



THE POST-CONFLICT ENVIRONMENT

INVESTIGATION AND CRITIQUE

EDITED BY DANIEL BERTRAND MONK AND JACOB MUNDY

The Post-Conflict Environment

The last quarter century has witnessed a renaissance in international peace-making, peacekeeping, and peace-enforcement. In this context, a growing policy toolkit has assigned itself the task of rebuilding nations and states, economies and consumers, governments and polities, cities and citizens. These new regimes of post-conflict management have coevolved with a new kind of environment.

Yet upon close inspection, today's post-conflict environment reveals itself to be the strange product of a particular historical moment. The interventions in this collection expose the ways in which post-conflict space is made as much as it is found. By denaturalizing the post-conflict environment in this way, these studies argue that the ostensible problem such spaces represent can only be understood in relation to the solutions proposed to fix them. That is, a post-conflict environment is as much constituted by the techno-politics of its international management as by the conflict itself.

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Daniel Bertrand Monk

and Jacob Mundy, editors

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Abbreviations

AIS	Armée islamique du salut, Algeria
BdL	Banque du Liban
CDR	Council for Development and Reconstruction, Lebanon
COMAP	Cadastral Operations Modernization and Automation Project
CTGL	<i>Confédération générale des travailleurs libanais</i> (General Confederation of Lebanese Workers)
CVR	Commission vérité et réconciliation, Democratic Republic of the Congo
EAR	European Agency for Reconstruction
ECHO	European Community Humanitarian Office
ECOMOG	Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
FLN	Front de libération nationale, Algeria
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GIA	Groupe islamique armée, Algeria
GNP	Gross National Product
Hamas	Harakah al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyyah (Islamic Resistance Movement), Palestine
HTSC	Hamra Trading and Shopping Company, Lebanon
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ICTJ	International Center for Transitional Justice
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
IER	Instance Équité et Réconciliation, Morocco
IFIs	International Financial Institutions
IFOs	International Financial Organizations
IGO	Inter-governmental Organization

IMF	International Monetary Fund
IMG	International Management Group
KDP	Kurdish Democratic Party, Iraq
KFOR	Kosovo Force
KRG	Kurdish Regional Government, Iraq
LL	<i>Livre libanaise</i> (Lebanese pound)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
OCHA	Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OFDA	Office for Disaster Assistance
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
OSO	Operation Support Officer program
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
PTSD	Post-traumatic stress disorder
PUK	Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
RUF	Revolutionary United Front
SAP	Structural adjustment program
TRC	Truth and Reconciliation Commission, South Africa
UNAMSIL	United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone
UNESCO	United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNMIK	United Nations Mission in Kosovo
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Association
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WB	World Bank

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At a second workshop, held at Colgate University in the spring of 2010, we developed these reformulated case studies into a more thoroughgoing critique. There, we agreed that our project was now an interrogation of the techno-politics of neoliberal peacebuilding. Our critique suggests that this politics, particularly through the six approaches we analyze in this volume, imaginatively constitutes and materially elaborates post-conflict environments in order to have epistemic and managerial sovereignty over them. We are thus equally grateful to Colgate University for co-sponsoring the second workshop that led to this collection. Without generous support from the Di-

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Daniel Bertrand Monk
Jacob Mundy

Note on Spelling: Because we want to respect the individual authors' voices, we have retained British spellings in those essays where the authors chose to use them.

Introduction

The Post-conflict Environment

A Genealogy

DANIEL BERTRAND MONK AND JACOB MUNDY

In surveying the range of efforts for peace, the concept of peace-building *as the construction of a new environment* should be viewed as the counterpart of preventive diplomacy.

—BOUTROS BOUTROS-GHALI, *An Agenda for Peace*, emphasis added

IN 1992, UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali authored a groundbreaking policy document in which he presented the vision of “a United Nations capable of maintaining international peace and security, of securing justice and human rights and of promoting, in the words of the [UN] Charter, ‘social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom.’”¹ Entitled *An Agenda for Peace*, this document, requested by an unprecedented UN Security Council summit meeting featuring the heads of all the current governments on the Council, assessed the United Nations’ capacity for peacekeeping and introduced the rationale for a decade of preventive diplomacy that followed its publication.²

No less significantly, the report also contributed immensely to the intellectual foundations of what would eventually come to be known as the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) paradigm. In R2P, the international community negotiated the competing demands of state sovereignty and international human rights, conditionally favoring the latter in cases when states were either the agents of, or indifferent to, what the International Commission on State Sovereignty called the “avoidable catastrophes” of the late twentieth century: “mass murder, rape, and starvation.”³ The R2P Doctrine, as the UN 2005 World Summit’s Outcome Documents make clear, implies

Clear and unambiguous acceptance by all governments of the collective international responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. Willingness to take timely and decisive collective action for this purpose, through the Security Council, when peaceful means prove inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to do it.⁴

The forms of intervention conceived of and acted upon in the period between the publication of these two documents—and to some extent, since—has presupposed something more than action strictly delimited to forestall or mitigate what Samantha Power described as emergent “problem[s] from hell”: ethnic cleansing, genocide, and forced migration.⁵ Boutros-Ghali’s 1992 report already anticipated a necessary corollary to the new preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping regimes: a sphere of action he referred to as “post-conflict peace-building.” Indeed, in the period between the publication of *An Agenda for Peace* and the UN General Assembly’s adoption of the R2P principles, an entire technocracy for managing the post-conflict phase of international humanitarian intervention would come into existence. Moreover, the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001 and 2003 also accelerated the creation of an emergent field of expertise in post-conflict action, with subsidiary proficiencies in “post-conflict assessment,” “post-conflict management,” “post-conflict recovery,” and “post-conflict development.”⁶ In the process, the forms of action required to establish and nurture institutions and infrastructure under post-conflict conditions came to be seen as something distinct from, and independent of, the political circumstances that occasioned the need for them to begin with. So complete has been the professionalization of post-conflict management as a kind of expertise that, without any hint of irony, the RAND Corporation published a *Beginner’s Guide to Nation-Building* in 2007.⁷

The principal argument advanced in this collection, however, is that the post-conflict environment that is acted upon by this new international technocracy of peacebuilding is in fact an extension of the politics from which that technocracy seeks to distinguish itself. Indeed, as we outline in the specific case studies collected here, the very idea of a post-conflict environment unselfconsciously *advances* the forms of structural violence that are, in many instances, underlying causes of armed conflict to begin with. Repeatedly, we find that pragmatic assessments of the “post-conflict environment” are at the same time continuations of the same logic whereby the international

community has identified certain of its members as “fragile” or “failed” states, and in the process ratified a contemporary history of intervention. Indeed, we understand the post-conflict environment to be the necessary *corollary* to the “failed state,” in a very precise sense. Leading theorists of late warfare like Mary Kaldor and Paul Collier have described the last two decades of mass armed violence as “wars of state unmaking” and “development in reverse.”⁸ The international, and increasing transnational, response has been the multiplication of knowledges and techniques of state- and nation-building.⁹ If the conflict environment is said to be one of “weak,” “fragile,” or “failed” nation-states—so the thinking goes—then the emergence of the late post-conflict environment is one where the *remaking* of identities, bodies, politics, economies, and governments within Neoliberal constraints is regularly treated as paramount. Our aim, in this collection, is to render that reasoning reflexive: we trace how the post-conflict environment of the new technocracy’s imagination is “imagineered” a priori as the site of a new *mission civilisatrice*.¹⁰

THE ORIGINS OF THE POST-CONFLICT ENVIRONMENT

A grim history attends the rise of this new post-conflict technocracy. On one hand, the end of a bipolar geopolitical order marked by the fall of the Soviet Union influenced the cessation of a number of long-standing conflicts. On the other hand, the end of global bipolarity has led to the efflorescence of violent struggles, and these have challenged both the perceptions of, and responses to, old and seemingly new repertoires of peace and violence. With respect to the so-called new wars, it is important to note that the 1990s witnessed the outbreak of a significant number of conflicts. Iraq, Somalia, Yugoslavia, Haiti, Rwanda, Algeria, Sierra Leone, Kosovo, Chechnya, East Timor—to name just a few horrors—loom large in histories of post-conflict peacebuilding.¹¹ Not only because a number of these conflicts presented the international community with a persistent “intervention dilemma” during the hostilities, but because their cessation posed even larger challenges to established conventions of peacekeeping.

The new landscapes of UN action since the end of the Cold War correlate with the rise of new techniques of peace examined in this volume. If one were to place former Yugoslavia in a special category all its own, it is notable that the UN mission to help resolve international disputes seemingly be-

came an endangered species in the 1990s: Iraq-Kuwait, Rwanda-Uganda, Chad-Libya, and Eritrea-Ethiopia being the only cases. Similarly, UN decolonization missions were few and met with varied outcomes: a smooth and successful referendum delivering independence to Namibia, a still-stalemate referendum process in the Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara, and East Timor's bloody rejection of autonomy under Indonesian rule in 1999. With internal conflicts becoming the dominant mode of warfare since the Second World War, most UN missions were tasked with the management of civil wars and inter-communal conflicts that either ended with the Cold War, began because it ended, or radically mutated with the loss of super-power inputs: Angola, Nicaragua, Cambodia, El Salvador, Mozambique, Somalia, Georgia (Abkhazia), Haiti, Liberia, Rwanda, Tajikistan, Guatemala, Sierra Leone, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Burundi, and, of course, the former Yugoslavia (Croatia, Macedonia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Serbia, and Kosovo). More recently, the United Nations has launched peacekeeping and peacebuilding initiatives in Afghanistan, Côte d'Ivoire, and the Darfur conflict (Sudan, Chad, and the Central African Republic), while reinforcing efforts in the Democratic Republic of Congo, East Timor, and Haiti. Haiti, indeed, has become the subject of a half-dozen UN missions since 1993.

At the same time, it is important to note that the United Nations' monopoly over these practices has been tenuous. New players have entered the fields of peace maintenance and rebuilding nation-states. Often in cooperation with the United Nations, the European Union has deployments to the former Yugoslavia, Chad, the DRC, and, at least on paper, the border between Egypt and the Gaza Strip. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has increasingly inserted itself into the management of post-conflict conditions too. Starting with its legitimate (Bosnia and Herzegovina) and dubious (Kosovo) interventions into the conflicts in former Yugoslavia, NATO has since assumed roles in stability operations in Afghanistan, protecting shipping near the Gulf of Aden from Somali pirates, and, in 2011, conducting an armed humanitarian intervention in Libya at the behest of the UN Security Council and in coordination with the Arab League.¹²

This, then, is the context in which the international community embarked upon an unprecedented range of peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions. No fewer than twenty-five UN missions were put into effect between the arrival of blue helmets in Angola in 1989 and the United States-led occupation of Afghanistan in 2002. Militarized humanitarian interventions

likewise marked the new security terrain of the 1990s with high-profile actions in Somalia, pre- and post-genocide Rwanda, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor, and Sierra Leone.¹³ No less significantly, these are also the conditions under which new post-conflict technocracies of peacebuilding would emerge, gain legitimacy, and eventually eclipse traditional peacekeeping functions.

The monumental scale of the enterprise just described has coincided with a Taylorization of action; in the aggregate of these cases, one witnesses a situation in which the new technocracy of peacebuilding defines the post-conflict environment in terms of constituent “fragments” of civil society so that it can “re-assemble” them according to its own highly specialized division of labor. As a result, the peacebuilders’ post-conflict environment is characterized as the locus where specific protocols of transitional justice, transitional governance, and economic aid, reconstruction, and development are to be implemented. The World Bank’s 2011 *World Development Report* describes the same “core tools” of peacebuilding quite succinctly, as the transformation or provision of “institutions that deliver citizen security, justice, and jobs.”¹⁴ So successful is this schematization of the post-conflict environment that investments in these forms of institutionalization are *themselves* often treated as correlates of sustainable peace and checks against recidivism into war.¹⁵

CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE POST-CONFLICT CONDITION

This identification of peacebuilding with institutionalization—and more specifically, with the introduction of the institutions of the liberal state—has occasioned a measure of critical analysis both within the peacebuilding technocracy and without. These criticisms align with two distinct, though related, understandings of Liberalism. Stakeholders in the peacebuilding paradigm derive epistemic legitimacy for institutionalization—as have “nation builders” like George W. Bush—from what is commonly referred to as the “Democratic Peace” paradigm. Drawing upon a tradition of political research that has claimed (largely on normative or institutionalist grounds) that democracies tend not to wage war on other democracies, liberal peacebuilders have reverse-engineered the same democratic peace into a program of action.¹⁶ Here, the introduction or re-introduction of institutions characteristic to liberal democracies into post-conflict conditions (democratic gov-

ernance, independent judiciaries, and free markets) becomes an action plan for peacebuilders. The problem, as peacebuilders themselves frame it, is that a liberal project is advanced through illiberal means. “The governance of post-conflict territories by the United Nations embodies a central policy dilemma,” Simon Chesterman argues. “[H]ow does one help a population prepare for democratic governance and the rule of law by imposing a form of benevolent autocracy?”¹⁷ With some variations, stakeholders and advocates of the liberal peacebuilding paradigm have, like Chesterman, suggested that the paradox of undemocratic democratization is an irreducible feature of peace transitions. It is, in other words, a necessary evil to be mitigated by introducing forms of “accountability and consultation” into transitional administrations, and by inviting local populations to become stakeholders “in the creation of . . . [political] structures, and in the process by which power is transferred.”¹⁸ Roland Paris has expressed a similar sentiment succinctly, arguing for “Institutionalization before Liberalization (IBL).”¹⁹ The only other alternative, some liberal peacebuilders argue, is to advance the same process in reverse. For example, Jack Snyder has not only argued that the nurturing of civil society must precede democratization, but that institutionalization of democratization prior to the emergence of civil society is actually a cause of ethno-political violence to begin with.²⁰ Each of these approaches amounts to roughly the same thing: they are efforts to acknowledge and at the same time disavow the illiberal dialectic of liberal peacebuilding by treating it as a sequencing problem instead.

Critics outside of the peacebuilding technocracy have tended to dismiss the reverse-engineering of the liberal peace just described and have commonly treated it as the form of imperialism characteristic to the historical present. As M. A. Mohamed Salih has suggested in an analysis of the political economy of the liberal peace, “built in” to the project of peacebuilding is “a discrepancy between political and economic liberalization” that repeatedly sacrifices the former in favor of the latter, and thus substitutes a species of pacification for peace.²¹ Implicitly, this kind of criticism resonates with a vision of Neoliberalism that Naomi Klein has termed “the shock doctrine.”²² According to this understanding of events, post-disaster conditions, whether natural or anthropogenic, emerge as opportunities for advancing a coercive, totalizing economic order in which only markets are “free.”

The most important studies of the liberal peacebuilding paradigm, however, have already begun to approach the concerns we raise explicitly here: that the premises of peacebuilding—as well as many criticisms of it—are “af-

firmative,” in the sense that they are complicit with what they would undo. Theodor Adorno once referred to “affirmative” critique as a kind of “groveling criticism.” In mistaking itself for the transcendence it finds absent in its object (in this case, Liberal peacebuilding’s own self-understanding), critique reveals itself to be a *re*-affirmation of the merely existent.²³

John Heathershaw advances a parallel argument when he notes, in reference to the writings of Roland Paris, that “critical works are incorporated by discourse and become the new dogma.”²⁴ Although Heathershaw sublimates the notion of totality implicit in this position to the discursive sphere (calling it “an intertextual process”), he nevertheless works through the otherwise unexamined language of the dominant peacebuilding paradigms to reveal how, in asserting a problematic coincidence of identity and positivity—that is, peacebuilding and its own notion—the “pragmatic” discourse of peacebuilding reveals itself to have been normative all along. For this reason, pragmatic peacebuilding is actually part of the same politics from which it purports to set itself apart. Measured against its own concept, then, “peace building is not essentially liberal.”²⁵

Heathershaw and Lambach are also correct to point out that implicit in current examinations of peacebuilding are a series of problematic assumptions about the post-conflict environment itself.²⁶ Indeed, it would be fair to say that in the “post-conflict” lie the unexamined premises of peacebuilding, both as the geographically typical *site* and the epistemic *ground* of intervention. Relying on the logic of a critical geopolitics, Heathershaw and Lambach challenge those premises; they treat as ideological the “Unitarian” optic of academic researches on the post-conflict condition, which advance an unexamined “territorialization of space.”²⁷ Here, in other words, the normative horizons of undivided sovereignty and bounded territoriality are projected onto the post-conflict environment as part of a problematic “political ontology.” They therefore propose a “re-conceptualization of our (spatial) frames for understanding the post-conflict” that privileges the multiple, the hybrid, and trans-national *socius*.²⁸

THE POST-CONFLICT ENVIRONMENT: AN IMMANENT APPROACH

Accepting the implications while refusing the methodological conclusions of this sophisticated and important research, the present collection treats the post-conflict environment as a reification that is irreducible, and this is

why we distinguish it from Heathershaw's term: *post-conflict condition*. More to the point, the theoretical position guiding the empirical researches presented in this volume is that the negation of the "Unitarian" perspective does not necessarily corroborate the *identification* of post-conflict conditions as its contrary: a space of contested and *de-territorialized* multiplicities that is "interspatial"—in Heathershaw and Lambach's terms—to the degree that it is negotiated between local and global frames. This is not to suggest that the "state in society" approach advanced by Heathershaw fails to resonate with a number of our own conclusions. But our aim here is not to retrieve an authentic post-conflict condition out of its misprision, so much as it is to understand how that misprision is productively constituted by and within the thinking of the peacebuilding technocracies, with real political effects. In this sense, this collection aspires to advance what David Campbell (paraphrasing Foucault) has described as the need for "problematization of problematizations." Here we apply this approach to contemporary fields of expertise concerning the post-conflict environment.²⁹ The problem of the post-conflict environment is at the same time an urgent problem in the history of thought.

