

THE STATE STATE YOU SEE

**How Government Visibility
Creates Political Distrust
and Racial Inequality**

Aaron J. Rosenthal

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For Devin Smith

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Introduction

The Submerged State and the Carceral State

Bob Holmes had never voted. Yet in the lead up to the 2016 election, the New Hampshire resident was so enthusiastic about Donald Trump's campaign that his tattoo shop was giving away free Trump-themed tattoos. Speaking to National Public Radio, Holmes explained that he hated "the government thinking that we are just dumb sheep and we're just going to allow them to keep doing this [expletive]. And our country stood up, voted Donald Trump into office because we're not that stupid." Holmes's passion aligned with the narrative surrounding Trump's victory wherein previously disengaged voters found their political voice through the antigovernment themes that pervaded Trump's campaign (Von Drehle 2017). As the title of the article featuring Holmes summed up, "Distrust of Government Drove Many New Hampshire Voters to Trump" (Lo Wang 2016).

A similar theme took hold again in 2020. With his reelection in question, Trump relied on distrust of government to mobilize his mostly white electoral base. During the rise of the COVID-19 pandemic, he leaned into this government antipathy by broadcasting support for protestors of state-imposed restrictions. Observers cast Trump's actions as an attempt to "re-energize the coalition of conservative Republicans and working-class populists who agree with the anti-government sentiment that helped power Mr. Trump's victory in 2016" (Shear and Mervosh 2020).

While prevalent government distrust is often seen as an enduring facet of American culture (A. King 1973), statistical trends show that Trump's

antigovernment electoral strategy was uniquely suited to this point in history. Where 77 percent of Americans said that they trusted government “most” or “all” of the time in 1964, only 15 percent made the same claim in 2015 (Pew Research Center 2015). Similarly, the mid-1960s saw just 35 percent of Americans name “Big Government” as the largest threat facing the country, with comparable percentages seeing either “Big Labor” or “Big Business” as the greatest threat. By the year of Trump’s election, however, the segment seeing big government as the most threatening had jumped to 67 percent (Fishman and Davis 2017).

Among the explanations for this trend (Nye, Zelikow, and King 1997), several scholars have gathered around a shift in American public policy, arguing that Americans have grown more skeptical of government over the last half century as the social benefits it provides come through increasingly clandestine pathways (Mettler 2018). As evidence, they point to the growing number of public policies that incentivize socially desirable behavior by delegating authority to private service providers or supplying assistance through generous tax breaks (Ellis and Faricy 2021; K. J. Morgan and Campbell 2011). Take the Home Mortgage Interest Deduction (HMID) as an example. This tax break, designed to encourage home ownership in the US, grew from \$12 billion in 1967 to more than \$100 billion in 2010.¹ And this concealed benefit is not alone. From 1981 to 2010, the number of hidden tax breaks like the HMID increased 86 percent, while the revenue lost to this concealed assistance rose 130 percent (Mettler 2011b, 121). By 2016, the federal government was losing \$1.6 trillion to social tax expenditures, making them more expensive than Social Security and Medicare combined (Faricy and Ellis 2021, 5). In response to this rising level of inconspicuous aid, scholars have alternatively described the American state as delegated, hidden, and submerged (Howard 1997; Mettler 2011b; K. J. Morgan and Campbell 2011).

In short, a convergence of three factors appeared to boost Trump’s electoral popularity and success. First, public policy changes made government *less visible* over the last half century. Second, this decline in visibility helped generate an increasingly *distrustful* electorate. Finally, this distrust *mobilized* a group of mostly white supporters, like Bob Holmes, to turn up and vote for Trump.

In contrast to this account, a different story was being told in Ferguson, Missouri, just a couple of years before Trump’s election in 2016. While the shooting death of Michael Brown by police officer Darren Wilson initially drew attention to Ferguson, the city remained in the public eye following Brown’s murder due to many of its practices. Of particular interest was

the city's heavy reliance on its criminal legal system (CLS) for generating revenue.² In 2013, the year before Michael Brown was killed, the city collected \$2.6 million in court fines and fees, nearly doubling the \$1.4 million it brought in just two years earlier through this mechanism. As a result, fines and fees made up more than 10 percent of the city's total revenue in 2013 and served as the city's second-largest source of income (Shapiro 2014; US DOJ 2015).

To generate this revenue, the Ferguson Police Department (FPD) aggressively enforced the city's municipal code. For example, a thirty-two-year-old Ferguson resident was issued eight separate citations while seated in his car after playing basketball at a local park. Among the charges were making a false declaration (giving his name as "Mike" rather than "Michael") as well as failing to wear a seat belt in his parked car. As a result of these citations, Mike (or Michael) lost his job. Rather than being an isolated incident, a Department of Justice (DOJ) investigation found that this kind of excessive charging was incentivized by the FPD, with officers receiving rewards and promotions based on the number of citations they issued (US DOJ 2015).

Compounding the situation, Ferguson's municipal courts frequently issued arrest warrants when individuals failed to pay the fines associated with their citations. In 2013 alone, the courts issued more than 32,000 arrest warrants for nonviolent offenses, or roughly three warrants per household (McCoy 2015). In summarizing this behavior, the DOJ wrote that FPD "officers appear to see some residents, especially those who live in Ferguson's predominantly African American neighborhoods, less as constituents to be protected than as potential offenders and sources of revenue" (US DOJ 2015, 2).

As this quote highlights, Ferguson's aggressive policing was concentrated within the city's Black community. In 2013, Black residents made up 67 percent of the city's population, yet they accounted for 85 percent of all vehicle stops, 88 percent of cases involving FPD use of force, 90 percent of all citations, and 93 percent of all arrestees. Among the more trivial citations handed out by the FPD, these disparities grew larger. Black residents comprised 95 percent of the city's charges for Walking in Roadways and 94 percent for Failure to Comply. Among the 75 instances in which the FPD issued more than four citations in a single incident between 2012 and 2014, Black residents were the target in 73. This bias extended to the court system as well, where Black people were 68 percent less likely to have their cases dismissed and 50 percent more likely to have cases lead to an arrest warrant. Demonstrating the nexus of the court and policing system, 96

percent of those arrested by the FPD due to an outstanding warrant were Black (US DOJ 2015).

In striking contrast to these racial disproportionalities in policing was the racial composition of the city's elected officials. Where two in three Ferguson residents were Black in 2014, five of six city councilors and six of seven local school board members were white, along with the mayor (Weissmann 2014). To explain this racial gap in representation, many pointed to low Black participation in the city's elections. In 2013, just 6 percent of Ferguson's Black residents turned out to vote, as compared to 17 percent of white voters (Graham 2015). Though Ferguson's Black population was consistently present on police citations and court arrest warrants, they were notably absent from polling stations and elected leadership.

Some observers drew connections between these disproportionalities in policing and voting. After the U.S. Department of Justice issued its Ferguson report, then-Attorney General Loretta Lynch noted that for many Black Fergusonians, the police are often "the only face of government that they see" (Lynch 2015). Leslie Broadnax, a Black Ferguson native who unsuccessfully ran for county attorney, noted, "I think there's a huge distrust in the system. [Many Black residents think] 'Well it's not going to matter anyway, so my one vote doesn't count'" (Z. Roth 2014). According to these accounts, the police standing out as the "only face" of government in Ferguson helped to explain Black residents' distrust of city government, and their subsequent disengagement from the city's electoral process.

Ferguson is not alone. Scholarship shows that racial turnout gaps remain high (Fraga 2018), with Black people disproportionately losing in American electoral politics, particularly at the city level (Hajnal 2009). Similarly, the FPD's overbearing methods are just one example of a shift in criminal legal policy that has affected communities across the country, often collectively referred to as "broken windows policing" (J. Q. Wilson and Kelling 1982). Promoted by the War on Drugs, supporters of this approach call for a heavier police presence to more aggressively enforce minor crimes (e.g., walking in roadways) (Epp, Maynard-Moody, and Haider-Markel 2014; Michener 2013). As exemplified by Ferguson, this policing strategy has been concentrated within communities of color, and Black communities most acutely (Beckett and Herbert 2009; Fagan and Davies 2000). In contrast to notions of a "hidden" state (Howard 1997), scholars focusing on these communities have described this development as generating an "omnipresent" state, wherein people constantly live in the shadow of domineering government officials (Fernández-Kelly 2015).

Submerged or Omnipresent?

The contrast between the narrative in Ferguson and that used to explain the election of Trump is dramatic. While pervasive *distrust of government* is consistent across both accounts, the roots and consequences of that distrust vary dramatically. In Trump's election, this distrust is seen as emerging from an increasingly *hidden* state and helped to politically *mobilize* a group of mostly white supporters. Conversely, distrust in Ferguson is linked to an increasingly *visible* state that promoted broad electoral *demobilization* among the city's Black population.

The tension between these accounts raises fundamental questions about public policy, race, political distrust, American democracy, and the way government appears in people's lives. How should we understand the visibility of the American state? How has public policy structured government visibility, not only over time but also across racial groups? Does America's widespread distrust of government come from the state being too submerged or too visible? What is the relationship between distrust of government and electoral engagement? How are racial inequality and government visibility implicated in this relationship?

In answering these questions, I argue that contemporary government visibility contains a racial split, wherein the state is made differently visible in the lives of white people and the lives of people of color.³ To explain this racial schism in government visibility, I bring together five previously disconnected public policy trends that have developed over the last fifty years. By attending to these five trends, I argue we can understand how a submerged state helped activate white voters for Trump while an omnipresent state promoted disengagement among the Black residents of Ferguson.

Tracing the Rise of a Dual Visibility: Five Policy Trends

The first policy trend I highlight in shaping this racial divide in government visibility is the aforementioned rise of the submerged state (Mettler 2011b). Where previous research has discussed this policy shift as primarily providing hidden benefits to wealthy Americans (Faricy 2015), I argue that these class-based accounts have overlooked important racial dynamics. More specifically, because so many of these submerged tax breaks are tied to America's racially discriminatory housing and labor markets (Roediger 2007; Taylor 2019; Thurston 2018b), I demonstrate that these benefits have disproportionately flowed to white Americans, helping to explain how America's tax code contributes to the growing racial wealth gap in

the US (D. A. Brown 2021). Drawing on this disparity, I contend that the rise of the submerged state has particularly impacted government visibility among whites.

Ironically, this first policy trend making it more difficult for white Americans to see their own public assistance has been accompanied by a second policy trend that has increased the visibility of government programs perceived as primarily benefitting people of color. Here a combination of policy changes, media stories, and political campaigns have raised the conspicuousness of a range of poverty policies, often collectively referred to as welfare (Hetherington 2005; Kellstedt 2003; Soss, Fording, and Schram 2011). While initially applied to direct-cash assistance programs, “welfare” has become an umbrella term used to refer to various means-tested policies, all linked by the popular misconception that their benefits mostly flow to undeserving recipients, namely Black Americans (Gilens 1999) and immigrants (Garand, Xu, and Davis 2015). With welfare becoming a more salient political topic over the last fifty years (Hetherington 2005), I argue it has also become a more visible representation of government.

Joining these first two trends is a third: a rise in the visibility of taxes. Though it may seem like taxes have been at the center of American politics since the Boston Tea Party, empirical evidence shows that their salience has grown considerably over the last half century (Hacker and Pierson 2007; Prasad 2018). Following the work of others, I attribute the growing visibility of taxes during this time to a combination of policy changes that increased more conspicuous forms of taxation (e.g., property taxes), as well as entrepreneurial politicians that emphasized taxes for their own electoral gain (Martin 2008; Prasad 2018; M. A. Smith 2007). Further, just as media attention and political rhetoric has helped to associate welfare with Black Americans and immigrants (Gilens 1999; Garand, Xu, and Davis 2015), so too have these forces promoted the false perception that whites are the only Americans who pay taxes (Walsh 2017; Williamson 2017).

Bringing these three policy trends together creates a new picture of government visibility among white Americans. Despite benefitting from the growth of many generous, albeit hidden, benefits over the last fifty years, whites have been left with an image of government as a force that takes “their” tax dollars to fund “welfare” policies that only benefit racial others, all while providing little to them in return. As a result, contemporary white Americans fundamentally misunderstand how the state intervenes for their benefit.

The fourth and fifth policy trends concern changes in government vis-

ibility among people of color. The fourth refers to the previously discussed changes in criminal legal policy leading to the greater visibility of the CLS within the lives of people of color. Such changes have taken two primary forms. First, the popularity of broken windows policing has generated a heightened presence of police in communities of color across America (Beckett and Herbert 2009; Michener 2013). Second, this more aggressive policing has led to an increased number of arrests that have combined with stricter sentencing laws to create an explosion in the number of people under correctional supervision (Alexander 2010; Western 2006). Not only does this make the CLS a totalizing institution for those who are incarcerated or on probation or parole (Lerman 2013) but it also raises the system's visibility in whole communities by rippling out through the social and familial networks of the incarcerated (Katzenstein and Waller 2015; Page, Piehowski, and Soss 2019). Collectively, these shifts are often referred to as the rise of the carceral state in the US (Gottschalk 2008).

Notably, these criminal legal policy changes emerged out of a political strategy from opponents of the civil rights movement who sought to tie the civil rights victories of the 1960s to the rising crime rates seen at that time (Weaver 2007). The success of this strategy can be seen in the fifth policy trend: the significant decline in civil rights legislation and the broader decrease in national political attention given to civil rights issues. I argue that the combination of these two trends has allowed government to become less visible as a provider of civil rights and more visible as the enforcer of punitive criminal legal policies. For people of color, this has made the CLS a uniquely conspicuous manifestation of government. Or as Soss and Weaver (2017) put it in echoing a sentiment from Du Bois (1899), today “the police are the government” in communities of color.

While the extant literature has covered each of these five trends separately (e.g., Alexander 2010; Hetherington 2005; Mettler 2011b; Prasad 2018; Weaver 2007), this book shows that the whole story of government visibility can only be understood and appreciated when these trends are brought together. Similarly, where previous studies discuss racial differences in state visibility (Soss and Weaver 2017; Thurston 2018a), *The State You See* represents the first attempt to systematically analyze these differences by considering the rise of the submerged state alongside the growth of the carceral state. In doing so, I not only provide a more comprehensive account of how government appears in people's lives but also illuminate new consequences of contemporary state visibility. More specifically, this combination of policy trends provides a better understanding of why

political distrust is so widespread in America today and how this distrust perpetuates racially patterned political inequality. Each of these contributions are briefly described below.

Why Does Everyone Distrust Government?

Explanations for the tremendous decline in political trust generally suggest that race provides little value in understanding the subject (Craig 1996; Stokes 1962).⁴ This argument emerges from drops in trust cutting “across all categories—Black and white, male and female, rich and poor” (Orren 1997, 84). Statistical trends support this claim. In 1964, 77 percent of both Black and white Americans said they trusted government “to do the right thing” either most or all of the time. By 2017, only 17 percent of whites and 15 percent of Black Americans expressed this same level of faith.⁵ Figure 1.1 illustrates the similarity of trust trends for white and Black Americans over the last sixty-one years. While these patterns do not reveal why trust has declined so dramatically in America, they do seem to indicate that whatever is driving this decline is being experienced evenly across racial groups.

Yet attention to differences in government visibility point to potential limitations in this reasoning. While the policy trends discussed above do suggest an increase in the conspicuousness of parts of the state that people distrust (i.e., welfare, taxes, and the police), they also illuminate how the visibility of these manifestations of government may differ across racial groups. Through the analysis conducted in this book, I find this to be the case. Where white distrust is connected to the growing visibility of taxation and welfare programs, distrust among people of color can be linked to the increasing conspicuousness of the CLS. In short, by focusing so heavily on the *levels* of political distrust across racial groups, this literature has missed differences in the *parts of the state to which that distrust is attached*.

Such an oversight is problematic for developing effective and inclusive remedies to increase trust in government. If we fail to consider the racially divergent reasons that trust is low, we are also likely to develop reforms that fail to foster greater trust across racial groups. American history would suggest such reforms will default to white understandings, thus neglecting concerns that drive distrust among people of color. Beyond this issue, however, this book also shows that it is important to attend to this racial variation in trust attachments because it provides essential insight into the relationship between this widespread political distrust and American democracy.




Figure 1.1. Sources: Pew, ANES, Gallup, ABC/Washington Post, CBS/New York Times, CNN.

Racial Inequality in American Elections: What's Trust Got to Do with It?

In addition to the 1960s seeing the aforementioned high levels of trust in government, this time period also witnessed a peak in voter turnout. Each of the presidential elections in the 1960s saw turnout rates above 62 percent. Apart from the 1940 election, that relatively high percentage had not been seen in America since 1908 and was not surpassed again until 2020. Turnout in each presidential election in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s failed to reach 60 percent, eventually bottoming out at 51.7 percent in 1996.⁶ Thus just as trust in government began to fall at the end of the 1960s, so too did participation.

Seeing these parallel trends as more than coincidental, many scholars sought to unlock the relationship between trust and participation (e.g., Citrin 1974). Initial efforts brought contradictory results, with some researchers finding that individuals with higher levels of trust were more likely to participate (Almond and Verba 1963), while other scholars saw

greater levels of engagement among the most distrustful (Gamson 1968). Ultimately, scholars seemed to settle this debate by claiming that neither relationship existed, arguing instead that trust is unrelated to voting (W. E. Miller 1980b). As a result, most scholarship concerning participation does not include a role for political trust (e.g., Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995).

Of course, a null relationship between trust and participation can be explained in two ways. Where the more obvious explanation is that trust has no impact on participation, a second possibility is that trust appears to have no influence because of a “cancelling-out” effect, wherein distrust encourages greater participation in some cases and discourages it in others. If this is the case, failing to differentiate between these two contexts would lead one to erroneously conclude that trust is not linked to participation where in reality a strong but contingent relationship exists. This possibility has motivated many studies, as scholars try to discover the conditions under which trust can mobilize and demobilize (Levi and Stoker 2000).

Notably, race has rarely been considered in this effort. To the extent that scholars have included race, it is often to investigate conditionalities in the relationship between trust and participation *within* racial groups, such as research seeking out contexts in which distrust generates mobilization among Black Americans (Jackson 1973; Shingles 1981). Given my findings that distrust emerges from different places, however, it seems pertinent to analyze the potentially contingent effect of trust on participation *across* racial groups. Perhaps trust impacts participation differently for whites and people of color because it is tied to different visible manifestations of government.

In pursuing this possibility, I find evidence of this racially contingent relationship, with distrust serving as an electorally *mobilizing* force among whites but a *demobilizing* force among people of color.⁷ Highly distrustful whites tend to see the political process as a path for reclaiming a misspent investment in government, as represented by the misperception of “their” tax dollars flowing to poverty policies. This finding helps to explain how a mostly white and distrusting electoral base rallied behind Trump’s campaigns. It further cuts against previous findings in suggesting that hidden programs can actually lead to greater engagement with electoral democracy (SoRelle 2020), though identifying this mobilizing impact requires attending to the parts of the state that fill the vacuum left by submerged policies.

In contrast, the story of Ferguson exemplifies how the visibility of the state for people of color, in the form of the CLS, generates a political distrust that leads to withdrawal from the electoral process. Distrustful people

of color are more likely to avoid contact with the government, reasoning that just as challenging a police officer as a person of color is a fruitless and potentially dangerous practice, so too is making one's voice heard through traditional electoral channels. In short, the divergent anchor points for distrust are connected to divergent consequences in ways that promote racial inequality in American democracy.⁸ Further, this inequality reveals that the loudest voices in the political process are highly distrustful whites who root that distrust in antitax and antiwelfare sentiment, helping to diminish the prospects for progressive policy reform in the US.

Identifying this political dynamic requires that advocates and scholars do more to account for racial variation in government visibility. Racial justice advocates should consider how to eliminate the many submerged tax benefits that are currently exacerbating the racial wealth gap (D. A. Brown 2021). Such efforts should be seen as working in tandem with reforms aimed at reducing the role, and thus the visibility, of the CLS within communities of color. From this perspective, reductions in the submerged state and carceral state are two sides of the same racial justice coin. To aid advocates in this work, scholars must create theoretical frameworks that approach government visibility in a more racially inclusive manner so we can better understand how these racial divides in visibility are created, and can therefore be dismantled. I turn to that task now.

Identifying the Tip of the Iceberg: A Theoretical Framework

Much of the extant government visibility scholarship functions as a rejoinder. As nations around the world built welfare states to provide greater economic security to their citizenry, scholars argued that the US effort was comparatively stingy (Katz 1986; A. King 1973). In response to characterizations of the US welfare state as reluctant (Jansson 2004), visibility scholars have argued that it is not that the American welfare state spends less but rather that it spends differently (Howard 2008). Most advanced economies rely on social spending programs in which the government directly provides assistance, whether that comes through government-issued checks or government-run services. Conversely, the US utilizes a more complicated range of instruments that tend to obscure the role of the state. Take the previous example of the HMID, wherein the US incentivizes home ownership through a benefit that is obscured within the tax code. Contrasted against this approach is the nation's public housing program. Here

the government directly funds and administers the provision of shelter for individuals. Notably, where the government spent over \$100 billion on the HMID in 2010, it devoted just \$7.6 billion to public housing (Rice 2016). Seizing on comparisons like this, government visibility scholars have highlighted the American welfare state's penchant for providing assistance in hidden ways (Howard 1997). The concept of visibility is thus closely linked to Arnold's notion of traceability (1990), meaning that an entity of government can be understood as visible when an individual is able to trace the entity back to the state.

Thus the overarching argument from visibility scholars is that the last fifty years have seen the American welfare state become increasingly reliant on policy designs that make it difficult for individuals to trace their benefits back to the government (Mettler and Milstein 2007). By uncovering these hidden policies, government visibility scholars have revealed America's submerged state (Mettler 2011b), an iceberg metaphor that suggests America's welfare state only appears small because policy designs hide so much of it beneath the water's surface, away from public view.

Following this metaphor, however, reveals a question: what is the tip of the American state's iceberg? If this scholarship has illuminated the parts of government that have become more hidden over the last fifty years, what state entities have remained visible during this time, or perhaps grown in their visibility? Asking this question highlights the "uneasy tension" that has existed between the extant visibility scholarship and the Race and Ethnic Politics (REP) scholarship, which points out "that at least for some groups, the American state is not hidden, but rather is quite visible and often not for the better" (Thurston 2018a, 162). As briefly described above, scholars here have outlined a different kind of shift over the last fifty years in how the state is made present in communities of color, with a particular emphasis on the rising visibility of the carceral state (e.g., Gottschalk 2008).

Previous research has noted this disconnect, and in so doing pointed to the tendency of the American politics literature to focus on a liberal-democratic "first face" of the state while ignoring the state's social control oriented "second face" that is more present in communities of color (Soss and Weaver 2017). Thus scholars have acknowledged the existence of racial differences in government visibility but missing from these accounts is a theoretical framework designed to systematically uncover how this kind of social variation in state visibility is created and to identify the political consequences that emerge from this variation. The framework presented below fills this gap.

Uncovering Social Variation in Government Visibility

American public policy ensures that people occupying different social positions come into contact with different parts of government. The existence of means-tested policies, such as Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) or the Supplemental Nutritional Assistance Program (SNAP), guarantees that only people falling under a given income threshold are able to benefit from certain programs. This social variation in policy contact is not solely contingent on income eligibility rules, however. For example, the HMID is generally classified as a universal program, meaning it is technically open to everyone. Yet nearly all HMID recipients are wealthier individuals because one can only benefit from it by owning a home (Mettler and Stonecash 2008). Such variation in program receipt begins to spell out how social patterns in government visibility are created, insofar as people occupying different social positions tend to be *exposed* to different parts of government.

Figure 1.2 shows how these socially patterned differences in policy *Exposure* begin to create socially patterned variation in government visibility. Regardless of policy design, a policy will not be visible to an individual if they are never *Exposed* to it.⁹ This mechanism of state invisibility is represented in the leftmost part of figure 1.2 by the *No Exposure* Path A. Put simply, this pathway generates an expectation of social variation in government visibility based on the idea that social position structures an individual's likelihood of benefitting from a given policy.

Of course, individuals can be *Exposed* to a part of government without directly benefitting from it. Most people learn about Social Security before they are old enough to be a recipient. This information could come from someone in a person's social network telling them about Social Security, seeing a story about the policy in the media, or hearing an elected official reference it in a speech. Each of these avenues represents a form of being *Indirectly Exposed* to a part of the state, as opposed to the *Direct Exposure* that comes from personal encounters (Larsen 2019). This distinction between *Direct* and *Indirect Exposure* represents variation in *Proximity* (Soss and Schram 2007; Vannoni 2019).

Proximity interacts with social variation in government visibility insofar as the probability of encountering a part of the state in a direct or indirect manner will vary based on social position. Those who live in poverty are more likely to be *Directly Exposed* to a policy like SNAP, while more affluent individuals are more likely to be *Indirectly Exposed* to SNAP (if they are exposed at all). Thus, even to the extent that people in different social posi-




Figure 1.2. Theoretical framework: How socially patterned variation in government visibility is created

tions can be *Exposed* to the same part of the state, there is still likely to be variation in the form of that *Exposure*. As figure 1.2 shows, this distinction between *Direct* and *Indirect Exposure* is important because *Proximity* shapes the factors that impact a policy's visibility (i.e., the likelihood of someone tracing that policy to government).

In cases of *Direct Exposure*, I expect that policy design will be the most powerful component in shaping visibility. When an individual personally encounters or benefits from a policy, their ability to identify that policy as part of the state should depend on the extent to which the policy design heightens or obscures its governmental connection. The government visibility literature has shown that an increasing number of policies utilize what Hackett calls “attenuated designs,” meaning that they use tax breaks or private service providers that shield the role of government (Hackett 2019). Research shows that individuals benefitting from policies with attenuated designs frequently fail to recognize themselves as state beneficiaries. For example, 60 percent of HMID beneficiaries say they have never received a government program (Mettler 2011b). Figure 1.2 characterizes these cases as *Direct Invisibility*, meaning individuals benefit from a policy but do not connect it to government due to a submerged policy design (Path B).

In contrast to attenuated designs are policies in which the state's role is

made clear. This category includes policies that provide assistance through checks bearing the government's name, such as Social Security (Campbell 2003). In addition to checks, government visibility is heightened when government officials are required to make their connection to the state obvious, such as the marking on the cars and uniforms of police officers (Lerman and Weaver 2014a). From this perspective, "policy design" can be a misleading term because wearing the government's name may not be included in a written policy. For the sake of consistency, however, I refer to the contexts in which clothing or signage makes the state's authority clear as examples of visible policy design.¹⁰ Instances in which individuals are *Directly Exposed* to policy designs that make the government's involvement clear are referred to in figure 1.2 as *Direct Visibility* (Path C).

Importantly, recent research suggests that there will be predictable social variation in the designs underlying the policies to which individuals are *Directly Exposed*. Schneider and Ingram (2019) show that politicians utilize policy designs as a tool for garnering electoral support. When providing benefits that will largely go to those in more powerful positions, elected officials tend to utilize hidden designs to avoid being seen as showering benefits onto the already advantaged. In contrast, they will try to make the state's role visible when imposing burdens onto those in weaker social positions, demonstrating their ability to punish these populations. In studying Arizona legislation, Schneider and Ingram exemplify this pattern in uncovering the widespread use of tax breaks used to mask benefits for the wealthy, along with harsh immigration policies used to highlight the state's visible punishment of undocumented immigrants. Such findings support an expectation of social variation in government visibility being created as individuals in privileged positions are more likely to receive benefits that follow figure 1.2's *Direct Invisibility* path, as compared to those in more marginalized populations encountering policies that follow the *Direct Visibility* path.

Rather than policy design shaping visibility, instances of *Indirect Exposure* provide space for third-party actors to influence one's view of the indirectly encountered part of the state, creating mediated understandings (Edelman 1971; Soss and Schram 2007). When individuals hear about a policy during a conversation with a friend or in a speech from an elected official, I expect that their perception of the policy's visibility will be based on the extent to which the elected official or friend emphasizes or obscures the policy's link to the state.

Notably, third-party actors may have their own motivations in highlighting or obscuring connections between a policy and government

(Mayrl and Quinn 2017). Consider the example of school choice vouchers that allow families to pay for private school tuition with public funds. Proponents of these vouchers often seek to disconnect them from government, arguing that they put “control in the hands of parents and . . . remove the state-centered barrier to [student] success” (Bonner 2013). Hackett (2019) refers to this strategy as “attenuated rhetoric,” wherein individuals advance their goals by placing distance between a policy and the state. Individuals experiencing *Indirect Exposure* to policies that are accompanied by attenuated rhetoric are reflected in figure 1.2’s notion of *Indirect Invisibility* (Path D).

In contrast, opponents of school choice vouchers note that they result in “government money being used potentially for an unconstitutional program” (Ringle 2011; cited in Hackett 2019). When exposed to this form of rhetoric, in which links between the policy and the state are emphasized, individuals are more likely to follow figure 1.2’s Path E, resulting in *Indirect Visibility*. That both *Indirect Invisibility* and *Indirect Visibility* are possible demonstrates the importance of moving beyond a sole focus on policy design in instances of *Indirect Exposure*. In these cases, I expect that the more important factor shaping the visibility of a policy is the content of the cues people receive from third-party sources.

Reflecting these roles played by both policy design and third-party cues, I refer throughout the book to changes in government visibility stemming from policy *trends* rather than policy *changes*. Where I view policy changes as primarily focusing on shifts in the policy itself, I use the term *trends* to underscore alterations in both the design of a policy and the rhetoric accompanying that policy. For example, as revealed in chapter 2, developments in the visibility of taxes emerged both from changes in US tax policy and shifts in the attention given to taxes by political elites. Using the term “policy trend” allows me to refer to these shifts in design and rhetoric simultaneously.

In sum, this theoretical framework provides a systematic explanation of the way social variation in government visibility can be created. First, social position structures the parts of the state to which people are *Exposed*, meaning that variation in visibility will occur due to individuals in specific social positions never coming into contact with certain parts of the state. Second, electoral strategies embraced by politicians suggest that individuals in more advantaged social positions are more likely to benefit from policies in which the state is hidden, while those in disadvantaged positions will tend to receive benefits (or burdens) from entities visibly connected to the state (Michener 2019; A. L. Schneider and Ingram 2019). Third,

even in those instances in which individuals in different social positions are *Exposed* to the same policy, there is still likely to be social variation in the form of that *Exposure* (i.e., direct or indirect). Due to this distinction, the factors involved in making that policy visible are likely to vary across social positions. Policy design plays a key role for those *Directly Exposed* to a policy, while the visibility of a state entity experienced indirectly will depend on the extent to which third-party rhetoric connects that entity to the government.

Finally, this framework uses the language of social differences, rather than applying a specific focus on racial variation. This is an intentional choice designed to highlight the portability of this theory for studying variation in government visibility across other social dimensions (e.g., class, gender, etc.). With that said, I believe race stands out in its capacity for structuring differences in visibility (D. King and Lieberman 2009). To focus only on the mechanism of *Exposure*, the historical and contemporary prevalence of racial oppression in the US has ensured that most public policies in the country contain racial disproportionalities in their recipient base. For example, where whites make up 72 percent of the country, they account for 81 percent of Medicare beneficiaries but only 43 percent of Medicaid beneficiaries (Michener 2019, 428). Mirroring this racially disproportionate provision of policy benefits is the American state's arrangement of policy burdens. The example of Ferguson highlighted earlier exemplifies how people of color disproportionately serve as the "burdenficiaries" of the criminal legal system (Alexander 2010; Michener 2019; Redner-Vera and Galeste 2015; Rios 2011). Subsequent chapters will make clear how these differences in *Exposure*, as well as differences in *Proximity*, create a particularly strong schism in government visibility across racial groups.¹¹

Of course, demonstrating that social differences in government visibility likely exist does not explain the political importance of those differences. As the next section shows, however, the social variation discussed above has clear implications for the development of the political attitudes and behaviors that shape American democracy.

Locations of the State: How Government Visibility Shapes Political Attitudes and Behavior

To appreciate how government visibility influences political understandings, I begin with the role public policy plays within the political process. While policy is usually discussed as the result of the political process,

the concept of policy feedback challenges this unidirectional treatment (Pierson 1993). According to this concept, the public preferences that inform elected officials are themselves shaped by policies (Campbell 2012; Mettler and SoRelle 2014), marking policies as not just the outputs of the political process but also as inputs capable of altering that process (Mettler and Soss 2004).

Policies can have this impact in two ways. First, by providing individuals with material resources, policies give people new incentives to engage in the political process. This mechanism helps to explain how Social Security increased political cohesion and engagement among senior citizens, making them into one of the most feared voting blocs in the US (Campbell 2003). Beyond these resource effects, policies can also impart lessons about government in ways that alter people's subsequent political attitudes and behaviors. Soss (2000) provides an example of these interpretive effects, showing that recipients of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) learn through their interactions with caseworkers that they are unlikely to be heard in the political process. Just as these recipients were denied voice when claiming their benefits, so too do they come to believe that all of government will not respond to their needs.

As these examples suggest, feedback scholars often demonstrate people's reliance on specific government entities in forming their broader beliefs about government. According to this argument, people extrapolate from their understanding of one part of the state in developing their sense of how government works as a whole. Beyond AFDC and Social Security, Lerman and Weaver (2014a) show that individuals who have experiences with the CLS come to interpret how government works through these experiences. As individuals have more intense levels of contact with the system, they not only become less likely to trust the CLS but also less likely to place trust in government as a whole. Similar arguments have been put forward for other policies and state entities, ranging from Medicaid (Michener 2018) to the GI Bill (Mettler 2007a).

In the remainder of this book, I refer to these influential parts of the state as people's *location of the state*. I argue that these parts of state become the anchor points to which people tie their evaluations of government and through which they develop an understanding of how the state will treat them. Their feelings about these locations of the state then become a constitutive part of their political attitudes (e.g., political trust) and political behaviors (e.g., political participation). Through these connections, locations of the state play an important role in shaping both American public opinion and American democracy.

Notably, psychological processes explain why these locations of the state exist. Abstract concepts present a cognitive challenge for people. To work through this challenge, individuals will fill in their understanding of an abstract concept through the use of examples (Medin and Schaffer 1978; Ross and Makin 1999). Consider the concept of fruit. To form an understanding of what constitutes fruit, people will draw on examples they have seen (e.g., apples, bananas, oranges, etc.) (Reisberg 2012). Known as the exemplar model of cognition, this theory suggests that people rely on concrete manifestations of an abstract concept in order to make sense of it. Applied to this framework, locations of the state provide the concrete examples that make it possible for people to form an understanding of “government” as an abstract concept.

That people would focus on specific instances of government in their comprehension effort also fits with the psychological understanding of humans as cognitive misers (Fiske and Taylor 1984). When asked to provide a judgment of an object, people do not consider all relevant information. Instead we use a cognitive shortcut by relying on information that is more readily available (Tversky and Kahneman 1973). For example, if media coverage highlights the president’s handling of foreign affairs, people will be more likely to invoke their judgment of the president’s foreign policy when evaluating the president as a whole (Iyengar et al. 1984). By relying on information that is more easily accessible in the brain, people reduce their cognitive load, making it easier to form evaluations in the complex and information-rich environment in which we live. Thus when people are asked to provide a judgment of government, they will rely on information that can be brought forth with less cognitive effort.

Bringing this research together, I argue that people forming their attitudes on government will not consider all relevant information but instead will reduce the cognitive burden of the task by using concrete examples of the state within their life (i.e., their locations of the state). Put simply, these locations of the state make it cognitively easier for people to understand what government *is* and *does*.

Government visibility then assumes an important political role because the visible parts of government in a person’s life supply their potential locations of the state. Further, social variation within this visibility is salient because it should lead to social variation in locations of the state, creating social patterns within political attitudes as these different parts of government become tied to people’s political understandings.

Importantly, emphasizing this social variation in government visibility, and therefore social variation in locations of the state, requires flipping the

analytic perspective generally adopted in feedback research. As seen in the studies discussed above, the tendency in feedback research is to explain the political power of particular policies (i.e., locations of the state) through the in-depth analysis of a single program selected by the scholar (e.g., Medicaid, Social Security, the GI Bill, etc.). In doing so, these studies privilege the political role of specific government interactions at the expense of others. By deciding which policies to study, scholars foreclose on the potential political influence of other government entities within a person's life and further privilege their own understandings of the important parts of the state above those of the public (Michener, SoRelle, and Thurston 2020).

In contrast, my expectation that social variation in government visibility also creates social variation in people's locations of the state requires that I begin without focusing on the political power of a particular policy, and instead do the work of locating the state within people's political understandings. To engage in this work requires systematically identifying which of the visible manifestations of government in a person's life actually take on this influential role. Any person is likely to connect a large range of entities back to the state, so a necessary consideration is which among these visible entities plays an outsized role in helping individuals form evaluations of government. I posit that two criteria are helpful in identifying these locations of the state: frequency and emotional content.

Frequency

If you are bad at remembering names (as I am), you might have been taught this trick. When you are introduced to a new person, repeat their name and then try to repeat it again shortly thereafter. Underlying this trick is psychological research emphasizing the connection between repetition and association. As Tversky and Kahneman note, "That associative bonds are strengthened by repetition is perhaps the oldest law of memory known to man" (1973, 208). By repeating the person's name when you meet them, you are strengthening the association between their face and name, theoretically making it easier to remember their name the next time you see their face.

Applying this same logic to my theoretical framework leads to an expectation that state entities are more likely to become locations of the state when people are exposed to them more frequently. As individuals consistently encounter the same policy, the associative bond between that policy and the state grows stronger, making it more likely that they will rely on their understanding of that policy in forming broader evaluations of gov-

ernment. Indeed, existing studies show that policies more durably shape people's political attitudes and behavior when contact with that policy is more consistent (Jacobs and Mettler 2011).

In recognizing the role of repeated contact, however, it is important to remember that not all forms of contact with a policy will provide a clear link to the state. In cases of frequent *Direct Exposure*, attenuated designs will minimize the connections to the state that people draw. One might receive a tax break every year, but because the role of the state in providing this benefit is hidden, it is less likely to serve as a location of the state. Similarly, attenuated rhetoric can obscure the state's role in instances of consistent *Indirect Exposure*. If a person is seeing news stories every day about charter school vouchers in which politicians are framing the issue as one of parental control (Hackett 2019), charter school vouchers are not likely to be an anchor point that is attached to that person's opinions of government. Conversely, being stopped by the police frequently (where uniforms make the state's role clear), and/or hearing stories from others in which policing is being discussed as a government issue, makes the police a more likely location of the state. From this perspective, repeated contact may be necessary for an entity to serve as a location of the state, but it is not sufficient. The role of policy design and third-party rhetoric remain influential.

Emotional Content

In addition to the frequency of *Exposure*, I argue that the emotional content of one's *Exposure* also plays a central role in the probability of a given entity becoming one's location of the state. All experiences are not equal in their capacity to impact people's cognitive connections. The concept of negativity bias suggests that experiences triggering negative emotions are significantly more influential and memorable than those fostering positive feelings (Ito et al. 1998; Lau 1985; Rozin and Royzman 2001). Not only do we pay more attention to negative events but we also learn more from negative experiences and place greater emphasis on these experiences in making decisions (Cacioppo, Cacioppo, and Gollan 2014). As an example, studies show that negative encounters with the police have a much stronger influence on people's perceptions of the police as compared to positive interactions (Mondak et al. 2017). Indeed, there is evidence that adverse experiences with cops are fourteen times more impactful than positive experiences in shaping global evaluations of the police (Skogan 2006). Drawing on this negativity bias principle, I expect that individuals

are more likely to treat an entity as their location of the state if their *Exposure* to it has generated negative emotions.

The importance of social variation, and more particularly racial variation, for structuring locations of the state is made clear when reflecting on this role of negativity bias. Studies have shown that when individuals encounter certain parts of government, people of color are far more likely to have a negatively charged experience. Such findings affirm the prevalence of racism in a wide range of America's governing institutions, including schools (Bruch and Soss 2018), the police (Epp, Maynard-Moody, and Haider-Markel 2014), and welfare agencies (Soss, Fording, and Schram 2011). This analysis shows how locations of the state can differ across social groups, even when citizens are *Exposed* to the same part of government. If a group's experience with the state entity is more likely to be negative, that entity is more likely to serve as their location of the state.

Emotional content and social variation also interact in instances of *Indirect Exposure* through the theory of socially constructed target populations (Schneider and Ingram 1997). In addition to policies containing material disproportionalities by providing greater benefits/burdens to one social group over another, this theory argues that policies can also contain social constructions of the individuals who benefit from it, creating *perceived* disproportionalities. These social constructions often build on inequalities in the provision of material benefits, such that a policy which provides disproportionate benefits to a social group is seen as primarily, or even exclusively, benefitting that group. For example, while structural oppression has led to Black Americans making up a disproportionate number of direct cash assistance beneficiaries relative to the racial composition of the nation, stereotyped constructions of welfare recipients lead people to incorrectly assume that *almost all* direct-cash beneficiaries are Black (Gilens 1999; Hetherington 2005).

I argue that these social constructions are important because they can shape the emotional content of one's *Indirect Exposure* to a policy. When a social group's indirect contact with a policy is accompanied by a social construction that leads them to believe that their group is the primary "beneficiary" of a policy, they are more likely to respond with negative emotions in recognition of their position as a "shared policy target" (Nuamah 2021). That policy is then more likely to become a location of the state for individuals in that social group due to this negatively charged *Indirect Exposure*. Consider, for example, that the construction of Black Americans as the perceived beneficiaries of welfare has also constructed white Ameri-

cans as the primary burdened beneficiaries of this policy (HoSang and Lowndes 2019). White *Indirect Exposure* to welfare through rhetoric that emphasizes this burdensome social construction then helps to drive welfare as a location of the state for whites due to the negative emotions it produces. As such, rhetoric drawing on the social construction of target populations for specific policies creates another pathway through which locations of the state can vary across social positions.

In sum, past policy feedback research has shown that individuals frequently rely on their understandings of a specific government entity in forming their broader evaluations of government. Building on this research, I refer to these salient manifestations of government as people's location of the state, and I further show that psychological tendencies designed to limit cognitive effort reveals why people draw on these concrete examples of the state in constructing their evaluations of government. I also argue that frequency and emotional content are key to understanding which parts of the state people will actually draw on in this manner. More specifically, I expect that the parts of the state that people are *Exposed* to repeatedly, and which generate negative feelings, are the most likely to become their location of the state.

Connecting this argument to the previous section's hypothesis of social variation in government visibility provides a complete picture of my theoretical framework. I hypothesize that there will be social variation in people's locations of the state, insofar as only visible manifestations of government in a person's life can serve this role. Ultimately, because these locations of the state become tied to people's political attitudes and behaviors, this social variation in visibility provides an entry point for understanding social patterning within American public opinion and American democracy.

Finally, in closing this framework, it is important to reflect on its approach to causality. Throughout the book, I describe people's locations of the state as anchor points for their broader understandings of government. Through this metaphor, I emphasize that I am interested in how people's political attitudes and behaviors are *associated* with their locations of the state, rather than analyzing how locations of the state *cause* particular attitudes. To the extent that there is a causal factor described within the framework, the emphasis is placed on public policy. Public policies, and the rhetoric associated with policies, are seen as causing social variation in government visibility, which in turn causes social variation in the particular attitudes that become tied together. This approach to causality is explained in greater detail in the research design discussed below.

Locating the State: A Research Design

The previous section described a flipped analytic perspective in relation to policy feedback research. Again, most feedback scholarship begins with a specific policy or range of policies in mind and investigates how these policies shape subsequent political attitudes and behaviors (Michener 2018; SoRelle 2020; Thurston 2018b). In contrast, locating the state requires starting without an interest in a particular policy, but instead with a desire to identify the influential parts of government in a person's life that shape their political understandings. Carrying out this theoretical intervention similarly requires a methodological shift. More specifically, I utilize a bottom-up approach to policy feedback that begins with people's political attitudes and behaviors and traces these back to the parts of the state to which they are connected (Michener, SoRelle, and Thurston 2020). The methods and methodologies detailed below explain how I put this approach into practice.

Interviews

The empirical center of this research design is a set of in-depth, semistructured interviews that were conducted and analyzed using an interpretive methodology. The flexibility provided by this method is a key asset for this research design, insofar as the open-ended nature of semistructured interviews places greater emphasis on the knowledge and experiences of the interviewees, as opposed to the a priori expectations of the researcher (Soss 2000; Spradley 1979). In line with the analytic emphasis of my theoretical framework, interviewees were given space to bring up any part of government they wished to discuss, unencumbered by any scholarly preconceptions I might have had about the parts of government that would be important in their lives. To encourage this freedom, I asked questions designed to get interviewees talking about government in different contexts (Schaffer 2016), such as more abstract uses (e.g., "What do you think of when you hear the word 'government?'"), as well as more personal, concrete usages of the term (e.g., "Over the last year, can you think of a time that you interacted with government?").¹² Similarly, follow-up questions allowed me to ask people if there was a part of government or an experience with the state that they felt exemplified more abstract attitudes about government that they shared (e.g., "I don't trust government") (Rubin and Rubin 2011).¹³ Through these questions, I identified those parts of the state that interviewees emphasized most in discussing government, giving me a sense of their locations of the state. Further, all interview subjects

filled out a survey following the interview that asked about their receipt of twenty-one government programs, allowing me to identify the parts of government that people benefitted from but did not mention during the interview (i.e., policies that were *Directly Invisible*).

Beyond their semistructured form, the interview's emphasis on drawing connections between expressed political attitudes and specific government entities followed an *interpretivist* methodology that fits with the theoretical framework's approach to causality. This approach differs from positivism, where more emphasis is placed on uncovering how one attitude *causes* another. Instead interpretivism places greater emphasis on establishing a coherent logic within which attitudes are connected to each other (Lin 1998). In the case of these interviews, it was particularly important to uncover the role that locations of the state played within this logic—not as a way of showing how these locations caused particular attitudes but rather to demonstrate that they helped structure how people think about government and politics (Cramer 2016). To give a specific example of this approach, chapter 4 is not concerned with how one's location of the state *causes* their level of trust in government but rather is interested in showing how one's location of the state is *connected* to their level of trust.¹⁴

Of course, my goal was not just to locate the state but also to examine how those locations differed across social positions. In order to examine this variation, it became essential to recruit interviewees from a wide range of social positions. The next section explains the ethnographic methods used to facilitate this recruitment.

Ethnographic Fieldwork

In line with the theoretical framework's emphasis on social variation broadly, I did not begin this research with a specific focus on race. Rather my goal was to listen to a variety of people who worked across social dimensions that have been central to the study of political science (Becker 1998; Cramer 2016; Schaffer 2016). In searching out this variation, I applied a case study logic to my sampling, meaning that each case (i.e., interviewee) was used to inform the selection of future cases (Small 2009; Yin 2013). As my framework developed, I was consistently working to understand the social cleavages within government visibility and recruiting interviewees from social positions that could either disrupt or confirm my evolving expectations. For example, as early interview data informed my belief that government visibility varied along racial lines, I worked to recruit interviewees within the same racial group who differed in other ways (e.g.,

different educational status, different income, different town, etc.) to see whether the suspected racial schism would hold. Rather than aiming at statistical representativeness, this sequential case study logic works toward a saturation point, such that the final interviews provide “very little new or surprising information” (Small 2009, 25).

To attain social variation in my interviewees, I used purposive sampling to select four research sites in an upper Midwestern state from which I conducted my recruitment (Miles, Huberman, and Saldaña 2013). Site A is a racially and ethnically diverse working-class neighborhood sitting in the urban center of a large metropolitan region. Site B is a middle-class, mostly white neighborhood located just inside the municipal boundary of the largest city in the same metropolitan region. Site C is an affluent suburban town, almost exclusively white, within the same metropolitan region. Finally, Site D is a middle-class rural town that is almost exclusively white and is located well outside of the metropolitan region. At each site, I spent approximately three months attending local community meetings and social gatherings before requesting any interviews as a way to build trust with residents.¹⁵ In addition, I also used purposive sampling to recruit interviewees from a sample collected at a large fair that attracted individuals from all over the state to get past any idiosyncrasies associated with these four sites.¹⁶

Table 1.1 provides a demographic profile of my interviewees.¹⁷ In total, I interviewed fifty-eight people between February and December of 2016, with each interview averaging approximately ninety minutes. While this is a relatively large number of interviewees, the interviews were never intended to provide data that could statistically generalize out to the nation, as explained above. Instead the statistical generalizability of my interview findings came out of my quantitative analysis.

