources and compliance from nested minorities.” We see these mechanisms of information provision and credible commitments across the other cases. In East Timor, the three major social movements had engaged in extreme hostility and provocation toward each other in the 1970s. After two decades of Indonesian occupation, civic associations—especially the Catholic Church (now 90% of the population)—became the provider of information among Fretilin, Uniao Democrata Timorense, and Apodeti. Harish identifies another organizational role of civic associations: creating social ties. The Catholic Church’s schools and seminaries created alumni who were key in resisting Indonesia. In Kachin state, the Lisu’s and Rawang’s nonparticipation in the Kachin Baptist networks made it hard to ensure minimal cooperation for the insurgency; the Kachin Independence Army were “increasingly suspicious about their [Lisu and Rawang] loyalty.” Likewise, the proliferation of subgroup-level civic associations in North Sulawesi forestalled information provision and credible commitments. Finally, as the anti-junta civic associations in northern Thailand developed, they drew on the information provision and credible commitments of cultural civic associations to unify around Lanna identity.

There are also the psychological aspects of civic associations, especially the attachments to larger political categories. The Catholic Church added a spiritual element to the East Timorese cause, and its increase in size from 30 percent to 90 percent of the population saw religious identity reinforce the fledgling national identity pushed by the social movements. This strengthened the emotional attachment to East Timorese nationalism and helped reduce the perception of threat from other social movements. Emotional attachment was the key mechanism described by Tans in the Bali case. An otherwise bland movement to protest an unpopular policy was infused with emotional national appeals: the Benoa Bay project would threaten 70 sacred sites of the Hindu religion, and colonial memory was invoked as protestors wore white, carried krises, and embraced the spirit of puputan. Such shared appeals were not possible in Kachin state, where the Lisu and Rawang stood outside the Kachin Baptist Network, or in South...
Maluku, where Christians’ and Muslims’ differences prevailed over their otherwise shared religious affect. In northern Thailand, anti-junta groups drew on the symbols and emotional attachments of Lanna identity. Protecting Lanna culture became a core side mission of these groups, and they utilized the extinct Lanna script and other cultural symbols.

The authors are careful to outline the context conditionality surrounding the role of civic associations. Harish points out that, despite the unity of the Timorese independence movement, help was still required from international actors: the United Nations and the United States. This makes sense when considering the success of the regional movement. However, if the appearance of the regional movement is the dependent variable, then the inclusivity of the civic associations is necessary. Pelletier shows how colonial legacy mattered in Kachin state. Some groups—for example, the Lisu and Rawang—inherit strong organizational capacities from the colonial period. This self-sufficiency isolated them from core pan-Kachin networks. Selway’s account of the Lanna relied on two co-ethnic prime ministers being ousted, which directed social movements to make an identity connection. Menchik’s account of North Sulawesi describes a vibrant, inclusive civic associational life that failed to translate into a regional movement due to truncation by local, national, international, and transregional movements. In short, context matters.

When State Exclusion Meets Civic Inclusion

The authors in this edited volume have uncovered explanations in line with two major theoretical frameworks in the literature for understanding ethnic mobilization. The fact that some mobilization occurs is not surprising since ethnic groups in Southeast Asia tend to be regionally concentrated. However, because our research design allows for the inclusion of several non-mobilizing cases, we are able to push these explanations further in the direction of a jointly necessary condition: regions mobilize (1) when they are excluded by the state but (2) when civic associations within the region are inclusive. We explore this below.

Table 13.1 shows the 12 regions under study in this volume. The source of state exclusion is listed in the second column, and a description of the civic associations is given in the third. We see that all regions, except for perhaps Bali, experience some state exclusion. The unification of civic associations seems to play out in all cases except for North Sulawesi and Northeast Thailand. In the former, Menchik described in detail the
context for associational life in North Sulawesi and the manner in which local, national, international, and transregional movements truncated any attempt at a regional movement. In contrast, Ricks’s account of northeast Thailand simply makes no mention of civic associations. Elsewhere, however, Selway (n.d.) shows that cultural civic associations are less numerous in Northeast Thailand than in North Thailand, suggesting the confor-
mity of this case. Relying on national survey data, North Thailand stands out on this variable. It is possible, then, that another explanation for why Northeast Thailand has not witnessed a regional movement is this lack of associational life, and specifically cultural civic associations and the role they play in forging a regional identity.

In sum, this volume pushes strongly in the direction of identifying a joint necessary condition. An inclusive civic associational life within the region is an important modifier for one of the dominant variables in this literature: state institutional exclusion. The cases in this volume point to the importance of other contextual factors and possible alternative routes for developing regional movements, but overall the evidence is strongly suggestive that both are required for the successful emergence of a regional political movement.

Alternative Explanation 1: Social Structure

To what extent does the underlying social structure affect inclusion—whether in state institutions or in civic associations? Several of the chapters point to the importance of this in the development of regional movements. In Malaysia, the size of the Chinese ethnic group relative to the Malay is an underlying theme in Ong’s account of Singapore’s underrepresentation in Malaysia’s federal legislature. Singapore’s large Chinese community pushed the Malay-dominated government in Kuala Lumpur to expel them from the federation. In Subhan and Ostwald’s account of East Malaysia, conversely, the lack of a dominant group forestalled regional movements. As Subhan and Ostwald write, “East Malaysia’s recognized diversity is considerably more complex, with over a dozen ethnic categories.” Moreover, the authors point to the illegal granting of citizenship and voting rights to “several hundred thousand primarily Muslim migrants from Indonesia and the Philippines.”