A simple and unoriginal observation—one shared by all the contributors to this project—can be interpolated as our common point of departure. It is the acknowledgement that violent conflicts, from brief episodes of mass armed warfare to decades of quiet government repression, are never entirely over. From Clausewitz to Weber to Foucault, social and strategic theorists have long recognized that the line between peace and war is one drawn by politics, not by nature. Commencing from this observation might suggest that our study has a weak purchase on the terrain we wish to explore. But we are in fact interested in how various efforts to claim mastery over the post-conflict environment necessarily confound themselves in their efforts to define the space, time, and constituent objects of intervention. If there is any blurring of the lines between peace and conflict, that obfuscation is an effect of the "war" for the post-conflict environment itself. Those struggles, their antagonists, genres of knowledge, sites of contestation, tacit ideologies, and—most importantly—their traceable repercussions, are this collection's principal concern.³⁰

The other intuition that grounds this study and affiliates our various contributions is a shared rejection of a common definition of the post-conflict environment. We view as hopelessly circular any effort to arrive at an operational definition or a theoretical model of the post-conflict environ-

ment empirically from a set of *a priori* axioms. We instead work immanently through the image of the post-conflict environment that stakeholders present as they plan to go about reforming it, as well as through the gaps in the “picture” that emerge as a result of stubborn political realities’ refusal to conform with their depiction. We do so, with the precise ambition to show how the “imaginative geography”—to cite Edward Said³¹—of a dominant geopolitical order presents itself to view in the ways that the same order imagines the sites that risk either falling out of, or may successfully be integrated within, its own logic. The paradox, of course, is that the order that would seek to tame the post-conflict environment is the same that produces it, and so our key observations here are once again about the post-conflict environment that emerges as a reification of a Neoliberal present’s ambiguous relation to a kind of violence from which it cannot be entirely separated. Hence the studies here question institutionally disparate yet functionally similar efforts to construct a pragmatic problem-solution dyad—that is, a “problematization.” Our effort to problematize these problematizations begins with the observation that the dyad refuses to recognize the dialectical relation between its two components. Each study in this collection then details how the forced dyadic organization, in an effort to structure the world as such, derails itself. Previous studies of the disciplines and technologies of the post-conflict environment have been content to stop at basic questions of whether or not the problem has been properly diagnosed and so whether or not the prescription fits the disease. We invert this picture and ask how the medicine is likewise symptomatic of the “disease.”

An already noted example of this approach is Campbell’s (1998) study of post-conflict Bosnia, which sought to account for the emergence of a particular solution (territorial division) to the alleged problem tormenting the Bosnian polity (ethnic conflict). He does so not just by denaturalizing the statement of the problem (that is, questioning ethnic framing of the conflict), but more importantly by elucidating the limits of contemporary liberal political thought that produced, spatialized, and legitimated such Solomonic illiberality across the Bosnian landscape (in the form of its partition). Campbell’s study is much more than a critique of the ethnic conflict literature of the 1990s. It is a thoroughgoing interrogation of a genre of thought and action that locates the solution to violent conflict in the “rightsizing” of state and sub-state boundaries. An interrogation whose objective is not to discard territorialized power-sharing as a “core tool”—to borrow, again, from the World Bank—in the effort to imagineer durable post-conflict environ-

ments. It is an interrogation that seeks to expose the tragedy of the core tool's complicity in the production of the initial problem and, more importantly, its complicity in the reproduction of the ideational and practical limits that ironically give it warrant while constraining its ability to achieve its promises.

In this collection, we perform similar evaluations of the core tools that have emerged within and from the post-conflict environments of the past two decades, namely, statebuilding, peacebuilding, transitional justice, refugee management, reconstruction, and finance and redevelopment. The cases in each study—respectively, Sierra Leone, Iraqi Kurdistan, Algeria, Palestinians, Kosovo, and Lebanon—have not been selected because they represent particularly telling deployments of the core tools. As with almost any post-conflict environment, one could apply the analysis developed in this collection to elucidate the doxa that operationalize the core tools normatively while at the same time rendering them self-defeating pragmatically. The cases in this collection instead reflect the contributors' deep familiarity with the environments themselves. When coupled with collectively shared hermeneutic suspicions about the co-constitutive relationship between images or the post-conflict environment and the techniques of post-conflict management, this familiarity has constellated a new and immanent critique of an immense field of practice in international security.

IMAGINATIVE GEOGRAPHIES OF PEACE

We apply this immanent approach to a series of case studies. The cases under examination here were chosen because they elucidate the most dominant regimes of knowledge and practice within the techno-politics of contemporary post-conflict management: statebuilding, peacebuilding, transitional justice, resettlement, reconstruction, and redevelopment aid. Our goal is not to offer a global atlas of the post-conflict environment nor is it to provide a total history of Neoliberal peacebuilding through a series of geographically and temporally balanced case studies. The geographic scope of the contributions here—the authors' ethnographic, historiographic, geographic, economic, and politicographic encounters in Eastern Europe, Southwest Asia, and Northwest Africa—should not be the terrain on which this volume is read and deliberated. On the one hand, we recognize the eminence of post-conflict zones in Latin America and Central and Southeast Asia, as well as

East and Central Africa. On the other hand, we dismiss the criticism that this collection is missing key cases or essential conflict sites. That the following chapters are intended as case studies of the subject conflicts—Sierra Leone, Iraqi Kurdistan, Algeria, Palestinian refugee camps, Kosovo, and Lebanon—is the first misperception that has to be abandoned. The chapters in this collection are rather case studies of totalizing logics. As each chapter argues, each logic elaborates an imaginative geography of conflict in those spaces, a geography that then warrants the precise ameliorative intervention from the very logic that has rendered that space as problematic. These are not just case studies of how theories of post-conflict management produce realities at the ideational level, they are also studies of how those self-legitimizing realities become operationalized in the techno-political interventions of post-conflict managers.

The larger point being that we are not out to dismantle Neoliberal peacebuilding by repeatedly demonstrating that it operates through the production of self-serving yet self-destructing constructs. Indeed, Neoliberal peacebuilding works quite effectively, but not in the ways in which these paradigms imagine themselves, their work, and the post-conflict worlds they make. The ways in which the constructs actually work and the broader ways in which they are effective cannot be accounted for within the given peacebuilding paradigms' self-understandings. The chapters in this collection are thus attempts to account for the productive and destructive capacities of late Neoliberal peacebuilding without relying upon or reproducing the epistemologies and ontologies of statebuilding, peacebuilding, transitional justice, resettlement, reconstruction, and redevelopment aid.

Statebuilding

Following this program, Catherine Goetze interrogates interventionary techniques of statebuilding and transitional governance in post-war Sierra Leone. She identifies the driving problematization of statebuilding as one that premises state failure and dysfunctional polities as the conditions of possibility for violent conflict, which then become the conditions of necessity that require the intervention of late statebuilding theory and practices. Goetze first supplements this initial observation by unearthing similar assumptions embedded within two important strands of thought: one, economic models of an abstract *pre*-conflict environment and, two, empirical findings related to the human terrain of demobilized fighters in Sierra Le-

one's post-conflict environment. Goetze then argues that domestic-level econometric analyses of civil war etiology, by omitting the international *a priori*, lack any analysis of actual economic structures. In the specific case of Sierra Leone, these pivotal yet nonetheless hypothetical assumptions about the essential nature of insurgents' motives have been translated into a very real set of interventionary practices aimed at controlling the trade of "conflict diamonds" so as to address the alleged sources of violence (i.e., rebel greed). The curiosity, for Goetze, is the extent to which rebel subjectivities are produced and morally shaded by these assumptions while the demonstrably predacious behavior of state actors and codependent foreign business interests (*vis-à-vis* Sierra Leone's lucrative diamond industry) have been implicitly rewarded and, indeed, are seen as essential to the stability of the post-conflict environment. As most of the studies in this volume admit, only the most naïve observer of transitional governance would be shocked to discover illiberal politics lurking behind the mantle of Neoliberal peacebuilding. The point, rather, is that the analytical absence of the state and extra-state actors from contemporary accounts of civil war causation plays a legitimating function in post-conflict statebuilding and transitional governance activities.

Peacebuilding

If the act of distinguishing between state and non-state actors presents itself as a *problematique* of transitional governance, then the act of repairing traumatized minds similarly becomes viewed as a necessary problem for peace- and nation-building practices to address. Given the preferred assumption that war is mainly psychologically produced and reproduced by those who have experienced its pain (rather than through structures that would otherwise implicate a field of stakeholders far beyond the sites of violence), Sarah Keeler explains that the normative consequent is the warrant to reconfigure trauma and suffering into acceptable ideal forms. Commencing from a critical reading of the disjuncture between normative theorizations of the post-conflict environment and the general absence of its conflictual realities at the agent level, Keeler goes on to outline the historical context that has given rise to layers of trauma and suffering while also witnessing the increasing penetration of foreign interests into the Kurdish region following the 1991 Gulf War. A clear consequence of these applications of routinized and gendered models of Selfhood is the denigration and dismissal of the multifarious and contradictory ways in which suffering is actually understood by its

subject persons and communities. Suffering, as viewed by universalist approaches, Keeler stresses, is rarely understood to constitute a means of resistance, whether as political resistance to local tyranny or psychic resistance to foreign medical interventions. Equally, Keeler argues, the regulation of post-conflict minds under the rubric of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) itself constitutes a form of structural violence that cannot be seen as an unintended consequence of peacebuilding in post-conflict societies. As with all of the chapters in this volume, Keeler reveals one of the ways in which structural violence must be taken as constitutive of the post-conflict environment. The imperative to discipline the state, the economy, and the society at large is likewise reflected in the need to discipline traumatized minds as well.

Transitional Justice

To build peace in the late post-conflict environment is to build justice institutionally and culturally while, at the same time, delivering reconciliation to war-torn societies. There is no clearer marker of this mandate and bifurcation than the proliferation, on the one hand, of ad hoc transitional mechanisms intended to reinforce the cultural means by which a society bridges the gap between conflict and peace, authoritarianism and democracy, the state of nature and the rule of law. Then, on the other hand, there are the *punitive* means by which transitional justice is increasingly administered within internationalized fora. Taking normative criticisms of Algeria's most recent national reconciliation policies as his point of departure, Jacob Mundy charts the thirty-year distillation of varied and contingent forms of justice and peacemaking into a generic and now requisite framework for post-conflict reconciliation—the truth commission. To counter the paradigm of retributive or victors' justice (which has become increasingly monopolized in the hands of institutions dominated by Western states), the paradigm of restorative or survivors' justice is presented as the alternative that builds state, national, and judicial capacity. The problem in either approach, however, is the assumed identities of conflict that are reproduced and sedimented by truth commissions. These identities are assumed to be the requisite identities for peace: combatants and civilians, victors and victims, perpetrators and survivors. What restorative justice "restores"—or, more accurately, reifies—is a set of identities wholly dependent upon an idealized ontology of war, not the actual, ambiguous, shifting, contradictory, and indeterminate identities that are lived and practiced by those in any real

conflict. In the end, Mundy does not ask us to envision an alternative model of justice but rather to consider how prevailing transitional justice prescriptions fail to deliver on their most basic promises. In so doing, they operationalize blindness to structural violence in the conflict and post-conflict environments.

Resettlement

From putative spaces of justice, we then move to a post-conflict space that is often rendered synonymous with “exceptional” injustice: the refugee camp. In her contribution to this volume, Romola Sanyal interrogates the now routine practice of corralling displaced populations, particularly those that cross international borders in times of armed conflict. Sanyal observes several related tensions between the two major international refugee institutions—UNHCR and UNRWA—that play a predominant role in the very production of refugees and their spaces. Sanyal argues, however, that the Palestinians’ exceptionality has increasingly become the implicit model for long-term international refugee management. The development and spatial application of “transitional settlements” by the UNHCR—an attempt to move away from the camp as ideal form while also attempting to eschew the new reality of refugee urbanism—is taken by Sanyal to reveal a new logic of refugee management with UNRWA as its implicit guide. One of the clear implications being that the camp is still not understood to be a site of imposed structural violence. And with the advent of transitional settlements, the means of imposing the disciplinary regime of the camp on certain displaced populations becomes all the more effective while reducing the visibility of its nature.

Reconstruction

As with refugee camps, ideational and material attempts to build out past violence in the physical spaces of the post-conflict environment are problematic in ways that their own assumptions do not allow them to visualize. Addressing the imperative to build or re-build in the post-conflict environment, Andrew Hersher documents the irresolvable tension between the assertion of destruction as the problem and the problematics of reconstruction. Nesting his analysis within familiar post-conflict claims of exemplarity/exceptionality, Hersher charts various meta-Kosovos. One

important image of Kosovo emerges out of the specific global controversy surrounding the legitimacy of NATO's campaign against Serbia in 1999, quickly followed by the effort to derive and codify an internationally accepted algorithm to legitimize future humanitarian interventions—the R2P project. Among the post-conflict duties R2P has assigned itself is the responsibility to rebuild, where Kosovo has become a crucial test case. Yet this undecided image of exemplarity and exceptionality has been carried into Kosovo's post-conflict environment. Where Kosovar leaders and their foreign backers insist that the territory's pursuit of independent and sovereign statehood is *sui generis*, Hersher notes that the foreign prescriptions for post-conflict reconstruction in Kosovo were very much generic models designed for no specific place at all. Rather than take exemplarity and exceptionality as given, Hersher analyzes the historical circumstances that gave rise to these two images. He seeks to understand their dialectical interactions, and to understand how they function as effective yet competing stays that co-constitute temporal liminality and legitimate the interventionary practices themselves. What is at stake here, for Hersher, is not just that architectural reconstruction in Kosovo has played a part in perpetuating two opposing—and possibly self-serving—views of the same space, whether its exceptionality or its exemplarity. By presenting their aims as the “restoration” of pre-conflict conditions, peacebuilders conflated the problem of housing with the problem of repatriation, so that patterns of post-conflict relief inadvertently function to intensify forms of stratification coextensive with conflict conditions. Despite assumptions that Kosovars would return to the restored environment, such wishful imagining generates new forms of displacement.

Aid and Redevelopment

Building/imagining the post-conflict environment, however, requires funding. Where International financial institutions (IFIs) like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund once functioned as an arm of the West in the Cold War struggle for control over the peoples and governments of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, these institutions have since had to recast and position their activities as concordant with the new peacebuilding agendas witnessed in the late post-conflict environment. The reconceptualization of armed conflict as “development in reverse,” according to leading World Bank economists, is illustrative of this conflation.³² Yet Na-

jib Hourani's critique of this new reality is not to be confused with established arguments that cite the nefarious history of structural adjustment programs or with newer claims of emergent "disaster capitalism."³³ Instead, Hourani examines the material and ideational construction of a post-conflict environment as the effect of, rather than the assumed precondition for, the establishment or reinstatement of Neoliberal economic reforms. The problematization that Hourani identifies is the prescription of economic liberalization for economies that otherwise enable authoritarianism and war. Where established criticisms of IFIs see nefarious politics or imperial logics lurking behind economic agendas, Hourani detects something quite different amongst the actual struggles for property allotments and retail space in post-conflict Lebanon. In other words, the joke might be on the IFIs. If there is any Trojan horse in this post-conflict situation, Hourani suggests, it is the ability of informal and formal political factions to use the vehicle of Neoliberal economic reform to advance illiberal agendas. Starting with Lebanon's post-conflict economic tribulations, Hourani traces the path that led to the World Bank's sizeable intervention into the Lebanese property sector in the mid-1990s, while at the same time Lebanon was witnessing the ascendancy of Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. While the economic competition within the post-conflict commercial spaces co-erected by the World Bank has been quite vigorous, so has the informal politics behind the various stakeholders in these new venues. Given that economics and politics cannot be separated in practice, Hourani suggests that they must be separated in theory and rhetoric so as to justify interventions that are always already political. Hourani concludes that the positing of a post-conflict environment aids in this process by licensing that which would not be possible without the environment in the first place.

PERSISTENT THEMES OF POST-CONFLICT CONSTITUTION

Across these studies we find an ensemble of discrete means by which different post-conflict configurations of space and time, agency and structure are variously enabled or disabled. Central to our studies is a transnational class of managers who co-constitute post-conflict environments through their knowledge and practice in and about those spaces. Tracing the circulations of these actors and their acts helps identify the ways in which local, national, regional, and global interactions impinge upon the work of constituting

post-conflict space today. Where Goetze examines the productive absence of an international political-economy in the science and management of “resource conflicts,” whose roots are ostensibly local in nature, Hourani details local manipulations of Neoliberal assumptions about the economics and politics of civil conflict and Neoliberal demands regarding free markets and liberal governmentality. While trauma is permissible at an abstract national level (what national mythology is not rooted in the overcoming of trauma?), Keeler examines efforts to eradicate it at the personal level of actual victims. Truth commissions likewise fetishize personal experience as the etiological locus of violent authoritarianism and conflict. But for Mundy, this global mandate for truth and accountability works by, one, denying it to most victims of war and dictatorship while, two, shaming those polities that refuse to follow the dictates of the global transitional justice technocracy. Spatial interaction acutely manifests in Sanyal’s examination of Palestinian refugee camps and Hersher’s examination of reconstruction in Kosovo. In both cases, the spatiality of Palestinian camp and Kosovar home exist within a context whose purpose is to build peace (in the case of the latter) or to at least make an armistice tolerable (in the case of the former). But these are conflicts intensely affected by geopolitical forces, particularly the interests of the United States. These forces not only affect the built environment in post-conflict space, they respectively work to enable national identities purposefully and haphazardly.

Building upon this last observation, another durable theme that emerges from our studies of the late post-conflict environment is the ambivalent rendering of the spaces themselves—are they exemplary or exceptional?—when refracted through the regimes of knowledge and managerial strategies that produce them as post-conflict. Sierra Leone is the classic case of a resource conflict driven by a criminally motivated rebellion, and so post-conflict statebuilding projects there have aimed to address these issues. Goetz, however, demonstrates that the exemplarity of Sierra Leone is produced by a certain scientific understanding of civil conflicts as self-contained worlds, an understanding that has achieved epistemic hegemony among economic theorists of armed conflict and those that would seek to manage the aftermath of those conflicts. As detailed above, Hersher addresses this tension head-on, examining the productive tension between the international political exceptionality of an independent Kosovo (i.e., efforts to render it as such by its leaders and backers) vs. the established models of post-conflict reconstruction automatically applied there. The making of post-conflict

spaces in Lebanon that are intelligible to international consumers is, for Horani, a sign of the failure of aid and redevelopment schemes to grasp the exceptional forces at work in Lebanon's civil war. Sanyal's intervention examines a different set of built environments. In the recent convergence of UNRWA and UNHCR styles of the spatial management of refugees, the institutional exceptionality of Palestinian refugees has become an exemplary model for a post-conflict technocracy that increasingly relies upon refugee camps as a space of permanent impermanence. The function of which is to satisfy the demands of some stakeholders (e.g., the antagonists behind a stalemated conflict, an international community unwilling to resolve a dispute, the post-conflict technocracy that now sees camps as a logical and inevitable form) at the expense of the refugees themselves. Mundy raises similar concerns about local and global allocations of dignity. Algeria stands as a country that tried to self-allocate dignity in ways that rendered it exceptionally deviant to international human rights and transitional justice communities. Whereas the exemplar, South Africa's TRC, did not represent a revolutionary redistribution of dignity in post-Apartheid South Africa. It worked precisely because it made a spectacle of national contrition that disabled many more victims' voices than it enabled in public displays of guilt and suffering. The power of the TRC, nearly twenty years later, rests in its ability to reproduce itself as an exemplar, not just in the distribution of restorative justice. Raising similar questions about victims' rights to their own suffering, as well as processes of remember and forgetting, Keeler unearths the ways that, through psychological and medical interventions, exceptional personal experiences of victimhood are disabled at the behest of attempts to erect exemplary yet depersonalized narratives of national suffering.