Quantitative Analysis

The statistical analysis of nationally representative datasets allowed me to test how particular findings and patterns from my geographically and temporally bound interviews mapped on to other spaces and times (Lin 1998). In places where I am most interested in patterns of policy use and visibility, I rely on the Social and Governmental Issues and Participation Study (SGIP), which is a nationally representative dataset that is rare due to it asking individuals about their use of twenty-one different social programs, including several submerged policies.¹⁸ I also utilize the American National Election Study (ANES) when analyzing relationships between political

TABLE 1.1. Interviewee Demographic Profile

% White	74
% Black	10
% Asian	10
% Latinx	2
% Multiracial	4
% Female	53
Median household income category	\$50,000 to \$75,000
Median educational achievement	College Degree
% from Site A	19
% from Site B	17
% from Site C	12
% from Site D	14
% from Fair Site	38

attitudes and behaviors that surfaced during the interviews. Beyond testing the robustness of my findings for American public opinion and American democracy, the ANES provides an additional advantage because it has asked many of the same questions over the last seven decades. Thus, while my interviews can only speak to contemporary dynamics, these historical quantitative datasets enable an identification of how the patterns of attitudes and behaviors I uncovered in the interviews have varied over time. Given my emphasis on the causal role of public policy, this historical analysis is crucial in allowing me to explore how past policy shifts have aligned with hypothesized changes in attitudes and behaviors.

Finally, to further explore this connection between policy changes and my empirical findings, the analysis process involved an ongoing movement between the data I was collecting and the extant literature. In this dialogue between fieldwork and framework, I used findings from existing scholarship to develop interview questions and to interpret the data provided in response (Soss 2014). In addition, I utilized what I was hearing in the interviews to guide my reading and to help form critiques of that literature. In this tacking back and forth, I was struck by the disconnect between the answers I was hearing in the interviews and the government visibility literature's emphasis on an increasingly hidden state. This disconnect pointed me toward REP scholarship in which government visibility was described in very different ways, such as the scholarship highlighted earlier that referred to policy shifts making the state omnipresent in communities of color (Fernández-Kelly 2015). As this example shows, this dialogue between fieldwork and framework was particularly essential in illuminating how the data I was hearing could be contextualized within historical policy

trends yet to be considered alongside each other. Ultimately, the remainder of the book provides the finished product of this dialogue, made to look much cleaner than the process that went into its construction.

Outline of the Book

The next two chapters introduce the formation of a racial split in American government visibility that has developed over the previous five decades. In chapter 2, I demonstrate that the growth of benefits submerged within the tax code has mostly benefitted whites, meaning it is primarily white Americans who have become less aware of how they benefit from government. Alongside this policy change, shifts in policy design and elite rhetoric have combined to make the state more visible in the form of taxation and “welfare” policies perceived as primarily benefitting Black Americans and immigrant communities. The contrasting visibility created by these trends leaves whites with an image of government as an entity that takes “their” tax dollars to provide benefits to racial others.

Chapter 3 then turns to two other policy trends to explain government visibility changes for people of color. First, this time period saw the decline of civil rights legislation. This decline was driven in part by political elites fostering a racist association between civil rights victories and a rise in crime, generating the second policy shift: “law-and-order” criminal legal policies that promoted aggressive policing and mass incarceration. In this way, people of color also experienced a form of contrasting visibility that has resulted in the CLS being a uniquely visible manifestation of the state. The chapter concludes by contextualizing this duality within America’s history of racial inequality.

Chapter 4 connects this racial split in state visibility to the historically low levels of political trust in America. After outlining the motivation behind my focus on political trust, I combine interview data with statistical analysis to show how people connect their level of trust in government to the parts of the state made most visible in their lives. My analysis reveals that white distrust is connected to welfare attitudes, while distrust among people of color is linked to feelings about the police. The chapter also incorporates an analysis of historical survey data to show how these trust associations have changed over time in alignment with the shifts in government visibility. I finish the chapter by elaborating on the implications of these findings for reforms aimed at increasing political trust.

The findings from chapter 4 are picked up in chapter 5. I argue that

the racially divergent anchor points of government distrust lead to racially divergent political consequences. Once again combining interview data and statistical analysis, I show that distrust among whites is associated with higher rates of electoral engagement across several specifications of this concept, while distrust among people of color fosters electoral demobilization. These findings illuminate how the public's widespread distrust of government fosters racial inequality within American democracy. The chapter closes with a discussion of the consequences that flow from the combination of chapter 4 and 5's findings, with a particular focus on the obstacles they present for progressive policy reform.

Having demonstrated the racial divide within the visibility of the contemporary American state, and the normatively disheartening results it generates, chapter 6 turns to ways these structures can be disrupted. This investigation focuses on the role of Black Lives Matter (BLM), a social movement that directly challenges the dual visibility dynamic by making police violence *more* visible in order to generate political mobilization. Through statistical analysis and interview evidence, I show how BLM uses a politics of visibility to shift political attitudes and behavior among both people of color and whites. For people of color, BLM is able to subvert the narrative associated with police visibility, transforming policing from an issue of personal failure to one of collective grievance, helping to generate greater participation in protests. Among whites, I find that BLM makes the police a more visible manifestation of the state but also faces a difficult task in converting this visibility into political action. I close the chapter with a discussion of 2020's unique conditions, showing how these have increased the disruptive capacity of BLM's use of the politics of visibility.

The concluding chapter uses findings from my analysis to consider future avenues of research, as well as the strengths and weaknesses of various policy reforms. I urge future scholars to consider additional forms of variation within the study of state visibility, including social dimensions beyond race and differences in visibility across levels of government. In addition, I highlight limitations within reforms centered around surfacing currently hidden social welfare policies. In place of this policy change, I argue for a reform strategy that combines a universal basic income with a reduction of the responsibilities given to the police, seeing such a strategy as capable of constructing a version of government visibility that promotes greater racial equity, both politically and economically.

Taxes and Welfare

The Tip of the Iceberg in White America

I interviewed Charlotte five days before the 2016 election. It was an unseasonably warm November afternoon, so we sat in her backyard and talked all things government. Charlotte lives in Site A, a community with a median income around \$35,000 and a high level of racial and ethnic diversity. Her white racial identity fits with about a quarter of the neighborhood, with the remaining three-quarters largely divided between Latinx, Black, and Asian Americans.

We started the interview by talking about Charlotte's many years living in the community and the changes she had seen during that time. After discussing how she felt the neighborhood was improving, particularly in comparison to the "really bad" years when crime levels were high, the interview moved into a more specific discussion of government and politics.

AJR: When you think about government in your own life, what would you say you feel like are the one or two ways that it has the biggest impact on you?

Charlotte [white]: Taxes. I mean, I don't really have any government assistance. I mean, in our neighborhood it makes an impact because of people that need government assistance, but me personally, I pay taxes. And fees that they call not taxes. But are basically taxes.¹

A month later, I sat down to talk to Jay at a local library. Like Charlotte, Jay is a resident of Site A. Unlike Charlotte, however, Jay is multiracial, identifying as Black, Native American, and white.

AJR: Do you feel like government impacts your life every day?
Jay [Black, Native American, white]: I mean, maybe some days more than others just because of the, like, policing downtown, like I've told you before. When I have to take the bus a lot of time, I'm wondering if I'm gonna have to stand out in the cold, because the police are gonna harass me to get out of the [indoor tunnel system]. Or just get harassed by the police on the regular. . . . You're always wondering if there's gonna be some problem. I think we had some community event, we rented out the place, and had a community event on the field, and the police came. I don't wanna say harassment, cause when you say that, you're thinking they're telling you to leave or pushing us around. But it's a form of harassment because they're profiling. . . . But a group of white people playing [on the other side of the park], and they never went to go say anything to them. And we're like, "Why are you not saying anything to them? Why just come over here and bother us?"

While living in close proximity, Jay and Charlotte see government playing a different role in their lives. For Charlotte, the state shows up as a force that taxes her and provides "government assistance" to the people in her neighborhood. Neighbors who, it is important to note, are a majority people of color. In contrast, Jay's daily experience of government centers on racial profiling and harassment from the police.

In the remainder of this book, I argue that Charlotte's and Jay's answers exemplify a duality in American government visibility that has created racially distinct understandings of what government *is* and *does*. Among whites, taxes and poverty policies serve as strong locations of the state, convincing them that government takes their tax money to fund programs that mostly benefit racial others. In contrast, the criminal legal system (CLS) stands out as a particularly prominent location of the state for people of color, revealing government as a force most interested in surveillance, control, and violence. These racially divergent locations of the state simultaneously explain why so few Americans trust government and how that widespread distrust perpetuates racial inequality in American democracy.

Before turning to the implications of this split, however, the next two chapters begin by explaining how the racial duality in government visibility has formed. To do so, I intertwine interview evidence and statistical analysis to shed new light on historical policy developments. More specifically, I bring together five previously disconnected policy trends that I argue have converged over the last fifty years to construct racial variation in people's

locations of the state. Consistent with the framework from the previous chapter, each of these policy trends attends to both policy design and third-party cues to capture changes in *Direct* and *Indirect Visibility*. As such, I consider shifts in actual policies as well as transformations in the rhetoric accompanying those policies.

In this chapter, I focus on the white side of the racial split, isolating three policy trends that have changed state visibility in the lives of white Americans over the last half century. First, I trace the rise of social benefits that are “submerged” in the tax code, demonstrating how these programs have showered white Americans with *Directly Invisible* state assistance (Metzler 2011b). Second, I point to developments in policy eligibility and media narratives that raised the American public’s awareness of “welfare” policies, making these programs a more *Indirectly Visible* manifestation of government for whites (Gilens 1999). Finally, I draw on increases in conspicuous forms of taxation and ascendant political strategies that have given taxes new salience in American politics, simultaneously increasing the *Direct* and *Indirect Visibility* of taxation among white Americans (Martin 2008; Prasad 2018). Together, I show that these trends have shifted government visibility such that white Americans are now less aware of how they benefit from government and more aware of how they are supposedly burdened by the state to provide for racial others. After walking through these trends, I conclude by showing how this form of government visibility helps to explain an emerging form of white identity politics in America (Jardina 2019).

Policy Trend 1: Submerging White Benefits

AJR: Are there any particular government programs that you’ve ever benefited from or drawn on? Are there any that stand out to you that you can remember using?

David [white]: No, not really.

AJR: What about government programs? Any government programs you’ve come into contact with or had family members come into contact with?

Eric [white]: No. No.

AJR: Are there any interactions you’ve had with a government entity over the course of your life that stand out to you in any way? Good or bad?

Eric: I’m trying to think. I really haven’t. No.

Reflecting a common response from white interviewees, both Eric and David struggled to think of a government program from which they had received benefits. Though the postinterview survey would generally reveal that these individuals had received benefits from several programs, it would seem that these policies did not rise to these interviewees' level of consciousness when thinking about experiences with the state, or even when directly asked about the receipt of government policies.

These responses are consistent with other studies. In a 2008 poll, when people were asked if they had ever used a government social program, 57 percent said no. Yet subsequent questions about particular policies revealed that 94 percent of those individuals had benefitted from at least one government social program (Mettler 2011a). In many cases, these answers can be contextualized within the widespread receipt of programs that obscure their connection to government, such as Eric and David each receiving the Home Mortgage Interest Deduction (HMID).² In the language of the theoretical framework, the rise of these “submerged state” programs has created an increase in *Directly Invisible* experiences with government, with people receiving benefits from a policy but failing to connect those benefits back to the state due to the policy's design.

While programs using hidden designs are commonplace today, American public policy has not always worked in this obscured way. Scholars have shown that the time period covering the end of the Great Depression through the mid-1970s was marked by a “national government [that] promoted economic security and opportunity in direct and visible ways” (Mettler 2007b, 194). This form of governance involved policies to assist several different groups, including seniors (e.g., Social Security), the impoverished (e.g., Aid to Dependent Children), veterans (e.g., the GI Bill), and workers (e.g., Unemployment Insurance) (Mettler and Milstein 2007). Not only were these programs created during this time period, but most of them also provided benefits through increasingly generous checks bearing the government's name. For example, kept in constant 2007 dollars, direct-cash assistance for those in poverty grew from an average monthly benefit of \$387 in 1936 to \$774 in 1973 (Mettler and Milstein 2007, 122).

Contrasted against this trend of conspicuous state aid, the last half century has involved the growth of policies that hide their connection to government through the use of private sector actors and tax breaks (Soss and Jacobs 2009). While these hidden policies can take many forms, the largest and most common is that of the tax expenditure (commonly known as tax breaks), wherein the federal government provides tax incentives and subsidies to private sector businesses and individuals. Where these tax expenditures made up just 1 percent of the federal budget in 1970, they accounted

for 36 percent by 2007 (Faricy 2015, 106). Within this shift, the largest rise has been among tax breaks designed to serve social ends, such as those designed to provide economic security. This class of tax breaks includes policies like the tax incentives given to employers to provide their employees with health care or retirement plans, such as a 401(k). By 2012, these social tax breaks made up 80 percent of all tax expenditures, jumping from 40 percent in 1974 (Faricy 2015). Such reliance on incentivizing social ends through tax subsidies for the private sector causes the US to stand out in a comparative perspective. On average, nations in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) devote 2.7 percent of their GDP to this form of private social spending. In the US, these hidden social benefits account for 10.6 percent of GDP (Faricy 2015).

As a result of this growth, large portions of the American population now benefit from social tax expenditures. According to a 2015 survey, roughly half of all American adults receive employer-provided health care, while four-in-ten are enrolled in employer retirement plans, (Ellis and Faricy 2021). From a budgetary perspective, this popularity leads to large amounts of tax revenue foregone by the federal government. In 2019 alone, tax breaks for employer-provided health insurance cost the federal government \$236 billion (Ellis and Faricy 2021).

As these statistics demonstrate, “for most American families [social tax expenditures] are in fact the main form of federal financial assistance supporting their economic security” (Ellis and Faricy 2021, 4). In the language of the theoretical framework, more people are now *Directly Exposed* to government through their receipt of these social tax breaks. Yet because these policies flow through the tax code, most Americans who receive these benefits do not connect them back to the government (Mettler 2011b). Thus the nation’s “main form of federal financial assistance” is *Directly Invisible* to its recipients, reducing the possibility that this assistance will come to mind as Americans form their understanding of government.

The increasing popularity of these hidden policies has been linked to several shifts in the American political landscape. For starters, the intensity of today’s partisan polarization makes social tax expenditures attractive. They often provide a convenient compromise between Republicans seeking to avoid any sign of government growth and Democrats attempting to create more generous social benefits (Morgan and Campbell 2011). Further, this policy trend is supported by special interest groups who tend to be the only actors with considerable knowledge of these obscured benefits. For example, the real estate industry has been a consistent proponent of the HMID because of its role in promoting home buying (D. A. Brown

2021). As a result, the political battle over these benefits is often the sound of one hand clapping, with a largely unaware public remaining silent while well-funded lobbyists seek to preserve and expand these tax breaks (Mettler 2011b).

This political imbalance mirrors an imbalance in the beneficiaries of submerged policies. Most scholarship concerned with hidden programs shows that they disproportionately aid wealthy Americans (Faricy 2015; Hacker 2002). For example, 88 percent of benefits from the HMID go to households that make over \$100,000 (Guardino and Mettler 2020). Similarly, where subsidized employer retirement plans are offered to 21 percent of workers making under \$10,000, they are offered to 70.4 percent of those with incomes greater than \$75,000. Compounding this gap, differences in ability to save money into these accounts means that just 31 percent of low-income workers who are offered these plans actually take advantage of them, as compared to 95 percent of higher-income earners (Faricy 2015). Further, even when lower-income individuals are able to contribute, they cannot contribute as much, meaning the tax benefits they receive are considerably smaller (D. A. Brown 2021). All told, almost 60 percent of social tax expenditures went to people with incomes in the top quintile of the country, with a quarter of these benefits accruing to those in the top 1 percent alone. By contrast, just 4.3 percent flowed to those in the bottom income quintile (Center on Budget and Policy Priorities 2020). Put simply, the submerged state has “created a social safety net that grows ever more generous as household incomes rise” (Ladd 2017).

While identifying this class-based inequality is essential, I argue that all of the attention devoted to it has glossed over important racial disproportionalities. Just as the growth of direct, visible policies from the 1930s to 1970s largely benefited white Americans (Katznelson 2006; Lieberman 1998), so too must we acknowledge that a similar racial exclusion has continued under the submerged policies that followed them. Certainly, part of this racial asymmetry can be attributed to the connection between race and class in the US (Michener 2017). The simple fact that America’s history of racial oppression has led to more people of color living in poverty means that when we speak of the exclusion of poor people from these obscured benefits, we speak disproportionately about the exclusion of people of color (Semega, Fontenot, and Kollar 2017).

This link between race and class is only part of the story, however. Policies like the HMID and tax deductions for retirement accounts demonstrate that hidden state policies frequently work through private housing and labor markets, with these public benefits flowing to those who own

homes and hold well-compensated, full-time jobs (Hacker 2002). While there is class inequality within the possession of these resources, America's history of racist policies and practices illuminate how this inequality is compounded, and at times superseded, by race.

Within housing, this history includes policies and practices like redlining and barriers to credit that prevented Black home ownership (Rothstein 2017; Thurston 2018b). Redlined maps from the Federal Housing Authority meant that 98 percent of the loans backed by the federal government to boost home ownership between 1934 and 1968 were given to white households (Fulwood 2016). When Black people were finally given more access to the housing market through policies like the Fair Housing Act, real estate agents engaged in “predatory inclusion” practices by selling Black people houses that were more likely to result in foreclosure, allowing these agents to put the houses back onto the market more quickly (Taylor 2019). Reflecting this history carrying into the present, whites were nearly twice as likely as Black people to own homes in 2020, the largest gap in more than fifty years (71.9 percent for whites compared to 41.8 percent for Black Americans) (Choi 2020).

While this statistic immediately shows that contemporary whites are almost twice as likely to be eligible for the HMID because of their home owning status, a deeper dive into the policy's usage suggests that the gap is actually much wider. Analysis of program usage shows that zip codes with a higher rate of HMID beneficiaries are 82 percent white and 5 percent Black, whereas the Black population nearly triples to 13.4 percent in zip codes with low HMID use (Harris and Parker 2014). Additional tax breaks in the housing market, such as those exempting profits made from home sales, also disproportionately accrue to white Americans, reflecting racist attitudes among whites that tend to drive property values down in Black neighborhoods and up in white areas. When white people sell their homes, their bigger profits generate bigger, but still hidden, tax benefits (D. A. Brown 2021).

Similar disparities can be found within the labor market, including in occupational inequality, labor market opportunities, and hiring discrimination (Fossett, Galle, and Kelly 1986; Quillian et al. 2017; W. J. Wilson 1997, 2012). Analyses continually show that individuals with traditionally “Black-sounding” names are less likely to receive callbacks or job offers when compared to those with traditionally “white-sounding” names, reflecting ongoing racism in hiring practices (e.g., Bertrand and Mullainathan 2004). Similar to home ownership, Black unemployment rates at the

beginning of 2020 were roughly twice as high as those of whites (6.6 percent for Black Americans compared to 3.6 percent for whites).³

Building on this employment gap, studies reveal large racial disparities in the use of submerged benefits tied to the labor market. White workers are not only more likely to be employed in sectors that provide government-subsidized private benefits but are also more likely to be in specific jobs in those sectors that offer these benefits (Sullivan et al. 2019). For example, among construction workers, 61 percent of white workers have access to employer-provided health insurance and 45 percent have access to employer-provided retirement plans. By contrast, health insurance access sits at 51 percent for Black construction workers and 29 percent for Latinx workers. Similarly, just 33 and 14 percent of Black and Latinx construction laborers are offered pensions by their employers, respectively (Sullivan et al. 2019). Further, due to legacies of racial oppression giving white people an increased ability to save, white workers are also more likely to be in a position to take advantage of these hidden programs when they are offered, and to contribute more when they do. Among those who have retirement accounts through employers, balances for whites range from 1.5 to 2 times larger than those held by Black earners, again leading to larger tax benefits (D. A. Brown 2021).

Moving beyond the housing and labor markets reveals a range of additional hidden tax benefits that disproportionately flow to whites. Tax shelters for gifts within families protect and promote intergenerational white wealth. Beneficiaries of 529 accounts, which provide tax benefits for college savings, are 84 percent white and just 5 percent Black (D. A. Brown 2021). Speaking directly to notions of government visibility in her analysis of racial inequalities in the US tax code, Brown notes that while whites retain considerable advantages from the system, “those advantages are often rendered invisible” (2021, 168). In the language of my theoretical framework, all of these benefits submerged within the tax code suggest that the American state provides a plethora of *Directly Invisible* assistance to white Americans.

With that said, the evidence provided above is suggestive, insofar as studies have not analyzed the isolated impact of race on the receipt of submerged state policies. Fortunately, data on program use allows me to identify the specific role of race. The Social and Governmental Issues and Participation Study (SGIP)⁴ is a nationally representative survey from 2008 that asked 1,400 individuals about their use of twenty-one different social policies.⁵ Eight of these twenty-one policies provide benefits that are sub-




Figure 2.1. Use of submerged programs across racial groups. *Source:* Social and Government Issues and Participation Survey

merged in the tax code, including the HMID, employer subsidized-health insurance, employer-subsidized retirement benefits, the Child and Dependent Care Tax Credit,⁶ 529 plans (qualified tuition programs), Coverdell Education Savings Accounts (education IRAs), student loans, the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), and the Hope and Lifetime Learning Tax Credits.

Using responses to questions about these programs, I calculated racial differences in the use of submerged policies. To start with a simple count of policy receipt, respondents to the SGIP utilized an average of 2.5 submerged programs out of the eight listed, with 85 percent of the sample claiming to have received at least one hidden benefit. While these numbers show the widespread receipt of submerged programs, a dive into racial variation reveals important differences. On average, whites benefitted from 2.86 submerged policies as compared to 2.39 among people of color. Similarly, as seen in figure 2.1, where just 8.9 percent of whites said they had never benefitted from one of these eight submerged programs, this number nearly doubles to 17.2 percent among people of color.

Of course, it is possible that these racial differences are simply a reflec-

tion of income-based differences between whites and people of color, recognizing again that submerged policies have been shown to disproportionately benefit the wealthy. To test the independent influence of race, I turn to multivariate analysis of the SGIP data. Here I analyze how race impacts the receipt of submerged programs, while controlling for the influence of other factors, including income, age, gender, education level, and partisan affiliation.⁷ The total count of the eight submerged programs one has utilized serves as the dependent variable in this analysis, with the racial identity measure constructed to examine how being white, as compared to being a person of color, impacts this number of submerged policies received.

My analysis uses OLS regression, with the full results provided in table E2.1 in Appendix E. Each variable is scaled to run from 0 to 1, meaning that the table results provide the expected change in the number of submerged programs received when moving from the minimum to maximum value on each variable, while controlling for the impact of the other variables included in the model. For example, the 1.87 coefficient for income in Model E2.11 demonstrates that while holding all other factors constant, moving from making less than \$20,000 to making more than \$100,000 is associated with benefitting from 1.87 additional submerged programs. Similar to income, the results in Model E2.11 also show statistically significant influences from age and education, indicating that younger and better-educated people benefit from a greater number of submerged programs. Of greatest interest for my purposes is the statistical insignificance of the race variable as illustrated in figure 2.2, suggesting that white people are not more likely than people of color to benefit from submerged policies when other factors are taken into account, such as income.

With that said, previous analysis of hidden programs has distinguished between means-tested and universal submerged policies (Mettler 2018). This distinction recognizes that most submerged programs are “universal,” meaning one does not need to fall under a certain income level to be eligible. Reflecting this asymmetry, six of the submerged policies included in the SGIP fall into this universal category, while just two are means-tested. More specifically, universal submerged programs include the HMID, employer-subsidized health insurance, employer-subsidized retirement benefits, the Child and Dependent Care Tax Credit, 529 plans, Coverdell Education Savings Accounts, and student loans. The EITC and the Hope and Lifetime Learning Tax Credits account for the means-tested submerged programs.

Of course, the “universal” label is misleading, given the discussion




Figure 2.2. Number of submerged programs used across racial groups. Differences are not statistically different at $p = .21$. 95 percent confidence intervals shown. All other independent variables are held at their means or modes. *Source:* The Maxwell Poll.

above noting how many of these supposedly universal benefits are reserved for people who own homes or hold a full-time, well-paying job. Means-tested submerged programs do not require this same kind of status, but rather necessitate that individuals make under a certain amount of money. For example, the EITC's basic requirement is that an individual has at least some earned income over the course of a year, but that their income does not exceed a given threshold. With this distinction in mind, it may be that race does not impact one's receipt of the few means-tested submerged policies but does shape one's ability to access the more prevalent universal hidden programs that are tied to status within America's discriminatory housing and labor markets. Models E2.12 and E2.13 test this possibility by splitting the submerged programs between means-tested and universal, with the results for these models shown in figure 2.3.

Model E2.12 begins by using a count of only means-tested submerged policies as the dependent variable. Similar to the model for the full range




Figure 2.3. Type of submerged programs used across racial groups. 95 percent confidence intervals shown. All other independent variables held at their means or modes. *Source:* SGIP.

of submerged programs, the results again demonstrate that younger and more educated people are more likely to receive means-tested hidden benefits, though it is worth noting that income no longer appears to be a significant factor. Also mirroring the previous results, race does not reach statistical significance as illustrated in the left panel of figure 2.3, suggesting that race does not play a role in structuring the receipt of these hidden means-tested programs.⁸

Model E2.13 then examines the factors that influence the number of universal submerged policies one has received. Repeating a familiar pattern, the results show that younger and more educated individuals benefit from a greater number of submerged universal programs. Differing from the means-tested results, income shows up as significant once more, indicating that wealthier people are more likely to benefit from these so-called universal policies.

Of greater importance to this analysis, the results in Model E2.13 also

show that white people are significantly more likely to benefit from submerged universal policies ($p = .04$). Holding all other factors constant, including income, whites benefit from roughly 0.2 more submerged universal programs than people of color. While this number may seem relatively small, it is important to remember that it is likely downplaying the level of racial disparity within the use of submerged benefits. In particular, any difference in the *number* of hidden policies used is likely to be compounded by the *size* of the benefit received by whites from that policy, as exemplified by the greater savings that whites place into employer-provided retirement plans and 529 plans for college (D. A. Brown 2021).

Taken as a whole, these quantitative results provide important evidence that race influences the receipt of submerged benefits, though that influence appears to be limited to the “universal” submerged policies that are more likely to be associated with one’s status in the nation’s housing and labor markets. As such, this analysis reveals a continuation of America’s history of excluding people of color from the state’s efforts to provide economic security. Just as the welfare state’s visible benefits that grew from the 1930s to the 1970s primarily flowed to whites (Lieberman 1998), so too have whites disproportionately benefitted from the rise of the safety net’s invisible assistance over the last fifty years.

In sum, this section argues that research into the growth of the submerged state has implicitly focused on rising benefits for whites, as race-based discrimination within America’s housing and labor markets have combined to exclude people of color from these hidden policies. Thus, to the extent that we speak of the submerged state making Americans less likely to see how they benefit from the state today, we are really speaking about white Americans. In the language of the theoretical framework, whites have become much more likely to be *Exposed* to government in *Directly Invisible* ways, with this invisibility ensuring that these generous policies will not serve as white people’s location of the state.

From this perspective, social tax expenditures, which the literature has referred to as “welfare for the wealthy” (Faricy 2015), might also be labeled as “welfare for the white.” Further complicating the extant literature, this section also raises a second question. If the quotes from Eric and David that opened this section illustrate how the rise of the submerged state *prevents* white Americans from seeing how they personally benefit from government, we are left with a question of where it is that they still *can* see the state. The next section begins to provide an answer.

Policy Trend 2: The Changing Racial Valence of Welfare

AJR: Are there any government programs that you remember receiving?

Kyle [white]: No. No, I mean the big kind of programs I can think of are things like WIC [Women, Infants and Children Food and Nutrition Service], or food stamps, or Section 8 housing.

AJR: What about government programs? Have you interacted with government programs at all?

Jane [white]: Like section 8? There's a lot of related housing programs. I think, I don't know a lot about the other [programs], but you're talking about like welfare.

In many ways, these answers mirror those from David and Eric that began the previous section. Yet instead of merely claiming that they had not benefitted from a government program, Kyle and Jane go on to name the policies they think I am asking about, indicating their own associations with government programs. In doing so, Kyle and Jane show that while they cannot recall any personal receipt of government assistance, they are aware of parts of government that provide benefits to other people. In the language of the theoretical framework, the policies Kyle and Jane have actually benefitted from are *Directly Invisible*,⁹ while the policies they identified in our interview are *Indirectly Visible* (namely WIC, food stamps, Section 8 Housing, and welfare). Where the previous section helps to explain the *Direct Invisibility* of their own benefits due to the policy design of submerged state programs, this section turns to an explanation for why Kyle and Jane landed on these specific *Indirectly Visible* policies from which they had never received assistance in forming their understanding of government.¹⁰

To start, it is helpful to identify the commonalities in the programs Kyle and Jane named. First, they are all designed to assist individuals living below or near the poverty line in the US. Beyond their shared targets, these programs are often grouped together due to the antipathy that they receive. According to recent surveys, roughly 46 and 30 percent of Americans want to see welfare and food stamp spending decreased, respectively, while 20 and 16 percent want to see spending increased. As a point of comparison, 6 and 13 percent of Americans wanted to see Social Security

and environmental spending cut, while 60 and 50 percent called for greater spending in these areas.¹¹

Expressions of disdain toward these programs are often gathered together under America's opposition to "welfare." While "welfare" most directly refers to direct cash assistance, popular usage of the term tends to include a looser arrangement of poverty policies perceived as benefitting people who might otherwise be working. Though there is no exact definition of the programs this label includes, popular uses of the term are generally understood as including cash or near-cash (e.g., food and housing) assistance for the poor (e.g., Gilens 1999; Williamson 2017).¹² Thus when Kyle and Jane were asked about government programs, they did not mention random social policies but instead specifically referred to some of the most reviled public policies in America, collectively known as welfare, as seen most directly in Jane's answer ("you're talking about like welfare"). In following this popular conception, my use of the term "welfare" throughout this book does not refer to direct cash assistance only but rather to this broader group of poverty policies.

The attachment of the welfare label to this set of policies is tied to America's history of racial oppression and a widespread misconception that these policies primarily benefit Black Americans (Quadagno 1994). This perception began as the Great Migration saw a large movement of Black Americans out of the South and into cities in the rest of the country (Wilkerson 2011). Racially restrictive housing laws, direct intimidation, and racialized economic policies meant that this movement led to higher degrees of racial segregation and concentrated areas of Black poverty (Massey and Denton 1993). Levels of Black-white residential segregation in the US doubled between 1880 and 1940 (Logan and Parman 2017). Due in part to these demographic changes, as well as many high-profile instances of urban unrest, a considerable amount of public attention became focused on urban Black poverty beginning in the late 1960s (Gilens 1999).

At the same time, numerous policy changes were driving dramatic shifts in both the number and racial makeup of individuals receiving federal poverty assistance. At its inception during the New Deal, direct-cash assistance was provided through the Aid to Dependent Children program (ADC), which contained features designed to prevent Black people from benefitting. In particular, Southern Members of Congress fought to ensure that authority for the program was handed down to the states (Lieberman 1998). As a result, states with larger Black populations were able to apply rules like "man in the house" and "suitable household" provisions in a dis-

criminary fashion, allowing them to block would-be Black beneficiaries (Nadasen 2005; Rosenblatt 1982). Such efforts kept Black people off of the welfare rolls and in the low-wage labor market (Piven and Cloward 1993).

Starting in the 1960s, protest movements and court victories began to erase this prohibition, giving Black people new access to ADC, and its successor Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) (Fording 2001; Soss, Fording, and Schram 2011). Partially as a result of these changes, as well as increases in benefit generosity that were taking place, direct-cash assistance caseloads began to increase rapidly. Between 1965 and 1975, the number of families receiving AFDC tripled, causing the annual price of the program to grow from \$10 billion to \$27 billion (Gilens 1999, 18–19). By the mid-1970s, “welfare expenditures and participation rates had reached record levels, and welfare caseloads had become more racially representative of the poor than ever before” (Soss, Fording, and Schram 2011, 95). Finally, with the launch of the Great Society and the War on Poverty in the 1960s, the federal government’s role in poverty assistance reached new heights through programs outside AFDC, such as food stamps and Medicaid.

These policy changes and demographic shifts in the US helped generate a rapid change in America’s dominant image of poverty, and thus a change in the perception of who was assisted by poverty programs. Where poverty was widely perceived as primarily white and rural in the early 1960s, it had changed to Black and urban by the early 1970s (Gilens 1999). In both reflecting and driving this changing image, media stories concerning poverty, and particularly less sympathetic aspects of poverty, became much more likely to feature Black faces (Gilens 1999; Kellstedt 2003). For example, of the thirty-six people pictured in major newsmagazine stories about the “underclass” published between 1988 and 1992, all were Black (Gilens 1996). Ultimately, a new association between “welfare” policies and Black Americans emerged from this combination of media narratives, policy changes, and demographic shifts, creating a policy trend that altered the racial valence of welfare in the US.¹³

As this association increased, so too did the national attention devoted to welfare. Capitalizing on and helping to fuel the hostility created by this link to Black Americans, welfare became a popular campaign topic for politicians (Gilens 1999; Soss, Fording, and Schram 2011). While this attention is often exemplified through President Reagan’s famous “welfare queen” speeches, it is actually far more extensive. Running from President Nixon’s proclamation of welfare as “a monstrous, consuming outrage,” through to President Trump calling out welfare recipients for

“taking advantage of the system,” welfare has served a key component of national political campaigns for the last five decades.¹⁴ Nor has the use of welfare for political gain been limited to Republicans, as evidenced by President Carter’s description of welfare as “anti-work” and “anti-family,” and more famously by President Clinton’s call for “ending welfare as we know it.”¹⁵ Accompanying the emphasis on this topic from political elites, the media has similarly increased its coverage of welfare (Kellstedt 2003). Demonstrating the impact of its growing salience, there has been a rise in the number of Americans who name welfare as a major national problem. Where roughly 2 percent of the country made this claim in 1966, this number had surpassed 10 percent by 1982, eventually peaking at more than 25 percent in 1996 (Soss, Fording, and Schram 2011, 67).

Importantly, this increased attention also contained the elements to make welfare a more *visible* manifestation of government, as specified by the theoretical framework. First, the focus on welfare has been consistent over a long period of time. This consistency is evidenced by the span of presidential candidates mentioned above, whose campaigns stretch across the last fifty years. A similar frequency can be seen in the media’s discussion of welfare (Gilens 1999; Kellstedt 2003). Second, not only has this attention been consistent, but it has also been overwhelmingly negative (Gilens 1999). Political gain associated with welfare has come almost exclusively from attacking the policy as exemplifying government waste, with media stories serving up a similar narrative (Hetherington 2005). By using welfare as this example, the political and media attention regarding welfare make its connection to government clear. As Hetherington sums it up,

Americans growing up in the television era have been fed a steady diet of stories about the urban poor buying liquor with food stamps, Cadillac driving “welfare queens,” and teenage mothers intentionally having more children to increase the size of their welfare checks. . . . This publicity places such programs on tops of people’s heads when they are asked to evaluate government’s trustworthiness. (2005, 26)

Taken together, the last fifty years have witnessed a policy trend that drove more consistent and negative *Indirect Exposure* to welfare among the American public through a combination of policy changes that increased the federal government’s role in poverty assistance, a growing association between these “welfare policies” and Black Americans, political campaigns denigrating welfare for electoral gain, and a rise in media coverage of wel-

fare. Further, because this *Indirect Exposure* routinely held up welfare as the pinnacle of government waste, its connection to the state was made clear along with its negative image, generating greater *Indirect Visibility* and causing it to be “on tops of people’s heads” when they think about government. In the language of the theoretical framework, welfare became a more likely location of the state for Americans.

The irony of welfare’s increasing visibility over the last five decades is that direct-cash aid generosity has declined overwhelmingly during this time period (Soss, Fording, and Schram 2011). From 1970 to 1996, the real value of the benefits provided by the Aid to Families with Dependent Children policy (AFDC) dropped more than 20 percent in all but one state and declined by 40 percent in two-thirds of states. AFDC’s successor, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), similarly saw two-thirds of states reduce their benefit levels by more than 20 percent between 1996 and 2019, with only three states actually raising the value of their benefits during this time. Exemplifying the results of this drop, the monthly TANF benefit for a family of three in Mississippi currently stands at \$170 (Burdine and Floyd 2019). In strong contrast to the brief spike in direct-cash assistance use in the 1960s and 1970s (Gilens 1999), the number of families using the policy has plummeted over the last fifty years. Where 82 percent of families with children in poverty received direct-cash aid in 1979, only 22 percent did in 2018 (Floyd 2020).

Despite reaching fewer people and offering weaker benefits, my interviews made it evident that welfare, and the racist stereotypes connected to it, continue to play a key role in shaping contemporary understandings of government, as can be seen in the discussion I had with Carol about her neighborhood.

Carol [white]: [The neighbor’s] house ended up being bought at some point by some Mexicans. It was foreclosed on. They brought a great deal of trouble and crime into the neighborhood, this particular family. The women did not work. I was 60 and exhausted. I see them, getting out of the car, primping her hair, living off the welfare system or whatever.

Nor was this an isolated instance, as Carol came back to this topic again later in the interview.

Carol [white]: Let’s say that with Somalis, there are a lot of them who use the welfare system. . . . This woman is having one child

after another, and they're living on the welfare system. They're living off us. This brings resentment. It's bound to bring resentment. Part of the problem is a lot of the church groups that bring them here, they bring them here and put them on welfare. So you have a middle class that is losing ground and a blue collar that is going under, and you put these people on the welfare system, it's going to build resentment.

In addition to illuminating the salience of welfare in her understanding of government, Carol's interview also reveals two additional points. First, scholars have tended to focus on the connection between Black Americans and welfare (e.g., Gilens 1999), but Carol illuminates how the socially constructed target population of welfare has recently been extended to include racist stereotypes of immigrant populations as well. In this way, she exemplifies the "immigrantization" of welfare that has taken place, wherein whites increasingly perceive these poverty policies as benefitting immigrant communities *in addition* to Black Americans (Garand, Xu, and Davis 2015). This extension demonstrates an important form of racial transposition, in which racist stereotypes about Black Americans have broadened out to immigrants (HoSang and Lowndes 2019).

Accounting for this immigrantization of welfare demonstrates the second salient issue raised by Carol, which is how this new understanding emphasizes a divide between whites and, not just Black people, but a broader category of nonwhite people (HoSang and Lowndes 2019). The racist stereotype that places immigrant communities into the category of "traditional" welfare recipients leaves whites as the only population not receiving benefits from the policy.¹⁶ Thus whites serve as the primary "burdenficiaries" of welfare, with their racial identity placing them into this "shared policy target" space (Nuamah 2021). In positioning whites this way, welfare serves as a particularly negative manifestation of the state among white Americans, helping to exacerbate a negativity bias that increases the likelihood of welfare acting as a location of the state for whites.

In short, *Indirect Exposure* to welfare among whites over the last fifty years has been repetitive, consistently connected to government, and negative, fulfilling the theoretical framework's criteria that make an entity more likely to serve as a location of the state.¹⁷ Ironically, this policy trend driving greater visibility of "welfare policies" perceived as benefitting people of color has occurred alongside the rise of a submerged state that provides "welfare for whites." Thus white Americans are more likely to see the state through the *Indirect Visibility* of increasingly meager poverty policies, while

they receive increasingly generous, but *Directly Invisible*, benefits from policies hidden in the tax code. As a result, whites not only perceive themselves as failing to get assistance from the government but also as having to pay for others to get government help. As Carol puts it when describing welfare recipients, “They’re living off us.”¹⁸ In making this claim, Carol invokes the second primary location of the state for white Americans: taxes.

Policy Trend 3: The Growing Visibility of Taxation

AJR: So, when you think about your life right now, what would you say you feel like are the one or two biggest ways government impacts your life?

Dick [white]: More like regulations. Taxes.

AJR: If you were to think about one or two ways where you feel like government most directly impacts your current life, what would you think of?

Dave [white]: Taxes. I mean, I don’t see a lot of limits. Honestly, [I] pay taxes. There’s not a lot of things that I want to do that [the government] prevents me from doing. You know, I have a job, I have employment. I’m not reliant on them for things.

In describing taxes as the main way government impacts their lives, Dick and Dave focus on an issue often described as perennially important in American politics. America’s “no taxation without representation” roots point to a national obsession with taxes that is older than the country itself. Yet scholarship shows that the American public’s “contemporary fear of high taxes, particularly on the wealthy, is unprecedented in American history” (Prasad 2018, 5; see also Hacker and Pierson 2007). Prior to the 1970s, elected officials “rarely fought over taxes” or “even mentioned the word at election time” (Martin 2008, 1). Following similar timing to the two previous sections, however, the salience of taxation began to grow over the last five decades as several forces converged to create a policy trend.

First, a combination of policy changes and a failure to update certain policies meant that most Americans saw their taxes increase in the decades leading up to the 1970s. From the mid-1950s to the mid-1970s, the average American family’s tax burden rose by 98 percent (Morgan 2007). While this number may be considerable on its own, its impact on state visibility was made more dramatic by the forms of taxation that drove this

growth. To start, a rise of unfunded mandates and larger social programs placed greater burdens on state and local governments, forcing an increase in the taxes levied by these levels of government. Between 1953 and 1973, the average percentage of an American's income devoted to state and local taxes increased from 7.6 percent to 12.1 percent, with a lot of this increase stemming from larger property taxes (Morgan 2007). In addition, a combination of inflation, income growth, and stagnant tax deduction policies meant that many people saw their income taxes rise during this time as well (Steuerle 1992).

This combination is notable because the hassle associated with paying income and property taxes increases people's awareness of these forms of taxation, as opposed to the automaticity of something like payroll taxes that are deducted from one's paycheck (Williamson 2017). Further, the government's role is made clear in paying income and property taxes, as people write checks to the state and fill out forms featuring the government's name. Through this obviousness, people's *Exposure* to income and property taxes comes in a *Directly Visible* form, with the consistency and negativity involved in paying these taxes compounding their likelihood of serving as a location of the state.

One of the major causes of this rise in property taxes sheds more light on how the visibility of taxes grew during this time. As detailed by Martin (2008), the 1970s saw the end of fractional assessment, a practice that allowed tax assessors to provide lower-than-market-price estimates for houses, giving homeowners a significantly lower property tax bill. Drawing a connection to the government visibility literature, Martin refers to fractional assessment as a "hidden social policy," noting that most homeowners were unaware of the tax benefits this practice provided to them before it ended (Martin 2008, 7). That so many recipients were unaware of fractional assessment is made more impressive by its \$39 billion price tag. This amount made it the largest government housing subsidy in the postwar era and cost the government just slightly less than Social Security (Martin 2008, 9). Given America's history of racially discriminatory housing policies touched on above (Fulwood 2016; Thurston 2018b), one can be certain that whites disproportionately benefitted from this practice. As the government phased fractional assessment out in the 1970s, it created a more accurate tax burden for white Americans; but by specifically shifting property taxes, it also created a more *Directly Visible* burden.

Beyond the rise in the *Direct Visibility* of taxes created by these policy changes, a shift in political rhetoric has helped to increase the *Indirect Visibility* of taxes over the last fifty years as well. As the Republican Party

emerged from the Watergate scandal, it was clear that they needed a new issue to help regain popularity. Seizing on the visibility of taxes generated by the policy changes covered above, “Republican politicians *sought out and nurtured* potential dissatisfaction within the public, playing to the tax dissatisfaction” (Prasad 2018, 11, emphasis in original). Polling at the time captures the success of this Republican strategy. Where just 52 percent of Americans said their federal income taxes were too high in 1966, 65 percent said the same just seven years later.¹⁹ Other focusing events, such as Proposition 13 in California and Ronald Reagan’s successful presidential campaign centered around tax cuts, further drove a new fascination with taxes among the American public (Hacker and Pierson 2007; Sears and Citrin 1982). As a result, “taxes became a potent symbol of everything that was wrong with government” (Morgan 2007, 35).

While this attention may have started with entrepreneurial Republican politicians (Prasad 2018), the success they enjoyed forced Democratic politicians to similarly turn their own focus to taxation. Indeed, taxes served as the most frequently mentioned issue in presidential advertisements from 1984 to 2004 for *both* Republican and Democratic candidates (Smith 2007, 141). The popularity of taxes within these political campaigns generated more frequent *Indirect Exposure* to taxes among the American public, with this rhetoric simultaneously making the state’s role clear and highlighting the negative aspects of taxes in ways that further increased its likelihood of serving as a location of the state.

Notably, this political rhetoric took advantage of the policy changes that preceded it by similarly emphasizing the “most visible and resented forms of taxation,” namely income and property taxes (Morgan 2007, 33). Not only did this combination of policy changes and elite rhetoric create a surge in the visibility of taxes, it also distorted American’s understanding of who pays taxes. More specifically, it helped to highlight the taxes that people see as hurting those with higher incomes and those who are more likely to own expensive homes that incur larger property taxes. Lost in this perception are the taxes that poorer Americans pay, including payroll taxes and regressive sales taxes.²⁰ As a result of this differential visibility, Americans frequently assume that lower income people pay no taxes. For example, while 88 percent of Americans label themselves as taxpayers, on average they estimate that just 66.5 percent of the population pays taxes (Williamson 2017, 47). Such misconceptions were encapsulated by then presidential candidate Mitt Romney when he talked about the “47 percent of the people . . . who are dependent on government . . . who pay no income tax” (Lowrey 2012).

Of course, racial understandings help construct these class-based perceptions of who pays taxes and who does not. In the post-Reconstruction South, white supremacist governments ran on returning to a government ruled by the taxpayer (Newman and O'Brien 2011). Such understandings have carried through American history due to the social construction of the “taxpayer” as white (HoSang and Lowndes 2019; Roediger 2007; Winant 1993). Exemplifying this construction, Walsh (2017) shows that attacks on integration efforts from the 1950s through the 1970s featured whites making arguments that invoked their own taxpayer status. Promoting the claim that whites pay more in taxes, they argued that they should be given a higher form of citizenship. In this way, “whiteness was automatically presumed to imply ‘taxpayer,’” while individuals failing to pay taxes have an implied nonwhite identity (Walsh 2017, 237).

Within this misperception, immigrants are frequently utilized as the epitome of a tax avoiding, nonwhite population (Williamson 2017). This theme could be seen in the earlier quote from Carol, claiming that non-white welfare recipients live “off us,” and similarly surfaced during my interview with Sam.

Sam: I'm pretty sure when you see that thing on Facebook where, if you're illegal [sic: a person in irregular migration] you get a free college education, free housing, a free check, plus you get paid under the table so you never pay any taxes, you come out ahead by far. I don't know if anybody really gets free education. And I suspect some of the other stuff, there's a few qualifiers. I know even if it's a poor living, there are some people that are happy to live in a tiny run-down house, drive a car that hardly runs, not leave the house much because you don't have any money, but if you don't have to work, they're fine with it. I don't think I'd ever want to live that kind of life even if it meant I didn't have to work, and with this election, I think a lot more people have that feeling that there's a large number of people just skating by thanks to the government.²¹

While accounts of actual tax burdens show that people in irregular migration do pay a considerable amount in taxes, including income taxes (American Immigration Council 2016), polling shows that the endorsement of this myth is widespread. Nearly 70 percent of the public, including majorities of both Republicans and Democrats, view immigrants as a burden on American taxpayers (Steinhauser 2010).

Thus while the visibility of taxes has theoretically increased across the whole of the American public through this rise in political attention, the framing within this rhetoric of white people as the individuals who actually pay these taxes created an asymmetry within this shifting visibility. Just as white people were painted as the “burdenficiaries” of welfare, so too have they been socially constructed as the group disproportionately hurt by taxes, helping to activate a negativity bias in this *Indirect Visibility* that has made taxes a particularly prominent location of the state among white Americans.