Singapore is a somewhat unique case in that the impetus for separating came from the center rather than the periphery. In other regions with a dominant ethnic group, such as East Timor, Bali, North Sumatra, North Sulawesi, North Thailand, South Philippines, and South Taiwan, regional movements all developed at some point. In contrast, the more internally diverse regions—for example, East Malaysia, Northeast Thailand, and the Kachin state in North Myanmar—experienced difficulties in getting unified regional movements off the ground. In North Myanmar, the various tribal divisions within each region made it easy for the central government...
to pick off subregions or for civic associations to exclude them. This same point should be emphasized more clearly for East Malaysia. And while not explored in Ricks’s account of Northeast Thailand, the region is similarly internally diverse. Most obviously, there is a significant ethnic difference in the south of this region, along the border of Cambodia, where a substantial proportion of the population is Northern Khmer. The province of Nakhon Ratchasima in the southeast of the Isan region also maintains a distinct language and dialect and refers to themselves as the Khorat people. Both the Khmer and the Khorat, however, also identify with the Isan regional moniker. Another division within the region less emphasized in the literature can be found in the differences between long-standing residents of the region and those who were forcibly moved there from the ashes of the kingdom of Vientiane in the 1800s. Thus, while observers often treat this vast region as homogenous, there is internal diversity, which may hamper the development of regional movements.

Even within ethnically homogenous regions, divisions may occur along other social dimensions. The accounts in this volume have emphasized the degree to which religion cross-cuts ethnicity (Selway 2011a, 2011b). In North Myanmar (Kachin state), the Lisu and Rawang had low proportions that were members of the Kachin Baptist Church (i.e., there was low ethnoreligious cross-cutting). East Timor was similar in the 1970s when only 30 percent of the population subscribed to Catholicism. Just 20 years later, however, with over 90 percent of the population converted, religious identity heavily cross-cut previous social divisions (ethnic, region, and organizational). It is perhaps no surprise, then, that East Timorese secession came at the end of the 1990s. A similar story emerges of Hinduism cross-cutting social groups in Bali. In contrast, low cross-cutting hampered regional movements in South Maluku, where the ethnic Ambonese were divided between Christians and Muslims.

Cross-cutting identities may also unite homogenous regions with the dominant (and other) regions. Northeast Thailand and Central Thailand share a Buddhist religious identity and a Thai national identity. The lack of a strong national identity in post-independence Indonesia, in contrast, led to attempts at secession in various regions, as we see in the accounts of North Sumatra, South Maluku, and North Sulawesi. In North Myanmar, the various Kachin sub-groups are members of the Sino-Tibetan language family, yet the dominant Burmans were unable to create a nationalism that was inclusive of these cousin groups. The Thai case thus stands out as a success story in nation building. A perhaps similar case is in Malaysia,
where the dominant Malay coined the term Bumiputera to include the East Malaysian ethnic groups in a larger national majority.

**Alternative Explanation 2: Democracy**

The role of democracy is ambiguous throughout this book, yet it remains a nagging factor in the background. There is empirical evidence to suggest that democracies would matter for regional mobilization. Democracies are, after all, associated with the protection of civil liberties and human rights (Poe and Tate 1994); more tolerant of linguistic diversity (Liu 2017) and religious differences (Fox 2008); less inclined to repress when faced with protests (Davenport 2007); and more likely to encourage—if not be outright shamed into promoting—civic society development (Murdie and Urpelainen 2015). The protection of human rights can even extend to wartime when democracies treat their prisoners of war more humanely (Reiter and Stam 2002) or during a global threat when democracies are more transparent in response to popular demands (Reiter and Stam 2020; Sen 1981).

If minority rights are considered human rights, democracies should also be more accommodating of regional identity demands. We see evidence of this with the Hokkien speakers in South Taiwan (see Wu and Liu chapter) and in Indonesia with Timor-Leste (see Harish chapter) or Bali (see Tans chapter). Yet, we do not see associated advantages of democracy unfold in Northeast Thailand with the Isan (see Ricks chapter) or in North Myanmar with the Kachin (see Pelletier chapter). And, in fact, it seems that democracy may have contributed to violence in North Sumatra with the Batak (see Toha chapter) and in South Maluku with the Ambonese (see Soedirgo chapter). In short, absent is a specification of how democracy facilitates mobilization. We identify two mechanisms.

**Democracy and Inclusiveness in State Institutions**

Democracy provides an electoral market for competition. The barriers to entry and exit are low, and the costs of participation are likewise low (Baum and Lake 2003; Brown and Hunter 2004). This sensitivity to electoral returns is what incentivizes democratic politicians to provide policies that reach relatively wide segments of the population—especially if they are concentrated in a specific area. Demands for recognition are generally more likely to materialize because it is easy for minority groups to petition,
demonstrate, and engage via other channels to voice their demands. We see this mechanism unfold in the Taiwan case. With democratization, the Hokkien majority in South Taiwan agitated for more linguistic recognition. As the political landscape shifted to more inclusiveness, it was harder for the state to deny Hokkiens their recognition. Note that since these demands predated political liberalization, it highlights the importance of democratic political institutions.

However, in some cases, the same electoral constraint can also manifest in a tyranny of the majority. If the constituents—especially if they are part of the politically dominant group—want the government to withhold recognition of an ethnic or regional minority, the government can be limited in its overtures toward minority populations. What we end up seeing is a limited minority voice, which results in mobilization. Consider the Batak and Singapore cases. While democracy gave North Sumatrans and the Singaporeans an electoral channel to voice their demands in Indonesia and Malaysia, respectively, in both cases the institutions were perceived as exclusive. For the North Sumatrans, there were perceptions of Javanese dominance; and for the Singaporeans, the federal government was seen as hostile toward the Chinese generally and the Singaporeans specifically. Frustrations in both cases resulted in drastic action, although the ensuing outcomes were quite different. In the Batak case, violence begot institutional accommodation and subsequent national identification. In the Singapore case, efforts to circumvent institutional constraints led to separation from the larger federation. In spite of the different outcomes, both cases unfolded under a period of nominal democracy. This suggests that when institutions favor the politically dominant, the marginalized minority may mobilize with extreme outcomes.

