

Educated Youth and the Cultural Revolution in China

Martin Singer

**KENNETH G. LIEBERTHAL AND RICHARD H.
ROGEL CENTER FOR CHINESE STUDIES**

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Martin Singer
University of Michigan

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I. Introduction

The cultural revolution was an emotionally-charged political awakening for the educated youth* of China. Called upon by aging revolutionary Mao Tse-tung to assume a "vanguard" role in his new revolution to eliminate bourgeois revisionist influence in education, politics, and the arts, and to help to establish proletarian culture, habits, and customs, in a new Chinese society, educated young Chinese generally accepted this opportunity for meaningful and dramatic involvement in Chinese affairs. It also gave them the opportunity to gain recognition as a viable and responsible part of the Chinese polity. In the end, these revolutionary youths were not successful in proving their reliability. Too "idealistic" to compromise with the bourgeois way, their sense of moral rectitude also made it impossible for them to submerge their factional differences with other revolutionary mass organizations to achieve unity and consolidate proletarian victories. Many young revolutionaries were bitterly disillusioned by their own failures and those of other segments of the Chinese population -- particularly the Peoples Liberation Army and the central leadership -- and by the fate of the middle school and college graduates of 1965, through 1967 many of whom were assigned to rural communes between November, 1967 and June, 1968.

In this essay an effort will be made first, to examine briefly pertinent elements of the Maoist vision of society, and then to examine basic loci of discontent among educated young people on the eve of the cultural revolution. Next the main body of the essay will be devoted to a relatively chronological review and reconstruction of the events of the cultural revolution as they affected young people. Finally, an attempt will be made to summarize and integrate the data and to achieve a fuller understanding of educated young people's involvement in the cultural revolution.

Mao Tse-tung

Three aspects of Mao Tse-tung's personality as a leader are important to our understanding of his relationship with educated young people during the cultural revolution. First, Mao is a visionary.

* In this essay, "educated youth" refers to middle school and college students and recent graduates.

Taking a broad view of history, he is often willing to sacrifice stability (and even foster chaos) for the sake of his vision of the future. Mao's vision is more like a religious experience than a blueprint. His dream is of the state in which there will be conscious enthusiastic participation by all Chinese in the fulfillment of the wishes and aspirations of the collective.¹ Second, Mao is a voluntarist. He believes that once men are imbued with correct attitudes their behavior will be correct as a consequence. They can at least to some extent impose their will on history. Human will can surmount material problems if it is disciplined and strong. Third, Mao is old. His age would appear to be a decisive factor in determining the present cast of his thought. Revolution involves sacrifice and the sublimation of energy and emotion for the sake of creations outside the self. It involves indomitable spirit in the face of tragedy, like the death of one's comrades.² These sacrifices can be justified only if they bear fruit, i.e. only if the revolution itself is successful. If the revolutionary vision is corrupted the justification for one's sacrifices, indeed the meaning of one's life, are held open to question.³ If this happens at a time of life when one is most vulnerable, because increasingly less able, to assert one's will and provide new meanings for that life the problem is even more acute.

An examination of Mao's changing attitudes toward young people illustrates these points rather dramatically. Speaking in November, 1957, at the height of confidence in his vision, Mao told a group of Chinese students in Moscow:

The world is yours, as well as ours, but in the last analysis, it is yours. You young people, full of vigor and vitality, are in the bloom of life, like the sun at eight or nine in the morning. Our hope is placed on you... The world belongs to you. China's future belongs to you.⁴

This sounds like a leader conscious of the movement of history, yet confident that his vision will survive -- carried on by younger people who share it. The failures of the Hundred-Flowers and the Great-Leap Forward period seem to have led Mao to some self-doubt. Less confident that his efforts would stand the test of time and transmission, he became more conscious of how long the revolutionization of Chinese

society would take. He therefore increased the ideological pressures on Chinese youth. In the years after 1959, Mao's tendency to find more and more signs of revisionism was intimately connected with his worries about the character of the leaders of the future.⁵

By 1964, the question of revolutionary successors was being dealt with rather frequently in the Chinese press. At the ninth Congress of the Communist Youth League, Hu Yao-pang revealed the doubts plaguing the leadership.

Since they have been brought up under conditions of peace and stability, it is easy for them to lapse into a false sense of peace and tranquility and to look for a life of ease and security. Because they have not been through the severe test of revolutionary struggle, they lack a thorough understanding of the complexity and exacting demands of revolution.⁶

The emphasis on the need to justify sacrifice as well as doubts about youths' ability to meet the challenges ahead were also reflected in another article in 1964, "Bringing Up Heirs For The Revolution."

... It is a question in the final analysis of how to ensure that the revolution, won by the older generation at the cost of such sacrifice, will be carried on victoriously by the younger generation to come; that the destiny of our country will continue to be held secure in the hands of true proletarian revolutionaries; that our sons and grandsons and their successors will continue to advance, generation after generation, along the Marxist-Leninist and not the revisionist path...⁷

The activist component of Mao's character being so strong, one could assume that his pessimism could only reach so far before he would try to apply a corrective. The limit may have been reached at the time of Mao's 1965 interview with Edgar Snow. In response to Snow's question about the younger generation, which had been bred under easier circumstances:

He also could not know, he said. He doubted that anyone could be sure. There were two possibilities. There could be continued development of the revolution toward Communism. The other possibility was that youth could negate the revolution and give

a poor performance: make peace with imperialists, bring the remnants of the Chiang Kai-shek clique back to the mainland, and take a stand beside the small percentage of counter-revolutionaries still in the country. Of course, he did not hope for counter-revolution. But future events would be decided by future generations, and in accordance with conditions that we could not foresee. From the long-range view, future generations ought to be more knowledgeable than we are, just as men of the bourgeois-democratic era were more knowledgeable than those of the feudal era. Their judgment would prevail, not ours. The youth of today and those to come after them would assess the work of the revolution in accordance with values of their own. Mao's voice dropped away, and he half-closed his eyes. Man's condition on this earth was changing with ever increasing rapidity. A thousand years from now all of them, he said, even Marx, Engels and Lenin, would possibly appear rather ridiculous.⁸

Mao Tse-tung and The Youth of China

Another key point for us to understand is the nature of the relationship between Mao and his people, especially the young people of China. Ruth Ann Willner has defined charisma as:

The absolute emotional and cognitive identification of a following with a leader and his descriptive, normative and perceptive orientation, i. e. the unqualified belief in the man and his mission.⁹

In her general study of charismatic leadership she identifies Mao as a charismatic leader. If one accepts her definition, then by 1965 Mao would appear to have enjoyed a charismatic relationship primarily with the young people of China who had been reared on an intensive diet of Mao's thought and, secondarily, with the People's Liberation Army which had recently been the target of Lin Piao's indoctrination efforts. Much of the Party leadership and cadres were operating within the Maoist vocabulary, but they were freely interpreting (Mao would say betraying) its content.

What was this "revisionist" drift that Mao detected in the six years before the cultural revolution? Mao felt that the CCP was becoming an entrenched bureaucracy and that this institutionalization of the revolution was changing its meaning. This was most specifically reflected in his inability to have his directions followed even in spirit. There were increasingly less veiled attacks on himself and his leadership. Finally and perhaps most importantly to Mao, there appeared to be a tendency among those assuming the bourgeois capitalist road to infect and corrupt the minds of youth.

It appears then that Mao turned to the youth of China for four reasons: (1) They were his greatest potential source of support, having been nurtured by his thought and knowing little or nothing of the negative results of applying that thought to reality. (2) That support was a power base from which to attack the revisionists of the Party and academic circles who were attacking his vision of society. (3) He had the opportunity to revolutionize an entire generation by involving them in a revolutionary mass movement. Mao had long been a firm believer in the necessity of "doing something" in order to know it.

Whoever wants to know a thing has no way of doing so except by coming into contact with it, that is by living (practicing) in its environment.¹⁰

(4) By exposing them to the rigours of revolution, he could instill the revolutionary virtue of hate. Mao saw hate as the emotional driving force behind human action -- a motive force for the creation of unity and dynamism.¹¹ The difficulty here lay in Mao's assumption that given revolutionary fervor, youth could be instilled with the same ideals that had been "revolutionary" for him but had lost their revolutionary meaning in the new environment. Lifton has labelled this phenomenon "psychistic fallacy."

The psychistic fallacy is the assumption on the part of any senior group that it can instill in the young the "old virtue" -- that some form of imposed psychic experience could eliminate all of the very elements in the environment which discouraged those "old virtues" in favor of new ones.¹²

In other words, Mao was ignoring the many changes in society that he himself had helped bring about, such as increased educational opportunity,

a virtual end to the "culture of poverty" in the rural areas and the elimination of those "enemies" who had made guerilla tactics necessary in the first place. Mao was also ignoring the deep changes that had occurred in his own role. He had ceased to be a revolutionary leader in the field, applying the principles of Marxism-Leninism to current problems, and instead had become the revolutionary leader, much removed from the public eye, and evolving into the font of more abstract revolutionary truth.¹³

We can only speculate about whether Mao realized the implications of active involvement for the sanctity of his transformed image. By plunging himself into public affairs he was (in a sense) lowering himself into the political arena and forcing the Chinese people to choose between him and his opponents. He had many advantages over his opponents in such a match, not the least of which was that they were operating within limits that he had defined, but he also had more to lose than they did -- his ideological "presence".

The State of Youth

In turning to the youth of China, Mao was turning to a potential powder keg since the situation among them was fraught with contradictions and frustrations. Perhaps the most frustrated youths were the children of the poor and lower-middle peasants brought into the higher levels of the education system during and after the Great Leap Forward. At the time, they had been assured that the purity of their class background, combined with education, would qualify them to be the new leaders of China. In fact, after 1959 there was a gradual return to an emphasis on intellectual expertise. By 1961, Foreign Minister Ch'en Yi could say:

It is incorrect for technical schools to spend too much time on political activities and labour movements at the expense of specialized training. If we do not emphasize specialized training, we shall always fall behind in our scientific culture.¹⁴

He even went so far as to defend scholars who had no interest in politics.

Previously, some organizations criticized those who had immersed themselves in specialized works and seldom took part in political activity as "white experts". This is wrong and should be corrected...we cannot measure a man's "redness" or "whiteness" by the amount of his political activity alone. There are some who need more time for technical work and there are some who have little interest in politics and seldom participate in it; but as long as they can accomplish something in their own fields and contribute to socialist construction, we should not criticize them for engaging in too little political activity.¹⁵

This emphasis on technical and theoretical expertise at the expense of political knowledge worked to the disadvantage of students of poor and lower-middle peasant families. The stress on "impartial" entrance examinations rather than class background or "political" quality as the primary criteria for admission discriminated against those who had gone to less prestigious schools or who could only attend school part time. Of course, bourgeois youths had the advantage of more rigorous training in better schools and consequently fared better in both exams and daily coursework. This was a humiliation to many peasant students and they were bitter. The extent of this bitterness was revealed after the cultural revolution broke out.

Old and young gentlemen, we tell you frankly that you all stink and are nothing in particular, just rotten trash...formerly you were in a privileged position, sat on our heads, and let your excrement fall on us to show that you could make use of the temporarily existing bourgeois education to climb higher up the ladder, to become white expert, to get into the university, to join up with "professors and experts". Your heart was set on a small car, a little modern house, a white coat, a laboratory...on enjoying comfort, affluence, a good reputation, a good salary.¹⁶

At the same time, the humiliation led many peasant students to emulate their more bourgeois peers.

A young assistant of poor peasant origin carried his own luggage on a shoulder pole when he came to the university several years ago. He kept this pole as a symbol of his family's miserable life in the old society and to prevent himself from backsliding.

But because of the poisonous influence of the counter-revolutionary revisionist line in education, he gradually came to look upon the shoulder pole as a "disgrace". After he graduated and became an assistant in the university, he was afraid the "professors" and "authorities" would look down on him if they knew about his past. As a result, he secretly threw the pole into the lake on the campus one night...¹⁷

These humiliated, frustrated youth of peasant background were the first to agitate for educational reform and they were to be the first members of Red Guard organizations.

A second locus of youthful disaffection was more diffuse. All Chinese youth of whatever background had been nurtured on the thought of Mao and they shared a resentment against the older generation for failing to live up to its own ideals. The focii of this resentment included: (a) the continued monopolization of power by the older (Long March) generation which created inertia at lower levels of command and effectively denied youth any meaningful political role; (b) the power plays of Party cadres more eager to preserve their own political positions than to defend ideological purity; and (c) increased evidence that the Party did not trust the spontaneity of the masses, including the student masses.

A third locus of disaffection revolved around the underutilization of the skills of the educated youth by the society which had trained them. There is no doubt that the young people of China were a chief beneficiary of the Chinese Revolution.¹⁸ The totalitarian nature of Chinese Communist society made it relatively easy to make sweeping changes in educational structure, if not in the spirit of the enterprise.¹⁹ It was less easy to make changes elsewhere. Thus each year thousands upon thousands of educated youth (middle-school and college graduates) were sent to work on rural communes or kept in urban areas but working at jobs requiring far less training than they had had. This was undoubtedly a cause of great disillusionment. Few students, whatever their background, were eager to go to rural and mountain areas.

Finally, a fourth cause of disaffection and frustration was that the young were denied the opportunity to prove to themselves and to

their elders their revolutionary capacity. Public questioning about whether the youth of China would betray the revolution won at such cost by their elders led to renewed intensive indoctrination efforts by the elders and increasing lack of confidence on the part of the young people. Combined with the aforementioned unwillingness of many adults to live up to the ideals that they were holding out to youth, this further exacerbated the generation gap in China.

Abbreviations Used in Text and Bibliography

CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CCPCC	Chinese Communist Party Central Committee
<u>JMJP</u>	<u>Jen Min Jih Pao</u>
<u>NCNA</u>	<u>New China News Agency</u>
PLA	People's Liberation Army
<u>SCMM</u>	<u>Survey of China Mainland Magazines</u>
<u>SCMP</u>	<u>Survey of China Mainland Press</u>
<u>URS</u>	<u>Union Research Service</u>

II. The Cultural Revolution: 1966

The Maoist attack on revisionism began in late 1965. Yao Wen-yuan, editor-in-chief of Chieh-fang Jih-pao of Shanghai and a member of the CCP Shanghai Municipal Committee wrote an article highly critical of the play "Hai Jui Dismissed From Office" by Wu Han, the vice-mayor of Peking.²⁰ The author is accused of making a veiled attack on Mao for the dismissal of P'eng Teh-huai in 1959. Similar Maoist attacks appeared on two series: "Evening Chats at Yunshan" by Teng T'o, and "Notes From Three-Family Village" by Wu Han, Teng T'o, and Liao Mo-sha. The Maoists contended that while pretending to recount historical anecdotes and ancient stories, the articles criticized and ridiculed both Mao and the Party policy of the Great Leap Forward.²¹ The Maoists tried to demonstrate that these "revisionist" pieces were having a pernicious, corrupting effect on the youth of China. Thus, a Shensi Middle School student is quoted by Chung-kuo Ch'ing-nien as saying:

In the past I listened to the Teng T'o black gang and buried myself in a heap of classical works. I almost followed the evil capitalist road. Now I have seen clearly that the Teng T'o black gang is a viper poisoning the young people. They used classical books and ancients to poison our minds and vainly attempted to persuade us to lay down the guns in our hands, not to struggle and not to make revolution. We must resolutely fight against all anti-party and anti-Socialist black gangs to the end.²²

Similarly, in another series of articles, Yang Shu is accused of attacking Mao and Lin, of denigrating revolutionary enthusiasm, of promoting study of the classics and western literature and of promoting expertise at the expense of politics.²³

The culmination of all these revisionist articles -- in the eyes of the Maoists -- was undoubtedly the "Outline Report on the Current Academic Discussion Made by the Group of Five in Charge of the Cultural Revolution" issued on February 7, 1966. The report suggested that:

We must insist on seeking truth from facts and uphold the principle of everybody being equal before truth. We must convince people with facts. We must not behave like scholar-tyrants who are always acting arbitrarily and trying to overwhelm people with their power.²⁴

This "Outline Report" was revoked by a Chinese Communist Party Central Committee (CCPCC) circular of May 16, 1966, which accused P'eng Chen, mayor of Peking, of responsibility for raising bourgeois slogans, denying the class nature of truth, slandering the proletarian dictatorship and perverting the doctrines of Mao.²⁵

Peking University

It is in this context that we must approach Peking University, the scene of the first real outburst against the academic establishment. It was probably the most respected institution of higher education in China in 1966. Its president, Lu P'ing, emphasized quality education and he was apparently not averse to sacrificing complete politicization to achieve high academic standards. As early as 1959, he had made his views on this question public:

The university must avoid and overcome the impetuous greediness for quantity and size and impatience for success, as well as the tendency toward unwillingness to bear hardships, to act realistically, and to do concrete work. Lofty revolutionary ambitions and big long-term targets of struggle must rest on a practical base of current concrete work. Otherwise, they would simply be illusion. We must combine these ambitions with the good academic tradition of learning with realism and perseverance.²⁶

The early 1960's at Peking University saw an increasing emphasis on professionalism. Many students joined the party for purely practical reasons and lacked real political experience and commitment. Additionally, the heavy academic burdens imposed by the school's high standards left little time for political activity.²⁷ This definitely led to discrimination against children of poor- and lower-middle peasants²⁸, in the sense that they were being penalized for poor academic preparation which resulted from their socio-economic position in society.

On May 26 Nieh Yuan-tzu and six other instructors of the philosophy department of the University, hung a big character poster attacking the Lu P'ing administration and the Party committee of the school. They asked the "bourgeois" academic authorities

Why are you afraid of wall-posters in big characters?
 Why are you afraid of holding condemnation meetings?
 To counterattack the black gang which launched a frenzied attack against the Party, socialism, and the thought of Mao Tse-tung is a life-or-death class struggle... To hold meetings and to post big character posters are mass militant styles of the best form. You "lead" the masses not to hold meetings and not to put up big character posters. You have manufactured various taboos and regulations. By so doing, have you not suppressed the mass revolution, forbidden it and opposed it? We absolutely won't allow you to do so!²⁹

The student body was apparently caught by surprise but nevertheless the general cautious consensus seemed to be that Lu P'ing was in the right. The academic authorities organized struggle meetings against Nieh and her fellow teachers and they were subjected to severe criticism. The situation changed dramatically on June 1, when the big character poster involved was broadcast to the entire nation.

On the evening of June 1, the Central People's Radio broadcast to the whole nation our first character poster. This gave the revolutionary teachers and students a great encouragement. They said emotionally: "Chairman Mao is directly leading us!" and "The Party Central Committee is behind us!" So moved that tears swelled up in their eyes, the revolutionaries of the department of philosophy held high two hands, danced with joy and cheered: "Long live Chairman Mao! Long live Chairman Mao!"³⁰

Apparently, the campus was the scene of genuinely open debate for about a week during which the Lu P'ing administration was removed from office at Peking University and the Peking Municipal Committee was also replaced. By June 7, a work team sent out by the new Party Committee had arrived. Though at first welcomed, it soon proved to be no friend of the more revolutionary students. By June 12 it had put an end to debate and to criticism of the University administration and instead had initiated criticism of left-wing students. The University was literally sealed off from the outside world. However, the artificial calm imposed by the work team was broken through

occasionally. Thus despite work team orders to the contrary, a criticism meeting of former president Lu P'ing was held. As more critics of the work-team emerged, they were dutifully labelled counter-revolutionaries but their increasing numbers made it harder for the work-team to isolate them from the student body at large. By mid-July a large segment of the student body of Peking University, particularly but by no means exclusively those of peasant background, were hostile to the work team.³¹

National Movement for Educational Reform

At the same time a national movement to reform the educational system was being initiated. On June 6, students of Peking No. 1 Girls Middle School wrote to Mao suggesting certain changes in the educational system. Among the reforms they advocated were that the old educational system be immediately abolished; that all graduates of senior middle schools go directly among the worker/peasant/soldier¹ masses and integrate with them; and that if it was found necessary for some people to continue their education beyond middle school, they should be selected directly by the Party (i. e. on the basis of political rather than purely academic criteria).³² Probably the wide publicity given the upheaval at Peking University encouraged these middle school students to come forward. It also seems likely that some activist organizers were sent to the school by the Maoists though there is no evidence to prove it.