Of course, the irony of taxation’s salience among white Americans is that it has remained in place since the 1970s, even as tax obligations have largely declined during this time. Large tax cuts spanning from the Reagan administration through to the Trump administration have helped to lower the tax burden on many Americans, with particularly steep drops among the wealthier, whiter segments of the country (Saez and Zucman 2019). For example, the overall tax rate for the richest four hundred households in the US was 70 percent in 1950, but subsequent policy changes dropped this rate to just 23 percent by 2018 (Leonhardt 2019). Yet just as cuts to welfare programs did not reduce their salience, so too has political rhetoric allowed taxes to maintain a dominant position in American politics even as tax burdens have been reduced (Hacker and Pierson 2007; Martin 2008). As a result, when asked about government, my white interviewees routinely turned back to welfare and taxes.

Sam [white]: Yeah welfare stuff comes up. That’s gotten to be just a big thing in the last couple of years, really. It seems like the consensus for most people is an awful lot of people make their living off the government and they don’t like people taking their tax money and laying around the house smoking cigarettes and drinking beer.²²

Conclusion: Connecting the Three Trends to Explain White Political Identity

While each of the three policy trends above have previously been discussed (e.g., Hetherington 2005; Martin 2008; Mettler 2011b), this chapter shows that the power of each is better understood when they are considered in combination with each other. The growing conspicuousness of welfare has provided whites with a clear sign of how the state spends “their” increas-

ingly visible tax money on policies perceived as only benefitting racial others, while white benefits have become more hidden due to the rise of the submerged state.

Revealing this interplay, studies show that when individuals are asked about where their tax money is spent, “welfare” programs for the poor are the most common answer, outpacing “the roads and schools that Americans see every day, and the military that receives more than half of the discretionary budget” (Williamson 2017, 99). Such misconceptions concerning the destination of taxes can be at least partially explained by elite rhetoric. The earlier anti-welfare quotes from Presidents Nixon and Carter both went on to specifically connect their anger to a mistreatment of taxpayers. The “outrage” Nixon spoke of was the outrage of welfare “against the taxpayer,” where Carter’s concern was with welfare’s inequitable treatment of “taxpayers’ dollars.” Such connections have helped to strengthen the welfare-tax link among the American public.

Again, while this link has theoretically been created for the public as a whole, racial undertones have positioned whites as being particularly burdened by this spending arrangement, helping to increase the likelihood of welfare and taxes serving as locations of the state for white Americans due to the negativity bias this perception invokes. As with immigrant populations, welfare recipients are also understood as the beneficiaries of a tax system to which they do not contribute (Williamson 2017). Indeed, the immigrantization of welfare has worked to create more overlap between these social constructions (Garand, Xu, and Davis 2015), with immigrants serving as a subset of a broader non-white group that benefits from welfare while failing to pay any taxes to fund the program. As a result, “welfare queens’ and ‘illegal aliens’ among others have been similarly condemned as freeloaders and parasites who feed off the labor of hardworking (white) taxpayers” (HoSang and Lowndes 2019, 19).

While previous scholarship has considered this welfare-tax connection among white Americans (e.g., Morgan 2007; Williamson 2017), I argue that it has missed two important features. First, the rise of submerged state policies has played a key role in forming this bond. By reducing the visibility of benefits for whites, these policies left welfare and taxes as more uniquely conspicuous manifestations of government in the lives of white Americans. Put simply, these three policy trends converged to mark whites as the disproportionate burdened beneficiaries of the visible parts of government while concealing their role as the disproportionate beneficiaries of America’s hidden state.

Second, tying these three trends together reveals how they have worked

together to shape an increasingly potent white political identity (Jardina 2019). The role of these policy trends in fostering this identity could be seen when my white interviewees were asked what they believe “politicians see when they look at them.”²³

Christina: I don’t know. A voter, and somebody who pays their taxes.

Zoe: A little soft white woman, a highly educated white woman. . . . But, I think they see me as taxpayer, as a constituent, someone who’s engaged in some way.

As these quotes reveal, the visibility of taxes for whites has actually made paying taxes a central aspect of how white people view their identity in the polity. With whites unable to see their own government benefits while easily recognizing those of racial others, this combination of policy trends has helped to uplift a taxpaying “producer” role for whites, as cast against the tax-avoiding “parasitic” role played by people of color, often filled in through stereotypes of “welfare queens” and “illegal aliens” (HoSang and Lowndes 2019).

Recognizing this connection is important, given research showing the growing power of white identity in American politics. As Jardina shows, “racial solidarity now plays a central role in the way many whites orient themselves to the political and social world” (2019, 4). Generally missing from this literature, however, is a concern for the role of public policy, and more particularly the role that social tax expenditures may have played in helping foster this white political identity. This inattention is notable given that when individuals are directly asked about these hidden policies, not only are white people more likely to express support for them but much of this support appears to stem from understanding these policies as benefiting “workers” and “taxpayers” (Ellis and Faricy 2021), two categories that are racially coded as white (HoSang and Lowndes 2019). This finding suggests that even if submerged tax benefits are revealed to the American public, white people are more likely to remain supportive of keeping these benefits in place because they will see this assistance as accruing to them in their position as the taxpayers and workers of America.

This link between white political identity and submerged policies suggests limitations to many of the reforms called for in studies of hidden state policies. More specifically, it suggests that the tactic of “surfacing” the submerged state by increasing people’s awareness of these policies may be self-defeating. Rather than driving opposition to these programs, such

awareness may only serve to reinforce racial understandings of the American welfare state (Callaghan and Olson 2017), providing greater support for tax expenditures perceived as benefitting white producers, while maintaining opposition to poverty programs perceived as aiding Black and brown “parasites” (HoSang and Lowndes 2019). This limitation calls for new policy reform strategies to tackle the inequality created by submerged state policies, a task to which I will return in the concluding chapter.

THREE

Police as the Face of Government

State Visibility among People of Color

Coach Y kept a busy schedule. Between school, work, and family, Sundays were the only day of the week where he could find an hour for our interview. I had no complaints about talking on the weekend, however, because I really wanted to speak with him. As a resident of Site B who identified as Black and Somali-American, Coach Y was part of a relatively small community of people of color in the middle-class neighborhood just inside the city boundary. Roughly 60 percent of the community identified as white, comprising a sizeable majority of the neighborhood that also boasted a median household income of nearly \$70,000. Thus my desire to interview him stemmed from a question of whether the middle-class, white-majority status of the neighborhood might have protected Coach Y from some of the police presence I had heard about from people of color living in the more working-class, racially diverse Site A. That possibility was driven from my head quickly.

AJR: So have you had any interactions with government that stand out to you?

Coach Y [Black, Somali-American]: In terms of, in what capacity?

AJR: Any capacity.

Coach Y: Oh man, my first experience was, I was arrested.

Where the previous chapter focused on public policy trends that concealed benefits and exaggerated burdens to foster misperceptions of government's role in the lives of white people, this quote from Coach Y points to a very different shift in the state's position in the lives of people of color. As this chapter will show, criminal legal policy changes have made Coach Y's response more common, with the criminal legal system (CLS) often serving as the first, and most frequent, face of government among people of color. Notably, this visibility of the CLS has increased in both direct forms, as Coach Y experienced through his arrest, but also through indirect forms, often coming from social connections and viral videos exemplifying the police violence aimed at people of color (Cohen and Luttig 2020; Thurston 2018a).

To understand this rising visibility of the CLS within communities of color, I argue that we must attend to two policy trends. First is the rise of law-and-order policies that rapidly increased the level of CLS contact for people of color, and most acutely Black Americans. Not only have new policies around policing ensured that people of color encounter the CLS more often in their daily lives but shifts in sentencing policies have also meant that these stops are more likely to result in longer spells of incarceration. Thus CLS contact has become more frequent and intense over the last five decades, generating greater levels of visibility.

While many will rightly note that the visibility of the CLS in communities of color, and particularly Black communities, predates the last fifty years of law-and-order politics (Muhammad 2010), I argue that a fifth policy trend helps to explain the unique nature of the contemporary CLS's conspicuousness. The rise of law-and-order legislation grew out of concerns about the increased civil rights being provided to Black communities in the 1960s (Weaver 2007), helping to spark the national government's retreat from the landmark civil rights legislation that had been a centerpiece of its agenda. As this decline in the prominence of civil rights took hold, an important countervailing image of government was lost. The state's visibility in communities of color as a beneficent provider of civil rights diminished just as its visibility as the enforcer of aggressive policing practices began to grow.

This chapter begins by walking through these two policy trends, providing greater detail in explaining how they worked together to make the CLS a uniquely visible manifestation of government for people of color in the US today. Following this discussion, the chapter offers two concluding arguments. First, I explain why I focus on a split in government visibility that separates whites and people of color, as opposed to one solely emphasizing a white-Black divide or one that also brings in class distinctions.

While the policy trends covered here have most sharply impacted Black Americans, and more specifically Black Americans living in poverty, I argue that both my interview evidence and more recent developments in policing converge to suggest a strong schism between whites and people of color more broadly. For example, the recent fusing of policing with immigration enforcement has helped to deepen the presence of the CLS in many Latinx communities (Gottschalk 2016), just as law enforcement agencies have ramped up surveillance of Arab and South Asian Muslim Americans (Selod 2018), thus extending the CLS's visibility beyond Black Americans alone.

Second, I place the policy trends in visibility for people of color covered here alongside the shifts for whites discussed in the previous chapter to illuminate the economic connections between the two sides of this duality. Due in part to the rise of submerged tax breaks and the declining revenues they have created, governments have turned to other funding sources. Often the solution has come partially in the form of increased policing in communities of color, using traffic violations and court fees to raise substantial portions of revenue in order to keep states and cities across America financially sound. In this way, the contemporary racial split in government visibility fits into a longer pattern in American history, wherein financial exploitation of communities of color is used to provide economic security for whites (Young and Meisner 2008).

Policy Trend 4: The Rise of “Law-and-Order” Policy and Politics

AJR: So, have you had any interactions with any kind of government agency or government entity that really stands out to you?

Emmie [Black]: Have I? A government entity?

AJR: Any kind of government.

Emmie: So like a police officer?

Starting in the late 1960s, US criminal legal policy experienced a dramatic change. Due largely to shifts in demographics and police reporting, crime rates appeared to spike in the middle of the decade, driving new public concerns about crime (Weaver 2007). In response, the federal government passed a series of legislative changes. Transitioning from his War on Poverty to a new War on Crime, President Johnson promoted the passage of the 1965 Law Enforcement Assistance Act (LEAA), which was later built upon with the 1968 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act (Hinton

2016). Through each of these policies, the federal government began an unprecedented effort to intervene in a policy domain traditionally reserved to states and cities. As a result, the proportion of the federal government's budget devoted to crime grew fivefold between the mid-1960s and mid-1970s, with much of this money working as grants to help bolster state and local police departments (Weaver 2007).

This effort from the Johnson administration served not only as a response to increased public anxiety about crime but also to politicians seizing and spurring on this anxiety through law-and-order campaigns (Flamm 2007). While Senator Barry Goldwater was unsuccessful in defeating Johnson in 1964, his crime-focused campaign convinced Johnson that the White House needed to turn more attention to the issue, as demonstrated by the president's promotion of the two pieces of legislation discussed above (Weaver 2007). This national emphasis on crime from the White House grew substantially following the election of President Nixon in 1968. As part of his "Southern strategy" to pick up disaffected white, segregationist Democrats, Nixon similarly centered crime in his campaigns and his governing. The pinnacle of this endeavor came in 1971 when he launched the nation's War on Drugs and began implementing the nation's new emphasis on drug enforcement with the aid of the recently passed Controlled Substances Act.

With this war declared, more funding for policing flowed from the federal government down to states and cities, with an emphasis placed on using this funding to increase the number of police stops in order to recover drugs that would demonstrate the success of the war (Balko 2014). As federal backing increased, state and local governments similarly began devoting more of their own budgets to crime-related efforts, creating a dramatic spike in police spending. City outlays for the police grew from an average of \$82 per resident in 1951 to \$286 in 2012 (Epp 2016). Between 1960 and 1980 alone, the number of people working for police forces doubled (Weaver 2012).

With this funding increase came a shift in policing strategy. Driven in part by Nixon's emphasis on recovering drugs, departments across the country began engaging in "broken windows" policing (Epp, Maynard-Moody, and Haider-Markel 2014). Employing this strategy, police engaged in greater efforts to prevent smaller crimes (e.g., vandalism) under the assumption that such efforts would ward off larger crimes (e.g., assault). Through this shift in police focus, "On virtually every measure one could conceive . . . the authority and reach of policing expanded" (Soss and Weaver 2017, 571). Indeed, arrest rates during the last fifty years have risen

substantially, with a particularly dramatic uptick in drug arrests. From 1980 to 2016 alone, drug arrests increased by 171 percent. Further revealing this emphasis on drugs, low-level offenses account for 80 percent of all arrests today, as compared to fewer than 5 percent of arrests made for serious violent offenses. At present, an arrest is made in the US every three seconds (Neusteter and O'Toole 2019). As these statistics demonstrate, criminal legal policy changes have made *Direct Exposure* to the police more routine for many Americans.

While this shift has theoretically increased *Direct Exposure* to the police across the whole country, the implementation of these policies has ensured that their effects are heavily concentrated in communities of color (Beckett and Herbert 2009; Braga 2001). To use one example, many cities adopted “stop-and-frisk” practices under the broken windows theory. Aided by the Supreme Court decision in *Terry v. Ohio*, this practice gives police greater discretionary power to “pat down” any pedestrian based on “reasonable suspicion” (La Vigne et al. 2012). In New York City alone, these stops rose from 90,000 in 2002 to 700,000 in 2011 (Lerman and Weaver 2014b, 3). Among those 700,000 stops, 53 percent of detainees were Black, 34 percent were Latinx, and just 9 percent were white (as compared to the city’s total population, which is 43 percent white).¹ New York is not alone. In a 2003 study, more than 70 percent of young Black men in Chicago reported being stopped by the police in the past year, as compared to a city-wide rate of roughly 20 percent (Skogan 2006). The pervasiveness of these stops was also evidenced in my interviews, as could be seen in Jay’s comment at the opening of the previous chapter where she talked about getting harassed by the police “on the regular” while doing things like waiting for the bus. A similar discussion of being frequently accosted by the police came up during my interview with Mohamed.

Mohamed [South Asian]: R Town police stopped me because he says that you didn’t stop at a stop sign. But I did. I have a stick shift car, and if I stop it, I change a gear. . . . I was stopped [by the police] many times. Many times. Speeding. Or my wife was stopped one time at night. My wife was accused, “Are you drinking?” We are Muslim, we don’t drink. Okay, that was that. Then, before this incident in June, May 28th, I was driving on R Road going west, and a SA Town police that was going east, he made a U turn, and accused me of speeding. Took my license and insurance card. . . . He pulled me on C Road, the speed limit on C Road is 40, and I was going 42 miles per hour.²

Mohamed's comment illuminates how broken windows policing has also given rise to greater investigatory car stops (Epp, Maynard-Moody, and Haider-Markel 2014). Serving as the vehicular equivalent of "stop and frisk," investigatory stops are justified by pulling people over for minor traffic violations (e.g., Mohamed's driving two miles per hour over the speed limit), with the proclaimed intent of catching individuals committing more serious crimes. Racial asymmetries are again present within this form of *Direct Exposure* to the CLS. Where 12 percent of all drivers are subject to a traffic stop each year, this number doubles to 24 percent among people of color, with this racial gap growing even larger when looking at investigatory stops alone (Robin Shepard Engel and Calnon 2004; Epp, Maynard-Moody, and Haider-Markel 2014; Moore 2015). Nearly six in ten Black men in the US report being stopped in their cars unfairly by the police (Desilver, Lipka, and Fahmy 2020).

Much of the nation saw this mistreatment of Black people exemplified to a horrific degree in the killing of Philando Castile by Falcon Heights police officer Jeronimo Yanez. A detail often missing from this account, however, is that Castile had been pulled over at least forty-nine times in the previous thirteen years, generally for minor infractions (LaFraniere and Smith 2016). Castile's story illuminates the frequency with which drivers of color are the victim of investigatory car stops, as well as the potentially fatal consequences that can follow from policing strategies that promote frequent stops of people of color and train officers to be fearful during these interactions (Kirkpatrick et al. 2021).

Compounding this growth in stops and arrests, changes to sentencing policy have ensured that when people are convicted of a crime, they are more likely to see significant prison time. Once again, the War on Drugs has played a large role (Alexander 2010). The advent of mandatory minimum sentencing has meant that drug possession crimes that once carried *maximum* penalties of one year shifted overnight to requiring a *minimum* of four years (Forman 2017). Partly as a result of this change, the number of people incarcerated for drug crimes increased from roughly 40,000 in 1980 to more than 450,000 by 2017, growing twice as fast as the overall incarceration rate (Bronson and Carson 2019). Beyond drug policy, this time period witnessed additional changes that sent people to prison for longer stretches. This group of new policies includes three strikes laws, wherein individuals received life sentences following their third felony conviction, as well as truth in sentencing laws that required people to stay in prison for more of their sentences (Turner et al. 1999).

The result of these changes can be seen today. The 2.3 million people

in America's prisons and jails as of 2020 represent a 500 percent increase in this population over the past forty years, putting the US above all other countries in the rate at which it locks people up (Bronson and Carson 2019; Sawyer and Wagner 2020). Often forgotten within this discussion are the individuals under correctional supervision within their own communities. This neglect is notable, given that the number of people on probation or parole (4.5 million) is roughly twice as large as the number of people behind bars (Sawyer and Wagner 2020). For these individuals under correctional supervision, whether in prison or in their community, *Direct Exposure* to the CLS is nearly constant.

Underlying each of these numbers are significant racial disproportionalities. Black men are incarcerated at six times the rate of white men, while the rate for Latino men is approximately 2.5 times greater (Bronson and Carson 2019). Where one in seventeen white men born in 2001 was likely to face imprisonment during their lifetime, this number was one in six among Latino men and one in three among Black men. Similar disparities exist for women, with one in 111 white women facing a likelihood of incarceration compared to one in eighteen for Black women and one in forty-five for Latina women (Bonczar 2003). Probation and parole rates contain the same inequalities, with Black Americans being 2.9 times more likely to be on probation and 5.2 times more likely to be on parole when compared to whites, while Latinx people are two times more likely than whites to be on parole (Hartney and Vuong 2009).

While much of this disparity can be attributed to more concentrated policing in communities of color, attention to sentencing policy helps reveal additional sources of these racial gaps. To take just a couple of examples, federal guidelines attached to mandatory minimums originally stipulated that being caught with 500 grams of powder cocaine (a substance more prevalent in white communities) earned the same mandatory five-year sentence that one received when possessing just five grams of crack cocaine (more prevalent in Black communities). Research further reveals that states with higher percentages of Black people were more likely to pass stricter sentencing laws, once again indicating how these policies disproportionately resulted in the incarceration of Black Americans (Duxbury 2021; Karch and Cravens 2014).

Taken together, these policy changes have shifted policing and incarceration in ways that greatly expanded the *Direct Exposure* that people of color have with the CLS, with this *Exposure* fitting the criteria needed to make the CLS a prominent location of the state for people of color. First, the CLS differs from many parts of government because of how clearly it

is connected to the state. Unlike most government bureaucrats, “criminal justice workers are distinguished by uniforms, badges, and official transport vehicles, all of which bear their government titles and locate their institutional authority” (Lerman and Weaver 2014a, 93). One might forget that their public school teacher is a government employee, but they are unlikely to do so with a police officer. As such, *Direct Exposure* to the police involves *Directly Visible* experiences of government.

Second, while the totalizing nature of prison life means that an incarcerated individual’s *Direct Exposure* to the state is constant, Mohamed and Jay show how repetitive encounters with the CLS can be for people of color outside of correctional supervision (Brayne 2014). In addition, Jay and Mohamed similarly exemplify the negativity present within these interactions for people of color, due to the greater likelihood of receiving poor treatment as well as the historical frame through which people of color experience contact with the CLS (Epp, Maynard-Moody, and Haider-Markel 2014; Weitzer and Tuch 2004). The combination of frequency, negativity, and visible connections to the state included in this *Direct Exposure* sets the stage for the CLS serving as a location of the state for people of color.

Finally, an additional element that promotes the unique visibility of the CLS for people of color is the relatively young age at which they are directly exposed to this state entity (Geller and Fagan 2019). In a sample of eleven highly policed neighborhoods, most respondents experienced their first interaction with the police before the age of fourteen. Further, among those who had these encounters before the age of eighteen, a majority reported being stopped seven times or more (Weaver and Geller 2019). A large-scale survey of Chicago students reveals similar results, with half of all respondents claiming they had been stopped by the police before tenth grade (Hagan, Shedd, and Payne 2005).

Within this youth contact, racial asymmetry is again apparent. Nationally, 39 percent of Black teens reported they had been stopped by the police, while only 19 percent of white teens said the same (Geller 2019). Black youth are also 2.5 times more likely than whites to be arrested for property offenses, 2.7 times more likely to be arrested for violations of curfew, and 5.8 times more likely to be arrested for drug offenses (Rovner 2014). Following their arrest, young Black people face more references to juvenile court, are more often sent to confinement, and are more likely to be transferred to adult facilities (Rovner 2014). All told, Black youth are incarcerated at five times the rate of white youth, while Indigenous and Latinx youth are three times and twice as likely as whites to be incarcerated, respectively (Geller 2019).

Political socialization research demonstrates that this early contact is important for government visibility (Sears and Brown 2013). Political attitudes are more malleable during one's adolescence (Sears and Valentino 1997), with recent research showing that early experiences with government have an outsized impact on the political understandings one holds later in life (Barnes and Hope 2017; Bruch and Soss 2018). That police often serve as the "first experience" with government for people of color, as exemplified by the quote from Coach Y that opened this chapter, suggests that the CLS plays a particularly strong role in shaping people of color's feelings about what government is and does. Indeed, recent research shows that police stops that occur during people's early adolescence have a larger impact on their level of trust in government in adulthood (Farhart and Rosenthal 2018). Put in the language of my theoretical framework, that CLS interactions so often take place in one's adolescence for people of color makes the CLS a more likely location of the state among this population. As all my interviews were with adults, it was difficult to directly see this dynamic, but there was some supportive evidence that came from parents from communities of color talking about their children.

TJ [Black]: But I'm worried something is going to happen to [my kids] because they're so active. So I'm like, you know, my son is a big person. He doesn't even look like a kid. I'm afraid the police are gonna stop him on the street. And he's a big boy too, so with that being said, he wears a lot of hoodies and sweats and things like that. It's not his choice. He wears suits now a lot, because of it. Just to dress appropriate, so hopefully they won't pull over and think he's done something. But my kids worry me.

AJR: So your son dresses differently because of the concern of what it looks like to the police?

TJ: Yep. Yeah. And I buy differently. I try not to buy him things with hoodies. I try not to buy things that are baggy, even though in the wintertime, it's nice because you can wear layers. But yeah, they do. And he has actually been, the police have pulled over and asked him why is he outside and this and that.

Social Media and Social Networks: Indirect Exposure to the CLS

In addition to revealing that her teenage son had been stopped by the police at a young age, TJ's account further illuminates how CLS visibility extends beyond those experiencing *Direct Exposure* to the system. In particular, TJ's

concern about her son speaks to people of color being *Indirectly Exposed* to the CLS through their social networks (Walker and García-Castañón 2017). While TJ demonstrates how this *Indirect Exposure* can work through a parent's concern about their child (Russell-Brown 2004), the reverse relationship is also important. Today, one in twenty-eight children in the US have an incarcerated parent, compared to just one in 125 in 1985. This ratio jumps to one in nine for Black children, as compared to one in fifty-six for whites (The Pew Charitable Trusts 2010). In this way, children from communities of color are disproportionately raised with *Direct Exposure* to the CLS through stops and juvenile detention, as well as unequal levels of *Indirect Exposure* through connections to incarcerated parents.

Beyond parent-child relationships, social networks are also implicated through domestic partnerships (Walker and García-Castañón 2017). The partners of incarcerated individuals are frequently drawn into contact with the system through extractive practices. These practices may call on partners to support their imprisoned loved ones through commissary contributions or charge them for an incarcerated partner's room and board through "pay to stay" programs (Katzenstein and Waller 2015). Family members can owe up to \$6 for a fifteen-minute call to an incarcerated loved one, a practice that yields more than \$9 million a year in the state of Michigan alone.³ Along similar lines, bail companies often turn to partners and parents to bail out jailed individuals who are hoping to return to work or home (Page, Piehowski, and Soss 2019).

Acknowledging this frequency of *Indirect Exposure* to the CLS also invokes a gendered aspect of this contact. That men of color are disproportionately incarcerated further reveals that the social networks called on to help those in prison disproportionately involve women of color (Katzenstein and Waller 2015; Walker and García-Castañón 2017). Roughly 12 percent of white women have an incarcerated family member, as compared to 44 percent of Black women (Lee et al. 2015). Page et al.'s (2019) research into bail companies reveals how system actors understand and exploit this gender dynamic, relying on gendered aspects of care to pressure partners (disproportionately women of color) into bailing out their loved ones (disproportionately men of color). While it is important to recognize these gendered differences within the mechanisms of *Exposure*, for the purposes of this book instances of *Indirect* and *Direct Exposure* both work to heighten the visibility of the CLS, making it a more likely location of the state for men and women of color alike.⁴ As Jay told me regarding her own familial history of being pulled over by the police,

Jay [Black, Native American, White]: My mom, she doesn't really have these experiences [being pulled over] as much. But if my dad is driving, he'll have a worse experience and my mom will be in the [passenger] side.

If we zoom out beyond family to consider social networks more broadly, research further reveals how *Indirect Exposure* works to heighten the likelihood of the CLS serving as a location of the state within communities of color. Studies show that people of color are both more likely to have acquaintances who have come into contact with the CLS and more likely to perceive those vicarious experiences in negative ways (Mondak et al. 2017). In this way, people of color are not only more likely to be *Indirectly Exposed* to the CLS through their social connections but their *Exposure* is also more likely to activate a negativity bias that heightens the possibility of the CLS becoming a location of the state.

As these experiences accumulate in the nation's racially segregated cities and social networks, they normalize the presence of both *Direct* and *Indirect Exposure* to the CLS in communities of color (Burch 2013). This concentration ensures that CLS *Exposure* ripples out through these neighborhoods (Prowse, Weaver, and Meares 2020). In her work on young men in heavily policed communities, Goffman notes that "the criminal justice system has come to occupy a central place in their lives and by extension those of their partners and families, it has become a principal base around which they construct a meaningful social world" (2014, 107).

Finally, even if people of color are able to avoid *Direct Exposure* to the CLS and *Indirect Exposure* through social and community networks, there is increasing evidence of *Indirect Exposure* coming through social media channels. Recent scholarship shows that unlike white youth, Black teens gain information about carceral violence through social media platforms (Cohen and Luttig 2020; Thurston 2018a).⁵ Reflecting this trend during our interview, Sierra recounted her own experience coming across a video of a police shooting on Facebook.

Sierra [Black, Latinx, White]: I don't know, just being a young person of color, government and what's going on lately. . . . I think [government] is important in my life. Especially growing up in the suburbs, I didn't see myself as a person of color really. I knew I was. I didn't stand out, even though I did stand out, but it didn't feel that way. . . . Growing up, I was just like all of my friends. But now I'm

like, okay, I'm a person of color, in the big city, when things happen just down the street a few days ago [the shooting of a Black man she saw on Facebook]. In my head I feel like I'm more aware of my perception in society than when I was just surrounded by my friends growing up. I think I definitely look the same in the city, but it feels different. Now I'm more aware of what I come off as.

In addition to establishing her own *Indirect Exposure* to police violence through social media, Sierra indicates that her reaction to this *Exposure* is based on her racial identity. She notes how seeing a video of police violence carried out against a Black person made her more aware of her own status as a person of color. In particular, this racial identity reveals to Sierra how “important” government is in her life, insofar as it makes her a “shared policy target” of this same kind of state-sanctioned violence (Nuamah 2021). Her understanding demonstrates how social media works to facilitate a broader knowledge among people of color that they are the primary targets of the CLS, even if they lack a personal experience that has imparted this lesson (Cohen and Luttig 2020). From this perspective, this form of *Indirect Exposure* activates stronger negative reactions among people of color, as they are positioned as the primary burdenfeciaries of the CLS. By spreading this *Indirect Exposure* in a way that activates negativity bias, viral videos of police abuse working through social media help to make the CLS a more widespread location of the state, particularly among people of color.

Police Beneficiaries: CLS (In)Visibility among White Americans

The flip side of CLS policies ensuring that people of color serve as the primary burdenfeciaries of the system is the construction of whites as its beneficiaries. In those rarer instances in which whites are *Exposed* to the CLS through direct experiences or stories from social contacts, research shows differences in treatment and historical understandings mean that they are more likely to positively evaluate both personal and vicarious CLS interactions (Mondak et al. 2017; Weitzer and Tuch 2004). This more positive perception has also been supported by law-and-order rhetoric from elected officials that consistently appeals to white voters (Flamm 2007). Importantly, because whites are less likely to experience the CLS through either *Direct Exposure* via CLS encounters or *Indirect Exposure* through social networks, this elite rhetoric becomes the primary way that many whites are

exposed to the system. Thus to the more limited extent that whites are *Exposed* to the CLS, any interactions are less likely to make the CLS serve as a location of the state due to the lack of negativity bias invoked by this *Exposure*.

Recognizing that whites frequently experience the CLS only through political rhetoric also helps to explain the extent to which they connect it to government at all. Where *Direct Exposure* to the CLS makes its connection to government clear due to the markings carried on police uniforms and cars, *Indirect Exposure* from political rhetoric aimed at white voters provides considerably different cues. In particular, law-and-order rhetoric has often been tied to a broader platform that includes calls for shrinking the size of government. Consider then-candidate Trump's 2016 Republican National Convention nomination speech in which he simultaneously called for "limited government" and increasing the power of the police.⁶ In tying these proposals together, Trump followed a rhetorical strategy that has been part of law-and-order politics since its inception. As Weaver notes in talking about the first law-and-order policy entrepreneurs:

Moreover they pursued policies at odds with what their ideology of limited government would dictate. The same group that opposed civil rights legislation on the grounds that it should be left to state control were at the helm of passing federal criminal justice legislation that would extend the federal government's authority (263).

In short, by marrying the rhetoric of law and order to a broader message of limited government, elites have provided third-party cues that utilize "attenuated rhetoric" (Hackett 2019), helping to disconnect the CLS from the government for many whites, creating a form of *Indirect Invisibility*.

The impact of this rhetorical strategy could be seen in those few instances where white interviewees brought up the police. For example, Trey spent much of our interview talking about his concern for the deficit and taxes, but when asked about his biggest criterion in selecting between two hypothetical candidates, he responded by saying,

Trey: For me it would be support for law enforcement. It would be, are they gonna allow law enforcement to do what they're hired to do. Which I still believe is enforce the rules and regulations, whatever they are. Or are they gonna holster them and allow more of the people to decide what the rules and regulations are. That would be what I would say.

While it might seem like Trey's desire for greater law enforcement power and limited government are in conflict, this tension is erased when the police are disconnected from the state.

To test this disconnect more broadly, I turn to the 2016 American National Election Study (ANES). In this survey, respondents were asked if they felt "less government is better" or if there is "more government should be doing." In addition, individuals provided their attitudes about the police using a feeling thermometer scale. If the disconnect between government and police described above holds, I expect that whites who feel more warmly about the police will also be more likely to support limited government, as exemplified by Trey. In contrast, for people of color, I expect that the connection between the state and the police to be stronger. As a result, people of color should be more likely to advocate for limited government as they feel more negatively about law enforcement, recognizing that their conception of limited government involves reducing the state's most visible manifestation in their lives (i.e., the police).

Table E3.1 in Appendix E tests this expectation, controlling for several other factors that might shape one's support for the police and limited government, including party identification, ideology, gender, age, income, education, political knowledge, and religiosity.⁷ I code the limited government variable so that individuals supportive of limited government are given a value of 1, while those who think government should do more are coded as 0. Given that this dependent variable is binary, I use logistic regression in this analysis.⁸ All the independent variables are also scaled to run from 0 to 1, and the results are presented as odds ratios. Thus all the numbers in table E3.1 represent the change in the odds of an individual wanting less government as the independent variables move from their minimum to maximum values. Finally, the variable for race is coded based on one's identification as white or a person of color.⁹

In Model E3.11, this race measure is first included as a control variable to determine how opinions about the police and limited government relate to each other across the population as a whole. The insignificant coefficient for the police feeling thermometer shows that there is no significant connection between people's attitudes about the police and limited government ($p=.2$). On the other hand, the coefficients for ideology, gender, age, and race all show up as significant, suggesting that conservatives, men, older people, and whites are generally bigger proponents of limited government.

Of course, the aim of this analysis is not to understand which racial group supports limited government more but rather to determine if there




Figure 3.1. Support for limited government and police attitudes across racial groups. Slopes are statistically different at $p=.02$. 95 percent confidence intervals shown. All other independent variables are held at their means or modes. *Source:* ANES 2016.

is racial variation in the way this support is associated with orientations toward the police. By interacting race and police attitudes, Model E_{3.12} turns to this goal. This interaction term is statistically significant ($p = .02$), indicating that the relationship between police attitudes and support for limited government does vary across racial groups. To enable an easier interpretation of this result, it is illustrated with a predicted probability graph in figure 3.1.¹⁰ In line with my expectation, this figure shows that whites who are most supportive of the police are also the most likely to say government should be smaller. Moving from a white person who feels

most negatively about the police to a white person who feels most positively about the police is associated with a 14 percent increase in support for limited government. In direct opposition, this same movement from least to most positive evaluations of the police is linked to a 10 percent *decline* in calls for limited government among people of color. For people of color, those who most support limited government also have the least positive assessment of the police.¹¹

These quantitative results provide another piece of evidence demonstrating racial differences in government visibility. For whites, the CLS is less visible because they are *Exposed* to it less frequently and experience more positive feelings when that limited *Exposure* occurs. Further, the *Exposure* that they do have often comes *Indirectly* from elite rhetoric in which whites are positioned as the beneficiaries of the CLS and support for law enforcement is attached to limited government sentiment. These third-party cues help to foster a disconnect between the CLS and government, making the CLS *Indirectly Invisible* among whites.

Ultimately, this disconnect fits into what Charles Mills refers to as white epistemologies of ignorance (Mills 1997), which often involve white Americans “not knowing something that is true” (Hayward 2017, 404). In this case, while the association between the police and government may seem straightforward, acknowledging this connection forces a discomfort in ideologies that seek to uphold white supremacy through aggressive policing and the denigration of “big government.” Such discomfort is assuaged by disassociating government from the CLS, as is often modeled in the rhetoric of political elites. Through this disassociation, whites can simultaneously resist “big government” while also promoting policies that foster greater government intervention in communities of color in the form of more state surveillance, control, and violence, helping to maintain their racial dominance (Bonilla-Silva 1997).

The dynamic is quite different for people of color who have been the targets of these aggressive criminal legal policies. The increased level and intensity of *Direct Exposure* experienced by people of color because of these policies has been compounded by the growth of *Indirect Exposure* through social networks and social media. As these largely negative indirect and direct experiences cumulate (Cramer and Toff 2017), the CLS grows in prominence as a location of the state, providing a uniquely visible manifestation of government to inform assessments of what the state is and does among people of color.

In reflecting on this contemporary dynamic, it is important to note that CLS visibility in the lives of people of color is not a new phenomenon. It

was more than a century ago that W. E. B. Du Bois spoke of his own neighborhood in writing that “the police were our government” (Du Bois 1899). Similarly, when the Kerner Commission investigated the causes of uprisings in Black communities in the 1960s, they identified racially discriminatory police practices as a key trigger (Kerner Commission 1968). While this history is instructive, I argue that the contemporary CLS is distinctly visible in communities of color in a way that sets it apart from this history.

This distinction is due not only to the historically high arrest and incarceration rates highlighted above but also the spread of the CLS into new areas. Due in part to waning revenues brought about by the rise of the submerged state, the last few decades have witnessed a retrenchment of the social welfare state, including the decline in welfare benefit levels mentioned in the previous chapter. In response, the CLS has taken over new services and roles (Soss, Fording, and Schram 2011; Wacquant 2009). For example, cuts in mental health services in Illinois have made Cook County Jail in Chicago the nation’s largest mental health hospital (M. Ford 2015), while prisons more broadly are the country’s biggest public provider of mental health services (Soss and Weaver 2017). The CLS has similarly become more involved in other areas of governance, including education, housing, employment, and child welfare (Rios 2011; Roberts 2011; Stuart 2016; Wacquant 2009). This includes CLS actors being more present in public institutions, including more officers in schools (Rios 2011), as well as police stings in welfare agencies and hospitals (Goffman 2014; Gustafson 2012). Indeed, the number of School Resource Officers in US schools grew by more than 6,000 between 1999 and 2004 alone (Owens 2017). Thus contemporary CLS visibility differs from its historical manifestations in that individuals are forced to navigate its presence even when interacting with nominally different parts of the state.

In sum, the reach of the modern CLS has grown to new heights in both breadth and depth over the last half century. It is broader than it has ever been in that more communities of color are touched by the CLS through increasingly aggressive policing of minor crimes and greater police presence in other state institutions. Further, social media helps to extend this breadth out to people of color who are able to escape *Direct Exposure* to the CLS. Simultaneously, the reach of the CLS is deeper insofar as CLS contact is now more frequent within communities and more totalizing for the large numbers of individuals under correctional supervision and their social networks. This combination of breadth and depth sets the visibility of the modern CLS apart from a history in which the CLS has consistently targeted people of color, with a particularly strong focus on Black commu-

nities (Muhammad 2010). Finally, as I reveal in the next section, a fifth and final policy trend has made the CLS distinctly visible in the lives of people of color, allowing the contemporary CLS to serve as a particularly potent location of the state.

Policy Trend 5: The Decline of Civil Rights Legislation

There is no easy way to pinpoint the timing of the civil rights movement's decline, yet it is clear that following the major civil rights victories of the mid-1960s, the end of this decade and the beginning of the next featured increasing resistance to civil rights legislation (Hinton 2016). Numerous factors likely played into this shift, including the deaths and assassinations of important movement leaders. In addition, observers connect this demise to opponents of the civil rights movement drawing links between crime and civil rights victories. As high-profile unrest in Black neighborhoods filled the media in the late 1960s, new civil rights bills failed for fear that supporters would be labeled as aiding "riots" and lawlessness (Murakawa 2008).

Weaver's (2007) analysis of the Democratic Party's platform illuminates this declining support. After devoting an increasing amount of its platform to civil rights throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the space devoted to the issue by Democrats dropped precipitously after 1968. Summing up this trend, she notes, "Civil Rights and crime were inversely related on the agenda: as action on civil rights withered, criminal justice expanded" (2007, 258). Weaver's analysis shows that Democrats largely abandoned civil rights legislation as they sought to counter the surging law-and-order strategy from Republicans, creating bipartisan support for stricter criminal legal policy and bipartisan opposition to civil rights legislation, such as efforts to extend the responsibilities of the Office of Economic Opportunity (see also Murakawa 2008).

Just as the rising conspicuousness of welfare and taxes clashed with the growth of the submerged state to create an important form of contrasting visibility for whites, the surge of the CLS's conspicuousness contrasted with the demise of civil rights legislation to make government visible in a new way for people of color, particularly Black communities. In this way, the decrease in civil rights legislation removed an important counterweight in the equation of what government is and does. What has remained visible, and indeed expanded tremendously in both its *Indirect* and *Direct* visibility to fill this vacuum, has been the CLS. As such, the CLS sits alone as

“the government” in communities of color in a way that is even truer today than it was when Du Bois initially made this claim more than one hundred years ago.¹²

Offering a critique of the government visibility literature, Adam Sheingate points out that “for the more than two million men and women serving time and the nearly seven million people under supervision of the correctional system, the American state is anything but hidden” (2009, 4). While I agree, this section shows that individuals under correctional supervision are just part of the story. The policy changes that fostered the surge in mass incarceration and broken windows policing, and their racially disparate impacts, have combined with the decline of civil rights legislation to make the CLS into a uniquely strong location of the state for communities of color more broadly.

Though this argument complicates the extant visibility scholarship, it should not be taken as dismissing the importance of submerged state policies. Rather this argument illuminates the role of hidden benefits within a broader “policy context,” or “policyscape,” that has shaped government visibility differently for whites and people of color over the last five decades (Mettler 2016; Soss and Jacobs 2009). As such, contemporary government visibility contains a racial duality. Where whites locate the state within taxes and welfare policies, people of color are more likely to use the CLS as an anchor point for understanding government.¹³

Dual Visibility: A Modern Iteration of a Familiar Divide

America’s history is one of racial inequality. This inequality is not a side effect of American political development but rather a central feature of it (R. M. Smith 1993). Since the nation’s founding, “white and Black Americans (and, more recently, Latinos, Asian Americans, and other groups) have experienced the state in different ways” (D. King and Lieberman 2009, 578). Contextualized within this history, the racial gap in American state visibility demonstrated above is not a novel concept but rather a modern iteration of a familiar divide. Given this connection to America’s past, it is important to consider how this contemporary schism relates to previous forms of racial division in ways that feature both continuity and discontinuity.

In their study of pre-Civil War America, Young and Meisner (2008) echo a similar theme in revealing a dual state. For whites, the state was composed of a social contract only open to other whites. Indigenous and

Black people existed in a separate state defined by predation. While distinct, the two states were held together through economic and political subjugation, wherein the land and labor extracted from Indigenous and Black people financed the white social contract state (Young and Meisner 2008). This antebellum example proves a useful parallel for today's dual visibility.

More specifically, the notion of a white state being financially reliant on extraction from communities of color continues in contemporary America's racial split. As noted in the previous chapter, the irony of the rising visibility of taxation for white Americans is that most have seen their tax burden decline over the last five decades (Saez and Zucman 2019). Helping to explain this decline is the rise of submerged benefits for whites, which have in turn left large gaps in budgets across the country. Not only have these revenue gaps left the CLS with more responsibilities due to the forced retrenchment of social welfare services (Wacquant 2009) but it has also led American cities to increasingly rely on the CLS to raise funds (Khachaturian 2020).

Ferguson, Missouri, provides a salient example. As the Department of Justice report into Ferguson put it, "The City budgets for sizeable increases in municipal fines and fees each year, exhorts police and court staff to deliver those revenue increases, and closely monitors whether those increases are achieved" (US DOJ 2015, 2). As noted in chapter 1, this dynamic meant that CLS fines and fees were the city's second-largest source of revenue, making up over 10 percent of the city's budget. To understand why the city needed to rely so heavily on the CLS, one must look at the other submerged benefits it provided to businesses and wealthier residents, often in the form of tax breaks and incentives. The city made "public-policy choices [to] protect the wallets of largely white businesses and property owners and pass the bills along to disproportionately Black renters and local residents" (Johnson 2015). Put simply, Ferguson raised CLS fines and fees that made government burdens for its Black residents more *Directly Visible* in order to make up for the *Directly Invisible* tax breaks provided to whites.

Notably, Ferguson's decision to make up for the revenue lost to white submerged benefits with money extracted from people of color through the CLS follows a much broader trend that is playing out in cities across the US (Khachaturian 2020). More than seven hundred municipalities in America raise at least 10 percent of their revenue from CLS fines and fees, with this number jumping to nearly 90 percent in some cities. In Newburgh Heights, Ohio, more than half of the town's revenue is collected from traffic violations alone. Notably, while 22 percent of the town's population is

Black, they make up 76 percent of license and insurance violations, along with 63 percent of speeding tickets (McIntire and Keller 2021). In this way, the pre-Civil War dual state captured by Young and Meisner (2008), featuring a white liberal state funded by a predatory state for people of color, shares many characteristics with the duality present in contemporary American government visibility.

In addition to being held together through economic subjugation, the two sides of the state's visibility are also connected by a neoliberal rationality that pervades each. Neoliberalism has been defined in several ways, but for the purposes of this book its essential feature is an application of market logic to understanding the broader social and political world (Soss, Fording, and Schram 2011). In this way, neoliberalism is a force that consistently denigrates the state in favor of the private market, often by emphasizing personal responsibility over collective care (W. Brown 2015). I argue that these tenets of government denigration, market glorification, and personal responsibility serve as a foundation for both sides of the contemporary state's visibility.

For whites, the state appears to take their tax money to provide assistance to racial others, while the design of their own hidden benefits creates a perception that any success they enjoy is due to personal achievement within the marketplace (Morgan 2007). Paul Ryan, then a vice presidential candidate, encapsulated this logic in his speech to the 2012 Republican National Convention. Speaking about his mother's small business, he told the audience, "After all that work, and in a bad economy, it sure doesn't help to hear from their president that government gets the credit. What they deserve to hear is the truth: Yes, you did build that."¹⁴ Within this perception fostered by public policy trends, white success emerges from overcoming the *visible* obstacles the state presents rather than the *invisible* assistance it provides.

Among people of color, the stricter CLS policies over the last fifty years have consistently contained a personal responsibility rhetoric that tells individuals caught up in the system that they alone are responsible for their "mistakes" (Haney 2010; Lerman and Weaver 2014a; Wacquant 2009). Indeed, the decline of the civil rights movement has weakened any blame that might be given to deeper, structural issues for crime (Weaver 2007), helping to validate the personal responsibility narrative. Through this logic, the state's overbearing presence in communities of color is primarily the fault of the individuals living there. This logic continues today, even among those seeking to reform the system. In announcing his My Brother's Keeper initiative to help young men of color, President Obama

argued, “And in this effort, government cannot play the only—or even the primary—role. . . . We can reform our criminal justice system to ensure that it’s not infected with bias, but nothing keeps a young man out of trouble like a father who takes an active role in his son’s life” (Dawson and Francis 2016, 25).

Thus while I argue the formation of the American state’s dual visibility emerges from five separate policy trends, I also contend that these trends are tied together through neoliberalism’s rising dominance within American politics over the last five decades (Harvey 2007). On both sides of this divide, the state is maligned in favor of the market, while accountability for both success and failure is placed onto the shoulders of individuals. The consequences of this commonality will be revealed in greater detail as I turn to a discussion of America’s historically low levels of trust in government in the next two chapters.

A Distinct Duality: Placing the Boundary between Whites and People of Color

Just as the rise of neoliberalism shows how a new logic pervades a familiar racial schism in America, I argue that we might distinguish the racial duality being described here from previous versions due to the placement of the boundary between the two sides. Accounts of racial inequality in the US generally focus on a Black-white divide (e.g., Bruch, Rosenthal, and Soss 2019; Peffley and Hurwitz 2010). This emphasis makes sense given the particular history of Black people in the US, filled with policies and practices that have uniquely targeted Black Americans (e.g., King 1995; Taylor 2019). As a larger Black middle class has formed in recent decades, several scholars have focused even more specifically on the gap between poorer Black communities and the rest of the country (e.g., Wilson 2012). For example, Soss and Weaver (2017) argue for a duality wherein most Americans understand government through a liberal-democratic “first face” of the state, while race-class subjugated communities composed of impoverished people of color more frequently interact with a “second face” of the state that is based on social control. Similarly, Wacquant refers to America as a centaur state that is “liberal at the top and paternalistic at the bottom,” where poorer Black Americans live (2012, 244).

Differing from these accounts, I focus on a split in visibility between whites and people of color more broadly. Placing the divide here is not intended to downplay the particular injustices, both historic and contem-

porary, faced by Black Americans. Nor is it designed to argue that class plays no role in how Americans experience and see government. Yet I argue that there are several reasons for focusing on the specific white-people of color schism in visibility.

Perhaps most importantly, I extend beyond a white and Black focus due to my interview evidence. As noted previously, interview quotes pointed toward the “immigrantization” of welfare, meaning that both Black Americans and immigrant communities have been socially constructed as the primary beneficiaries of the program, leaving whites as the sole burdenficiaries (Garand, Xu, and Davis 2015). Further, my interviews with non-Black people of color consistently surfaced the CLS as a location of the state, just as it did among Black interviewees. This evidence can be seen in the quotes above from non-Black people of color like Mohamed and will be provided throughout the remainder of the book.