Central to the construction of post-conflict space is a set of varied and reoccurring techniques and technologies. As one might expect, spatial technologies figure prominently in the accounts here, whether the space of the refugee camp, the reconstructed space of a war-torn country, the space where acts of national reconciliation are performed and consumed, as well as the space where post-conflict normalcy is affirmed through conspicuous consumption of Euro-American products and brands. Keeler additionally documents how new and old forms of personalized psycho-pharmacological management ostensibly seek to de-traumatize individuals and so homogenize experiences and identities in ways that are amenable to projects of post-conflict peace- and nation-building. Goetze, on the other hand, traces international techniques and technologies of prohibition aimed at the ostensible

resources driving armed conflicts in the world's poorest countries. For the authors here, these are the other “core tools”—these routine and evolving knowledges, practices, and technologies—that co-constitute the late post-conflict environment. In the analyses collected here, they emerge as the premier mechanisms through which the global peacebuilding technocracy elaborates and operates within post-conflict environments.

CONCLUSION

We accept the proposition that there are elements of the post-conflict environment that are not new. Recent efforts to picture and build the post-conflict environment hold salient parallels with past interventions into zones of war and perceived anocracy. To say, however, that the late post-conflict reconstruction is nothing more than derivations of the Marshall Plan or that state- and nation-building are colonialism in new bottles ignores the primacy of historical context. Indeed, we would argue that historical context does not merely explain differences in statebuilding between post-war Germany and Kosovo. By historical context, we mean the idea that it is the contemporary condition that produces the very past said to prefigure what follows. Rather than an evolutionary approach to understanding the post-conflict environment (e.g., studying its mutations since the end of the Second World War), we adopt a genealogical approach that explores the contingency of the past based on the present. Just as Benedict Anderson counter-intuitively concluded that national history does not produce but is produced by its alleged product, the nation,³⁴ we find that the late post-conflict environment is an essential condition of possibility for the production of its supposed precursors. In the short term, one prominent effect of this productive process is the generation of conflict histories based on the needs of the post-conflict present. Images of the post-conflict present become the window through which the conflictual past is imaginatively constructed. More broadly, it also produces *longue durée* self-images in much the same way that disciplines and institutions often project themselves counter-temporally into modern, classical, and ancient arenas. These historical constructs not only become legitimating genealogies for the interventionary practices behind the late post-conflict environment, they become adopted and projected as the sine qua non historical understanding of the broader problematic they erect.

In what follows, then, we do not attempt to advance a critique that opposes an idealized image of select post-conflict environments with a supposed contradictory or more robust account of those environments' alleged reality. We do not pretend to present superior readings of post-conflict environments in places such as Palestinian refugee camps, Kosovar housing projects, Beirut shopping centers, or alluvial diamond mines in West Africa. While the contributors to this collection are united in the view that post-conflict environments are often represented in problematic ways (starting from the very claim that they are post-conflict), we do not necessarily believe that the only response to this tendency is the assertion of more accurate or incisive counter-representation. To do so would merely invite the same criticism of this collection that its contributors apply to the schema advanced by stakeholders in the production of the "post-conflict environment." Understanding the doxa of stakeholders to be coextensive with what they represent, we deal here only with *their* post-conflict environment, attempting to understand the effects of mobilized reifications. Thus, our concern here is not with a right way to represent the post-conflict environment, but with the ways in which sometimes competing, sometimes harmonious images of post-conflict bodies, spaces, and institutions (1) legitimize the interventionary practices into those lives and environments by creating justificatory narratives while (2) realizing and revealing the broader logic of Neo-liberal peacebuilding from which they obtain moral warrant but in which they are always already embedded. This collection is thus able to account for the post-conflict environment in novel ways that its traditional managers are unable to. Because we view the tacit as entirely problematic, we are better positioned to advance an understanding of peacebuilding in the age of Neoliberalism that does not amount to a self-understanding.

That our interventions do not lend themselves to easy scientific appropriation and redeployment back into post-conflict fields and knowledges is intentional. There are, however, other ways in which we believe this collection will break new ground on pressing issues of global peace and conflict. This volume examines how the leading techniques and technologies of peacebuilding can be read as paradoxically disabling effective management of post-conflict spaces while ultimately enabling the reproduction of the global political and economic condition known as Neoliberalism. Our method, which details the imaginative and material elaboration of post-conflict environments by the dominant regimes of techno-political knowledge and practice of peacebuilding, could likewise find purchase in attempts

to understand late war-making. How are conflict environments expected, assembled, and contested by the scientific and technocratic stakeholders who position themselves as the premier stage managers of the theater of war? In the same way that we view post-conflict environments as performatively constituted through acts that are misidentified as the effects of the environment itself, a new war studies would take as its object of analysis the “theater” of war in the same way that we have attempted to understand the contemporary theater of peace. An exciting agenda of research, as the conclusion to this volume suggests, is the investigation of the dramaturgical regimes of war and peace, their mutual imbrication, and so the ways in which conflict and post-conflict environments reciprocally make and unmake each other, synchronically and diachronically. As we approach a world in which war is ostensibly facing extinction,³⁵ a simultaneous inquiry into the dramaturgical staging of war and peace might lead us to a more critical understanding of both, critical in the sense of an ironic yet ethically pressing science. Here we have accounted for the appearance and powers of peace in ways that raise suspicions about its intellectual architecture, its normative warrant, its temporal inauguration, its spatial configuration, its material amplification, and its ideological instrumentalization. The alleged disappearance of war, and the powers this disappearance confers, need to be accounted for likewise.

Notes

1. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace* (New York: United Nations, 1992), available at <http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html>.
2. See UN Security Council, “Provisional Verbatim Record of the Three Thousand and Forty Sixth Meeting,” UN Document S/PV 3046 (January 31, 1992).
3. The inaugural document of the R2P paradigm is the report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). In it, “The Responsibility to Protect” is introduced as “the idea that sovereign states have a responsibility to protect their own citizens from avoidable catastrophe—from mass murder and rape, from starvation—but that when they are unwilling or unable to do so, that responsibility must be borne by the broader community of states.” See International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty* (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, December 2001).
4. <http://www.un.org/summit2005/documents.html>.
5. Samantha Power, *“A Problem From Hell”: America and the Age of Genocide* (New York: Perennial, 2003).
6. *Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: A Lexicon*, ed. Vincent Chetail (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).

7. James Dobbins and others, *The Beginner's Guide to Nation-Building* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2007).

8. Kaldor, *New and Old Wars*. Paul Collier, *Wars, Guns, and Votes: Democracy in Dangerous Places* (New York: Harper, 2009).

9. One way to appreciate the growth of the abstract and practical knowledges related to the late post-conflict environment is to witness the rise of its associated terms. In the U.S. Library of Congress and the JSTOR archive of academic articles, for example, the overwhelming majority of holdings bearing terms like *state-building*, *stability operations*, *nation building*, *transitional justice*, *refugee*, *humanitarian intervention*, and *complex humanitarian emergencies* have all been published in the last twenty years, most in the past decade.

10. Imagineers, *Walt Disney Imagineering: A Behind the Dreams Look at Making the Magic Real* (New York: Disney Editions, 1996).

11. While the 1990s witnessed the outbreak of a significant number of conflicts, it was not, as is often believed, a time of unprecedented levels of internal violence. See James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War," *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 1 (2003): 75–90.

Coupled with the claim that the old borders of politics, economics, and identity were being eroded, debate has naturally ensued as to whether or not mass organized violence after 1989 has witnessed a revolution in the ontology of war. Others have suggested a more evolutionary perspective: late warfare is the manifestation of new configurations of already existing techniques and technologies of mass violence. Statements of new war theory can be found in *Restructuring the Global Military Sector: New Wars*, ed. Mary Kaldor and Basker Vashee (London and New York: Pinter, 1997). Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007). Mark Duffield, *Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security* (London: Zed, 2001). *Shadow Globalization, Ethnic Conflicts and New Wars: A Political Economy of Intra-State War*, ed. Dietrich Jung (London and New York: Routledge, 2003). Herfried Münkler, *The New Wars* (Oxford: Polity, 2005). Theoretical, empirical, and historical critiques of new war theory are voiced in Stathis N. Kalyvas, "'New' and 'Old' Civil Wars: A Valid Distinction?," *World Politics* 54 (2001): 99–118. Errol A. Henderson and Joel David Singer, "'New Wars' and Rumors of 'New Wars,'" *International Interactions* 28, no. 2 (2002): 165–90. Edward Newman, "The 'New Wars' Debate: A Historical Perspective Is Needed," *Security Dialogue* 35, no. 2 (2004): 173–89. *Rethinking the Nature of War*, ed. Isabelle Duyvesteyn and Jan Angstrom (London and New York: Frank Cass, 2005). Erik Melander, Magnus Oberg, and Jonathan Hall, "Are 'New Wars' More Atrocious? Battle Severity, Civilians Killed and Forced Migration Before and After the End of the Cold War," *European Journal of International Relations* 15, no. 3 (2009). An analysis of the debate is performed in Jacob Andrew Mundy, "Deconstructing Civil Wars: Beyond the New Wars Debate," *Security Dialogue* 42, no. 3 (2011): 279–95.

12. Pierre Hazan, "Reconciliation," in *Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: A Lexicon*, ed. Vincent Chetail (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 258.

13. Marina Ottaway and Bethany Lacina, "International Interventions and Imperialism: Lessons from the 1990s," *SAIS Review* 23, no. 2 (2003): 71–92.

14. World Bank, *World Development Report* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2011), overview.

15. Alex J. Bellamy, *Responsibility to Protect: The Global Effort to End Mass Atrocities* (Malden, MA: Polity, 2009), 169, cites RAND studies on recidivism.

16. On democratic peace, see Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett, "Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946–1986," *American Political Science Review* 87, no. 3 (1993): 624–38.

17. Simon Chesterman, *You, the People: The United Nations, Transitional Administration, and State-Building; A Project of the International Peace Academy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 127.

18. *Ibid.*, 143.

The literature on the paradoxes of liberal peacebuilding is extensive. For a critical review, see Oliver P. Richmond and Jason Franks, *Liberal Peace Transitions: Between Statebuilding and Peacebuilding* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009).

19. Roland Paris, *At War's End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

20. Jack Snyder, *From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict* (New York: Norton, 2000).

21. M. A. Mohamed Salih, "A Critique of the Political Economy of the Liberal Peace: Elements of an African Experience," in *New Perspectives on Liberal Peacebuilding*, ed. Edward Newman, Roland Paris, and Oliver P. Richmond (Tokyo and New York: United Nations University Press, 2009), 134.

22. Naomi Klein, *The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism* (New York: Metropolitan, 2007).

23. Theodor Wiesengrund Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*, trans. E. B. Ashton (New York: Seabury Press, 1973), 336.

24. John Heathershaw, "Unpacking the Liberal Peace: The Dividing and Merging of Peacebuilding Discourses," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 36, no. 3 (2008): 597–621.

25. *Ibid.*, 620.

26. John Heathershaw and Daniel Lambach, "Introduction: Post-Conflict Spaces and Approaches to Statebuilding," *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding* 2, no. 3 (2008): 269–89.

27. Here we are drawing on Agnew's "territorial trap" argument. See J. Agnew, "The Territorial Trap: The Geographical Assumptions of International Relations Theory," *Review of International Political Economy* 1, no. 1 (1994): 53–80.

28. Heathershaw and Lambach, "Introduction," 286.

29. David Campbell, *National Deconstruction: Violence, Identity, and Justice in Bosnia* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), x–xi. Michel Foucault and Paul Rabinow, "Polemics, Politics and Problematizations," in *The Foucault Reader*, ed. Paul Rabinow, trans. Lydia Davis (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984).

30. Here is an instructive analogy to the kind of project we are attempting here: Reflecting on the strange relationship between intellectual production and its ostensible objects of analysis, anthropologist Joseba Zulaika noted that terrorism studies during the Cold War and immediately afterwards had always seemed to outpace actual terrorism until September 11, 2001. The question Zulaika poses is quite provocative: had decades of discursive anticipation of mass terrorism, particularly in the United States, produced the very conditions that made it possible? See Joseba Zulaika, "The Self-Fulfilling Prophecies of Counterterrorism," *Radical History Review*, no. 85 (2003): 191–99.

In this volume, we are likewise concerned with the relationship between discrete knowledges and their object. Our working hypothesis, however, is more dynamic. We seek to highlight the ways in which key stakeholders in various post-conflict settings *produce* the post-conflict environment and are themselves reciprocally defined by it. In this sense, our model of "problematization" is more dramaturgical than discursive.

31. Edward W. Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage, 1994).

32. Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis, "Understanding Civil War: A New Agenda," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46, no. 1 (2002): 3–12.

33. Klein, *The Shock Doctrine*.

34. Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (New York: Verso, 1991).

35. See Azar Gat, "Is War Declining—And Why?" *Journal of Peace Research* 50, no. 2 (2013): 149–57.

CHAPTER I

Statebuilding

Statebuilding in a Vacuum

Sierra Leone and the Missing International Political Economy of Civil Wars

CATHERINE GOETZE

ABSTRACT

This chapter looks at the way the commonly propagated standard narrative of civil wars contributes to the constitution of post-conflict spaces and illustrates this analysis with frequent references to the case of Sierra Leone's civil war and post-conflict environment. The standard war narrative is based on three interrelated arguments which will be looked at one by one. First, it contends that post-colonial states, particularly African states, are and probably always were doomed to fail because of dysfunctional politics and deadly competition among groups, notably ethnic groups. The state, as well as ethnic groups, are hereby reified categories which take on absolute value to which real-life politics is compared; the obvious finding of gaps between ideal and reality is then taken as proof for "state failure." A second aspect of the standard narrative, namely, that of greedy warlords and material incentives for violence, is closely associated with the state failure and ethnic competition narrative. This narrative's logic follows from the state failure narrative as it proves the national elite's incompetence, the immaturity of the population, and the general lack of "politics" in the country at war. A third aspect of this common war narrative is the individualization of acts associated with the war. War is not seen as the expression of a collective grievance or social conflict but as an amalgam of individual acts; particularly acts of violence have become considered as individual, decontextualized, and isolated acts which are motivated by greed, brutality, or terror, in some accounts

even by madness, but which are never part of *longue durée* processes of the social construction of collective history. There are not symptoms of collective agency in social conflicts but acts of criminal intent and energy.

The chapter also argues that this standard war narrative—state reification, greed, and individualization—subscribes to a neo-liberal agenda of global governance. Neoliberalism is understood as containing three essential aspects: (a) economics are dissociated from society, politics, and culture as the capitalist production mode is presented not as a socio-political choice but as “naturally” legitimate and efficient; (b) as economics are dissociated from society, politics, and culture, the negative consequences and side effects of the capitalist production mode such as dispossession, impoverishment, social disruption, environmental damage, and so forth are presented as being individual and isolated incidences which only require individualized but not collective or political responses; (c) this leads to a depoliticization of the capitalist economic order and the disappearance of debate over its legitimacy.

The standard war narrative and the Neoliberal agenda are connected through the stakeholders’ interest in shaping the post-conflict environment to their worldview. I identify three such groups of stakeholders: politics, notably governments; transnational enterprises and their defendants; and Western academics. I analyze the shaping of the post-conflict environment through these stakeholders with a social field analysis which is inspired by Pierre Bourdieu’s social analytical “thinking tools.”¹ The field analysis demonstrates how the logic and rationale of the stakeholders’ respective social fields make them disposed to view armed violence in a country through this particular, Neoliberalism standard narrative as it is the only narrative that fits their own positioning in the world.

INTRODUCTION

A typical Hollywood film, *Blood Diamond* (2006, directed by Edward Zwick) offers an overly stereotyped yet popular narrative of the civil war in Sierra Leone. The bad guys are the ruthless rebels of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF): sweaty, shouting, drunken brutes who force an abducted boy, Dia, to mine diamonds for them through torture, drugs, and brainwashing; the perversion of Dia’s fate is so deep that he will later point his weapon against his own father. Dia seemingly reflects the dramatic opening sentence

of Bernard J. MacCabe Jr., the CEO of Sandline International Executive—a private security company that had its hands deep in the Sierra Leonean war—in a hearing on that conflict in the US Congress: “The child terrorists of Sierra Leone know only one life: violence, prosecuted upon them through fear and intimidation by their rebel masters.”² Conveniently, *Blood Diamond* also concurs with MacCabe’s view that the mercenaries in Sierra Leone were only there to help. In the film, a white, self-identified “Rhodesian”³ mercenary, Danny Archer (Leonardo DiCaprio), turns out to be a good guy in the end when he helps Solomon (Djimon Hounsou), Dia’s father, rescue his son. Solomon represents the black, helpless, and innocent victim of war who only becomes empowered when a Western journalist (Jennifer Connelly) arranges for him to speak before the international NGO-business conference at Kimberly, South Africa. There the “international community” decides to fight against so-called blood diamonds. But the film does not tell how the story continued after the Hollywood happy ending. Most probably, Dia returned to his miserable job of diamond mining for two handfuls of rice per day under the whip of drunk and brutish foremen, yet this time on the account of some international diamond mining company or some local patron. His father, Solomon, likely returned to his miserable life as rural worker, unable to remarry after the death of Dia’s mother, given the control local patrons often exert over unmarried women in Sierra Leone.⁴

Most stereotypes superficially resemble what we see, and so, in this case, the film is not factually wrong when giving the impression that diamonds played an important role in the civil war in Sierra Leone. However, the role and importance of diamond mining in the Sierra Leonean war is much more complex and multifaceted than presented in this film. The Sierra Leonean Truth and Reconciliation Commission, in any case, refuses to grant diamonds a causal role in the war when it is stating: “There is a widely held belief in the western world that the conflict in Sierra Leone was initiated and perpetuated because of diamonds (. . .) In the Commission’s view, this version of the conflict is simplistic.”⁵

If diamonds have, indeed, deeply shaped the country since their commercial discovery in the early 1930s, they have done so in a much more intricate, ubiquitous, and profound way than the standard narrative of “rebel greed” can adequately capture, whether that narrative is expressed in mainstream films, the statements of private security contractors, or prevailing theories of contemporary armed conflicts. The question arises then, why does this narrative remain so powerful as to fuel not only the phantasm of

Hollywood script writers but also to shape in large extent the post-conflict environment of Sierra Leone? I argue this narrative is essentially supported by important stakeholders in the post-conflict environment because it is a narrative that best suits their own social positions and dispositions, that shapes their interest in Sierra Leone (and other post-conflict environments as discussed in further chapters of this book), and that guides their actions and practices. Hence, this chapter takes a closer look at the narrative on civil wars in Africa generally, and in Sierra Leone particularly, in order to analyze how the standard narrative of war has shaped the post-conflict environment.