On June 13, the CCPCC announced that it had indeed decided to reform the enrollment system by eliminating entrance examinations and relying instead on recommendation and selection. Though politics were to be "brought to the fore" the document left open the possibility that the "best students" would be those who combined academic ability and correct political character. A decision to postpone enrollment of graduates into higher educational institutions was also announced in order that graduating students might participate in the cultural revolution in their own schools and to allow sufficient time to implement the new enrollment policy. Students preferring not to stay in their schools to carry on the cultural revolution were to do manual labor in rural areas.³³ In effect, the CCPCC was providing encouragement and incentive to middle school students to participate in the cultural revolution.

Further encouragement was provided by a number of editorials appearing in the Peking press in early June. Jen-min Jih-pao (hereafter, JMJP) on June 1 urged them to "Sweep Away All Monsters" that had entrenched themselves in ideological and cultural positions.³⁴ In another editorial several days later, it urged the young students to "criticize the old world":

...we criticize the old world, the old ideology and culture and old customs and habits which imperialism and all exploiting classes use to poison the minds of the working people. We criticize all non-proletarian ideology, all reactionary ideology, which is antagonistic to Marxism-Leninism, to Mao Tse-tung's thought.³⁵

The "role" that the students were being asked to play was becoming increasingly clear. They were to be the defenders of Mao's thought in the "vanguard" of the revolutionary forces. They were to carry Mao's message to all the people of China and to lead the attack on the bourgeois authorities in education.

Student attacks in early June concentrated on the examination system³⁶, but soon branched out to include denunciation of teachers and academic authorities.

By the end of June, the cultural revolution had spread to Tsinghua University. The work team there was later accused by the Maoists of carrying out a policy of "hit hard at the many in order to protect the handful". This policy involved dismissing all cadres from office and subjecting them to severe criticism. The large-scale struggle against the cadres lasted until July 15. The cadres themselves were made to criticize and struggle against the left students to make amends for their "crimes".³⁷ The team's treatment of left students was subsequently attacked as particularly harsh.

One by one students were surrounded and verbally attacked. Their every action was watched closely. They were trailed. They were locked up in various rooms on the campus. When some of the revolutionary students became ill, the work teams would not even let them go to the hospital for treatment... The work team stopped at nothing. Misery hung over Tsinghua like dark clouds and fog.³⁸

Student leaders came in for particularly close attention:

Kuai Ta-fu was the most cruelly persecuted. He was watched by special guards day and night, and his every action was recorded. Different groups were incited by the work teams to attack him in turns. He was harassed in every way. Slanderous tatzupao were pasted on the head of his bed and even on his bedding. The "special representative" (probably Mme. Liu Shao-ch'i) would not let Kuai Ta-fu write to the Party Central Committee to state his case. She exerted such pressure on him that he went on a hunger strike in protest. Even while he was fasting, some people dragged him from his bed to "debate" with him, literally trying to kill him with exhaustion.³⁹

There was a lull on the campuses and in the middle schools in early July. The work teams were apparently doing an effective job of maintaining "order".

Leadership Support for Revolutionary Students

All this changed on July 18 when Mao is reported to have criticized the work teams apparently fearing that they would slow the momentum of the mass movement he was trying to foster. To symbolize the Maoists' support for the students, Ch'en Po-ta, new head of the Central Cultural Revolution Group, and Chiang Ch'ing (Mme. Mao) began on July 23 a series of visits to Peking University. Ch'en told the students:

We have come as pupils to learn from you, and study how you debate... We are not your teachers. Our minds are just like a white blank. We must first learn from you before we can teach you...⁴⁰

Chiang Ch'ing echoed Ch'en's statement that they had come as pupils. She said they hoped to understand "things" better by studying the students' wallposters and talking with them. She promised that the government (i. e. the Maoists) would never divorce itself from the students.⁴¹ K'ang Sheng, another member of the Central Cultural Revolution Group, emphasized the faith that the Maoists had in the revolutionary masses.

...It is necessary to rely upon the masses, to have faith in the masses and to arouse the masses freely. Because the masses are the masters, they can make a success of work...⁴²

On July 28, the Peking Municipal CCP Committee, in response to the criticism of the work teams it had dispatched, announced their abolition. Students, teachers and staff of the schools were urged to set up mass organizations to carry on the cultural revolution and members of the work groups were instructed to study the criticism of the masses.^{42a}

By the end of July the Maoists were using every resource to increase revolutionary fervor. Middle school students had been unleashed, college students had been proclaimed worthy to lead the central leaders, while the work teams, the only controlling organizational force, had been recalled. The time was now ripe for a dramatic act by Mao Tse-tung himself. This is reported to have occurred on July 16 when 75 year old Mao is said to have swum a long distance in the Yangtze River, and in very good time.⁴³ How far and how fast he really swam, or even whether he swam at all is not really too important. The significance lies in the gesture -- the appeal of this "youthful" act to the students he was trying to mobilize. It was a strong, if unsubtle, attempt on his part to identify himself with the vitality of youth. The dramatic increase in student praise of Mao during July and August suggests that his appeal was highly successful. For example, a group of students from the Chinese Language Department of Peking University wrote:

We will certainly make ever greater efforts to study... Mao Tse-tung's thought, to face the direction pointed out by Chairman Mao, to open our eyes wide and see the future, to forge ahead through the storms and waves, and resolutely carry the great proletarian cultural revolution through to the end.⁴⁴

Continuing his active involvement in political affairs, Mao wrote on August 1, a letter to the Red Guards. This preceded their official unveiling at the first mass rally in Peking later in the month. In it he urged them to rebel against the landlord class, the bourgeoisie, imperialists and revisionists and against the handful of Party authorities taking the capitalist road. He also urged them to unite with all possible allies.⁴⁵ On August 5, he wrote his own character poster accusing "some leading comrades" of having

...enforced a bourgeois dictatorship and struck down the surging movement of the great cultural revolution of the proletariat. They have stood facts on their heads and juggled black and white, encircled and suppressed revolutionaries, stifled opinions differing from their own, imposed a white terror, and felt very pleased with themselves...⁴⁶

With Mao himself writing posters and urging rebellion, any inhibitions young people might have had about denouncing authorities were surely diminished.

On August 8 the CCPCC issued its "Decision Concerning the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution."⁴⁷ Several points are of special interest since they more clearly pinpoint the object of the attack:

...to struggle against and crush those persons in authority who are taking the capitalist road, to criticize and repudiate the reactionary bourgeois academic "authorities" and the ideology of the bourgeoisie and all other exploiting classes and to transform education, literature and art and all other parts of the superstructure that do not correspond to the socialist economic base, so as to facilitate the consolidation and development of the socialist system.⁴⁸

Recognition was given the many "previously unknown" young people who had assumed the role of daring pathbreakers in the cultural revolution. It exhorted Chinese to "Cast out fear. Don't be afraid of disorder." It enjoined the masses to struggle by reason, and not by force. An entire section was devoted to the transforming of education into a bastion of proletarian politics.⁴⁹ Specific reform proposals included shortening the period of schooling, decreasing the number but increasing the quality of courses offered, and transforming the teaching method, including simplifying teaching material. In addition to studying, students were to participate in industrial work, farming, the military and in the struggles of the cultural revolution.

Early Mass Rallies and Movements

On August 18, the first mass rally was held in Peking when the Red Guards were revealed to the world. An account of the day's proceedings described the Red Guards as a

revolutionary mass organization set up in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution by the capital's college and middle school students. Members pledge that they will remain red vanguards defending Chairman Mao, the Chinese Communist Party and their motherland all their lives.⁵⁰

A Red Guard from the Girls' Middle School of Peking Normal University mounted the rostrum and put a Red Guard armband on Mao, an obvious symbol that he was their leader. On seeing this, youths in the crowd are reported to have "jumped a foot in the air" and shouted: "Chairman Mao joins our Red Guards. This is the greatest support and inspiration to us... With Chairman Mao's backing, we have nothing to fear."⁵¹ At the rally, Ch'en Po-ta warned the revolutionary youths that

Revolution is no easy thing. In order to win victory in revolution, one must conquer all resistance and overcome all difficulties. Comrades must stand erect like heroes, subject yourself to hammering and tempering over and over again, and be able to stand all trials and all unexpected but possible setbacks...⁵²

He also reminded the Red Guards of the historical importance that the rally would always hold for them:

...Your present visit to Peking, I think, will have a very deep and indelible impression on you as long as you live. It will always arouse revolutionary norms in your minds. It will always encourage you to advance in big tempests.⁵³

The importance of this mass rally should not be underestimated. First, it gave official recognition to the Red Guard organization. Second, it provided a mass catharsis for the youth. Third, it offered a religious-like experience that would remain indelibly blazed on the minds of all participants. Fourth, it demonstrated to the Red Guards themselves just how large a force they were. Fifth, it provided enthusiastic courriers to spread the revolutionary word throughout China. Finally, it was a powerful show of force by the Maoists.

After this first mass rally which was broadcast to the entire nation, Red Guards in Peking and elsewhere went on a rampage against the "four olds". Sustaining their attacks was a sense of religious

fervor and moral rectitude stemming from their identification with Mao. Some of their attacks seem positively silly, betraying an adolescent puritanism underlying the movement at this stage. The Red Guards of Peking No. 2 Middle School wrote a big character poster declaring war on the old world.

You dislike from the depth of your hearts the innocent, honest, natural beauty of the broad masses of workers, peasants, and soldiers. The objects of your service are the heavily made-up and gaudily dressed lords and ladies. Your souls are filthy and reactionary.⁵⁴

Red Guards in Hangchow, Canton, Wuhan, Changsha, Tsinan, Nanchang, Chengchow, Hofei, Nanking, Foochow and other major cities were similarly active.

The first indication of resistance to the Red Guards came in an editorial in JMJP on August 23 when the editor blamed the resistance on those in authority who take the capitalist road:

The use of... slogans to incite a number of workers and peasants to struggle against the revolutionary students is extremely reactionary and completely contravenes the Party's mass line.⁵⁵

The editorial went on to assert that the Red Guards were "lawful" organizations under the dictatorship of the proletariat. "Anyone who opposes the revolutionary actions of the revolutionary students directly contravenes the teachings of Mao."⁵⁶

The prevailing chaotic atmosphere was confirmed by a report in JMJP on August 26 declaring that "A 'Big Disturbance' Must Be Made at Tsinghua University," in which revolutionary students were quoted as saying:

We are absolutely not anarchists. We only oppose the old order and want to build a new order. In this course of destroying the old and establishing the new, the state of "anarchy" will inevitably exist for a period of time.⁵⁷

The official public reaction, in such editorials as "It's Fine!"⁵⁸ and "In Praise of Our Red Guards", was unqualified praise.

Our Red Guards have performed immortal meritorious deeds in the cause of the great proletarian cultural revolution. Chairman Mao and the Central Committee of the Party enthusiastically praise their soaring revolutionary spirit, and the broad masses of workers, peasants, and soldiers enthusiastically acclaim their revolutionary action.⁵⁹

However, this public praise during late August for the chaotic spirit of the Red Guards was tempered by subtle efforts to encourage a sense of discipline. For example, on August 28, JMJP urged the revolutionary youth to "Learn from the Chinese PLA" by observing the Three Cardinal Rules of Discipline and Eight Points of Attention, formulated by Mao for the guerilla forces many years earlier. There was also a reminder that all struggle was to be non-violent.⁶⁰

In Chou En-lai's speech to Peking Red Guards on September 1 the question of organization and discipline receive their first substantial treatment.⁶¹ Chou noted the chaotic state of Red Guard organization in middle schools in Peking and urged amalgamation to make transmission of instructions easier. He also reproved the Red Guards for holding too many meetings, suggesting that they elect representatives to facilitate the execution of certain tasks. He dealt with the question of "searches" of private property. His tactic was to appear to praise the revolutionary activities of the young people and then to reprove them for excesses.⁶²

Search is really necessary, but a full investigation must be made...you must make sure that the resident of the house to be searched is really a criminal at large, and is hiding himself, and ask the police station to help you in the search, so that you may be well-protected and will not make a frivolous search.⁶³

Chou also dealt with the question of Red Guard membership. Apparently, membership had originally been restricted to children of correct family background, but the momentum of mass mobilization in August brought a rapid increase in membership, including a number of people of impure class background. Chou tried to clarify the situation.

Those students, though having poor family background, may also join the Red Guards organization, provided that they have turned against their original class and behaved well, because they could not choose this class when they were born. But the Red Guard organizations should chiefly admit students of the five red categories.⁶⁴

Exchanging Revolutionary Experience

By early September, there were a steady stream of demands for struggle by reason.⁶⁵ The Center then unveiled a new plan designed to spread revolutionary fervor directly to other parts of the country while at the same time providing an outlet for some of the youthful energies which were beginning to bubble over. This plan endorsed the exchange of revolutionary experience among students in Peking and throughout the country. Chou was the first to speak to this point:

At present, students in various parts of the country are coming to Peking to exchange revolutionary experiences, and students in Peking are going to other places to establish revolutionary ties. We think this is a very good thing. We support you. The Party's Central Committee has decided that all college students and representatives of middle school students in other parts of the country should come to Peking group after group at different times... Everybody knows that the great cultural revolution in every locality and in every unit must be carried out by relying on the masses in that locality and in their unit for only then can it be carried out well and thoroughly...⁶⁶

Chou later explained in a speech on September 10 that the Center wanted to make the Red Guards a model for the entire country.⁶⁷ They were a "reserve force" of the PLA, a fighting corps destined to battle by reason and not by force. He also warned them to be aware of local sensitivities when visiting other places, to use persuasion and always to consult with local revolutionary organizations, rather than imposing their will on them.⁶⁸

As the movement to exchange revolutionary experience got under way, the CCPCC found it necessary on September 8 to cope with the violence at hand; it issued a directive concerning the protection

of Party and State secrets from seizure by local groups.⁶⁹ On September 11, it felt pressed to issue a four-point directive explicitly saying that "It is definitely wrong to be afraid of the students."

Workers, peasants and city dwellers were warned not to interfere with student activities, to have faith in the ability of the majority of students to educate themselves, and not to get into conflicts or arguments with the student groups. It seems safe to assume that this directive was prompted by increased worker antagonism toward the students, and their move into the cities to join the struggle.⁷⁰

Red Guard groups travelling to Peking from other parts of the country were provided rail transportation at little or no cost. For these students, coming to Peking and seeing Mao in person appeared to have a tremendous impact. Here is the reaction of a group of students from Tibet Nationality Academy:

October 18 was the most unforgettable day in our lives. We were received by the great leader Chairman Mao. When Chairman Mao, sitting in an open car, was passing by our ranks, we were so moved that warm tears rolled down our cheeks. It was really the greatest happiness to see our great leader Chairman Mao so radiant and looking so spirited. To Chairman Mao we have thousands of things to say...⁷¹

These students all went to Peking University to talk to the students there and learn how the cultural revolution was being carried out. On October 1, Hung Ch'i detailed the changes that the model, Peking University, had undergone. The work of destroying the old was said to be proceeding satisfactorily and a committee to run the cultural revolution in the University had been organized. Most interesting, bitter stories were told at organized meetings to arouse class hatred. One can only speculate that these sessions were intended to keep chaos within bounds by providing targets for attack and also to prevent an increase in the factionalism which was developing.⁷⁶

A general mobilization of Peking's non-student population was apparently necessary to handle the influx of young people:

Workers of service trades have also been mobilized. In many restaurants and dining halls, food is served round the clock. Special bus lines connect universities, colleges, institutions and schools -- the suburbs of the city have been opened, to give

the students and teachers from other parts of the country every transportation convenience.⁷³

When these students returned home, they had an electric effect on their fellows as this editorial shows:

As soon as they got back to their schools, they infected millions of revolutionary fellow students and schoolmates with the inspiration and the revolutionary enthusiasm that they had drawn from their experiences. This...called forth a tremendous surge of militant spirit among the masses of revolutionary students and teachers all over the country...⁷⁴

The nature of the instructions issued by various provincial and municipal Party Committees concerning the reception of Red Guards from Peking and elsewhere⁷⁵ reveals two things: (a) that on the surface at least the committees wanted to give the impression of being hospitable to the Red Guards coming to their region from other places; (b) that there was nevertheless some mutual antagonism between visiting Red Guards and local groups. The need to do propaganda work among the local groups was pointed out by several such committees.

The Committee for cultural revolution of various schools should propagate and explain the situation to the broad masses of workers, peasants, revolutionary cadres, revolutionary teachers and students and residents in general so that they fully understand the political significance of the reception given to the revolutionary teachers and students from other places, actively and enthusiastically carry out the work of reception, and create favorable conditions for them to join in the cultural revolution, which will facilitate a prosperous development of the great proletarian cultural revolution.⁷⁶

Local residents were to learn humbly from the visitors and help provide food and lodging for them. There were also reports of Peking Red Guards giving Red Guard visitors the benefit of their experiences to help them solve local problems. For example, the Red Guards of Peking Medical College helped the Red Guards of Chungshan Medical College by relating their own experiences in achieving unity by "recollecting past bitterness and thinking of present sweetness."⁷⁷ Finally,

there was this acknowledgment:

While living and fighting together, the revolutionary teachers and students in Kwangtung and those from other parts of the country hold different view on certain problems. This is an entirely normal phenomenon and is not surprising at all.⁷⁸

Thus, the months of September and October, and early November saw large movements of young people from one part of the country to another. These shifts disrupted normal railway traffic and affected production since many youths sent to the countryside upon graduation left their posts for the cities to join in the cultural revolution.

Recreating the Long March

A shift in emphasis occurred in early November. On November 2, China News Service released a long, odyssey-like account of a group of eleven middle school students who travelled 2,000 li on foot from Anhwei province to Peking.⁷⁹ The justification for their journey as revealed by China News Service, is quite significant.

We are youths brought up under the red banner without going through tests in the storm of revolution. We have been looking for an opportunity to steel ourselves in the storm of revolution to step up the remolding of our world outlook and the revolutionization of our thinking. To foster and steel ourselves in the quickest way to be the successors to the cause of the proletariat.. We decided to leave our bright classrooms and cozy homes, forsake the convenience of means of transportation, seize this good opportunity to unite ourselves with the workers and peasants and learn from the workers and peasants and soldiers, and make up our mind to train ourselves to be a worthy next generation of the proletarian revolution.⁸⁰

Their story abounds with accounts of self-inflicted suffering. For example:

We were born in the new society and had no experience of starvation. We even found it intolerable to go without food for one day... Our predecessors suffered starvation to free us from hunger today; we temper ourselves today to prepare ourselves

for carrying out the Chinese revolution and world revolution so as to prevent more people in the world from being starved.⁸¹

The account concluded with the acknowledgement that they had taken only the first step on a long journey, which would be continued in order to become worthy revolutionaries.

On the same day, at a mass rally in Peking, Lin Piao expressed Center approval for the concept of exchanging revolutionary experience on foot. He suggested that its usefulness lay in the widespread contact with the masses that it would provide the sheltered revolutionary students. He also stressed the need for advanced planning and organization of such enterprises and the need for ideological and physical preparation.⁸² This exchanging of revolutionary experiences had great appeal to the Central leaders at this time because in addition to bringing contact between the masses and smaller groups of students it also provided the young revolutionaries with genuine experiences of suffering and hardship. It also reduced the number of students traveling to Peking since the rigors of the journey discouraged many who lacked great ideological commitments. In fact there were indications, especially by the middle of November, that the Central leaders had had enough of such mass gatherings and were trying to clear Peking of all students. Finally, it allowed restoration of the transportation system which was in disarray.

Attempts to Disperse Students

On November 12, a letter issued by the General Office of the CCPCC and the State Council urged the two million Red Guards and revolutionary students who had been reviewed on November 10 and 11 to return home as soon as possible carrying with them Mao's message. Peking's students and PLA men were urged to help these students "register for train tickets, help them board the train, and give (them) a warm sendoff." The PLA personnel were also praised for their organizational and mobilization support given the visiting students.⁸³

Merely four days later, on November 16, the general drift of official thinking became plain. It was announced that after November 21, no more Red Guards were to come to Peking by train, ship or bus

to exchange revolutionary experience. However they would be given free transportation back to their place of origin. Schools were to remain closed until the following summer and students were to be allowed to resume trips to Peking in the spring. Official reasons given for this decision included the cold weather that was approaching, and the need to devote transportation facilities to the movement of supplies during the winter and spring. It endorsed Lin Piao's November 3rd speech and authorized provinces to organize exchanges of revolutionary experiences on the basis of the principles contained therein within their own provinces during the winter.⁸⁴ The notion that exchange of revolutionary experience on foot, which was not forbidden even to Peking, was perhaps a more valid revolutionizing experience must at least have made it easier for Mao and his associates to call a halt to these mass revolutionization meetings.