In contrast to the Batak and the Singapore cases, in other cases we see limitations for the effect of democracy on mobilization. In South Philippines, we see evidence of more accommodating education policies for the Muslims during democracy. However, as Mendoza demonstrates with careful process tracing, this is a spurious correlation. The expansion of penetrative education policies happened because of state-building needs and not because of regime type per se. Moreover, Muslim mobilization did not happen until the Marcos dictatorship. Similarly, in Malaysia, where the United Malays National Organization (UMNO) controlled the political landscape until recently, the nominal democratic institutions have perpetuated both a tyranny of the majority—under the collective reference of Bumiputera—and a tyranny of the minority—where the Peninsular (Federa-
ated) Malay cultural narrative dominates over East and Northeast identities. The absence of any regional mobilization despite clear identity differences is testament to how UMNO has used institutional channels to co-opt regional elites.

The one case where democratic institutions seem to have no effect in either direction is Northeast Thailand. While the residents there are culturally distinct from Central Thailand, there have been no ethnic or regional movements—not even during the democratic period when institutions were very inclusive (see Hicken 2006). Ricks argues that this distinctive identity on which mobilization would have happened was effectively eliminated during the absolute monarchy period. As the Siamese king sought to modernize the country, the ethnic minorities in the Northeast—then known as Lao—were incentivized through education and forced through violence to assimilate as Thai. Assimilation efforts continued as the absolute monarchy gave way to a military regime. Over time, the Lao in Northeast Thailand have come to be known as Isan (a moniker for Northeast) as testament to the assimilation efforts. And, thus, when the political regime was a democracy and the institutions were inclusive, there was no distinct identity for mobilization.

This discussion highlights that while democracy may provide an electoral arena for ethnic and regional identities to contest (and mobilize), it is neither necessary nor sufficient for accommodation. When the institutions favor the numerical dominance of the majority ethnic group and/or allow for the co-optation of the regional elites, we are less likely to see mobilization—let alone accommodation.

Democracy and Inclusiveness in Civic Associations

Democracies are also characterized by a vibrant civic society. In fact, some commonly used measures of democracy have non-electoral elements that include freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, and freedom of speech (e.g., Freedom House and Varieties of Democracy). When government allows for civil liberties, civic associations can mobilize, disseminate information, and coordinate their efforts. We see the importance of democracy for civic associations in two Indonesia cases. The Timor-Leste case highlights the importance of Indonesia’s democratic transition. By the late 1990s, the Church played an important role in unifying civil society—and in articulating the demands for independence. However, independence could not have happened in the absence of democracy. As counterfactual
evidence, Harish considers what happened when Timor-Leste declared independence in 1975. The other case highlighting the importance of democracy in facilitating mobilization is Bali. There, the seemingly oversized Balinese ethnic coalition happened because it was actually the only winning coalition. Any smaller coalition would have generated parochial opposition when the larger concern was the developers wanting to reclaim Benoa Bay. Instead, the presence of the shared ethnic identity allowed the many different groups to coordinate on what was effectively the second-best alternative. Without democracy, the protests would not have been possible.

While it is important that democracies foster civic associations, it is imperative that the fostered associations bridge subgroups within a region. When they do so, the us-them demarcation within the regional identity hardens—making it more prone to violence (see Varshney 2003). We see this manifesting in North Myanmar and two cases in Indonesia (i.e., Maluku Islands and North Sulawesi) —where the church has been an important actor. In North Myanmar, while the Kachin Baptist Church played a unifying civic association role, the introduction of semi-democratic institutions has actually led to divisions within the Kachin (manifesting in sub-national violence). The story is similar in the Maluku Islands, where despite a shared Ambonese ethnic identity, democracy allowed quotidian institutions to survive. Likewise, in North Sulawesi, while the Church gave the Minahasans a sense of being a part of a global Christian majority, the intragroup disputes of a more local and parochial nature effectively diminished the ability of Minahasans to mobilize.

The one case of North Thailand at first blush seems to question whether democracy is necessary. There, Lanna cultural civic associations emerged during a period of democracy (1990s–2000s), but the separatist agitations occurred during a period of de-liberalization (early 2010s) that ended in the 2014 coup. Timing and sequence are important here. Without the associational dynamics created during the vibrant democratic period, the ethnoregional networks and symbolic material that framed the political grievances in ethnic terms would have been absent. The very choice of the term “Lanna” rather than the equivalent cardinal term—payap means “north”—that the Northeasterners attached themselves to is instructive.

This discussion suggests that while democracy is important—possibly necessary— for civic associations to mobilize, it is not sufficient (as we see in the North Sulawesi case). Moreover, even when there is mobilization, it is not always for inter-ethnic interests: when democracy is
young or only quasi in nature, civic associations can harden intra-ethnic differences. Under these conditions, we see democracy contributing to violence instead.

Final Thoughts

The discussion in this concluding chapter—which summarized the findings in this volume and offered a broad theoretical argument—supports our original contention that the literature on secessionism, civil wars, and ethnic accommodation suffers from important case selection bias. To address this, we developed a research design that focused on cardinal regions that exhibit a minimal descent-based claim. The case studies demonstrate some support to one of the major theories in the literature regarding state exclusion and regional mobilization—but modifies it by emphasizing the importance of civic associations at the regional level. The volume also considers alternative explanations such as social structure—for example, the relative size of groups and their degree of cross-cutting—and democracy. Each of the case studies is rich in context, thereby allowing for ex post theory building versus ex ante theory testing.

We end with a cautionary note: As governments choose to open the political arena for (more) contestation, the constitutional rules (e.g., electoral and legislative) and other important state institutions (e.g., language policies and education) must not systematically exclude minority regions. If they do, they must find some way of channeling the inevitable civic pressures that will follow. While we have shown that regional-level civic associations must themselves be able to bridge subgroups within a region, governments can find other solutions. They could, as in the case of East Malaysia, simply buy off regional elites via subsidies. More formal ways would be to encourage the inclusion of regional elites into the national leadership of political parties. One method is legislation that requires some kind of broad geographic party registration (Selway 2015). Alternatively, this could take place within parties via formal or informal representation rules (Chandra 2007).
One of the biggest problems dogging the study of separatism has been selection on the dependent variable (Geddes 1990). In order to identify the causes of separatism, it is important to study not only groups that mobilize for some form of separation but also those that do not. Otherwise, we cannot know whether the factors found in the separatist cases might also be present among the non-separatist ones, in which case our conclusions would be biased at best and spurious at worst. Separatism is susceptible to this danger because there is no clearly defined universe of non-separatist and separatist cases. The reasons take us back to Gellner (1983, 43–45), who observed that there are countless potential nationalisms, only a small share of which ever materialize. So when existing studies examine variation in separatism among already existing groups, they are already omitting possibly infinite nongroups that might have mobilized but did not, opening the door to bias or spurious findings. The epistemic risks are even greater among studies that start with a set of “politically relevant” groups or “minorities at risk.” What such studies can say is what causes variation after all kinds of other factors have done the work of getting groups to the point of being politically relevant or at risk, or more precisely, to the point of being counted by scholars as such a group. But this is rarely recognized as a causal identification limitation,
and in any case the results—despite some important findings—are less than satisfying precisely because of this limitation.