The similarity of accounts from non-Black people of color and Black Americans makes sense when examined within the context of modern policing. Several of the statistics on racial disproportionalities within the CLS presented earlier demonstrate that while Black Americans are often impacted most acutely, other communities of color are similarly exposed to a greater extent than whites (Hurwitz, Peffley, and Mondak 2015; Redner-Vera and Galeste 2015; Stowell, Martinez, and Cancino 2012; Walker and García-Castañón 2017). Helping to shape these disparities, recent history has witnessed the merging of the immigration system and the CLS (Vazquez 2011), exemplified by the rising cooperation of local police with federal immigration authorities. The birth of this “crimmigration” system has extended the visibility of the CLS into more non-Black immigrant communities, particularly among Latinx populations (Gottschalk 2016).

Similarly, the War on Terror has increased the presence of law enforcement in the daily lives of South Asian and Arab Muslim communities, often leaving them under consistent state supervision (Selod 2018). While this form of surveillance is often associated with the FBI and TSA, recent initiatives have incorporated local policing agencies. These efforts include an extensive surveillance campaign from the New York Police Department that monitored more than 250 mosques and several Muslim Student Associations (Apuzzo and Goldman 2011). In addition, the federal government’s Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) program routinely brings in local policing to aid their efforts in surveilling Muslim communities in cities across the country (Nguyen 2019). Through these changes, and others like them, whites are left as the only racial group that has been relatively unaffected by the rising presence of the CLS in American society.

Two additional arguments motivate my focus on race, as opposed to the combination of race and class.¹⁵ First, there is evidence that middle- and upper-class people of color are commonly detained by the police (Epp, Maynard-Moody, and Haider-Markel 2014). To the extent that individuals in this race-class position live in predominantly white areas, they tend to be singled out by the police for being “out of place” (Capers 2009; 2011). This trend came up often in my interview with Mohamed, who lived in a middle-class white neighborhood. In addition to telling me about being repeatedly stopped by the police while driving in his neighborhood, Mohamed also recounted the following story.

Mohamed [South Asian]: Last year, my son was 12 or 13 years old, we are playing basketball in our backyard in the afternoon. And R police came in there with guns and everything. They accused us of breaking into our own house. This is one incident.

Mohamed’s account aligns with several high-profile stories like the arrest of Harvard professor Henry Louis Gates in front of his home, and it further shows how consistently middle- and upper-class people of color are *Directly Exposed* to the police due to exclusionary understandings of race and place (Capers 2009).

Beyond this *Direct Exposure*, I also argue that the visibility of the CLS for more affluent people of color is raised through *Indirect Exposure*. As mentioned earlier, *Exposure* to the CLS among people of color has spread *Indirectly* through social media networks featuring viral videos of police violence carried out against people of color (Cohen and Luttig 2020; Thurston 2018a). Given that this *Indirect Exposure* is likely to reach both poorer and more affluent people of color, it seems that the *Indirect Visibility* of the CLS for people of color is likely to transcend class lines. This is an important distinction, insofar as a lot of the literature’s emphasis has been on the way direct contact with the police shapes political life for people of color (e.g., Epp, Maynard-Moody, and Haider-Markel 2014; Lerman and Weaver 2014a; White 2019).¹⁶ By focusing on the broader notion of CLS visibility, experienced in both *Direct* and *Indirect* ways, the impact of the CLS on political attitudes and behavior among people of color is extended significantly farther within this framework.¹⁷

Conclusion

The previous two chapters illuminate five policy trends within America's polycscape that have created both real and perceived racial disproportionalities in who benefits and who is burdened by the state. These trends have worked together over the last fifty years to generate a racial split in the state that people see. For whites, this shift has involved the growth of hidden social policies alongside policy changes and political strategies that increased the visibility of welfare and taxation. The combined impact of these three trends has made it more difficult for whites to see how they personally benefit from the state and easier to see how government takes "their" tax dollars to fund programs perceived as benefitting racial others. For people of color, tough-on-crime policies clashed with the declining legislative attention devoted to civil rights, making the CLS a uniquely visible manifestation of government.

While each of these five trends have been explored in previous studies (e.g., Morgan 2007; Mettler 2011b; Quadagno 1994; Weaver 2007), the contribution of the last two chapters comes from examining the interplay of these policy trends within a government visibility framework to uncover a racial duality in contemporary America. In doing so, I argue that both sides of this racial schism are held together by a neoliberal logic that denigrates the state and promotes personal responsibility, as well as a set of economic conditions in which the CLS extracts revenue from communities of color to fund the budget shortfalls partially created by the growing number of submerged benefits for whites.

This economic subjugation reveals how this duality fits into a longer history of racial inequality in America (Young and Meisner 2008). The task that remains is uncovering how the particular historical and cultural conjunctures that came together to create this divide actually shape American public opinion and democracy. In the next chapter, I begin this task by analyzing the relationship between this duality and America's historically low levels of trust in government.

Visible in All the Wrong Places

Dual Visibility and American Political Distrust

Two sets of protests gripped the US in the spring and summer of 2020. In the first, protestors appeared at state capitols across the country to protest restrictions put in place to deal with the spread of COVID-19. In the second, the deaths of Ahmaud Arbery, Breonna Taylor, and George Floyd, among others, sparked protests against police violence and racial discrimination that spread both nationally and internationally. On the surface, vast differences separated these protests.

Participants in the first set frequently brought weapons with them and were greeted with a passive law enforcement presence. Images of assault weapon-toting protestors shouting into the face of indifferent police officers filled the media. Protestors carried signs stating their demands, asking for the right to return to work and get haircuts. President Trump's Twitter account featured messages of support for these protests, calling on governors to "LIBERATE" their states (Fritze and Jackson 2020).

Protests in the second category varied both in their demands and the response to those demands. While the protestors were generally unarmed, they were often met with police violence. At least one hundred cities saw police departments employ tear gas in the first few weeks of these protests (Lai, Marsh, and Singhvi 2020). Images and videos showed the police using force against peaceful and acquiescent protestors, including running them over with cars and horses, shooting people on their front porches with paint bullets, pepper spraying violinists, and arresting compliant reporters.¹ Rather than asking for haircuts, protest signs asked for the right to

breathe. In contrast to his endorsement of the first set of protests, President Trump echoed the words of a racist Miami police chief from the 1960s in threatening these protests with bullets (Wines 2020). In helping to explain these different responses, participants in the first protests were almost exclusively white, while the second set featured a multiracial coalition led by Black Americans (D. R. Fisher 2020).

Acknowledging this racial distinction illuminates a connection between the dual visibility dynamic uncovered over the last two chapters and these protests. The white protestors' fury at COVID-19 restrictions can be partially contextualized within a broader misperception of government as an entity that does nothing but take one's tax money to fund programs that provide for racial others. When asked to restrict their movement by a state that is already seen as only burdensome, it is not surprising that many white Americans responded with anger. Of course, this anger is ironic given the police's consistent restrictions on the movement of people of color, a governing dynamic that helps to explain the second set of protests. While there are certainly several conditions that went into the particular breadth and intensity of the 2020 protests against police violence,² they must be understood as emerging from the history of conspicuous policing discussed in chapter 3.

Despite these differences, however, there is one element that holds these protests together: a profound distrust of government. Both protests grounded their resistance in the idea of a state that was acting too forcefully and encroaching on their lives to an undesirable level. While there are vast differences in the accuracy of this claim, this commonality reveals a dynamic that works across the dual visibility of contemporary American government and exemplifies the historically low levels of trust in government that exist today. Examining this pervasive distrust through the lens of the policy trends covered in the last two chapters, it becomes clear that the last five decades have seen the government become visible in all the wrong places.

This chapter explores the connection between the racial schism in government visibility and the decline of American political trust over the last fifty years. In doing so, I show that while Americans across racial groups may be joined in their distrust of government, they diverge in the parts of the state to which they attach that distrust. More specifically, I find that people's distrust of government is attached to the racially divergent locations of the state uncovered in the previous chapters, such that white distrust is linked to feelings about welfare while distrust among people of color is tied to police attitudes.

Uncovering this racial variation reveals two additional points about America's widespread political distrust. First, it indicates that many of the proposed reforms aimed at increasing confidence in the state through changes in government visibility have implicitly focused on whites, and thus need to be reshaped to build trust in a racially inclusive manner. Second, this racial contingency illuminates a previously unseen role that distrust plays in perpetuating racial inequality in electoral participation, as chapter 5 explores in greater detail. Ultimately, it is only through the identification of this racial variation in the locations of the state that are attached to people's distrust that we can see how distrust drives inequality in American democracy and take appropriate steps to remedy this injustice.

W(h)ither Political Trust?

The theoretical framework from chapter 1 indicates that a person's location of the state works as an anchor point to which their broader political attitudes and behaviors are attached, following the idea that individuals will tend to rely on concrete manifestations of government in their life to reduce the cognitive load associated with forming evaluations of an abstract concept like government. Thus a person's evaluation of their location of the state should be tied to their evaluation of government as a whole. As such, there is nothing inherently special about political trust within this framework. Rather trust represents one of many political opinions that I expect to be linked to a person's location of the state. With that said, there are two reasons that political trust takes on a significant role in the next two chapters.

First, distrust of government is an essential feature of contemporary American politics, in both its prevalence and its impact on political outcomes. Chapter 1 notes that while political distrust is often discussed as a constant within the US, public opinion polling suggests otherwise. As seen in figure 4.1, the percentage of people who say they trust the government most or all of the time has declined substantially in recent history, moving from more than three in four Americans saying they trusted government "most" or "all" of the time in 1964 to fewer than one in four today.³

Reflecting its pervasiveness, distrust of government was a common topic throughout my interviews. While my questions never asked interviewees about their level of trust in government directly, people tended to bring up their distrust organically as they recounted their broader feelings about the state. For example, Maya told me that people in her neighborhood did



Figure 4.1. Percentage of people saying they trust government to do right most or all of the time, 1958–2018. Sources: Pew, ANES, Gallup, ABC/Washington Post, CBS/New York Times, CNN.

not have “a lot of trust in the public sector.” During my discussion of government with Maria, she admitted that she did not trust “most of the big politicians.” Chuck Wes told me he found it “hard to trust government.”⁴

With trust declining so dramatically, several scholars have examined the impact this widespread cynicism has on the American political dynamic. Many have expressed concern over a “cumulative downward spiral,” wherein people’s distrust leads them to withhold resources from government, without which “government cannot perform well, and if government cannot perform, people will become more dissatisfied and distrustful of it” (Nye, Zelikow, and King 1997, 4). This dynamic can be seen today with Americans increasingly unwilling to turn to the state to deal with social problems, confident that the state will be unable to solve them (Lerman 2019). Given the political left’s view on state intervention, Hetherington claims that the degeneration of trust in government has played “the central role in the demise of progressive public policy in the United States over the last several decades” (2005, 3). More recently, as discussed

in the opening of this book, America's widespread distrust of government was linked to the election of Donald Trump in 2016 (Lo Wang 2016; Von Drehle 2017). Observers have noted that Trump's success in running a campaign rooted in distrust of government helped to explain his *laissez-faire* approach to COVID-19, understanding that more assertive action would have angered his antigovernment electoral base (Haberman 2020). Building on this contention, distrust of government has been linked to the American public's comparatively high levels of COVID-19 vaccine skepticism, with cross-national evidence suggesting that trust in government is one of the most potent predictors of vaccine uptake (Doherty et al. 2021; Klein 2022; Thompson 2021).

Distrust's prevalence, as seen in my interviews and public opinion polls—taken together with the crucial outcomes linked to this prevalence—underscore the value of understanding this attitude. Only by gaining a better sense of what motivates America's widespread distrust of government can we devise suitable reforms for increasing the public's confidence in the state.

This insight is linked to the second reason I focus on political trust, which is the way I argue government visibility reveals new aspects of distrust in America not covered in the extant literature. The bulk of these past efforts can be grouped into three categories (Nye, Zelikow, and King 1997). Explanations have focused on economic changes, such as growing inequality (Lawrence 1997); social changes, including a decline in Americans' trust in one another (Mansbridge 1997; Putnam 2001); and political changes, like rising partisan polarization and greater media attention devoted to political scandals (Bowler and Karp 2004; Hetherington and Rudolph 2015). That political trust began to decline so sharply in the late 1960s and early 1970s shines a particularly bright spotlight on distrust-inducing events of the time, including Watergate and dissatisfaction with the Vietnam War.

Each of these factors has undoubtedly contributed to the loss of confidence in government, and I am not suggesting that a focus on government visibility replaces or contradicts these accounts. Indeed, while the start of the policy trends covered in the previous two chapters roughly aligns with the beginning of political trust's collapse in the US, they are not a perfect match. For example, law-and-order politics started in the late 1960s (Weaver 2007), but its impact on policing and incarceration rates grew more substantially toward the end of the 1970s and early 1980s, well after the decline in trust levels began. Put simply, I am not claiming that changes in government visibility are *the* cause for declining trust, but rather one of several factors that have shaped this trend.

Indeed, I view the policy trends from the previous two chapters as complimentary to other explanations. For example, recent studies have attributed the lack of trust in government to the rise of partisan polarization (Hetherington and Rudolph 2015), as well as the growth of a twenty-four-hour news cycle that focuses on political scandals (Cappella and Jamieson 1997; Chan 1997; Chanley, Rudolph, and Rahn 2000). I see these explanations as benefitting from an incorporation of the changes in government visibility described in the previous two chapters. The declining visibility of government's more positive faces, such as the downturn in civil rights legislation for people of color and the replacement of direct benefits with submerged assistance for whites, means that much of the public has lost a visible, positive image of government to balance against the negativity generated by factors like polarization and scandals. Just as the rise of the submerged state made welfare and taxes more potent locations of the state for whites, it has also provided greater power to issues like partisan polarization and political scandals in structuring white people's evaluations of what government *is* and *does*.

While working in this complimentary fashion with other explanations, I argue that there are both theoretical and empirical insights gained through a more explicit focus on government visibility when examining political distrust. Theoretically, extant research into distrust generally begins with a question of *why* Americans have lost faith in government. In contrast to this approach, I argue that centering government visibility calls for a different question: *what do people mean by the word "government" when they say they do not trust it?*

Recall from chapter 1 that my theoretical framework argues that when an individual is tasked with evaluating the state (e.g., how much trust they place in it), the human psychological tendency to reduce one's cognitive load will lead them to rely on the part of the state made most visible in their life (i.e., their location of the state). As such, their decision to trust the government is tied to how much they trust their location of the state. Aligning this theoretical proposition with the previous two chapters suggests that shifts in government visibility have also changed the image of the state that people have in their head when asked to provide their level of political trust. From this perspective, confidence in government has declined, in part, because people's trust evaluations are now connected to the less beneficent parts of the state that have become more conspicuous over the last five decades.

Connecting this theoretical proposition to the empirical findings from the previous two chapters centers race within an analysis of political dis-

trust. If people's evaluations of government, including how much trust to place in it, are anchored in their location of the state, then the racial duality in state visibility suggests that people in different racial groups will attach their distrust of government to different parts of the state. More specifically, white political trust should be tied to beliefs about welfare and taxes, while people of color should connect their trust attitudes to feelings about the CLS.

In contrast to this expectation, much of the literature on political trust contends that demographic differences do not provide explanatory value (Craig 1996; Stokes 1962). Scholars note that most social groups have expressed a significant decline in political trust in recent decades (Orren 1997, 84). Figure 1.1 in chapter 1 illustrated this trend, showing the similarity of trust trends for white and Black Americans over the last sixty-one years. Indeed, these trends correlate highly ($r = 0.71$). As Levi and Stoker put it in their review of the trust literature, "Nearly all of this research . . . agrees on one point. Whether citizens express trust or distrust is primarily a reflection of their political lives, not their personalities nor even their *social characteristics*" (2000, 481, emphasis added).

The validity of this conclusion rests on the assumption that the racial similarity in trust trends reflects a similarity in conditions. According to this logic, trust attitudes among different racial groups have followed each other so closely because these attitudes emerge from the same place. This chapter challenges this assertion by using the racial split in government visibility to stress racial differences underlying people's distrust. The duality uncovered in the previous chapter suggests that people from different racial groups mean different things in their use of the word "government" when they say they distrust it.

By centering race, I join with scholars of racial and ethnic politics (REP) who have illuminated connections between race and political trust. Here research has demonstrated that political distrust among Black Americans differs from white distrust in terms of its levels, roots, and consequences (Avery 2006; 2009; Nunnally 2012; Wilkes 2011). While similar to my analysis in drawing this connection between race and trust, this existing research has largely ignored the role of the CLS and has focused almost exclusively on Black Americans. Thus my analysis is also designed to build on this REP scholarship by devoting more attention to the CLS and thinking about people of color more broadly.

In sum, the next two chapters focus on political trust due to its substantive importance in American politics, as well as the particular contributions I argue government visibility provides to our understanding of the subject.

A focus on visibility reorients the study of political trust from a question of *why* people do not trust government to one of *what* people mean by “government” when they say they distrust it. Combining this analytic lens with the dual visibility uncovered in the previous chapter calls out for a reconsideration of race in understandings of contemporary political distrust, and an expectation that whites and people of color attach their distrust to the most visible parts of government in their lives.

Racial Differences in Political Distrust

To align with my theoretical framework’s emphasis on the connections between people’s location of the state and their political attitudes, this section relies on two sources of evidence. First, I approach my interview data with an emphasis on the parts of government that people mention when they are espousing politically distrustful attitudes. The interpretive lens I use for my interview data analysis suggests that the concrete examples of the state that people surface in conversation illuminate what they mean by “government” when they say they distrust it (Schaffer 2016).⁵ This effort reveals how the racially divergent locations of the state uncovered in the previous chapters specifically connect to people’s distrust of government. Second, I draw on quantitative analysis to demonstrate the racial contingencies in the attitudes that are connected to people’s level of trust in government, thus providing statistical generalizability for the interview findings. In addition, quantitative analysis of historical data is used to trace a shift in trust associations over time, showing that changes in the parts of government to which people tie their distrust roughly agree with the timing of the five policy trends that I argue have fundamentally shifted government visibility.

“Should It Be 100 Percent of the Budget?”: Welfare, Taxes, and White Political Distrust

Jeff [white]: I’m not always for a free handout. Like I said, I think government should be there to assist and help guide, not necessarily just provide. And to me, welfare is propagating some bad habits. And not always because sometimes people just plain need help. But, there are people that abuse the system greatly and we’re just propagating in and continuing to perpetuate that problem. And then you get some of the other people that could be closed-minded, mind

you, that see that and [think] the whole thing is bad. Again, government mistrust and other things happen there. And [imitating these people] “Well I work hard every day and work this many hours in a coal mine or something doing this, and they go to the grocery store and get free handout.” Well, it’s not quite like that but you get what I’m trying to say.

Amy [white]: I think my upbringing, more of having a negative perception of government a lot. Too intrusive. And not always to be trusted. But my dad was kind of an independent worker. He was a farmer. So they sort of have this love/hate relationship with government. Because they rely a lot on [government], they get a lot of help from the government at times. Sometimes, it felt like it was too much. Like too much oversight, or too much taxing, and that sort of thing. So I heard a lot of complaining from my dad about the government over the years. And he’s very much more of a hands-off type of guy. So that was another thing that went into it. Too much involvement and also he felt like other people got too many handouts. You know, my dad was very much a salt of the earth, working hard, and never really having that much money. So then . . . there was a sense that it wasn’t fair and other people were getting more help.

Beyond establishing the centrality of welfare and taxes for Jeff and Amy’s understandings of government, these quotes specifically highlight the tendency of my white interviewees to connect political trust evaluations to these parts of the state. Jeff sees many people in his community connecting their mistrust of government to their feelings about welfare, such that concerns about welfare abuse leave them with a sense that “the whole thing is bad.” Amy recollects not trusting the government during her upbringing due to her father’s feelings about “too much taxing” going to fund “handouts” for others. Both accounts also point to pertinent racial stereotypes that are implicit in concerns about welfare and taxes, contrasting “hard workers” like farmers and coal miners who are seen as receiving no government help (commonly perceived as white) with welfare recipients getting a free government handout (commonly perceived as people of color) (HoSang and Lowndes 2019; Roediger 2007).

Notably, I am not the first scholar to suggest that government trust is tied to welfare. Partially echoing claims from chapter 2, Hetherington (2005) argues that the decline in America’s trust in government can be linked to the public’s growing association between welfare and the state.

Similarly, Mettler contends that welfare is a powerful microcosm of government for people, such that they “extrapolate from it to form negative assessments of the government generally” (2018, 7). The findings from the previous chapters lend support to these assertions. It makes sense that people would increasingly connect their level of trust in government to welfare as it became a more prominent location of the state over the last fifty years. Building on this thinking, I also argue that this connection between welfare and government was aided by the growing visibility of taxes seen as paying for these programs, and the submerging of benefits that hid a substantial portion of public assistance, making welfare a more uniquely conspicuous form of government aid.

Beyond this extension, however, I also put forward an important caveat, insofar as the racial split in government visibility suggests that these developments primarily impacted white Americans. As chapter 2 shows, policy changes, political rhetoric, and media attention have combined to convince whites that they are uniquely burdened by welfare. They misperceive themselves as the “hard workers” and “taxpayers” that provide the benefits necessary for communities of color to live off of the welfare system, meaning that their *Indirect Exposure* to welfare is more likely to induce the negative emotions needed to make welfare into a location of the state. Indeed, this negative perception is evidenced by public opinion data from the 2016 ANES showing that 51 percent of whites called for a decline in welfare spending, as compared to only 34 percent of people of color. Beyond these spending preferences, however, the unique visibility of welfare among whites due to this negative perception further leads to an expectation that it is only white Americans who attach their distrust of government to welfare.

To provide a more direct test of this expectation, I turn to the statistical relationship between welfare and political trust attitudes.⁶ Regarding measurement, it is essential that any question about political trust allows individuals to draw on their own image of government in providing their level of trust, rather than relying on a part of the state implied in the question. For this reason, I avoid three of the questions that are generally included in the four-item scale used to measure political trust (Aberbach 1969; Hetherington 2005; A. H. Miller 1974a; Stokes 1962). These three questions prime people to think about particular aspects of government by asking about corruption, big interests, and taxation. This last item is particularly problematic in that taxes are anticipated to be more closely connected to government visibility for whites and thus could artificially drive any racial contingencies found using this scale.⁷ To create a more conservative test, I

rely on a measure in which respondents are asked “how often they can trust government in Washington to do what is right.” Here connecting one’s trust to the ambiguity of the government “doing right” becomes a strength for this analysis because it gives respondents greater flexibility to pull on their own image of government, a cognitive task that more closely aligns with my theoretical framework.

Of course, one potential issue here is that specifically asking about the federal government primes people to focus on programs and policies handled by Washington, DC. This concern is made more worrisome given that policing is mostly run at the state and local level. With that said, my interview evidence leads me to believe this federal distinction is not a significant cause for concern. Most of my interviewees tended to ignore the layers of government, choosing instead to think about it as one connected system. Indeed, this tendency also aligns with my theoretical framework insofar as the notion of people having a location of the state suggests that individuals will generally form evaluations of government by relying on specific, concrete manifestations of the state, rather than taking into account its differentiated levels, actors, and entities.⁸

My statistical analysis begins by examining the relationship between people’s feelings about trusting government “to do what is right” and their attitudes on welfare. To align the timing of my quantitative and qualitative analysis, I once again use the 2016 ANES. Unfortunately, this survey does not include an item asking for opinions of “people on welfare” but does include an item asking people about their feelings on welfare spending (i.e., should it be decreased, kept the same, or increased).⁹ This item is measured such that higher values indicate an interest in seeing welfare spending increased. Identical to the analysis in chapter 3, all statistical models include standard control variables and all variables are scaled to run from 0 to 1, meaning that each coefficient represents the proportional change in political trust when moving from the minimum to maximum value of the independent variable. Given that political trust, as the dependent variable, runs on a five-point scale from never to always, I use OLS regression in this analysis.¹⁰

To provide a baseline for this analysis, Model E4.11 in Appendix E looks at the relationship between political trust and welfare attitudes while controlling for race, giving a sense of how these items are related regardless of people’s racial identification.¹¹ As would be expected based on prior analysis (e.g., Hetherington 2005), welfare spending attitudes show up as significantly linked to trust in government ($p = .007$). Moving from someone who wishes to see welfare spending decreased to one who wants to see




Figure 4.2. Political trust and welfare attitudes across racial groups. Slopes are statistically different at $p = .049$. 95 percent confidence intervals shown. All other independent variables are held at their means or modes. *Source*: ANES 2016.

an increase is associated with a 4 percent rise in political trust. The results further indicate that conservatives and whites are significantly less likely to place trust in government. While this result for race is interesting, the aim of this analysis is not to identify if whites or people of color trust government more but rather to see if that trust is connected to different parts of government in a way that aligns with racial variation in people's location of the state.

To examine this racial divergence in trust attachments, I bring in an interaction between race and welfare attitudes. The interaction term's statistical significance in Model E4.12 indicates that there is racial variation in the relationship between feelings about welfare and political trust ($p = .049$), with figure 4.2 presenting a predicted probabilities plot of this inter-

action term. As seen in this figure, the strong relationship between welfare attitudes and trust in government found in the previous model (and previous literature) is entirely driven by attitude associations among whites. According to these results, moving from wanting to see welfare spending decreased to wanting to see it increased is associated with a roughly 6 percent increase in political trust for whites, in contrast to a 0.1 percent decrease among people of color.¹² Thus it would seem that white Americans who express less confidence in government today attach their political distrust to their feelings about welfare, as could be seen in my interview with MichMpls.

AJR: So when you think about your life now, what would you say you feel like are the one or two biggest ways that government plays a role?

MichMpls [white]: A good role, a bad role, a changing role?

AJR: The most impact. The most influential in your life. The biggest way it seems like government influences your life.

MichMpls: I try to not have it influence my life. It's a hard question because I try and keep government out of my life. . . . Taxes have a big influence on my life. I'm trying to think of things that I can't avoid, no matter [what], you know.

AJR: Let me ask you this then, given that taxes are one of the big ways you feel like government influences you, how well do you feel your tax money is spent?

MichMpls: You do know my opinion on that, so I think horribly. . . .

AJR: I guess are there particular places that you feel like, if you were to cite one or two of the biggest examples where you go "this epitomizes wasting taxpayer money," is there one area of government that stands out to you?

MichMpls: Nothing comes to mind but let me think about it for a minute. Maybe collectively some people call it entitlements, or the welfare system. Because it encourages the wrong behavior. You always need some sort of safety net, so it's not against the concept of the safety net, but when it's so, when I can go to the [local grocery store], an expensive organic grocery store, and the person in front of me is paying with food stamps, there's a problem. It's no longer a safety net, it is truly a lifestyle. When people say I'd take a

job, but I make more money sitting at home, we've created a problem. . . . Do you want to incent people not to work, or do you want to incent people to work? Do you want to incent people to buy their \$12 per pound organic blueberries at the [local grocery store] with their food stamps? Is that what welfare's for? Like, is there a limit? Is it, should it be 100 percent of the budget goes to it? Like, at what point do you say, I mean, every, I can't say every, the overwhelming majority of houses that are on welfare have cell phones, have cable TV. How about sending them to work instead of giving everything away? And people would feel better about themselves if they only, I know my kids feel better about things when they earn it than when I just give it to them. And we have created an incentive structure that is so costly, and it has created such big government, and it sends all the wrong behaviors.

In this excerpt, MichMpls's thinking epitomizes welfare and taxes serving as the locations of the state that are tied to distrust, with government working as a force that most impacts him by taking his tax money and then giving what he perceives as nearly 100 percent of that money to people who abuse welfare and food stamp programs.

In addition, his sentiment also raises an additional important implication of this connection between distrust and these locations of the state. By making the argument that nearly 100 percent of the government's budget goes to these programs (as funded by white tax dollars), MichMpls's distrust not only involves welfare but also extends to government expenditures as a whole. It would appear that welfare serving as a location of the state for white Americans suggests a broader web of political understandings in which distrust is attached not only to welfare but to the entirety of state spending. If this claim is true, then the relationship between political trust and government spending opinions should work in ways that mirror the relationship between political trust and welfare.

I turn now to a statistical examination of this expectation. In place of the welfare spending question, I bring in a question that asks respondents to provide their broader government spending attitudes by placing themselves on a seven-point scale running from "Government should provide many fewer services in order to reduce spending" to "Government should provide many more services even if it means an increase in spending." This variable is scaled so that higher values indicate a greater desire to see government spending increased. The same trust measure is again included as the dependent variable, along with the same control variables. Model

E4.21 first controls for race, providing results that look nearly identical to those from Model E4.11. Conservatives and whites again appear less trusting, and the government spending variable also indicates that those who wish to decrease spending are less likely to place trust in the state ($p < .001$). Movement from the minimum to maximum value on the spending scale is associated with a 10 percent increase in political trust.

Model E4.22 then turns to an analysis of racial variation within this link between distrust and government spending by including an interaction between spending preferences and race. The significance of this interaction term shows that there is a racial contingency in this relationship ($p = .023$), with figure 4.3 providing a visual illustration to specify how this contingency works. Identical to welfare spending, these results demonstrate that political trust is linked to government spending preferences among white Americans but not people of color.¹³ In this case, moving from the minimum to maximum value on spending preferences is associated with a 14 percent increase in political trust for whites, but only a 2 percent jump for people of color.

Identifying this connection between distrust and broader state spending preferences extends the implications of my findings in an important way. These results suggest that the rising visibility of welfare and taxes has fostered a political distrust among whites that is linked to antipathy for government spending as a whole, with welfare serving as white people's representation of how the state spends money. Thus the widespread distrust of government among whites creates hefty resistance not only to increasing spending for welfare programs but also to any initiative that can be linked to increased state spending. In many ways, this finding aligns with work from Nye et al.'s edited volume on political distrust, where the authors conclude that "The top reasons given for distrusting government are that it is inefficient, wastes money, and spends on the wrong things" (1997, 1).

In combination with the findings presented above, however, two clarifications from this conclusion are made apparent. First, I can add specificity. The notion of distrusting government because it "wastes money" by "spending on the wrong things" is really about a perception of too much money being allocated to welfare programs. Second, this rationale only exists for white Americans, as the results show that distrust among people of color is not connected to either welfare attitudes or broader state spending preferences. This asymmetry can be understood when viewed next to the findings from chapter 2, suggesting that the three policy trends covered there combined to raise the visibility of welfare in a unique way among whites. More particularly, these trends fostered the perception that whites were




Figure 4.3. Political Trust and Government Spending Attitudes Across Racial Groups. Slopes are statistically different at $p = .023$. 95 percent confidence intervals shown. All other independent variables are held at their means or modes. Source: ANES 2016.

more burdened than other racial groups by welfare programs, helping to induce a negativity bias that increased the association between welfare and government among white people. Of course, if this finding helps to explain how government visibility has promoted the decline of white political trust, it leaves an open question as the parts of the state that are linked to distrust for people of color. The next section provides an answer.

**“There’s Distrust with the Police”:
Distrust and CLS Visibility among People of Color**

In contrast to the public’s deep distrust of government, a 2017 poll found that 57 percent of Americans had either a “great deal” or “quite a lot” of

confidence in the police, making it one of the most trusted public institutions in the nation. In the two years leading up to this poll, confidence in the police had actually jumped 5 percent (Norman 2017). Notably, this increased trust came during a time period with several high-profile, police-implicated deaths involving Black Americans. In July of 2015, Sandra Bland committed suicide in a Texas jail cell after being assaulted by an officer during an investigatory car stop that began with her failing to signal during a lane change. Less than a year later, Alton Sterling was killed by the police in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, while selling CDs in front a convenience store. The next day, a police officer in Falcon Heights, Minnesota, killed Philando Castile during an investigatory car stop for a broken taillight. Notably, these cases stand out only due to the attention they received, with analysis pointing to thousands of other police-related killings taking place during this same stretch of time.¹⁴

That overall trust in police grew alongside these events should not obscure the racial gap within this growth. Deviating from increased trust among whites, Black confidence in the police dropped by 5 percent between 2015 and 2017, along with a 14 percent decline among Latinx individuals. As a result of these divergent trends, only 30 and 45 percent of Black and Latinx respondents said they trusted the police in 2017, respectively, compared to 61 percent of whites (Norman 2017). Tellingly, this racial gap in opinion exists even among law enforcement officers, with 57 percent of Black officers saying that fatal police encounters are signs of a broader problem, as compared to just 31 percent of white officers (Desilver, Lipka, and Fahmy 2020). Recognizing this sentiment in communities of color, President Obama's task force on the problems of modern policing identified building trust as its "foundational principle" ("President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing" 2015).

While the racial gap in police trust is well-established (Peffley and Hurwitz 2010; Tuch and Weitzer 1997), I argue that its implications for American public opinion have been underexplored. Not only did my interviewees of color bring up their distrust of the CLS but they also tended to connect this distrust to a broader cynicism about the state, exemplifying the way the CLS functions as a location of the state that anchors people of color's broader political attitudes. For example, Maya, a Latina interviewee, explained the distrust of government that she saw in her neighborhood by telling me, "There's distrust with the police in the community." Or Jay, who summarized her recent ordeal of being stopped by the police three times in one hour by saying, "That was my bad experience with the government."

From this perspective, I expect that evaluations of the CLS among people of color to be not only more unfavorable but also more *politically consequential*, because the system serves as such a visible and negative manifestation of the state. With more frequent *Direct* and *Indirect Exposure* making the CLS a clearer manifestation of what government is and does for people of color, it follows from my theoretical framework that people of color should rely more heavily on the CLS when forming evaluations of government, writ large. From this perspective, the historically low levels of trust in government among people of color today can be connected to the historically high levels of CLS visibility covered in the previous chapter. Differently, the disassociation between the CLS and the state for white people found in chapter 3 suggests there should be no link between white feelings about the police and levels of trust in government. If this understanding is correct, attitudes about the CLS today will be linked to political trust among people of color, but not white people.

This expectation can be examined statistically by reproducing the same statistical analysis from the previous section, but now replacing welfare and spending attitudes with evaluations of the police. Table E4.3 picks up this analysis, beginning with an investigation of the relationship between political trust and feeling thermometer scores for the police. Model E4.31 starts by controlling for race to see what this relationship looks like across the population as a whole. In addition to liberals and people of color showing higher levels of trust in government, police attitudes are also statistically significant ($p = .001$), indicating that individuals grow more trusting of government as they feel more positively about the police.

Model E4.32 then investigates the potential for a racial contingency within this relationship by interacting police attitudes with race. The statistical significance of this interaction term is illustrated in figure 4.4, showing that there are racial differences in the connection between people's feelings about the police and their level of trust in government ($p = .048$). Just as the previous section showed that whites drive the association between welfare and political trust, figure 4.4 shows that the link between the police and trust in government is primarily a reflection of attitudes held by people of color. Moving from the most negative to positive feelings about the police is associated with a 14 percent increase in government trust among people of color but just a 4 percent rise for whites. This distinction further supports the argument that whites tend to disconnect their feelings about the CLS from government, while the CLS's position as a location of the state for people of color means that one's feelings about it are tied to one's understanding of government as a whole.¹⁵




Figure 4.4. Political trust and police attitudes across racial groups. Slopes are statistically different at $p = .048$. 95 percent confidence intervals shown. All other independent variables are held at their means or modes. *Source*: ANES 2016.

While this finding extends the importance of CLS distrust among people of color, it is possible that it mostly reinforces previous analysis showing that direct contact with the CLS drives decreased levels of political trust (Lerman and Weaver 2014a). Different from this past scholarship, my contention is that the visibility of the CLS extends beyond people of color who have personally experienced the system through arrest or incarceration (*Direct Exposure*), with social media and social networks creating widespread instances of *Indirect Exposure* that make the CLS more *Indirectly Visible* for people of color. Such a distinction is important for determining the breadth of the CLS's reach in shaping political attitudes among people of color.

To test this assertion concerning the role of *Indirect Visibility*, Model E4.33 repeats the same analysis but drops out all respondents who indicated that they had ever been arrested or stopped by the police within the last year. The model therefore examines the potential for racial variation in attitude associations held among those who lack *Direct Exposure* to the CLS. As can be seen in table E4.3, the results for this model are nearly identical to the previous results, once again featuring a statistically significant interaction between race and police attitudes ($p = .015$). Indeed, the results are actually more dramatic among this group lacking *Direct Exposure*, revealing that moving from disliking to liking the police is associated with a 17 percent rise in political trust for people of color but a 0.3 percent decline for whites. By demonstrating that racial variation in the connection between political trust and police attitudes extends beyond individuals who have directly encountered the system, this model helps to illustrate the extensive political power of CLS visibility among people of color in contemporary America.

The findings put forward in this section support the argument that the CLS's increasing visibility over the last five decades of "tough-on-crime" policy has helped to drive down political trust for people of color, in the same way that I argue this happened for whites due to the greater conspicuousness of taxes and welfare. Yet the interview and quantitative evidence presented here only cover the contemporary period, leaving a gap between these findings and the historical argument being made in this book. Have these attitude associations actually changed in alignment with the historical shifts in government visibility and the decline in trust? Or do these racially contingent connections to political trust predate these trends? In the next section, I turn to an analysis of historical data to help answer this question.

The State People Trusted?

The origins of the public policy shifts focused on in chapters 2 and 3 can all be traced back to roughly the same period spanning from the end of the 1960s to the end of the 1970s. It was during this time that submerged benefits grew more popular (Mettler and Milstein 2007), welfare policies became linked to Black Americans by political rhetoric and media attention (Gilens 1999), the permanent tax revolt started in the US (Martin 2008), the national popularity of law-and-order politics began (Flamm 2007), and the decline of civil rights legislation set in (Weaver 2007). As

these trends coalesced, I argue that a racial duality formed within government visibility that helped to drive political trust levels down from their peak levels in the 1960s. Put simply, as the most visible manifestations of government became less trustworthy parts of the state, trust in government declined. Of course, the validity of this argument rests on the assumption that people did not hold these same locations of the state prior to these policy developments.

While there is no way to produce interviews capable of delving into people's locations of the state during the period of higher trust in the 1960s, it is possible to partially test this argument by statistically analyzing whether the trust associations discovered above also existed prior to the policy developments explored in chapters 2 and 3. Unfortunately, even this relatively simple task is complicated by data availability. Questions about welfare were not included on the ANES until 1976, well into the rise of welfare's visibility and its association with Black Americans (Gilens 1999; Kellstedt 2003). Analysis of news coverage shows that the percentage of people pictured in stories on poverty who were Black jumped from 27 percent in 1964 to 72 percent in 1967 (Gilens 1999, 114). In addition, political trust levels had already started their descent by 1976. Just 34 percent of Americans said they trusted government most or all of the time, down from 67 percent ten years earlier. Recognizing this limitation, the section below focuses only on the link between feelings about the police and levels of trust in government, as a question about the police was first introduced to the ANES in 1966.

Trust the Police? Political Trust Attitude Associations in 1966

That a police feeling thermometer was first included on the ANES in 1966 is fortunate for several reasons. First, this time period preceded the rise of broken windows policing and mass incarceration that made the police more visible in communities of color. The total number of people in state and federal prisons in 1966 was just under 200,000, meaning that the US incarcerated approximately 100 people per 100,000 residents.¹⁶ By comparison, today's incarceration rate is six times larger, with approximately 1.6 million individuals locked up in state and federal prisons (Sawyer and Wagner 2020). Second, law-and-order politics were relatively new at this point in American history (Weaver 2007). While Barry Goldwater was the first presidential candidate to make law and order a central issue in his 1964 campaign, his landslide defeat also suggests the relatively weak appeal

that this form of politics held at the time (Murakawa 2008). Third, 1966 was a time of significant civil rights legislation. The previous two years had seen the passage of the Civil Rights Act (1964) and the Voting Rights Act (1965), two of the largest pieces of civil rights legislation passed by Congress. As argued in the previous chapter, these victories provided an important and beneficent manifestation of government for people of color, and particularly Black Americans.

Finally, levels of political trust were quite different in 1966. As a whole, 67 percent of Americans said that they trusted the government to do the right thing most or all of the time, with 72 percent of people of color making this claim. These high numbers contrast sharply with the 17 percent of people of color who expressed confidence in the state in 2016. Further reflecting the differences of these time periods, the average feeling thermometer rating for the police was 78 among people of color in 1966, as compared to an average rating of 65 in 2016.

That people of color trusted government and the police more in 1966 provides a potential counterargument to the assertion being made in this book. Where I am arguing that the CLS was a less potent location of the state for people of color before the rise of broken windows policing and mass incarceration, the high levels of confidence provided for both the government and the CLS in 1966 suggests attitudes about them may already have been linked within communities of color.

To test this dynamic, I ran a model almost identical to the one from the previous section to examine the relationship between government trust and police attitudes in 1966.¹⁷ The results of this model can be seen in table E4.4. Mirroring previous analyses, race is first included as a control variable in Model E4.41. Here the results reveal several changes in comparison to 2016. First, the lower levels of trust from whites and conservatives found in 2016 disappear, while greater trust shows up in 1966 among Democrats and younger individuals. More importantly, showing consistency with 2016, trust is found to be significantly related to orientations toward the police across the public as a whole ($p < .001$).

To test whether this significant link between political trust and police attitudes is again driven by attitude associations among people of color, as it was in 2016, Model E4.42 brings in an interaction term between race and police attitudes. Where this interaction term was significant in 2016, it just edges into marginal significance in this case ($p = .1$), indicating that there are still racial differences in the relationship between political trust and police attitudes, though those differences appear to be less dramatic. However, where the interaction term was negatively signed in 2016, it is




Figure 4.5. Political trust and police attitudes across racial groups, 1966. Slopes are marginally different at $p = .1$. 95 percent confidence intervals shown. All other independent variables are held at their means or modes. *Source*: ANES 1966.

positively signed in 1966. As seen in figure 4.5, this reversal indicates that the relationship between feelings about the police and trust in government in 1966 was actually driven more by attitude associations held by whites. In this case, moving from disliking to liking the police is linked to just a 1 percent increase in political trust for people of color but a 20 percent jump among whites.¹⁸

Obviously, this result differs substantially from the 2016 equivalent and does so in ways that support my argument about government visibility. As expected, trust in government was not linked to feelings about the police among people of color prior to the policy trends that drove the rising visibility of the CLS. With civil rights victories replaced by mass

incarceration and broken windows policing, however, the CLS became a more prominent and less trustworthy location of the state among people of color over the last five decades. In the process, not only did feelings about government become fused to attitudes about the CLS for people of color but levels of support for both declined as well.

In addition, these results indicate that white trust in government was more closely linked to attitudes about the police in 1966. Though this finding was unexpected, it may also help to explain how Goldwater's unsuccessful campaign two years prior to this survey laid the groundwork for Nixon's successful campaign two years after it (Murakawa 2008; Weaver 2007). Goldwater's law-and-order campaign appears to have fostered attitude associations between government and the police among whites that helped Nixon more successfully appeal to white voters in his own presidential bid focused on issues of crime.¹⁹

Interestingly, the results from the previous chapter and the sections above show that this white attitude association between the police and government disappeared by 2016. In chapter 3, I credited this disassociation to repeated arguments from conservative politicians that tied increased policing to appeals for limited government. These results reveal that this disconnect had not set in for whites at the birth of law-and-order politics. It would seem that as this white association between police and the state faded, and welfare emerged as a more prominent location of the state among whites, trust in government declined for white Americans as well.

How Changes to Government Visibility Can Increase Trust

The only thing that Americans seem to agree on as much as their distrust of government is their feeling that trust in government needs to be improved. In a 2018 poll, 68 percent of respondents said it is "very important" to build the level of confidence that Americans have in government (Raine, Keeter, and Perrin 2019). What do the findings above tell us about how to help fulfill this widespread desire?

First, my analysis provides a strong caveat to assertions that increasing trust can come from making the government more visible. Discussions of the submerged state frequently begin from the idea that the submerging of government benefits has made people less likely to trust the state. As the analysis in this chapter reveals, this reasoning applies primarily to policy dynamics and political trust among white Americans. For people of color, my findings indicate that it would be more accurate

to say that distrust emerges from the government frequently being too visible (Thurston 2018a), particularly in relation to the everyday conspicuousness of the CLS.

Reflecting this distinction, reforms aimed at increasing political trust require a new conversation between scholars and advocates who too frequently speak past each other. On the one side, government visibility scholars concerned with increasing political trust must give greater attention to criminal legal reforms. Research into state visibility should be intentional in considering how surfacing currently submerged benefits to increase trust could work in tandem with decreasing the visibility of the CLS in communities of color. For their part, advocates and scholars concerned with policing in the US too frequently speak of increasing trust in the CLS without attending to the implications of their work for increasing trust in government more broadly (e.g., “President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing” 2015).

To exemplify the importance of this conversation, consider reforms aimed at handing responsibility for mental health crises over to publicly employed social workers rather than police officers (A. Roth 2020). Such a reform is frequently isolated as a policy proposal concerned with policing in the US. Yet the analysis above suggests that this is an idea that visibility scholars should be interested in, as it has profound implications for shifting the way government appears in people’s lives in a way that might build trust in the state. From this perspective, the implications of this reform go beyond policing, reaching out into American public opinion and democracy. If the CLS is left out of conversations about state visibility or vice versa, however, these implications are missed.

Second, calls to increase the visibility of government benefits are made more complicated by welfare’s position as a location of the state among white Americans. Surfacing currently hidden programs may focus more public attention on these programs, leading them to become newly connected to welfare. This dynamic is more likely, and therefore more troubling, for the limited number of submerged benefits for the poor. Exemplifying this potential, Callaghan and Olson (2017) show that surfacing the Earned Income Tax Credit, a submerged policy for individuals near the poverty line, leads to less support for the program among people who score high on a scale of racial resentment. Thus surfacing hidden programs may fail to increase political trust and simultaneously create a dynamic that leads to reduced spending on poverty programs that currently benefit from their inconspicuousness. A more detailed discussion of strategies for shifting government visibility is included in chapter 7.

Conclusion

Where the previous chapter showed that Americans vary in the state they see, this chapter finds that they are connected in distrusting what is visible to them. Hidden within this commonality, however, is a racial split in distrust attachments that can be connected back to the division in government visibility. Over the last five decades, welfare's rising visibility has made it a more prominent location of the state for whites, such that white distrust of government is now connected to welfare attitudes. As a result of welfare's visibility, whites who distrust the government have negative feelings about not only welfare but also government spending more broadly. People of color exhibit no association between political distrust and welfare but instead are more likely to attach their mistrust to opinions of the police. Importantly, the analysis put forward here shows that this link between police and government distrust among people of color did not exist prior to the growth of CLS visibility over the last fifty years. Put simply, government visibility has shifted in different ways for both whites and people of color, but in this shift government has fostered widespread distrust by being visible in all the wrong places.

As noted in the introduction to this chapter, my intention in making this argument is not to discredit other explanations for the decline in political trust. Rather I view the changes in government visibility discussed here as one factor among many that contributed to this descent—and one that works in complementary ways with many of the other accounts of America's distrust. Differing from other explanations, however, government visibility places emphasis on racial variation within the waning levels of political trust. As this chapter begins to show, recognizing the role of race is important because it points toward previously underexplored racial variation in the attitudes associated with people's distrust. In the next chapter, I extend the implications of this racial distinction by showing how it unlocks the relationship between political distrust and racial inequality in America's electoral democracy.

Invisibility and Membership

How Government Visibility Creates Racially Patterned Political Inequality

I met Chuck Wes for an interview at a neighborhood café after he got off work. Unfortunately for us, the coffee shop was holding trivia night, so we spent the evening battling the sound of questions and nearby tables celebrating. Speaking over the emcee's recitation of the previous round's answers, Chuck explained his feelings about government.

Chuck Wes [Black]: I think that in 2016, [government is] suspect. I think it's suspect. And I don't know. Just, I feel like, there's a motive. Everyone has a motive. And I feel like it's scary because the government has a lot of power, and they sometimes abuse that power. And so, it makes it hard to trust, you know, government.