All indications are that the new regulations were ineffective. On November 25 and 26 Mao and Lin reviewed nearly two-and-a-half million more Red Guards and revolutionary students. The new deadline for leaving Peking via free transportation was December 20 and this time no Red Guards in Peking would be given free transportation and food after December 21st. Furthermore, the youths were to be issued through tickets and were to make no stopovers.⁸⁵ The heat was obviously being turned higher. Perhaps in response to these continuing pressures from Central authorities, a long march contingent from Shensi proposed on December 1 in JMJP that Red Guards avoid using buses and other means of public transportation even in cities,⁸⁶ presumably in an effort to protect the concept of "exchange on foot" from prohibition in the face of ominous government warnings.

Invocation of the Tradition of the PLA

A series of articles in JMJP from December 14 through January 7 indicate a new emphasis on controlling the student movement. They commend to the Red Guards the tradition of discipline embodied by the PLA since the days of the Long March. Students who were engaged in experimental long marches were urged to emphasize nine things: to carry out ideological mobilization; to carry out agitation and propaganda work during a march; to organize leadership work while marching; to launch mass mutual-aid activities during marches; to propagate Mao's thought while marching; to observe the three main

rules of discipline and eight points of attention; to do good deeds for the masses; and to pay visits to and learn the revolutionary tradition of the workers and poor and lower-middle peasants while marching.⁸⁷ The implication was that the students were to prepare themselves for renewed struggle the following spring.

In a similar vein, Chiang Ch'ing, meeting on December 28 with a number of Red Guards and revolutionary teachers and students who had come to Peking on foot, stressed the need for integration with workers and peasants and the need for frugality. She said:

You have come here, obeying Chairman's Mao's teaching and developing the style of frugal life and hard work. You learn from the workers and poor and lower-middle peasants. You have inherited and developed the excellent revolutionary tradition. We learn from you. The revolutionary road has twists and turns and is uneven. Students, you must pluck up courage and redouble revolutionary spirit a hundred fold to march forward continuously.⁸⁸

By December 31, the CCPCC had decided to impose short-term military and political training on revolutionary teachers and students of universities and middle schools.

This will do much to strengthen war preparedness, safeguard the national defense, intensify steeling of the revolutionary quality, scientific character, organization and discipline of revolutionary teachers and students, train some students who will join the PLA and become PLA fighters in the future, and improve further the relationship between the army and the people...⁸⁹

Student Relations With Workers and Peasants

To understand why the Central leaders considered it essential to assert greater control over Red Guard and student activities, it is first necessary for us to review relations between revolutionary young people and workers and peasants during the period from September to the end of 1966. We had briefly mentioned this topic previously. The four-point decision issued on September 11 attempted to bring peace between workers and peasants on the one hand and students on

the other.⁹⁰ A JMJP editorial on the same day had admitted that a number of people in authority were suppressing the mass organizations and were even inciting workers and peasants who "did not know the truth" to oppose the students.⁹¹ A series of CCPCC decisions handed down on September 14th prohibited students from going into the communes unless authorized by Party leaders. At the same time, revolutionary teachers and students and Red Guards in urban schools were to be mobilized and sent to the countryside to help with the autumn harvest.⁹² But considering the amount of traveling being done by young people in this period it would seem that the response was not overwhelming. The question is whether the young people, full of their role as the "vanguard" of the revolution, did not alienate the peasant population rather than integrate with it. Officially, students were praised for coming to the countryside to help with production and propagate Mao's thought⁹³ and the peasants credited them with helping to revolutionize peasant thinking.⁹⁴ Nevertheless, perhaps more indicative of the frictions that may have developed is a description of the attitude with which the young people approached the countryside. They were said to be "determined to apply to labor their revolutionary vigor of sweeping away the four olds and establishing the four new things."⁹⁵ The peasants would surely have resented the implications of this attitude especially since peasants in many areas had in the years after the Great Leap Forward reverted to pre-Liberation organizational forms and were even receiving "capitalist" market incentives. They would naturally be resistant to any threats to their new prosperity.

On November 17, it was officially announced that the cultural revolution would be extended to include factories and mines. An effort was made to preserve production while pursuing revolution. While students were permitted to send representatives to factories to exchange revolutionary experience, they had first to make contact with workers' organizations already on the scene. Still by December 9, things had obviously gotten out of hand in the factories. In a series of regulations dealing with "promoting production and grasping revolution," the CCPCC found it necessary to order workers to abide by their regular hours, normal discipline and production quotas. Students were to restrict their activities in factories to non-working hours.⁹⁶ Given the increasing tendency to factionalism among Red Guard groups, the Center may have feared that this spirit would infect the workers, seriously disrupting production.

The cultural revolution was next extended to the countryside. On December 15, the Socialist Education Movement was merged with the newer campaign. Red Guard organizations were to be formed by children of poor and lower-middle peasant families. Revolutionary students were to be allowed to eat, live, and labor with the peasants in the countryside. Finally, rural secondary school students were to be given vacations (in common with their urban counterparts).⁹⁷

The stage had thus been set by late December and the revolution was on. The Red Guards, the vanguard of the revolution, had agitated the populace. However, the question was whether the result was to alienate the people from students or from those enemies singled out by Mao. Another problem revolved around student antagonism towards the workers and peasants and whether the Maoists would backstep and support the masses or continue to back the vanguard. Mao had discussed this very question in 1939:

What role have China's young people played since the May 4th Movement: In a way they have played a vanguard role -- a fact recognized by everybody except the diehards. What is a vanguard role? It means taking the lead and marching in the forefront of the revolutionary ranks... Our young intellectuals and students must go among the workers and peasants, who make up 90 per cent of the population, and mobilize and organize them... (they) must unite with the broad masses of workers and peasants and become one with them, and only then can a mighty force be created.⁹⁸

It is suggested that inherent in this prescription is a major theme of the cultural revolution. Not that Mao knew exactly how far left the students would go, but rather he always knew that no matter how far "left" they went, they would have to be reined in to an extent by the "conservatism" of the "revolutionary" masses. Vanguardism makes chaos, they are usually not mature enough to make order.⁹⁹

III. The Cultural Revolution: 1967

A new phase of the cultural revolution began in January. On January 4, eleven revolutionary mass organizations in Shanghai issued a "Message to all Shanghai" warning that a handful of persons in authority taking the capitalist road in Shanghai were trying to sabotage production to thwart the progress of the cultural revolution. It urged workers and students to unite to defeat the bourgeois enemy.¹⁰⁰ Seven of the eleven organizations involved were student groups. In a subsequent "Urgent Notice" by the Shanghai revolutionary rebel organization, including more than ten student groups, students were told that "The integration of students with workers and peasants is the inevitable road by which the students will transform their world outlooks and carry to success the great cultural revolution."¹⁰¹

The entire country was urged to follow the example of the revolutionary rebels of Shanghai¹⁰² and there were soon reports of power seizures in Shansi, Heilungkiang and other areas. The Red Guards, as revolutionary mass organizations, took part in many of these power struggles. In the main, they proved totally incapable of participating in administration. This was due both to their lack of political/administrative experience and to their inability to resolve factional disputes within their own ranks and with other revolutionary mass organizations. Both of these liabilities would seem to stem at least in part, from their moral rectitude -- a virtue quite appropriate to the smashing phase of the cultural revolution, but counter-productive when Mao wanted them to tighten their belts and unite with the masses.

Attacks on Egoism

The unwillingness of revolutionary youth to relinquish the central role that they played in the early stages of the cultural revolution made them vulnerable to charges that they were suffering from "egoism" and to demands that they undergo self-rectification.^{102 a} Apparently, the Maoists had originally hoped that the Red Guards, imbued with a sense of common cause, would subsume their factional differences, form a great alliance, and work under some form of central leadership. Instead sectarianism increased. The most effective statement of the nature of egoism appeared in *JMJP* on January 31. An article by the Third Headquarters Red Guard of Peking enumerated four erroneous

tendencies within egoism which were hindering the formation of grand alliances. They were: (a) Ultra-democracy and liberalism which was said to involve separation from, rather than integration with, the masses leading to a corrosion of unity and organizational discipline and eventually leading to anarchy as a result of a subjective relaxation of pressure on the self after victory has apparently been won. (b) Pursuit of the limelight referred to the opportunist always found in situations where there is something to be gained. Such a person will do anything that gets him into the limelight, but refuses to be involved in matters for which he will receive no credit. (c) Mountain-Stronghold Mentality involved reliance on the strength of one's own position refusing to enter into any alliance except as the leader. (d) Sectarianism and Small Group Mentality referred to people with "narrow vision" who concern themselves only with the interests of their own small group. All four of these erroneous tendencies were said to be rooted in "ego" which is "the headquarters of the bourgeoisie in the heads of many comrades."¹⁰³

Attempts to Control Violence

As the power seizures proceeded, violence increased. To meet the growing problem of disorder, a spate of documents, directives and circulars were issued by the CCPCC in January concerning public security work, attacks on Mao and Lin, and the promise of protection for left organization (January 13);¹⁰⁴ against instigating the masses to struggle against the PLA (January 14);¹⁰⁵ declaring military control over warehouses, after some of them had been looted (January 19).¹⁰⁶ Finally, on January 23 the CCPCC ordered direct intervention by the PLA in support of the revolutionary masses of the left.

In this great struggle of the proletariat to seize power from the bourgeoisie, the PLA must firmly take the side of the proletarian revolutionaries and resolutely help and support the proletarian revolutionary leftists.

...the demands of all true revolutionaries for support and assistance from the army should be satisfied. The so-called "non-involvement" is false, for the army was already involved long ago.¹⁰⁷

This call for intervention by the PLA proved unfortunate for many revolutionary rebel organizations, especially Red Guard groups. The PLA seems to have been most interested in restoring order and in maintaining the sanctity of its self-image. It suppressed a wide range of organizations in February and March primarily because they were disruptive rather than because they were counter-cultural revolutionary.¹⁰⁸

The Three-Way Alliance

The three-way alliance, derived from the experience of the Heilungkiang power seizure, involved an alliance between the revolutionary mass organizations, the PLA and the cadres.¹⁰⁹ It was proclaimed the way for power seizures to occur (perhaps in recognition that the revolutionary rebels lacked the unity and discipline to seize power on their own). To some Red Guards, this looked like a return to the old. A Hung Ch'i editorial in February stressed the need to treat cadres fairly because of their greater political maturity. "Even cadres who have committed very serious mistakes should be handled leniently after they are criticized and struggled against."¹¹⁰ The Red Guards, as but one of several types of revolutionary mass organizations, found themselves being squeezed into alliances with cadres whom they distrusted on the one hand, and PLA men who were suppressing their organizations on the other. By the end of January the Red Guards were caught in a psychological crossfire. Attacked for their factionalism and ego indulgence, they were being indiscriminately suppressed by the PLA whom they had been taught to rely on as a friend of the people. They were being urged to enter into three-way alliances that included the very cadres that they had been denouncing as bourgeois power-holders not a month before.

Attempts to Resume Classes: I

By late January the Central leaders had obviously decided that the Red Guards and revolutionary youth, who were becoming more free in their verbal and physical attacks on the PLA, and were causing much trouble in the efforts to establish three-way alliances, were a political liability. Beginning on January 28 a series of orders were issued by Central authorities in an effort to bring about an end to exchange of revolutionary experience in any form and a resumption

of classes. (a) On January 28 the Central Military Commission ordered college students and teachers who had gone to other areas to exchange revolutionary experiences to return to their home areas to make revolution.¹¹¹ (b) On February 3, the CCPCC ordered an end to the exchange of revolutionary experience on foot and a return of all participants to their respective schools to participate in power seizures there.¹¹² (c) On February 4, the CCPCC ordered the resumption of primary school classes after the Spring festival. It ordered primary school pupils who had gone to other places to return to their schools to play an active part in struggle-criticism-transformation and to organize studies. Cultural revolution committees were to be elected. Some general knowledge was to be taught, but the emphasis for the time being was to be on political education.¹¹³ (d) On February 8 a renewed plea was made for ending the exchange of revolutionary experience by February 20.¹¹⁴ (e) On February 12 the CCPCC ordered the abolition of all national organizations, such as the liaison centers organized by educated young people who had fled their production posts in rural areas when the cultural revolution began.¹¹⁵ (f) On February 13 the CCPCC ordered schools and other units to refrain from continuing to struggle against the work teams of the previous summer. Now the main attack was to be directed against those who were proponents of the erroneous line.¹¹⁶

On February 19 all middle school students were ordered to stop going elsewhere to forge revolutionary ties by March 1.¹¹⁷

Those who have gone to the countryside or factories are also required to return to their schools, where they must attend their lessons on the one hand and make revolution on the other. In order to strengthen their revolutionary spirit, scientific approach, and concept of organization and discipline, the middle school teachers and students must, by groups and by stages, go through short-term political and military training.¹¹⁸

In addition to short-term political and military training (administered by the PLA), the Red Guard organizations within the schools were to "reorganize, consolidate and develop". Revolutionary committees were to be elected democratically by students, teachers and staff on the basis of the revolutionary grand alliance. Lessons were to be clearly combined with the cultural revolution though some time was

to be devoted to reviewing math, physics, chemistry and foreign languages. There was to be no retaliation against revolutionary teachers and students who had made criticisms. Struggle among mass organizations and any form of violent struggle were prohibited. Finally, teaching ranks were to be reorganized and purified.

A similar set of regulations concerning the cultural revolution in universities, colleges and schools was issued by the CCPCC on March 7. Teachers and students were to return to their schools by March 20, specifically including "those who participated in the seizure of power in other units or are stationed in liaison posts in other localities." These returning students were to engage in struggle-criticism-transformation and to undergo short-term political and military training. They were to criticize and repudiate the "bourgeois academic authorities" and to devise reforms for the educational system, teaching policy, and teaching methods. Except for the few "bourgeois academic authorities," the teaching staff were to be united with and educated. Power was to be held jointly by revolutionary students, revolutionary teachers and revolutionary cadres. As in the middle schools, the Red Guards were to be "rectified, consolidated and developed."¹¹⁹

The Center also found it necessary to re establish order among the thousands of educated youths sent to rural areas after graduation, who had used the cultural revolution as an excuse to flee their production posts and return to the cities. Accordingly, on February 12 Shanghai's Wen-hui Pao issued a call to poor and lower-middle peasants to welcome the educated youths as they returned to the countryside and under no circumstances to blame them for abandoning their posts.¹²⁰ Next, on February 17 the CCPCC called on those who had left to return to their units to participate in seizing power. Liaison stations were to be abolished. The youth were reminded to "participate in agricultural production with contentment and participate in the great proletarian cultural revolution in rural areas." Placement problems, of key importance to these youths, were to be solved gradually by Party Committees at various levels.¹²¹

Responses to Changed Situations

Undoubtedly, there was great confusion among the Red Guards at this juncture. In the first place, the call to return to classes was unexpected, since classes had only recently been cancelled for the second half of the year.¹²² The cancellation of exchange of revolutionary experience was also surprising because a resumption of trips to Peking and elsewhere had been specifically promised in November.¹²³ In addition, attacks on Red Guard egoism and calls for rectification were increasing. The PLA was alienating revolutionary young people by indiscriminately suppressing disruptive organizations regardless of their political coloring. Cadres whom the Red Guards had labelled "counter-revolutionary" and "bourgeois" were now being called "good or comparatively good." Furthermore, Red Guards were meeting with hostility from factory workers and peasants and a series of false power seizures must have been disillusioning to political idealists who believed that they had swept away the old order. Finally, Mao himself seemed to be compromising with the enemy by retreating from his concept of revolutionary power seizure to support the revolutionary committee concept. Since Mao was the embodiment of revolutionary morality for these young people, such backsliding was not so much immoral as unthinkable.

The responses to these confusing developments varied. Some groups, such as "the Tungfanghung Fighting Column of the Lu Hsun Corps of the Revolutionary Rebel Headquarters of the Sports Front of Shanghai" looked to their own faults, to "erroneous trends" in the Red Guard movement and urged an "open rectification" of the Red Guards.¹²⁴ Others disengaged themselves from the political struggle altogether and became "Wanderers," idling in the cities.¹²⁵ Still others moved further left, refusing to recognize any authority at all, drifting toward anarchism. Finally, some stuck to the earlier Maoist line moving left only to the extent that the point of reference moved to the right.¹²⁶ They hoped for a reversal of the "February Adverse Current", of PLA suppression, of the reinstatement of bourgeois cadres, and of the establishment of false power seizures.

The formation of the Red Guard Congress in Peking on February 22¹²⁷ may be seen largely as a means of imposing order and organization from above on the ranks of revolutionary youths, and further confirming that the original trust of the masses and mass spontaneity -- "revolution

from below" -- had been abandoned. It was most likely that in the same spirit in March a prescription for a "true" Red Guard appeared and though much of the language is the same as that found in articles appearing in the summer of 1966, there are significant variations. As before, they were to be dedicated to Mao and to making revolution, but now they were also urged to be willing to make sacrifices, i. e. compromises, for future generations. While continuing to rebel and to struggle by reason, they were also to seek ties with peasants, 'be good at self-criticism and heed the masses.¹²⁸

Attempts to Resume Classes: II

Meanwhile, Mao's March 7 Directive ordered the PLA to give military and political training in the universities, middle and primary schools and to help in reopening classes, in strengthening organization and setting up leading organizations based on the three-in-one combination, and in carrying out struggle-criticism-transformation. The Directive also urged students not to exclude from political and military training those teachers who had made mistakes.¹²⁹ Released with Mao's Directive was a report of the Tientsin Yen'an Middle School "In Realizing the Great Alliance and Reorganizing, Consolidating and Developing the Red Guards in the Whole School With the Teaching Class As the Foundation,"¹³⁰ reporting that with the help of the PLA's political and military training, they had been able to put an end to armed violence and through criticism were able to achieve a three-way alliance in the school and a reorganization of the Red Guard organization. Also discussed were "fears" harbored by organizations in approaching the prospects of a great alliance:

Since the great cultural revolution, many organizations have made contributions to and developed affection for the movement. Now that they are required to return to classes to make revolution, quite a number of living ideas have arisen. They have no clear idea of the relation between the great alliance and the fighting detachments. They fear that they would lose their "sphere of influence" and "office" and that they would be cold-shouldered once they are back in classes. In short, they are troubled by "self-interest."¹³¹

The resumption of classes began very slowly. Many revolutionaries did not heed the initial calls to return. Reluctant to surrender their freedom, they saw no purpose in resuming classes until educational reforms had been enacted. Neither did they want to submit to PLA political and military training, including day-long indoctrination in Mao's thought.

That Red Guard morale was low in this period is evidenced by efforts to boost it. For example, at a Congress of Red Guards of Peking Middle Schools held on March 25, Chiang Ch'ing praised their past, indelible efforts.

Guided by the invincible thought of Mao Tse-tung, the revolutionary Red Guards have performed immortal exploits in the great proletarian cultural revolution. This is something no one can erase. It is our hope that you revolutionary Red Guards will guard against arrogance and rashness, carry forward your merits, overcome your shortcomings and make new contributions to the great proletarian cultural revolution.¹³²

Factionalism continued to be a problem in the middle schools and this was said to be caused by the handful of Party authorities taking the capitalist road. An article relating the situation at Shanghai No. 6 Secondary School for Girls revealed that there were two major revolutionary mass organizations in the school: The "Mao Tse-tung's Thought Red Guards" and the "August 18 Fighting Group of Shanghai Red Guard Headquarters". The article detailed the invidious work of the "handful":

They first persuaded some of those with poor peasant or proletarian family backgrounds that they were the only true revolutionaries and encouraged them to exclude those whose parents were members of the former exploiting classes.... Then they advised the latter to join organizations directly under their influence and told them that they should rebel against their exclusion, on the grounds that "the theory of class origin" was itself reactionary... As a consequence the pupils were divided into revolutionary camps and both were deceived by the executors of the bourgeois reactionary line... As the antagonism grew... the students from the two organizations would each occupy their half of the classroom and refuse to speak to "those from the other side."¹³³

No doubt some factionalism in the schools, especially in this period, resulted from manipulation by outside forces seeking for their own purpose to set the revolutionary masses off against each other. However, fear of loss of position and prestige, the various manifestations of egoism, and the sense of moral rectitude were probably the cause of factional disruption in most schools. Indeed, manipulation by the "handful", where it did occur, would seem to have amounted to capitalizing on these factors.