Although the war in Sierra Leone is not itself subject of analysis here (this has been done otherwise more or less well),⁶ a short recounting of events seems appropriate to guide the reader through the subsequent analysis.

The Sierra Leonean civil war started in 1991 and was officially declared over in 2002. Sierra Leone, about the size of Scotland, is a relatively small country in West Africa with approximately five million inhabitants. It is, similar to neighboring Liberia, a colony where former slaves settled and encountered the “indigenous” populations. Until the discovery of diamonds and other precious metals, Sierra Leone participated in the world economy through the trade of slaves (until abolition), timber, palm oil, and cocoa, commonly under the direction of non-African merchants. After independence the country continued on the local level the administrative system of local chiefs and patrons which had been established by the British colonial rule, and on the national level slowly but firmly transformed into a one-party state, first *de facto* then, since continuous changes to the constitution by President Siakah Stevens in the 1970s also *de jure*. When the war broke out, Sierra Leone had been under one-party rule for twenty years, first under Stevens and, since 1987, under his successor, Josef Momoh. After the RUF had started its attacks in the east and south of the country, Momoh was removed in April 1992 by a military putsch led by a dissatisfied young captain of the Sierra Leonean army, Valentine Strasser. Allegedly the RUF attacks were supported logistically and strategically by Charles Taylor from Liberia, who is said to have met and befriended Foday Sankoh, the RUF leader, in training camps in Libya in the 1980s.⁷

Strasser’s National Provisional Ruling Council called for elections for 1996 in which the RUF was invited to participate but did not. The elections were won by Ahmed Tejan Kabbah, who was also considered by the United Nations and the former colonial power, Great Britain, as the lawful and legitimate president of Sierra Leone. In May 1997, however, Kabbah was over-

thrown by another military coup, this time by Major John Paul Koroma who accused the Strasser and Kabbah regimes of enriching themselves with the budgets that should go to the army and self-defense militias, and of prolonging the war to that purpose. Koroma invited the RUF to participate in the government, and Sankoh became Minister of Minerals. The United Nations and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)—engaged there since 1992 with its Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) under the leadership of Nigeria—disapproved of the coup and put the country under sanctions. In 1998, the Koroma regime was overthrown by ECOMOG troops, supported by local militias, and the RUF took to the bushes again. Kabbah was reinstated, and the United Nations lifted the sanctions. In 1999, the United Nations helped negotiate the Lomé Peace Agreement between the Kabbah government and the RUF. In the struggle over political posts, advantages, demobilization, and amnesty, the RUF resorted to fighting again (indeed it had never lost control of the hinterland), and in May 2000 it captured a large contingent of peacekeeping forces from the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), which had been deployed in 1999 first to support and then to supplant ECOMOG.⁸ At this moment, Great Britain unilaterally intervened with 1,200 troops (Operation Palliser),⁹ freed the captured UNAMSIL troops, pushed the RUF back, and captured Sankoh. In 2002, the war was declared over.

There is no simple way of explaining the war. Even the basic facts are disputed, such as the number of dead and displaced. Counts range between 20,000 to 200,000 killed and half to all of its population suffering displacement.¹⁰ This chapter will not attempt to offer an account of the reasons, causes, and dynamics of the war but instead explore the way this post-conflict environment has been constituted by the existing narratives, and among them it will look at those that translate into global patterns of domination. The war in Sierra Leone is dominantly explained by a narrative in which state failure is imputed to the greed of political elites and rebels, in cases provoked by poverty, and where violence is seen as individual acts of brutality due to traumatising, particularly in the case of child soldiers, and individual criminal strategies of warlords. The common narrative recounts the Sierra Leonean war as result of the actions of greedy politicians and warlords (Stevens, Momoh, Sankoh, Koroma, etc.) who would undermine state institutions and make them violently collapse while at the same time leading a disparaged and disoriented youth, which has been overwhelmed by the force of globalization, into chaos.¹¹ Although strongly disputed by a large

array of very differentiated studies, testimonies, and analyses, this narrative has largely survived among various stakeholders over the past ten years since the official end of war.¹²

Their popularity among stakeholders in post-conflict environments can be explained by the way they suit the actual practices and policies during the war and in post-conflict settings. Expressed in various shades by international organizations,¹³ governments,¹⁴ or “observers” (e.g., journalists and academics),¹⁵ this narrative has shaped Sierra Leone’s post-conflict environment by opening up and delimiting spaces of action, enabling repertoires of action and assigning roles to international and local actors. It ties international actors to these environments as they determine respective social positions in the field of international statebuilding. The narrative is sustained by this international authority that makes local actors position themselves with respect to the international discourse. Stakeholders should, in this case, be understood quite literally as those groups of actors who have stakes, that is, something to gain from participating in the shaping of the post-conflict environment. Obviously, some stakeholders have something to gain from contesting the dominant narrative (like me, constructing my intellectual and ethical identity, yet less my university career, through this exercise in critical thinking) but these are less shaping the post-conflict environment itself; the chapter here looks therefore exclusively at those stakeholders whose actions have a visible, tangible effect on the post-conflict environment in Sierra Leone, and who notably grant effectively legitimacy to act politically in the post-conflict environment to some actors and refuse it to others.

A social field analysis helps reveal how global patterns of economic, political, and cultural dominance translate into the constitution of the post-conflict environment through the processes of legitimizing and delegitimizing specific actors’ groups and their actions based on the common narratives of civil war. I will not discuss the accuracy with which these narratives capture the conflict dynamics (although a lot will be said about how they partly fail to do so) but how these narratives influence very basic choices by stakeholders in the post-conflict environment like the identification of “good” politicians or spoilers, of legitimate economic activities, or, even more generally, the definition of “politics” per se. This analysis draws on Pierre Bourdieu’s notions of social fields and capital, so as to allow the mapping of relationships of domination and power that make up the post-conflict environment.

POST-CONFLICT PEACE AND STATEBUILDING AS SOCIAL FIELD

Post-conflict statebuilding allows certain groups to gain capital, in both the material and intangible sense, whereas it deprives others of these opportunities. These shifts in capital configurations can indicate the scope and structure of the transnational fields of post-conflict statebuilding. The notion of capital is derived from Bourdieu's work on social fields, and it encompasses more than simply material resources. Capital is, in Bourdieu's work, a generic term designating all kinds of "exchange values," hence also immaterial goods (such as prestige, honor, or knowledge), "investments" of the past (e.g., going to school) and future expected returns on investments (e.g., sending one's children to school).¹⁶

Exchange value is, in turn, not solely defined by the nature of the product and production process per se (e.g., education) but by the commonly shared dominant value structure in a given social field (e.g., education in a "good" university). This value depends, in turn, on the "stakes" of the field; that is, the right knowledge and the right way to produce scientific results in the case of universities¹⁷ and from the power distribution among the actors in the field. Capital is therefore a relational and processual concept as much as the "right" capital configuration of a social field is subject to dispute, struggle, and conflict among the actors in the field. The important difference between Bourdieu's notion of field versus the standard economic notion of market, and Bourdieu's notion of capital versus the standard economic notion of capital, is this subjective and socially constructed element of exchange value. Even though economic capital may represent objective wealth, it only becomes useful capital if this objective wealth is commonly accepted and sought for as exchange value in a social field. If many divergent types of capital forms and capital (re)production processes exist, then social actors will struggle over imposing their view of what "good" capital is.¹⁸

Domination in the field arises from the capacity of certain actors to impose their specific capital(s) over others. They can do so if their capital and their strategies in using it and reproducing are more efficient, and they are so if they can draw on a large array of resources which have value in many different social fields (some types of capital are even almost entirely ubiquitous such as money); capital types are also more powerful if a generalized, undisputed view exists that this is, indeed, the best and right capital configuration for this given field, hence, some capital forms are self-reproducing.

This recognition or commonsense understanding of "right" or "good" is

what Bourdieu called symbolic capital; owners of symbolic capital have the capacity to define the “right,” the “good,” the “pure,” etc., or, in a more canonically inspired language, the “orthodoxy.” Capital is therefore structuring, and it is structured by the past experience and power distribution among actors at the given moment of the analysis. It cannot be understood without analyzing at the same time the field, what is at stake in the field, the actors and their social positions, and the ways certain capital configurations are justified, imposed, defended, and propagated as orthodoxy. It is this process of defending specific capital configurations and structuring the post-conflict environment according to dominant patterns of capital that is taking place between and among international actors. The standard narrative of war is an important discourse of legitimation and delegitimation of specific actors, practices, and institutions; that is, of specific capital holders and their forms of capital (re) production. In the following, this discourse will be taken as a starting point to look out for the stakeholders in these fields and the effects that they have managed to obtain in the post-conflict environment as well as in their respective fields by thinking in the terms of the standard narrative of war.

THE STATE IS DEAD, LONG LIVE THE STATE: THE IDENTIFICATION OF THE POLITICAL IN THE POST-CONFLICT ENVIRONMENT

One common narrative of civil wars, particularly in Africa, is the story of the violent collapse of the state. This narrative exists in different shades from hysteric catastrophism¹⁹ to extremely detailed analysis how specific actors have used their institutional and political power for their private ends.²⁰ In all cases, the state failure literature is based on a similar argument, namely, that political institutions such as the Western state have been imported to the former colonies in Africa and have not “naturally” grown out of these societies’ history as they have in Europe.²¹ Consequently, state institutions have not taken root in society and have been subverted, undermined, distorted, exploited so that many states exist barely through the force of their international recognition²² and through global patronage in the Cold War.²³ They were likely to collapse once recognition and patronage would start failing them in the post-Cold War era and “bad” economic policies brought the economies down.²⁴ This story occasionally perpetuates the lament over weak manpower at the eve of decolonization, where Africans were said to be

lacking education and skills and, hence, were devoid of the capacities for self-government.²⁵

Most state failure narratives are based on the ontological assumption that nation-states are the natural and basic units of analysis because they are natural containers of societies and quite naturally constitute the limits of the political. This assumption is, in turn, based on a reified understanding of the state. States are taken as given systems of territorially bound, legally founded, and bureaucratically organized institutions, and politics is conceived as taking place solely within these entities. There are few if any differentiations between different types of institutional arrangements which have, in history and present times, constituted “real” political communities, and there is especially very little, if any reflection on how these institutions have shaped policies and politics, notably political economy choices.²⁶ The reification of the ideal image of the nation-state actually avoids analyzing the variety of formal and informal socio-economic configurations over which and within which politics take place. State failure is then simply equivalent to the failure of politics per se. Consequently, conflicts are depoliticized, as politics is not seen to be exactly about the question of what form the political community will take and how it should be regulated within an existing formal-institutional and informal, social, and normative framework, and with respect to the social, cultural, political, and economic history of a society.²⁷

Much of the state failure genre implicitly or explicitly reproduces images of African states torn by tribalism and pre-modern savagery, lacking civilization and modernity.²⁸ Precolonial and colonial African societies are considered as having existed without political structures and institutions or with extremely dysfunctional ones, already torn by ethnic warfare.²⁹ The nationalist struggles of independence are commonly denigrated as manipulation of a handful of elites, as aberration in a liberal world, or as, in the end, insufficient to overcome “traditional” cleavages such as tribal and ethnic affiliations or religious conflicts.³⁰ Those narratives rarely miss out on accounting for the ethnic and religious cleavages of the societies under analysis; however, far less, if anything is said about social and economic stratifications and structures.³¹ Ethnicity is commonly reified in those accounts as groups, and their distinctions are taken for granted, and it is seen as the basic and unvaried feature of African societies. So strong is the view that the reality of ethnic groups is indisputable that Brubaker argues that they are treated as “as substantial entities to which interests and agency can be attributed [. . .] unitary collective actors with common purposes.”³²

Such reifying perspectives understand all ethnic conflict as being about ethnic identity; in fact, they often understand all conflict in Africa as being a conflict about ethnic identity. They take the public display of discourses about ethnic identity for granted without considering that ethnification of politics might be only a framing; that is, an assembling and consensus-building speech act of a social conflict where actual causes might lay elsewhere.³³ The reification of ethnicity conceals conflict dynamics more than it explains them, as the process of creating identities is not the subject of the analysis. Social and political conflicts especially are hence taken out of the picture.

The image of artificial states torn in parts by ethnic groups or greedy warlords (see below for a discussion) is easily repeated in policy circles, from Robert Kaplan's (in)famous new barbarism thesis to parliaments of Western states. Reference to state failure and ethnic groups has, consequently, gained almost ritual status. Even in the case of Sierra Leone where large agreement exists that ethnicity did not play a major, or any, role at all, the large majority of analyses set out to discuss the ethnic composition of the country and include some reference to possible "tensions" that might have influenced the war.³⁴ Generally speaking, state failure and ethnicity have become synonymous for politics in Africa and a general key for explaining all sorts of problems. Hence, Lord Wallace of Saltaire (William Wallace, a Liberal Democrat and former Director of research at the Royal Institute of International Affairs) is able to state knowingly and confidently the following in the House of Lords' deliberation on conflict prevention:

We should recognise that, after all, African countries are attempting in two generations to move through stages of economic and social growth and state-building that took European states several centuries to go through. Our states went through many disastrous wars and internal conflicts and massacres before we emerged from that period. So it is not surprising that a continent that was in a pre-modern, tribal state—as with clanned Scotland not that long ago—should find it difficult to cope with that rapid transition.³⁵

The reification of the state image and of ethnic groups allows the conclusion that one solution to conflicts is to import the state once again, yet to do so better this time by "rooting" it deeper in society.³⁶ Means to that end are seen in anti-corruption measures and so-called good governance as it is assumed in these narratives that it is corruption, fraud, embezzlement, nepotism—

that is, conscious efforts of destruction and criminality of parts of the political elites—that have undermined *the* state. This argument again denies that those acts which are considered by outsiders' eyes as corruption or nepotism might be, for others, politics, and, as Joel Migdal points out, even moral politics as it corresponds to the social convenience of community life.³⁷

As a consequence of the failure of the first round of state importation, it is the role of the international community, writ large, to reintroduce state-ness again into these countries. Fukuyama argues: "Thus 'stateness' has to be begged, borrowed, or stolen from other sources, ranging from multilateral agencies like the UN or the World Bank in such places as East Timor or Sierra Leone, to the European powers running the Office of the High Representative in Bosnia, to the United States as an occupying power in Iraq."³⁸

The main flaw of the argument, as Fukuyama himself and others have observed, remains that only states (as ideal-type images, not as realities) are considered legitimate institutional arrangements of which sovereignty is the central characteristic; yet, sovereignty forbids external interference into the internal affairs of the state. The Responsibility to Protect Report proposed a solution to this conundrum and was consequently adopted by the United Nations in the General Assembly's 2005 World Summit Outcome Declaration and through Security Council resolutions 1674 (2005) and 1894 (2009). In the Responsibility to Protect Report, sovereignty is defined as the capacity of states to protect their own populations from harm, which is, in turn, defined as human rights violations.³⁹ The World Summit Outcome Declaration mellows this claim down by reaffirming national sovereignty as non-interference and respect for territorial borders. However, it also puts the protection of human rights at the same level as the protection of territorial integrity and explicitly interprets the UN Charter as authority of the UN to promote human rights and fundamental freedoms (para 119). The Declaration therefore calls upon states to actively protect human rights as part of their legal obligation as members of the UN. The Declaration finally explicitly states that a state has the "responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity," even the incitement to such crimes, and that if a state fails to do so, the UN can act under chapter VI and VII, that is, such failure is tantamount to threatening world peace (para 138 and 139).

It is henceforth the existence of violence of the kind that is labeled "human rights violations" by the United Nations Security Council (and sometimes simply regional arrangements such as the European Union) that makes

a state a “failed state.” The vagueness of the term and the utter confusion that exists over the cause-effect relationships in state failure allows for an enormous elasticity to the narrative, such that it is easily applied to Sierra Leone but far more difficult to argue, in the UN Security Council, for conflicts like Russia’s war in Chechnya.

The analytical weaknesses of the concept are largely compounded by its political utility. In narratives on civil war, it permits explanations that hold the huge advantage for international ordering policies to categorize groups of actors and to impute them responsibilities in the conflict and post-conflict environment, namely, by distinguishing those who allegedly undermine or have attacked the state, and those who are likely to save it. Hence the crucial question for post-conflict environments is the identification of “spoilers” and the means of coercing them into the statebuilding exercise.

The criteria for distinguishing state supporters from state attackers (“spoilers”) are, as the elasticity of the narrative shows, less the actual policies of the actors. Indeed, the simple fact of using violence might be sufficient. The identification of a spoiler is primarily based on these actors’ compatibility with the dominant political capital in the global order and with their compliance with the economic, social, and political project of the statebuilders.

Stakes are high, as the dominant principle of global order itself is a matter of dispute between the members of the United Nations Security Council with a deep rift growing between, on the one side, the United States, Great Britain, and France who advocate the human rights and responsibility to protect interpretation of sovereignty (all but for themselves, of course) and, on the other side, China and Russia who cling to a traditional understanding of sovereignty as state of non-interference. Around this Security Council struggle, a wider competition is going on between states and international agencies, foremost the United Nations for whom the responsibility to protect interpretation is an excellent inroad to expanding its authority in world politics, and between a larger and variable group of states outside the UN Security Council, including Germany, Japan, Brazil, India, and to a certain extent countries like Nigeria, Egypt, Israel, or Canada who, each, dispose of some particular form of capital that bestows it with a crucial position in the social field of international politics and shapes its interest in either interpretation of sovereignty.