Against this background, the chapters gathered in this volume represent a significant breakthrough. The core insight is to treat cardinal regions—regions defined by cardinal directions (north, south, east, west)—within each country as a universe of cases for the study of separatism. This move manages to cover the whole set of possible regionalisms—understood as movements for some kind of greater autonomy for a given region—whether or not an observed regionalism actually exists. This represents a conceptual improvement over my own approach in The Foundations of Ethnic Politics (2008) and other work (Hale 2000), where I treat administrative regions as the units of analysis. Looking at administrative regions does have advantages over group-centered analysis since one can easily identify a universe of such regions (the units that exist in every country) and, by including all regions, ensure that there is no selection on the dependent variable. Rather than presuming some form of group identity as a baseline for analysis, this approach allows us to study identity as an independent variable. It also allows one to test, as I did in my 2008 book, how variation in patterns of group identity (within each region) influences outcomes like separatism. This supplies the empirical grounds for my conclusion that identity distinctiveness and even strong national consciousness do not necessarily push in the direction of separatism—unionist nationalism is quite possible (Hale 2009)—and that identity is much more about cognitive uncertainty reduction, while separatism is primarily about perceptions of regional interests that factor in the credibility of potential political unions not to exploit the regions in question.

The focus on cardinal regions—whether or not they correspond to administrative regions—takes the move an important step further, allowing analysts to further problematize the facts of either the existence or non-existence of administrative regions. This is important. Research that treats administrative regions as starting points has found that variation in the nature of the administrative unit has significant implications among ethnically distinct regions, with greater institutional robustness of the units associated with stronger separatist claims (Beissinger 2002; Cornell 2002; Gorenburg 2003; Hale 2000). And a focus on administrative regions leaves out mobilization that does not correspond with any particular administrative unit; my focus on varying separatism within administrative units led me, for example, not to concentrate on a few very important instances
of mobilization, such as separatism in Moldova’s Transnistria region. By focusing on whether mobilization occurs in cardinal regions regardless of administrative structure, therefore, we gain the possibility of studying the impact of administrative structure on such mobilization while also avoiding the pitfalls of selecting on the dependent variable by choosing ethnic groups as the primary unit of analysis.

The studies in this volume illustrate the strengths of this approach using cases from Southeast Asia, showing what we can learn by combining instances of non-mobilization to instances of mobilization and treating both group/regional identity and territorial institutional design as variables. Out of this rich material, the authors emphasize the influence of three primary factors that existing theory would lead us to expect to be important: demographics, the degree of inclusiveness of state institutions, and the presence of and patterns of organization and connections among civic associations. In what follows, I will first lay out how I see these patterns fitting together in a larger theory of identity politics and then suggest how patterns detected in Southeast Asia may relate to cases in other parts of the world, including those I know best (in postcommunist Eurasia).

**The Nature of Identity Politics**

Identity can be usefully understood as the sets of “points of personal reference on which people rely to navigate the social world they inhabit” (Hale 2004b, 463). That is, identity defines individuals’ relationships to the social world, and identity categories (hence “groups”) are defined by common relationships that sets of people have to important reference points. That is, identity groups share membership in the categories that these points of personal reference define. In this sense, as Brubaker put it, identity politics is about “how people—and organizations—do things with categories” (2006, 12–13).

But not all categories are equal. Because the social world is complex and ever-changing, and because human brains are not capable of perfectly perceiving and understanding all relationships to every aspect of the social world at all moments, some points of personal reference (aspects of identity) take on more important roles than others in guiding behavior. In some cases, this is because some aspects of identity hold more intrinsic importance. For example, in a situation where two people who speak different, unintelligible languages first encounter one another at a time when com-
munication is important, language will likely be more important in guiding how these individuals treat each other than will additional differences they might have, such as different hairstyles.

In other cases, however, certain aspects of identity can take on additional meaning as cognitive rules of thumb, conveying information not only about the distinction defined by the trait itself but also about distinctions along other lines that simply happen to be correlated with the trait in question. For example, if for some historical reason people who speak one language tend to have more money and power than those who speak another language, or if groups of people who have long fought for control over a piece of land for economic reasons tend also to be divided along linguistic lines, individuals are likely to infer information about status or attitudes to the territorial dispute upon hearing someone speak in one or the other language. Identity categories become thick with meaning to the extent that they take on such “extra” meaning as rules of thumb. And people identify with a given identity category when they place themselves in a meaningful social category, implicitly or explicitly recognizing that a “group” exists that is impacted in similar ways by their relationship to the points of personal reference that the categorization connotes (Hale 2004b, 479). In this sense, for there to exist “a group,” it need not have significant meaning at all, only a recognition by a set of people that a group exists (Tajfel 1981). But groups can vary greatly in what Brubaker calls “groupness,” the degree to which people sharing a relationship to a category actually display the kinds of behaviors we think about when talking about “group behavior,” by which we usually imply behaviors that are at least common among the group and at most actually scripted for group members (2006, 12–13). When we talk about the appearance of “group identity,” then, what we really have in mind is a process through which an identity category becomes thick with meaning and people increasingly identify with it.