In early April articles began to appear on the touchy question of teacher-student relations. Many teachers were apparently reluctant to return to their classes for fear that their actions would bring them renewed criticism and besides there were as yet no teaching materials available. They also questioned whether students would any longer respect their authority. On April 2, Kuang-chou Jih-pao released a report from Canton No. 12 Middle School declaring that the barriers and antagonisms that had formerly existed between teachers and students were coming down as a result of the study of Mao's thought.¹³⁴ In an editorial, students were reminded that most teachers were good or comparatively good, that only a small handful were bad elements, and that in "resumption of classes and making of revolution in schools" the revolutionary teachers and students were an integral whole. Students were urged to help teachers correct their views.¹³⁵

On April 13, Peking's Ch'un Lei attacked the system of boarding schools for children of Communist officials, labeling them "hotbeds of revisionism" and declaring that they were all to be smashed.¹³⁶

In reality there was more rhetoric involved in these reports than action. The PLA was confronted with a multitude of problems in the schools. There were a great variety of organizations and it took a tremendous effort to distinguish among them.¹³⁷ and antagonism among the various factions was often too intense to allow formation of revolutionary great alliances. In these circumstances the PLA could only give political and ideological training and inveigh against the perils of egoism and petty bourgeois factionalism. Meanwhile, students had misgivings about the PLA itself because of its suppression of revolutionary mass organizations earlier in the year.

Shift to the Left -- April

Complicating the Army's task was a shift to the left as indicated by a new CCPCC order issued April 1st to the military commands.¹³⁸ It contained five key points. First, mass organizations could no longer be declared counter-revolutionary without prior clearance with the Center. Second, there were to be no indiscriminate arrests.

Those labelled "counter-revolutionary" merely because they have trespassed against or criticized a military district command, or voiced disagreement over the power seizure in a place or unit, shall without exception be freed and orders for the arrest of others not yet in custody shall without exception be rescinded.¹³⁹

Third, even where individual members of mass organizations had conclusively been found to be counter-revolutionary, they were to be distinguished from the organization itself. Fourth, problems were to be resolved by rectification and the development of criticism and self-criticism and not by struggling against the masses.¹⁴⁰ Fifth, the PLA was to support all leftist revolutionary organizations without prejudice.

Obviously this swing to the left must have caused unhappiness in the PLA. Undoubtedly, too, the Red Guards and other revolutionary mass organizations felt vindicated by the policy shift. The decision probably resulted from a number of failures including evidence that the PLA was doing a poor job of recognizing and supporting the genuine left¹⁴¹ and of sham power seizures in some areas.¹⁴² The discovery of the February Adverse Current of T'an Chen-lin,¹⁴³ probably had an important psychological impact on the Central leaders and so did the poor response to resumption of classes accompanied by student disillusionment with the government and the PLA. There was also evidence of counter-revolutionary coups within the PLA¹⁴⁴ and of a build-up of local military power at the expense of central authority. The decision to launch a new and direct attack on Liu Shao-ch'i¹⁴⁵ was probably prompted at least in part by the need for a rallying point for the leftist forces. At any rate, the drift of the Directive and the new anti-Liu campaign combined to make the PLA's efforts to bring about a resumption of classes almost impossible.

By April, an increasing number of youths were again roaming around the country despite the CCPCC which had declared their continued suspension.¹⁴⁶ Apparently the April 1 and April 6¹⁴⁷ curbs on the PLA, and the appeal to the left for renewed denunciations of the bourgeois line encouraged renewed travel by revolutionary youths. On April 17, the Central Military Commission admitted that

Recently it has been discovered that a few people of the literary and art troupes and units of certain colleges and schools have arbitrarily come to Peking or gone to some other places without approval. It considered this an unfavorable development for "the concentration of forces" to make a success of the great cultural revolution in their own units.¹⁴⁸

Only three days later on April 20 the CCPCC found it necessary to reconfirm the earlier order as follow:

Recently a small number of students and masses have again begun to come to Peking and go to other areas to exchange experience and establish revolutionary ties. Some schools in Peking have again sent personnel to outside areas to exchange experience and establish revolutionary ties.¹⁴⁹

No doubt, the coming of spring would in itself have prompted some travel by young people, especially given the Center's earlier assurances that this would be allowed, but the turn to the left surely encouraged the more inhibited. The Center, on the other hand, having learned from experience with the Red Guards and other youths seemed determined to keep tighter control of the movement.

Factionalism and Violent Struggle

These early efforts to control the young people were ineffective. By May 22 JMJP was admitting that:

Of late, a gust of sinister wind of struggle by force has appeared in some areas, between units and between mass organizations. It has interfered with the real orientation of the struggle, stymied the extensive democracy under the conditions of democratic dictatorship, affected and wrecked production, upset the orderly process of revolution, destroyed State property, and threatened security in the lives of the people.¹⁵⁰

At the same time, the Central leaders were wary of repeating the suppression of mass organization which had occurred earlier in the year. Contradictions between the "hoodwinked" and the "revolutionaries," they pointed out repeatedly, are contradictions within the ranks of the people and should be dealt with accordingly through a process of unity-criticism-unity. The Center appealed to those with differences to "seek common ground in major issues while reserving their minor differences."¹⁵¹ At the same time, the hand of the PLA was strengthened by reference to a directive in which Mao noted that the Army had the power to deal with problems of struggle with force.¹⁵²

This threat of renewed PLA intervention signaled a new effort to control violence. On June 6, the CCPCC issued a circular prohibiting "armed struggle, illegal arrest and looting and sabotage." No mass organizations or individuals were to make arrests or set up courts; there was to be no seizure of the files of the Party, government or army; state and collective properties were to be protected; armed struggle, looting, beating-up people and fighting within and among units was forbidden; and no raids were to be conducted. All violations of these provisions were to be "severely" dealt with by garrisons and local troops.¹⁵³ Similarly, on June 24, delegates from various parts of the country in Peking for conferences, revolutionary committees and the like were urged to insure that agreements between opposing factions included the prohibition of street demonstrations, quarrels and mutual attacks, obstruction of the means of transportation, mobilization of peasants to go to the cities, arrests or detentions, and seizure of arms.¹⁵⁴

At the same time, the PLA was being warned against repeating its earlier mistakes. A Chieh-fang Chün Pao editorial urged the PLA to distinguish carefully between the two types of contradictions and to unite with all forces that could be united with.¹⁵⁵ It condemned those PLA comrades who still sought to solve contradictions by coercion. A subsequent editorial asked the PLA to support the left despite its past mistakes and shortcomings.¹⁵⁶ Groups were to be evaluated solely on the basis of whether they followed Mao's instructions:

If only they follow a correct orientation and even if they have some shortcomings and have made some mistakes, we must start from the viewpoint of love for them and enthusiastically

help them correct their shortcomings and mistakes. On no accounts should we take a side stream for the main stream, and make a fuss about the shortcomings and mistakes of the left, and refuse to give them active support.¹⁵⁷

PLA cadres were to have "friendly chats" with the masses, shedding their lofty airs. In a third editorial on June 27, the paper suggested that people in the army who had made mistakes admit and correct their errors and assured the PLA that the people would understand and support them.¹⁵⁸

Attempts to Resume Classes: III

Part of this new campaign to end violent struggle was a renewed effort to resume classes, thus keeping the young people off the streets. As early as May 26, JMJP had praised the concept of PLA supervised political and military training of students in colleges and middle schools.¹⁵⁹ A month later JMJP claimed that Mao's call to "resume classes while continuing the revolution" and to set up three-way alliances was being heeded.¹⁶⁰ In view of later attempts to start classes this seems a questionable claim. More important was the admission that:

... some schools have encountered a great deal of resistance in resuming classes and making revolution. Such resistance comes mainly from the fact that the poison of the bourgeois reactionary line has not been thoroughly eliminated and that the barriers and antagonisms between revolutionary teachers and students and between the students themselves have not been entirely swept away.¹⁶¹

On July 3, JMJP hailed Peking Aviation Institute for resuming classes and making revolution.¹⁶² It had been one of the more active schools in the early days of the cultural revolution and special pressure may have been applied to have it set a "good example". The school was to engage in struggle-criticism-transformation and educational reform for the first two months and shift gradually to an emphasis on academic subjects by September 1. The curriculum in the summer included the study of Mao's thought, labor training in factories, farms and the PLA, and a smattering of specialized knowledge. Initially,

students were to stay in their schools to study, but later they were to get practical training outside the school. The idea seems to have been to gather experience during this experimental period before a formal system of education was developed.

On July 10, there were reports that a number of teachers and students of other colleges were following the example of Peking Aviation Institute in resuming classes.¹⁶³ By July 11, NCNA could report on an oath-taking rally in Peking where more than 30,000 teachers and students representing more than 50 colleges and universities, had sworn to resume classes and make revolution.¹⁶⁴ As we have said the resumption of classes was seen as vital to establishing revolutionary organization and discipline among the teachers and students, but the unity suggested by this rally was spurious. In fact at least six universities and colleges were nowhere near forming a revolutionary great alliance. Peking University, Peking Geological Institute, Peking Normal University, Peking Agricultural University and Tsinghua University all experienced violent outbreaks in early July. Only four days earlier there had apparently been a battle at Peking University among students from these schools; four students were reported killed and more than 300 injured.¹⁶⁵ By July 9, fighting was so severe that Ch'en Po-ta had to be called to the campus in the middle of the night to help restore order.¹⁶⁶

There were parallel developments on the middle school level. On July 3 it was reported that a Tientsin middle school had forged a revolutionary great alliance between pupils and teachers with the help of the PLA. According to the PLA, the formation of the alliance involved overcoming some non-proletarian trends among the young people, including individualism, anarchism, and cliquishness. Middle school students throughout the country were urged to follow the example of this school in resuming classes and making revolution.¹⁶⁷ On July 4 JMJP praised the many middle schools in Shanghai that had formed revolutionary great alliances. It revealed that the curriculum at Shanghai middle schools in July included the study of Mao's thought, military and political training, productive labor, and refresher course in physics, chemistry and foreign languages.¹⁶⁸ However, it appears that in fact many students were not returning to school. JMJP called on parents to support resumption of classes in the following editorial:

...once parents are armed with the thought of Mao Tse-tung they will firmly stand on the side of Chairman Mao's proletarian revolutionary line and recognize the great struggle in resumption of classes while carrying on revolution.¹⁶⁹

By July 14 over 130 Peking middle schools were said to have formed revolutionary great alliances with the help of the PLA.¹⁷⁰

The Wuhan Incident

Efforts to control the left forces were seriously set back when, in the third week of July, the so-called "Wuhan Incident" occurred. Ch'en Tsai-tao, commander of the Wuhan Military region, staged a "counter-revolutionary" coup in Wuhan with the help of many army personnel and mass organizations, most notably including the One Million Heroic Troops. They seized control of much of the city and kidnaped Mao's two emissaries, Wang Li and Hsieh Fu-chih. According to one account, Wang Li was physically mistreated. New Hupeh University and three middle schools were also taken over by force. Young people seem to have been a special target for attack. Many were arrested, including members of New Hupeh University's provisional committee, and some were paraded in the streets. By July 26 the situation was under some degree of control. Wang Li and Hsieh Fu-chih were back in Peking and the leading organ of PLA units in Wuhan had admitted its mistakes of orientation and line and had promised to correct its errors.¹⁷¹ A letter from the CCPCC to the revolutionary masses of Wuhan on July 27 praised the "broad masses" and suggested education for those who had been deceived. It accused responsible members of the Wuhan Region Military Command of dissolving revolutionary organizations and arresting many of their members. An immediate end to this practice was ordered with reinstatement of those falsely arrested. Among the suppressed organizations had been three student groups, representing New China Engineering College, New Hupeh University and the New China Agricultural College. The Wuhan Incident was to be treated as a "vivid lesson" of the struggle between the proletarian and bourgeois lines which should inspire the proletarian revolutionaries to continue the cultural revolution through to the end.¹⁷²

In fact, the Wuhan incident appears to have set off a violent frenzy of activity by the left. Many mass organizations used it as an excuse for an all-out attack on the PLA, and in some cases on all authority. Educational activities of June and July took second place to factional violence throughout August and September.¹⁷³ Apparently fearful that the prestige of the PLA would be totally undermined in the wake of the incident, a series of articles appeared in the Chinese press in late July and August. For example, on July 30, in commemoration of the 40th anniversary of the PLA, JMJP lauded its role as the "strongest pillar of our country's dictatorship of the proletariat".¹⁷⁴

The attacks came anyway. On August 1 Hung-se Pao-tung of Canton demanded that military power be placed firmly in the hands of the proletariat. It argued that the cultural revolution was essentially a struggle for political power which could not succeed until military power was firmly in the hands of Mao's headquarters. It also rejected the idea that "problems in the army should be solved in the army".¹⁷⁵ On August 2, Yao Wen-yuan, a member of the Central Cultural Revolution Group, urged that :

... Politically, ideologically, theoretically, organizationally and in other respects we should ruthlessly and penetratingly expose, completely overthrow, thoroughly criticize and repudiate and discredit China's Khrushchev, P'eng Te-huai, Lo Jui-ch'ing and the handful of other top persons in the Party and army in authority taking the capitalist road, and their counter-revolutionary revisionist line. We should... strike at the handful of reactionaries who are vainly attempting to run back the wheel of history.¹⁷⁶

By August 5, Hung-se Pao-tung had stepped up its attack on the "handful" in the Canton Region Military Command. It claimed to possess a telephone directive and a recorded conversation linking the "responsible leader of Canton Military Region with Hunan's conservatives."¹⁷⁷

Support the PLA

In response to these attacks from Canton (and undoubtedly from elsewhere) Lin Piao is reported to have issued a directive on August 9 declaring that the success of the cultural revolution depended on the prestige of both Mao and the army. He also excused the chaotic

situation by declaring that chaos was necessary to expose the reactionaries, and was a normal part of revolution. He distinguished three kinds of upheaval: struggles of good people against bad people which were fine; struggles of bad people against other bad people which were indirectly useful; and struggles of bad people against good people which were not good, but were to be treated as a contradiction among the people. Lin also established three points for the PLA to apply in order to avoid mistakes. They were: correct investigation of conditions at lower levels; adherence to instructions from the Central Committee; and distinguishing among people on the basis of whether they were for or against Mao and not on the basis of whether they had attacked the military. He also ordered that those who had made mistakes were to receive training with the revolutionary rebels as their teachers and their own mistakes as teaching materials.¹⁷⁸ Additional attempts were made to uphold the image of the PLA by associating it with Mao during the latter part of August. Thus on August 14, NCNA carried a report of a "Conference of Activists in Study of Chairman Mao's Works" that was held by Peking Garrison.¹⁷⁹ Nevertheless the prestige of the PLA was very low during August.

Meanwhile the disorder in the Canton area and elsewhere continued unabated. On August 20, 500 revolutionary rebels in fifteen trucks were said to have been ambushed in the suburbs of Canton by armed members of Ti Tsung and Ch'un Lei. About fifty rebels were killed and many were wounded.¹⁸⁰ An agreement was reached on August 22 between Chou En-lai and fifty-two representatives of revolutionary rebel organizations and twenty-six representatives of conservative organizations in the Canton area which called for a halt to all violent struggle and the putting away of all arms.¹⁸¹ However, a few days later, the Red Flag faction accused "Canton's T'an" (Huang Yung-sheng, Commander of the PLA in the area), Ch'un Lei, District Headquarters and Doctrine Guards of attacking members of the Red Flag in direct violation of Mao's agreement.¹⁸²

This renewed violence prompted NCNA to point out on the first anniversary of Mao's first review of Red Guards that the cultural revolution was aiming at two kinds of power seizure. The first was proletarian seizure of power from that handful of Party authorities taking the capitalist road. Equally important, was the need to seize power in one's own minds by ridding oneself of preoccupation with

self.¹⁸³ It was apparently the renewed violence (interpreted by the Center as political immaturity at the same time that it was being declared necessary) which led the Center to demand a more moderate policy toward the cadres.¹⁸⁴ Perhaps the leadership realized that the experienced cadres were China's chief hope for reestablishing order. As JMJP put it:

"Revolutionary cadres" are vital to the success of the cultural revolution for, without them, the Red Guards who are politically immature may lose their power as soon as they seize it.¹⁸⁵

By the end of August, JMJP was warning that there could be no sure guarantee of victory in the cultural revolution without the PLA¹⁸⁶ while at the same time the Red Flag of South China Teachers Training College was declaring that "Huang Yung-sheng, commander of Canton military region, must be knocked down."¹⁸⁷ On September 4, Wen-hui Pao demanded that revolutionary mass organizations which placed their own interests above those of the Party henceforth cease to do so. It accused them of carrying out only those directives of the Center that met with their approval. It further warned that continued sectarianism would blur the distinction between right and wrong and totally unprincipled factional struggle would result.¹⁸⁸

In Canton disorders continued. There were accusations that the more conservative organizations such as Ti Tsung and Doctrine Guards, had attacked the rebels with guns and the rebels were urged to take up their arms once again, in self-defense.¹⁸⁹ There were increasingly militant warnings by "leftist" students against "right capitulationism" among those revolutionary rebels who were putting such stock in the written agreement to stop violent struggle. True revolutionary rebels were urged never to give up the fight against "Canton's T'an".¹⁹⁰

A more forceful defense of the PLA was obviously necessary if it was to continue to serve as a viable part of Chinese society. On September 5 the CCPCC issued an order prohibiting the seizure of arms, equipment, and other military supplies from the PLA. It called on all of the people to "care for the PLA and support it." The PLA was instructed to correct people's wrong acts through political and ideological work and to fire in the air if education failed. If there was continued resistance, arrests of the counter-revolutionary

leaders should be made and in the event they resisted, the PLA was authorized to fight in self-defense.¹⁹¹

Equally important was the talk delivered by Chiang Ch'ing at a conference of representatives from Anhwei in Peking on September 5. Chiang, as an acknowledged spokesman for the left forces among the Central leaders, was apparently chosen to forewarn the Red Guards and young people of an impending government crackdown. She spoke out against armed struggle and singled out an "ultra-left" organization, the May 16 Corps, denouncing it as being counter-revolutionary. A majority of its members were described as hoodwinked young people, led by a minority of bourgeois elements. This group was said to have centered its attacks on Chou En-lai but she neglected to add that its "bourgeois leadership" included Wang Li and other of her chief associates. Another indication that the speech was a concession to the PLA and a turn to the right was her denunciation of the efforts by some groups to "seize a handful in the army", for the slogan had become the rallying cry for left organizations in various parts of the country.¹⁹²

A new barrage of articles on the PLA appeared. On September 9, JMJP declared that "Without A People's Liberation Army the People Have Nothing". It warned proletarian revolutionaries to be very careful in handling their relations with the PLA and to avoid undermining its strength and prestige.¹⁹³ On September 14, JMJP called for unity, admitting that the revolutionary ranks were deeply divided.¹⁹⁴ On the same day, Wen-hui Pao criticized proletarian revolutionary organizations for vying with one another for leadership positions and blamed this situation on their ego indulgence.¹⁹⁵ Nung-ts'un Ch'ing-nien joined in the call to support the army and condemned the egoism of certain revolutionary "young comrades".¹⁹⁶

Violence did continue in Canton and elsewhere, but it now had an air of desperation in light of the new determination of the Central leaders to restore order. Evidence of this determination is seen most clearly in a speech delivered by Chou En-lai in mid-September, to representatives of universities and colleges in Peking. In his talk he lashed out at the Red Guards for their arms seizing activities, for their network of national liaison stations and for their slogan of "dragging out the handful in the Army." He warned the Red Guards that they had one month to return to their schools and that those who did not would be expelled and would forfeit graduation.¹⁹⁷ In his parting words,

Chou warned the Red Guards that the situation had changed from that of the year before:

The time has changed. The present leaders have survived tests. Mistakes can be criticized, but nothing like what has taken place before should be repeated... You have more or less made mistakes, but this was mainly because of your wrong appraisal of the situation. Chairman Mao told us to tell you that it is now the turn of you revolutionary young fighters who are in the wrong.¹⁹⁸

In a similar vein, Chiang Ch'ing had warned representatives of the Ti faction of Red Guards in Peking on September 17 to call back their representatives from liaison centers all over the country. She advised them to confine their activities to their own units.¹⁹⁹ In early October more was revealed about the "ultra-left" May 16 Corps in a speech by Chou which condemned the organization that was said to have been plotting against him. Amplifying the earlier charges against the group he ended by urging the "hoodwinked" masses to "drag themselves out".²⁰⁰

Crackdown on Young People

The new campaign to crack down on young people began to take shape in October and focussed on three major goals: The return of wandering educated youths to their posts in rural and mountain areas; the resumption of classes; and assignment of jobs to 1965 and 1966 graduates.