As seen in the previous chapter, Chuck's distrust of government put him in agreement with most Americans. This distrust proved to be a consistent theme throughout our interview, becoming a kind of ongoing gag. More than once, Chuck checked over his shoulder in an exaggerated way to see if the nearby trivia players were actually government agents listening in on our conversation.

Chuck Wes: I guess, when you just look at the way things are, the way the world is shaped, the way things are happening, it's hard to

have trust in the government. It's hard to say I believe we have a government that is for the people, for equal rights, does the right thing. . . . They're like the biggest gang, the government. . . . Am I gonna get a call tomorrow from a government official?

While Chuck's actions and words were somewhat lighthearted, his stylized paranoia also revealed important aspects of his attitudes toward government. In expressing his political distrust, Chuck connected this feeling to a certain understanding of how the state worked—and thus how he should behave in relation to the state. In particular, Chuck exhibited a form of distrust that was tied to the state being a “scary” entity that abuses its tremendous amount of power in a way that works against equal rights. Further, Chuck's concern about government agents demonstrates a fear of state surveillance, while his gang analogy references organized state violence. By providing these additional understandings of government as he expressed his lack of trust, Chuck gives meaning to his political distrust.

This chapter uses the meaning underlying people's distrust to investigate the relationship between that distrust and political participation, entering into a longstanding scholarly debate over the capacity of distrust to increase or decrease political engagement (Almond and Verba 1963; Gamson 1968; Miller 1980; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). Differing from this literature, I focus on the location of the state to which people's distrust is attached, and how these locations shape the meaning of people's distrust as it relates to their understandings about citizenship and membership within America's political system.

By exploring these connections, I gain insight into the way distrust is linked to participatory habits, and ultimately reveal a strong but racially contingent relationship between distrust and electoral participation. I find that distrust associated with welfare and taxes generates political mobilization among whites because the meaning of white distrust is rooted in a sense of investment and membership in the polity. As white people connect their distrust of government to their antipathy for taxation and welfare, this connection reinforces the misperception that white people disproportionately pay into the system, giving them a larger say in the political contestation over what happens with that money. In contrast, distrust tied to the criminal legal system (CLS) pushes people of color away from the conventional political process. By anchoring distrust among people of color, the CLS invests that distrust with feelings of diminished citizenship and a desire to remain invisible to a violent and dangerous state. Thus the racially divergent locations of the state not only foster different anchor

points for distrust but also shift its political influence by altering the meaning of that distrust. In uncovering this contingency, I demonstrate a more concealed mechanism through which the American state continues its history of creating and perpetuating racially patterned political inequality in an era when explicitly discriminatory policies are less politically palatable.¹

Political Distrust: The Great (De)Mobilizer?

Just as political trust levels have never returned to the peaks they hit in 1964, so too did the US fail to reach the same turnout levels achieved that year prior to 2020. In the four decades that followed 1964, both measures declined considerably. The similarity of trust and participation trends can be seen in figure 5.1, which charts turnout in presidential elections and the percentage of people saying they trust government most or all of the time. Notably, there has been a divergence between these measures over the last twenty years, with trust levels continuing to fall while turnout levels rose closer to their 1960s' heights. Even with this recent gap, however, the two trends still correlate at .41 over this time period. If this period is limited to the years prior to 2004, that correlation jumps to .78. At first glance, it would seem that political trust and participation have been tightly linked.

In reaction to this high correlation, copious scholarship has been devoted to analyzing the impact of trust on participation (e.g., Citrin 1974; Hooghe and Marien 2013; A. H. Miller 1974a). In this effort, several conflicting findings have been put forward. Early research argued that trusting individuals believe government is responsive to the public's voice, meaning that trust should encourage participation (Almond and Verba 1963; Stokes 1962). In direct opposition, other scholars argued that distrustful individuals should be the most eager to see government change its course. From this perspective, distrust would mobilize participation by providing individuals with greater motivation to get involved (Bandura 1982; Gamson 1968).

In staking an alternative path, a third set of scholars contend that there is no link between political trust and participation (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). Much of this literature developed out of attempts to dispel arguments that the decline in political trust in the late 1960s caused the simultaneous decline in turnout rates. As Miller argued, "The decline in turnout has not taken place as a consequence of declining trust . . . there is simply no direct causal link between the attitudes of trust in government and the decision to vote" (1980, 24). While each of these three theories has its pro-




Figure 5.1. Political trust levels and turnout rates, 1964–2012. Sources: Pew, ANES, Gallup, ABC/Washington Post, CBS/New York Times, CNN.

ponents, this lack-of-association argument appears to have been the most successful, insofar as political trust is rarely included in studies analyzing American political involvement (e.g., Verba, Scholzman, and Brady 1995; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980).

Responding to the popularity of this explanation, a fourth and final section of the literature has argued that trust's effect on participation is contingent (Levi and Stoker 2000). According to this argument, the null relationship between trust and participation found by others is missing the real connection between the two, wherein trust mobilizes in some cases but demobilizes in others. Scholarship in this area clusters around two ideas. In the first, research has focused on different types of political acts involved, arguing that distrust will dissuade people from more “conventional” forms of participation taking place inside the electoral process (e.g., voting) while encouraging them to get involved in “unconventional” ways (e.g., protesting) (Citrin 1977; Jackson 1973; Muller 1977).

For a second group of scholars, this contingency rests on the characteristics of the individuals involved, not the type of political action. Early research suggested that distrust only fosters political engagement among those who also possess a high level of political efficacy, with distrust con-

vincing people that change needs to happen while efficacy provides them with a belief that they can create that change (Gamson 1968; A. H. Miller 1974b; Shingles 1981). Similar arguments have substituted other characteristics for efficacy, contending that distrust will lead to increased political participation only among the wealthy (Nie and Verba 1987) or the educated (Chan 1997; Citrin 1977), who are able to draw on their resources to translate distrust into political action.

Despite the expansive nature of this literature, I argue that two limitations call for further analysis. First, as can be seen in the dates provided for most of the citations above, little attention has been devoted to this subject in recent years. As trust and participation trends have diverged over the last two decades, scholarship attending to this relationship has waned. This fading scrutiny leaves an open question as to how trust is related to participation in the contemporary era, where cynicism operates as a central facet of the political dynamic rather than a new phenomenon. As touched on in chapter 1, Donald Trump's ability to win the presidency in 2016 through a campaign grounded in political distrust raises the salience of studying this relationship in America today.

Second, much of the literature investigating the impact of trust on participation has ignored race, a gap also made more salient by Trump's 2016 victory. To the extent that race has been covered, scholars have focused on dynamics *within* racial groups. For example, research has considered the conditions under which distrust fosters participation among Black Americans (Jackson 1973; Shingles 1981). Yet the previous chapter's findings concerning racial variation in trust attachments necessitate an analysis that emphasizes contingencies *across* racial groups. How might the effect of trust on participation be different for whites and people of color, given that their level of trust in government is connected to different locations of the state?

In pursuing this question, I take a new approach to studying trust's effect on engagement, as highlighted in this chapter's introduction. Similar to the skepticism placed on shared meanings of the word "government" in the last chapter, this chapter argues that *racial differences in locations of the state create different meanings of distrust* (Schaffer 2016; Soss 2014). For example, if a person attaches their distrust to a part of government that they find *frustrating*, I expect that their distrust will differ in its meaning when compared to a person who connects their distrust to a part of the state that they *fear*.

Placing analytical emphasis on this difference in meaning aligns with my theoretical framework's focus on the connection between locations of

the state and interpretive policy feedback effects. According to this argument, locations of the state shape people's evaluations of government by imparting lessons to people about how the state relates to them, and how they in turn should relate back to the state (Pierson 1993; Mettler and SoRelle 2014). While one of these lessons might be that government is not to be trusted, as exemplified in the previous chapter, that distrust is likely to be just one aspect of a broader web of political understandings that is shaped by a person's location of the state (Lin 1998). Other attitudes, such as a belief in the responsiveness of government, are also likely to be impacted by this location of the state and will be connected to a person's trust attitudes within their broader web of political opinions.

Thus I argue that if we want to understand the *meaning* of the distrust produced by a particular location of the state, we must attend to the other attitudes and behaviors that are tied to it. For example, the previous chapter illuminated that welfare and taxes serving as the location of the state for white distrust revealed its connections to broader government spending attitudes in a way that was not true for distrust among people of color. By identifying this connection, we gain a greater understanding of the meaning underlying white distrust. Given the racial variation in distrust attachments already uncovered, I expect that the meaning of distrust varies across racial groups in ways that implicate its connection to political attitudes and behaviors beyond spending preferences.

This chapter tests this expectation by exploring the connection between political distrust and participation, investigating how the different meanings of distrust shape its effect on political participation.² Here I align with previous research in emphasizing the way policy feedback effects shape participation habits via their impact on feelings of membership in the polity and "the content and meaning of citizenship" (Mettler and Soss 2004, 66). More specifically, scholars show that when feedback effects lead a person to "view his citizenship as worth less than that of others" they become "less likely to participate" (Mettler and SoRelle 2014, 84). Thus I place analytic emphasis on the meaning of one's distrust as it relates to their sense of citizenship and membership within the political community, with the expectation that a distrust tied to feelings of diminished citizenship is likely to push people away from the political process. Conversely, if distrust is invoked alongside a sense of full membership in the polity, I expect that it will generate higher levels of political engagement.

In line with my interpretive approach, I uncover these differences in the meaning of distrust by analyzing how people use the term in practice during my interviews (Schaffer 2016). As seen in the interview excerpt from

Chuck Wes above, when people discuss their distrust they also reveal its meaning by surfacing the understandings of government connected to this distrust, such as Chuck's fear of a violent state. Importantly, these meanings provide clues about people's sense of citizenship, giving insight into how their form of distrust shapes their level of political involvement. Thus by engaging in the interpretive work of elucidating variation in meaning, I can then plug the different meanings of distrust I find into the positivist pursuit of analyzing the causal relationship between distrust and political participation habits (Lin 1998). Ultimately, in demonstrating how racial variation in locations of the state connects to the racially divergent meanings of people's distrust, this analysis illuminates the role that American government visibility plays in structuring racial inequality in American democracy.

“I Don't Think They'd See Me”: Distrust and Political Invisibility among People of Color

This section contemplates the meaning of distrust for people of color, given its attachment to the CLS found in the previous chapter. To do so, I highlight the understandings of citizenship that emerged among interviewees of color as they discussed the CLS. In particular, I show how the form of political distrust that emerges from the connection between government and the CLS invokes a sense of diminished citizenship that is expressed through acquiescence and state avoidance. Working together, these understandings illuminate how distrust for people of color generates a desire to remain invisible to the state. As a result, I argue that distrust among people of color causes disengagement from the political process.

“I Just Put My Hands Up”: Acquiescence

Coach Y [Black, Somali-American]: Oh man, my first experience [with the government] was, I was arrested. My first experience was I got into a car accident, and the police ran my registration and said you have a warrant. And I said okay [Laughs]. I was 19 at the time. And he said you failed to pay a seat belt ticket. I said, “It wasn't me, I can assure you that.” And I suspect it was my little brother got the ticket and didn't tell me about it. And didn't pay the ticket, and then there was a warrant. . . . And so I just put my hands up, and the officer said, “It looks like you did this before.” And I said, “No, this

is my first time, but I don't think I can get out of it." So he took me in and processed me. So going from a normal day to becoming an inmate, someone in custody for a seat belt ticket was an experience. But I'd seen worse than that. It wasn't a big deal. Called my family. [They] couldn't get me out. So I stayed in jail that night. Strange feeling. Weird. I'd rather be in a refugee camp [laughs]. It was just another reality check. So that was my first [experience with government] I would say.

The beginning of this quote from Coach Y was included in chapter 3 to show the CLS's visibility in people of color's lives, but the rest of it is brought in here to give a broader sense of how the CLS serving as a location of the state shapes understandings of government among people of color. In addition to the distrust of the CLS, and thus the government, that developed out of this interaction, it is important to note Coach Y's quick recognition that protest would be futile and his description of the corresponding choice to put his hands up. Pursuing this course of action comes despite his belief in the mistaken identity and injustice involved in his detention, and his statement that spending the night in jail was worse than his past experiences in a refugee camp.

Through this behavior, he portrays an understanding among people of color that "any encounter with the police can, based on an inadvertent action or remark or misunderstanding, escalate into a humiliating or threatening experience" (Epp, Maynard-Moody, and Haider-Markel 2014, 47). Indeed, stories ranging from Sandra Bland to George Floyd show the possibility of escalation going beyond humiliation and threat, with the potential of serious bodily harm and death. Demonstrating this knowledge, Coach Y pursues what he perceives to be the safest course of action in complying with law enforcement, employing a strategy of appearing "as non-threatening to the police as possible" (Weaver, Prowse, and Piston 2019, 1163).

In addition to attempting to maintain safety, Coach Y's demeanor also reveals certain understandings about his own sense of citizenship. As Capers puts it:

The law-abiding minority who negotiates the criminality script by being overly obsequious, by not asserting his right to proceed, his right not to answer questions, or his right not to grant consent, is doing more than accepting a "racial tax." . . . In declining to assert any rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, he is assuming the posi-

tion of a second-class citizen, or three-fifths of a citizen, or a denizen, or an at-will citizen allowed autonomy only at the discretion of the law officer. (2011, 28)

From this perspective, Coach Y's lack of protest to an unjust arrest helps to explain the meaning of political distrust when it is connected to the CLS. This form of distrust is bound up with a sense of diminished citizenship and fear that promotes acquiescence during interactions with the state. Ultimately, this meaning provides important clues about how political distrust among people of color might structure political engagement. If the best course of action when dealing with the CLS is to avoid speaking up, and the CLS serves as the most visible manifestation of what government is and does, it makes sense that a distrust of the state connected to the CLS would cause one to avoid speaking up to government in other venues, including through the political process.

Further, that Coach Y engaged in this acquiescent behavior in what he described as his first experience with government reveals how this knowledge can be possessed by people of color who have not been *Directly Exposed* to the CLS. In Capers's language, Coach Y understood his non-resistant role within a racialized "criminality script" despite this being his first encounter with the CLS (Capers 2011). While my interview did not reveal how Coach Y learned this behavior, his story reveals the power of *Indirect Exposure* in fostering this understanding of how to relate to the CLS, and thus the government more broadly. Moreover, the officer involved also illustrates his knowledge of this script rooted in the stigmatizing connection between criminality and Blackness in his assumption that Coach Y's complacency indicated previous arrest experiences (Muhammad 2010).

My interview with Curt, a white man, further underscores the racialized nature of these understandings.

Curt [white]: I got stopped by a highway patrolman coming back from [different state]. "You don't have your seat belt on." Really? I said nobody gets in my car without a seat belt. "I didn't see it." I said sir, I don't want to argue with you, but I was going that way at 65 miles per hour, and you were sitting there, you actually saw that I didn't have my shoulder belt on? And I'm wearing a grey sweatshirt with a grey seat belt. Well he didn't give me a ticket, but he had to write me a warning. A warning for what? That I talked to you? Little things like that kinda irritate me. And I understand there's a big push for seatbelts right now, because it's a buck and a quarter for a

seat belt fine, but I guarantee you I would have been out in H town fighting that one. Because I do not get in a car without a seatbelt. I'm sure he went back to look at my record, which is clean and came back with my warning. He said you must have had it off your shoulder. I said no. I'm driving this way, with a great big suburban and a trailer behind it. I guarantee you I had a seat belt on. Sometimes I'll forget in the heat of the moment in the middle of [different state]. But yes. Every day. Every solitary day of my life, you know. Forgot my plates one time. I got 5 vehicles. All trucks. Forgot my plates. Got stopped by a highway patrolman. "Your plates are overdue." Yes they are, I said. He said, "Ah just go get them on there, I'll see you again." And he will. So there's give and take all the way around.

Curt's story differs from Coach Y's in two important ways. First, it is clear that the understandings each brought to these interactions, prior to the contact occurring, are distinct. In contrast to Coach Y's sense of diminished citizenship, Curt portrays how "Whites begin their encounters with the police assuming they have full citizen rights and leave these experiences with their status undiminished" (Epp, Maynard-Moody, and Haider-Markel 2014, 47). Thus where Coach Y refused to challenge the police, Curt shows a willingness to argue with the officer, and even the courts, in the face of perceived injustice.

In addition to the attitudes brought to these experiences, the treatment received in the experiences themselves also differs. The officer in Coach Y's case demonstrates no belief in Coach Y's story, while Curt is given the benefit of the doubt when driving with expired plates, referring to his relationship with the police as one of "give and take." In this way, the perceptions that Coach Y and Curt brought to their CLS experiences—one of diminished citizenship and acquiescence compared to one of full citizenship and an ability to challenge—were reinforced. While the previous chapters suggest that the CLS does little to shape political attitudes among whites, the contrast in these stories reveals that any *Direct Exposure* to the CLS that whites may have is also likely to impart different understandings about one's sense of citizenship.

"Never Use the Address You're In": Avoidance

Jay [Black, Native American, white]: I'm learning to drive. I'm pretty good at it. Just have to get my license and pass the test. But I don't want to go driving outside of [central city]. Because I'm just scared

of how the police might react out in [nearby suburbs] and stuff. Like I've been to these areas before, I know kind of how the police are. It's like, my boyfriend has told me all these bad experiences he has when he gets pulled over with police officers. . . . I've had experiences with cops when I'm walking or on the train and stuff, and some of them are bad. But [until this recent experience] I've never had any extremely bad ones where at the moment, I'm like, "Oh my god, what are they gonna do? Arrest me? He had his hand on his gun, is he gonna shoot us if we say something wrong?" Never really had that experience [before] and that experience just made me not want to live outside of [central city], or [Site A neighborhood].

As in the previous section, Jay's story exhibits an understanding of how interactions with the CLS can escalate if a Black person says "something wrong." Where her account differs, however, is the strategy used to avoid this escalation. Rather than acquiescence, Jay surfaces the strategy of avoiding these interactions in the first place by restricting her movement. Referencing a recent time in which she was pulled over three times in one hour while driving with her boyfriend in a suburban area, Jay indicates her desire to drive only in the more racially diverse urban neighborhoods in which she lives and works. Underscoring the frequency of her *Direct Exposure* to the CLS, Jay acknowledges that she will still have to interact with the police in these neighborhoods due to their presence on public transit and on the streets, but she sees this contact as preferable to the "extremely bad" experience she had in the suburb in which an officer pulled his gun.

During our interview, Mohamed raised a similar strategy, albeit in a slightly different setting.

AJR: You hear about issues with the police from other people?

Mohamed [South Asian]: Yes, a lot of people. They were told not to drive on L Avenue.

AJR: By who?

Mohamed: I mean, their friends. The parent tells their kids.

AJR: They tell them . . .

Mohamed: Yeah, it's not safe.

AJR: Because of the police?

Mohamed: The police, yes.

Where Jay refers to avoiding suburban areas, Mohamed discusses the common knowledge among people of color in his urban community that individuals should not drive on a specific road due to the prevalence of police stops that occur there, and the danger involved in those stops.

While these stories involve slightly different spatial strategies, they are linked through their conceptions of race, place, and policing that lead to restricted movement (Capers 2009; Prowse, Weaver, and Meares 2020). Jay and Mohamed mirror the theme of acquiescence in revealing how a distrust of government attached to the CLS diminishes one's sense of citizenship, taking away the freedom of movement that one would expect to be afforded to citizens in a democratic society. Further, this restricted movement is specifically employed as a strategy to avoid contact with the state, providing further insight into the meaning of distrust for people of color by connecting it to an understanding that any contact with the state could be dangerous (Brayne 2014). This additional meaning lends greater support to the expectation that distrust tied to the CLS will generate disengagement from the political process.

Finally, both Mohamed and Jay point to a role for *Indirect Exposure* in promoting these attitudes. While Jay mostly focuses on her own experience, she also references stories from her boyfriend about interactions with the police, showing how romantic partnerships facilitate *Indirect Exposure* and lessons of avoidance. Similarly, Mohamed's discussion of community wisdom invokes information about restricted movement being passed between social and familial networks. Again, *Direct Exposure* to the CLS plays a part, but *Indirect Exposure* allows for these attitudes about diminished citizenship to spread without personally encountering the CLS.

Revealing a similar transfer of information and strategy between generations, TJ told me the following during our interview.

TJ [Black]: So I got pulled over by the police and freaked out because my house is right next to the alley, so you go up the alley and I park like this. And I didn't freak out because they pulled me over, I did because two of them got out and came to my car. I don't see a reason for that. There's no reason for both of you to get out and surround my car. You see it's a woman in the car. I'm by myself. Why gang up on me? And they're like, "Why did you turn?" [I said] "Because I live right here." I felt very, and my mom's a police officer. . . . Luckily, she retired [before the recent high-profile police shootings], so that was a blessing. I'm not saying they're all bad, I definitely know they're not. . . . But at the same time, there's

a lot of bad ones out there too. And I won't even say bad, some of them are just scared. But if you're scared, you're in the wrong field. If you're scared, if you cannot do your job correctly and stop profiling, then you should find another job.

AJR: So did they ever give you a reason [for the stop]?

TJ: No they did not. They didn't. I was just happy that they left at that point in time. I was, and I was that close to home too. So yeah, I guess the reason was I turned left when they got behind me. But I happened to stay right there, and then my ID didn't have that address on it. They didn't believe me, so I had to go in the house and get the mail and say this is where I live at. It was ridiculous. But that's a lesson my mom taught me: never use the address you're in. I've always, when I move, I use my last address.

AJR: Why is that?

TJ: Because police, if you have a problem with the police, they'll have your address.

AJR: And this is what your mom, the police officer, said?

TJ: Yes. Because if you ever have a problem, and bring it up, [and it's] about the police, they will make you their priority. So she taught me that a long time ago, so I always use my last address.

As can be seen in my questions, I was personally caught off guard by the idea that TJ's mother, as a former police officer, would encourage her to mislead the police by using an old address. Beyond this surprise, however, it is important to recognize how this misdirection feeds into the same strategy of avoiding contact with the CLS. Where the previous stories focused on restriction of movement as a mechanism for averting state contact, TJ highlights a broader category of state avoidance tactics connected to her distrust of government (Brayne 2014).

Throughout my interviews, participants of color discussed various methods for evading the CLS, bolstering this connection between state avoidance and political distrust among people of color in ways that suggest this form of distrust will lead to political disengagement. As another example, Michelle recounted the following about the recent block party in her community.

Michelle [Black]: It's free food. We have the police coming to show us their badges and stuff. And I'm for sure not coming then . . . I

didn't feel safe. I didn't want to go over there and try to small talk with the police. And I consider myself middle class and educated. . . . And I have not had very good experiences with police officers.

Beyond highlighting the broader theme of avoidance, Michelle's quote also makes a more direct connection between a distrust of government rooted in the CLS and broader civic and political disengagement. In this case, Michelle's distrust of the CLS, and the avoidance tactic designed to deal with this distrust, pushed her away from a community event because of its police presence. As a result, she was less able to attend community events, reducing her level of civic engagement. Sky made this link between her distrust and political disengagement even clearer.

Sky [Asian/Pacific Islander]: And then government is scary. I had a very odd connection between government and the police force. . . . Like protesting something, I would not put myself in a dangerous situation. . . . [I think that if I] go to the Governor's mansion [to protest], I'm probably gonna get arrested. I was just living in a lot of fear of assumptions. Because I don't understand the system. I now know it's not the case. You have rights. You can testify. It is my right having a permit, a green card. But the system itself, really mutes immigrants. . . . We have a tendency to hold still, don't make a fuss. And that's like part of our identity as an immigrant. And we don't really have a lot of strong power. We don't vote. You know it's unfair in a way because I think we are still buying, still paying, still being a part of the engine, but I don't think government is recognizing that. . . . And then once I got a green card, I started realizing I can't vote, but when Obama, like 8 years ago, I realized this person is inspiring, and I can't vote for him, but I wondered how I can help him. So I called one of the campaign offices here in town, and [asked them] "Is there anything I can help? I don't have, I'm documented, but I don't have high status here. I can't vote, and I really don't want to get arrested." I think that's what I actually said. Because I thought door knocking, I have a potential of getting arrested.

Sky explicitly shows how the CLS as a location of the state helps to foster a form of political distrust that promotes withdrawal from the political process. Her "odd connection" between government and the police led her to believe that many forms of contact with the political process, ranging from protesting to door knocking, could lead to her arrest. Thus Sky's

distrust of government, grounded in this connection between the police and the state as a whole, led her to avoid political involvement completely. Importantly, Sky's account also demonstrates the ability for individuals to move past this avoidance, as seen in her willingness to volunteer for then-candidate Obama's presidential campaign. It is this kind of circumvention of the dual visibility dynamic that will be covered in greater detail in the next chapter.

In sum, this section shows how a distrust of government attached to the CLS implicates an understanding of the state that includes a sense of diminished citizenship, as revealed through strategies of acquiescence, restricted movement, and state avoidance. As these themes coalesce in giving meaning to distrust among people of color, they also reveal how this form of distrust is likely to drive political disengagement. By tying one's distrust of the CLS to a desire for invisibility from the system, the CLS's position as an anchor point for one's broader political distrust shapes its meaning in ways that foster a desire for invisibility from the state as a whole. This finding points toward Cohen's (2010) conception of "political invisibility," wherein individuals actively and intentionally disengage "from all forms of politics" in an attempt "to remain invisible to officials who possibly could provide assistance but were more likely to impose greater surveillance and regulations on their lives" (Cohen 2010, 196).

Indeed, this theme of invisibility showed up in other ways during interviews with people of color. Chapter 2 showed that white interviewees routinely drew on their status as taxpayers in describing their political identity, revealing the strength of taxes as a location of the state. In contrast, consider the following answers from two Black interviewees when asked the same question of what politicians see when they look at them.

Emmie [Black]: I don't think they would. I don't think they'd see me.

Chuck Wes [Black]: Honestly, I don't think they'd see me.

Recall that in the introduction to this chapter, Chuck Wes described his own distrust of government while relaying his fear of state surveillance. Here we can see the consequences of that form of distrust. In dealing with his distrust, Chuck works to remain invisible to this surveillance, but as a result he feels that he becomes invisible to elected officials as well.

“So Change It if You Don’t Like It”: Distrust and Political Membership among Whites

Ishmael [white]: But the government’s really bad at charity. Really, really bad. They don’t understand that it’s a two-edged sword. You have a lot of power to do good and power to do a lot of bad. You can ruin somebody with charity, and government doesn’t care about that. I work now tutoring adults going for their GEDs. God these people’s lives are just unbelievable. And they don’t, they’re all on all kinds of assistance. And it’s like, they’re almost like children, a lot of them. They never figured out how to do a lot of things themselves. Delay gratification. They’re all wearing all kinds of ink. That ain’t free. So you and I are paying for that.

Ishmael surfaces familiar themes in tying his apparent political distrust to tax dollars funding tattoos for people on government assistance. Notably, through this account, Ishmael positions the two of us (“you and I”) as the taxpayers providing these funds, implicitly bringing up race by putting two white people into the category of individuals paying for assistance programs. In addition to reinforcing the position of welfare and taxes as locations of the state attached to white distrust, however, this understanding also hints at an important theme in explaining the meaning of this form of political distrust.

That whites, like Ishmael, felt they provided a disproportionate share of tax revenue underscores how the visibility of taxes promotes a broader sense of full citizenship. As could be seen in my interviews, the visibility of tax burdens fostered distrust *and* represented a contribution to the state that provided whites with a sense of membership in the polity.

Julie [white]: I do think overall, as much as it’s easy to throw a generalization and complain and this and that, when you get right down to it, every single person in our government or “the government” as people say, is made up of US citizens. It’s all US citizens. They’re your neighbors. They’re not some outside entity that comes in. They live in your community.

Dick [white]: To me? Government is us. It’s not an entity I’m removed from. Government is me. . . . We are the government. And

we all have a process of being involved in that government. So when I think of government, I think of all of us.

Revealing a sense of membership, Dick and Julie both draw on language that portrays a high level of proximity and familiarity with government. While Julie acknowledges complaining about government, she also recognizes that it is a force composed of her neighbors and should not be seen as “an outside entity that comes in” to her community. Dick takes this a step further, contending that the “government is me.” Reflecting his membership within the state, Dick notes that it is not an entity he can be “removed from.” Notably, Dick also claims this insider status in turning toward notions of political engagement. Working within a conception of everyone being a part of the state, Dick points to the responsibility “we all have” for getting involved in the government.

In our interview, Jeff raised many of these same points but went on to clarify how this notion of membership connected to both taxation and political distrust, while also illuminating how this form of distrust shaped his level of political engagement.

Jeff [white]: The United States was formed by the people, and the people want to govern themselves, so that’s what they should be doing. When [people are] electing their leaders and stuff, and when they complain about that after the fact, it’s like, well you elect them, so change it if you don’t like it. And that is one of the reasons I think I got involved in the government on the local level, because I saw my taxes going up.

Similar to Dick, Jeff surfaces notions of political membership, drawing on the ideal of a government “by the people,” while also drawing on this insider position to indicate people’s responsibility to get politically involved in order to “govern themselves.” For Jeff, if people “don’t like” government, their position within the polity provides them with the means, and perhaps the obligation, to change it. To exemplify this understanding, Jeff draws on his own story. Referencing a commonality within white distrust, he connects his dissatisfaction with government to an increasing tax burden. More importantly, he notes that this feeling led to him getting more engaged in the political process. From this perspective, Jeff’s tax dollars served as an anchor point for his distrust while he also tied that distrust to an understanding of his position as a member of the polity capable of sparking change by getting politically involved. Put simply, Jeff’s distrust generated greater political participation.

While Jeff does not include a discussion of why he felt his taxes were too high, it is worth recalling his discussion of welfare mentioned in chapter 4 in order to highlight the connection between taxation and poverty policies. In more clearly establishing the role of welfare, Marny offered the following account in our interview, drawing on her experience working in a local store.

Marny [white]: I kinda have a problem and some issues with the government's way they handle their welfare and food stamp programs. I see generation after generation after generation. I'd like to see them work harder to break that cycle. I also don't like seeing the parents coming in and they're buying Red Bull and Monster and the little kids going "I'm hungry" and [the parents saying] "We don't have any money for that." You know that's what the food stamps are for. I don't think they're for the Red Bull and Monster. If nothing else, buy them some hot dogs. Buy some whatever. I don't think the government is doing due justice for that.

AJR: So you see that in town?

Marny: Sure, because we take EBT. So we see it. We're not allowed to speak on behalf of it, whatever they buy, they buy. But personally, I don't, I think they need to buy nutritious food. The energy drinks are not something I think they should be allowed to buy. So that I would have a problem with. And I've spoken to a few legislators about that.

Here Marny shows how the visibility of welfare programs and taxation has shaped the meaning of her distrust of government by tying it to a belief that her tax money is being put toward those programs. Rather than pushing her away from the political process, this form of distrust inspired her to reach out to her elected officials to advocate for making food stamp regulations more stringent. Seeing her membership dues (i.e., tax dollars) being handled poorly, Marny got involved to change the way those dues were being spent.

Crucially absent from Jeff and Marny's accounts is any sense of the diminished citizenship that filled the distrustful accounts provided by people of color. Rather both Jeff and Marny moved toward the government in response to their distrust. In doing so, they drew on the visibility of taxation and welfare not only as reasons to distrust the state but also as a symbol of their membership in the polity that gave them a voice in the political process (Edelman 1985; Mettler and SoRelle 2014; Soss and Jacobs 2009).

Finally, it is important to point out the contrast between this concep-

tion of membership discussed by whites and explanations from people of color about their position in relation to the state.

Kimmie [Asian/Pacific Islander]: Cause to me, [the government] are in the sky. How can I, and I am here [holding her hand close to the ground], they are there [holding her hand above her head]. How can I interact with them? What can I do?

Rather than seeing herself as part of government, Kimmie envisions the state as an entity that hovers above her. Through this position, Kimmie describes a distance from the state that clashes with white interviewee accounts, while also bringing in a conception of hierarchical authority relations. The state is simultaneously far away and looking down on her. Ultimately, it is through this combination of distance and hierarchy that Kimmie reveals her sense that government will not listen to her, indicating how this form of distrust portends a different impact on her political engagement as compared to white feelings of membership.

Just as the visibility of taxes and welfare help explain the connection between white distrust and membership, so too can the CLS's visibility provide an understanding of the link between distrust among people of color and this feeling of distance.

Jay [Black, Native American, white]: And I know, a lot of police officers downtown are from [surrounding suburbs], and they're not used to our people, and used to how people in [central city] act, or [are not] used to lots of people of color. So it's interesting. And you can definitely tell. I can tell how police officers are from [central city], cause they're talking to the kids. Not yelling and screaming for the kids to get out of the [indoor tunnel system]. Versus when they're from somewhere else.

In strong contrast to Julie's account of government being composed of community members, Jay explicitly notes that the part of the state to which she is frequently *Exposed*, namely the police, often comes from suburban areas outside of her neighborhood. Jay's experiential knowledge of this issue aligns with data showing that 60 percent of police officers in the nation's seventy-five largest cities live outside the city limits. Statistics further show that over three-quarters of cities have police forces that are whiter than their populations, proving Jay's wisdom about the connection between race and place (Badger, Keating, and Elliott 2014). Notably, this

racial mismatch has actually widened in recent years, with over two-thirds of police departments becoming whiter than their communities between 2007 and 2016 (Leatherby and Oppel Jr. 2020). Far from making people of color feel like members of the polity, this social and physical distance shows how the CLS's position as a location of the state conjures an image of government as an occupying white force that visits communities of color and then retreats to other areas (Ogletree and Smith 1994). As Jay and Kimmie demonstrate, this distance helps foster a perception of CLS actors as less compassionate in their work and leaves people of color with a sense that the government is hovering above them, always watching but impossible to reach.

In sum, an exploration of racial variation in the meaning of political distrust reveals racial differences in the relationship between distrust and political participation. White distrust's attachment to taxes and welfare underlies broader understandings of membership in the polity, such that distrust encourages greater political engagement among whites. From this perspective, white distrust is more akin to the mindset of discomfited shareholders who draw on their insider status to express dissatisfaction with the way their investment is being spent. On the other hand, the meaning of distrust among people of color is shaped by its connection to the CLS, generating a form of distrust that includes feelings of diminished citizenship and ultimately a desire to avoid state contact. As a result, distrust pushes people of color away from the political process. These findings suggest that the lack of association between trust and participation found by previous scholars masks a strong but racially divergent relationship. The next section turns to quantitative analysis to test the statistical generalizability of these findings.

Distrust and Participation: A Racial Contingency

The analysis below includes four measures to capture political participation as the dependent variable. The first three fall into the "conventional" and electoral category of participatory acts, beginning with a dichotomous indicator of turnout in the 2016 election. Voting is utilized due to its salience within studies connecting participation to trust, as well as its centrality within the broader literature on political engagement (Citrin 1974; Nie and Verba 1987). In addition to turnout, I bring in a five-point scale composed of different participatory acts one might engage in beyond voting. This scale includes: (1) going to a political meeting, rally, speech,

or dinner; (2) wearing a campaign button, putting a campaign sticker on one's car, or placing a sign in front of one's house; (3) working for a party or candidate; (4) contributing money to a campaign; or (5) contacting a US representative or senator. Through this measure, I am better able to capture the link between trust and the depth of people's participation (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). The final measure of conventional participation draws on these first two indicators to account for complete avoidance of the political process. An individual is given a score of 1 if they *did not* vote in 2016 nor engage in any of the five acts listed in the scale, and a score of 0 if they engaged in one or more. This measure is designed to capture the notion of political invisibility described previously and aligns with Cohen's (2010) operationalization of the same concept. Finally, to capture the potential that distrust only mobilizes "unconventional" forms of political engagement, I include participation in a protest as a fourth dependent variable (Citrin 1977).

Political trust is again measured by the extent to which individuals trust government to do what is right. As I am interested in the political consequences of trust, however, this item now becomes the key independent variable. I also carry over the same standard set of control variables from previous chapters. The only exception is a switch from measures of party identification and ideology to the strength of ideological and partisan attachments,³ recognizing that stronger partisans and those with firmer ideological commitments are generally more likely to participate (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Schlozman, Verba, and Brady 2012).⁴

The models for turnout, invisibility, and protest participation utilize logistic regression and display the coefficients as odds ratios. Using this specification, the results show the odds, relative to 1, of the individual engaging in that act given the movement from the minimum to maximum value on the independent variable.⁵ The models for the participatory scale utilize negative binomial regression because it is a count variable running from 0 to 5.⁶ Thus the results shown for models using this scale represent the change in the number of participatory actions. Finally, all of the data used for this analysis again come from the 2016 ANES.

Mirroring the process applied in chapter 4, table E5.1 in Appendix E begins by controlling for race in examining the relationship between trust and the four dependent variables, providing a sense of how trust impacts participation for the whole population. The results indicate that those with stronger partisan and ideological attachments are more likely to participate in conventional ways, as are wealthier, better educated, older, and more politically knowledgeable individuals. For protesting, only age and religi-

osity reach significance, showing that younger and less religious people are more likely to get politically involved in this “unconventional” way. More importantly for this analysis, the results find agreement with previous studies in revealing no association between trust and participation when the whole population is considered together (Miller 1980). This insignificance holds for both conventional and unconventional forms of participation, indicating a lack of contingency based on the form of engagement. Of course, this null result leaves an open question as to whether it accurately reflects a lack of connection between trust and participation or is instead masking a contingent relationship between the two.

To answer this question, table E5.2 investigates the potential that trust and participation are differentially related across racial groups by including an interaction between political trust and racial identity. This interaction term reaches statistical significance for all three measures of conventional participation. As with the racially diverse trust attachments shown in the previous chapter, the significance of these interaction terms demonstrates that the relationship between trust and participation differs considerably for whites and people of color.⁷ Figure 5.2 illustrates these interactions using predicted probability plots to display how the impact of trust on participation shifts across racial groups.⁸

In line with my expectations, these figures show how distrust serves as a politically mobilizing force for whites, while it demobilizes people of color. Moving from whites who express the greatest level of trust to those who express the least is associated with a 10 percent increase in the probability of voting, along with a 9 percent decrease in the likelihood of political invisibility. This shift corresponds with the interview findings above, showing that welfare and taxes, when serving as locations of the state for whites, foster a form of distrust imbued with feelings of membership and full citizenship. As a result, white distrust promotes greater levels of electoral engagement.

This relationship flips for people of color. Here it is the most distrusting who are the least likely to be active in the electoral process. Moving from the most to least trusting among people of color is associated with an 8 percent decline in turnout probability, 0.5 fewer participatory acts, and a 6 percent increase in the likelihood of political invisibility. These results point to the different meaning of distrust among people of color. Due to its connection to the CLS, this form of distrust encourages a sense of diminished citizenship, leading people of color to avoid interactions with the state. The analysis above reveals how this desire for state avoidance extends into contact with government initiated through the electoral process.




Figure 5.2. Political trust and political participation across racial groups. 95 percent confidence intervals are shown. All other independent variables are held at their means or modes. Source: ANES 2016.

Interestingly, this same racial contingency does not show up for protest involvement. The lower right panel in figure 5.2 indicates that distrust decreases the odds of protesting for both whites and people of color, though this relationship is not significant in either case. While there are likely many factors driving this difference,⁹ the interview findings do illuminate one explanation for why white distrust fails to generate greater engagement in this “unconventional” form of participation. Given the connection between white distrust and a sense of membership within the polity, it makes sense that whites would view “conventional” forms of participation as more effective means of making their demands heard. As seen in the actions taken by both Jeff and Marny, the insider status associated with white distrust pushes engagement in political actions where the state is more clearly involved, such as reaching out to elected officials or running for office themselves. In the next chapter, I turn more attention to the interaction between the dual visibility dynamic and participation outside electoral politics.

Notably, these findings also align and build on Davin Phoenix’s recent book *The Anger Gap* (2019). Here Phoenix shows that anger does more to politically mobilize whites than it does Black Americans, with this racial contingency being stronger for acts in the electoral arena, as compared to anger’s more uniform impact in mobilizing activities like protesting. Differing from Phoenix’s analysis of anger, however, I find that distrust actively demobilizes people of color, rather than generating a weaker mobilizing effect. In addition, I argue that this racial contingency is best understood by investigating the location of the state to which one’s distrust is attached.

Ultimately, quantitative analysis gives greater support, and statistical generalizability, to the argument that the racially divergent attachments of political distrust foster racially divergent political consequences. Where distrust mobilizes whites, it demobilizes people of color. These results show how variation is obscured in analyses exploring the relationship between distrust and participation for the population as a whole. Where this type of investigation would conclude that America’s widespread distrust has no impact on participation, the results presented here show how it actually fosters racially patterned political inequality.¹⁰

Trust and Participation in an Age of Confidence

As with the previous chapter, the strength of my argument rests on the contemporary nature of the racial contingency found above. If there is evi-

dence that the racially divergent relationship between trust and participation predated the decline of American political trust, then the argument's emphasis on the American state's dual visibility would be misplaced. To investigate this possibility, I again turn to historical data from the ANES. In this case, I use the 1964 ANES, as it was the first year in which questions about both political trust and voting were asked.¹¹ This year also represents the peak of American trust in government, with nearly 78 percent of ANES respondents indicating that they trusted the government most or all of the time.

Once again, I do everything possible to keep the measurement strategies aligned with the 2016 statistical models, providing a strong comparison across time periods.¹² Unfortunately, protest participation was not asked about in 1964, so the analysis only includes measures for turnout, the participation scale, and political invisibility. Table E5.3 begins by looking at the relationship between these three measures of participation and political trust in 1964 while controlling for race. Similar to the 2016 results, these models show that older, wealthier, and more educated individuals were more likely to be engaged in the electoral process, along with people carrying stronger partisan attachments. Also mirroring the contemporary period, political trust does not show up as significantly related to any of these measures of electoral participation.

In contrast to the similarity between these results and 2016's, the interaction terms between race and political trust in table E5.4 show a change in dynamics over the last fifty years. Where 2016 saw clear racial variation in the relationship between trust and participation, the insignificant interaction terms in table E5.4 indicate no such variation during this time of greater faith in government. Figure 5.3 further illustrates the relatively similar relationships between trust and participation across racial groups in 1964. As the figure shows, any racial divergence that did exist at this time appears to work in the opposite direction of that in 2016. The most distrustful people of color were also more likely to participate, following a pattern similar to that of whites in 2016. With that said, the lack of statistical significance within the interaction terms is a reminder that any interpretation of these trends should be tempered.

The most salient conclusion is that the results from 1964 do not resemble those found in the contemporary period. Combined with the findings from the previous chapter, these results suggest that when American trust attachments differed, so too did the impact of trust on participation. Ultimately, these findings lend greater support to the relationship between trust, race, and participation transforming over the last fifty years, just as




Figure 5.3. Political trust and political participation across racial groups, 1964. 95 percent confidence intervals are shown. All other independent variables are held at their means or modes. *Source:* ANES 1964.

the state's appearance in people's lives changed. Where the last chapter showed how this shift in visibility led to a decline in political trust, the findings here reveal how this decline helped to uphold racial inequality in American democracy.

Conclusion

This book opened with a puzzle. How is it that Donald Trump's campaign seemed to mobilize white voters by appealing to rampant distrust in government, while Ferguson's Black population was pushed away from the polls by mistrust? This chapter completes the book's answer. While Black residents of Ferguson and white Trump voters may have both registered low levels of political trust, they connected that distrust to different parts of government, and in doing so they gave different meaning to their distrust. Where the attachment of white distrust to taxes and welfare provokes notions of membership to the state, the link between distrust and the CLS among people of color generates a form of distrust that is tied to a sense of diminished citizenship. As a result, these racially divergent meanings of distrust foster racially divergent participatory consequences. Distrustful whites rush into the electoral process to make their dissatisfaction heard, while distrustful people of color work to remain invisible to a state that they recognize as fundamentally dangerous.

Ultimately, these findings improve the literature's understanding of the relationship between trust and participation, and in doing so they reveal the important connection between the dual visibility dynamic and American democracy. Coupling this racially contingent relationship with today's historically low levels of political trust uncovers the contemporary state's role in perpetuating racially patterned political inequality. In this way, the dual visibility dynamic fits with a much longer pattern present in American history of state-driven political inequality across racial groups (e.g., Fox 2012; King and Smith 2005). Diverging from much of this historical precedent, however, differences in government visibility do not stem from policies containing explicitly racist language. In this way, the dual visibility dynamic allows for this inequality to remain at a time when deliberate attempts to foster racist outcomes are widely seen as unacceptable.

Beyond these implications for democracy, the preceding four chapters combine to illuminate this duality's consequences for progressive policy reform. It is not only that political distrust for whites is attached to a desire for decreased taxation and government spending, but also that

among whites, those with the greatest level of this distrust are the loudest within the electoral process. Thus any push to pass policies that promote increased government spending, and particularly initiatives that include increased spending on poverty programs, are likely to be heavily resisted by those who are most likely to make their political voices heard.

Though the reverse relationship may generally be true for distrustful people of color, it is important to recognize political invisibility among people of color not as a form of surrender but as an active political choice (Weaver, Prowse, and Piston 2020). It is easy to read the findings from this chapter as an absence of political activity in communities of color, but such a reading focuses too narrowly on electoral acts as the only form of activity. I argue that a more accurate interpretation sees a desire for state avoidance as an indication of what is politically present in communities of color that hold a deep distrust of the state. Such an interpretation is not intended to diminish the inequality that results from this avoidance but rather to ensure that notions of agency are not lost in studies focusing on the impact of the CLS on political behavior among people of color. In building on these ideas, the next chapter focuses more specifically on how the dual visibility described in the previous chapters has been disrupted by the rise of the Black Lives Matter movement, illuminating pathways for overcoming the political inequality uncovered here.

Black Lives Matter

Disrupting the Duality

By many measures, the 2020 protests in response to George Floyd's murder by the Minneapolis Police Department were the largest in US history. Estimates place the number of Americans who participated between fifteen and twenty-six million (Buchanan, Bui, and Patel 2020). By comparison, the historically large Women's March following President Trump's election drew roughly four million people (Chenoweth and Pressman 2017). Adding to the impressive size of the crowds was the number of localities in which protests took place. Over the thirty days following Floyd's death, more than 40 percent of America's roughly 3,000 counties had seen at least one protest under the banner of the Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement (Buchanan, Bui, and Patel 2020).

The unprecedented geographic diversity of these protests alludes to another historically anomalous feature: their high level of racial diversity (McAdam 2020). More particularly, the high levels of white support within the protests sticks out in America's history of fights for racial justice. In terms of population, 95 percent of the counties that held a protest were majority white, and almost three-quarters of the counties with protests were more than 75 percent white (Buchanan, Bui, and Patel 2020). Vermont, a state that is 94 percent white and has fewer than 10,000 Black people in its entire population, saw more than thirty different protest sites. Alaska had more cities with protests (fifteen) than there are Alaskan cities with more than 5,000 people (eleven).¹ White participation also went beyond these white-dominated parts of the country. Surveys of protestors in Los Angeles, New York City, and Washington, DC, found that a major-

ity of participants were white (D. R. Fisher 2020). While past civil rights marches have seen white involvement, this set of protests appeared to draw a new level of white engagement.

In its historical peculiarity, this level of white backing contrasts strongly with the findings from previous chapters. Where I argued in chapter 3 that a combination of public policy and elite rhetoric allowed whites to disconnect the criminal legal system (CLS) from the state, these protests indicate a widespread amount of white awareness of state-sponsored CLS discrimination, along with a willingness to act on that awareness. Through this contrast, the protests in the summer of 2020 point to the BLM movement disrupting the dual visibility dynamic by raising the conspicuousness of the CLS among white Americans.