From this perspective, the question of regional identity can be understood as a question of the thickness of “region” as an identity category for large numbers of individuals and of the extent to which large numbers of individuals identify with the social category defined by their region. The question of regionalism, then, becomes the question of whether regional identity is mobilized (and how powerfully) in the pursuit of regional autonomy and interests. One aspect of this question is of particular interest to people like myself who study ethnic identity: What is the role of ethnicity in driving or facilitating the rise of regional identity and regionalism?
Liu and Selway (cf. Introduction, this vol.) highlight three broad factors that this book’s chapters identify as important determinants of whether regionalism emerges in the cardinal regions of Southeast Asia, and these make sense from the theoretical perspective just outlined. The following pages develop these ideas in the context of the theoretical framework presented above.

When Ethnicity Matters: Accessibility and Fit

Whether a particular identity category becomes a rule of thumb for social navigation—that is, whether it becomes thick enough with meaning for people to strongly identify with it—naturally depends on this category’s cognitive usefulness in serving this purpose. Psychologists have found that whether people invoke a particular category as a guide to behavior in this way depends on that category’s fit and accessibility (Hale 2008, 39). Fit is the degree to which the category appears at least roughly to fit the situation at hand, making it a plausible candidate for taking on extra meaning. To return to the hypothetical example given in the previous section, people who speak different languages are likely to use language as a shorthand for inferring information about status or attitudes only if language repertoire roughly correlates with (or, at least, is implicitly believed roughly to correlate with) status or attitudes. When the two overlap almost perfectly, we say there is a high degree of situational fit, and when there is no observable correlation at all, we say fit is low.

At the same time, an identity category will not be cognitively useful as a shorthand if it itself is hard to observe or for some other reason is unlikely to come to mind for such use. Language can be cognitively useful because it is readily perceptible merely by hearing someone speak, potentially conveying information about that someone even before anyone hears the content of what they are saying. This is an example of accessibility: language is highly situationally accessible, meaning that it is readily available as a cognitive uncertainty-reducing device due to the ease (even automaticity) of perceiving it in a situation like the one described. Even where identity categories are not so easily perceptible, they can also be chronically accessible. A category is chronically accessible when for reasons independent of the situation at hand an individual is likely to invoke that category for interpreting that situation, as might happen when people are socialized through education or experience that a particular way of categorizing people is generally useful (important) or
when people have some sort of motivation to use one way of categorizing people instead of another. That is, chronic accessibility is what the individual mind brings to the situation, while situational accessibility is what the situation brings to the individual mind.

As a way to address selection bias problems involved in studying separatism, the study of cardinal regions is interesting because there is no presumption of a preexisting ethnic group or administrative unit corresponding to a given region that could take on extra meaning by “fitting” with other important social divides and being readily accessible in a given situation. That is, there is no presumption that any particular point of personal reference exists with which people might identify and that might take on extra meaning. People are likely to be able to see cardinal direction on a map, but this presumes a map and enough education to interpret it (Anderson 1983, 116, 163), and in any case there are no intrinsic boundaries between, say, “north” and “south” that can define groups precisely enough to structure collective action (Barth 1969; Wimmer 2013). All of this means that cardinal region in and of itself is extremely unlikely to become a cognitive shorthand in its own right (taking on the extra meaning needed for people to coordinate their activities around a regionalist agenda) without some other identity category at least implicitly coming to do this “work.”

What might be the candidates for doing this work? As Liu and Selway (Introduction, this volume) note, extensive research has found that ethnic categories—broadly defined following Chandra (2012) as categories that are somehow associated with descent—tend to be useful because they are often highly perceptible and “sticky” (difficult or very costly to change) (Chandra 2006; Fearon 1999). In other words, they tend to display high situational accessibility. But even the most perceptible and stickiest categories are unlikely to be useful for understanding and guiding behavior in situations where they do not fit in the sense described above (Kurzban, Tooby, and Cosmides 2001; Voorspoels, Bartlema, and Vanpaemel 2014). So another reason ethnic categories are frequently utilized as cognitive rules of thumb (taking on a great deal of meaning) is that (for a variety of reasons) they tend to be distributed in ways that overlap with divides in other, less readily perceptible but highly meaningful categories like status, wealth, relationships to state-led development, types and ranges of opportunities, and indeed geographic distribution, among many other things (Bates 1974; Hale 2004b).
The Role of Ethnic Structure in Cardinal Regionalism

It is reasonable to posit, therefore, that cardinal regionalisms are likelier to arise where there is at least some overlap between ethnic categories and a given cardinal region. In Southeast Asia, as this volume’s chapters present it, the most likely candidates tend to be distinct languages (or language repertoires), different physical features (i.e., skin color), different religious traditions, and different cultures/customs more generally. Regionalist mobilization in southern Taiwan, for example, grows out of a concentration there of people who share a distinct linguistic repertoire (Hokkien speakers) and cultural differences related to earlier immigration relative to Taiwan’s north, which is far more diverse and historically more oriented to Mandarin (Wu and Liu, this volume). Cases in the post-Soviet world would seem to bear this pattern out. In Russia, a huge but strikingly ethnically homogeneous country, one finds hardly any trace of cardinal regionalism. While some have speculated (or feared) that a distinct “Far Eastern” identity could emerge, nothing of the sort has ever taken hold with enough significance to merit mention here (Sputniknews 2006).1 In Kazakhstan, though, significant broadly “northern” mobilization occurred in the 1990s on the back of the large ethnically Russian population concentrated in that part of the country (Hale 2009; Laruelle 2018). Ethnic categorizations can also be negatively defined. In eastern Moldova (Transnistria), for example, a strong separatist movement emerged less on the basis of ethnic commonality (though virtually all shared Russian in their language repertoire) and more on the basis of not strongly self-identifying with Romanian identity at a time when the country’s central government was thought by many to be pursuing unification with Romania (Kaufman 1996).