The educated youths who, after graduation, had been sent to work in the rural and mountainous areas were among China's most disillusioned young people at the start of the cultural revolution. Eagerly leaving their work posts in late 1966 and early 1967 they had returned to the cities embittered with experiences of cruel and inhumane treatment. Many associated the policies by which they felt they had been victimized with Liu Shao-ch'i, hoping that these policies would be discredited along with the denounced leader. However, the Central leaders rejected the charge and insisted instead that the youths themselves had been deceived by a handful of powerholders in the Party taking the capitalist road.²⁰¹ Efforts by the young people

to have their stories heard by municipal and provincial authorities met with little success. A "September 7 Incident" is said to have occurred in Wuhan municipality in which a group of "educated youths," apparently returned from rural areas where they had been assigned to do labor, were fired on by fully armed workers as they tried to take their complaints to the "employment office" of the "General Headquarters of Proletarian Revolutionary Groups in Wuhan for Grasping Revolution and Promoting Production." Some were killed and many were wounded.²⁰²

On October 8 the CCPCC issued a circular on "The Necessity for Educated Youths and Other Personnel Assigned to Work in Rural and Mountainous Areas to Persist in Staying in the Countryside to Grasp Revolution and Promote Production" in which once again the Center refused to deal with the complaints of the educated youths. Instead it repeated earlier orders to return to rural posts, to dissolve liaison posts established in the cities and to prohibit membership in mass organizations of the cities by these youths. On the other hand, the circular called on the workers and cadres of rural people's communes to bring politics to the fore, to treat the educated youth fairly, and to deal with problems of the youths' housing and safety in the coming winter.²⁰³

As if to convince the Center (and the revolutionary masses) that their situation was more desperate than the circular acknowledged, several student accounts of "atrocities" appeared in early November. "What We Saw and Heard on T'ungshan Ridge" detailed violent discrimination against educated youths sent to work at a state farm in Hunan. All the youths sent there were said to be in debt because, although they worked thirty days a month, they could not earn enough money for food. They also complained that their injuries were not attended to.²⁰⁴ In "Letter from Ch'aling" a group of former middle and primary school students complained about the harsh treatment that they had received at another state farm. According to their report, some of those sent to the farm were as young as thirteen, many suffered from diseases, and they were not paid regulation wages and therefore could not eat properly.²⁰⁵ Stories such as these had probably circulated before the issuance of the CCPCC directive, but the Central leaders seemed unwilling to make even token efforts to answer the youths' complaints. Understandably, the young were reluctant to return to work.

This issue became even more important in late 1967 as many 1965 and 1966 graduates were permanently assigned to mountain and rural areas. In any circumstances few would have been eager to go but these atrocity stories cannot have increased their enthusiasm. However, Party organs persevered in urging students to place the "interests of the revolution above all else."²⁰⁶ On October 25 Nung-ts'un Ch'ing-nien said:

For educated youths to go to the countryside and mountainous areas to integrate themselves with workers and peasant masses and to participate in the three great revolutionary movements of class struggle, the struggle for production, and scientific experimentation as well as the construction of a new socialist countryside -- this is a great call of our most respected and beloved leader Chairman Mao. It is a basic measure for promoting revolutionization of youths' thinking and cultivating them into successors to the proletarian revolutionary cause.²⁰⁷

These exhortations continued until the end of the year. On December 21, Hung-se Ch'ing-nien declared that going to rural areas to settle down and do farm work was the correct orientation for educated youths. Revealingly, it also urged those still exchanging revolutionary experience elsewhere to return to their posts.²⁰⁸

Attempts to Resume Classes: IV

The next campaign to resume classes was officially promulgated on October 14 in a CCPCC Circular. First, all universities, secondary schools and primary schools without exception were ordered to commence classes immediately. Second, Mao's directive concerning combating self-interest and repudiating revisionism was to be seriously enacted. Third, teaching, study and reforms were all to be carried out simultaneously. Fourth, all schools were to realize the revolutionary great alliance and establish the leadership of three-in-one combinations. Fifth, teachers for the most part were to be considered good or comparatively good; those teachers who had made mistakes but had recognized and corrected them, were to be allowed to continue work. Sixth, preparations were to be made immediately for the recruitment of new students.²⁰⁹

During October, editorials supporting these provisions and reporting the progress of various universities and middle schools appeared.²⁰⁹ a Tung Ch'i University's educational reforms received attention on October 30 when it was reported that the students had visited factories and villages to solicit the opinions of workers and peasants on transforming education.²¹⁰ On November 3 *JMJP* featured the tentative proposals of Tung Ch'i University for transforming education. The emphasis was to be on combining education and production. The school was to be administered by two three-way alliances. The first would combine revolutionary leading cadres, leaders of revolutionary mass organizations and the militia while the other would include teaching, designing and building units. Students were to engage in productive labor each year with the necessary term of study reduced to three years. This new system was supposed to be conducive to the ideological remodeling of intellectuals and the elimination of town/country, worker/peasant and mental labor/manual labor dichotomies.²¹¹

The reform program of Peking Teachers' University dealt more specifically with academic matters. Examinations were to be used to promote study by testing reasoning instead of mere memory. Students would no longer repeat courses. Politics was to be stressed and student initiative was to be cultivated. The class line was to be carried out in admitting new students with entrance examinations abolished in favor of the system of recommendation and selection.²¹²

One of the most interesting documents of the period concerning teacher/student relationships, "Stipulating Respect for Teachers and Love for Students", formulated by a Peking Middle School, was reproduced by NCNA on November 11. The main emphasis for students was on developing greater self-discipline and a relationship of political concern for and mutual help with the teachers. Teachers were to creatively apply Mao's thought, maintain "togetherness with the students," maintain self-discipline and have respect for the opinion of the masses.²¹³

The theme that resistance to revolutionary struggle arose from concern with "self" was developed further in an article by East China Teachers University which prescribed five points necessary for a successful educational revolution: the study of Mao's thought; the practice of struggle and criticism before transformation; the transformation

of the educational system as a whole, rather than specific subjects; the fostering of a new relationship of unity and helpfulness between teachers and students and the furtherance of revolution within the university, rather than outside it.²¹⁴

Finally, in the closing months of 1967 there were also attacks on the idea of intellectual education being superior to other more practical kinds of education, and on the length of medical and other specialized educational programs.²¹⁵

All of these reports on reform activity indicate general adherence to the principles of educational reform outlined by the Center including a new teacher/student relationship, a changed enrollment policy introducing political criteria in place of purely academic ones, the need to combine "theoretical" education with productive labor and, most important, the primary importance of Mao's thought in all aspects of education. Variations in the specific proposals are not really significant being due mainly to differences of locale and authorship. The exception to this appears to be that of Tung Ch'i University; where the proposed double three-way alliance seems a genuine attempt to bring the students out of the classroom and into the real Chinese world.

The resumption of classes must still have been lagging however, for on December 14 JMJP again found it necessary to reprimand "some comrades (who) think that it is not necessary to resume classes in order to carry out revolutionary mass criticism."²¹⁶ By December 31 the Revolutionary Joint Committee of Middle School Red Guards of Canton took a harsher line, urging that punitive measures be taken against those teachers and students who without valid reason had not yet returned to their schools.²¹⁷

Clearly late 1967 marked a low ebb indeed for young revolutionaries. Forced to return to school, they could only foresee a future assignment to unwanted, and intellectually unrewarding, lifetime jobs in rural areas. They were being subjected to great ideological pressures with their role as "vanguards" of the revolution increasingly undermined by charges that they were "politically immature" with much to learn from the masses of workers and peasants and from the PLA. Additionally, they were confused by their conflict with the PLA which they now viewed as hostile and conservative but which their early training had taught them to regard as a friend and ally. The obvious shift of power to the military and in favor of bureaucratized stability must indeed have had a powerfully disillusioning effect on many young people.

Sheng Wu-lien

Youthful response to disillusion can be seen in part from an examination of pronouncements of Sheng Wu-lien. In early October of 1967, as the suppression of leftists began in earnest, some twenty organizations in Hunan had founded the Hunan Provincial Proletarian Revolutionaries Great Alliance Committee, or Sheng Wu-lien, whose prime movers were middle school students.²¹⁸ Three of this organization's documents are available to us. The most important, "Whither China?", expresses youthful despair at the turn events were taking but also indicates a vague faith in the future.²¹⁹ Sheng Wu-lien claimed to have taken the inspiration for its primary political goal -- the establishment of people's communes -- from Mao himself.²²⁰ It rejected the revolutionary committee as a superficial political innovation supporting the same power interests that had dominated China before the power seizures.²²¹ In its view, there were two remaining barriers to fulfillment of the cultural revolution. These were the red capitalist bureaucracy as epitomized by Chou En-lai²²² and the Army.²²³ Both of these obstacles could be overcome only by revolution.²²⁴ Their distrust of the PLA is the inevitable result of PLA suppression of leftist groups in 1967 which had undone years of indoctrination that the army and the people were like "fish and water."

During the January Revolution, the people had some very childish ideas on the power of the army.²²⁵

It is now seen that the Army now is different from the people's army before the Liberation. Before the Liberation the army and the people fought together to overthrow imperialism, bureaucratic capitalism, and feudalism. The relationship between army and people was like that of fish and water. After Liberation, as the target of revolution has changed from imperialism, bureaucratic capitalism and feudalism to capitalist-roaders, and as these capitalist-roaders are power-holders in the army, some of the armed forces in the revolution have not only changed their blood-and-flesh relationship with the people that existed before Liberation, but have even become tools for suppressing the revolution... if the first great proletarian cultural revolution is to succeed, a radical change in the army will be necessary.²²⁶

Moreover, they saw the necessity of violent struggle to overthrow the red capitalist class that Chou represented.²²⁷

Sheng Wu-lien ascribed the failure of uprisings in January and August of 1967 to lack of popular understanding of the depth of change necessary in the political structure. The January Revolution was said to have failed for having been aimed at individuals in office rather than at the class they represented.²²⁸

Interestingly enough the three documents, especially "Whither China?", do not come to terms with the inherent conflict between their statements and their faith in Mao. Mao, their leader and the embodiment of their revolutionary ethic, cannot be conceived as doing anything detrimental to the leftist position, except in the service of a broader vision. His "retreats" are attributed to his wisdom and the people's lack of understanding. Thus, Mao is said to have been justified in disregarding the "unrealistic" demands of "impatient" revolutionaries and making a "broad retreat" of unprecedented proportions.²²⁹ Yet, one hears in this analysis a plea for further explanation from the leader as to why an "unprecedented" retreat was necessary.

Mao himself never seems to have attacked Sheng Wu-lien directly, but if he had it might have been in terms he had used in 1937:

We are also opposed to "left" phrase-mongering. The thinking of "leftists" outstrips a given stage of development of the objective process; some regard their fantasies as truth, while others strain to realize in the present an ideal which can only be realized in the future. They alienate themselves from the current practice of the majority of the people and from the reality of the day, and show themselves adventurist in their actions.²³⁰

The Sheng Wu-lien leaders might argue that this did not apply to them but they could hardly make such a claim in reply to the attacks of recognized left leaders in the Central government. K'ang Sheng attacked the organization on a broad front for opposing the preparatory group for Hunan Provincial Revolutionary Committee, contradicting Mao's views (he is said to have personally approved the Hunan preparatory group), describing the state machinery as a "privileged class" to be smashed, and for distorting the intent of Chiang Ch'ing's September fifth speech and labeling it a "strategic retreat."²³¹

Chiang Ch'ing appears to have been caught in an embarrassing position. She had of course supported the young revolutionaries and her speech was indeed a retreat. Trying to salvage as much of the situation as possible, she insisted that not everyone who had joined Sheng Wu-lien, not even all its leaders, were bad and she asked that a distinction be made between the really bad leaders and the "hoodwinked" masses.²³²

Finally, Sheng Wu-lien was accused of having had some connections with members of the "May 16 Corps,"²³³ which had been denounced earlier for trying to create dissension in the Central leadership and separate Chou from the members of the Central Cultural Revolution Group.

Sheng Wu-lien documents eloquently the desperation felt by the young after the crackdown of autumn, 1967. Deprived of the illusion that the PLA was their friend and more fearful than ever of the bureaucracy, these students of middle school age opted for violent revolution and struggled to maintain their image of Mao as unerring leader.

IV. The Cultural Revolution: 1968

The early months of 1968 brought a consolidation of military control and reimposition of bureaucratic regulation in China. The young left forces were on the defensive everywhere.

In education, there were more demands for reform by local college and school groups, but they were only variations on earlier themes. There were renewed calls for shortening the period of schooling but with a new call for all students to do manual labor after a few years of school:

After going to school for a comparatively short time, creatively studying and applying Chairman Mao's writings and laying a foundation in moral, intellectual and physical development, all students require tempering and need to grow up in the midst of actual struggle.²³⁴

This argument was given official approval in a JMJP editorial of the same day. Also attacked were attempts to stress technical accomplishments at the expense of proletarian politics,²³⁵ and purges of left faculty members which occurred in Chungshan University and probably elsewhere.

By March, authorities in both Shanghai and Canton were admitting that the hoped-for resumption of classes was not going smoothly. Revolutionary committees were said to exist in all Shanghai primary schools and in 80% of the middle schools, but some of them seem to have been merely formal rather than fully operating structures. Wen-hui Pao admitted that violent struggle was continuing in some schools; that others were still split among quarrelling factions; that there was much scrambling for leadership positions on the new school-wide revolutionary committees; that some students ignored the leadership of these committees and prevented their fellow students from returning to school; and that some dissatisfied elements threatened sabotage, thus frightening teachers and students to stay out of school.²³⁶ In another article, Wen-hui Pao referred to three prevalent arguments against resumption of classes which were that classes were no longer like classes but were completely lifeless; that courses that tried to impart "knowledge" signified a restoration of old things; and that current explorations in the educational revolution were a waste of time, because the Center was bound to establish unified principles of educational revolution soon anyway. The Wen-hui Pao answer to these "wrong" arguments, was to arm students with Mao's thought.²³⁷

The three arguments, accepted as genuinely those of Shanghai's youths, indicate their disillusionment, lack of will to pursue more "revolution" at least on such a limited scale, and a willingness on the part of many students to let "authority" take over.

Apparently, a similar problem existed in Canton for on March 7 Nan-fang Jih-pao noted in an editorial that:

... There are some students who care nothing about resuming classes to make revolution and would not go back to school sometimes, they would only take a look here and there and then home again. Is that right? Some of them, hoodwinked by bad men, even engage themselves in fighting, smashing things, taking things by force and such improper acts. That is even more dangerous.²³⁸

A broad-based attack on factionalism was launched in early 1968. A movement to "support the left, not any faction", was reported by NCNA on January 7th in which the PLA was told to give unlimited support to all those who supported Mao's line, regardless of factional labels. In practice, this policy often seemed aimed at reestablishing order at any price.²³⁹ On January 12 Wen-hui Pao detailed ten crimes of factionalism.²⁴⁰ Among other things the factionalists were accused of interpreting directives for their own ends, placing their own interests above the people's, "taking the part for the whole" in labelling rival organizations as bad because of a few bad elements, and coming out in greatest force when trying to secure "seats on committees". Factionalism was condemned as the great enemy of the cultural revolution:

... bourgeois and petty-bourgeois factionalism is actually a very dangerous enemy hiding in our ranks. It sows dissension, impairs unity, dampens the fighting spirit, jeopardizes revolution, undermines production, shields bad elements, aids and abets them and does everything that is bad. We must topple it as if it were a bitter enemy.²⁴¹

Factionalism in Canton: I

The factionalism in Canton gives us a clear view of the Sheng Wu-lien position in action. Of the two major factions in Canton, "East Wind" was the more moderate. In 1968, it generally supported the PLA and the revolutionary committee. Red Flag, the more left

group, generally refused to recognize the revolutionary committee, condemned the PLA as infiltrated by a bourgeois handful, distrusted the policy of moderation toward erring cadres, and stressed the need for more disruption to achieve thorough revolutionization. All these positions were shared by the Sheng Wu-lien.

This new opposition to all factions had complex results in Canton. While on the one hand factionalism was condemned as an evil to be eliminated, on the other both East Wind and Red Flag were two factions, two revolutionary mass organizations, that had been recognized by the Center. Presumably since factionalism involved contradiction among the people the two groups should speedily resolve their differences. East Wind adhered to this official version of the situation in Canton. However, Red Flag argued that its dispute with such groups as Ti Tsung and Doctrine Guards involved problems of line and not of quarrelling factions. For example, in Hung Ch'i P'ing-lun of January 1968,²⁴² the Canton Red Flag group argued against the "revisionist trend of thought" which incorrectly labels the struggle between the two lines as "factional struggle." Instead it said:

...The Hung Ch'i faction mainly comprises those revolutionary rebels who have battled against the bourgeois reactionary line, consistently adhered to Chairman Mao's revolutionary line, closely followed Chairman Mao's great strategic plan, put daring above everything else and bravely fought against the capitalist roaders, the bourgeois reactionary line and all old practices and forces of habit.²⁴³

These opposing views of the situation in Canton run through pro-government and pro-PLA pronouncements on the one hand and "left" Red Flag pronouncements on the other. At the end of February, NCNA denounced factionalism as an outgrowth of "self-interest".²⁴⁴ The "mountain stronghold" mentality was similarly attacked as "enlarged individualism" and contrary to basic communist principles.²⁴⁵

Meanwhile, the "leftists" continued to argue the need for more chaos in Canton, but -- they claimed -- only as a means to realize Mao's revolutionary vision. They were anarchists only to the extent that they were opposed to the system of order of the PLA/bureaucracy. Perhaps, in the Center's view, anyone opposed to that order was opposed to all order. Representative was the Pa-i Chan-pao article "More Widespread Disorder Called For In Canton" which said:

The conservative forces entrenched in Canton are still quite strong. Because of their political resurgence in recent months, organizationally they continue to command a definitely superior position...

To alter this situation it is necessary to foment as much chaos as possible. Throwing the enemy into disarray and tempering the masses of people is what Chairman Mao has clearly enumerated when touching on the current situation.²⁴⁶

Praising the January Revolution period of chaos as the one time that the rebels dared to think to speak up and to act,²⁴⁷ the article expressed support for the "revolutionary spirit" of the revolutionary committee but not for its structure.²⁴⁸ Finally, in direct opposition to official policy, it advocated retaining mountain strongholds.

...Only when the "left" faction has greater superiority in the relative strength between the two major factions (not merely in the relative number of places in the united organizations) can the members of that faction play the role of unified leadership. Therefore, even if the two major factions have now formed an alliance they should not immediately abandon their "mountain stronghold."²⁴⁹

Within this context, Huang Yung-sheng's speech at the inaugural rally of the Kwangtung and Canton Revolutionary Committees on February 23, could only have alienated further the "left" forces. In it he lauded the PLA for its part in the cultural revolution and urged the Red Guards and other revolutionary mass organizations to "regulate themselves organizationally."²⁵⁰ The Canton Municipal Revolutionary Committee edicts against anarchism and against "seeking the limelight" must have seemed particularly irritating and in no way conciliatory to these forces.²⁵¹

Nod to the Left

There was an apparent movement leftwards in early spring as evidenced in a JMJP editorial of April 20th titled "Victory for the Proletarian Revolutionaries" in which a new definition of factionalism was proposed that distinguished between proletarian factionalism

and bourgeois factionalism.²⁵² This coupled with a renewed demand by Mao that both rival factions and PLA units undergo indoctrination and that regional and district commanders of the PLA help local armed units correct their mistakes,²⁵³ perhaps reflects his growing uneasiness about the heavy hand that the PLA was using to restore order.

This thesis is supported by the increasing concern that was being shown in March about "right reversals of verdict." As early as March 29 Wen-hui Pao had declared that some people were trying to "reverse the right verdict" on the adverse current of February, 1967. It called for defeat of such attempts as an important aspect of the struggle to defend the proletarian headquarters.²⁵⁴ If such rightist trends were genuinely disturbing the Center, some mobilization or at least conciliation of "left" organizations, would be necessary to signal a change of heart. The JMJP editorial seems to have been designed to have that effect.