In delving further into this disruptive capacity, this chapter asks how the BLM movement influences the racial divide in government visibility, as well as the racial inequality this divide produces. Drawing on interview data and quantitative analysis, I highlight two ways BLM challenges the dual visibility dynamic uncovered in previous chapters. First, as suggested by the 2020 protests, I argue that BLM is able to make the CLS a more conspicuous manifestation of government for whites by simultaneously raising the profile of police violence and clearly connecting this violence to the state, often through the use of social media (Thurston 2018a). Second, because the CLS is already visible for people of color, I find that BLM's impact comes less from shifting the system's conspicuousness among this population and more from subverting the narrative associated with CLS visibility. BLM is capable of transforming CLS visibility within the lives of people of color into an issue of institutionalized bias that catalyzes group consciousness, replacing the impression of CLS contact as emerging from individualized failings. As a result of this transformation, the politically disengaging impact of political distrust for people of color found in the previous chapter is partially reversed, particularly in relation to protest participation. Ultimately, these results underscore the political nature of government visibility (Mayrl and Quinn 2017), demonstrating how mass actions can illuminate, challenge, and reconstruct the boundaries of the state that guard its current racial duality.

Black Lives Matter and Government Visibility

While not often framed in these terms, government visibility is a key component of the BLM movement. BLM works “to render the state’s power

to shape, reinforce, and then naturalize patterns of racial inequality *visible and tractable to the government*, as a way to contest and hopefully change the state's role in shaping patterns of racial inequality" (Thurston 2018a, 162, emphasis added). Making the state's role in creating and perpetuating racial inequality visible is a necessary precondition for getting people to advocate for racially equitable public policies and practices. While BLM does this work across many areas of state policy, its prominent focus on policing has meant that its efforts around state visibility are most evident in relation to the CLS.² From this perspective, BLM endeavors to raise the visibility of the CLS to generate greater levels of political engagement.

The findings from previous chapters suggest it is important to consider the effectiveness of this strategy across racial groups. For people of color, this tactic could be self-defeating. The CLS is already conspicuous in communities of color, and it is that conspicuousness that drives people of color away from the electoral process. In contrast, given the apparent disconnect between the CLS and government for whites, increasing the CLS's tractability to the state may serve a different purpose for this population. Beginning with a recognition of this potential racial variation, this chapter looks at BLM's impact on government visibility among people of color and whites separately.³

“Pulling Together Like-Minded People and Making Noise”: Black Lives Matter and the Criminal Legal System’s Visibility among People of Color

AJR: If you were to try to identify what can actually change things, that can move the country, what do you think those are?

Emmie [Black]: Hmm. The thing that would change the country is when people change their minds. First they gotta change their minds so we can come together in groups and figure out what needs to be done. Cause no matter what, even though the laws and structures are set up in place, they are forever a moving force, so it's a matter of who's pressing where, how can we do that. Anytime you take a step forward, it's almost like taking two back. There are organizations out there, even here, you have Black Lives Matter. I think they managed to get the largest Black vote turnout in the state. I believe it was the state. It may have even been more than the state. In history. Through the work they're doing. Pulling together like-minded people and making noise to do things. So

there's a lot going on. People try. There's a lot going on, trying to bring people together and understand the importance of what needs to be done.

Where the previous chapters raise the possibility of BLM's tactics fostering greater disengagement among people of color, Emmie begins to show how the form of CLS visibility encouraged by BLM contradicts this conclusion. In particular, she suggests that the specific aspect of BLM's work that she finds politically inspiring is its ability to change people's minds by bringing "together like-minded people and making noise" and helping individuals "understand the importance of what needs to be done." Through this emphasis, Emmie highlights the role that social movements often play in allowing individuals, and particularly individuals from marginalized populations, to realize the position of their individual grievances within a larger, collective voice (Piven 2006). Emmie sees BLM bringing people together in this way as key to increasing levels of political participation among Black Americans.

From this perspective, Emmie's account suggests that BLM can use CLS visibility to encourage political engagement by helping people of color tie their CLS exposure to similar injustices perpetrated against others. In doing so, what may have once been an individualized and isolated sense of mistreatment becomes part of a collective concern. This shift in understanding is particularly important in relation to the CLS due to the neoliberal rationality that pervades the system, promoting personal responsibility at the expense of structural explanations (Wacquant 2009; Lerman and Weaver 2014a; Soss, Fording, and Schram 2011). In response, BLM has "challenged outcomes that many citizens have viewed as natural or related to personal choice, as instead being shaped by decisions of voters, elected officials, and public servants and by the biases of institutions" (Thurston 2018a, 165).

Thus BLM may raise the visibility of the CLS, helping to maintain its position as a location of the state for people of color, but it does so through a less individualized lens. CLS visibility becomes tied to a collective problem that is rooted in America's racially discriminatory history, policy, and politics, rather than being the result of individual faults that draw state attention. The resulting form of visibility does not garner more trust in the CLS, but instead it provides a sense of how political pressure can generate change, along with a mechanism for providing that pressure. If this strategy is effective, it suggests that BLM is capable of transforming

CLS visibility from a force tied to an individualized political distrust that promotes disengagement into a collective distrust that mobilizes greater political involvement.

This expectation aligns with research investigating the circumstances in which exposure to the CLS leads to increased levels of participation. While most scholarship focuses on CLS contact making individuals less likely to engage politically (e.g., Burch 2013; Lerman and Weaver 2014a; White 2019), Walker (2020b) shows that the opposite effect can also take place. In particular, when experiences with the CLS are indirect and are “viewed through the lens of institutional bias” rather than the “product of personal failure,” they are more likely to promote increased participation (Walker 2020b, 122). Similarly, Nuamah and Ogorzalek (2021) use cases of school closings to show that state discrimination and failure is capable of promoting greater political engagement. Here they argue that school closings can activate feelings of group consciousness and linked fate among Black Americans in the affected neighborhoods by helping them realize their collective position as a shared target of the state’s discrimination (Dawson 1995), ultimately leading to political mobilization.

Thus it would seem that BLM may be capable of disrupting the dual visibility dynamic by using CLS conspicuousness to activate group consciousness and linked fate among people of color. But rather than merely facilitating this recognition as shared targets of policy discrimination, BLM simultaneously provides a political avenue through which people can fight back. As a result, CLS visibility is transformed from a politically demobilizing force connected to individual faults into a mobilizing force tied to institutional biases and collective grievances.

Notably, the work from Walker (2020a) and Nuamah and Ogorzalek (2021) both suggest that this form of mobilization tied to feelings of injustice is concentrated among people of color, with Walker’s focus on indirect CLS contact focusing more specifically on people of color being motivated to take on political acts outside of voting. Speaking to BLM’s capacity to generate involvement from CLS *Exposure*, research has also shown that BLM protests were more likely to occur in localities with greater numbers of Black people who had been killed by the police (Williamson, Trump, and Einstein 2018). Such findings suggest that this form of mobilization may be more prominent among people of color taking actions outside the electoral process.

Statistical analysis allows for a partial investigation into BLM’s disruptive capacity by first examining its association with understandings of the police as a broader discriminatory force, as opposed to a state entity that

deals with individualized failings. The 2016 ANES asked respondents to give their opinion of BLM on a 0 to 100 “feeling thermometer,” as well as their feelings about the level of racial discrimination perpetrated by the police. In particular, individuals were first asked if they felt the police treated white people better than Black people, and if responding affirmatively, they were then asked how much better this treatment was. I combine these two questions into a scale designed to capture attitudes on police discrimination.⁴

Table E6.1 in Appendix E looks at the relationship between this measure of police discrimination and feelings about BLM while including the same set of controls from previous chapters. The BLM feeling thermometer is included as the dependent variable, with all variables in the analysis coded to run from 0 to 1. In using OLS regression, the results show the proportional change in degree of support on the BLM feeling thermometer when moving from the minimum to maximum value of the independent variables. As with the models from chapter 4, this analysis is not intended to provide causal evidence. I recognize that support for BLM may lead one to view the police as more discriminatory, just as feeling that the police are discriminatory may drive one’s support for BLM. Thus the multivariate analysis is only intended to assess the partial correlation between these two measures.

The results show that several different factors are associated with increased support for BLM. People of color are more likely to show support, as are Democrats, liberals, and women. In addition, individuals with lower incomes are marginally more supportive. While several of these measures show a strong, substantive relationship to BLM support, none are more strongly linked than attitudes about police discrimination ($p < .001$). In particular, moving from someone who believes the police harbor no racial discrimination to someone who believes the police treat whites much better than Black people is associated with a twenty-four-point jump on the BLM feeling thermometer.

Though causal inference cannot be drawn from these results, they do indicate that individuals who support BLM are significantly more likely to see CLS mistreatment of Blacks as a systemic and collective issue rather than being one based in individual choices. As such, it seems BLM may be capable of shifting the narrative underlying the connection between political distrust and the CLS among people of color, such that this distrust promotes greater political involvement rather than the demobilization found in the previous chapter. My interviews provide some support for this expectation.

TJ [Black]: I think [politicians] should get out here and go to the grocery store, look at the prices, and go look at the cost of living. Even go to a couple of houses and see how it is in these houses where they are on welfare, and ask questions, do surveys like you do. If they did that, then they could go back, and all sit down together and look at the surveys and look at the different prices of food and figure it out. If they're willing to try, I think they could fix it.

AJR: Would you ever call a politician and say you have to look at this? You have to do something about this?

TJ: I would not because I don't think it would do anything. Now, if I could round up 80 people, then I would. But my own word is not gonna do anything. But if I could get a lot of people to back me, then yeah, I would do it. But I also understand, just like, when all this killing was happening with the police. I got out there two days, and I did get out there in the streets, and I was on the bridge [site of a BLM protest], but the thing is, who has the time? Between work, like right now, I go to work, I go to school, I got three other entrepreneur jobs, I just don't have the time. . . . And I didn't realize it until I tried to get out there and make a difference and it really backed me up. I was like I really can't do this. And it hurt. I was mad at myself, but truthfully, in the end, it didn't change anything as I see.

TJ reveals both the capacity of BLM to encourage greater political engagement and the limitations confronting these efforts. TJ's engagement in BLM-led protests following high-profile police killings represented a different level of political involvement than she had experienced prior, referring to this involvement as her attempt to "get out there and make a difference." In doing so, she specifically draws on the BLM protests as examples of the kind of collective support that she thinks might get politicians to take notice and support change. From this perspective, BLM provided TJ with a participatory outlet for expressing her distrust of government—and one that she believes can be politically effective.

However, TJ also highlights several obstacles facing BLM's mobilizing effort. While her reference to organizing eighty people suggests she sees collective action as potentially effective, she also expresses her belief that the protests exemplifying this tactic have failed to inspire reform. As a result, she casts doubt on whether she will engage in this kind of activity again due to a lack of time. This account points to an issue facing any movement driven by subjugated populations. In particular, histories of dis-

crimination and oppression mean that these populations are generally less likely to have the financial resources needed for an extended political commitment (Cohen 1999; Piven 2006; Strolovitch 2007; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). Further, Nuamah (2021) suggests that while experiences of state discrimination and failure can initially lead to mobilization among historically oppressed groups, and particularly impoverished Black Americans, the end result is a collective participatory debt, wherein this initial engagement fosters greater political distrust and disillusionment with the political process. Such resignation can be seen in TJ's discussion.

Finally, it is important to note that TJ isolates getting involved in a protest, rather than taking on political activities within the "conventional" electoral process. This form of engagement aligns with Walker's (2020b) findings showing that indirect CLS experiences viewed through a collective bias lens are more likely to increase participation for people of color in actions outside of voting, as well as Williamson et al.'s (2018) analysis showing that places with more police killings of Black people saw a greater number of BLM protests. Protests circumvent a lack of belief in electoral change while also offering a more immediate opportunity for engagement, rather than being forced to wait for an electoral cycle (Gillion 2013; Walker 2020b). Taking these findings into account again suggests that if BLM is able to shift the role of distrust among people of color by turning it into a politically mobilizing force, it is more likely to be effective in generating involvement in protests.

This expectation can be statistically tested through the 2016 ANES. Here I rerun chapter 5's analysis of the relationship between distrust and political participation, but I now include a measure to assess BLM's impact on this relationship. The investigation uses the same four dependent variables to measure political engagement: turnout, a scale of participatory acts, political invisibility, and protest participation. All of the same independent variables are also included, along with the introduction of the BLM feeling thermometer.

Table E6.2 begins by examining the link between BLM attitudes and participation with no interaction terms included in the analysis, meaning it assesses this relationship across all racial groups. Most of these results mirror those from the previous chapter, but support for BLM has a notable connection that goes beyond the influence of the other measures. Aligning with Emmie's discussion of BLM's mobilizing power, supporters of the movement were more likely to vote and take on a greater number of nonvoting participatory acts, as well as being marginally less likely to completely avoid the political process. As can be seen in the size of the coeffi-




Figure 6.1. Protest participation and support for Black Lives Matter. 95 percent confidence intervals are shown. Relationship is significant at $p < .001$.

cients in table E6.2, however, the greatest substantive association for BLM support is in its relationship to protest behavior. Figure 6.1 shows that someone with the most negative view of BLM had a predicted probability of protesting at less than 1 percent, as compared to a predicted probability of more than 9 percent among the most fervent BLM supporters. While BLM support is associated with increased engagement both inside and outside the “conventional” political process, it has its largest substantive impact on acts that are separated from electoral politics (Williamson, Trump, and Einstein 2018).

In examining the potential for disrupting the American state’s dual visibility, however, the more pertinent question is not how BLM support is connected to participation, or even how it is connected to political trust,

but rather how it influences the impact of trust on participation. I investigate this question by running the same analysis from table E6.2 but now include an interaction between political trust and BLM attitudes, allowing me to see how distrust's impact on participation might vary across levels of BLM support. In addition, reflecting my expectation of BLM playing a different role for whites and people of color due to notions of collective grievance and group consciousness, the analysis is run separately for whites and people of color. The results for whites are provided in table E6.3, while results for people of color are shown in table E6.4.⁵

Starting with whites, the results show that BLM support does seem to moderate the impact of trust on participation, but only in relation to the number of nonvoting participatory acts one engages in.⁶ Interestingly, table E6.4 does not show this same relationship for people of color, suggesting that BLM has a bigger impact on whites within this realm of participation. Figure 6.2 provides graphs of these results, demonstrating the interaction between trust and BLM support in relation to the scale of participatory acts for both populations.⁷ Two points are made apparent by this graph. First, while there may be statistical differences in how this relationship works across racial groups, there do not appear to be substantive differences. For both whites and people of color, it would seem that BLM supporters engage in greater number of acts as they grow more trusting.⁸ This finding alludes to a second point, which is that BLM support appears to modify the relationship between trust and *electoral* participation more among whites than it does for people of color. Where chapter 5 found that distrust generally mobilized whites into the electoral process, the right panel of figure 6.2 shows that this impact is limited to whites with more negative feelings about BLM.

Mirroring white supporters of BLM, people of color who back the movement become less likely to engage in electoral politics as they grow less trusting of government. While this result follows the avoidance response to distrust seen among people of color in chapter 5, a disruption within this behavior is found in relation to protest participation. Model E6.44 displays a significant interaction between political trust and BLM attitudes. This significance indicates that trust varies in its impact on protest participation across levels of BLM support among people of color, while the results show no such variation for whites. Figure 6.3 helps to illustrate these interaction terms, showing that there is a substantive racial difference in this case.⁹ For whites, BLM supporters are much more likely to protest than opponents, but both groups become slightly less likely to protest as they grow more trusting. Among people of color, however, trust has a very dif-




Figure 6.2. Scale of participatory acts and political trust across racial groups and support for Black Lives Matter. 95 percent confidence intervals are shown. All other independent variables are held at their means or modes. *Source*: ANES 2016.

ferent impact on protesting across BLM attitudes. Where people of color who oppose BLM mirror the general pattern found in chapter 5, with the most distrusting people being the least likely to engage, this relationship flips for BLM supporters.¹⁰ Here distrust seems to function more as a politically mobilizing force. Predicted probabilities show that BLM supporters who harbor distrust in government were roughly twice as likely to protest as compared to BLM supporters who express trust in the state.

Ultimately, this section provides tentative evidence of BLM's capacity to disrupt the dual visibility dynamic. I argue that this disruption comes not from decreasing the visibility of the CLS among people of color, nor from increasing trust in the police, but rather from subverting the narrative associated with a highly visible and distrust-inducing CLS. *Exposure* to the CLS is often construed through a neoliberal narrative of personal responsibility and individual mistakes (Haney 2010; Soss, Fording, and Schram 2011). I argue that BLM transforms this understanding by using CLS visibility to activate group consciousness among people of color, revealing CLS contact to be a collective issue rooted in institutional bias.




Figure 6.3. Protest participation and political trust across racial groups and support for Black Lives Matter. 95 percent confidence intervals are shown. All other independent variables are held at their means or modes. *Source:* ANES 2016.

Through this shift, BLM makes politics a more suitable venue for reform while simultaneously providing an outlet for the expression of a collective voice within this venue. Similar to previous findings concerning contexts in which CLS contact encourages greater political engagement (Walker 2020b; Williamson et al. 2018), my findings also suggest this effort is more successful in generating involvement outside of the electoral arena.

“You Can’t Pretend It Doesn’t Exist”: Black Lives Matter and the Criminal Legal System’s Visibility among Whites

Previous chapters argued that the development of criminal legal policy over the last fifty years has included a successful effort by political elites to create a disassociation between the CLS and the state for whites. This effort, combined with less frequent *Exposure* to the CLS, has made the system *Indirectly Invisible* among white Americans. From this perspective, BLM’s utilization of the politics of visibility could be seen in a very different light as it relates to changing the political attitudes and behaviors

of white people. In this case, we might better understand BLM's efforts as helping to foster a stronger connection between the CLS and the state within white minds.

In this endeavor, "Viral videos of police violence against African Americans have been one way that BLM activists have worked" to "make visible the different lived experiences people of color have when they encounter law enforcement" (Thurston 2018a, 165). Within the framework developed here, this use of social media videos is an important aspect of BLM's work because it provides a different medium for *Indirect Exposure* to the CLS among whites. The elite rhetoric focused on in chapter 3, and the disconnect between the police and the state that it created, fit into a form of information gatekeeping that allowed whites to disregard police violence perpetrated against people of color, failing to identify it as an example of oppressive state intervention (Hayward 2017). Through this willful blindness, contradictory understandings of "big government" have been created that feed white epistemologies of ignorance, helping perpetuate policies that bolster white supremacy (e.g., the promotion of overbearing policing practices and inadequate poverty assistance) (Hayward 2017; Mills 1997). In contrast to this rhetoric, however, videos of police violence seen on social media provide fewer opportunities for third parties to frame the content. The state's role is more likely to be obvious in this mechanism of *Indirect Exposure* to the CLS, helping to disrupt white epistemologies of ignorance by increasing the CLS's visibility (Hayward 2017).

BLM's tactic of raising the conspicuousness of state-sanctioned violence against Black Americans in order to change white political attitudes and behavior is not new. This strategy closely mirrors some of the earliest work taken on by the NAACP in their fight against lynching (Zangrando 1980). Francis (2014) documents the organization's public awareness campaign, explaining that the "initial exposure-focused strategy was predicated on the belief that white Americans would become so enraged that they would feel compelled to do something to end the tragedy of racial violence" (2014, 29). This campaign was not only about increasing white *Indirect Exposure* to this violence but also about helping whites understand how this violence was tied back to the state, thus increasing its *Indirect Visibility*. This precedent helps demonstrate government visibility's fluid and contestable nature, showing how actors and movements can work to shift what is visibly connected to the state in order to generate political change (Mayrl and Quinn 2017). In this way, the invisibility of the CLS for whites creates a political opportunity for BLM, whose efforts can shift the boundaries of

the state within the white imagination by more closely linking the CLS to the government.

The influence of BLM on CLS visibility among whites can be partially examined in a statistical sense by returning to the relationship between political trust and feelings about the police analyzed in chapter 4. The findings presented there showed that trust in government was associated with police attitudes among people of color but not whites, indicating racial variation in the connections made between the state and the CLS. Table E6.5 reexamines this lack of connection within the context of support for BLM. The analysis includes the same measure of political trust as the dependent variable, along with the same independent variables utilized in chapter 4.

In place of the interaction between police attitudes and race, however, I now include an interaction between feelings about the police and BLM, while splitting the model so that whites and people of color are analyzed separately. In this way, rather than assessing how the connection between political trust and police attitudes differs across racial groups, I now can see how this link varies across levels of support for BLM *within* both communities of color and white populations. Given the many other mechanisms of CLS visibility operating among people of color covered in chapter 3, I expect that BLM support will do more to shape the relationship between political trust and police attitudes among whites.

In contrast to this expectation, the interaction term reaches significance in both models in table E6.5, indicating that the association between trust in government and feelings about the police varies across levels of BLM support for both people of color and whites. Figure 6.4 provides a graphical illustration of each of these interaction terms. In contrast to their statistical similarity, however, this figure reveals a substantive difference across racial groups. As the left panel of figure 6.4 shows, the connection between police attitudes and trust in government remains strong among people of color who oppose BLM but is simply stronger among BLM supporters. Moving from negative to positive police evaluations is associated with a 9 percent increase in trust in government among BLM opponents and a 25 percent increase for BLM supporters.

Though this gap is significant, the story is substantively different for whites. Here BLM support is not associated with a shift in the intensity of attitude associations but rather the existence of any association at all. The right panel in figure 6.4 demonstrates that white BLM supporters connect their feelings about the police to their level of political trust, while




Figure 6.4. Political trust and police attitudes across racial groups and support for Black Lives Matter. 95 percent confidence intervals are shown. All other independent variables are held at their means or modes. *Source:* ANES 2016.

white BLM opponents display no link between these beliefs. The movement from antipathy to warmth vis-à-vis police is connected to a 1 percent decline in political trust among white BLM opponents but a 14 percent increase in trust for white BLM supporters. Viewed from this perspective, white BLM advocates hold trust associations that approximate those found among people of color more generally, as seen in chapter 4. These results suggest that the CLS is more visibly linked to government for whites who back BLM's efforts.¹¹

Causality is again difficult to ascertain. Whites who already held an association between the state and the CLS may have been more likely to support BLM, just as BLM might have helped to foster this association among the movement's white supporters. While I explicitly avoid causal language in the statistical analysis above in recognition of this limitation, I also believe that the interview data provide evidence that BLM shapes the connection between the police and the state for whites, as seen in those instances when whites brought up *Indirect Exposure* to the CLS.¹²

Katy [white]: I used to think government was wrong a lot. Now I understand how hard it is. So I can appreciate those positions better. . . . If you look at the situation with the police today, I mean, there are bad cops. The same as there are good cops. Hopefully there are more good cops than bad cops. But you can't pretend it doesn't exist. So, I do think if I got, if there is something I felt strongly enough about, I would probably, I would say wait just a minute. But I'd think about it for a while. Because of what it could create, how much do I care about it, do I care enough about it to deal with all the things that go with [getting politically involved]? Or should I just say forget it and find something else to do.

Julie [white]: For me personally, I've never felt [like government is too involved]. So it would be hypothetical, if anything, but no. I mean, obviously I'm concerned about current events of why are police officers killing people, you know? Maybe that. But other than that. It doesn't affect me personally. I have an overarching concern with maybe we ought to look into that. But I don't know if they've, I haven't researched that or anything.

Each of these quotes illustrate that the current visibility of the CLS has made it a more potent location of the state for white Americans. Both Julie and Katy brought up the police in explaining their understanding of government without being prompted to do so. Indeed, not only did the police surface, but each participant brought up the CLS in relation to “current events,” highlighting that this connection has been forged by the specific visibility of police discrimination and violence partially raised by BLM's activism. Katy's point that “you can't pretend it doesn't exist” exemplifies the shifting visibility of the CLS currently taking place in the lives of many white Americans.

While these accounts indicate a disruption in the dual visibility dynamic, they also highlight some of the political shortcomings of organizing that aims to increase CLS visibility in this form. Both Julie and Katy are more aware of the CLS's connection to government, but neither appear to feel a desire to engage in the political process to change CLS policy. Katy suggests that this is not something she feels “strongly enough about” to get involved. Further, in stressing that CLS discrimination may be an issue of individual bad officers, she does not seem to connect the CLS's visibility to broader institutional biases. From this perspective, structural reforms are unnecessary. Julie similarly expresses concern but is not mobilized by

it, noting that she has not taken additional steps to “look into” the issue in greater detail. In a possible explanation for why she has not taken action, she implicitly draws on her whiteness in articulating that this is not a problem that affects her personally.

Ultimately, the combination of this interview evidence and statistical analysis suggests mixed results for BLM’s use of the politics of visibility among whites. While the connection between the police and the state among white supporters demonstrates that the movement has helped to raise the CLS’s visibility for some whites, it does not appear that this connection necessarily fosters greater white mobilization around CLS treatment of Black lives. In addition, the impact of this increased visibility is weakened by the amount of support BLM receives from white Americans in the aggregate. Relatively few whites labeled themselves as supportive during my interviews in 2016, meaning that even if BLM was able to shift visibility among its white advocates, it was reaching a small part of this population. That the average BLM feeling thermometer score for white respondents in the 2016 ANES was 42 illustrates the unfavorable opinions held by this racial group, especially when compared to the average score of 66 among people of color.

With that said, this description of limited support and lack of mobilization contrasts strongly with the high level of white involvement in the protests of 2020 discussed at the beginning of this chapter. This contrast illuminates a potential difference between BLM’s role in 2016, the year in which my interview and statistical data were collected, and the movement’s influence in 2020. What changed during this time? The next section will offer some answers and point to larger disruptions in the dual visibility dynamic in the summer of 2020.

Seeing the CLS with 2020 Vision

While my interviews were held just four years prior to 2020, several factors came together during this time period to profoundly change the visibility of the CLS among whites. Of greatest import, the summer of 2020 saw the combination of the disturbing video showing George Floyd’s murder at the hands of the Minneapolis Police Department along with the COVID-19 pandemic. Together, these factors fueled a different type of CLS visibility for many white Americans, as well as a different response to that visibility.

First, the COVID-19 pandemic generated a number of public health restrictions, such that people were unable to travel, go to restaurants, attend live entertainment, or engage in several other leisurely pursuits. In

addition, many Americans lost their jobs or had their hours considerably reduced. Together, these changes took away a lot of distracting activities that many people replaced with increased social media use. In surveys leading up to May 2020, the month of George Floyd's murder, roughly half of all US adults said they had started using social media more since the start of the pandemic (Samet 2020). Many social media platforms, including Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram, saw unprecedented increases in use during the spring of 2020 (Ford Rojas 2020; Ghaffary 2020). Given the importance of social media in distributing videos of police violence, these are salient trends in explaining how George Floyd's murder altered CLS visibility (Cohen and Luttig 2020; Weaver, Prowse, and Piston 2019).

Similar to social media use, the pandemic also led to increased consumption of news, as people tracked emerging information about the coronavirus. Comparing March 2019 to March 2020, the time devoted to current events on mobile devices in the US increased by 215 percent. In addition, when people put down their phones, it seems they were frequently turning on their televisions. The average daily consumption of television in the US increased from 275 minutes at the beginning of March 2020 to 354 minutes by the end of the month.¹³ All of these factors taken together meant that when the video and story of George Floyd's murder broke, more people were engaging with devices and platforms where they were likely to see it.

Finally, the impact of the George Floyd video on CLS visibility among whites relates not only to its viral spread but also to its content. Differing from many videos of police killings of Black people, such as the tragic murders of Walter Scott or Tamir Rice, Floyd's murder is carried out over more than nine minutes. During that time, Floyd can be heard begging for his life, while Derek Chauvin, the white officer involved, holds an indifferent facial expression that is often directed at the camera. In explaining the larger white response, Michael Steinberg, the director of the University of Michigan's Civil Rights Litigation Initiative, spoke to the particularly appalling nature of Floyd's death: "The video was so revolting . . . this smug white male officer with his hand in his pocket, carrying out a modern-day lynching. It shocked many white people into realizing that this is not an aberration, this is part of a systemic problem" (Washington 2020).

In this way, the combination of the pandemic and the nature of George Floyd's murder produced a particularly powerful disruption to the disconnect between the police and the state among white Americans. Lockdown conditions ensured that white Americans were more likely to be *Indirectly Exposed* to the CLS through the video of Floyd's murder—and indeed were

likely to see it multiple times, creating the kind of repeated *Exposure* that generates a more potent form of visibility. In addition, when white people did experience this *Indirect Exposure*, its content carried a greater capacity to induce a negative emotional response. This reaction is important given the role of negativity bias in making *Exposure* more impactful on visibility. As a result, the video of George Floyd's murder was able to raise the CLS's *Indirect Visibility* among whites in a uniquely influential way.

Adding to this disruption were two other conditions that made white people not only more likely to see the state in a new way but also more likely to act on that visibility through their own political engagement. First, the pandemic produced a severe disturbance in people's routines. When this kind of disorder occurs in people's lives, they also become more likely to engage in activities aimed at disturbing the status quo, such as protesting (Jost et al. 2017). Historical examples of unrest during times of public health lockdowns attest to this phenomenon. The cholera pandemics of the 1800s produced seventy riots across the world (Kline Cohn Jr. 2017). Isolation due to smallpox led to protests and riots in both Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and Laredo, Texas, during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Seeing this dynamic, one social psychologist predicted extensive social unrest due to the coronavirus on March 21, 2020, more than two months before the worldwide protests in response to George Floyd's murder (Fisher 2020).

Second, just as collective grievances serve as an important vehicle for mobilizing people of color in response to CLS visibility, so too have shared grievances played a role in mobilizing whites in 2020. In this case, however, the grievance was against Donald Trump. While antipathy for Trump was well-established prior to the pandemic, as illuminated by his historically low approval ratings (C. Wilson 2018), frustration grew during his response to COVID-19. In taking action against the CLS following the murder of George Floyd, many liberal white Americans saw BLM protests as also being aimed at President Trump due to his vocal support for law enforcement (Demby 2020). With Trump as a common enemy, liberal whites found a collective grievance within the BLM protests following George Floyd's death, a key element to any kind of mobilization (Simmons 2014).

Thus several factors in 2020 served as kindling for broader white engagement around CLS issues, with the video of George Floyd's murder acting as the match to ignite it. Finally, as more whites got involved due to these conditions, a cascading effect appears to have set in. White people seeing other whites getting engaged created greater social pressure

and permission to speak out. White people interviewed by National Public Radio during the George Floyd protests pointed out that seeing other white people in their personal circle speaking up made it “feel safer and more important to care” (Demby 2020). A white BLM supporter noted that where “in the past it was conspicuous to be speaking out about BLM as a white person . . . [n]ow it feels conspicuous to NOT be sharing a post” (Demby 2020). The combination of social pressure and momentum helps to explain why BLM’s work in 2020 not only shifted CLS visibility among whites but also generated greater white involvement (Jost et al. 2017; Sinclair 2012).

Accompanying this increased white engagement was an even broader shift in white opinion on BLM. As noted earlier, support for BLM among whites was relatively low in 2016. By June of 2020, however, 60 percent of whites said they either strongly supported or somewhat supported the movement (Parker, Menasce Horowitz, and Anderson 2020). Rather than happening steadily over these four years, however, this shift happened rapidly. Net support for BLM jumped by 15 percent among whites in the two weeks following George Floyd’s death (Cohn and Quealy 2020).

This shift in opinion is crucial in considering the politics of visibility’s capacity to impact substantive reform. The NAACP’s previously mentioned campaign around raising the visibility of lynching found success in moving white attitudes on the issue but did not lead directly to transformation in public policy. Rather this shift in white opinion was important in creating the conditions that allowed for NAACP victories within political and legal venues (Francis 2014). This historical precedent suggests that BLM’s success in 2020 in building white support through the politics of visibility may create the political space necessary for securing transformative policy change within formal political institutions (Cineas 2020). At the time of this writing, however, the realization of this potential remains to be seen, and is likely dampened by recent evidence showing that white support of BLM has declined to levels lower than those seen at the beginning of 2020 (Chudy and Jefferson 2021).

Conclusion

Prior to this chapter, my findings painted a normatively disheartening picture of contemporary government visibility. The combined conspicuousness of taxation, poverty policies, and the CLS have been shown to simultaneously promote racially patterned political inequality and deter

redistributive social spending. The former outcome is made more difficult to overcome by a growing sense among white Americans that the country has entered a “postracial” era (R. T. Ford 2009; Tesler and Sears 2010), while the latter is made more critical by the growth of economic inequality (Piketty 2017; Soss and Jacobs 2009). The dual visibility dynamic seems to fit with recent characterizations of an American public that looks “for government in all the wrong places” (Balogh 2012). In the context of this book, however, the issue is not how Americans look for government; it is how policies structure the way government is presented to them.

In seeking to understand how this structure could be overcome, this chapter analyzes the impact of the Black Lives Matter movement on contemporary government visibility. Two disruptive pathways are illuminated. First, BLM can subvert the dynamic attached to CLS visibility among people of color. By ensuring that instances of discriminatory treatment are viewed through the lens of linked fate, institutional bias, and collective grievances rather than individual decisions, BLM may be able to convert political distrust among people of color into a politically mobilizing force, particularly in relation to actions taken outside the electoral process. Second, BLM increases the visibility of the CLS among whites, working against forces that have driven a disconnect between this system and the state in their understanding of government. This effort appears to have been particularly effective in 2020 due to a range of factors that helped BLM more powerfully increase the CLS’s visibility among whites while simultaneously making whites more likely to politically engage in response. Recent evidence, however, suggests that this impact may have been dishearteningly temporary (Chudy and Jefferson 2021).

This discussion of disruptive pathways is not intended to be exhaustive, but rather it offers a narrow focus on a salient social movement. Indeed, evidence from the previous chapters points to other avenues for transforming the dual visibility dynamic, such as radically scaling back the CLS’s presence in communities of color (Davis 2003; Vitale 2017). A similarly apparent area of reform would involve raising the visibility of submerged policies to make white Americans more aware of the many ways they benefit from government—a strategy that has been promoted by scholars of the submerged state (Mettler and Milstein 2007; Mettler 2011b). In closing out this book, I turn to some of these other areas of reform, providing a more detailed analysis of their strengths and weaknesses in transforming American democracy and policymaking.

The Politics of Visibility and Prospects for Change

Tom Hanks plays Doug in a 2016 *Saturday Night Live* sketch. Doug is a Trump supporter who sports a Make America Great Again hat and a bald eagle emblazoned t-shirt. In this apparel, he seems out of place on *Black Jeopardy*, a trivia show that tests the contestants' knowledge of Black America.¹ At first, Doug predictably struggles against his two competitors, both of whom are Black. The tenor of the sketch begins to change, however, when the host asks about the iPhone requesting people's thumbprint. Doug rings in: "What is 'I don't think so, that's how they get you.'" The host, played by Keenan Thompson, responds with a somewhat surprised but emphatic "Yes! Yes! That's it!" Doug's fellow contestants also chime in with their own agreement, saying "I don't trust that." Doug continues his answer: "I read that goes straight to the government," evoking an appreciative response from the host: "Well that is not bad, Doug." Doug's surprising success continues throughout the remainder of the sketch. When the host asks, "They out here saying every vote counts," Doug again provides the correct answer, responding "What is, 'C'mon, they already decided who wins even before it happens."

Where Doug's Trump-supporter appearance initially made him look like a clear outsider on *Black Jeopardy*, he was ultimately able to find success through some surprising commonalities with his fellow Black contestants. Not only does this agreement help Doug with the answers but it also allows him to form bonds with the other contestants and the show's host.

Speaking to its social commentary, *The Atlantic* noted the sketch's hopeful and depressing conclusion: "People casting opposing ballots in November might not realize just how much they have in common" (Kornhaber 2016). In particular, whether it is iPhone thumbprints or fair elections, nearly everyone in America appears ready to agree that the government is not to be trusted.

This book helps to illuminate the formation of this consensus. Public policy changes over the last five decades have created a dynamic in which the most conspicuous manifestations of government in people's lives are not trustworthy. As people's feelings about government have become attached to these locations of the state, political distrust has spread across the American public. As the SNL sketch reveals, this distrust can be seen within attitudes held by Black Americans and white Trump voters alike.

Yet the tone of the sketch changes again when the final Jeopardy category appears: Lives That Matter. As the host reads the category, the contestants slowly turn to Doug, realizing that their harmony has hit its breaking point. Smiling, the host acknowledges this shift: "Well, it was good while it lasted, Doug." Though they may have agreed on their distrust of government, it seems Doug and his fellow contestants still disagree on quite a lot.

In this discord, the sketch reveals this book's central argument: Americans may agree that they dislike the state they see, but that does not mean that they see the same state. For communities of color, the last fifty years have contained declining state attention to civil rights and an increased emphasis on surveillance, policing, and incarceration. In response to this shift, it is obvious that the state cannot be trusted as it continuously fails to recognize people of color's basic humanity.

Changes in state visibility have been quite different among whites. Here the rising visibility of welfare and taxes have clashed with the growing submergence of government benefits that disproportionately go to white Americans, creating an understanding of a state that takes "their" tax money to fund poverty programs perceived as benefitting Black people and immigrant communities. Interview evidence reveals these racially disparate anchor points for political distrust, with statistical analysis confirming that white distrust is attached to feelings about welfare and government spending, while distrust among people of color is linked to attitudes about the police.

This racial distinction is essential for unlocking the relationship between political trust and American democracy, as it reveals how distrust serves as an electorally mobilizing force for whites but tends to foster elec-

toral disengagement among people of color. As a result of this racial contingency, the loudest political voices in American elections are distrustful whites who harbor resentment for poverty spending and taxes, while the least likely to make their voices heard in the electoral process are people of color who have been the direct or indirect targets of a discriminatory criminal legal system (CLS). Ultimately, this analysis demonstrates that the American public's widespread distrust functions as an obstacle to more generous social welfare policies and more humane criminal legal policies.

In closing this book, I consider how these findings can inform efforts to change this political dynamic. Using the understanding of government visibility uncovered here, I argue for policy solutions capable of advancing a more racially equitable democracy and redistributive welfare state, while also illuminating policy pathways to avoid. In particular, the extant literature's focus on the state's increasing submergence frequently invites reforms aimed at making the government more visible in people's lives by surfacing currently hidden programs. By focusing on the parts of the state that have grown more conspicuous alongside the rise of the submerged state, however, two important caveats to this surfacing strategy are made clear.

First, the role of race within the politics of government visibility serves as a warning of the political environment in which this surfacing would take place. Raising the visibility of hidden programs may lead them to take on the same kind of racial valence as that seen within the already visible "welfare" programs perceived as benefitting racial others. As a result, surfacing these policies could create (white) hostility toward programs that currently benefit from their relative anonymity. This concern is particularly salient for those few hidden programs that do not serve more affluent Americans, as these can be more easily connected to existing poverty policy stereotypes. For example, Callaghan and Olson (2017) find that surfacing the Earned Income Tax Credit, a submerged benefit that assists individuals with incomes near the poverty line, decreases support for the program, particularly among racially resentful individuals. As such, surfacing all hidden programs may have the unintended consequence of further decreasing spending on poverty assistance by giving politicians an ability to link downwardly redistributive submerged policies to extant racist stereotypes about "welfare parasites" (HoSang and Lowndes 2019).

In contrast to this point, others might argue that so long as the entirety of the submerged state is surfaced, upwardly redistributive submerged policies, such as the HMID, would also face new public resistance. While there is experimental evidence in support of this point (Guardino and Met-

tlar 2020), I believe the findings from this book also provide reasons to be skeptical. First, this experimental evidence relies on a one-sided argument, in which strong signals about the upwardly distributional nature of the HMID are provided without an opposing claim. In reality, an opposing view that is supportive of the HMID is likely to emerge, particularly given the vested interest groups that benefit from submerged policies, such as the real estate industry (D. A. Brown 2021; Mettler 2011b). Here I think the analysis in chapter 2 suggests such opposing arguments have a high probability of success. In particular, supportive politicians and interest groups could respond to the surfacing of the HMID by claiming that it rewards “workers” and “taxpayers,” labels that already appear connected to people’s understanding of who benefits from submerged programs (Ellis and Faricy 2021). Given that these labels play strongly into racially coded understandings of whites as producers (HoSang and Lowndes 2019), surfacing upwardly redistributive submerged programs may actually lead to increased support for them.

Put simply, the racial dynamics present within the politics of government visibility suggest that surfacing currently hidden programs may lead to greater antipathy for downwardly redistributive programs (e.g., the EITC), while also bolstering the public backing of upwardly redistributive policies (e.g., the HMID). While future research would benefit from experiments using competitive frames to test these dynamics, I use this chapter to develop an alternative strategy around raising the visibility of state benefits in a way that is more attentive to these racial politics.

Second, it is crucial for any reformers drawing on the politics of visibility to recognize how a call to increase the state’s visibility may sound in communities of color. Here the problem is not the invisibility of government but rather its obvious visibility in the form of the CLS. Anyone using a politics of visibility to advance reforms must contend with this variation if they wish to create racially inclusive change. Generating more inclusive policy alternatives requires simultaneously attending to the submerged state scholarship (e.g., Mettler 2011b; Hackett 2017) as well as scholarship in racial and ethnic politics (REP) that has described a more visible and controlling carceral state (e.g., Fernández-Kelly 2015; Weaver, Prowse, and Piston 2020). This chapter puts forward policy ideas that emerge from a conversation between these two lines of research.

Before turning to policy reforms, however, I first consider avenues of research opened up by my analysis. The complicated nature of studying variation in government visibility means that any analysis will be partial. In pointing out the partiality of my own analysis, I hope to illuminate promis-

ing pathways for future scholars to examine in creating a more comprehensive picture of contemporary government visibility.

Avenues for Future Scholarship

Moving beyond (and within) Race

One obvious future step is to analyze how state manifestations vary across social divisions other than race. As noted in chapter 1, my theoretical framework is designed to identify schisms in government visibility across social differences more broadly. This book's focus on race developed out of the evident racial cleavage among my interviewees, but it is clear that highlighting this gap helped to obscure others. Indeed, the interview data pointed to two particular ways of approaching salient social divisions in state visibility that merit further study.

First, there are divisions that cut across the dual visibility dynamic. To name just a few examples, class, gender, and sexual orientation clearly structure how the state appears in people's lives in ways that work outside of racial identity. That each of these dimensions contains its own policy history and feedback dynamics helps to explain why an analysis of these gaps falls outside the scope of this book, while also illuminating the value of future scholars' centering state visibility within an exploration of them. In addition to generating further divides in visibility, these social dimensions may also serve as forces capable of disrupting the racial duality. As noted in chapter 3, the boundaries within this duality should be understood as blurry and porous (Alba 2005; Fox and Guglielmo 2012), meaning that individuals may move between the boundaries, allowing them to better recognize how the state appears to both whites and people of color. Where chapter 6 investigated the role of BLM in encouraging this kind of boundary crossing for whites, similar efforts could be taken to see how other social dimensions, such as class, allow people to move across this racial divide.

In addition to their transgressive capacity, social dimensions create intersectional schisms within each side of the duality as illuminated by my interview evidence. References to these intersectional differences are made in a few places throughout the book, such as gendered differences among people of color that shape the form in which *Exposure* to the CLS is more likely to take place (i.e., *Direct Exposure* for men of color versus *Indirect Exposure* for women of color). In seeking to provide a detailed analysis

of the specific racial duality separating whites and people of color, however, instances of intersectional analysis in this book are regrettably rare. This limitation is notable given recent research showing differences in the downstream impacts of indirect CLS contact as compared to direct contact (Walker 2020b), as well as scholarship focusing on gendered differences in experiences of the CLS (Katzenstein and Waller 2015; Page, Piehowski, and Soss 2019; Walker and García-Castañón 2017).

Within this same intersectional focus, the diverse histories and lived experiences of different racial and ethnic groups in the US illuminate problems with an analysis that speaks collectively of people of color (Fox 2012; Hattam 2007; Kim 1999). The argument made here is that people of color experience a different type of surveillance and policing when compared to whites, but that argument masks important forms of variation in CLS contact across different racial groups within the broader category of “people of color.” For example, CLS visibility may be more likely to come in the form of state and local police for Black Americans and Indigenous communities (Alexander 2010; Perry 2006), while it may appear as immigration authorities within Latinx neighborhoods (Provine et al. 2016), or as the FBI among South Asian Muslim Americans (Selod 2018). These differences are collapsed within my analysis, but each offers a distinct history and a unique form of contact with law enforcement agencies, suggesting that these experiences may also facilitate different feedback effects if one moves beyond political distrust and participation. Further, many individuals sit at the intersection of these various forms of surveillance, such as Black Muslim Americans forced to simultaneously navigate the War on Drugs and the War on Terror. These observations call for scholarship that is designed to analyze similarities and differences in state visibility across and within these communities, taking into account other social dimensions such as immigration status and religion.

Government Visibility and Federalism

Beyond socially patterned divisions, the analysis put forward here suggests more attention should be given to variation in state visibility across levels of government. While the state visibility literature has mostly focused on changes in government visibility at the federal level, relatively little scholarship has considered government conspicuousness at state and local levels. The inattention to the CLS within visibility studies illuminates one limitation created by this federal focus, but this is just one of many state and local level government institutions that has grown in its visibility

alongside the rise of the submerged state (Sheingate 2009). The amount of power devolved to state and local governments in recent history clarifies the value of including a consideration of federalism within visibility research (Lowi 1998; Mettler 2000). In addition, scholarship has shown that race shapes the way in which this devolved power is used, as well as the extent to which power is passed down to lower levels of government in the first place (Michener 2019; Soss, Fording, and Schram 2011). These findings suggest a promising avenue for research that analyzes state visibility as it varies simultaneously across social positions and geographic localities.

Indeed, the potential opportunities that a federalist lens could provide to the study of government visibility are furthered by the capacity to consider variation in visibility across, and within, different states and cities. Budgeting and policy decisions made by lower levels of government mean that the visibility of government entities is likely to vary in ways that could alter feedback effects. For example, CLS visibility might vary not only across racial groups but also across states and cities based on the number of police officers per capita or the discretion provided to those police officers to make stops. These sources of variation present an analytical advantage for visibility scholarship that brings federalism into its investigation.

Finally, the inclusion of race and federalism within government visibility scholarship raises an additional set of important questions, particularly in relation to political trust. Scholars might investigate whether any racial variation exists in the amount of trust that people place at different levels of government? While we know that the American *public* has tended to place more trust in state and local governments (McCarthy 2016), there seems to be no investigation into how this degree of confidence might vary across different *publics* (Key 1961). Given that the CLS is mostly operated at lower levels of government, it seems possible that increased trust in lower levels of government might not extend equally to communities of color or work the same across different localities.

Government Visibility in the Workplace

In focusing on visible parts of the state, this book utilized a new approach to policy feedback. Rather than beginning with my own policy of interest and analyzing its impact on people's political understandings, I instead began with people's political attitudes and actions and worked from there to identify the conspicuous parts of government that shaped these responses (i.e., one's locations of the state). One advance initially offered by this approach was uncovering politically influential parts of government that

had not previously been considered within feedback scholarship. For the most part, this advantage did not materialize. The government entities discussed throughout the book are included in the existing policy feedback literature, including welfare programs (Bruch, Ferree, and Soss 2010; Barnes and Hope 2017), the CLS (Burch 2013; White 2019), and submerged state policies (Hackett 2020; Mettler 2011b).

The one exception does not concern a specific interaction with the state but rather the venue in which those interactions take place. In particular, interviewees frequently emphasized the workplace as a primary site for their contact with government. While this finding is not included in the main analysis because it did not divide along the same racial duality, it is mentioned here to help inform future research. Government visibility scholarship has focused on the workplace as a venue in which government is hidden, particularly through the receipt of benefits like employment-based health care (Hacker 2002). While these employment-based submerged benefits are an important feature of contemporary government visibility, my interviews show that other forms of occupational interactions with government are an important domain in which many Americans see the state. Two potential issues are made apparent when considering this dynamic.

First, my interviewees generally interpreted this workplace contact with the state as unnecessary bureaucratic interference because it often came in the form of regulation. As seen in the contrast between welfare and the submerged state, this form of workplace *Exposure* similarly creates a dynamic in which the benefits provided by the state are hidden (e.g., employment-based tax cuts), while its costs remain conspicuous (e.g., workplace regulations). Second, the hierarchical nature of the workplace means that the political lessons inspired by this contact with the state are more likely to be manipulated by the opinions of one's superiors, giving these individuals tremendous power over American workers' political attitudes and behaviors. In line with the argument from Hertel-Fernandez (2018), this observation indicates that the political power held by large American companies may come less from their direct lobbying and electoral contributions and more from the way they politically mobilize their workers. Feedback scholars should consider devoting more energy to the attitudinal and behavioral changes generated by government contact in the workplace, as well as the way these feedback effects are shaped by company leadership.