Of course, not just any distinct group concentrated in a country’s cardinal region is capable of mobilizing a strong regionalist movement. Drawing on Posner (2004, 2005), Liu and Selway in this volume find important roles in Southeast Asia for group size, which might be specified as the proportion of people belonging to a certain social category (sharing certain attributes) who might conceivably identify with it relative to those who could not be expected reasonably to identify with it. Where (potential) groups have been too small to supply majority support for a regionalist

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1. Again, the focus here is on macro-regions defined by cardinal regions of a country. In Russia, one can find regionalisms on a much smaller scale, among its 80-plus primary administrative regions (subjects of the federation).
movement within a given region, they have typically failed when attempting to mobilize regionalist movements, as did the Ambonese Christian-led South Maluku Republic (RMS) movement efforts (Soedirgo, this volume). Perhaps relatedly, Russian efforts to foment a broad east Ukrainian separatism after annexing Crimea in 2014 rather dramatically flopped outside of certain parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, which had the largest concentrations of people who self-identified as Russian by nationality (Giuliano 2015, 2018; O’Loughlin, Toal, and Kolosov 2016). This provides a sort of baseline proposition for the appearance of regionalism: a minority identity within a given region is unlikely to become a focal point for rallying a strong regionalist movement.

Cross-Cutting Cleavages

Another major pattern emerging in this volume is that cross-cutting cleavages within a region can undermine cardinal regionalist mobilization even when the region in question substantially overlaps with a meaningful ethnic distinction. The possibility of subdividing potentially regionalist groups can provide opponents important resources for countermobilization. This can be done when the cross-cutting cleavages are local: For example, subdivision within the Kachin group led some subgroups to countermobilize against its autonomy movement, and this has been exploited by the Myanmar central government (Pelletier, this volume). Cross-cutting cleavages can also undermine support for regionalism when the cleavage separating the group from the rest of the country is cross-cut by another thick categorical distinction that would divide the country in a different way. Indonesia’s religious divides, for example, have often cut across and undermined efforts to mobilize ethnic-majority-based regionalist movements. This happened with the RMS mentioned above, as Muslim Ambonese (in Indonesia’s Muslim majority but in an ethnic minority) were reluctant to buy into a Christian-led Ambonese regionalism (Soedirgo, this volume). Something similar can be observed in Malaysia, where the potential for East Malaysian regionalism has been largely thwarted by the country’s own cross-cutting Muslim-Christian divide, in part through manipulation by central authorities (Subhan and Ostwald, this volume). The importance of cross-cutting cleavages has been found important in reducing the prospects for ethnic group separatism and even ethnic voting everywhere from India to Africa (Chandra 2005; Dunning and Harrison 2010), and some central leaders (like Mikhail Gorbachev in the late USSR period)
have explicitly mobilized lower-level or subgroup nationalisms in order to weaken separatist initiatives from higher-level ethnic or regional units (Beissinger 2002; Hale 2008).

Whether a cleavage with the potential to drive a cardinal regionalism “wins out” over a cross-cutting cleavage can be expected to depend on some of the same factors that determine whether a regionalist cleavage mobilizes in the first place. At the most basic level, one categorization will have an advantage over another to the extent that it is (a) thicker with meaning, connoting a stronger sense of united fate with greater implications for people’s life chances, and (b) more powerfully available either situationally or chronically. The chapters in the present volume provide some insight into where such advantages might come from. Several chapters echo the emphasis of theorists since Gellner on education (Darden and Grzymala-Busse 2006; Darden and Mylonas 2016; Gellner 1983). When education has ethnic content, it effectively conveys to individuals a conceptual framework for understanding their place in the world that puts ethnic identity distinctions front and center, not only enhancing ethnicity’s subjective fit but also raising its chronic accessibility for interpreting events and deciding what paths of action might be to their benefit (Hale 2008, 95). Thus Menchik (this volume) shows how colonial-era education promoted a sense of distinctiveness that helped drive regionalism among Minahasans in Indonesia’s North Sulawesi, while Mendoza (this volume) describes how the absence of such education during the colonial period explains the relatively weak sense of common Muslim identity and low propensity to rebel in the Philippines’ south (something that changed only in the 1970s). Darden, Grzymala-Busse, and Mylonas have shown that these patterns hold up well throughout Europe and the postcommunist world (Darden and Grzymala-Busse 2006; Darden and Mylonas 2016).

Identity Work Done by Civic Associations

One of the most novel contributions of the present volume, however, is another factor highlighted by editors Liu and Selway: the role of civic associations in promoting identification with ethnic and, by implication, potentially regional categories. By structuring daily life around practices that are understood as ethnic, forming what Soedirgo (this volume) calls “quotidian communities,” civic associations can constantly prime people on ethnicity (making ethnic categories highly accessible) at the same time that they render ethnic categories a strong fit for understanding how the
outside world relates to them in important realms covered by the associations. Thus, for Soedirgo, quotidian communities organized around religion both facilitated regionalist mobilization among south Maluccan Christians in Indonesia at the same time that it essentially doomed these efforts to failure by rendering their efforts to win over the region’s Muslims with appeals to common ethnicity noncredible. Conversely, Selway (this volume) demonstrates that the absence of “cultural civic associations” in Northern Thailand largely explains the absence of strong regionalist movements there, even though the territory stands out for a distinct ethnic Lanna culture and identity. Relatedly, Harish (this volume) finds that East Timorese were able to mobilize a more effective independence campaign in the 1990s than in the 1970s in part because its civic organizations were more unified around the cause.