This notion is further born out in a Wen-hui Pao editorial "Factionalism Must Be Subjected To Class Analysis" which appeared on April 26 in comment on the JMJP editorial of the previous day. The editorial declared that the struggle between the "two classes, two roads and two lines" would go on and that the most important aspect of this struggle was right reversal of verdict and right splitism, right capitulationism and right conservatism.²⁵⁵

There are two tests of the significance of this "turn to the left". First, there is the question of whether the PLA/bureaucratic position was strong enough to obviate even feigned compliance. Subsequent events seem to indicate that while their position had solidified, they were not strong enough to defy even "feigned compliance" which in itself gave a useful boost to the new policies. The second test was how receptive the "left" forces continued to be to Maoist proddings. Though there were increasing signs of disillusionment and discontent among the revolutionary youth by early 1968, and a certain segment was becoming totally alienated, some youth seemed prepared to have one more go at it. Their willingness to tread the revolutionary path at Mao's call seems to have resulted from the association that many youths made between their early days as "revolutionary vanguards" and the freedoms and official respect that they enjoyed in that period as contrasted with their subordinate and not very respectable situation in Chinese society in the spring of 1968. Perhaps also contributing

to this shift to the left was the need to conciliate the young while preparing to disperse them in the countryside after the 1968 graduations. The events of the second quarter of 1968 support both these explanations.

Factionalism in Canton: II

Factional struggle reached renewed intensity undoubtedly as a result of the Center's announced approval of proletarian factionalism. Reports from Canton indicate that the effect of the change was to strengthen the determination of both the PLA and the left. For example, Chungshan University's August 31 Combat Corps reported being harassed by the Canton Garrison Headquarters²⁵⁶ and boldly declared:

It has been discovered that, in the great proletarian cultural revolution, a handful of diehard reactionaries have sneaked into the Canton Garrison Headquarters and usurped the sacred tool of the proletarian dictatorship so as to constantly oppose the series of directives by Supreme Commander Chairman Mao...²⁵⁷

In turn, a group of East Wind fighters, defending the Canton Garrison Headquarters, labeled the August 31 article a "big poisonous weed."²⁵⁸ By May 30, there were pitched battles reported between PLA men and students. In one involving No. 22 Middle School, 130 PLA men were said to have been wounded, 18 of them seriously.²⁵⁹

Chungshan University was the focal point of violent struggle in June. The most severe episode was the incident of June 3, in which members of the Red Flag faction were accused of having set fire to the school of physics, killing some of the East Wind members trapped inside. Firearms and poison gas were reportedly used.²⁶⁰ That some of the revolutionary young people still felt a personal loyalty to Mao is revealed in the closing paragraph of a letter sent by some of Chungshan University's East Wind fighters to Mao on June 5, appealing to him for help.

Chairman Mao, Oh, Chairman Mao, all our fighters are boundlessly faithful to you. We have made an oath long ago that we will live to fight for your revolutionary line... we shall fight to the very end. Our spirit will remain although we may be killed.²⁶¹

The bloodshed at Chungshan University resulted in renewed appeals by the more conservative groups for an end to strife and for unity against the class enemies who were accused of spreading rumors against the Party Center and against the PLA, of having provoked violent struggle and promoted hunger strikes, and of having attacked leading members of the revolutionary committee. This was a direct attack on the tactics employed by Red Flag, August 31, and other such groups.²⁶²

Similar violence was occurring on the middle school level. The "June 6 Incident" in Canton is said to have included the kidnapping of a Red Guard of the Red Flag faction by a group of peasants. An attempt to gain his release was met by peasant gunfire and hand grenades. The students reported that their request for PLA help was refused on the grounds that the PLA was only there to propagate Mao's thought.²⁶³

Violence was also occurring in other parts of Kwangtung. Pi-hsueh Huang-po detailed a "counter-revolutionary massacre" on a state farm in Yingte where peasants allegedly attacked the educated youths of the farm. Several of them were tortured, and six persons were killed, including five youths and one revolutionary cadre.²⁶⁴

Factionalism in Wuchow

Violent factional struggle was also increasing in Wuchow. That students were involved in these struggles is clear from a meeting that Chou held later in the summer with representatives of the two factions of Wuchow.²⁶⁵ The two factions involved were the more conservative Wuchow Lien-chih (The Wuchow Combined Command) and the more noisy "Revolutionary Rebel Grand Army April 22". The first group seemed to enjoy the support of the PLA while the latter was always at odds with it. Both groups had been declared genuine revolutionary mass organizations by the Center but the events of this period bear witness to a steady diminution of the power of "April 22" at the hands of the PLA and the Alliance Command. The Alliance Command was accused by its rival of having burned down 2,000 buildings in Wuchow in an attempt to suppress "April 22",²⁶⁶ whose members by May were seeking refuge in Canton. There they were verbally attacked by the more conservative groups such as Ti Tsung.²⁶⁷ The headquarters of April 22 in Kwangsi had been leveled²⁶⁸ by June. "April 22" forces in exile in Canton were accusing the "capitalist roaders" in Wuchow of setting up one-sided revolutionary committees which excluded their members.

"April 22" fighters are firm defenders of the revolutionary committees; But, the capitalist-roaders in Kwangsi adopted the method of slaughtering rebels and set up revolutionary committees participated in by "Lien Chih" alone. This enabled the conservatives to overthrow previous decisions and the capitalist-roaders to reverse the verdict on themselves. This is an important point of the rightist reversal of verdicts in Kwangsi. Therefore, it is necessary to expose, criticize and repudiate these revolutionary committees. 269

Attempts to Resume Classes: V

Given this renewed turmoil, it is easy to understand the relative lull in educational reform during this period. Without question the most hailed event was the solidification of Tung Ch'i University's "May 7 Commune". The reforms proposed there the previous autumn had been put into practice apparently satisfying the Central leaders, for in the spring the May 7 Commune was held up as a model for other colleges and college students throughout the country. The three-way alliance between 220 teachers and students, thirty designers from East China Design Institute and 900 engineers from the Shanghai Municipal Building Construction Bureau was said to have helped to remold the world view of the students.

In their practice in the past half year, the revolutionary teachers and students of "May 7" commune have come to realize that the united body formed of the school, the construction work unit and the designing unit is a good classroom for speeding up the ideological revolution of the intellectuals and fostering a new proletarian generation. Intellectuals collect in schools, which are easily flooded by bourgeois ideology. 270

The content of teaching had also been simplified by connecting it with practical work.

Perhaps a more accurate reflection of the effect on the schools of the factional struggle of the period, was a speech by Chang Ch'un-ch'ao to the General Office of the Shanghai Municipal Revolutionary Committee. He reminded members that student problems had to be handled with prudence and that the scope of attacks on the student body had to be narrowly confined:

You of the Normal University have gone too far in so short a period and people are complaining about it. If the students are to be handled properly, the scope of attack must not be too wide. This is different from the struggle against the small handful of renegades, special agents and capitalist roaders. The teachers' ranks must be cleared out boldly. We must not ask everyone to pass the test, nor is it necessary to read the files of everyone.²⁷¹

Similarly, on June 11 the students of Nanking University and Nanking Engineering College were again urged to end factional struggles.²⁷²

The same chaotic situation existed in middle schools. In June, the Red Flag United Front of Canton issued a report on right reversals of verdict in Canton middle schools in which six types were discerned. They were: attempts to reverse the correct decisions made on capitalist roaders and traitors within the Party; attempts to edge out revolutionary cadres; attempts to suppress proletarian factionalism but indulge bourgeois factionalism; attempts to disintegrate the revolutionary ranks; and attempts to exclude revolutionary rebels from middle school revolutionary committees. The investigation team admitted that some bad people had infiltrated the revolutionary ranks but argued that this was not surprising but was part of the law of class struggle.²⁷³

We can see still more clearly the effect that violent factionalism was having on the schools by the rather surprising announcement in Kuang-chou Hung-tai-hui that some universities and schools were still unable to resume classes, more than fifteen months after the resumption had first been ordered. The delay was blamed on bourgeois factionalism.²⁷⁴

Job Assignments

The many graduating students to be assigned jobs at the beginning of the summer was the other main concern of the government. Most educated youths were to be sent to rural areas to settle permanently among the peasant masses. As early as April 20 Wen-hui Pao took note of the negative attitude adopted by "some" university graduates about going to such areas. The attitude that they would be "losing more than they can gain" is laid to a bourgeois world outlook and

revisionism in education.²⁷⁵ By early May, Wen-hui Pao had begun a campaign to convince youth of the importance of settling down in rural areas. It implied that their loyalty would be open to question if they refused their assignments.²⁷⁶ The following excerpt from Mao's "Orientation of the Youth Movement" was held up to the young people as the standard to be followed:

How should we judge whether a youth is a revolutionary?
How can we tell? There can only be one criterion, namely, whether or not he is willing to integrate himself with the broad masses of workers and peasants and does so in practice. If he is willing to do so, he is a revolutionary; otherwise he is a non-revolutionary or a counter-revolutionary.²⁷⁷

Taking up this theme, Wen-hui Pao urged youths to integrate with the workers and peasants and temper themselves for the rest of their lives. The workers, peasants and soldiers were extolled as the best teachers of revolutionary youth. Particular importance was attached to learning the masses' revolutionary firmness and revolutionary thoroughness, overcoming their petty-bourgeois proneness to waver continuously, and heightening their proletarian consciousness...²⁷⁸

That resistance was strong can also be deduced from a Wen-hui Pao article of May 25 which warned that class enemies were trying to sabotage the complex task of job allotments. Another article noted that 2,000 representatives of 500 Shanghai middle schools had met on May 24 to exchange experience on how best to perform ideological and political work with that year's graduates. The object of this intensive indoctrination was to make them more willing to go to the rural areas.²⁷⁹

By June 9, one thousand graduates of Shanghai middle schools were meeting to voice their determination to go to rural and frontier areas to settle down permanently. They were warned anew that this movement would be resisted not only by class enemies, but also by some comrades.²⁸⁰

A circular of the Peking Municipal Revolutionary Committee attacked the great importance that many educated youths attached to cities:

It is also necessary to thoroughly criticize and repudiate the bourgeois reactionary line of attaching importance to cities, holding the countryside in contempt, using bourgeois selfishness to corrupt the youths and sabotaging the policy of mobilizing educated youths to go to rural and mountain areas.²⁸¹

About the same time Hung ch'i T'ung-hsun of Canton published a directive on job allotment which provided that social science graduates were to go to the army and state farms; some engineering students were to be sent to factories, others to farms; and medical students were to go to those rural areas where there was insufficient medical service.²⁸²

On June 17 Wen-hui Pao found it necessary yet again to admonish young people who still thought that they should get better jobs than as farmhands,²⁸³ and by June 30, appeals were being made to the parents of graduates to encourage their children to go down to the rural jobs to which they had been assigned.²⁸⁴ In addition, reports began to appear detailing the transformations experienced by educated youths who had gone to rural areas. Referring to some youths who had gone to Inner Mongolia to settle, a group of peasants said:

The educated youths had never taken part in labor before. However, after coming to our village, they showed no fear of hard work and fatigue and rushed to do the different jobs... In only a few months, they learned to do many farm jobs and were much stronger than they were when they first arrived here...

...they earnestly tempered themselves in the three major struggles.²⁸⁵

To summarize, there was by late June a definite increase in violent factionalism, a reduction of serious efforts to reform education, dissatisfaction among graduates with job allocation and a strong campaign to get educated youths to the countryside despite their prejudice. The "turn to the left" had in a sense stopped almost as soon as it had started. What had begun as an encouragement to proletarian factionalism had blended quickly into a further dispersion of youthful forces to the countryside.

Violent Struggle

Violent factional struggle continued into the summer of 1968. Conflict was reported in various colleges across the country. Continuous and intense violence was reported at Tsinghua University in Peking in late June. Posters appearing in Peking on July 7 reported fifteen students killed in these clashes. The two major factions of the school were involved and participants were said to have been armed with sub-machine guns and grenades. Indeed, posters reported that the main building had been burned down while occupied by one hundred people. A rally occurred outside the Peking Municipal Revolutionary Committee office on July 7 to protest the killings of some faction members. By the end of the month the roads approaching the University had been completely shut off.²⁸⁶

The "April 22" forces in Wuchow continued to suffer defeats at the hands of the Alliance Command. A CCPCC order of June 13 to end the violence there²⁸⁷ proved ineffective. On July 3 a new CCPCC notice was issued with Mao's personal endorsement. It accused a "handful of top Party capitalist-roaders" and their agents in Kwangsi of disrupting railway traffic, of seizing aid materials going to Vietnam, and of storming units of the PLA, seizing arms and equipment and attacking PLA men. The CCPCC called on the people, led by the Preparatory Group of Kwangsi Revolutionary Committee and supported by the PLA, to end armed struggle, return all supplies bound for Vietnam, and return the weapons and equipment taken from the PLA. Counter-revolutionaries were to be punished severely.²⁸⁸

The CCPCC issued a similar "July 24 Notice" concerning Shensi which charged people there of robbing state banks and warehouses, burning public buildings and private homes, looting cars and ships and disrupting services, attacking PLA units, and refusing to obey the orders and directives of the Center. Finally, it urged the people of Shensi to study and follow the provisions of the July 3 Notice.²⁸⁹

Both notices were later promulgated throughout the country. Although each stressed leniency for those who confessed their crimes, there can be little doubt that a determined crackdown was in the offing. Perhaps, a measure of the seriousness of the situation is that even the Red Flag faction felt it necessary to denounce anarchism in its ranks:

The meeting also criticized the anarchical ideas existing among some people in our ranks and the wrong guiding thought of a very few people who thought that only they belonged to the left wing. It called upon the Red Flag fighters to heighten their vigilance, to purify and consolidate the ranks of the revolutionary rebel groups to a further extent.²⁹⁰

Anti-intellectualism and Workers Propaganda Teams

This purification effort must have come too late for on July 22, Wen-hui Pao hailed Mao's latest directive on the educational revolution:

Students should be selected from among workers and peasants with practical experience, and they should return to production after a few years of study.

Those intellectuals who only have book knowledge and lack practical knowledge, should know themselves well, see their own defeats and put on a humble attitude. It is better still for those who hold the workers and peasants in contempt, refuse to shed their airs of a university students and are reluctant to work as ordinary workers and peasants to quickly cast away their lofty airs. Such lofty airs are a burden on them...²⁹¹

This anti-intellectual tone was to become stronger with each passing. On July 26, NCNA published a discussion in which a Red Guard of Shanghai No. 6 Middle School expressed the new attitude toward intellectuals:

Formerly, we were anxious to become college students, thinking they are "learned". During the great proletarian cultural revolution, we find many college students, who have been poisoned by the revisionist educational line... We now understand that if a college is not in accordance with Chairman Mao's educational line, it would only serve to poison the students. We don't trust such colleges.²⁹²

Mao is reported to have met on July 28th with five student leaders representing various Peking campus factions.²⁹³ Among those present were Nieh Yuan-tzu of Peking University, Kuai Ta-fu of Tsinghua

University's Chingkangshan group, Tan Hou-lan, a Red Guard leader from People's University and representatives from Peking Aeronautical Institute and the Peking Geological Institute. At the meeting, Mao complained that the struggle-criticism-transformation campaign was not going well in Peking's universities.²⁹⁴ and he expressed general disappointment in college youth. Some reports say that Mao was in tears during this meeting. Others quote him as saying: "You have let me down, and what is more you have disappointed the workers, peasants and soldiers of China."²⁹⁵ Mao specifically charged the college youth with an inability or unwillingness to unite in common cause, with a failure to maintain self-discipline, and with increasing resort to physical violence to solve problems. He warned them that they would be physically separated if violence did not stop.

Two days later the first Workers' Mao Tse-tung Thought Propaganda Team arrived at Tsinghua University, scene of Peking's worst campus violence. Initially, the Workers' Teams were to restore order (with the help of the PLA) and to guide the proletarianization of the students' world outlooks. Their role would be expanded later. The Workers' Team received Mao's public blessing on August 5 when he sent a basket of mangoes, "a treasure gift he had received from foreign friends".²⁹⁶ This act has rightly been regarded as the "death warrant" of the Red Guards.²⁹⁷

During late July and August the severe crackdown on left forces was felt throughout the country. College campuses were invaded by Workers' Teams. There was also an increasing anti-intellectualism in official press pieces and a great many Red Guards were removed from revolutionary committees.

In Canton, using the July 3rd and July 24th notices as a pretext, a crackdown began on the Red Flag faction. A meeting of the Kwangtung Provincial Revolutionary Committee on July 31st tolled the death knell of the revolutionary rebels in Kwangtung. The meeting was held to expose and criticize Wu Ch'uan-pin, a member of the committee and a leader of the Red Flag faction of Chungshan University who was accused of trying to seize power from the army and of arming some of the factions.²⁹⁸ This meeting was a signal for attacks on the left group by more conservative organizations. On August 1, an East Wind publication blasted the Red Garrison Headquarters, holding

it responsible for many counter-revolutionary massacres and assaults on the PLA.²⁹⁹ By August 4, the personal attacks on Wu had gained momentum. The Revolutionary Rebel Committee of his own Chungshan University accused him of spreading counter-revolutionary rumors and fomenting right splittism and of trying to topple the revolutionary committee.³⁰⁰ It even attacked his moral character.³⁰¹ In a further article on August 7, the Revolutionary Rebel Committee of Chungshan University accused him of contempt for the masses. His own earlier attacks on the more conservative groups, such as Doctrine Guards, now came back to haunt him:

Wu Ch'uan-pin has never had any regard for the masses of workers, peasants, and soldiers. He is extremely hostile to the broad masses of worker-peasant proletarians and called them without exception "Ti Tsung and Doctrine Guard bandits." From his point of view all workers, peasants, and soldiers are non-revolutionary and no good, being all "big" old conservatives and "iron rod royalists," and he alone is a revolutionary "hero" that is the master of history.³⁰²

These charges against Wu were especially serious in the context of the developing campaign to support the Workers' Teams and to undermine the self-confidence of revolutionary students. As early as July 25, Kuang-ming Jih-pao had warned intellectuals and educated youth to integrate with workers, peasants, and soldiers, overcoming their alienation from the worker-peasant masses and destroying the revisionists "spiritual aristocracy in education."³⁰³

On August 6 Wen-hui Pao began to attack the "theory of many centers" as politically and ideologically corrupt, clearly referring to revolutionary rebel groups, each of which sought to be the center.³⁰⁴ It warned that this "theory of many centers" was "dangerous" to the victory of the great proletarian revolution and its adherents were accused of harboring bourgeois sentiments:

Some people uphold the mountain-stronghold mentality because their minds are filled with such filthy things as personal fame and fortune. With the bourgeois filthy things in their mind, they will go all-out to build a personal mountain stronghold and establish an independent kingdom. They readily accept the words pleasing them but refuse to hear good-intentioned remonstrations. Such people are cold to the proletarian headquarters. They will invariably commit big mistakes.³⁰⁵

On August 15 Chairman Mao issued his latest "latest directive" on the revolution in education which proclaimed the superiority of the working class in all fields of endeavor:

Our country has seven-hundred-million people and the working class is the leading class. Its leading role in the great cultural revolution and in all fields of work should be thoroughly brought into full play. The working class also should continually raise its political consciousness in struggle.³⁰⁶

The new role of the Red Guard was spelled out rather clearly in an August 17th JMJP editorial marking the second anniversary of Mao's first review of the Red Guards.³⁰⁷ It acknowledged the Red Guards' role as "vanguards" in the early stages of the cultural revolution but now it urged the students to make the workers their teachers and to support the Workers' teams coming to their schools. The editorial put the matter rather bluntly --- intellectuals who did not measure up to the proletarian standard were dispensable.