In the case of Sierra Leone, as in most post-conflict environments, it is the human rights and responsibility to protect discourse that represents the dominant symbolic capital. Bourdieu defined symbolic capital as socially shared recognition of dominant actors’ capacity to author(ize) the “right”

way of interpreting the world: “Symbolic power is the power to construct a reality which follows a gnoseological order.”⁴⁰ Following this concept, the definition of state failure and of political groups which are legitimate to participate in the re-introduction of the states is nothing less than a sideshow of a larger dispute over how much intervention is admissible in the current world system and what constitutes acceptable and legitimate forms of violence and what does not—an archetypical symbolic power struggle according to Bourdieu.⁴¹

Symbolic capital gains its value from the recognition of its authority through a large number of other actors (like all capital); others integrate the dominant discourse as part of their capital configuration (if they can) and strategy to develop their social positions. In the case of the Sierra Leonean war and post-conflict environment, this mimicry strategy has allowed states like Nigeria to gain international standing as defenders of the human rights and responsibility to protect norms despite its own internal human rights violations. Nigeria thereby bridged the difficult gap that has opened between the understanding of sovereignty as being predominantly based on territorial integrity and the responsibility to protect understanding. During the war, Nigeria became a pillar of the external “peacekeeping” through ECOMOG in Sierra Leone, hence, presenting itself in the United Nations and ECOWAS as the image of a strong state with strong institutional capacities (that is, a military), and one overly dedicated to the new interventionism norm. By playing up as a defender of human rights in another country and proposing at the same time its good services as peace broker (one of the many peace agreements in the war was signed in Nigeria), Nigeria warded off nosy questions about its own human rights records and border stability. The latter position had the additional advantage of reaffirming the post-colonial order of West Africa by excluding any peace solutions that foresee border changes.

Nigeria’s position, which would have been otherwise considered extremely difficult to hold, fits perfectly well with the interventionism-versus-sovereignty ambiguity within the international community, and hence benefitted extensively from the dominant global order.

NARRATIVES OF GREED AND DIAMONDS: LEGITIMIZING AND DELEGITIMIZING ECONOMIC ACTORS

Another dominant narrative of civil wars locates the most important enabling condition of armed conflict in poverty and underdevelopment where

strongmen will try to gain economic advantages through the use of armed violence and particularly by illegitimately and violently exploiting natural resources.⁴² This discourse has been mostly propagated by development bodies like the World Bank or Western governments' foreign aid agencies.⁴³ Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler's greed explanation is the best known of these: civil wars will break out if the material profits that can be gained from violently exploiting natural resources outweigh the costs of violent appropriation.⁴⁴ Hence, violence entrepreneurs have strong incentives to wage war in order to gain access to the riches of natural resource exploitation. The two authors tried to prove that "objective grievances" measured by the Gini coefficient as proxy for social inequality, an ethno-linguistic index as proxy for social fragmentation, and the country's Polity score as proxy for political repression do not correlate significantly with the outbreak of civil wars. However, resource wealth seemingly leads to a higher risk of civil war and so, the authors conclude, greed is more important than grievances. In a similar study, a number of researchers found that diamonds particularly are significantly and positively correlated with the outbreak of civil wars.⁴⁵ These studies were complemented by others which argued that poverty-stricken populations will join armed factions for booty and loot if other sources of income fail, for instance due to external price shocks.⁴⁶

Economic war analyses have been widely criticized for their methodological problems.⁴⁷ For most of their "proxies," the available data are, to say the least, patchy, given that the collection of reliable data on business revenues and taxes (necessary for the estimation of the GDP of a country), of individual revenues and taxes (necessary for the estimation of income and income inequality), and of the geographical and social distribution of economic activity is already difficult in most developing countries, yet even more so in the context of wars. In the time and country range used by Collier and Hoeffler in their 2004 study, only in four of seventy-nine cases was the Gini coefficient of actual good quality according to the original source.⁴⁸

However, the most striking failure of these economic analyses is their incapacity to tell us anything about the production structure of a country that leaves individuals confronted with a binomial choice between farming (or mining) and fighting.⁴⁹ They do not investigate how an armed conflict is embedded in a social order that is shaped and reproduced by the economic opportunities on which it is built. Economies of countries considered at risk of war are predominantly based on agricultural or mining monocultures with a small manufacturing sector while commonly lacking services, communica-

tions, and a high-end technology sector. Such thin production structures can produce polarized and vulnerable social orders, which are already, even without outright war, upheld by violence, yet they do not have to, and these orders will take very different forms from one society to another. Additionally to the failure to analyze the official economic structure of a country, these analyses fail to account for the informal economy. It is perceived as part of the criminal economy but very seldomly, if ever, as a correlate and complementary to the official economy.⁵⁰ Informal economies develop over long time periods and are not causally related to civil wars. In most countries black markets constitute a means of survival for individuals and communities. In oppressive states, they can also offer spaces of resistance.⁵¹ Hence, informal structures can have stabilizing effects because they offer employment and income where the formal and official sectors do not and because they replace failing public structures. Notably, and confusingly for anyone who wants to use a distinction between the formal and informal (shadow and light), they do so at the same time and often by the same actors, as they are grounds of government corruption, large-scale embezzlement, money laundering, or rebel-movement financing.

Under the condition of failing industrial development, declining rural sectors, and growing informal economies, accumulation and the formation of social classes take particular forms. New social classes emerge and others sink into poverty, most often in rural populations.⁵² This can lead to violent disruptions of social hierarchies and create major social conflict, but again, it does not have to. There is no clear and linear causality that can be established between social change and civil wars. Social conflicts can take various forms, and it all depends very much on the social mobilization processes, on leadership and opportunities, as well as on the political and socio-economic context. Richards and Chauveau, for instance, point out that similar dysfunctions of patron-client networks in Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire have led to civil war in the former and to xenophobic politics in the latter case.⁵³ It is only by a careful study of the local economic opportunities, their interactions with global structures and processes, and how these shape social orders that the risk and type of violence can be evaluated through which discontent and conflict might erupt; it also needs local specific analysis, which includes local transnational analysis as well as the local impact of global structures, in order to evaluate by which trajectories which actors will gain or lose from a civil war. The over-aggregated approach of quantitative grievance studies generally misses out on all these differentiations.

What the greed narrative does, however, is to criminalize all economic activities, which can be, by near or far, associated with a rebel movement and, henceforth, legitimizes exactly the same activity for other governmental and other “legal” actors. The simple fact that every armed movement will need to procure and pay for weapons somehow becomes blurred by the focus on the “greed” motive and the inversion operated by identifying primary resources as inciting rebellions and not rebellions inciting the exploitation of natural resources. Legitimacy or illegitimacy, right or wrong of an economic activity does not result from the production mode as such but from the actor pursuing this economic activity. In the Sierra Leonean case, for instance, it is not diamond mining for two handfuls of rice per day which is exploitative, nor the structure of global diamond markets where profit margins of several hundred percent are realized (without diamonds having any real use value, as even industrial diamonds can be nowadays replaced by ceramics),⁵⁴ but the fact that the RUE, the rebel movement, has used diamonds to purchase weapons.

The greed hypothesis contends that the rebels’ modes of enrichment are more predatory than other forms of natural resource exploitation in Sierra Leone (or in Africa in general) and that, generally speaking, the brutality displayed by these actors is more serious than the brutality displayed in the “legitimate” exploitation of resources. Hence the international narrative does not condemn mining in its exploitative form per se but only if it is not the state or multi-national firms pocketing the profit. It is the definition of international-socially acceptable economic actors that is at stake. During the Sierra Leonean war and in its post-conflict environment, rebels or former rebels were and are clearly not acceptable. The UN Security Council’s Resolution 1306 embargoed all diamond trade from Sierra Leone except for diamonds certified by the Sierra Leonean government,⁵⁵ even though it was evident that the government had also financed its war efforts by paying private security companies with shares in diamond mining. Rumors persist that ECOMOG troops were involved in diamond trading too.⁵⁶

The United Nations and the Kimberley Certification Scheme made a general rule out of this distinction between legitimate diamonds certified by governments and illegitimate diamonds, mined and sold by “opponents” by stipulating:

Conflict diamonds are diamonds that originate from areas controlled by forces or factions opposed to legitimate and internationally recognized gov-

ernments, and are used to fund military action in opposition to those governments, or in contravention of the decisions of the Security Council.⁵⁷

A number of reports were decisive in shaping the United Nations' and other agencies' views on the diamond mining sector in Sierra Leone: "The Heart of the Matter" report by the Canadian NGO Canada Africa Partnership, financed by the Canadian Ministry of Development;⁵⁸ the report of the Expert Panel on Diamonds pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1306;⁵⁹ the World Bank report "Conflict Diamonds";⁶⁰ and the report "Sierra Leone Diamond Policy Study," sponsored by the UK Department for International Development.⁶¹ These reports concur in one shared view of Sierra Leone's diamond industry. Sierra Leone's diamond sector became dysfunctional because of government corruption⁶² yet this does not pose any fundamental problem that needs new arrangements of the mining industry. The end of the war, in fact, offers the possibility to restart anew by supporting the post-conflict government—which is "good" because elected—in licensing foreign investors.⁶³

Those who had played a major role in the exploitation of the country's natural resources in the past—namely, multi-national companies registered in South Africa, Canada, the United Kingdom, or Israel and the international merchant networks—were exempt from being imputed any responsibility for the breakdown of Sierra Leone's economy or even politics. Neither the global diamond market nor the principles of cartel trade underlying it were critically examined for their contribution to the impoverishment and the retarded economic development of Sierra Leone. Economic alternatives to the mining sector or to foreign licensing of the mining sector, for instance, nationalization or the creation of local cooperatives, were not considered in these reports.

Meanwhile, the welfare function of minerals trade for Sierra Leone's society remains a thing to be proven. Before the war, the minerals industry in Sierra Leone contributed to 70 percent of the total value of exports but made up only 14 percent of the GDP and employed just 3.5 percent of the total labor force.⁶⁴ The global mineral sector is peculiarly structured as it is largely dominated by a very restricted number of multi-national companies, which are fully integrated vertically into cartels in those areas that are of concern for Sierra Leone (rutile, bauxite, diamonds). In other words, these multinational companies control the entire production and distribution chain: prospecting, exploitation, trade, distribution, and sales. The entirety of raw

diamonds (and of other raw minerals) is exported, and none are treated in Sierra Leone itself; there is no “trickle down” effect, so to speak, into other sectors of the Sierra Leonean economy.⁶⁵ Within the global minerals market, the diamond market is particularly concentrated as it is controlled up to 75 percent by the South African firm De Beers. In some economic theories, the cartelization of the minerals industry is justified by the risks involved in prospecting and exploitation, which require great financial flexibility and, hence, price control.⁶⁶ However, the value of diamonds is rather the result of a conscious marketing strategy for a mineral that has little use-value, which had not figured on the list of precious gems before the twentieth century, and that, from the outset, has been marketed as luxury good by controlling strictly its scarcity. The role of the South African company De Beers was crucial for this marketing not only by creating the slogan “Diamonds are forever” but also by establishing the still dominant cartel system by which almost all of the world’s diamond production is bought and resold by De Beers—at their conditions and prices, obviously.⁶⁷

In Sierra Leone, however, the upfront costs associated with prospecting are largely minimized as the territory is nowadays fully prospected, including the deep pipes (commonly referred to as “kimberlite mines” as their geological pattern was first described for the diamond mines of Kimberley).⁶⁸ Most of the mining in Sierra Leone has, in the past anyway, taken place on the surface (commonly referred to as “alluvial mining”—mining in the waterbed). Alluvial mining is more labor-intensive than capital- and technology-intensive. Only recently, where most alluvial sites are being depleted, does the problem of technology-intensive deep mining appear.

In fact, it is the easiness with which alluvial diamonds can be mined that is, by the above cited reports, seen as the main problem of regulating the mining sector in Sierra Leone.⁶⁹ Anyone can become a diamond miner by means of water, spade, sieve, and hard work. It is estimated that more than 50 percent of the country’s diamonds are mined in this artisanal fashion. Artisanal mining provides a much greater share of jobs than do the multinational companies, yet, its largely anarchic existence is seen as the main problem of Sierra Leone’s economy and recovery. In most international reports, artisanal mining is described as the main reason for Sierra Leone’s failing state income.

Most of the artisanal mining takes place without governmental license, diamonds are smuggled out of the country, and, obviously, miners and mine owners do not pay any taxes on income achieved. Miners are not protected

in any way and are commonly not collectively organized or members of existing labor unions. Mine owners are usually local chiefs who have “inherited” their presumed right to mine from their empowerment in colonial times. They eagerly and jealously defend their alleged privileges by violent means, by using and abusing local legal customs, notably bride services or penalties imposed on young men for “unruly” behaviour, and by manipulating national and international stakeholders. From this ambivalent position of being quite often the only local job provider and, on the other side, commonly extremely exploitative, many international agency reports have mainly retained the latter part, imputing some of the responsibility for the war to the greed of these local chiefs.

Whether this analysis is correct or not is, in this chapter here, less of interest. Rather it is noteworthy that this focus on artisanal mining fits well into the standard narrative of civil wars (the greedy local chiefs) and suits even better the international ideas of restructuring the mineral mining sector of Sierra Leone to allow greater foreign investment. Artisanal mining is a thorn in the side of international mining interest for two reasons. First, the value of diamonds is not intrinsic but dependent on their scarcity. This is one of the main reasons why De Beers from the outset aimed at controlling the entire sales flow of the mineral and, hence, the quantity available. Illicit mined diamonds, however, are not sold to “official” dealers; their quantities are not controlled, nor are their prices; they risk flooding the market, hence, depreciating the prices of diamonds elsewhere.⁷⁰ This risk has been recognized not only by De Beers but also by other diamond producers⁷¹ and is probably one of the major reasons why these actors cooperated in the establishment of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme.

Second, illicit mining questions both the state’s authority to control its territory as well as the principles of state-guaranteed private property rights. Mining on other companies’ concessions has been a practice since diamonds were discovered when Sierra Leone was still a British colony. The first (and for a long time only) official mining company, the Sierra Leone Selection Trust (SLST), a subsidiary of the American Selection Trust Ltd., very early on employed private security forces to keep illicit miners out of their concessions, yet without much success.⁷² In the 1950s, the British undertook several efforts to ban illicit mining notably by “foreigners” (miners suspected to be from Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal, etc.) and expelled them with the help of French authorities from Sierra Leone.⁷³ At its origin, illicit mining was already defined as mining on state property, which had been leased out

by the colonial authorities to a non-African, non-Sierra Leonean cartel-type mining company. Illicit mining therefore appears as the double problem of protecting state and private property (the land and the license) and enforcing the colonial authority's control of the territory.⁷⁴ For Sierra Leoneans on the ground, however, it seemed reasonable to argue that they were mining on "their" territory. The RUF seemingly referred to such feelings of collective possession to justify their mining activities. These were presented as rightful repossessions of profits by the miners and as acts of resistance against exploitative local chiefs, state agencies, or multi-national companies.⁷⁵

This reading of the conflict between multi-national enterprises and artisanal mining as a case of colonial dispossession and rebellious repossession is rarely found in the literature and especially not in the literature produced and referred to by the main stakeholders in the post-conflict environment. The fact that foreign capitalised cartels, which are entirely oriented towards the global market, dominate the trade is rather presented as normalcy. All of the reports cited above argue that legal mining—mining through these companies—is central to economic development of the country, which has been lost in the past because of irresponsible policies and bad governance, but which, with the right policy management, can become the basis for development again.⁷⁶ None considers alternatives.

The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme has given legal leverage to both actor groups, governments and multi-national companies, notably those represented by the World Diamond Council. The certification scheme only allows certified diamonds to be sold to retail. The certificate of origin is solely issued by the governments of diamond-producing states. It is supposed to assure customers that they are not buying "blood diamonds" or "conflict diamonds" (diamonds mined by opponents of governments). Through the greed narrative, and its international agreement correlate of the Kimberley Certificate, illicit mining and artisanal mining became associated with rebel diamonds. It is not the exploitation of mineral resources for the private account of a very limited number of companies and company shareholders that is at stake in the post-conflict environment but what is seen as infringement on their activities, artisanal mining.

To summarize, the civil war narrative that focuses on greed shapes and constitutes the post-conflict environment by ascribing legitimacy to certain economic activities but, more importantly, to certain categories of economic actors. As rebels have been entirely delegitimized as economic actors, so have illicit miners more generally as they have been, rightly or wrongly, as-

sociated with rebels' "blood diamonds." Sierra Leone's underclasses have hence been deprived of any legitimacy to talk economics and social rights associated with an active participation in economic production processes. Multi-national companies and those government and international agencies who deal with them in the diamond (and mineral) mining sector have re-established their legitimacy to represent the economic development opportunities of the country.

OF WARLORDS, VICTIMS, AND ANGRY YOUNG MEN: METHODOLOGICAL INDIVIDUALISM AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ARCHETYPES

The construction of legitimate and illegitimate economic actors is underscored through another common trait of the three dominant war analyses, namely, their methodological individualism. A central figure in all three strands of war analysis is the archetypal individual, whether *the* warlord, *the* victim child soldier, or *the* angry young man. In econometric studies, it is a methodological necessity to treat data as aggregation of individual preferences. In state failure analyses, collapsing state institutions are seen as the prey of the greedy politician or the greedy warlord who (if not the same as the politician) "confronts national governments, plunders their resources, moves and exterminates uncooperative populations, interdicts international relief and development and derails peace processes."⁷⁷ The warlord is seen in the figure of the rebel leader, such as Foday Sankoh in the case of Sierra Leone, or in those pre-war political leaders who out of greed and incompetence have more or less deliberately led their countries into war in order to preserve their personal riches and power (Yugoslavia's Milosevic would ideal-typically exemplify this species). In any case, warlords are directly responsible for the collapse of state institutions, as attacking them is, according to the common narrative, part of their larger strategy of personal enrichment.⁷⁸ Already the notion of warlord denies them any legitimacy and implies that any authority this person might have relies solely on the use of violent means. These individuals are commonly presented as rational criminals as the search for material gains has crowded out ideology.