While I have not seen this factor systematically explored outside this volume, I see parallels between this argument and the study by Brubaker et al. (2006) on how ethnic distinctions that sometimes dominated high politics in the Romanian city of Cluj (in northern Romania, where a large Hungarian population resides) did not tend to extend to the practices of ordinary life, demonstrating a certain weakness of ethnic grassroots mobilizational potential. Relatedly, in the context of the USSR, where the totalitarian state left hardly any room for daily life to be organized by autonomous civic associations, those institutions that did organize daily life on a mass scale (virtually all were state led) had powerful effects on ethnic identification. Because Soviet institutions actually served to institutionalize ethnic divisions and structure many aspects of ordinary life along ethnic lines (including job opportunities, education, and forms of identity one would need to report or present to authorities through one’s domestic passport), these same ethnic lines came to be the basis for much of the ethnic mobilization that took place when the USSR collapsed (with many works citing this mobilization as the cause of this collapse) (Brubaker 1996; Hale 2008; Slezkine 1994; Suny 1993). Other research, though, has found that pre-Soviet authorities in several European regions that became part of the USSR (especially the Hapsburgs and interwar states) actively encouraged the development of cultural civic associations that continued to structure life for many even during Soviet rule (Darden, forthcoming; Darden and Grzymala-Busse 2006). In Ukraine in particular, pronounced senses of distinct cardinal regional identity have emerged among those whose (ancestors’) daily life was organized in this way through civic or state institutions, and these have produced distinct patterns of mobiliza-
tion and identity in some of the country’s western regions relative to those to the south and east (Darden forthcoming). But these western Ukrainian associations have simultaneously promoted a particularly intense identification with the state as a whole, resulting not only in a powerful rejection of regional separatism but to strong opposition to the idea of other regions separating from Ukraine.

Non-Ethnic Boundaries: Administrative and Geographic

Of course, one might at least consider whether categorizations beginning without any inherent ethnic content can create at least some sense of cardinal regional identity that might be mobilized for regionalist ends. Perhaps most prominently, this might be expected to happen when a country’s primary subnational administrative units coincide roughly with cardinal regions. The cases in Southeast Asia would seem to argue against this possibility. The studies of North and Northeast Thailand presented in this volume (Selway and Ricks, respectively) find little evidence of strong regionalism despite overlap with ethnic categories with the potential to thicken in meaning. That said, one suspects that the outcomes could be quite different when such cardinal-region administrative units are delegated substantial decision-making autonomy and made at least somewhat accountable to their own populations, creating incentives for their leaders to cultivate regional identifications that could add legitimacy to their role and actions. One can identify, for example, a number of federal countries in history whose units have roughly corresponded to cardinal regions, and one frequently finds at least some regionalist mobilization there, as in Pakistan in 1970–71, Czechoslovakia in 1990–92, the Mali Federation in 1960, today’s Belgium, today’s Tanzania, and the Nigerian First Republic in 1960–66. But the federal units in these cases also tended to overlap with preexisting ethnic distinctions, if not preexisting lines of actual ethnic mobilization, so do not establish whether administrative boundaries and autonomy by themselves are enough to foster a strong regionalism (I will return to this topic below).

The volume’s focus on Southeast Asia also raises an interesting question of whether natural geographic boundaries, in particular those defining islands, might have the potential to become thick enough points of personal reference to help structure a regionalist movement. One might theorize that island geography makes it easier to “imagine” a map of the nation, with the island providing the visual shape (Anderson 1983, 116, 163).
case of the South Maluku islands, for which the RMS failed to mobilize a unifying regionalist movement, would indicate that groups defined by residence on a set of islands, as with administrative regions, are unlikely to become thick points of personal reference in the absence of other cleavages distinguishing them from peoples on other lands.

Overall, administrative and geographic boundaries are most likely to take on thick meaning as points of personal reference when they at least roughly overlap with ethnic categories, making it easier for identity entrepreneurs to link them to people’s life chances. Indeed, when they are given autonomy, leaders with the power to run administrative units often have powerful opportunities to impact ethnic structure within their territories. As Roeder (2007) compellingly argues, “segment-states” can promote separatism in part by using their resources to align cleavages, reducing the degree to which they cross-cut (or impacting balances) in ways that support regionalist ends that they might believe are to their political advantage. Education can be an important part of these efforts. To the extent that the four Thai regions remain primarily administrative arms of the central government, with little delegation of genuine autonomy, then, comparative experience might suggest that regionalist movements there are likely to remain weak, though the next section identifies some other factors that could change this prediction (and may be doing so already, as Selway indicates).

**Credible Commitments Not to Exploit**

If thick ethnic identification among minority groups concentrated in a cardinal region does not inherently tend toward separation, merely structuring how people understand a given situation, separatism is most likely to result when ethnic categorizations tend to overlap with collective action problems that are motivated not by ethnicity itself but by concerns about life chances that people perceive to be linked to the ethnic categories to which they belong (Hale 2008, chap. 3). Key to whether a cardinal regionalism emerges, then, is likely to be the degree to which central authorities credibly commit to non-exploitation of the country’s different constituent cardinal regions along lines that also roughly correspond to thick ethnic categories.

In this volume, Liu and Selway emphasize one crucial implication: the importance of power sharing, especially when it is institutionalized. The importance of this factor runs strongly throughout this book. Where cen-
Regional institutions and leaderships have tended to suppress important interests of people who share identification with ethnic categories roughly corresponding to cardinal regions, pressures for separation of some sort have tended to arise, as with Singapore’s experience in the Federation of Malaysia (Ong, this volume), the brutal suppression of East Timor by Indonesia (Harish, this volume), and the failure to accommodate Batak considerations also in Indonesia (Toha, this volume). This is strongly in line with a great deal of other research finding that one of the strongest determinants of group rebellion (including separatist rebellion) is their systematic exclusion from power (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010). In other words, cardinal regional rebellion is far less likely when central authorities are able to credibly commit not to exploit cardinal regional populations.

One way central governments can do this is by sharing power with regional authorities, making them at least partly accountable to their own populations. Since federalism is one important form of such power sharing, this volume’s focus on cardinal regions might yield a novel theoretical proposition: Structuring federal systems along cardinal regional lines would seem inherently dangerous for the federation, with the danger increasing when regional demarcation occurs only along one cardinal directional dimension and when the cardinal regional federal units roughly overlap with an ethnic distinction.

Bi-regional federations (as with an east-west or north-south bifurcation) are destabilizing because one unit is almost inevitably at least slightly bigger than the other, which makes it very difficult for the larger side to credibly commit not to exploit the smaller through political dominance. East and West Pakistan thus broke apart in 1971, Senegambia in 1982–89, the Mali Federation in 1960, Czechoslovakia in 1992, and Serbia and Montenegro in 2006 through various forms of regionalist mobilization. Surviving cases are frequently considered among the world’s most unstable federalisms (Belgium, Tanzania) or effectively eliminated regional autonomy (Cameroon 1972).