Ours is a state of the dictatorship of the proletariat and it does not need intellectuals who look down upon the workers and peasants. All ideas opposing the proletariat should be subjected to criticism and repudiation in the great proletarian cultural revolution.³⁰⁸

A Wen-hui Pao editorial observed that while at the beginning of the cultural revolution, students went to factories and communes to exchange revolutionary experiences and establish revolutionary ties, it was now time to reverse the procedure and have the workers and peasants go to the schools to take part in revolutionary mass criticism and repudiation.³¹⁰ In an editorial on August 9, the Team's mandate was extended beyond schools to include organizations at all levels. The editorial praised working class leadership in struggle-criticism-transformation as something never before attempted and urged the masses of revolutionary Red Guards and revolutionary intellectuals to "honestly learn from the working class...to test themselves in the course of fiery class struggle."³¹¹

Resistance to the Workers' Teams had become evident by August 29. Class enemies were accused of trying to create enmity between Workers' Teams and revolutionary teachers and students in order to defeat the plans to let workers take over the running of the schools.³¹³ This resistance was further detailed on August 29. Some intellectuals were accused of resisting working class leadership in the schools on the grounds that their disciplines were too specialized for lay leadership. The editorial maintained that working class leadership is possible in everything.³¹⁴ Another important article that appeared in August, "The Working Class Must Exercise Leadership in Everything," by Yao Wen-yuan³¹⁵ also emphasized the need for worker supervision of education. Yao explained that Workers' Teams were being sent to the schools because:

...it is impossible for the students and intellectuals by themselves alone to fulfill the task of struggle-criticism-transformation and a whole number of other tasks on the educational front; workers and People's Liberation Army fighters must take part and it is essential to have strong leadership in this period.³¹⁶

By August 27 NCNA could report that a revolutionary great alliance had been forged by the Workers' Team sent to Tsinghua University. Progress had been made in establishing Mao study classes and the general atmosphere at the University was described as one of "bubbling revolutionary vitality."³¹⁷ By that time Workers' Teams were reported to be in twenty-six colleges and universities in Shanghai.³¹⁸ At a meeting on August 29 the Canton Red Guard Congress of Colleges and Universities was admitting its mistakes and joining in the denunciation of Wu Ch'uan-pin and his associates for vilifying the workers and peasants and attacking the Workers' Disciplinary Corps.³¹⁹ Support was declared for the Kwangtung Provincial Revolutionary Committee, for the PLA, for the Workers' Disciplinary Corps, for the Workers' Team; for an end to all factionalism.³²⁰ In other words, the left forces had been routed on all fronts.

Consolidation of Workers' Teams' Positions

During the month of September the position of the conservative forces in the revolutionary committees and of the Workers' Teams in the schools was solidified. There was also continuing emphasis on the need for integration with the worker/peasant masses. Chiang

Ch'ing's September 9 speech at a Peking mass rally reveals the mood of the left forces in the Central leadership. Making no effort to hide her displeasure, she urged her listeners not to forget the contributions that the revolutionary youth and revolutionary Red Guards had made in the initial and middle stages of the cultural revolution. She acknowledged the existence of factionalism but at the same time she urged the workers to protect the revolutionary young people. Obviously she was trying to stem the tide of reaction which the left rightly feared was approaching.³²¹

A definition of the "Reeducation of Intellectuals" was given in a Wen-hui Pao editorial of September 10. The goal of the Workers' Teams was a reeducation of all students in proletarian education, a change in the intellectuals' habitual isolation from politics, a change in the intellectuals' habitual isolation from workers and peasants and from reality, a transformation of all intellectuals into proletarian intellectuals.³²²

Some schools had apparently refused to admit the Workers' Teams and the workers' resentment towards the "intellectuals" is quite obvious from the following Wen-hui Pao editorial:

The buildings and houses are built by us and it is we workers and poor and lower-middle peasants who provide you intellectuals with articles of food and clothing. What reason have you got to bar us from the big buildings? Dare you debate with us on this point? To be quite frank we have limits to our patience. We will hit back at those words and actions that oppose Workers' Mao Tse-tung Thought Propaganda Teams.³²³

On September 14 Mao's "latest instruction" on education emphasized that the vast majority of the students trained in the old schools could integrate with the workers and peasants after they had been reeducated.³²⁴ A report issued on September 21 maintained that things were progressing smoothly in the 26 Shanghai colleges and universities with Workers' Teams.³²⁵

Downgrading Pure Intellect

The inadequacy of intellectual training which was divorced from practical application was also emphasized. Typical of many articles of the period was one which reported the shame felt by medical students sent to the countryside who could not relieve a child with severe burns because the facilities their textbook had taught them to expect were not available.

The angry students threw away the book, saying "What we have learned in the past cannot be used for serving the poor and lower-middle peasants in rural areas at all!"³²⁶

When a rural health worker came along and after brief examination was able to make up some native salve which relieved the child's pain, the students concluded that:

What is real skill? That which can be used in serving the poor and lower middle peasants is real skill. Where can we learn such skill? We can learn such real skill only through practice in the rural areas and by following the way of combination of education with productive labor.³²⁷

The remainder of 1968 saw no wavering from the new policy of cracking down on the left factions. The Workers' Teams remained in the schools and further entrenched themselves. Wen-hui Pao noted that a Team at Shanghai College of Finance and Economy periodically returned to their factories to work taking some teachers and students with them each time.³²⁸ NCNA was reporting in early November that "hundreds of thousands" of middle school and college graduates had gone to work in factories and mines and rural areas in the previous months. Most were said to have gone to rural areas, "determined" to follow Mao's path and integrate with the peasants.³²⁹ On October 30, the Chairman of Canton Municipal Revolutionary Committee had spoken to thousands of educated youths on their way to rural areas and urged them to brave the storms, to temper themselves into successors to the proletarian revolutionary cause.³³⁰ The Chinese press was full of stories of transformations undergone by educated youths in rural areas and in the PLA. In one, it was shown how college student recruits into the PLA had lost their fear of "dirt" and physical labor:

In the past they came back to wash themselves several times during one hour's labor; but now when they come back from labor several of them use one basin of water to wash their faces.³³¹

Similarly,

When post-graduate Chang Tieh-cheng of male students' 12th Company carried night soil for the first time he did not like it because it was a dirty job and he had to get up early without

much sleep. But later after comparing himself with the poor and lower-middle peasants he discovered that something was wrong with his thinking and feeling... he was suffering from a "common disease" of the intellectuals, namely looking down upon the working people.³³²

Despite these optimistic reports problems continued into 1969. On January 5 JMJP warned parents against obstructing their children's assignment to rural areas. It advised them to stop treating their children as "flowers in a greenhouse" and to cease being a "stumbling block" to their children who were "marching forward along the road of revolutionization."³³³

In addition, the sending of so many educated youths to the countryside caused resentment among some peasants. Peasants from a commune in Chekiang describe their resentments in this way:

These intellectual youths who are accustomed to residing in cities where they walked on paved roads, lived in concrete buildings equipped with electric lights and running water, "opened their mouths when food came and stretched at their limbs when clothes came" do feel unaccustomed to rural life when they first arrive. They must go through a transition period to get used to rural life.³³⁴

In January 1969 NCNA described the rigid nature of discussion and application meetings established by the Workers' Team at Central China Normal College. Meetings were held every three days in classes, once a week in departments and once a month in the whole college. Thus each person had the "chance" to speak out and to supervise the work of others.³³⁵

Tsinghua University, the first to receive the Workers' Teams, announced the formation of its revolutionary committee on January 29, six months after the Team's arrival. Despite Team reports that "the revolutionary teachers, students, and staff of the university are full of vigor, militancy, and are in high spirits"³³⁶ the half year of heavy indoctrination necessary before the committee's establishment attests to the resistance that was probably encountered.

Resistance in other schools was even greater. In August, the Team at Wuhan University was still helping intellectuals "one by one" and "patiently" to change their world outlooks.³³⁷ Progress at Peking University was apparently even slower. In October, 1969, it seems there was still much to be done:

The revolutionary teachers and students are...working hard to overcome their tendencies as intellectuals to vacillate politically and to fail to carry the revolution through to the end...Mao's brilliant concept...is gradually being realized in Peking University... They made a pledge to change their ideology and become staunch fighters in continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat.³³⁸

A debate in *JMJP* on the operation of urban primary and secondary schools appeared between November 15 and December 27, 1968.³³⁹ Among the readers' suggestions were that middle schools be run by factories, that primary schools be run by neighborhood organizations, that teachers go by rotation to factories to perform manual labor, and that workers take part in teaching and the study of culture. Others suggested that primary and middle schools be run jointly by factories and communes.³⁴⁰

A similar discussion of how "socialist universities" should be run appeared in *JMJP* from March 29 to May 14, 1969. Tsinghua University's Work Team reported that it had organized revolutionary teachers and students into small cultural revolution squads which were sent into factories and rural areas to be re educated by workers and peasants.³⁴¹ Workers and poor peasants had also been invited to the University to give lectures. The Workers' Team also noted that some teachers and students were hesitant to participate in academic lessons for fear they would be accused of trying to restore the old:

Proper academic lessons must still be given and taken, but the important thing is that the old content and methods of teaching-learning must be reformed under the guidance of the thought of Mao Tse-tung.³⁴²

From Fudan University came the suggestion that it was necessary to break down comprehensive universities. Simplifications, additions, and mergers were to be made in accordance with the needs of socialist education because the purpose of comprehensive universities was not to train highly specialized intellectuals but

To train ordinary laborers who are infinitely loyal to Chairman Mao, who have a higher consciousness of the struggle between the two lines, who will serve workers, peasants and soldiers wholeheartedly, who are capable of solving practical problems and criticizing the bourgeoisie from the proletarian stand and viewpoint and with the proletarian method, and who have acquired a certain amount of technical knowledge.³⁴³

Similarly, specialized fields such as medical education were to stress the rural areas and to devote their main attention now to popularization.³⁴⁴

Inherent in all these so-called reforms is a fanatical "anti-intellectualism" -- a rebellion against study for its own sake and against knowledge divorced from action. This also underlies the effort to integrate the youths with the worker/peasant masses. Intellectualism was blamed for corrupting the innocence of peasant students and for making them interested in food and clothes.³⁴⁵ College students sent to rural areas "invariably" found their academic knowledge to be relatively worthless.³⁴⁶

This campaign had predictable results among students. Those who had studied began to wonder why. Former students complained that "they shouldn't have studied so hard if they had known they would have to serve as workers" or that "it was a disadvantage to have studied."³⁴⁷ Meanwhile those who were still in school became increasingly "in-different." As JMJP put it:

... some students attend school without bringing their satchels. They doze in the class. During the time for self-study, they talk nonsense and walk about and do not sit quietly. They do not learn their lessons...³⁴⁸

As late as September 1969, students were being told that the spirit of rebellion was dead. While it had been appropriate to rebel against the small handful of capitalist-roaders during the cultural revolution, it was now wrong to disobey orders of the revolutionary committees set up with Mao's approval.³⁴⁹

In summary, disillusionment, lethargy, and disinterest were to characterize the behavior of Chinese educated youth in 1969.

Educated Youth in Perspective

In this final section an effort will be made to integrate the material reviewed above to aid in interpreting the nature of youthful involvement in the cultural revolution.

Characteristics

Revolutionary youths were imbued with a profound sense of mission which was to purify Chinese society (and later, themselves) and to maintain the Maoist tradition. Like many adolescents they were puritanical and Mao's appeal to their natural dedication and selflessness could only increase their puritanism. This was manifested in their early attack on the four olds and in their righteous indignation at the injustice of the revisionists. They felt an almost metaphysical identification with Mao which strengthened their feeling of moral rectitude. This contributed to their later unwillingness to compromise even when confronted with Mao's own requests. They were also highly conscious of history and of their roles as actors whose exploits were being indelibly recorded.

Roles

Mao asked revolutionary youths to be "vanguards" of the revolution which involved awakening the masses to the need for revolutionary change and destroying those elements of society tainted with bourgeois characteristics. He required them to defend the sanctity of his thought in the political, educational, and artistic spheres against betrayal both by present enemies and by future generations who might otherwise be tainted by revisionism and ego indulgence. He instructed them to grasp his own revolutionary tradition and, under his watchful supervision, take their place in the historical continuum.

Resentment against the Older Generation

Young people of whatever background tended to resent the older generation for failing to abide by the revolutionary ethic that it had preached. During the cultural revolution this resentment was exacerbated. There developed among many youths a general disillusionment with the PLA in reaction to its suppression of revolutionary mass organizations in 1967 and its new role as a conservative element in

Mao's proletarian headquarters. In addition, there was a general reinstatement of cadres who had made even serious mistakes after they had been viciously denounced by revolutionary youths as enemies of the proletariat. Simultaneously there began an easing out of representatives of young people's revolutionary organizations from their newly acquired position on revolutionary committees. These events and the high incidence of sham power seizures convinced many young people that "faith in the masses" was a relatively empty slogan. Finally, the young people resented the older generation for pouncing on their own failures -- for quickly attacking their egoism, their "petty bourgeois wavering" and their inability to carry the revolution through to the end.

Membership in Mass Organizations

The data reveal that many factors influenced educated youth to join mass organizations in the early stages of the cultural revolution. They were attracted by the opportunity to participate meaningfully in the political process for the first time since leadership positions had been monopolized by comrades of the Long March generation. The youths also shared a desire to affirm actively their faith in Mao Tse-tung and his thought and to participate in the construction of a better society more in keeping with his views. In addition, they were attracted by the opportunity to test their revolutionary mettle to the satisfaction of themselves and of older generations, dispelling once and for all any questions of their fitness to be true revolutionary successors.

They could even surpass their elders by withstanding the trials of revolution without losing their integrity as Maoists as they believed their elders had done. They would thus become among the most worthy revolutionaries in society and among the most qualified to govern China. At the same time they could share in the comradeship of mass movement and affirm their identity as part of a large community of young people. Participation provided them with the chance to travel throughout China and to gain advantage in education and politics by proving that they possessed the virtues of true proletarian revolutionaries. It also enabled them to rid themselves of the stigma of having had an impure class background. Finally, it provided an emotional catharsis from the psychological, moral, and physical frustrations of their society.

The Educational System

Much attention was paid during the cultural revolution to complaints by students of poor and lower-middle peasant and worker families that they were being discriminated against and humiliated by the bourgeois-oriented educational system. The educational revolution, and especially the creation of Workers' Propaganda Teams to reside permanently in the schools, reflected Mao's desire to proletarianize educational opportunity. There were numerous manifestations of this policy. Enrollment was now by recommendation and selection rather than by objective examination. Traditional barriers between teachers and students were broken down. At the same time, it was emphasized that teachers had much to learn from peasant and worker youths who had had practical experience with life. In the same spirit, students and teachers alike were to participate in productive labour. 1969 does seem to have been a year of some backtracking to earlier methods -- such as the willingness to use marks to get young people to study, but student lethargy at this stage had less to do with the absence of normal academic discipline than with diffuse disillusionment with society. Many students felt little motivation to study seriously when they knew that they were going to be sent to rural areas to work as farmhands all their lives.

Underutilization of Skills of Young People

Underutilization of the skills of young people remained a most serious problem. The government policy of sending students to the countryside upon graduation appears to have been intensified in late 1967 and early 1968 to handle allocation of jobs to two years of graduates; in the view of the authorities, there was a greater need than ever to rectify the youths' world outlook by forcing them to integrate with the peasant masses. At the same time, those who had fled their posts in rural areas to fight for their future in the cultural revolution were sent back to these posts in humiliation. Whatever their background these youths were in a very poor position to press on central and local authorities their demands for correction of injustices. The failure of the Central leaders to speak to the grievances that these youths had raised convinced many young people that they had been abandoned. Finally, the taste of power that many of these youths had attained as Red Guards only made settling down in rural areas more difficult.

* * *

It seems unlikely that the educated youth of China will easily forget the political power, popular acclaim, and comforts of ideological orthodoxy which were briefly theirs during the cultural revolution. This taste of meaningful participation has undoubtedly only made it more difficult for them to accept the compromises and contradictions that exist in Chinese society and in their own position in that society. To the extent that intensive indoctrination makes such acceptance psychologically necessary the result will be severe conflict with their own previous experiences with power. In any case it seems unlikely that this generation will ever again lend itself to the kind of hyper-emotional, crusading involvement that it brought to the cultural revolution.

There are some long-range factors that seem to be working in favor of the young people. It seems unlikely that the central leaders will easily forget the powder keg that Mao Tse-tung ignited in 1966. Their immediate reaction has been to sandwich the students between the more reliable forces of the PLA and the workers (in the city schools and universities) and the peasants (in the rural communes). Nevertheless in the long run -- especially after Mao's death -- they are likely to decide that this policy toward intellectuals is incompatible with their nationalistic desire to enhance their country's power and status in the world community through technological progress.

To most educated young people in China the cultural revolution represents a traumatic loss of political innocence. Such innocence -- and the optimism and dedication that accompany it -- are valuable assets for any country struggling to break away from the past and establish its place among modern nations. This innocence can only be lost once. That it fell in a largely unsuccessful campaign of an old revolutionary to preserve his legacy from the inevitable storms of history is one of the real tragedies of the cultural revolution.

Footnotes

1. Implicit here is the faith that the wishes of the individual and those of the collective will be identical; theoretically, the collective wishes being the sum total of the "correct" wishes of individuals. Donald J. Munro, The Concept of Man in Early China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969), p.163.
2. Robert Jay Lifton, Revolutionary Immortality: Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese Cultural Revolution (New York: Random House, 1968), pp.13-14.
3. Ibid., pp.14-15.
4. NCNA, 6/11/68; SCMP 4195.
5. cf. James R. Townsend, The Revolutionization of Chinese Youth: A Study of Chung-kuo Ch'ing-nien (Berkeley: Center for Chinese Studies, 1967.)
6. The Great Cultural Revolution in China (Hong Kong: Asia Research Centre, 1967), p. 66.
7. Ibid., p. 83.
8. Edgar Snow, "Interview with Mao," The New Republic, CLII (Feb. 27, 1965), 23.
9. Ruth Ann Willner, Charismatic Political Leadership: A Theory (Princeton: Center for International Studies, 1968), p. 9.
10. Mao Tse-tung, "On Practice: On the Relation Between Knowledge and Practice, Between Knowing and Doing," Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol I (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1965), p. 299.
11. Richard H. Solomon, "Mao's Effort to Reintegrate the Chinese Polity: Problems of Authority and Conflict in Chinese Social Processes," Chinese Communist Politics in Action, ed. A. Doak Barnett (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1969), p.314.

12. Lifton, Revolutionary Immortality, p. 110.
13. cf. Franz Schurmann, Ideology and Organization in Communist China (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1968), p. 522.
14. cited in Immanuel C. Y. Hsu, "The Reorganization of Higher Education in Communist China, 1949-1961," China Under Mao: Politics Takes Command, ed. Roderick Macfarquhar (Cambridge: M. I. T. Press, 1966), p. 298.
15. Ibid.
16. CNA #636, pp. 3-5.
17. NCNA 2/9/69; SCMP 4359 pp. 1-10.
18. Edward Friedman, "Cultural Limits of the Cultural Revolution," Asian Survey IX (March, 1969), p. 191.
19. C. T. Hu, "Communist Education: Theory and Practice," China Under Mao: Politics Takes Command, p. 253.
20. Wen-hui Pao, 11/10/65.
21. The Great Cultural Revolution in China, pp. 91-115.
22. Chung-kuo Ch'ing-nien 6/66; SCMM 537.
23. SCMM 537.
24. CCP Documents of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, 1966-1967 (Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, 1968), pp. 7-12.
25. CCP Documents, pp. 20-28.
26. Victor Nee, The Cultural Revolution at Peking University (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969), pp. 27-28.

27. Ibid., pp. 24-31.
28. Chung-kuo Ch'ing-nien Pao, 8/16/66; SCMP 3772.
29. JMJP 6/2/66 quoted in Nee, The Cultural Revolution in Peking University, p. 54.
30. Chung-kuo Ch'ing-nien 6/16/66; SCMM 537, p. 14.
31. cf. Nee, The Cultural Revolution in Peking University, pp. 61-65.
32. URS 44.1 (7/1/66), p. 1.
33. The Chinese Cultural Revolution, ed. K. H. Fan (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1968), p. 139-140.
34. The Great Cultural Revolution in China, pp. 210-214.
35. Ibid., pp. 265-266.
36. cf. JMJP 6/19/66; URS 44.1 (7/1/66); on 21 crimes of the examination system.
37. China Topics (August 30, 1968), p. 16.
38. China Reconstructs, July 1967; Ibid., p. 17.
39. Ibid.
40. CB #830 p. 3.
41. Ibid., p. 4.
42. CB #819 p. 3.
- 42a CB #852, p. 8.
43. Hsin Ti-yu 7-8 (August 24, 1968); SCMM 522.
44. URS 44.13, pp. 197-198.