The focus on individuals in common civil war narratives constitutes the post-conflict environment as a field of external intervention. As already discussed above in the section on the responsibility to protect, violence is set

equal to individual human rights violations and hence deprived of its political and social aspects. In this reading, violence is not born out of collective political movements⁷⁹ neither do they constitute acts of social ordering through punitive violence, vengeance, or disciplining,⁸⁰ nor do they result from psychological moves such as transgression, herd behaviour, or collective hysteria⁸¹—just to name some alternative interpretations that can be made of violence.

Consequently to this individualization, post-conflict environments are spaces where *identities* have to be protected, groups reconciled in order to pardon (an individual act) misbehaviour of some (always individuals). Some individuals have to be dealt with on specific terms, either for their criminal behaviour, as trauma victims, or as any other “vulnerable group,” depending on the category they are ascribed to by the interveners. Rebellions and acts of war are thereby stripped off their political and social meaningfulness and even their military sense as they are reduced to individual responsibilities and to the status of “crimes” and “human rights violations.”⁸² This narrative corresponds to actual global governance policies that privilege individual human rights over collective and social rights, and which, in turn, promote a Western vision of retributive justice and reconciliation over local forms of justice seeking, and which press for the intensified codification of international criminal law.

The Security Council Resolution 1315 on the capture of UNAMISL troops by the RUF in 2000 in Sierra Leone neatly illustrates this criminalization and individualization process. Here the top UN body declares that it is “deeply concerned at the very serious *crimes* committed within the territory of Sierra Leone against the people of Sierra Leone and United Nations and associated personnel and at the prevailing situation of impunity.”⁸³ This little masterpiece of guerrilla strategy is presented as a criminal and not a military act, committed by an individual who already before has been depicted as a greedy warlord. The military-strategic aspect of this act and of its context disappear, namely, Lomé Peace Agreement negotiations, where the RUF was keen on striking a favourable bargain on issues like disarmament, demobilization, and soldier reintegration amnesties for rebels and their leaders, and the political offices in a future government.

The depiction of Charles Taylor as being the *éminence grise* behind the RUF for personal motives, namely, access to Sierra Leonean diamonds, had similar functions. It allowed key actors in the region, particularly President Obasanjo of Nigeria and Lansan Kouyaté of Guinea (both neither exactly

shining examples of respect for human rights and the rule of law), to enhance their roles as rightful representatives of states by establishing a terrific horror mirror image in Taylor's role as warlord.⁸⁴ The warlord narrative conveniently concealed the realpolitik power interests of the regional actors. As already discussed above, it has also allowed actors (like Nigeria) to position themselves with respect to debates over the international and global codification of criminal law by re-affirming that human rights violations can only be the act of individuals, of warlords and rebels but not of (however defined) legitimate representatives of states (like President Obasanjo). In the same vein, government actors in Sierra Leone were able to connect Charles Taylor to the RUF through the greed narrative, hence implying that the illegal diamond trade through Liberia would be only on the account of the RUF, the rebels, and their warlord allies,⁸⁵ not on the Sierra Leonean government, the militias, the private security companies, or even ECOMOG, hence, reaffirming that only governments are legitimate economic actors (see above).

In sum, just as the greed explanation of civil wars distinguishes legitimate and illegitimate economic actors not on the grounds of the economic production mode but on the grounds of who gains the profit from production, the individualization of the civil war narratives identifies legitimate and illegitimate military and political actors by ascribing a priori legitimacy to specific roles rather than to the acts and their context themselves; human rights abuses by so-called warlords are dealt with differently than human rights abuses by presidents of countries whose support is needed for conflict resolution (even Charles Taylor benefitted from this governmental prerogative before he lost the elections of 2003 and then, "private" person again, was accused of war crimes and crimes against humanity).

The overarching logic of these ascriptions is not rooted in the concrete atrocities committed, and even less in a differentiated analysis of the political motivations, strategies, and interactions behind certain acts of violence and war. These narratives rather have to be seen as part of the struggle over human rights and the legalization of humanitarian interventions on the global level as already discussed for the ascription of legitimacy to political actors through the state failure narrative. If individuals are made responsible for violence as private persons rather than as politicians, and if war is defined not as a political act but as a criminal one then this has the effect of safeguarding the state sovereignty norm of the international system on the one hand (as the state remains the only legitimate locus of politics) and of providing arguments to justify "just wars" and humanitarian interventions to

“stop human rights abuses,” on the other hand. In a larger sense the individualization of the standard narratives of war assign legitimate *agency* just in the same way as the state failure aspect of the standard narrative does (see above). By individualizing acts which are the result of collective, relational, and processual politics, the standard narrative of war categorizes the actors, and it attributes right or wrong, acceptable or unacceptable motives to their acts. How this ascription works can be well seen with the treatment of the category of child soldiers.

One figure that clearly has no right to appear in the category of political actors are children, and among them particularly girls. In current civil war narratives, child soldiering and particularly girl child soldiering is therefore treated as an exception. They are considered to be a category apart from all those involved in the war. Child soldiering is commonly considered to be an aberration to the norm. Its existence requires special explanation, and, hence, violence and traumatising are pointed out as main causes of child soldiering. Children are generally considered as victims who do not take up weapons and use violence out of their own agency. In the standard narrative children do not fight because they reproduce roles and aspirations of the social world they are growing up in, or because they pursue goals or even an explicit political agenda; they only become fighters because they have been forced to. They have been abducted and are instrumentalized by adult interests.⁸⁶ Girls in particular are regularly depicted as having been abducted and sexually abused rather than having acted out of their own will. The standard narrative often does not even admit that these children, at least, make their own destiny out of what has happened to them.⁸⁷

The victimization of child soldiering does not only deprive them of being perceived as agents of their destinies but it also treats them as isolated from the societies and cultures they grow up in and in which they are taking over roles within the group (roles that might already include fighting or sex).⁸⁸ It does so not because of what these children did or did not do, but because of a certain image of childhood that, in the dominant international discourse on childhood, has been declared the norm which needs protection and promotion.⁸⁹ In this image, children go to school and play but do not affirm their being, personality, and social role by fighting in wars. With respect to Sierra Leone, Sweden's then Ambassador to the United Nations neatly summarizes this dominant image:

Many of these young children were abducted long ago into the ranks of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), and they are now—some of them perhaps

at the age of only eight or ten—some of the fiercest fighters in the war. Of course, they are heavily traumatized, fed violence and destruction for a large part of their lives, and I think one of the biggest challenges ahead will be to integrate the surviving children of Sierra Leone into a society where identity is based on respect and common norms, and not on carrying a loaded rifle. These children should be able to go to school and to play with their friends. They should be able to be with their families and not grow up with fighters as their role models.⁹⁰

This statement entirely neglects the fact that most of the underage soldiers in Sierra Leone have never enjoyed a peaceful childhood with schools, boy scout associations, football clubs, and Sunday family picnics. Neither did they have safe places to desert to or to return to after the war. Yet, acknowledging this would not only prove most of the child soldiering discourse to be hypocritical, it would also force the observer to analyse and recognize the grievances and war motivations of these groups.

The only category of people left who, by their very nature, are considered as an almost natural category of violent agents are angry young men. Yet, even if most civil war narratives recognize some legitimacy in the fact that young men can become frustrated up to the point of taking up weapons, this behaviour is still considered an aberration. Particularly in narratives of identity politics, these young men are understood as seeking sense in an anomic and chaotic world, and therefore easy prey for sectarian violence entrepreneurs. Mary Kaldor's new wars narrative notably focuses on these individuals:

The political goals of the new wars are about the claim to power on the basis of seemingly traditional identities—nation, tribe, religion. Yet the upsurge in the politics of particularistic identities cannot be understood in traditional terms. It has to be explained in the context of growing cultural dissonance between *those who participate in transnational networks, which communicate through email, faxes, telephone and air travel, and those who are excluded from global processes and are tied to localities, even though their lives may be profoundly shaped by those same processes*.⁹¹

For the Sierra Leonean case, Christopher Clapham draws a similar conclusion, in similar empathetic terms: "Perhaps the most fundamental source of the Sierra Leone malaise, difficult though this is to pin down, is a deeply rooted sense of cultural insecurity and dependence."⁹² The narrative of angry young men in Sierra Leone has been mainly popularized by Ibrahim

Abdullah and his interpretation of the RUF as an assembly of urban and rural “lumpen” youth whose brutality is in direct relationship with their lack of education and ideological guidance in the post-Cold War era.⁹³

In greed models too, these young men are seen as lured into war by promises of material compensation rather than fighting for a cause. Humphreys and Weinstein’s survey of ex-combatants in Sierra Leone in 2004⁹⁴ for instance use Weinstein’s dichotomy of “opportunistic” versus “activist” rebel organizations to explore the motivations for joining the RUF or civil defense forces.⁹⁵ In his model, Weinstein formulated that rebel movements that have access to rich resources will recruit mainly by promising material benefits which are acquired through excessive violence and looting, whereas organizations which have fewer opportunities to offer material incentives will recruit on ideological grounds and uphold tighter discipline than opportunistic organizations. Humphreys and Weinstein see this confirmed in the motivations of young men to join the RUF and CDF respectively:

But political motivations notwithstanding, the role of material incentives cannot be minimized. Material incentives were particularly important in motivating participation within the RUF. RUF combatants were promised jobs, money, and women; during the war, they received women, drugs, and sometimes more valuable goods. CDF combatants, on the other hand, were expressly forbidden from taking valuable goods. The CDF helped to meet their basic needs, but few expected much in the way of material benefits from their participation in the faction.⁹⁶

While the survey also notes other motivations among RUF fighters such as “fighting corruption” and points out that, for the lower rank and file, diamonds were not important, it holds up the common image of the disoriented, uneducated, unemployed young man (little or no gender differentiation is made in this survey) who joins the rebels, the RUF in this case, because it is the easiest way to get food and sex, and because, as the authors argue, these men are more vulnerable to manipulation and abduction:

Most importantly, however, the vast majority of RUF recruits were abductees. For these individuals, common arguments about expressive motivations, selective incentives, and social sanctions are rendered irrelevant. A grievance account predicts the observed correlation between welfare and membership, but for abductees the interpretation is the wrong one: poverty and alienation

cannot reasonably be seen as a source of frustration that motivates political action. In this context, traditional indicators of grievance must represent something other than marginalization; for example, poverty or a lack of access to education might make individuals more vulnerable to manipulation by political or military elites.⁹⁷

In short, as soon as a person (a child) has been abducted, he or she becomes a victim who has no agency over how and why he or she lives their lives as they do. And as these people have no agency, and especially no legitimate agency, they cannot in any sensible way represent political or social injustice and grievances. If their desire for fulfilling basic needs is commonly recognized—after all, this is what international agencies such as UNDP have been working for—their political agency is denied as these men are seen first of all as victims of greedy warlords, and second as limited to their basic needs (food and sex). The roots of the lack of “food and sex” conveniently drop out of the picture (in the case of this survey they were not asked for), and the authors do not offer any explanation as to why such a high percentage of young people in Sierra Leone are uneducated and impoverished, and what the connection between these circumstances and violence could be or how, in any case, uneducated and impoverished underclasses can collectively express grievances in alternative ways given the social, political, and economic circumstances of a country like Sierra Leone before the war. The individualization of standard narratives of civil war probably demonstrates the best how Neoliberalism mind-frames exert their framing power on the perception of the events on the ground. In these narratives, “Society does not exist,” as Thatcher famously said; people’s choices are not conditioned by socio-economic structures. The narrative restates in various forms that politics are not only unable to change anything fundamental about these circumstances; such changes are not even necessary given that the core of the problem is individual misbehaviour. Actors are either deprived of any view of agentic acting (notably children, but also angry young men as victims) or they are merely seen as criminals who break rules and use violence to become rich (warlords, angry young men).

This Neoliberal discourse can frame standard narratives because it has become a very deeply interiorized worldview that shapes not only the economic field but also other socio-professional fields, notably the field of academic and international organisations’ analysis.

THE WINNER TAKES ALL, THE LOSER STANDING SMALL:
DOMINANT CAPITAL AND THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE POST-CONFLICT ENVIRONMENT

If the post-conflict environment can be understood as a social field, then the most important struggle over legitimate economic capital will evolve around the problem of making the international interveners' capital—whether political, economic, or local—convertible. This, in turn, becomes a struggle over economic and political authority within the field of the post-conflict (re)construction process in which the narratives of war, whether academic or not, play an important role in offering perception frames and discursive elements of justifying policy choices, by emphasizing specific events, facts, and actors, and of taking others out of the picture, in short: in authoring and authorizing the post-conflict environment. This process does not only take place in the concrete field of peacekeeping and statebuilding but it is supported by evolutions and actors in other social fields, most notably in those overlaps between such other fields with the peacekeeping and statebuilding field.

Humphreys and Weinstein's study is revealing for the ways capital domination translates into the constitution of the post-conflict environment by transferring epistemologies gained in one social field, namely, the American academic field, into an entirely different one, namely, the peacekeeping and statebuilding field in Sierra Leone. The cultural capital of two American Ivy League scholars transforms into symbolic power to categorize entire spans of the Sierra Leonean population. Cultural capital can be, generally speaking, considered the dominant currency in academia.⁹⁸ The notion encloses not only specific knowledge, data, and information (i.e., various types of communicative symbols) but also more widely epistemological and ontological approaches to this world as they are produced, reproduced, sanctioned, and promoted in academia. Cultural capital can be made of tangible and intangible goods (certificates and knowledge) and can be gained, dissipated, invested, or inherited like any other capital. National differences notwithstanding, the academic field follows its own set of "rules" by which "right" or "wrong" cultural capital is authored and authorized. These rules are expressed in the institutions of doctoral theses, peer review processes in publishing and grant awards, etc., yet they often carry discipline-specific and national characteristics (for instance, in the acceptable methodologies, the acceptable language, and the acceptable presentation).

Consequently, Humphreys and Weinstein's cultural capital is not built on the Sierra Leonean social field but on the academic field in the United States, and it is also this cultural capital of theirs that gives their study relevance and national and international attention, rather than the inherent merits of the survey. As all fields, the academic field is tightly connected with other social fields, and the value of such capital is determined by its convertibility into capital in other fields. Hence, the reference for recognition of Humphreys and Weinstein's cultural capital is not primarily whether they capture accurately or not the spoken, tacit, and unspeakable grievances of rebels but whether authorizing authorities in the US academic field, specifically in the political science field, recognize their research and whether *other* institutions in the post-conflict environment, for instance the United Nations, acknowledge the authority which the academic recognition has bestowed them with.

The rules of the game of the American academic field (publications, grants, awards, tenure committees) are, however, barely compatible with the world in which Sierra Leonean combatants live. If in the US academic field a questionnaire survey of the model of US electoral research makes perfect sense (and has been honored by publications in the field's most recognized, peer-reviewed journals such as the *American Political Science Review*, tenure in their universities, and grants and awards from prestigious institutions such as the American African Studies Association), it is more than questionable that this is an appropriate method to understand what motivated a twelve-year-old to join the RUF or CDF in the midst of the Sierra Leonean civil war; already the survey's question "Which political group did you support before the conflict began?" is unanswerable for someone who is on average twenty-five years old in 2003, given that she or he would be, on average, barely thirteen years old when the conflict began in 1991. It is therefore not surprising that the survey finds that the interviewees did not support any particular political group before the war.

Detailing the situation of this research is helpful in order to carve out how inappropriate the survey approach is to understand the meaning that combatants in Sierra Leone would have given to their actions in a more carefully, sensibly constructed study. Two white, middle-class, middle-aged men, both trained as economists in prestigious Western universities (Oxford and Columbia), from New York and Stanford respectively, encounter Sierra Leonean ex-combatants of an average age of twenty-five years who, according to the two researchers, have spent the longest years of their lives in the bush

and in combat, a large percentage of whom have been orphaned (understand: the poorest segments in their communities) already before they became soldiers, and up to 30 percent of whom are drug addicts. These young men have spent their cognitive and intellectual skills at surviving a war; most have received not more than primary education. And yet, the two researchers ask them

What are the main political goals of your group? 1) to defend my community, 2) to bring an end to autocratic rule in Sierra Leone, 3) to bring peace to Sierra Leone, 4) to root out corruption, 5) to express dissatisfaction with the government, 6) to get power back from another group, 7) other.⁹⁹

Without being condescending towards the ex-combatants, it is safe to assume that they knew not what to make of these answers (autocracy!) as much as our two political scientists would likely not know the difference in sound between an AK-47 and AK-49—a knowledge and skill the ex-combatants most certainly have.¹⁰⁰

Similarly, the question that leads Humphreys and Weinstein to the conclusion that the strongest incentive for fighting was money is not only inappropriate in terms of asking questions about political motives but it is also methodologically flawed.

What did the group tell that you would gain for participating? 1) Money, 2) Diamonds, 3) Women/men, 4) Food, 5) A job, 6) Land, 7) A way to improve the situation in Sierra Leone, 8) That my family would be protected, 9) A possibility to get revenge, 10) other.¹⁰¹

This question is clearly biased towards material goods as they are mentioned in concrete terms and juxtaposed to an abstract aim vaguely formulated like “making Sierra Leone a better place.” This latter is also nothing that a person can gain from any activity, only something someone can hope to eventually result in the long term from events to which she or he is contributing. The answers proposed here (and which were additionally to be prompted, hence, giving verbally a certain order to them) are not of the same value and comparable importance.¹⁰² Yet, this kind of research has inspired a similar survey in Liberia on the account of UNDP,¹⁰³ has been labelled as “pioneering”¹⁰⁴ and “groundbreaking”¹⁰⁵ for future combatant surveys, has received prizes and awards, has been widely published, has been frequently cited by interna-

tional agencies,¹⁰⁶ and both researchers are now consultants for the World Bank, the US Agency for International Development, the RAND corporation, and other organizations.

Its findings seem to neatly confirm Abdullah's disarray hypothesis of *lumpen* youth run wild, and it conveniently sidelines more fundamental questions to be asked about Sierra Leone's society, economy, and politics, and how it is embedded in the regional and global society, economy, and politics.¹⁰⁷ It also orders and categorizes the actors in the post-conflict environment in a way that is consistent with dominant narratives—greed, state failure, identity crises—and it conveniently delegitimizes the most uncomfortable group of citizens, namely, those whose sheer misery would otherwise throw up questions about the viability of the capitalist market economy and its multi-national corporations, about the colonial and post-colonial past with its political distortions, about external interferences and dispossession since colonial times and with the current trend of individualizing justice and injustice and “privatizing” life chances. All this is not achieved by the analytical force of research on war alone but by the authority of the authors of the research to name the good and the bad in the war and post-conflict situation.