In sum, the analysis presented in this book highlights several paths for future research. In focusing so intently on a divide between whites and

people of color, I leave open questions about how government visibility might vary across and within other social dimensions. In addition, by elucidating the role of state and local CLS actors within the study of government visibility, this book suggests that more scholarship should be devoted to the interaction between state conspicuousness and federalist relations. Finally, the frequency of government contact within the workplace points to it as an important venue for both visibility and policy feedback scholars to consider as we think about how people encounter government, and how those encounters shape public opinion and American democracy.

Policy Solutions: Going Beyond Surfacing

As noted previously, the policy reforms often recommended in response to government visibility research stress the need to surface currently hidden programs. This change is expected to give people a more accurate sense of what government assistance looks like, helping to foster a vibrant democracy and potentially generating greater public resistance to the many hidden programs that disproportionately benefit the wealthy. While I see substantial promise in this approach, I also worry that the intersection of government visibility and race illuminates some limitations. Given the racially charged hostility directed at the most visible social policies today, any surfacing of hidden policies may generate new resistance to surfaced programs that benefit the working poor (e.g., the EITC), while well-connected interest groups may be able to protect surfaced policies that aid the wealthy by tying them to racialized notions of benefitting taxpayers and workers. Fortunately, just as the intersection of race and state visibility illuminates this concern, it also suggests a policy alternative to circumvent it.

Universal Basic Income

In place of the patchwork of submerged and visible policies that make up the contemporary American welfare state, I argue that these findings point to the promise of a Universal Basic Income (UBI). Though there are many forms that a UBI can take, it is defined by two common elements (De Wispelaere and Stirton 2004; Hoynes and Rothstein 2019). First, it provides a universal benefit that is open to all (or nearly all) members of a population, with the size of this benefit not changing in value based on the characteristics of an individual (e.g., income). Second, the value of that benefit

is sufficient for one to live on without receiving other forms of assistance (Hoyne and Rothstein 2019). Support for this form of assistance in the US has come from a wide range of sources, including Martin Luther King, Jr.; liberal economist Robert Reich; and conservative economist Milton Friedman (Gordon 2014; King 2010). Most recently, UBI gained prominence when Andrew Yang built his 2020 presidential campaign around the promise of \$1,000 a month for all adult US citizens.

When viewed through the lens of the politics of visibility, this type of UBI proposal provides several advantages. First, a check from the government every month is demonstrably visible in its connection to the state. UBI avoids the misconceptions that come with the contrasting visibilities contained within the contemporary welfare state, allowing everyone to more easily understand their own position as a beneficiary of government benefits (Esping-Andersen 1990). Second, its universality allows a UBI to bypass the bifurcations that have characterized the US welfare state since its founding, dividing beneficiaries along the lines of gender, race, and perceptions of “deservingness” (Fox 2012; Katz 2013; Lieberman 1998; Mettler 1998). These distinctions have allowed American social policy to create and exacerbate racism and misogyny in the US, as opposed to ameliorating these forms of prejudice (Lieberman 1998; Quadagno 1994; Soss, Fording, and Schram 2011). The findings presented here show how the contrasting visibility within the contemporary welfare state encourage this brand of “othering,” while also suggesting that tying everyone to the same UBI could diminish this capacity. Similarly, a UBI’s universality ensures that everyone is *Directly Exposed* to the policy in a proximate way, meaning that people’s interpretations of the policy are more likely to be based on their own experiences. As a result, UBI weakens the power of third-party framing that comes with *Indirect Exposure*, an issue that has been highlighted throughout this book. While other policy proposals hold similar promise in increasing the visibility of government assistance, such as free college tuition or postal banking, they ultimately lack this crucial combination of universality, direct proximity, generosity, and strong markings of the state that makes UBI’s impact on the politics of visibility uniquely strong.

Ultimately, the promise of a UBI rests on the knowledge that policy shapes politics (Schattschneider 1935; Campbell 2012). Where some might argue that we need to start by changing the racial attitudes that are shown here as blocking a more generous welfare state, the framework and findings introduced in this book emphasize that it may be easier to change policies first in order to shift racial attitudes. UBI’s visibility, universality, proximity, and generosity stand out as uniquely capable of fulfilling this goal, helping to create more redistributive social policy while also disrupt-

ing the dual visibility dynamic by making everyone more aware of how they benefit from government. Thus reformers would be better served by passing a UBI even if American public opinion does not seem ready, recognizing that public opinion is likely to shift after its implementation. Indeed, research shows that UBI's design elements are essential for a policy to generate the broad constituency needed to defend it, indicating that a UBI is likely to be politically durable following its initial passage (Campbell 2011). As more scholarly attention is devoted to UBI experiments and case studies (Hoynes and Rothstein 2019), this analysis suggests that researchers should investigate the policy's impact on political attitudes and behaviors in addition to its economic effects.

Similarly, studies might also examine the attitudinal influence of recent changes to government visibility introduced by policies responding to the COVID-19 pandemic. The relatively generous stimulus checks sent to most American households mirror some of the important dynamics of a UBI, while the expansion of the Child Tax Credit from a one-time tax break to a fully refundable monthly check also created a more inclusive and visible form of state assistance (Rosenthal 2021). As of the time of this writing, both of these forms of aid have been discontinued, suggesting any political impact is likely to be short-lived, but they still reveal an appetite among Americans to see government provide benefits of this kind, at least in times of crisis. Notably, history reveals that crises can generate foundational changes in social policy that outlive their origins (e.g., Campbell 2003). Time will tell if the COVID-19 pandemic spurs any structural shifts in the visibility of the American welfare state.

In sum, I argue that the racial dynamics surrounding the American state's visibility suggest that efforts to surface currently submerged policies may have the unintended effect of driving greater inequality into US social policy by creating racialized animosity toward the few hidden policies that benefit the working poor (e.g., EITC), while leaving submerged programs for the wealthy intact (e.g., HMID). In place of this reform strategy, I argue for the replacement of many of America's hidden *and* visible policies with a Universal Basic Income, seeing it as capable of not only increasing the generosity of America's welfare state but also alleviating the racial animosity contained within it.

Decreasing CLS Visibility through the Reallocation of Responsibility

Diagnosing contemporary policing as being too visible in the lives of people of color suggests an obvious pathway for reform: make the CLS less

visible in these communities. Though straightforward, this recommendation contradicts many of the criminal legal reforms that have been promoted and implemented in recent years. These include changes to police training, such as more emphasis on the role of implicit bias and procedural justice. Additional reforms look to increase police transparency through greater reporting requirements or mandating body-worn cameras. Such reforms do not aim to make the CLS less visible but rather attempt to shift the nature of its current visibility. Research shows these reforms have yielded limited results (Robin S. Engel, McManus, and Isaza 2020). Many of these changes were central to the National Initiative for Building Community Trust and Justice created by the Obama administration, which then helped roll out these policing reforms in six pilot cities throughout the US.² Minneapolis served as one of these cities, going above and beyond many of the recommendations from this initiative and serving as a “model of progressive police reform” (McHarris and McHarris 2020). The city mandated trainings in implicit bias, mindfulness, procedural justice, de-escalation, and crisis intervention. The police department also required that officers wear body cameras, brought in a more racially diverse leadership, facilitated greater dialogue between the police and the community, and strengthened its use-of-force standards (Vitale 2020). In spite of these changes, 78 percent of police stops for moving violations between 2019 and 2020 involved Black and East African drivers, while whites made up just 12 percent of these stops in the predominantly white city (Mannix 2020). The shortcomings of these reforms were made even clearer as the nation watched Minneapolis police officer Derek Chauvin keep his knee on George Floyd’s neck for more than nine minutes while three other officers watched the murder without intervening.

In place of these reforms, the politics of visibility calls for a more fundamental change that reenvision the role of policing in society. As discussed in chapter 3, police presence has spread to several public institutions, ranging from schools to social welfare offices (Gustafson 2012; Rios 2011; Stuart 2016). Accompanying this spread is an increased role for the police in trying to deal with issues traditionally handled by other government actors. Critiques of this expanded role come not only from progressive advocates and elected officials but from the police themselves. As former Dallas chief of police David Brown noted:

Every societal failure, we put it on the cops to solve. . . . Not enough mental health funding, let the cops handle it. Not enough drug addiction funding, let’s give it to the cops. Here in Dallas we have

a loose dog problem. Let's have the cops chase loose dogs. Schools fail, give it to the cops. . . . That's too much to ask. Policing was never meant to solve all those problems (Horwitz 2016).

Brown's assessment aligns with a critique of policing grounded in the politics of visibility. Improving policing should be based less on shifting the terms of their contact with communities and more on reducing that contact altogether.

To make this policy shift effective, however, requires not just an absence of policing but also the presence of other actors with training that is more appropriate for the situations often handled by the police (McHarris and McHarris 2020; Vitale 2017). Fortunately, models for this form of governance are already appearing in cities across the country. The city David Brown once policed, Dallas, has started sending social workers out with police calls (Manfield 2019). The Crisis Assistance Helping Out On The Streets (CAHOOTS) program in Eugene, Oregon, works through the city's emergency communication center to send out medics and crisis workers in place of the police.³ Common Justice in New York City offers an alternative to the CLS based on survivor-centered responses to violence. Rather than working through the CLS for crimes like assault, robbery, and even murder, survivors can address harms through restorative justice practices based in accountability and healing.⁴

Programs like these offer promising ways to reduce police visibility, and importantly they currently do so without significant state support. Broader reform, however, necessitates putting funding and resources toward these practices at the same levels as those historically provided to the CLS. At the same time, this effort could be joined by giving greater support to policies designed to address the sources of crime, rather than punishing its consequences. Included in this effort could be more money for policies aimed at fixing deficiencies in education, housing, and health care (Kaba 2020). Such an approach reverts back to a structural understanding of crime; one that was overtaken by the law-and-order politics that drove the initial rise in police visibility at the end of the 1960s (Weaver 2007). The findings from this book suggest that returning to this structural understanding is not only necessary for repairing policing in the US but also saving American democracy.

Appendixes

Appendix A

Interview Protocol and Postinterview Survey

This appendix provides the full interview protocol. As the interviews were conducted in a semistructured format, each of these questions was not necessarily asked in every interview, nor was the order of the questions displayed below followed. Rather the questions included in this protocol are those that I constructed the interviews around and came prepared to ask. In keeping with the goal of asking follow-up questions in semistructured interviews in order to answer research questions and to make the interview feel more conversational, I often asked questions that are not included in this protocol. In addition to the interview protocol, this appendix also provides the survey that was given to each interviewee after they had completed their interview.

Interview Protocol

1. Thank you so much for taking the time to meet with me today.
Your input today is going to help my research project and will

hopefully help those of us studying politics better understand the relationship between people and government. I want to emphasize that there are no wrong answers to any of these questions. I am here only to learn from you. So let's start—maybe you can tell me a bit more about where you live.

- 1a. How have you seen it change in the time you've been living there?
- 1b. Do you see it as being similar to or different from some of the other neighborhoods in the area?
2. What is one of the biggest challenges you see facing your neighborhood?
 - 2a. Is that something most of your neighbors also see as a big challenge?
 - 2b. How do you see people trying to deal with these issues? Who do they go to in order to get these things fixed? The government? Community organizations? Churches?
 - 2c. (If not government) What do you think makes people turn to places other than government in these cases?
 - 2c. (If government) Do people tend to find that the government responds in these cases?
3. People mean many things when they say the word "government." Tell me a bit about what you think of when you hear the word government?
 - 3a. Is there any particular experience, or conversation you've had, or person you talk to, or place you hear about politics that you think has had a big influence on you viewing government that way?
 - 3b. Do you view government as being good or bad? Tell me more about that.
 - 3c. Is there an area or issue where you feel like the government is too involved or does too much?
 - 3d. What about an area where you feel the government doesn't do enough?
4. Think about the past year or so; can you remember having contact with government in any way?
 - 4a. What did that experience tell you about how government works?
 - 4b. What can you tell me about that experience? Is there anything that stands out for you?

- 4c. Would you describe that experience as “typical” of what happens when you deal with government?
- 4d. What about in your current life? What is the biggest way you feel government currently affects your life?
- 4e. Any other contact you’ve had with government that stands out to you?
- 4f. Would you say that government affects your life every day?
- 4g. What about growing up? What do you remember hearing about government when you were growing up? Are there any experiences with government you remember?
- 4h. What do you remember learning about government in school? How do you think that understanding of government has changed for you?
- 4i. Are there any government programs that you’ve ever benefited from? What were those experiences like?
- 4j. Would you prefer that the government be run more like a business?
5. What about among your friends and family? What do you hear from them about government?
 - 5a. Has what you’ve heard from them fit with your own experiences?
 - 5b. Is there any time where you felt like your views of government changed a lot?
6. If you felt the government had wronged you in some way, say by giving you an unfair parking ticket or making you wait in a long line for something they were supposed to send to you, what would you do?
 - 6a. (If they say they couldn’t do anything) Do you think there are other people who would be more successful in fighting that kind of thing?
7. Some people really like to follow politics, but others really try to avoid it. What about you? Do you see yourself as being interested in politics?
 - 7a. People do all sorts of things to try to change their communities, their cities, the world and so on. Is there anything that you do where you feel you are trying to change the world around you?
 - 7b. Do you view any of those things as political?
 - 7c. A lot of people struggle to get out to vote because they don’t have time, they have to work, or they just don’t feel like it.

What about you? In the last couple of elections, have you been able to make it to vote?

- 7d. If you had a friend who wanted to get involved in politics, what would your advice be for them?
8. When you think about your friends and family, do they talk about politics?
 - 8a. What are those conversations like?
 - 8b. Are there other places you tend to hear about politics or see political news, such as social media sites?
9. What do you think politicians see when they see you?
 - 9a. Tell me a bit more about that.
 - 9b. Are there other things they might see that could cut against that image of you?
 - 9c. What does it mean to you for politicians to see you as X?
 - 9d. What do you think makes politicians see somebody like you that way?
 - 9e. Can you think of an experience you had with someone in government that made you feel like X?
 - 9f. How much do you think people in X group can change the way government operates?
 - 9g. How much do you think people in X group agree on their feelings about government and politics?
 - 9h. How many of your friends and family do you think would also claim that politicians see them as X?
10. Is there anything else you'd like me to know that we haven't covered so far?

Postinterview Survey

For each of the following, please indicate how you feel about the statement:

Q. I generally trust politicians to do the right thing.

- Strongly agree
- Agree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Disagree
- Strongly disagree

Q. Politicians care about what people like me think.

- Strongly agree
- Agree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Disagree
- Strongly disagree

Q: In my *own* interactions with the people working for the government I have been treated with respect.

- Strongly agree
- Agree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Disagree
- Strongly disagree

Q: Most people can be trusted.

- Strongly agree
- Agree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Disagree
- Strongly disagree

Q: People in my neighborhood can be trusted.

- Strongly agree
- Agree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Disagree
- Strongly disagree

Q: Please indicate your level of involvement with the following programs. Check all boxes that apply.

	An immediate			
	family			I have never
	member			received
	(brother,	My parents		benefits from
	sister, child,	received		this program,
I have	parent) has	A close friend	benefits from	and neither
received	received	has received	this program	has anyone in
benefits from	benefits from	benefits from	while I was	my immediate
this program	this program.	this program.	growing up.	family.

- Social Security
- Medicare
- Medicaid
- Welfare/
- Public Assistance
- Earned Income Tax
- Credit
- Grant to Attend
- College
- Student Loan for
- College
- Veteran's Benefits
- Unemployment
- Government
- Pension
- Workman's
- Compensation
- Government
- Subsidized
- Housing
- GI Bill
- Deduction of
- Mortgage Interest
- from Taxes
- Head Start
- WIC
- Disability Benefits
- SNAP/
- Food Stamps

Please list any other government programs that either you, a family member, or a close friend has benefited from that was not listed above:

Q: Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Democrat, a Republican, an Independent, or something else?

- Democrat
- Republican
- Independent
- Something Else

Q: Below is a seven-point scale on which the political views that people might hold are arranged from very liberal to very conservative. Where would you place yourself on this scale, generally speaking?

- Very liberal
- Liberal
- Slightly liberal
- Moderate
- Slightly conservative
- Conservative
- Very conservative

Q: What is your current age?

Q: With which of the following racial/ethnic groups do you identify? Circle all that apply.

- Black or African American
- Asian or Pacific Islander
- Native American
- Hispanic or Latino
- White
- Other, please specify:

Q: Please indicate the highest education level you achieved?

- 9th Grade
- 10th grade
- 11th grade
- High School
- Some college
- College degree
- Graduate/advanced degree

Q: Into which of the following categories does your annual family income fall?

- Under \$10,000
- \$10—\$25,000
- \$25–49,000
- \$50–74,000
- \$74–99,000
- \$100–125,000
- \$125–150,000
- \$150,000—\$200,000
- \$200,000—\$500,000
- More than \$500,000

Appendix B

Ethnographic Research Details

As noted in chapter 1, the four ethnographic sites were primarily selected to enable recruiting of individuals from diverse social positions. Of course, this criterion left several choices for my sites, even with the specification that they all exist within the same state. The primary motivation for the sites selected, beyond social variation, had to do with access. I chose sites in which I had existing social or geographic ties, as these connections made it easier to make an initial inquiry about observing the community.

In each case, my initial contact with the site was made through voluntary groups that worked only within the geographic boundaries of the site. In two cases, this involved making contact with neighborhood associations; in another, it involved reaching out to a group working on local business issues; and in the final case, this meant getting in touch with volunteer committees dealing with city planning and natural resources. My first request of these groups was permission to come and observe their meetings, which tended to happen on a monthly or bimonthly basis. After obtaining permission, I would attend these meetings, introducing myself as a graduate student from the local university who was studying communities around the state.

During these monthly visits, I would do my best to establish relationships with the individuals in the community. Generally, I would show up to meetings early so I could talk with people before the meetings started, and I would similarly stay after the meetings to continue conversations. When

possible, and if opportunities presented themselves, I would tag along for other community gatherings, whether these were the community Christmas festival or conversations that took place at the local bar following the meeting.

More than one hundred hours were devoted to this observation work with the twofold goal of encouraging individuals at the sites to feel comfortable with my presence, just as I worked to understand the sites. While none of the quotes included in the book draw on what I heard during this observational work, this portion of the research process ultimately provided me with valuable information about the people I was going to interview, including a perspective on how they communicated to people who were not interviewing them. When it came time to recruit individuals for interviews, I used the information I had gathered through my observations to ensure I asked people who I felt represented the diverse perspectives present at the site. Ultimately, this gave me greater confidence that my interviewees approximated the variation that was present *within* each site, in addition to the variation *across* sites. Further, I was able to rely on the relationships I had built with interviewees through this ethnographic work to ask for recommendations of other residents I could interview who spent less time at community gatherings. This “snowball sampling” tactic ensured that I did not just talk to the most civically or socially active people in each site.

Appendix C

Interview Information

This appendix expands on the book's description of the interviews in three ways. First, it provides a more extended discussion of how I approached issues of bias in the interviews, and particularly interviewer bias. Second, I describe the data analysis process that all the interview data were put through, including the role of the interpretivist methodology that I adopted. Finally, descriptions are provided for each of the interviewees, including their pseudonym, racial identity, and site location, as well as the date on which their interview was conducted.

Interviewer Bias

Several steps were taken to make the interviewees more comfortable for these interviews. As noted in both the main text and Appendix B, the primary component of this effort was the ethnographic work during which I built relationships with the interviewees. In addition, interviewees always chose the location of the interview. As a result, many interviews took place in the interviewees' homes, but locations also included coffee shops, libraries, restaurants, places of employment, and bars. Finally, each interviewee was allowed to select their own pseudonym to provide greater confidentiality.

Each of these steps was taken to help the interviewees feel more at ease in sharing information about sensitive and controversial topics, such as government and politics, thus enhancing the validity of the interview data (Rubin and Rubin 2011; Soss 2000). Even with these efforts, however,

I recognize the significant potential for bias within an interview setting. Interviews create interviewer bias, wherein the identity and appearance of the interviewer sends cues to the interviewee about the kind of information they should or could share. As noted in chapter 2, this kind of bias was clear insofar as white interviewees frequently used possessive pronouns to discuss taxation (e.g., “our” shared tax burden), clearly taking a cue from my own white identity in their use of language.

In following the advice of others, rather than taking on the impossible task of eliminating interviewer bias, I instead sought to understand “how it works and what it tells us” (Lin 2000, 191). In this case, I argue that interviewer bias provided both advantages and disadvantages. The plural possessive language used by white interviewees around taxes showed their comfort in revealing things that might not have surfaced for an interviewer of a different race. This advantage, however, is matched by the disadvantage stemming from interviewees of color not necessarily feeling a similar sense of connection, meaning that certain topics were assuredly obscured during my interviews with people of color. In recognizing these instances of bias, I hope to illuminate important limitations to my analysis that could be built on by future scholars.

Data Analysis Process

The multistage coding process of the interview data began with a verbatim transcription of each interview. Notably, all interviews were audio recorded, with the exception of interviews with two individuals who preferred that I only take written notes. The transcription process is often overlooked in interviewing, but it is essential for the analytic opportunity it provides (Schaffer 2016; Soss 2014; Spradley 1979). At the end of each transcription, I drew on this process of close listening to write a brief summary of the interview as a whole, helping me to synthesize the data and allowing me to engage in the interpretive work of analyzing the interviewee’s set of beliefs as a coherent whole (Lin 1998; Rubin and Rubin 2011).

Specific quotes and sections of interviews were then dropped into broad clusters that represented substantive points of interest at that stage of the project (Miles, Huberman, and Saldaña 2013). As these clusters developed, I would periodically summarize each one as a whole, with the goal of identifying major themes, as well as differences between social positions within each cluster (Rubin and Rubin 2011). These themes and differences would then be put into conversation with other types of evidence, including subsequent interviews, scholarly literature, and preliminary statistical analysis.

Coming out of this coding dialogue, clusters would be renamed, dropped, split apart, or combined, representing a process that approximates factor analysis in its goal of synthesizing the data based on underlying dimensions (Miles, Huberman, and Saldaña 2013). This factoring procedure was consistent throughout my analysis process as I sought to best synthesize the data in terms of substantive clusters, as well as finding the most striking social cleavages within these clusters that seemed to separate interviewees' accounts. As this synthesis began to take shape, a second dialogue took place in which I generated expectations that I then sought to disrupt or confirm, as briefly discussed in chapter 1 (Rubin and Rubin 2011).

As this process unfolded, it was important to utilize the interpretivist approach to concepts. Where positivists work to construct precise definitions of concepts so that other scholars can use them, interpretivists aim to understand concepts by investigating how people use them in lived practice, seeing this use as key to explaining how people make sense of the concept (Schaffer 2016; Soss 2014). In the context of interviews, this means that the words people use in association with a concept are crucial, insofar as they tell the interviewer how an individual creates meaning out of that concept (Lane 1962; Wittgenstein 1965). Applied to this project, this approach meant that I was not interested in pursuing the positivist goal of constructing a more precise definition of "government." Rather my interest was in attending to the parts of the state that people brought up when talking about government, as these reveal how they actually understand the concept of government. Thus conducting my interviews with an interpretive methodology aligns with my framework's emphasis on concrete examples of government helping people construct their sense of what government *is* and *does*. As noted in chapter 1, this approach prioritized creating a bottom-up conception of government (Cramer 2016; Michener, SoRelle, and Thurston 2020; Prowse, Weaver, and Meares 2020).

Of course, my goal was not just to locate the state but also to examine how those locations differ across social positions. Fortunately, this goal also aligns with an interpretivist methodology. Interpretivism pushes researchers to be skeptical about the shared meaning of concepts by investigating how the use of concepts travels across different contexts (Schaffer 2016; Soss 2014). People in different contexts who use the same word might mean different things by that word. For me, this skepticism involved exploring social variation in the parts of the state that people drew on in discussing government, recognizing that these differences point to social variation in the locations of the state that people use to make sense of government.

Interviewee Descriptions

This section provides the pseudonyms for each interviewee, the site from which they were recruited, their self-identified racial identity, as well as the date on which the interview was conducted. I do not provide any other identifying information in order to protect the anonymity and confidentiality of the interviewees.

TABLE C1. Interviewee Details

Pseudonym	Date	Site ^A	Racial Identification
Amy	4/13/16	F	White
Bernie and Lucie	9/29/16	B	White
Bogert	8/22/16	D	White
Carla	8/19/16	F	Asian/Asian American
Carol Hill	12/7/16	B	White
Charlotte	11/3/16	A	White
Christine	3/9/16	F	White
Chuck Wes	11/1/16	A	Black
Coach Y	10/16/16	B	Black, Somali-American
Curt	11/7/16	D	White
Daisis Oasis	3/7/16	A	White
Dave	4/11/16	F	White
David	4/20/16	F	White
Deb	4/6/16	F	White
Dick and Jane	12/15/16	D	White
Dick Self	12/19/16	F	White
DK	9/27/16	B	White
Donna	12/15/16	D	White
DR	10/28/16	D	White
Emmie Brown	10/19/16	A	Black
Eric Red	12/9/16	C	White
Hotmetal	11/29/16	B	White
Ishmael	12/20/16	F	White
Jackie	6/22/16	F	White
Jane	10/11/16	B	White
Jay	11/8/16, 12/1/16*	A	Black, Native American, White
Jeff	8/23/16	D	White
Joe	3/11/16	F	White
Julie	7/14/16	F	White
Kathy	7/26/16	F	White
Katy	10/27/16, 11/16/16*	C	White
Kimmie Fagud	11/10/16	A	Asian/Pacific Islander
Kyle	3/29/16	F	White
Lisa	11/2/16	F	Asian/Pacific Islander
Marc	8/30/16	F	White
Maria Jackson	2/26/16	F	White
Marny	12/6/16	D	White

Maya	10/18/16	A	Latinx
Michelle	9/15/16	F	Black
MichMpls	12/22/16	F	White
Millie	11/30/16	B	White
Mohamed	9/8/16	F	South Asian
PetPeeve	10/13/16	B	White
Publicus Anonymous	11/17/16	C	White
Robert and Laura	12/2/16	C	White
Rose	9/26/16	B	White
Rose Stone	10/14/16	C	White
Sam	12/6/16	D	White
Sanyare	11/28/16	A	Black
Sierra	7/12/16	F	Black, Latinx, White
Sky	11/4/16	A	Asian/Pacific Islander
Stephanie Lawrence	12/8/16	C	White
TJ	12/15/16	A	Black
Trey Turner	12/16/16	F	White
TS	10/31/16	A	Asian/Pacific Islander
William and Sophia	10/4/16	B	White
Zack Sloane	12/13/16	C	White
Zoe	3/8/16	F	White

^aSites A, B, C, and D are described in chapter 1. Site F refers to the large fair from which the remaining interviewees were recruited.

*Interviews with both Jay and Katy were held over two sessions.

Appendix D

Dataset Information and Question Wording

This appendix includes two distinct sections. In the first, I provide more information on the two datasets used in the book: the American National Election Study (ANES) and the Social and Governmental Issues and Participation Study (SGIP). In the second section, I provide information about the survey questions and coding schemes used in the statistical analysis.

Dataset Information

American National Election Study (ANES)

The book primarily relies on the 2016 ANES Time Series Study, which can be found online at <https://electionstudies.org/data-center/2016-time-series-study/>. In addition, it also relies on earlier years from within this same Time Series Study. These years are noted within the text.

Social and Governmental Issues and Participation Study (SGIP)

Unlike the ANES, the SGIP has been used relatively few times within published research. I therefore feel compelled to provide a bit more detail on this dataset, though an even more extensive description can be found in Appendices A, B, and C in Suzanne Mettler's *The Government-Citizen Dis-*

connect. The SGIP was conducted over the phone by the Survey Research Institute and Cornell University. The sampling process used national random digit dial, as well as an oversample of individuals between eighteen and thirty-four years of age, and an oversample of households with incomes under \$35,000. Calls were made between August 23 and November 1, 2008. A total of 1,400 surveys were completed. Weights are provided to adjust the sample, making the presence of age, gender, race, and ethnicity representative of the eighteen and over population in the continental US.

Question Wording and Variable Coding

Chapter 2

SGIP—Table E2.1 and Table F2.1

Dependent Variable

Count of Submerged Programs Used-(*Question Wording*) *Speaking of government programs, I'd like to ask about your experience with several government policies over the course of your life. Could you tell me for each of the following if you personally have ever at any time received benefits or payments from any of the following social programs?*

Following this, individuals were asked about twenty-one different social programs. Individuals who indicated personal receipt were coded as 1, while those who indicated no receipt were coded as 0. As discussed in chapter 2, universal submerged programs include the HMID, employer subsidized-health insurance, employer-subsidized retirement benefits, the Child and Dependent Care Tax Credit, 529 plans, Coverdell Education Savings Account, and student loans, while means-tested submerged programs are the EITC and Hope and Lifetime Learning Tax Credits. This coding comes from Mettler's *The Government-Citizen Disconnect*.

Key Independent Variable

Race-Self-identification of the respondent's racial identity as a person of color (0) or white (1). People of color include individuals who identified as Black, American Indian or Alaska Native, Asian, Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander, or Hispanic.

Control Variables

Party ID—Five categories, scaled to run from Democrat (0) to Republican (1).

Female—Self-identification of the respondent's gender as male (0) or female (1).

Age—Self-reported age of respondents, scaled to run from 18 (0) to 92 (1).

Income—Six categories, scaled to run from under \$20,000 (0) to more than \$100,000 (1). Education—Five categories, scaled to run from “Less than High School” (0) to “Graduate degree” (1).

Chapter 3

ANES—Table E3.1 and Table F3.1

Dependent Variable

Preference for Limited Government—Measured as the belief that “*less government is better*” (1) or that “*there are more things government should be doing*” (0).

Key Independent Variables

Race—Self-identification of the respondent's racial identity as a person of color (0) or white (1). People of color include individuals who identified as black, American Indian or Alaska Native, Asian, Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander, or Hispanic.

Police Feeling Thermometer—response to how people would rate the police on a feeling thermometer running from 0 to 100, rescaled to run from most negative (0) to most positive (1).

Party Identification—Seven categories, scaled to run from strong Democrat (0) to strong Republican (1).

Control Variables

Ideology—Seven categories, scaled to run from extremely liberal (0) to extremely conservative (1).

Gender—Self-identification of the respondent's gender as male (0) or female (1).

Age group—Twelve categories, scaled to run from 18–20 (0) to 75 or older (1).

Income groups—Twenty-eight categories, scaled to run from under \$5,000 (0) to more than \$250,000 (1).

Education—Thirteen categories, scaled to run from “Less than 1st grade” (0) to “Doctorate degree” (1).

Political knowledge scale—Constructed from four questions, where 0 is the incorrect answer and 1 is the correct answer. These are then added together and rescaled to run from no correct answers (0) to four correct answers (1). Below are the specific questions.

For how many years is a United States Senator elected—that is, how many years are there in one full term of office for a US senator? Correct answer: 6.

On which of the following does the US federal government currently spend the least [Foreign Aid, Medicare, National Defense, Social Security]? Correct answer: Foreign Aid.

Do you happen to know which party currently has the most members in the US House of Representatives in Washington? Correct answer: Republicans.

Do you happen to know which party currently has the most members in the US Senate? Correct answer: Republicans.

Religiosity—Binary indicator for an individual indicating that religion is not an important part of their life (0) or is an important part of their life (1).

Chapter 4

2016 ANES—Tables E4.1 to E4.3 and Tables F4.1 to F4.6

Dependent Variable

Political Trust—Based on respondent’s answer to the question: *How often can you trust the federal government in Washington to do what is right?* Scale includes: Never (0), Some of the time (.25), About half of the time (.5), Most of the time (.75), and Always (1).

Key Independent Variables

Race—Self-identification of the respondent’s racial identity as a person of color (0) or white (1). People of color include individuals who identified as black, American Indian or Alaska Native, Asian, Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander, or Hispanic.

Welfare Spending Scale—Three-point scale, includes a desire for decreased spending (0), keeping spending levels the same (0.5), or increased spending (1).

Government Spending Scale—This question asks individuals to place themselves on a seven-point scale running from “*Government should provide many fewer services in order to reduce spending*” (0) to “*Government should provide many more services even if it means an increase in spending*” (1).

Police Feeling Thermometer—Response to how people would rate the police on a feeling thermometer running from 0 to 100, rescaled to run from most negative (0) to most positive (1).

Party Identification—Seven categories, scaled to run from strong Democrat (0) to strong Republican (1).

Control Variables

Ideology—Seven categories, scaled to run from extremely liberal (0) to extremely conservative (1).

Gender—Self-identification of the respondent’s gender as male (0) or female (1).

Age group—Twelve categories, scaled to run from 18–20 (0) to 75 or older (1).

Income groups—Twenty-eight categories, scaled to run from under \$5,000 (0) to more than \$250,000 (1).

Education—Thirteen categories, scaled to run from “Less than 1st grade” (0) to “Doctorate degree” (1).

Political knowledge scale—Constructed from four questions, where 0 is the incorrect answer and 1 is the correct answer. These are then added together and rescaled to run from no correct answers (0) to four correct answers (1). Below are the specific questions. For how many years is a United States senator elected—that is, how many years are there in one full term of office for a US senator? Correct answer: 6.

On which of the following does the US federal government currently spend the least [Foreign Aid, Medicare, National Defense, Social Security]? Correct answer: Foreign Aid.

Do you happen to know which party currently has the most members in the US House of Representatives in Washington? Correct answer: Republicans.

Do you happen to know which party currently has the most members in the US Senate? Correct answer: Republicans.

Religiosity—Binary indicator for an individual indicating that religion is not an important part of their life (0) or is an important part of their life (1).

Police stop—binary indicator for an individual claiming to have been stopped or questioned by a police officer in the past year, either themselves or a member of their family. Coded as 0 if this did not happen and 1 if it did.

Police arrest—binary indicator for an individual claiming to have been arrested at any point in their lives. Coded as 0 if this did not happen and 1 if it did.

1966 ANES—Table E4.4 and Table F4.7

Dependent Variable

Political Trust—Based on respondent’s answer to the question: *How often can you trust the federal government in Washington to do what is right?* Scale includes: None of the time (0), Some of the time (.33), Most of the time (.66), and Just about always (1).

Key Independent Variables

Race—Self-identification of the respondent’s racial identity as a person of color (0) or white (1). People of color include individuals who identified as black, American Indian or Alaska Native, Asian, Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander, or Hispanic.

Police Feeling Thermometer—Response to how people would rate the police on a feeling thermometer running from 0 to 100, rescaled to run from most negative (0) to most positive (1).

Control Variables

Party Identification—Seven categories, scaled to run from strong Democrat (0) to strong Republican (1).

Ideology—Feeling thermometer rating where individuals placed themselves between 0 (Most Liberal) and 100 (Most Conservative).

Gender—Self-identification of the respondent’s gender as male (0) or female (1).

Age group—Seven categories, scaled to run from 17–24 (0) to 75 or older (1).

Income groups—Five categories, scaled to run from being in an income group between the 0 and 16th percentile (0) to being between the 96th and 100th percentile (1).

Education—Seven categories, scaled to run from “8 grades or less” (0) to “Advanced degrees” (1).

Chapter 5

2016 ANES—Tables E5.1 to E5.2 and Tables F5.1 to F5.6

Dependent Variables

Voting—Binary indicator for an individual self-reporting to have not voted in the 2016 election (0) or to have voted in the 2016 election (1).

Participation scale—Scale composed of five different participatory acts an individual could have engaged in. These are all binary indicators and include: (1) going to a political meeting, rallies, speeches, or dinners, (2) wearing a campaign button, putting a campaign sticker on their car, placing a sign in their car or in front of their house, (3) working for a party or candidate, (4) contributing money to a campaign, or (5) contacting a US representative or senator. These are added together to run from engaging in none of these acts (0) to engaging in all these acts (5).

Political Avoidance—Coded as 0 if an individual engaged in one or more of the acts listed above in the participation scale or voted. Coded as 1 if an individual engaged in none of these acts.

Protest Participation—Binary indicator for an individual joining in a protest march in the past twelve months. Coded as 1 if an individual did protest and 0 if they did not.

Key Independent Variables

Political Trust—Based on respondent's answer to the question: *How often can you trust the federal government in Washington to do what is right?* Scale includes: Never (0), Some of the time (.25), About half of the time (.5), Most of the time (.75), and Always (1).

Race—Self-identification of the respondent's racial identity as a person of color (0) or white (1). People of color include individuals who identified as black, American Indian or Alaska Native, Asian, Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander, or Hispanic.

Party Identification—Seven categories, scaled to run from strong Democrat (0) to strong Republican (1).

Income groups—Twenty-eight categories, scaled to run from under \$5,000 (0) to more than \$250,000 (1).

Education—Thirteen categories, scaled to run from "Less than 1st grade" (0) to "Doctorate degree" (1).

Political Efficacy—Ten categories based on responses to both "Pub-

lic officials don't care much what people like me think" and "People like me don't have any say about what the government does," scaled to run from disagree strongly (0) to agree strongly (1).

Control Variables

Partisan—Binary indicator for an individual expressing no party attachment (0) or at least some party attachment (1). The "1" category includes those who expressed either a "strong" party identification or a "not very strong" identification, thus leaving out those who stated they were independent, but leaned towards one party.

Ideologue—Binary indicator for an individual identifying as moderate (0) or at least some liberal or conservative attachment (1). The "1" category includes those who expressed themselves as "slightly" liberal/conservative, thus leaving out only those who stated they were moderate.

Gender—Self-identification of the respondent's gender as male (0) or female (1).

Age group—Twelve categories, scaled to run from 18–20 (0) to 75 or older (1).

Political knowledge scale—Constructed from four questions, where 0 is the incorrect answer and 1 is the correct answer. These are then added together and rescaled to run from no correct answers (0) to four correct answers (1). Below are the specific questions.

For how many years is a United States senator elected—that is, how many years are there in one full term of office for a US senator? Correct answer: 6.

On which of the following does the US federal government currently spend the least [Foreign Aid, Medicare, National Defense, Social Security]? Correct answer: Foreign Aid.

Do you happen to know which party currently has the most members in the US House of Representatives in Washington? Correct answer: Republicans.

Do you happen to know which party currently has the most members in the US Senate? Correct answer: Republicans.

Religiosity—Binary indicator for an individual indicating that religion is not an important part of their life (0) or is an important part of their life (1).

1964 ANES—Tables E5.3 to E5.4 and Table F5.7

Dependent Variable

Voting—Binary indicator for an individual self-reporting to have not voted in the 1964 election (0) or to have voted in the 1964 election (1).

Participation scale—Scale composed of five different participatory acts an individual could have engaged in. These are all binary indicators and include: (1) going to a political meeting, rallies, speeches, or dinners, (2) wearing a campaign button, putting a campaign sticker on their car, placing a sign in their car or in front of their house, (3) working for a party or candidate, (4) contributing money to a campaign, or (5) contacting a US representative or senator. These are added together to run from engaging in none of these acts (0) to engaging in all of these acts (5).

Political Avoidance—Coded as 0 if an individual engaged in one or more of the acts listed above in the participation scale or voted. Coded as 1 if an individual engaged in none of these acts.

Key Independent Variables

Race—Self-identification of the respondent's racial identity as a person of color (0) or white (1). People of color include individuals who identified as black, American Indian or Alaska Native, Asian, Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander, or Hispanic.

Political Trust—Based on respondent's answer to the question: *How often can you trust the federal government in Washington to do what is right?* Scale includes: None of the time (0), Some of the time (.33), Most of the time (.66), and Just about always (1).

Control Variables

Party Identification—Seven categories, scaled to run from strong Democrat (0) to strong Republican (1).

Ideology—Feeling thermometer rating where individuals placed themselves between 0 (Most Liberal) and 100 (Most Conservative).

Gender—Self-identification of the respondent's gender as male (0) or female (1).

Age group—Seven categories, scaled to run from 17–24 (0) to 75 or older (1).

Income groups—Five categories, scaled to run from being in an income group between the 0 and 16th percentile (0) to being between the 96th and 100th percentile (1).

Education—Seven categories, scaled to run from “8 grades or less” (0) to “Advanced degrees” (1).

Chapter 6—Tables E6.1 to E6.5 and Table F6.1

Key Variables

Black Lives Matter Feeling Thermometer—Response to how people would rate BLM on a feeling thermometer running from 0 to 100, rescaled to run from most negative (0) to most positive (1).

Police Discrimination—Respondents were first asked if they felt the police treated whites better than Blacks, treated the two racial groups the same, or treated Blacks better than whites. For those who indicated they believed whites were treated better, they were then asked how much better: much better, moderately better, or a little better. This scale combines these two questions. In doing so, the coding runs from those who thought the police treated Blacks the same or better than whites (0), those who thought whites were treated a little better (.33), those who thought whites were treated moderately better (.67), and those who thought whites were treated much better (1).

Voting—Binary indicator for an individual self-reporting to have not voted in the 2016 election (0) or to have voted in the 2016 election (1).

Participation scale—Scale composed of five different participatory acts an individual could have engaged in. These are all binary indicators and include: (1) going to a political meeting, rallies, speeches, or dinners, (2) wearing a campaign button, putting a campaign sticker on their car, placing a sign in their car or in front of their house, (3) working for a party or candidate, (4) contributing money to a campaign, or (5) contacting a US representative or senator. These are added together to run from engaging in none of these acts (0) to engaging in all these acts (5).

Political Avoidance—Coded as 0 if an individual engaged in one or more of the acts listed above in the participation scale or voted. Coded as 1 if an individual engaged in none of these acts.

Protest Participation—Binary indicator for an individual joining in a protest march in the past twelve months. Coded as 1 if an individual did protest and 0 if they did not.

Political Trust—Based on respondent’s answer to the question: *How often can you trust the federal government in Washington to do what is right?* Scale includes: Never (0), Some of the time (.25), About half of the time (.5), Most of the time (.75), and Always (1).

Race—Self-identification of the respondent’s racial identity as a person of color (0) or white (1). People of color include individuals who identified as black, American Indian or Alaska Native, Asian, Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander, or Hispanic.

Control Variables

Partisan—Binary indicator for an individual expressing no party attachment (0) or at least some party attachment (1). The “1” category includes those who expressed either a “strong” party identification or a “not very strong” identification, thus leaving out those who stated they were independent, but leaned towards one party.

Ideologue—Binary indicator for an individual identifying as moderate (0) or at least some liberal or conservative attachment (1). The “1” category includes those who expressed themselves as “slightly” liberal/conservative, thus leaving out only those who stated they were moderate.

Party Identification—Seven categories, scaled to run from strong Democrat (0) to strong Republican (1).

Ideology—Seven categories, scaled to run from extremely liberal (0) to extremely conservative (1).

Gender—Self-identification of the respondent’s gender as male (0) or female (1).

Age group—Twelve categories, scaled to run from 18–20 (0) to 75 or older (1).

Income groups—Twenty-eight categories, scaled to run from under \$5,000 (0) to more than \$250,000 (1).

Education—Thirteen categories, scaled to run from “Less than 1st grade” (0) to “Doctorate degree” (1).

Political knowledge scale—Constructed from four questions, where 0 is the incorrect answer and 1 is the correct answer. These are then added together and rescaled to run from no correct answers (0) to four correct answers (1). Below are the specific questions.

For how many years is a United States senator elected—that is, how many years are there in one full term of office for a US senator? Correct answer: 6.

On which of the following does the US federal government currently spend the least [Foreign Aid, Medicare, National Defense, Social Security]? Correct answer: Foreign Aid.

Do you happen to know which party currently has the most members in the US House of Representatives in Washington? Correct answer: Republicans.

Do you happen to know which party currently has the most members in the US Senate? Correct answer: Republicans.

Religiosity—Binary indicator for an individual indicating that religion is not an important part of their life (0) or is an important part of their life (1).

Appendix E

Full Table Results

Tables from Chapter 2

TABLE E2.1. Likelihood of Benefitting from Submerged Government Policies

	Model E2.11 All Submerged Policies	Model E2.12 Submerged Means tested Policies	Model E2.13 Submerged Universal Policies
White	0.141 (0.11)	-0.043 (0.05)	0.184* (0.09)
Income	1.872*** (0.16)	-0.094 (0.06)	1.967*** (0.13)
Age	-1.008*** (0.22)	-0.560*** (0.08)	-0.448* (0.17)
Female	0.137 (0.09)	0.080* (0.04)	0.056 (0.08)
Education	1.572*** (0.18)	0.277*** (0.07)	1.295*** (0.15)
Party ID	-0.014 (0.11)	-0.053 (0.04)	0.039 (0.09)
Constant	1.307*** (0.19)	0.608*** (0.07)	0.698*** (0.15)
Observations	1177	1177	1177
Method	OLS	OLS	OLS
R ²	.31	.07	.38

Source: SGIP.

[^]p < .1; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.

Standard errors in parentheses. Significance tests are two-tailed. Survey weights provided by the SGIP are employed. Universal submerged programs include the HMID, employer-subsidized health insurance, employer-subsidized retirement benefits, the Child and Dependent Care Tax Credit, 529 plans, Coverdell Education Savings Account, and student loans. Means-tested submerged programs are the EITC and the Hope and Lifetime Learning Tax Credits.

Tables from Chapter 3**TABLE E3.1. Relationship between Limited Government Support and Police Attitudes across Racial Groups**

	Model E3.11 Support for Limited Government, Controlling for Race	Model E3.12 Support for Limited Government across Race
Police Attitudes	1.183 (0.29)	0.619 (0.23)
White x Police Attitudes		3.057* (1.47)
White	2.164*** (0.26)	0.983 (0.36)
Party ID	1.183 (0.16)	1.200 (0.16)
Ideology	4.908*** (0.66)	4.786*** (0.64)
Female	0.677*** (0.07)	0.670*** (0.07)
Age	1.601* (0.30)	1.556* (0.29)
Income	1.262 (0.24)	1.266 (0.24)
Education	1.874 (0.77)	1.871 (0.78)
Political Knowledge	1.349^ (0.24)	1.372^ (0.24)
Religiosity	0.989 (0.11)	0.975 (0.11)
Constant	0.084*** (.03)	0.132*** (.05)
Observations	3,144	3,144
Method	Logistic Regression	Logistic Regression
Pseudo R ²	0.15	0.15

Source: 2016 ANES.

^p < .1; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. Coefficients provided are odds ratios. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance tests are two-tailed. Survey weights provided by the ANES are employed.

Tables from Chapter 4

TABLE E4.1. Political Trust and Welfare Spending Attitudes

	Model E4.11 Political Trust and Welfare Attitudes, Controlling for Race	Model E4.12 Political Trust and Welfare Attitudes across Race
White	-0.071*** (0.01)	-0.097*** (0.02)
Welfare Attitudes	0.040** (0.01)	-0.001 (0.03)
White x Welfare Attitudes		0.062* (0.03)
Party ID	-0.017 (0.01)	-0.016 (0.01)
Ideology	-0.075*** (0.01)	-0.073*** (0.01)
Female	0.000 (0.01)	0.000 (0.01)
Age	0.005 (0.02)	0.006 (0.02)
Income	0.012 (0.02)	0.012 (0.02)
Education	-0.004 (0.04)	-0.006 (0.04)
Political Knowledge	-0.017 (0.02)	-0.017 (0.02)
Religiosity	0.015 (0.01)	0.016 (0.01)
Constant	0.438*** (0.03)	0.456*** (0.04)
Observations	3,845	3,845
Method	OLS	OLS
R ²	0.06	0.06

Source: 2016 ANES.

[^]p < .1; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance tests are two-tailed. Survey weights provided by the ANES are employed.