Nigeria’s First Republic is perhaps the most prominent example of a federation divided along more than two cardinal regional lines, but one region (its Northern region) was still dominant in terms of population over the others (its Eastern and Western regions) (Dent 1995). Being unable to credibly commit not to exploit the minority regions, the central government soon found itself embroiled in the Biafran Civil War. Subdividing the federation, eliminating the cardinal regional structure and creating more incentives to mobilize smaller ethnic categories within cardinal regions,
later stabilized the federation, making it far more credible that the center would not be dominated by a unified northern grouping. Citing this and other examples, I have elsewhere made the case that granting autonomy to regional units in a federal structure (a form of inclusive institution) can stabilize and help unify a country rent by separatism so long as the regional units are defined in such a way that no single one has a clear advantage over the others (Hale 2004a).

Along with institutional solutions, the cases here show that leaders can also take concrete actions or adopt approaches that assuage (potential) fears of (potential) groups that they might be exploited, promoting stabilization and helping prevent strong regionalist challenges. For example, Taiwan’s leadership shifted to accommodate Hokkien speakers with democratization, mitigating regionalist pressures in the country’s south (Wu and Liu, this volume), while the granting of representation ended a Batak rebellion in Indonesia (Toha, this volume). Likewise, a complex, negotiated power-sharing arrangement made possible Singapore’s inclusion in the Federation of Malaysia in the first place, and the violation of its spirit led to its unraveling (Ong, this volume). Outside Southeast Asia, an excellent example of leadership actions defusing potential cardinal regionalist mobilization can be found in Kazakhstan: During his nearly three decades in power, President Nursultan Nazarbayev effectively compensated ethnic Russians in northern Kazakhstan for a slow but steady “Kazakhification” of the country (and suppression of political regionalist movements) with a policy of tight economic and social integration with Russia as well as a steady rise in standards of living (Hale 2009). This led to the marginalization of what in the 1990s looked to many to be potentially strong regionalist movements, while also ensuring that Russia saw no need to help support them (Laruelle 2018).

Conversely, the most nakedly belligerent leadership is quite capable of provoking strong regionalisms where they had not been existent before. The revocation of preexisting autonomy is a classic source of regionalist sentiment where populations have wanted autonomy, as with the Maluku conflict in Indonesia (Soedirgo, this volume), as is outright repression.

2. This also highlights another factor capable of powerfully influencing whether strong regionalist movements occur: potentially interventionist foreign actors. Menchik (this volume), for example, shows how important CIA support was for the Minahasan rebellion in North Sulawesi, much as Mylonas (2012) has demonstrated that this factor can be decisive in explaining patterns of separatism in the Balkans and beyond.
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as with Minahasans in Indonesia’s North Sulawesi and Indonesia’s East Timorese (Harish, this volume), and thwarted representation, as may be happening with Thailand’s Lanna region (Selway, this volume). Outside Southeast Asia, Georgia’s radical nationalist Zviad Gamsakhurdia abolished South Ossetian autonomy in his country’s north in the early 1990s, provoking a strong regionalism in which Russia eventually intervened, and a botched attempt by northern-based power networks to retain power in Tajikistan activated and armed regionally based patronage networks there that wound up provoking a civil war that created strong regionalist identities during the 1990s (Schoeberlein-Engel 1994; Tuncer-Kilavuz 2011). And precisely because leadership change can often bring dramatic shifts in how groups are treated without credibly durable power-sharing institutions, moments of succession or institutional change can often catalyze conflicts in countries where peace had long prevailed, as with Tito’s death in Yugoslavia or democratization in the Balkans (Snyder 2000).

Conclusion

By studying cardinal regions, we gain interesting new leverage on one of the perennial challenges of studying ethnic politics: How to understand group mobilization without presuming the existence of any particular set of groups. By focusing on cardinal macro-regions, general areas of each country defined by cardinal direction and not by any particular ethnic distinction, we automatically include all cases of potential cardinal regionalisms and can (at least in principle) identify the roles of ethnicity and any other factor in shaping whether regionalisms occur and in what form.

This study, of course, is just a beginning. One of the virtues of the cardinal region approach is also one of its weaknesses: the absence of preexisting meaningful points of personal reference also means that any operational definition precise enough to allow quantitative analysis would of necessity be arbitrary or introduce some of the presumptions that the approach is meant to avoid. This volume’s strategy is to let these initial case studies speak for themselves, showing how the approach can supply leverage on individual cases, even though different authors make different choices about how to apply the approach, even about what should or should not be considered a cardinal region. And it is true that for some countries, like Indonesia with its archipelago composition, it is hard even to talk about “cardinal regions.” The results, though, suggest a progressive
research agenda, highlighting the role of demographics, power-sharing institutions, and civic associations in driving outcomes. Future work would do well to develop ways to create datasets that can explore some of these conclusions more systematically, thereby advancing toward the approach’s full potential to illuminate not only the sources of regionalism but also the nature, causes, and effects of ethnic identity itself.


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Contributors

Henry E. Hale  Professor, George Washington University
S.P. Harish  Associate Professor, William & Mary
Amy H. Liu  Professor, University of Texas at Austin
Jeremy Menchik  Associate Professor, Boston University
Mary Anne S. Mendoza-Davé  Assistant Professor, California State Polytechnic University, Pomona
Elvin Ong  Assistant Professor, National University of Singapore
Kai Ostwald  Associate Professor, University of British Columbia
Alexandre Pelletier  Assistant Professor, Laval University
Jacob I. Ricks  Associate Professor, Singapore Management University
Joel Sawat Selway  Associate Professor, Brigham Young University
Jessica Soedirgo  Assistant Professor, University of Amsterdam
Mohamed Salihin Subhan  PhD Candidate, University of British Columbia
Ryan Tans  Lecturer, Yale-NUS College
Risa J. Toha  Assistant Professor, Wake Forest University
Chun-Ying Wu  Postdoctoral Fellow, Barcelona Institute of International Studies
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