The conversion of academic capital into symbolic power replicates the international economic agencies' narratives of warlordism, greed, and illicit economic activities such as artisanal mining as described above. In both cases, the criminalization of rebels singles out behaviour that is not compatible with dominant international structures; it hence justifies the intervention of international agencies, and it creates a transnational development field with the aim of changing these behaviours. The authority to devise economic and social policies thus shifts from the local level to a triangle of global economic leaders, global development agencies (and their associated NGOs), and transnational as well as local elites who dispose of economic, social, and cultural capital which is similar to those proposed by the intervening actors.

CONCLUSION

The convertibility of different capital forms of the various social fields involved structures the post-conflict environment. The dominant economic capital of international agencies and multi-national companies translates

into political capital for the Sierra Leonean government and parts of its elites. In an ironic inversion of the Marxist logic that the state backs exploitative economic relations, the Sierra Leonean case could be seen as economic power backing the state. All intervening actors converge in their narrative of state failure because of greed and frustrated, angry young men so that the “natural” solution to conflict appears to be development through foreign investment in most notably the mining sector. The power of this narrative is such that this policy advice is not questioned although little in Sierra Leone’s past can make one believe that such an economic policy will lead to “trickle down” effects and broad development.

Politically, too, Sierra Leone has returned to what could be called the proper state of the state. The government is elected, however marred by violence, fraud, and manipulation these elections are, and not one centimetre of the border has been altered. A Truth and Reconciliation Commission has been set up, war criminals have been tried at the Special Court for Sierra Leone, and the economic and social policy of the country is guided by international agencies. All is well.

The structuring effect of the global dominant capital configuration and how it has translated itself onto the Sierra Leonean post-conflict environment is such that Sierra Leone’s politics, society, and economy neatly beckon all these measures of the “liberal peace”: state institutions, liberal market economy, and a society of individuals whose entitlement to political participation is dependent on their social positions. It is mainly this latter point—the political denigration of the dispossessed—that renders the liberal peace a neoliberal one. It combines an unquestioned and unquestionable dominance of the private property and private economic exploitation model with an individualized yet hierarchical model of legitimate political participation: economic cartels are allowed, labor unions, notably “wild” unions, are not; labor and environmental exploitation for the account of the government and business companies are legitimate, labor and environmental exploitation for communities and collectives are not. Just like in the national context of neoliberal politics, most states have been producing legislations and policies that support the enrichment of some at the expense of social welfare and collective rights;¹⁰⁸ the post-conflict environment, a product of global governance in the ways international agencies, states, non-governmental organizations, and local actors work together, has been structured by policies and politics which allow some to enrich themselves at the expense of the large majority. The narratives by which those civil wars are

explained, which invite external intervention and such a (re)structuring of the post-conflict environment (an environment that remains largely conflictual), play an important role in legitimizing and delegitimizing actors and their policies in this process of neoliberal governance. Their popularity among international agencies, media, governments, etc., has to be located in the way they make the politics and society in these countries intelligible to global actors and hence how they structure the post-conflict environment rather than in their analytical merits alone. The standard narrative gives interveners a sense of doing what has been proved, scientifically in an ideal case, to be the right thing to do. The work of academic scholars like Paul Collier or Humphreys and Weinstein give international agencies, governments, the United Nations, and other actors means to translate their already existing material power into symbolic power and to authoritatively structure the post-conflict environment. Whether this indeed creates peace, however, can be doubted.

Notes

1. Didier Bigo, "Pierre Bourdieu and International Relations: Power of Practices, Practices of Power," *International Political Sociology* 5, no. 3 (2011): 225–58.

2. "Prepared Statement of Col. (Ret) Bernard J. McCabe, Jr., Director, Sandline International, Before the House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on Africa," *Federal News Service* (June 11, 1998), <http://www.lexisnexis.com>.

3. Sandline International and Executive Outcomes, the two private security companies hired by the Sierra Leonean government for training and protection, were largely staffed by former personnel of the South African armed forces, notoriously the "Civil Cooperation Bureau," covert special forces allegedly involved in the murders of anti-Apartheid activists. See for instance, "Executive Outcomes Has Commercial Operations in Many States—UN," *Business Day* (January 16, 1997), <http://www.lexisnexis.com>. "'We're Not Choirboys.' The Head of Executive Outcomes on Modern Warfare," *Newsweek International* (February 24, 1997), <http://www.lexisnexis.com>; or the memoir of Executive Outcome's CEO, Eeben Barlow, *Executive Outcomes: Against All Odds* (Alberton, South Africa: Galago Books, 2007).

4. Paul Richards, "To Fight or to Farm? Agrarian Dimensions of the Mano River Conflicts (Liberia and Sierra Leone)," *African Affairs* 104, no. 417 (2005): 571–90.

5. Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, *Witness to Truth: Report of the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission*, Volume 2 (Accra, Ghana: GPL Press, 2004), para 38–39.

6. For a more detailed account of Sierra Leone's post-colonial history and the

war see Paul Richards, *Fighting for the Rain Forest: War, Youth and Resources in Sierra Leone* (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 1996); *The Cambridge History of Africa. Volume 5. From C.1790 to C.1870*, ed. John E. Flint (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976); David Keen, *Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone* (New York: Palgrave, 2005); Mariane C. Ferme, *The Underneath of Things: Violence, History, and the Everyday in Sierra Leone* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001).

7. The questions if, when, and how much Taylor supported the RUF remain hotly disputed; if for most accounts there is no doubt that the RUF could not have launched its attacks without Liberian support and that they could only sustain their war effort with the support of Charles Taylor, the Special Court for Sierra Leone (<http://www.sc-sl.org>) struggles to provide proof of such support, which Taylor denies.

8. The mandate was continuously extended until UNAMSIL was a “robust” peacekeeping mission; that is, when it was authorized to use force to achieve the aims set out in the UN Security Council Resolutions and not only for self-defense purposes. See the corresponding UN Security Council resolutions: United Nations Security Council, “Resolution 1306” (United Nations, New York, July 5, 2000). United Nations Security Council, “Resolution 1270” (October 22, 1999). United Nations Security Council, “Resolution 1181” (United Nations, New York, July 13, 1998).

9. A detailed account can be found in Andrew M. Dorman, *Blair's Successful War: British Military Intervention in Sierra Leone* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2009).

10. Contrary to other places (e.g., Bosnia and Kosovo) there have been no forensic studies in Sierra Leone; death counts and displaced figures rely on estimations derived from partial observations of NGOs, ECOMOG, the Sierra Leonean government, and the United Nations.

11. Ibrahim Abdullah, *Between Democracy and Terror: The Sierra Leone Civil War* (Dakar, Senegal: Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa, 2004); Lansana Gberie, *A Dirty War in West Africa: The RUF and the Destruction of Sierra Leone* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005); William Reno, *Warlord Politics and African States* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998).

12. The UCDP *Conflict Encyclopedia*, a reference tool for international organizations, media, and practitioners, for instance, summarizes the conflict using all the associated keywords of this narrative: “ineffective economic system,” “undermining the state’s capacity to deliver public goods,” “autocratic rule,” “wrecked by factionalism and ethnic patronage,” “systems of patronage and corruption” to come to the conclusion, “Thus the stage was set for trouble in the early 1990s, with a weak and factionalized army, a corrupt and unpopular autocratic government, plenty of opportunities for illicit natural resource extraction and hordes of unemployed and frustrated youth” (Uppsala Conflict Data Program, *Conflict Encyclopedia* (Uppsala University 2012), www.ucdp.uu.se/database, accessed October 5, 2012).

13. Louis M. Goreux, “Conflict Diamonds” (World Bank, Washington, DC, February 2001); Paul Collier and others, *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and*

Development Policy (Washington, DC: World Bank and Oxford University Press, 2003); Simon Chesterman, "State-Building and Human Development: Background paper for the Human Development Report 2005" (Human Development Report Office, United Nations Development Program, New York, 2005); Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, "The DAC Guidelines: Helping Preventing Violent Conflict" (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris, 2001).

14. To name a few reports of governmental development agencies: Department for International Development, "The Causes of Conflict in Africa" (Department for International Development, London, March 2001); Department for International Development, "Building Peaceful States and Societies" (Department for International Development, London, 2010); Die Bundesregierung, "Action Plan: Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Peace-Building" (Die Bundesregierung, Berlin, May 12, 2004); Michael Bratton, "State Building and Democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa: Forwards, Backwards, or Together" (Institute for Democracy in South Africa; Ghana Centre for Democratic Development; Michigan State University, Cape Town/Accra/East Lansing, September 2004).

15. For instance, *Rescuing a Fragile State: Sierra Leone 2002–2008*, ed. Lansana Gberie (Waterloo, Ontario: Laurier Centre for Military, Strategic and Disarmament Studies, 2009); Christopher Clapham, "Sierra Leone: The Political Economy of Internal Conflict" (Netherlands Institute of International Relations Conflict Research Unit, The Hague, Netherlands, July 2003).

16. See Loïc J. D. Wacquant, "Lire 'Le Capital' de Pierre Bourdieu," in *Pierre Bourdieu, Sociologue*, ed. Louis Pinto, Gisèle Sapiro, and Patrick Champagne (Paris: Fayard, 2004).

17. Pierre Bourdieu, *Homo Academicus* (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1984).

18. This is a rough summary of Bourdieu's development of the notion of field and capital derived from his three works: Pierre Bourdieu, *La Noblesse d'état: Grandes écoles et esprit de corps* (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1989); Bourdieu, *Homo Academicus*; Pierre Bourdieu, *La Distinction: critique sociale du jugement* (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1979). For more explanations, see Pierre Bourdieu, *Raisons Pratiques: sur la théorie de l'action* (Paris: Seuil, 1994); Pierre Bourdieu and Loïc J. D. Wacquant, *Réponses: pour une anthropologie réflexive* (Paris: Seuil, 1992).

19. Robert D. Kaplan, *The Coming Anarchy: Shattering the Dreams of the Post Cold War* (New York: Random House, 2000); Hans Magnus Enzensberger, *Civil War*, trans. Piers Spence and Martin Chalmers (London: Granta, 1994).

20. William Reno, *Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Jean-François Bayart, *The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly* (New York: Longman, 1993).

21. Bertrand Badie, *The Imported State: The Westernization of the Political Order*, trans. Claudia Royal (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000); Jeffrey Ira Herbst, *States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).

22. Robert H. Jackson, *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Third World* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

23. Christopher Clapham, *Africa and International System: The Politics of State Survival*, Cambridge studies in international relations (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

24. The argument that economic breakdown is the result of “bad” policies by inexperienced or greedy African leaders is presented in *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority*, ed. I. William Zartman (Boulder, CO, and London: Lynne Rienner, 1995); Robert H. Bates, *When Things Fell Apart: State Failure in Late-Century Africa* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

25. However, these accounts seldom mention that it was colonial policies which kept the large population in poverty and ignorance. Sierra Leone was no exception to the rule with merely a couple of thousand urban Blacks, out of an estimated population of more than two million, having obtained secondary education in 1955 (Kenneth Little, “Structural Change in the Sierra Leone Protectorate,” *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute* 25, no. 3 (1955): 217–34).

26. This is a striking difference to the differentiations that are made in neo-institutionalist approaches to the study of industrialized OECD states; see Gøsta Esping-Anderson, *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); *Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage*, ed. Peter A. Hall and David W. Soskice (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001).

27. The concept of state failure has been criticized commonly for its lack of analytical precision; see for instance Alexandros Yannis, “State Collapse and Its Implications for Peace-Building and Reconstruction,” in *State Failure, Collapse and Reconstruction*, ed. Jennifer Milliken (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2003). However, only a few authors are concerned with the depoliticization effect of the concept; for thorough discussion of this aspect see *Politics Without Sovereignty: A Critique of Contemporary International Relations*, ed. Christopher J. Bickerton, Philip Cunliffe, and Alexander Gourevitch (New York: University College London Press, 2007).

28. For a critical reflection on the anthropology of ethnicism, tribalism, and savagery see Adam Kuper, *The Reinvention of Primitive Society: Transformations of a Myth* (New York: Routledge, 2005).

29. Paul Collier and Tony Venables, “The Political Economy of Fragile States and Implications for European Development Policy,” in *The Challenges of Fragility to Development Policy* (Barcelona, Spain: European Report on Development Conference, 7–8 May 2009).

30. Christopher J. Bickerton, “State-Building: Exporting State Failure,” in *Politics Without Sovereignty: A Critique of Contemporary International Relations*, ed. Christopher J. Bickerton, Philip Cunliffe, and Alexander Gourevitch (New York: University College London Press, 2007).

31. Basil Davidson, *The Black Man’s Burden: Africa and the Curse of the Nation-State* (Oxford: James Currey, 1992).

32. Rogers Brubaker, “Ethnicity Without Groups,” *European Journal of Sociology* 43, no. 2 (2002): 163–89.

33. Ibid., 166.
34. See for instance Keen, *Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone*; John L. Hirsche, *Sierra Leone: Diamonds and the Struggle for Democracy* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000).
35. Lord Wallace of Saltaire, *Debate on Sub-Saharan Africa* (London: United Kingdom House of Lords, January 30, 2002), <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200102/ldhansrd/vo020130/text/20130-06.htm>, columns 266–70.
36. *Making States Work: State Failure and the Crisis of Governance*, ed. Simon Chesterman, Michael Ignatieff, and Ramesh Chandra Thakur (New York: United Nations University Press, 2005); Michael Barnett, “Building a Republican Peace: Stabilizing States After War,” *International Security* 30, no. 4 (2006): 87–112; Volker Boege and others, “On hybrid political orders and emerging states: state formation in the context of ‘fragility’” (Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, Berlin, 2008); John Dryzek, “Democratization As Deliberative Capacity Building,” *Comparative Political Studies* 42, no. 11 (2009): 1379–1402; Shannon D. Beebe and Mary Kaldor, *The Ultimate Weapon Is No Weapon: Human Security and the New Rules of War and Peace* (New York: Public Affairs, 2010).
37. Joel S. Migdal, *State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another*, Cambridge studies in comparative politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 19.
38. Francis Fukuyama, “‘Stateness’ First,” *Journal of Democracy* 16, no. 1 (2005): 84–88.
39. See International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty* (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001).
40. Pierre Bourdieu, “Sur Le Pouvoir Symbolique,” *Annales. Economies, sociétés, civilisations* 32, no. 3 (1977): 405–11.
41. Ibid., 407.
42. See for instance United Kingdom House of Commons, International Development Committee Publications, International Development, 6th Report, 28 July 1999 with a special section on Sierra Leone.
43. Department for International Development, “The Causes of Conflict in Africa”; Collier and others, *Breaking the Conflict Trap*. See also the works of the World Bank’s working group on the Economics of Conflict (<http://www.worldbank.org>), led by Paul Collier in the 1990s.
44. Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War,” *Oxford Economic Papers* 56, no. 4 (2004): 563–95; Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, and Dominic Rohner, “Beyond Greed and Grievance: Feasibility and Civil War,” *Oxford Economic Papers* 61, no. 1 (2009): 1–27; Päivi Lujala, Nils Petter Gleditsch, and Elisabeth Gilmore, “A Diamond Curse?: Civil War and a Lootable Resource,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49, no. 4 (2005): 538–62; E. Wayne Nafziger and Juha Auvinen, “Economic Development, Inequality, War, and State Violence,” *World Development* 30, no. 2 (2002): 153–63; Michael L. Ross, “What Do We Know About Natural Resources and Civil War?,” *Journal of Peace Research* 41, no. 3 (2004): 337–56; Mi-

chael L. Ross, "How Do Natural Resources Influence Civil War? Evidence from Thirteen Cases," *International Organization* 58, no. 1 (2004): 35–67.

45. Lujala, Gleditsch, and Gilmore, "A Diamond Curse?"

46. Edward Miguel, Shanker Satyanath, and Ernest Sergenti, "Economic Shocks and Civil Conflict: An Instrumental Variables Approach," *Journal of Political Economy* 112, no. 4 (2004): 725–53; Richard Snyder and Ravi Bhavnani, "Diamonds, Blood, and Taxes: A Revenue-Centered Framework for Explaining Political Order," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49, no. 4 (2005): 563–97.

47. Christopher Cramer, "Homo Economicus Goes to War: Methodological Individualism, Rational Choice, and the Political Economy of War," *World Development* 30, no. 11 (2002): 1845–64; Astri Suhrke, Espen Villanger, and Susan L. Woodward, "Economic Aid to Post-Conflict Countries: A Methodological Critique of Collier and Hoeffler," *Conflict, Security and Development* 5, no. 3 (2005): 329–61.

48. Klaus Deininger and Lyn Squire, "New Ways of Looking at Old Issues: Inequality and Growth," *Journal of Development Economics* 57, no. 2 (1998): 259–87.

49. To reproduce the title of an article dealing with this particular choice in Sierra Leone: Richards, "To Fight or to Farm."

50. For a different view, see Carolyn Nordstrom, *Shadows of War: Violence, Power, and International Profiteering in the Twenty-First Century* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004).

51. Reno, *Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone*.

52. Cramer, "Homo Economicus Goes to War."

53. Jean-Pierre Chauveau and Paul Richards, "West African Insurgencies in Agrarian Perspective: Côte d'Ivoire and Sierra Leone Compared," *Journal of Agrarian Change* 8, no. 4 (2008): 515–52.

54. Debora L. Spar, "Markets: Continuity and Change in the International Diamond Market," *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 20, no. 3 (2006): 195–208.

In the words of one of the reports on diamonds: "Sierra Leone's diamonds are highly prized both for their high quality and for the handsome margins afforded by their low production costs" (Chaim Even-Zohar, "Sierra Leone diamond sector financial policy constraints" (Management Systems International, Washington, DC, 2003), 1).

55. United Nations Security Council, "Resolution 1289" (United Nations, New York, May 19, 2000).

56. Chris McGreal, "Sierra Leone peace force accused of sabotage," *The Guardian* (September 9, 2000).

On private security companies and diamonds, see also Ian Douglas, "Fighting for Diamonds: Private Military Companies in Sierra Leone," in *Peace, Profit or Plunder?: The Privatisation of Security in War-Torn African Societies*, ed. Jakkie Cilliers and Peggy Mason (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 1999).