TABLE E4.2. Political Trust and Government Spending Attitudes

	Model E4.21 Political Trust and Government Spending, Controlling for Race	Model E4.22 Political Trust and Government Spending across Race
White	-0.061*** (0.01)	-0.122*** (0.03)
Government Spending Attitudes	0.099*** (0.02)	0.024 (0.04)
White x Government Spending Attitudes		0.111* (0.05)
Party ID	-0.002 (0.01)	-0.002 (0.01)
Ideology	-0.072*** (0.02)	-0.066*** (0.02)
Female	-0.011 (0.01)	-0.011 (0.01)
Age	0.009 (0.02)	0.009 (0.02)
Income	0.005 (0.02)	0.003 (0.02)
Education	0.014 (0.04)	0.012 (0.04)
Political Knowledge	-0.018 (0.02)	-0.015 (0.02)
Religiosity	0.007 (0.01)	0.009 (0.01)
Constant	0.383*** (0.04)	0.424*** (0.05)
Observations	3,425	3,425
Method	OLS	OLS
R ²	0.08	0.08

Source: 2016 ANES.

[^]p < .1; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance tests are two-tailed. Survey weights provided by the ANES are employed.

TABLE E4.3. Political Trust and Police Attitudes

	Model E4.31 Political Trust and Police Attitudes, Controlling for Race	Model E4.32 Political Trust and Police Attitudes across Races	Model E4.33 Political Trust and Police Attitudes across Races for Only Those Lacking CLS Contact
White	-0.087*** (0.01)	-0.016 (0.04)	0.046 (0.05)
Police Attitudes	0.085** (0.03)	0.142*** (0.04)	0.167** (0.06)
White x Police Attitudes		-0.101* (0.05)	-0.171* (0.07)
Party ID	-0.022 (0.01)	-0.023 (0.01)	-0.020 (0.02)
Ideology	-0.096*** (0.01)	-0.093*** (0.01)	-0.104*** (0.02)
Female	-0.001 (0.01)	0.000 (0.01)	-0.004 (0.01)
Age	-0.004 (0.02)	-0.001 (0.02)	0.018 (0.02)
Income	0.001 (0.02)	0.001 (0.02)	0.007 (0.02)
Education	-0.009 (0.04)	-0.008 (0.04)	-0.030 (0.06)
Political Knowledge	-0.014 (0.02)	-0.015 (0.02)	-0.016 (0.02)
Religiosity	0.012 (0.01)	0.013 (0.01)	0.008 (0.01)
Constant	0.430*** (0.04)	0.390*** (0.04)	0.387*** (0.06)
Observations	3,779	3,779	1,991
Method	OLS	OLS	OLS
R ²	0.07	0.07	0.07

Source: 2016 ANES.

[^]p < .1; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance tests are two-tailed. Survey weights provided by the ANES are employed.

TABLE E4.4. Political Trust and Police Attitudes in 1966

	Model E4.41 Political Trust and Police Attitudes, Controlling for Race	Model E4.42 Political Trust and Police Attitudes across Race
White	-0.032 (0.02)	-0.182 [^] (0.10)
Police Attitudes	0.178 ^{***} (0.04)	0.012 (0.11)
White x Police Attitudes		0.189 [^] (0.12)
Party ID	-0.129 ^{***} (0.02)	-0.130 ^{***} (0.02)
Ideology	-0.001 (0.00)	-0.001 (0.00)
Female	-0.006 (0.01)	-0.006 (0.01)
Age	-0.112 ^{***} (0.03)	-0.111 ^{***} (0.03)
Income	-0.022 (0.03)	-0.021 (0.03)
Education	0.026 (0.03)	0.025 (0.03)
Constant	0.641 ^{***} (0.05)	0.768 ^{***} (0.09)
Observations	1,148	1,148
Method	OLS	OLS
R ²	0.08	0.08

Source: 1966 ANES.

[^]p < .1; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance tests are two-tailed. Survey weights provided by the ANES are employed.

Tables from Chapter 5

TABLE E5.1. Relationship between Political Trust and Participation

	Model E5.13			
	Model E5.11 Turnout	Model E5.12 Partic. Scale	Political Invisibility	Model E5.14 Protest
White	1.188 (0.19)	0.929 (0.09)	0.880 (0.15)	0.756 (0.19)
Political Trust	0.729 (0.23)	1.351 (0.29)	1.329 (0.46)	1.716 (0.84)
Partisan	1.813*** (0.25)	1.152 (0.10)	0.657** (0.10)	1.237 (0.40)
Ideologue	1.345* (0.20)	1.435*** (0.15)	0.721* (0.11)	1.867 [^] (0.60)
Female	1.112 (0.16)	0.946 (0.08)	0.835 (0.13)	1.283 (0.32)
Age	4.674*** (1.17)	1.145 (0.18)	0.230*** (0.06)	0.150*** (0.08)
Income	2.621*** (0.67)	0.832 (0.14)	0.497* (0.14)	0.537 (0.28)
Education	5.088** (2.81)	3.203*** (1.10)	0.265* (0.15)	2.881 (4.12)
Political Knowledge	2.070** (0.52)	2.211*** (0.36)	0.460** (0.12)	2.098 (1.25)
Religiosity	1.071 (0.16)	0.825* (0.07)	1.041 (0.17)	0.601* (0.14)
Constant	.196*** (0.08)	-2.339*** (0.27)	2.472* (1.09)	0.021*** (0.02)
Observations	3563	3498	3498	3790
Method	Logistic Regression	Negative Binomial	Logistic Regression	Logistic Regression
Pseudo <i>R</i> ²	0.11	0.03	0.08	0.05

Source: 2016 ANES.

[^]p < .1; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. All coefficients are exponentiated. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance tests are two-tailed. Survey weights provided by the ANES are employed.

TABLE E5.2. Racially Contingent Relationship between Political Trust and Participation

	Model E5.23			
	Model E5.21 Turnout	Model E5.22 Partic. Scale	Political Invisibility	Model E5.24 Protest
White	2.215** (0.62)	1.362 (0.28)	0.448** (0.14)	0.726 (0.34)
Political Trust	1.833 (0.84)	2.442* (0.98)	0.489 (0.25)	1.623 (1.27)
Political Trust x White	0.194** (0.12)	0.383* (0.17)	5.850* (4.13)	1.107 (1.08)
Partisan	1.824*** (0.25)	1.151 (0.10)	0.654** (0.10)	1.237 (0.40)
Ideologue	1.309^ (0.19)	1.420*** (0.15)	0.744^ (0.12)	1.869^ (0.60)
Female	1.108 (0.15)	0.953 (0.08)	0.838 (0.13)	1.282 (0.32)
Age	4.804*** (1.21)	1.158 (0.18)	0.223*** (0.06)	0.150*** (0.08)
Income	2.674*** (0.68)	0.836 (0.14)	0.490* (0.14)	0.537 (0.27)
Education	5.616** (3.07)	3.445*** (1.19)	0.238* (0.14)	2.860 (4.17)
Political Knowledge	2.026** (0.52)	2.203*** (0.36)	0.471** (0.13)	2.100 (1.26)
Religiosity	1.033 (0.15)	0.807** (0.07)	1.086 (0.17)	0.602* (0.14)
Constant	.129*** (0.06)	-2.64*** (0.31)	3.858** (1.81)	0.022*** (0.02)
Observations	3563	3498	3498	3790
Method	Logistic Regression	Negative Binomial	Logistic Regression	Logistic Regression
Pseudo R ²	0.11	0.03	0.09	0.05

Source: 2016 ANES.

^p < .1; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. All coefficients are exponentiated. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance tests are two-tailed. Survey weights provided by the ANES are employed.

TABLE E5.3. Relationship between Political Trust and Participation, 1964

	Model E5.11 Turnout	Model E5.12 Partic. Scale	Model E5.13 Political Invisibility
White	1.405 [^] (0.27)	0.920 (0.12)	0.816 (0.17)
Political Trust	0.909 (0.32)	0.753 (0.14)	1.178 (0.44)
Partisan	2.042*** (0.31)	1.525*** (0.15)	0.504*** (0.08)
Ideologue	0.786 (0.16)	1.647*** (0.15)	1.140 (0.26)
Female	0.889 (0.13)	1.011 (0.07)	1.223 (0.19)
Age	5.234*** (1.64)	1.205 (0.18)	0.228*** (0.08)
Income	3.888*** (1.11)	2.173*** (0.31)	0.250*** (0.07)
Education	4.420*** (1.47)	4.115*** (0.54)	0.186*** (0.07)
Constant	.33** (0.13)	-0.186 (0.72)	1.818 (0.74)
Observations	1,353	1,353	1,363
Method	Logistic Regression	Poisson Regression	Logistic Regression
Pseudo R ²	0.09	0.06	0.09

Source: 1964 ANES.

[^]p < .1; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. All coefficients are exponentiated. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance tests are two-tailed. Survey weights provided by the ANES are employed.

TABLE E5.4. Racially Contingent Relationship between Political Trust and Participation, 1964

	Model E5.41 Turnout	Model E5.42 Partic. Scale	Model E5.43 Political Invisibility
White			
	0.765 (0.49)	0.869 (0.36)	1.658 (1.22)
Political Trust	0.419 (0.35)	0.694 (0.41)	2.870 (2.75)
Political Trust x White	2.527 (2.34)	1.095 (0.68)	0.344 (0.36)
Partisan	2.035*** (0.31)	1.524*** (0.15)	0.507*** (0.08)
Ideologue	0.793 (0.16)	1.648*** (0.15)	1.128 (0.25)
Female	0.886 (0.13)	1.011 (0.07)	1.229 (0.19)
Age	5.266*** (1.65)	1.206 (0.18)	0.226*** (0.08)
Income	3.872*** (1.11)	2.172*** (0.31)	0.252*** (0.08)
Education	4.392*** (1.46)	4.112*** (0.54)	0.187*** (0.07)
Constant	.552 (0.35)	-1.735*** (0.42)	0.994 (0.69)
Observations	1,353	1,353	1,363
Method	Logistic Regression	Poisson Regression	Logistic Regression
Pseudo R ²	0.09	0.06	0.09

Source: 1964 ANES.

[^]p < .1; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. All coefficients are exponentiated. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance tests are two-tailed. Survey weights provided by the ANES are employed.

Tables from Chapter 6

TABLE E6.1. Relationship between Police Discrimination and Black Lives Matter Support

	Model E6.1
White	-0.151*** (0.02)
Police Discrimination	0.242*** (0.02)
Party ID	-0.057*** (0.02)
Ideology	-0.194*** (0.02)
Female	0.064*** (0.01)
Age	-0.019 (0.02)
Education	-0.054 (0.04)
Income	-0.042^ (0.02)
Political Knowledge	-0.027 (0.02)
Religiosity	0.008 (0.01)
Constant	0.671*** (0.04)
Observations	3717
Method	OLS Regression
R ²	0.35

Source: 2016 ANES.

^p < .1; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance tests are two-tailed. Survey weights provided by the ANES are employed.

TABLE E6.2. Relationship between Black Lives Matter Support and Political Participation

	Model E6.23			
	Model E6.21 Turnout	Model E6.22 Partic. Scale	Political Invisibility	Model E6.24 Protest
White	1.360 [^] (0.23)	1.018 (0.10)	0.811 (0.15)	1.182 (0.35)
Black Lives Matter Support	1.713* (0.40)	1.630*** (0.23)	0.657 [^] (0.16)	13.009*** (7.68)
Political Trust	0.653 (0.22)	1.155 (0.26)	1.477 (0.54)	0.857 (0.47)
Partisan	1.804*** (0.26)	1.132 (0.10)	0.648** (0.10)	1.128 (0.36)
Ideologue	1.378* (0.21)	1.448*** (0.15)	0.715* (0.12)	1.827 [^] (0.59)
Female	1.089 (0.16)	0.901 (0.08)	0.854 (0.13)	0.997 (0.25)
Age	4.806*** (1.22)	1.219 (0.19)	0.214*** (0.06)	0.192** (0.10)
Education	6.345** (3.68)	3.002** (1.02)	0.226* (0.13)	2.575 (3.80)
Income	2.613*** (0.68)	0.855 (0.14)	0.481** (0.13)	0.594 (0.31)
Political Knowledge	1.978** (0.50)	2.151*** (0.35)	0.482** (0.13)	1.909 (1.16)
Religiosity	1.095 (0.17)	0.878 (0.07)	0.996 (0.16)	0.744 (0.18)
Constant	-2.097*** (0.46)	-2.584*** (0.27)	1.282** (0.47)	-5.385*** (1.01)
Observations	3465	3740	3459	3746
Method	Logistic Regression	Negative Binomial	Logistic Regression	Logistic Regression
Pseudo R ²	0.11	0.03	0.09	0.10

Source: 2016 ANES.

[^]p < .1; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. All coefficients are exponentiated. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance tests are two-tailed. Survey weights provided by the ANES are employed.

TABLE E6.3. Relationship between Political Trust and Political Participation across Levels of Black Lives Matter Support among Whites

	Model E6.33			
	Model E6.31 Turnout	Model E6.32 Partic. Scale	Political Invisibility	Model E6.34 Protest
Black Lives Matter Support	1.283 (0.58)	0.903 (0.20)	0.925 (0.46)	13.305** (10.78)
Political Trust	0.597 (0.35)	0.464* (0.15)	1.862 (1.17)	0.055 (0.10)
BLM Support x Political Trust	0.676 (0.75)	3.871* (2.23)	0.993 (1.19)	9.007 (21.24)
Partisan	1.465* (0.22)	1.100 (0.09)	0.783 (0.13)	1.497 (0.46)
Ideologue	1.619** (0.25)	1.517*** (0.14)	0.555*** (0.09)	1.743 (0.67)
Female	1.225 (0.18)	0.926 (0.07)	0.750^ (0.12)	1.075 (0.30)
Age	5.433*** (1.42)	1.558** (0.21)	0.196*** (0.06)	0.429^ (0.21)
Education	10.987*** (6.66)	3.319*** (1.09)	0.118** (0.08)	6.304 (7.58)
Income	2.934*** (0.78)	1.077 (0.16)	0.491* (0.14)	0.552 (0.27)
Political Knowledge	2.342** (0.62)	2.042*** (0.30)	0.397** (0.11)	1.552 (0.79)
Religiosity	1.126 (0.17)	0.772** (0.06)	0.964 (0.16)	0.689 (0.19)
Constant	0.105*** (0.05)	-2.521*** (0.27)	4.835** (2.53)	0.002*** (0.002)
Observations	2111	2283	2108	2286
Method	Logistic Regression	Negative Binomial	Logistic Regression	Logistic Regression
Pseudo R ²	0.11	0.04	0.09	0.14

Source: 2016 ANES.

^p < .1; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. All coefficients are exponentiated. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance tests are two-tailed.

TABLE E6.4. Relationship between Political Trust and Political Participation across Levels of Black Lives Matter Support among People of Color

	Model E6.43			
	Model E6.41 Turnout	Model E6.42 Partic. Scale	Political Invisibility	Model E6.44 Protest
Black Lives Matter Support	0.985 (0.59)	0.974 (0.41)	0.958 (0.60)	48.182** (67.73)
Political Trust	0.229 (0.23)	0.536 (0.38)	2.817 (2.91)	134.514* (274.32)
BLM Support x Political Trust	11.547^ (15.62)	3.986 (3.62)	0.113 (0.16)	0.002* (0.006)
Partisan	2.474*** (0.51)	1.108 (0.18)	0.448*** (0.10)	1.107 (0.41)
Ideologue	1.115 (0.23)	1.296^ (0.20)	1.018 (0.23)	1.232 (0.44)
Female	0.986 (0.20)	0.949 (0.14)	0.956 (0.21)	1.074 (0.38)
Age	4.731*** (1.86)	1.741* (0.47)	0.261** (0.11)	0.152** (0.11)
Education	2.154 (1.55)	2.063 (1.12)	0.923 (0.72)	2.518 (3.29)
Income	3.776*** (1.44)	0.845 (0.24)	0.251*** (0.10)	0.798 (0.49)
Political Knowledge	1.912^ (0.72)	1.852* (0.50)	0.485^ (0.20)	0.940 (0.60)
Religiosity	0.881 (0.20)	1.094 (0.18)	1.180 (0.28)	1.150 (0.44)
Constant	0.293^ (0.22)	-2.286*** (0.51)	1.552 (1.13)	0.002*** (0.003)
Observations	732	835	729	838
Method	Logistic Regression	Negative Binomial	Logistic Regression	Logistic Regression
Pseudo R ²	0.11	0.02	0.09	0.07

Source: 2016 ANES.

^p < .1; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. All coefficients are exponentiated. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance tests are two-tailed.

TABLE E6.5. Relationship between Political Trust and Police Attitudes across Levels of Black Lives Matter Support

	Model E6.51 Political Trust among Whites	Model E6.52 Political Trust among People of Color
Police Attitudes	-0.038 (0.04)	0.005 (0.07)
Black Lives Matter Support	-0.016 (0.05)	-0.027 (0.07)
Police Attitudes x Black Lives Matter Support	0.245*** (0.06)	0.248** (0.10)
Party ID	-0.012 (0.01)	-0.034 (0.02)
Ideology	-0.061*** (0.01)	-0.056* (0.02)
Female	-0.009 (0.01)	0.005 (0.02)
Age	0.005 (0.02)	0.010 (0.03)
Education	0.088* (0.03)	-0.124* (0.06)
Income	0.015 (0.02)	0.029 (0.03)
Political Knowledge	-0.020 (0.02)	-0.029 (0.03)
Religiosity	0.005 (0.01)	0.049** (0.02)
Constant	0.274*** (0.04)	0.420*** (0.07)
Observations	2283	836
Method	OLS Regression	OLS Regression
R ²	.12	.10

Source: 2016 ANES.

[^]p < .1; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance tests are two-tailed.

Notes

Chapter 1

1. Values presented in 2010 dollars. Data source: the Joint Committee on Taxation's "Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures." Data for 1967 come from the 1967–1971 report, while data for 2010 come from the 2010–2014 report.

2. Following the work of other scholars (e.g., Terwiel 2020), I use the term "criminal legal" in place of the more commonly used "criminal justice" to challenge the assumption that the current system delivers justice.

3. Throughout the book, I use the term "people of color" to refer to individuals who do not identify as white. As noted in many places in subsequent chapters, placing the dividing line between whites and people of color obviously conflates different racial and ethnic groups within the broader category of people of color. A detailed discussion of the decision to focus on this divide is provided in chapters 3 and 7, but it is worth noting here that while this boundary placement obscures important differences, it is intended as a first step toward a more nuanced understanding of social variation in government visibility that I hope future scholars will build on. In places where I am speaking of actions that more specifically impact a particular racial group within the broader category of people of color (e.g., Black people, Latinx people), I refer to that specific racial category. I also recognize that there is a debate over the use of the term "people of color" as opposed to alternatives such as BIPOC (Black, Indigenous, and People of Color). Ultimately, I made the decision to use "people of color" instead of BIPOC due to concerns about the BIPOC term (Deo 2021).

4. In contrast to many of the dominant political trust studies overlooking race, several race and ethnic politics (REP) scholars have explicitly demonstrated how political distrust among Black Americans differs from white distrust in terms of its levels, roots, and consequences (Avery 2006, 2009; Nunnally 2012; Wilkes 2011). This research provides crucial context for this book and is built on through an

incorporation of the carceral state scholarship, as will be explained in greater detail in chapters 3 and 4.

5. Data taken from the Pew Research Center Report on “Trust in Government by Race and Ethnicity.” Full report available at <https://www.people-press.org/chart/trust-in-government-by-race-and-ethnicity/>.

6. Voter turnout statistics come from the United States Election Project. Voter turnout for all national elections can be found at <http://www.electproject.org/national-1789-present>.

7. In general, I focus on political participation as it relates to the electoral process (e.g., voting, engaging in campaign work, etc.). I recognize that this choice excludes important forms of participation that take place outside the electoral arena (e.g., protesting). A more detailed discussion of this scope condition is provided in chapters 5 and 6.

8. These findings build on recent scholarship showing similar racial contingencies in the participatory impact of anger (Phoenix 2019) but differs from this analysis in focusing on the concept of distrust and the parts of the state to which that distrust is attached.

9. In keeping with extant policy feedback scholarship, I use the term “policy” in this framework to refer to interactions with government, writ large. For example, the concept of policy feedback is frequently used in describing the downstream consequences of indirect and direct contact with the CLS (e.g., Walker 2020a; Weaver and Lerman 2010). While these encounters with the police likely involve a number of separate of policies and practices, as opposed to contact with an isolated social welfare policy, the term policy feedback is still used to capture how these interactions with government shape subsequent political understandings.

10. Treating state markings on uniforms as a kind of policy design is in line with scholarship on the importance of this type of visibility for generating strong policy feedback effects (Weaver and Lerman 2010).

11. My emphasis on race is not intended to discount the existence of differences in government visibility across other social dimensions, or intersectional schisms that might exist. Indeed, it is my hope that scholars will apply this framework to social gaps beyond race, thus providing an even more comprehensive understanding of American government visibility. Chapter 7 will cover some of these other social differences in government visibility in greater detail, but a proper treatment of dimensions beyond race lies outside the scope of this analysis.

12. The full interview protocol is available in Appendix A. This appendix also contains the postinterview survey given to each interviewee.

13. One concern with my approach to interviews is the risk of people consistently mentioning a specific part of government not because of its visibility in their life but rather because it is easier to return to a state entity that was brought up earlier in the interview. To steer people away from this form of artificial fixation, I asked questions containing oppositions (e.g., what is an area you think government is too involved and what is an area you would like to see government more involved). In addition, when asking questions about parts of government that people felt exemplified an attitude they held, I pushed interviewees to provide multiple examples to keep them from becoming artificially focused on one part of the state. Ultimately, the most important check on this concern was the consistency with

which *different* interviewees brought up the same parts of government, as well as the racially patterned nature of this consistency.

14. In this interpretive methodology, I use the interview data to analyze the weight being placed on specific parts of the state as people explain their political understandings, which is not to be confused with a more positivist approach that might rely on a simple quantitative counting of the parts of the state people mention. Where a counting procedure might suggest the two people who mention a policy several times similarly rely on that policy in constructing their political attitudes and behaviors, an interpretive approach digs beneath these mentions to analyze the role the policy plays in forming those individuals' sets of beliefs (Lin 1998). More detail on my data analysis process is provided in Appendix C.

15. While I believe that the trust I built with my interviewees was a strength of this project, I am aware of the potential for interviewer bias, meaning that subjects would not share something with me because of my identity. As will be shown in the next chapter, my interview data suggest that many of my white interviewees were more inclined to discuss particular issues (e.g., “our” shared tax burden) because of my own white identity. This note highlights that interviewer bias is ultimately less about eliminating systematic bias and more about understanding “how it works and what it tells us” (Lin 2000, 191). The role of interviewer bias is discussed in greater detail in Appendix C.

16. Beyond social variation, the motivation behind the selection of these particular sites had to do with access. More information about gaining access to each site and my initial trust-building process can be found in Appendix B.

17. Appendix C provides more detail for each of the interviewees, including the site from which they were recruited, their racial identity, and the date on which their interview was conducted.

18. Data available at <https://suzannemettler.weebly.com/data.html>.

Chapter 2

1. All interviewees are referred to using pseudonyms that they selected. “AJR” is used to refer to my own speech. All interviewees are also listed with their racial identity due to the emphasis placed on race within the analysis.

2. In David's case, his postinterview survey revealed his personal receipt of Medicare, college grants, student loans, and the HMID. Eric had benefitted from Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, a government pension, and the HMID.

3. Data on unemployment are taken from the Bureau of Labor Statistics and can be found at https://www.bls.gov/web/empsit/cpsee_e16.htm.

4. More information about the Social and Governmental Issues and Participation Study can be found in Appendix D.

5. In the SGIP, individuals were given the following prompt: *Speaking of government programs, I'd like to ask about your experience with several government policies over the course of your life. Could you tell me for each of the following if you personally have ever at any time received benefits or payments from any of the following social programs?* Following this prompt, individuals were asked about twenty-one different social programs. Individuals who indicated personal receipt were coded as 1, while those who indicated no receipt were coded as 0. As discussed in the main text, universal submerged programs include the HMID, employer subsidized-health

insurance, employer-subsidized retirement benefits, the Child and Dependent Care Tax Credit, 529 plans, Coverdell Education Savings Accounts, and student loans, while means-tested submerged programs are the EITC and the Hope and Lifetime Learning Tax Credits. This coding comes from Mettler's 2018 text, *The Government-Citizen Disconnect*. More information on variable coding can be found in Appendix D.

6. This survey refers to the Child and Dependent Care Tax Credit before it was briefly changed to a monthly deposit provided by the government through the American Rescue Plan (Rosenthal 2021). This policy change has implications for shifts in government visibility brought about by the COVID-19 pandemic, as will be discussed in greater detail in chapter 7.

7. These control variables are coded as follows: Party ID uses five categories, scaled to run from Democrat (0) to Republican (1). Female measures the self-identification of the respondent's gender as male (0) or female (1). Age captures the self-reported age of respondents and is scaled to run from 18 (0) to 92 (1). Income uses six categories, scaled to run from under \$20,000 (0) to more than \$100,000 (1). Finally, education uses five categories, scaled to run from "Less than High School" (0) to "Graduate degree" (1). More information on variable coding can be found in Appendix D.

8. Given that the number of policies one benefits from could also be classified as a count variable, table F2.1 in the online appendix (Appendix F) tests these same relationships using Poisson regression. The results are substantively identical.

9. According to postinterview surveys, Kyle had received Pell Grants, while Jane had received unemployment and the HMID.

10. In keeping with the theoretical framework, my focus in this chapter and the next is on the parts of government that are emphasized most by my interviewees, as well as the racial variation in these highlighted state entities. This focus allows me to elucidate people's locations of the state and the racial differences in these locations. Thus my analysis should not be taken to suggest that other parts of government were not mentioned during my interviews, but rather that they were not emphasized to the same degree and did not exhibit this same racial schism.

11. The spending attitudes toward welfare, social security, and environmental spending all come from the 2016 ANES, while the attitudes for food stamps are taken from the 2000 ANES because that is the last time this item was included.

12. Gilens (1999) conceptualizes the popular understanding of welfare as a subset of government assistance programs that share specific characteristics: benefits are means-tested, they are provided in cash or near-cash form, and are understood as assisting the working-age, able-bodied poor. Williamson follows the lead of her respondents in using welfare to mean "any income supplement program for low-income or unemployed people, including food assistance but excluding Social Security retirement benefits, education grants, and tax credits" (2017, 99).

13. The association between Black Americans and welfare is often referred to as the "racialization" of these policies (Berg 2001). In this book, I use the terminology of a changing racial valence, as opposed to racialization, to emphasize that poverty policies have long been associated with race in America but were once more associated with whiteness. For example, Mother's Pensions, a precursor to ADC, were perceived as a tool for supporting white mothers and preventing white children

from being placed into orphanages (Crenson 1998). From this perspective, poverty policies have a long history of being racialized in America, but not always in a way that led the public to perceive them negatively or to view the recipients as predominantly people of color.

14. Nixon quote from “Annual Message to Congress on the State of the Union, January 22, 1971,” Richard M. Nixon, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1971* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1972), 51. Trump quote taken from Lucey, Catherine, “Donald Trump wants welfare reform, says ‘people are taking advantage of the system,’” *PBS News Hour*, November 24, 2017.

15. “The President’s News Conference of August 6, 1977,” Jimmy Carter, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Jimmy Carter, 1977 (Book II—June 25 to December 31, 1977)* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1978), 1443.

16. Research similarly shows a history associating Indigenous people with the receipt of welfare, further valorizing whites as the only racial group not receiving benefits from this policy (Tan, Fujioka, and Lucht 1997).

17. White hostility toward welfare may also be more potent because it fits with evolutionary pressures that have made people particularly sensitive to the type of “fraud” embedded in stereotypes of the welfare program (Alford and Hibbing 2004). More intricately aligning this research with evolutionary psychology sits outside the scope of this book, but this connection provides a promising avenue for future research.

18. Several white interviewees appeared to cue off of my racial identity in using plural possessive pronouns, discussing “our” shared tax burden. This language highlights how interviewer bias works in both advantageous and disadvantageous ways (Lin 2000). White interviewees using this language show their comfort in revealing things that might not have surfaced for an interviewer of a different race. This advantage is matched by the disadvantage stemming from interviewees of color not invoking a similar sense of group consciousness, meaning that certain topics were assuredly obscured during my interviews with people of color. A more extended discussion of the role of race and interviewer bias can be found in Appendix C.

19. Public opinion on taxes taken from Gallup’s page on taxes. Found at <https://news.gallup.com/poll/1714/taxes.aspx>.

20. The irony of this understanding among whites is further compounded by the CLS’s use of fines and fees to extract money from communities of color in order to make up for funds lost to tax breaks for disproportionately white households. This irony will be covered in greater detail in the next chapter.

21. My theoretical framework makes reference to *Indirect Visibility* coming from third-party sources, noting that these sources may take the form of social networks or elite rhetoric. As seen throughout this chapter, my interviewees were clearly *Indirectly Exposed* to parts of the government through both of these mediums. Indeed, they often seemed to move fluidly between them, explaining their understanding of government by referencing stories from friends and aligning those stories with media narratives or speeches that they heard (Cramer and Toff 2017). Given this movement, it was difficult for me to tease out which third-party source had the greatest impact on government visibility. With that said, I recognize the importance of identifying the relative strength of these sources, as doing so

could provide insight as to how third-parties shape people’s political attitudes and behaviors. I hope that future research might do more to examine how people balance elite rhetoric and social network discussions in forming their understandings of indirectly encountered policies, and ultimately of government as a whole.

22. Notably, the association between being a taxpayer and whiteness, as well as the connection between welfare and people of color, are not made explicit in this quote, as is the case for many of the quotes in this section. Yet this absence of race must be contextualized within an understanding of explicit racial stereotypes as increasingly taboo (McConnell and Leibold 2001). Therefore while racial stereotypes provide the background for these understandings, they often function through biases that may not rise to the level of consciousness (Greenwald, McGhee, and Schwartz 1998). A significant amount of scholarship shows that race structures these understandings of welfare and taxation, even if it is not being explicitly invoked (e.g., Soss, Fording, and Schram 2011; Winter 2008).

23. This question (“what do you think politicians see when they look at you?”) is a variant on the one used by Hayward (2013), who asked individuals what they thought “other people” saw when they looked at them. Here I replaced her use of the phrase “other people” with “politicians,” in order to specifically elicit responses regarding one’s *political* identity.

Chapter 3

1. This racial breakdown of the stop-and-frisk data comes from the American Civil Liberties Union (New York chapter) and can be found at <https://www.nyclu.org/en/Stop-and-Frisk-data>.

2. To maintain the anonymity of the locations, and therefore of the interviewee, I have replaced the specific municipalities and roads mentioned by Mohamed with the first letter of the city, town, or street he named. This same strategy is used for interview data throughout the remainder of the book.

3. Data on state revenue from phone calls to the incarcerated are taken from the Prison Phone Justice website maintained by the Human Rights Defense Center. Data available at <https://www.prisonphonejustice.org/>.

4. Acknowledging this gender dynamic should not be used to diminish the growing number of incarcerated women of color. Female incarceration is growing at a much faster rate when compared to men (Sawyer 2018). In addition, this gender dynamic should also not erase the particular carceral hardships faced by trans, gender nonconforming, and intersex people of color (Vitulli 2013).

5. As discussed in chapter 6, there are reasons to think that social media may have played a larger role in shaping CLS visibility among whites during the summer 2020 protests, but research investigating this dynamic prior to 2020 suggests that social media did more to expand the visibility of the CLS for young people of color (Cohen and Luttig 2020).

6. Full transcript available at <https://www.politico.com/story/2016/07/full-transcript-donald-trump-nomination-acceptance-speech-at-rnc-225974>.

7. Again, Ideology and Party ID are coded so that higher values are more conservative/Republican. A full breakdown of the survey questions and coding included in this analysis is provided in Appendix D.

8. In keeping with the theoretical framework laid out in chapter 1, I make

no claim on causality in this statistical analysis. My suggestion is not that police attitudes predict attitudes on limited government, nor that support for limited government causes feelings about the police. The goal of this quantitative analysis is to partial out the *connection* between these two attitudes and see how this connection may function differently across racial groups.

9. More information about the choice to place the dividing line in visibility between whites and people of color is provided later in this chapter.

10. All figures for interaction terms in this book were created as predicted probability plots using the Margins package in STATA.

11. To clarify that this is a function of racial differences in government visibility and does not stem from variation in partisan feelings about the police and/or limited government, table F3.1 in the Online Appendix F includes an interaction in which race is replaced by party ID. In this case, the interaction term fails to reach significance, showing that there is no conditional impact of party attachment on the relationship between police attitudes and support for limited government.

12. Notably, this fifth policy trend of declining civil rights attention is distinct from the previous four, as I cannot capture it through my interviews or postinterview surveys. In this way, it differs from the bottom-up focus on policy visibility that drove my emphasis on the other four trends. Despite this contrast, I felt it was important to include this fifth policy trend to differentiate contemporary CLS visibility from the long history of policing that has its roots in the social control of, and violence against, Black populations (Kaba 2020; Reichel 1988). I argue that removing the federal government's visibility as a provider of civil rights serves as crucial background for understanding this unique form of contemporary CLS visibility, even if it is a policy trend that is difficult to capture through my interviews.

13. The CLS, taxes, and welfare were far from the only parts of government that surfaced during these interviews, with people occasionally mentioning entities like Social Security, the military, or the postal service. The motivation behind focusing on the CLS, taxes, and welfare is threefold. First, they were particularly salient throughout the interviews, reinforcing their role as people's locations of the state. Second, they were the clearest examples of socially patterned variation in the locations of the state that surfaced during my interviews, and thus they provided a crucial case for exploring the political implications of social variation in government visibility. Finally, related to this second point, an investigation into this division reveals the important role that social variation in government visibility can play in American politics, as will be shown in the next two chapters.

14. Full transcript of the speech available at <https://www.npr.org/2012/08/29/160282031/transcript-rep-paul-ryans-convention-speech>.

15. Though I generally found this racial distinction to be relatively sharp and consistent, I am not making the claim that all white interviewees saw government one way and all people of color saw it differently. Rather the boundaries of the contemporary dual visibility dynamic are blurry and somewhat porous (Fox and Guglielmo 2012). As Alba writes, when boundaries are blurred, people may be seen as “simultaneously members of the groups on both sides of the boundary or that sometimes they appear to be members of one and at other times members of the other” (2005, 25). In truth, the complicated history of race and class in America makes it difficult to ever completely disentangle the two, and this is made even

more complicated by considerations of ethnicity. For example, some impoverished whites may often see the state in ways more similar to people of color, while some middle- and upper-class people of color may experience a state visibility that resembles that of white Americans. This issue of boundary placement and crossing is considered in greater depth in chapter 7.

16. There are important exceptions to this focus on direct contact. Walker, along with other colleagues (e.g., Walker 2014, 2020a; Walker and García-Castañón 2017), has specifically devoted significant attention to the impact of indirect CLS contact on political life (see also Burch 2013; Mondak et al. 2017). Even here, however, the notion of indirect contact generally concerns those with a family member or loved one who has come into contact with the CLS, thus excluding those who only experience the CLS indirectly through social media or traditional media platforms. As such, the implications of the CLS visibility discussed here remain broader than its treatment in past studies.

17. Ultimately, as with any form of boundary construction, the duality I provide in this book illuminates certain divisions while obscuring others. I focus on race within this analysis because I found it to be the strongest cleavage among my interviewees, but this should not be taken as evidence that divisions in government visibility do not exist along other dimensions of social difference (e.g., gender, class, ethnicity, etc.), or that divisions do not work intersectionally (e.g., race/gender, class/immigration status, etc.). My hope is that because I show how a systematic approach to socially patterned variation in government visibility can work in one case (i.e., that of race), future scholars will analyze how similar visibility divisions work for other dimensions of social difference. This avenue for future scholarship is discussed in greater detail in chapter 7.

Chapter 4

1. Information on police car attacks on protestors can be found here: <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/07/us/bloomington-car-attack-protesters.html>. The video of police shooting a group on their front porch with paint bullets can be found here: <https://minnesota.cbslocal.com/2020/05/30/light-em-up-video-appears-to-show-law-enforcement-shooting-paint-rounds-at-citizens-on-their-porch/>. Video of police pepper spraying violinists: <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/video/2020/jun/29/elijah-mcclain-vigil-police-pepper-spray-violin-protest>. Video of police arresting compliant reporters here: <https://edition.cnn.com/2020/05/29/us/minneapolis-cnn-crew-arrested/index.html>.

2. The particular role played by the COVID-19 pandemic in sparking such widespread protests will be covered in greater detail in chapter 6, where I turn to pathways of disruption within this dual visibility dynamic.

3. Data for figure 4.1 came from several sources and were then put together into a moving average by the Pew Research Center. More information on these sources can be found at <https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2021/05/17/public-trust-in-government-1958-2021/>. The average of this moving average was taken in those years when several polls were administered, giving me greater confidence in the estimates provided.

4. Maya is a Latina interviewee from Site A. Maria is a white interviewee recruited from the fair. Chuck Wes is a Black interviewee from Site A.

5. More information on this interpretive data analysis process can be found in Appendix C.

6. Drawing on the theoretical framework, this analysis is about how the policy changes presented in the previous chapters caused racially patterned variation in government visibility, which in turn caused political attitudes to become linked to different parts of the state. I am not making claims about the causal relationship between attitudes (e.g., trust attitudes causing welfare attitudes or welfare attitudes causing trust attitudes), but rather the extent to which attitudes about particular parts of the state are associated with political trust, how this association varies across racial groups, and how this variation in associations has been caused by changes in government visibility. Thus I employ multivariate analysis as a tool for generating partial correlations between attitude associations, as well as the racial conditionalities within these partial correlations, rather than using it as a method for inferring causality.

7. Ultimately, this role of taxes within a question on trust makes it difficult to include an analysis focusing on racial contingencies in the relationship between taxes and trust. Therefore this chapter remains focused on the connection between welfare attitudes and white trust, despite the argument that both taxes and welfare serve as locations of the state for whites.

8. Furthermore, evidence suggests that Americans have become more likely to care and think about national politics, as opposed to state or local government (Hopkins 2018). Chapter 7 provides a more detailed discussion of the intersection between the findings from this book and American federalism.

9. Welfare attitudes are often measured using a “feeling thermometer” question for “people on welfare,” similar to the one used for policing in this analysis. I believe the spending item I employ actually presents a more conservative test for my purposes, as it does not allow for as much variation. Thus I would expect the findings presented here to hold when using a “people on welfare” feeling thermometer measure.

10. Each of the models that use this trust measure as the dependent variable are also run using ordinal logistic regression and produce substantively identical results. These models using ordinal logistic regression can be found in tables F4.1 to F4.3 in the Online Appendix F. I present the OLS results here for ease of interpretation.

11. Mirroring the dividing line within the dual visibility dynamic, race is again measured using a binary indicator of whiteness.

12. To ensure that the differences uncovered here do not stem from broader racial contingencies within trust attachments, table F4.4 in the Online Appendix F provides placebo tests. These results show that there are no racial contingencies within the relationships between political trust and Social Security, childcare, and environmental spending preferences, bolstering the particular role played by welfare.

13. Related to this investigation is an expectation of racial differences in the relationship between government spending preferences and welfare spending preferences. Table F4.5 in the Online Appendix F examines this expectation, showing that white spending preferences are much more closely associated with welfare spending attitudes when compared to this link among people of color.

14. See <https://mappingpoliceviolence.org> for more information and statistics about police killings.

15. Table F4.6 in Online Appendix F examines the possibility that the racial contingencies found here are merely reflections of partisan differences in the relationship between political trust and welfare/government spending/police attitudes. The interaction term between party ID and welfare, government spending, and police attitudes does not reach significance in this table, indicating that Republicans and Democrats do not vary in the associations held between trust in government and their attitudes on welfare, government spending, or the police. This finding bolsters my claim for the particular role played by race.

16. Data taken from the Bureau of Justice Statistics report “Prisoners 1925–81.” This report is available at <https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p2581.pdf>.

17. Due to differences in how questions were asked over time, there are a couple of changes between the 1966 models and those from 2016. First, both religiosity and political knowledge are not included because these questions were not asked in 1966. Second, ideology is measured using a feeling thermometer scale, where respondents had to place themselves between 0 (most liberal) and 100 (most conservative). This differs from the seven-point self-identification scale used in 2016. More information about the specific questions and coding for these variables can be found in Appendix D.

18. That the 1966 results show a larger substantive amount of racial variation in attitude associations when compared to 2016 but indicate a weaker level of statistical significance may point to a power issue coming from the relatively smaller number of observations. In particular, there were fewer than 150 people of color included in the 1966 models due to ANES sampling in that year, as compared to 1,200 people of color in 2016. As such, finding any level of statistical significance indicates just how large the racial variation is within these attitude associations.

19. Ultimately, an in-depth analysis of the relationship between police attitudes and political trust held by whites in the 1960s, as well as the electoral impact of this relationship, lies outside the scope of this book, but these results provide an interesting avenue for future research.

Chapter 5

1. While overtly discriminatory laws may be less tolerated today, I do not intend to downplay their existence or popularity, as exemplified by the preponderance of voter suppression laws. Instead I argue that the dual visibility dynamic functions in a subtler manner. This subtlety increases the importance of bringing this dynamic to the surface and revealing its impact.

2. In contrast to the previous chapter, this analysis posits a causal relationship. I argue that political trust has a causal effect on participation habits, while there is little reason to believe this relationship functions in reverse (i.e., participation habits effecting political trust).

3. Individuals are scored as ideologists if they self-identify as liberal or conservative (rather than moderate) and partisan if they identify as a strong or moderate Democrat/Republican (rather than independent or leaning Democrat/Republican). Specific coding for all questions is available in Appendix D.

4. The choice to use strength of partisan and ideological attachments is sup-

ported by their significance in several of the models included in this chapter. As a robustness check, table F5.1 in the Online Appendix F replaces the ideologue and partisan variables with party ID and ideology. The results for the racially contingent relationship between participation and trust are identical under this specification.

5. For example, an odds ratio of 0.85 indicates a 15 percent decline in the odds of the dependent variable taking on a value of 1, given the movement from the minimum to the maximum value on the independent variable, while an odds ratio of 1.15 represents a 15 percent increase in these odds. As such, any coefficient value under 1 can be interpreted as a negative association, while anything over 1 indicates a positive association.

6. Negative binomial regression is employed to deal with the overdispersion contained within the participatory scale variable. This overdispersion is revealed by the chi-square goodness of fit statistic when modeled using Poisson regression, as well as the alpha term generated by the negative binomial models.

7. To account for potential racial differences in mobilization efforts, table F5.2 in the Online Appendix F controls for the extent to which individuals were contacted by partisan or nonpartisan sources during the campaign. The results are substantively identical.

8. The overlapping 95 percent confidence intervals in figure 5.2 do not indicate a lack of significance in these interaction terms. The significance of the interaction term relates to the differences in the slopes of the lines.

9. Protest involvement is a difficult variable to include in statistical analysis due to the lack of variation on this measure. Only 115, or 3.3 percent, of 2016 ANES respondents indicated they had attended a protest in the previous twelve months. With that said, the similarity of the slopes in the lower-right panel of figure 5.2 does seem to indicate a different set of racial dynamics in the relationship between trust and this “unconventional” form of participation.

10. Tables F5.3 to F5.6 in the Online Appendix F examine the potential that the racial conditionality found here is masking the moderating effect of a different variable that has previously been cited as shaping the relationship between trust and participation. In particular, I analyze the moderating influence of party ID, income, education, and political efficacy. Almost none of these interactions reach statistical significance, suggesting that trust does not have a differential effect on participation across partisan lines, income levels, educational attainment, or feelings of political efficacy. These results bolster my argument’s specific emphasis on race. The one exception to this is the significant interaction term in the model looking at efficacy and the participatory scale. Finding agreement with some previous literature, this interaction shows that distrust is a mobilizing force for those with high efficacy, while those with lower efficacy are more likely to engage in multiple participatory acts when their trust levels are high. This specification may differ from the other models due to the greater motivational demands placed on individuals engaging in many of the acts included in this scale.

11. While 1964 does not align with the analysis of 1966 in chapter 4, I selected this year because the ANES included questions about participatory actions beyond voting, whereas the 1966 version did not. With that said, analysis from 1966 also shows that no racial contingency existed in the relationship between trust and voting at that time. These results can be found in table F5.7 in Appendix F.

12. As with the historical models from chapter 4, the 1964 analysis deviates from the 2016 models due to an absence of questions about political knowledge and religiosity, as well as a different measure of ideology. These differences are covered more extensively in chapter 4. In addition, the models for the participatory scale in 1964 use Poisson regression rather than negative binomial regression because the negative binomial models were unable to converge in STATA. Given how far the pertinent interaction term in Model E5.42 is from being significant ($p = .89$), I believe that it would remain insignificant if the model were run using negative binomial regression.

Chapter 6

1. Data on number of protest sites taken from <https://www.creosotemaps.com/blm2020/>.

2. The breadth of issues considered by BLM can be seen in the platform put together by the Movement for Black Lives, which range from reparations to community investment. This platform can be found at <https://m4bl.org/policy-platforms>.

3. To maintain consistency with the broader dual visibility dynamic, I keep the division within this chapter between whites and people of color. With that said, there are obvious reasons to believe that the political role of BLM has a different impact on non-Black people of color, given the movement's explicit focus on Black Americans.

4. This measure is somewhat similar to the one used by Walker (2020b) to capture feelings about institutional bias but is focused more specifically on the police due to the emphasis I place on CLS visibility. The full text and coding scheme for these questions is included in Appendix D.

5. As mentioned in chapter 5, statistical analysis of protest participation using the 2016 ANES presents some issues. In particular, the relatively low protest participation rate within the sample (3 percent) creates difficulties due to the lack of variation on the dependent variable. These issues are compounded when run within interactions split across racial groups, as is done in this chapter, because the cell sizes created by these interactions are quite small. While this approach makes any statistical significance found here more impressive due to the power issues inherent in the analysis, it also means the results must be seen as suggestive rather than conclusive. The language used in this section is designed to emphasize this suggestive nature of the results. As such, this analysis should be seen as a foundation for future research working with larger datasets and interview samples.

6. The survey weights provided by the ANES are designed to generate representativeness of the US population as a whole. As these models are run separately for whites and people of color, the ANES survey weights are not utilized.

7. Following convention, this graph measures BLM supporters as those one standard deviation above the mean on the BLM feeling thermometer and BLM opponents as those one standard deviation below the mean.

8. Due to the small cell sizes created by these interactions, the models produce odds ratios with very large coefficients and standard deviations. Ultimately, the figures, rather than the tables, provide the clearest illustration of the substantively important results included in this chapter.

9. Running an interaction between trust and BLM attitudes that is split across racial groups mirrors a three-way interaction between trust, BLM attitudes, and racial identity. I choose not to model this relationship in this manner due to concerns about how three-way interactions operate. Table F6.1 in Appendix F does provide these three-way interactions and lends greater support to the assertions made in this section. The three-way interaction between political trust, BLM attitudes, and race only reaches significance for protest participation, and not for any of the other three “conventional” forms of participation, including the participation scale. Again these results should be interpreted with caution due to the small cell sizes created by this type of interaction.

10. Given the distribution of trust attitudes and BLM attitudes among people of color, the cell sizes are particularly small at the higher end of the trust scale and lower end of the BLM feeling thermometer. The size of these cells and the correspondingly large error bands serve as another reminder of the need to be cautious in interpreting these results.

11. Running an interaction for both racial groups individually again mirrors a three-way interaction between police attitudes, BLM attitudes, and race. As discussed in the note above, I avoid three-way interactions due to concerns about how they operate. In addition, the three-way interaction in this case does not reach statistical significance as BLM support appears to shape the relationship between police attitudes and political trust in a statistically similar way for whites and people of color. As argued here, the more important racial distinction is substantive, not statistical.

12. While the interview evidence is suggestive, I do believe a more detailed investigation is needed to allow for stronger assertions of causality.

13. Statistics on mobile phone use and television consumption taken from <https://www.nielsen.com/us/en/insights/article/2020/covid-19-tracking-the-impact-on-media-consumption/>.

Chapter 7

1. The sketch can be seen in its entirety at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O7VaXlMvAvk>.

2. For more information on this initiative, see: <https://trustandjustice.org/>.

3. More information about the CAHOOTS program can be found at <https://whitebirdclinic.org/cahoots/>.

4. More information about the Common Justice program can be found at <https://www.commonjustice.org/>.

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