45. The Great Power Struggle in China (Hong Kong: Asia Research Centre), pp. 3-4.
46. Ibid., p. 5.
47. CCP Documents, pp. 47-54.
48. Ibid., p. 42.
49. Ibid., pp. 50-51.
50. The Great Cultural Revolution in China, p. 440.
51. Ibid.
52. Hung-ch'i no. 11 8/66; SCMM 540.
53. Ibid.
54. The Great Power Struggle in China, p. 8.
55. Ibid.
56. Ibid., p. 27.
57. JMJP 8/26/66; SCMP 3776, p. 9.
58. JMJP 8/23/66; in The Great Power Struggle in China, p. 23.
59. Hung-ch'i no. 12, 1966; The Great Power Struggle in China, pp. 24-25.
60. NCNA 8/28/66; SCMP 3772.
61. CB #819, pp. 16-21.
62. Thomas W. Robinson, Chou En-lai's Role in China's Cultural Revolution (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1969), p. 22.

63. Ibid., p. 20.
64. CB #819, p. 17.
65. cf. Hung-wei Pao (Canton), 9/2/66; SCMP 3786.
66. The Great Power Struggle in China, pp. 17-18.
67. CB #819, p. 29.
68. Ibid., p. 36.
69. CCP Documents, p. 72.
70. Ibid., p. 75-76.
71. Chung-kuo Fu-nu no. 12 11/7/66; SCMM 560.
72. Hung-ch'i no. 13 10/1/66; SCMM 549, pp. 1-3.
73. NCNA 9/21/66; SCMP 3788, p. 19.
74. NCNA 10/16/66; SCMP 3805, pp. 17-18.
75. cf. Hung-wei Pao 9/13/66; SCMP 3787, pp. 22-23. cf. Hung-wei Pao 9/18/66 SCMP 3790, pp. 2-3.
76. Hung-wei Pao 9/13/66; SCMP 3787, p. 23.
77. SCMP 3797.
78. Hung-wei Pao 9/27/66; SCMP 3795, p. 4.
79. China News Service, no. 4592 11/2/66; URS 45. 25, p. 376-388.
80. Ibid., p. 377.
81. Ibid., pp. 380-381.
82. The Great Power Struggle in China, p. 18.

83. CCP Documents, pp. 97-99.
84. Ibid., pp. 109-111.
85. Ibid., p. 127-128.
86. JMJP 12/1/66.
87. CB #815.
88. JMJP 12/29/66; SCMP 3785 pp. 19-21.
89. CCP Documents, pp. 150-153.
90. Ibid., pp. 75-76.
91. JMJP 9/11/66; SCMP 3785, pp. 5-6.
92. CCP Documents, pp. 79-80.
93. Hung-wei Pao 9/20/66; URS 45.13, pp. 191-194.
94. Hunan People's Broadcasting Station 9/19/66; URS 45.13 pp. 186-187.
95. Hung-wei Pao 9/20/66; URS 45.13 p. 191.
96. CCP Documents, pp. 116-119.
97. Ibid., pp. 133-135.
98. Mao Tse-tung, "The Orientation of the Youth Movement," Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol II (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1965), p. 245.
99. The variables in this formulation are: a. how far left the students would go b. how resistant to change (in the direction desired by the Maoists) the workers and peasants would be.

100. The Great Power Struggle in China, pp. 74-77.
101. Ibid., pp. 77-82.
102. CCP Documents, pp. 157-158.
- 102a JMJP 1/67; SCMP 3874 pp. 1-2.
103. JMJP 1/31/67; SCMP 3880 pp. 8-11.
104. CCP Documents, pp. 175-178.
105. Ibid., pp. 181-182.
106. Ibid., p. 186.
107. Ibid., pp. 195-197.
108. Kathryn Winston, "The Chinese Student and the Cultural Revolution." (unpublished study, University of Michigan, 1969), p. 51.
109. The Great Power Struggle in China, pp. 124-129.
110. Hung-ch'i no. 4 February 1967; SCMM 566., pp. 1-8.
111. CCP Documents, pp. 211-213.
112. Ibid., pp. 222-230.
113. Ibid., pp. 235-236.
114. Ibid., pp. 244-246.
115. Ibid., pp. 278-279.
116. Ibid., p. 294.
117. Ibid., pp. 321-324.

118. Ibid., p. 321.
119. Ibid., pp. 343-346.
120. Wen-hui Pao 2/12/67; URS 47.12 pp. 168-170.
121. CCP Documents, pp. 301-302.
122. Ibid., p. 109.
123. Ibid., pp. 109-110.
124. JMJP 2/26/67; SCMP 3893, pp. 1-10.
125. Wen-hui Pao 7/10/67; quoted in F. T. Mits, "The Wanderers," Current Scene V (August 15, 1967) pp. 2-3.
126. cf. Klaus Mehnert. Peking and the New Left: At Home and Abroad, (Berkeley: Center for Chinese Studies, 1969), p. 27.
127. NCNA, 3/2/67; SCMP 3893; pp. 14-16.
128. T'ien-an-men (Peking) 3/67; SCMM 576, pp. 1-3.
129. CCP Documents, p. 356.
130. Ibid., pp. 356-360.
131. Ibid., pp. 358-359.
132. Kuang-ming Jih-pao 3/27/67; SCMP 3911, p. 3..
133. NCNA 4/13/67; SCMP 3920, p. 18.
134. Kuang-chou Jih-pao 4/2/67; SCMP 3963, p. 8-10.
135. Kuang-chou Jih-pao 4/2/67; SCMP 3963, pp. 8-10.
136. Ch'un Lei (Peking) no. 4 4/13/67; SCMP 3940; pp. 6-11.

137. cf. Fang Cheng, "Mainland China's Education in 1967", Communist China: 1967 (Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, 1969), p. 210.
138. CCP Documents, p. 386.
139. Ibid., p. 399.
140. Ibid., p. 400.
141. cf. CCP Documents, pp. 385-387.
142. cf. The Great Power Struggle in China, pp. 129-132 for details of a "sham" power seizure in Shantung.
143. cf. Chung-ta Hung-ch'i (Canton) no. 63 4/4/68; in The Great Power Struggle in China pp. 163-169.
144. cf. CCP Documents, p. 385.
145. cf. Hung-ch'i no. 5 1967.
146. CCP Documents, p. 378.
147. cf. CCP Documents pp. 409-411 for an "order of the Central Military Commission" essentially repeating the CCPCC order of 4/1.
148. Ibid., pp. 422-423.
149. Ibid., p. 430.
150. JMJP 5/22 67; in The Great Power Struggle in China, p. 203.
151. Ibid., p. 204.
152. CCP Documents, pp. 463-464.
153. Ibid.

154. Ibid., pp. 466-467.
155. Chieh-fang chun Pao, NCNA 6/20; SCMP 3973, p. 10.
156. Chieh-fang chun Pao, SCMP 3975 pp. 1-3.
157. Ibid., p. 2.
158. Chieh-fang chun Pao, 6/27/67; SCMM 588 pp. 8-9.
159. JMJP 5/26/67.
160. JMJP 6/21/67; SCMP 3973, p. 19.
161. Ibid., p. 19.
162. JMJP 7/3/67; URS 48.4 p. 1.
163. Kuang-ming Jih-pao 7/10/67.
164. NCNA 7/11/67; SCMP 3984, pp. 4-5.
165. China Topics, 8/30/68, p. 7.
166. Ibid., p. 13
167. NCNA 6/29/67; SCMP 3972 p. 19.
168. JMJP 7/4/67; SCMP 3985 pp. 1-5.
169. JMJP 7/12/67; SCMP 3986 p. 13.
170. NCNA 7/14/67; SCMP 3982 pp. 18-19.
171. cf. The Great Power Struggle in China, pp. 181-190.
172. CCP Documents, pp. 484-488.

173. In samplings of the Mainland Chinese press by translation services, by the third week in July reports of resumption of classes and the revolution in education had all but disappeared. The months of August and September are filled with details of violent struggle among mass organizations and of attacks on the PLA and (verbal) counterattacks by it. It is not until mid-October that education again becomes an important news topic.
174. JMJP editorial, released by NCNA 7/30/67; SCMP 3994 pp.1-5.
175. Hung-se Pao-tung (Canton) no.16 8/1/67 SCMP 4071, pp.13-17.
176. NCNA 8/2/67; SCMP 3995 pp.13-14.
177. Hung-se Pao-tung no.17 8/5/67; SCMP 4119 pp.15-17.
178. Chu-ying Tungfanghung (Canton) 9/13/67; SCMP 4036 pp.1-6.
179. NCNA 8/14/67; SCMP 4003, p. 15.
180. Ching kangshan and Kwangtung Wen-i Chan-pao no.6 8/26/67; SCMP 4032; pp. 9-13.
181. Ibid., nos. 7 and 8 9/5/67; SCMP 4044 pp.5-7.
182. Kuang-i Hung-ch'i no.16 9/4/67; SCMP 4/28, pp. 3-14.
183. NCNA 8/18/67; SCMP 4007, p. 16.
184. Wei Tung (Tientsin) in NCNA 8/18/67; SCMP 4006 pp. 22-23.
185. JMJP 8/18/67; SCMP 4015 pp.14-16.
186. JMJP 8/28/67; SCMP 4021 pp.3-5.
187. Hua-shih Hung-ch'i no.7 8/29/67: SCMP 4043 pp.1-9.
188. Wen-hui Pao released by NCNA 9/4/67; SCMP 4024 pp. 25-27.
189. Ching kangshan and Kwangtung Wen-i Chan-pao nos. 7 and 8 9/5/67; SCMP 4044 p.5-7.

190. Chih-t'ien Chiangshan 9/5/67; SCMP 4042 pp. 7-10.
191. CCP Documents, pp. 507-510.
192. Ibid., pp. 521-533.
193. JMJP 9/9/67; SCMP 4022 pp. 14-15.
194. JMJP 9/14/67; SCMP 4024.
195. Wen-hui Pao editorial 9/14 released by NCNA 9/15/67; SCMP 4024.
196. Nung-ts'un Ch'ing-nien no. 17 9/10/67; SCMM 612 pp. 1-2.
197. The Great Power Struggle in China, pp. 423-426. The speech was delivered on September 17.
198. Chung Hua-min, "The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in 1967," Communist China: 1967 (Hong Kong: Union Research Ltd., 1969), p. 84.
199. K'an Chin Chau 10/15/67; SCMP 4078, p. 10.
200. The Great Power Struggle in China, pp. 198-199.
201. CCP Documents, p. 560.
202. San-erh-i-i-i Chan-pao no. 2 10/30/67; SCMP 4090, pp. 9-11.
203. CCP Documents, pp. 560-564.
204. Ke-ming Ch'ing-nien 11/10/67; SCMP 4098 pp. 10-14.
205. Ke-ming Ch'ing-nien 11/10/67; SCMP 4102 pp. 6-8.
206. Wen-hui Pao 10/26/67; SCMP 4058, pp. 10-11.
207. Nung-ts'un Ch'ing-nien no. 20 10/25/67; SCMM 612, p. 8.

208. Hung-se Ch'ing-nien no. 12 12/21/67; SCMP 4125 pp. 14-15.
209. CCP Documents, pp. 566-567.
- 209a cf. SCMP 4049 pp. 1-3; SCMP 4053 pp. 13-14.
210. NCNA 10/30/67; SCMP 4053 pp. 8-11.
211. NCNA 11/3/67; SCMP 4057 pp. 8-9.
212. Ibid., p. 10.
213. NCNA 11/11/67 SCMP 4067 pp. 11-12.
214. NCNA 11/28/67; SCMP 4070, pp. 14-15.
215. JMJP 12/17/67; SCMP 4100 pp. 5-8.
216. JMJP 12/14/67; SCMP 4084 pp. 1-3.
217. Chung-hsueh Hung-wei Ping (Canton) 12/31/67; SCMP 4116. pp. 12-14.
218. Later official accounts of the organization accuse the parents of these middle school students of complicity in the organization of Sheng Wu-lien, cf. I-yueh Feng-pao (Canton) nos. 23-24, March, 1968; in Mehnert, Peking and the New Left, pp. 102-106.
219. Kuan-yin Hung-ch'i (Canton) no. 5 3/68; in Mehnert, Peking and the New Left, pp. 82-100.
220. cf. CCP Documents, pp. 49-50.
221. Kuang-yin Hung-ch'i (Canton) no. 5 3/68; in Mehnert, Peking and the New Left, p. 93.
222. Ibid., pp. 87-88.
223. Ibid., pp. 89.

224. Ibid.
225. Ibid., p. 88.
226. Ibid., p. 89.
227. Ibid.
228. Ibid., p. 93.
229. Ibid., p. 92.
230. Mao Tse-tung, "On Practice," Selected Works Vol I, p. 307.
231. I-yueh Feng-pao nos. 23-24 3/68; Mehnert, Peking and The New Left, pp. 107-116.
232. Pa-wu (Canton) 2/68; in Mehnert, Peking and The New Left, p. 117.
233. I-yueh Feng-pao 23-24 3/68; in Mehnert, Peking and The New Left p. 103.
234. NCNA 1/9/68; SCMP 4097 p. 18.
235. Hsin-hua-kung Pao (Canton) 1/13/68; SCMP 4128 pp. 8-12.
236. Wen-hui Pao 3/2/68; SCMP 4144 pp. 11-12.
237. Wen-hui Pao 3/2/68; SCMP 4145 pp. 13-15.
238. Nan-fang Jih-pao 3/7/68; SCMP 4144 p. 9.
239. NCNA, 1/7/68; SCMP 4101, pp. 9-15. cf. "Support the Left and Not Any Faction" in Chieh-fang chun Pao 1/28/68.
240. NCNA 1/14/68; SCMP 4103 pp. 1-2.
241. Ibid., p. 2.

242. Hung-ch'i P'ing-lun and Kang-pa-i Chan-ch'i (Canton) 1/68; SCMP 4115, p. 7.
243. Ibid., p. 8.
244. NCNA 2/25/68; SCMP 4130, p. 2.
245. Wen-hui Pao 3/28/68; SCMP 4172 pp. 20-21.
246. Pa-i Chan-pao (Canton) no. 4 1/68; SCMP 4121 p. 6.
247. Ibid., p. 7.
248. Ibid.
249. Ibid., p. 11.
250. Nan-fang Jih-pao 2/23/68; SCMP 4138 pp. 1-7.
251. Nan-fang Jih-pao 3/7/68; SCMP 4140 pp. 1-3.
252. JMJP 4/20/68; SCMP 4168 pp. 19-21.
253. Hsiao-ping No. 23 4/5/68; SCMP 4169 pp. 1-3.
254. Wen-hui Pao 3/29/68; SCMP 4171 pp. 8-10.
255. Wen-hui Pao 4/21/68; SCMP 4180 pp. 4-5.
256. Pa-san-i No. 21 5/31/68; SCMP 4208 pp. 1-2.
257. A mimeographed sheet issued by "Scout 430" of East Wind Scouts (Canton); SCMP 4202 pp. 6-7.
258. Ibid., p. 6.
259. A mimeographed sheet issued by "Love East Wind" Combat Corps of Tung-K'ai Lock Factory of Canton; SCMP 4204 p. 10.
260. Ibid., pp. 11-13.

261. SCMP 4204.
262. Kung-jen, P'ing-lun No.5 Early June, 1968; SCMP 4211, p.1-3.
263. Liu-liu Hsueh-an Te-k'an n.d.; SCMP 4204 pp.1-2.
264. Pi-hsueh Huang-po 7/68; China Topics 9/20/68 pp.1-9.
265. Kung Ko Hui (Canton) 7/25/68; SCMP 4279 pp.1-13.
266. Hsi-chiang Nu-t'ao June, 1968.
267. A mimeographed sheet issued by a "Kwangsi April 22" delegation in Canton; SCMP 4202 pp.4-5.
268. Hsi-chiang Nu-t'ao No.1 6/68; SCMP 4220 p.7.
269. Ibid., p.16.
270. Wen-hui Pao 5/6/68; SCMP 4195 p.5.
271. Hung-ssu T'ung-hsin (Canton) nos. 4-5 7/12/68; SCMM 623 p.10.
272. Ibid., pp.11-14.
273. Hung-se Tsao-fan-che new no.2 late 6/68; CB #861 pp.1-18.
274. Kuang-chou Hung-tai-hui 6/22/68; SCMP 4223 pp.4-6.
275. Wen-hui Pao 4/20/68; SCMP 4177 pp.9-10.
276. Wen-hui Pao 5/4/68; SCMP 4185 pp.10-11.
277. Ibid., p.10.
278. Ibid.
279. Wen-hui Pao 5/25/68; SCMP 4207 pp.7-8.

280. Wen-hui Pao 6/10/68; SCMP 4213 p. 15.
281. Hung-ch'i T'ung-hsun No. 1 mid 6/68; SCMP 4210 pp. 13-14.
282. Ibid., p. 16.
283. Wen-hui Pao 6/17/68; SCMP 4231 pp. 14-15.
284. Wen-hui Pao 6/30/68; SCMP 4228 pp. 7-8.
285. JMJP 6/28/68; SCMP 4213 p. 16.
286. China Topics 8/30/68 pp. 19-20.
287. The Great Power Struggle in China, pp. 206-208.
288. Ibid., pp. 208-210.
289. Ibid., pp. 210-212.
290. Chan Kwang-tung 7/10/68; SCMM 629 p. 22.
291. Wen-hui Pao 7/22/68; SCMP 4249 p. 14.
292. NCNA 7/26/68; SCMP 4230 p. 22.
293. Far Eastern Economic Review 9/29/68 pp. 377-378.
294. China Topics 8/30/68 pp. 1-2.
295. Far Eastern Economic Review pp. 377-378.
296. Peking Review no. 32 8/9/68 pp. 5-6.
297. Richard Baum, "China: Year of the Mangoes," Asian Survey IX January 1969, p. 14.
298. Kung-jen P'ing-lun No. 7 early August, 1968.; SCMP 4265, pp. 1-10.

299. Hsin Chu-ying and Teng-feng Kung-jen (Canton) 8/1/68; SCMP 4265 pp.11-13.
300. Chung-ta Chan-pao (Canton) 8/4/68; SCMP 4257 pp.1-5.
301. Ibid., p.5.
302. Chung-ta Chan-pao No.55 8/7/68; SCMP 4340 p.6.
303. Kuang-ming Jih-pao 7/25/68; SCMP 4238 pp.6-8.
304. Wen-hui Pao 8/6/68; SCMP 4255 p.9-10.
305. Wen-hui Pao 8/6/68; SCMP 4253 pp.11-12.
306. NCNA 8/16/68; SCMP 4244 pp.16-17.
307. NCNA 8/17/68; SCMP 4244 pp.13-16.
308. Ibid., p.15.
310. Wen-hui Pao 8/17/68; SCMP 4254 pp.13-14.
311. Wen-hui Pao 8/19/68; SCMP 4254 pp.5-7.
312. Wen-hui Pao 8/24/68; SCMP 4262 pp.11-12.
313. Wen-hui Pao 8/28/68; SCMP 4263 pp.5-6.
314. Wen-hui Pao 8/29/68; SCMP 4263 pp.1-3.
315. Hung-ch'i no.2 8/68; SCMM 625 pp.1-4.
316. Ibid., p.2.
317. NCNA 8/27/68; SCMP 4250 pp.23-26.
318. Wen-hui Pao 8/27/68 SCMP 4264, pp.11-16.
319. Kuang-chou Hung-tai-hui no.11 8/29/68; SCMP 4303, pp.1-2.

320. Ibid., pp. 3-6.
321. NCNA 9/9/68; SCMP 4258 pp. 19-20.
322. Wen-hui Pao 9/10/68; SCMP 4276 pp. 1-3.
323. Ibid., p. 13.
324. NCNA 9/14/68; SCMP 4762 pp. 15-17.
325. Wen-hui Pao 9/21/68; SCMP 4280 pp. 9-14.
326. JMJP 8/24/68; SCMP 4254 pp. 5-10.
327. Ibid., p. 10.
328. Wen-hui Pao 10/4/68; SCMP 4293 pp. 9-11.
329. NCNA 11/1/68; SCMP 4294 pp. 19-21.
330. Chung-hsueh Hung-tai-hui 10/30/68; SCMP 4306, pp. 12-15.
331. Kuang-ming Jih-pao 12/23/68; SCMP 4337 p. 3.
332. Ibid.
333. JMJP 1/5/69; SCMP 4344 pp. 7-8.
334. JMJP 2/2/69; SCMP 4361 p. 4.
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339. CB #870.

- 340. Ibid., p.18.
- 341. CB #881 pp.1-3.
- 342. Ibid., p.3.
- 343. Ibid., p.5.
- 344. Ibid., pp.20-21.
- 345. JMJP 12/25/68; SCMP 4337 pp.10-11.
- 346. NCNA 1/19/69; SCMP 4345.
- 347. JMJP 2/18/69; SCMP 4391 pp.1-3.
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