57. United Nations Department of Public Information, *Sanctions and War: General Assembly Adopts Resolution on "Conflict Diamonds"* (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, March 21, 2001), <http://www.un.org/peace/>

africa/Diamond.html, accessed January 13, 2011; see also the official website of the Kimberly Process (<http://www.kimberlyprocess.com>).

58. Ian Smille, Lansana Gberie, and Ralph Hazleton, "The Heart of the Matter. Sierra Leone, Diamonds and Human Security" (Partnership Canada, Ottawa, January 2000).

This report was prompted by a similar report from the NGO "Global Witness" on diamonds in Angola: Global Witness, "A rough trade: the role of companies and governments in the Angolan conflict" (Global Witness, London, December 1998).

59. United Nations Security Council, "Report of the Panel of Experts appointed pursuant to Security Council resolution 1306 (2000), paragraph 19, in relation to Sierra Leone," UN Document S/2000/1195, December 20, 2000.

60. Goreux, "Conflict Diamonds."

61. Jim Williams and others, "Sierra Leone diamond policy study" (AMCO-Robertson Mineral Services Ltd, January 2002).

62. A somewhat more skeptical voice can be found in the a magazine published by EU Commission: David J. Francis, "Diamonds and the Civil War in Sierra Leone," *The Courier* (August 2001).

63. Williams and others, "Sierra Leone Diamond Policy Study," 11–13.

64. Data for 1985, Emmanuel A. Cleeve, *Multinational Enterprises in Development: The Mining Industry of Sierra Leone* (Hants, England: Aldershot, 1997), 35.

65. Even-Zohar, "Sierra Leone Diamond Sector Financial Policy Constraints," 4; Lansana Gberie, "Diamond industry annual review: Sierra Leone 2004" (Partnership Africa Canada and Network Movement for Justice and Development, Ottawa and Freetown, Sierra Leone, 2004); Lansana Gberie, "Diamond industry annual review: Sierra Leone 2006" (Partnership Africa Canada and Network Movement for Justice and Development, Ottawa and Freetown, Sierra Leone, February 2006); Lansana Gberie, "Diamond industry annual review: Sierra Leone 2005" (Partnership Africa Canada and Network Movement for Justice and Development, Ottawa and Freetown, Sierra Leone, February 2005).

66. Cleeve, *Multinational Enterprises in Development*, 17.

67. Spar, "Markets"; Ann E. Andrews, "A Diamond Is Forever: De Beers, the Kimberley Process, and the Efficacy of Public and Corporate Co-Regulatory Initiatives in Securing Regulatory Compliance," *South Carolina Journal of International Law and Business* 2 (2006): 178–214.

68. For a long time, the only mining company operating in Sierra Leone, Sierra Leone Selection Trust, had prospected most of the kimberlite mines in the 1970s and 1980s which are taken by the current license holders, Rex Minerals, as granted; see "Rex Diamond Mining Corporation," *Canada NewsWire* (January 31, 1997), <http://www.lexisnexis.com>.

69. Even-Zohar, "Sierra Leone Diamond Sector Financial Policy Constraints," 4.

70. Spar, "Markets," 206. Donna J. Bergenstock and James M. Maskulka, "The De Beers Story: Are Diamonds Forever?," *Business Horizons* 44, no. 3 (2001): 37–44.

71. Canadian producers notably showed a strong interest as large kimberlite diamond mines were discovered in Canada's Northwest Territory in the 1990s. Canada also financed the report "The Heart of the Matter," which helped launch the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme.

72. Clapham, "Sierra Leone."

73. Sylvie Bredeloup, "La fièvre du diamant au temps des colonies (Afrique)," in *Variations*, ed. Bernard Moizo (Paris: Éditions de l'Aube, 1999), 177.

74. Ibid.

75. Krijn Peters, *War and the Crisis of Youth in Sierra Leone* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011). For this argument, see Sigismond A. Wilson, "Sierra Leone's Illicit Diamonds: The Challenges and the Way Forward," *Geojournal* (2009): 1–22.

76. For instance, USAID has established an entire program for the development of the diamond sector in Sierra Leone from 1999 to 2007; see Jean Pierre Tutusaus, Sue Nelson, and Arthur Abadje, "USAID/Sierra Leone Diamond Sector Evaluation" (AMEX International, Washington, DC, July 20, 2007).

77. John Mackinlay, "Defining Warlords," *Building Stability in Africa: Challenges for the New Millennium*, ed. Jakkie Cilliers and Annika Hilding-Norberg (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, February 2000), <http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/monographs/no46/Defining.html>.

78. Münkler, *The New Wars*.

79. See Charles Tilly, *The Politics of Collective Violence* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

80. See Georg Elwert, "The Socio-Anthropological Interpretation of Violence," in *International Handbook of Violence Research*, ed. Wilhelm Heitmeyer and John Hagan (Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003).

81. See for instance Jean Hatzfeld, *Machete Season: The Killers in Rwanda Speak*, trans. Linda Coverdale (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005).

82. For a thorough discussion see Martti Koskeniemi, "Between Impunity and Show Trials," in *Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law* (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2002).

83. The same resolution continues:

reaffirming further that persons who commit or authorize serious violations of international humanitarian law are individually responsible and accountable for those violations and that the international community will exert every effort to bring those responsible to justice in accordance with international standards of justice, fairness and due process of law

which again, in this case, is clearly aimed at Foday Sankoh and his RUF.

84. The Security Council mission to Sierra Leone in 2000 reports: "Most of the mission's interlocutors (in the region) including those at the most senior levels, had no doubt that President Taylor exercised strong influence, even direct control, over RUF. In the assessment of many, the main objective of RUF was to maintain control of the diamond-producing areas."

85. The same mission report: "The view was firmly and frequently expressed within Sierra Leone that the cause of many of the country's problems lay in the support provided to RUF by President Taylor, motivated partly by his own political and security concerns and partly by his interest in profits from diamonds mined in Sierra Leone."

86. John-Peter Pham, *Child Soldiers, Adult Interests: The Global Dimensions of the Sierra Leonean Tragedy* (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2005).

For the United Nations, see Graça Machel, "Report of the expert of the Secretary-General, Ms. Graça Machel, submitted pursuant to General Assembly resolution 48/157" (United Nations, New York, August 26, 1996); Graça Machel, "The Machel review, 1996–2000: a critical analysis of progress made and obstacles encountered in increasing protection for war-affected children" (Government of Canada, Ottawa, 2000); UN Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict, "Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict" (United Nations, New York, August 13, 2007).

87. Critically, see Yvonne E. Keairns, "The voices of girl child soldiers" (Quaker United Nations Office, New York, October 2002):

For example, it has been assumed that most if not all girl soldiers were raped and sexually abused by the armed groups of which they were a part. This study reveals that not all armed groups raped the girls. The stated position of some of the armed groups forbids sexually intimate relationships between men and women without the consent of the woman and the approval of a commander to enter into a relationship. In some armed groups contraception shots were required and abortions performed even when the girl opposed this action. (7)

88. Jean-Hervé Jézéquel, "Les enfants soldats d'Afrique, un phenomene singulier? Sur la necessite du regard historique," *Vingtième siècle*, no. 89 (2006): 99–108; Siobhán McEvoy-Levy, *Troublemakers or Peacemakers?: Youth and Post-Accord Peace Building* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2006).

89. Similar struggles over the image of childhood can be observed in global debates about child labor. See Anna Holzscheiter, "Discourse As Capability: Non-State Actors' Capital in Global Governance," *Millennium* 33, no. 3 (2004): 723–46.

90. Speech of Ambassador Hans Dahlgren of Sweden, Chairman of the Sanctions Committee, before the United Nations Security Council (Meeting 3957) dealing with the third report of the Secretary-General on Sierra Leone, December 18, 1998.

91. Kaldor, *New and Old Wars*, 73, emphasis added.

92. Clapham, "Sierra Leone," 10.

93. Abdullah, *Between Democracy and Terror: The Sierra Leone Civil War*. Ibrahim Abdullah, "Bush Path to Destruction: The Origin and Character of the Revolutionary United Front/Sierra Leone," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 36, no. 2 (1998): 203–35; for a critical discussion, see Richards, *Fighting for the Rain Forest*.

94. Macartan Humphreys and Jeremy M. Weinstein, "What the fighters say: A Survey of Ex-Combatants in Sierra Leone. June–August 2003. Interim Report:

July 2004" (The Post-conflict Reintegration Initiative for Development and Empowerment, Freetown, Sierra Leone, July 2004).

95. Jeremy M. Weinstein, *Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

96. Humphreys and Weinstein, "What the Fighters Say," 28–29.

97. M. Humphreys and J. M. Weinstein, "Who Fights? The Determinants of Participation in Civil War," *American Journal of Political Science* 52, no. 2 (2008): 436–55.

98. See Bourdieu, *Homo academicus*.

99. Macartan Humphreys and Jeremy M. Weinstein, "What the Fighters Say: A Survey of Ex-Combatants in Sierra Leone" (Freetown, Sierra Leone: The Post-conflict Reintegration Initiative for Development and Empowerment, July 2004), Survey Instrument, Question 59, available at <http://www.columbia.edu/~mh2245/Survey.pdf>, accessed March 17, 2011.

100. Rosalind Shaw describes in the introduction of her book *Memories of the Slave Trade* a similar cross-cultural impossibility to communicate. She reports how Edward Ball came to conclude that memories of the slave trade in Sierra Leone are denied:

He (Ball) concluded his research with a trip to Sierra Leone [. . .] interviewing descendants of African slave traders. Most of these descendants were awkward, and sometimes irritated and evasive, at being confronted with the aggressively interrogative style of a Western journalistic interview, featuring such statements as "Your ancestor was a slave dealer." (Rosalind Shaw, *Memories of the Slave Trade: Ritual and the Historical Imagination in Sierra Leone* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), 1)

101. Humphreys and Weinstein, "What the fighters say," Survey Instrument, Question 65.

102. Statistically, too, this answer is likely to be biased against answer seven as it is, in the given setting, entirely possible that respondents will answer randomly, hence even under the condition of multiple answers there will be a lower possibility that one of the answers will be seven and in any case this answer will be compounded by a larger number of "material" answers.

103. James Pugel, "What the Fighters Say: A Survey of ex-Combatants in Liberia" (United Nations Development Programme, New York, April 2007).

104. Birger Heldt, "Management of Civil Wars and Genocidal Violence: Lessons from Statistical Research," *Genocide Prevention Advisory Network* (June 1, 2010), <http://www.gpanet.org/content/management-civil-wars-and-genocidal-violence-lessons-statistical-research>, accessed January 13, 2011.

105. Desmond Molloy, "DDR: A shifting paradigm and the scholar/practitioner gap" (Pearson Peace Keeping Centre / Centre pour le maintien de la paix, Ottawa, 2008).

106. See for instance Patricia Justino, "The impact of armed civil conflict on household welfare and policy responses" (United Nations Development Policy

Analysis Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, New York, 2007).

107. Given the little data available it is of course possible to argue that already this research is a step forward and that careful, contextualized reading of the answers does offer insights into motivations and causes of civil war. This is what Paul Richards tries in using the same data as Humphreys and Weinstein but contextualizing it a deeper analysis of Sierra Leone's society. See Richards.

A far more differentiated study of meanings attributed by "ordinary" people to the violence of the civil war can be found in Ferme, *The Underneath of Things*.

108. See Ulrich Brand and Nicola Sekler, "Postneoliberalism: Catch-All Word or Valuable Analytical and Political Concept?" *Development Dialogue*, no. 51 (2009): 5–13.

CHAPTER 2

Peacebuilding

The Performance and Politics of Trauma in Northern Iraq

SARAH KEELER

ABSTRACT

This chapter deconstructs peacebuilding as a site of Neoliberal interventionism by highlighting preconceived notions about and the reification of what constitutes a post-conflict environment (PCE), what comprises officially sanctioned trauma and suffering, and what counts as recovery. This is done via an analysis, drawing on examples from post-2003 Iraq, of two interrelated levels integral to doctrines of peacebuilding and the promotion of good governance: mental health and trauma work and the introduction of market economy standards and the advancement of consumerism as a recuperative act on individual and societal levels.

Prevailing attitudes and practices within peacebuilding increasingly posit mental health as a necessary area of post-conflict intervention that will reform damaged psyches in the image of Western cultures of individualism; where such interventions do not bring about full recovery, this is attributed to inherently dysfunctional cultural qualities. Here, the PCE itself is reified, and the imagined beneficiaries of peacebuilding practice brought to life through behavioral norms—performances—facilitated by medical interventions. They respond as expected according to their role allocation as victims of the conflict sanctioned and reified by the official narrative. Thus trauma work facilitated by the Neoliberal peace paradigm addresses only “acceptable” post-conflict suffering, clearly demonstrating the formation of a specific entity, on which peacebuilders (and local populations alike) exert their influence, knowledge, and recovery work.

The fully recovered citizen in the PCE is considered rescued if he or she expresses well-being through full participation in the (re)constructed market economy and exchange of external production and domestic consumption; that is, in becoming a consumerist citizen. Spaces of consumption become the fora in which local people are encouraged to recover, to feel better about themselves and their political and social opportunities as citizens in the PCE. This confluence of ideas of economic and psychic recovery, of human and consumer rights, is demonstrative of how the PCE is transformed into a specific concrete reality by the very privileged actors who either benefit from intervention, consider it a Kantian imperative, or both.

INTRODUCTION

The term *peacebuilding* has come to encompass a wide range of post-conflict interventions by the international community, as well as grassroots initiatives from local NGOs and civil society actors. However, despite the proliferation of such interventions and initiatives as developed in the post-Cold War era, neither the terminology itself, nor its application in international settings, has done much to dispel its often-ambiguous nature in meaning or form.¹ In item fifty-seven of his 1992 *Agenda for Peace*—in many respects a definitive document in this new era of peacekeeping operations—UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali described “the concept of peace-building as the construction of a new *environment*”² in the wake of conflict. What this new environment might entail, be it conceptual, material, or socio-political is elusive. Indeed, as a generic term encompassing many of the specific domains analyzed elsewhere in this volume, “peacebuilding is apparently little more than a composite of neoliberal problem-solving strategies,”³ with scant attention paid to the ideological and pragmatic assumptions underpinning its application. Given the ways in which peacebuilding has come to function as a kind of vague panacea “to mobilise significant political and economic resources for increasingly intrusive third party interventions,”⁴ recent decades have seen its advance into myriad post-conflict settings,⁵ and alongside it the pervasive if at times malleable notion of exactly what constitutes those same settings. Not only is the (highly flexible) notion of peacebuilding increasingly invoked among theorists and practitioners in development studies, anthropology, security studies, and a host of other disciplinary fields, it has also become something of a household concept, held as a kind

of positive, progressive ideal against which little critical inquiry has occurred, not least amongst the very “benefactors” of such peacebuilding operations in “war torn” societies or post-conflict environments. With an awareness of this pervasiveness, and its relevance to practitioners, benefactors, recipients, and observers, in the analysis that follows I advance a view of peacebuilding as a kind of cultural terrain which both conscribes and is imposed upon the post-conflict environment. Accounting for both the ideological legacies of imperialism and earlier forms of global intervention from which contemporary peacebuilding partially stems,⁶ as well as the agency and variability present in culturally contingent settings at the broadest level (and that with which peacebuilding is most concerned), my exploration “insists on interpreting violence and conflict in all the detail of social and cultural contexts, contexts which they also powerfully shape” in order to “show that they are formative of socio-political relations on the widest as well as the smallest scale.”⁷

Speaking of what he calls the high modernist taste for mapping not only geographic terrains but consequent social realities, James Scott remarks on “the apparent power of maps to transform as well as merely summarize the facts that they portray.”⁸ By exploring the cultural and social mapping of post-conflict environments as well as their physical realities, I aim to show how peacebuilding functions as a process of meaning making mutually created by actors “within” and “outside” this reified space. This not only problematises the chronological and geospatial boundaries of the post-conflict environment, but reveals peacebuilding itself to be a kind of ethnographic site populated by “victims,” “perpetrators,” “recipients,” “donors,” “assessors,” “observers,” “practitioners,” and others as *social roles* rather than absolute positions. Such an analysis of the post-conflict environment, for the purposes of the present volume, addresses the need to elucidate the particular relationship between the object constituted in the practice and performance of such roles⁹ and the ways in which in mutually defining relations, subjectivities in post-conflict societies shape these interventions. Further, in practical ethnographic terms such an analysis highlights processes whereby, rather than marking any conclusive disjuncture between the cessation of conflict and the emergence of peace and peacebuilding processes, “post-conflict” environments represent terrains of ongoing tension and residual violence, normalized into structural power relations and channeled into and performed through the kinds of social roles cited above, much as Mundy’s exploration of transitional justice as an important site in which the

politics of naming determines not only the role allocation for actors but also the very understanding of peace and justice. Specifically here, peacebuilding initiatives, set within the normative structures of global relations of inequality and intervention, may in fact advance the very systems of conflict and domination they seek to ameliorate, and unwittingly become caught up in the societal dispersal of residual violence.¹⁰

The semi-autonomous Kurdish region of northern Iraq represents these liminal realities between war and peace in a particularly interesting way, given its position *within* a state still caught up in the ravages of war. The Kurdistan region alone is internationally lauded as a beacon of democracy and prosperity within this otherwise grim picture of contemporary Iraqi politics of violence. Given its relative stability and quasi-state status,¹¹ Iraqi Kurdistan is also an ideal (and idealized) recipient of the kind of peacebuilding initiatives that effectively serve to recast the post-conflict environment in their own image, along the way investing notions of personhood, citizenship, and social and economic relations that sustain the archetypal social roles described above. For example, because of security concerns in wider Iraq and the relative stability in the north, the majority of aid and NGO activities operate from the Kurdistan region, where a glut of international aid, investment, and attention is focused; if Iraq as a whole is a disaster beyond repair (so a realist view might hold), then *Iraqi Kurdistan* is ripe for and responsive to the various kinds of interventions that aid, investment, and wider international attention promote. And the Kurds—government, civil society, individuals—play their roles well, whether as the infant democracy cast in the likeness of their benefactors, the perpetual and deeply traumatized victims of Arab (or Iranian state) aggressors, or the enclave of secularist cultural patterns in the face of Islamist expansion. The Iraqi Kurdish ethnic minority, numbering some six million, have since the 2003 invasion become the exemplary, the “worthy” Iraqis within international Neoliberalism.¹² Whatever the commitments (or lack thereof) from the international community to the idea of sustained Kurdish autonomy, the payoffs for this responsiveness on the part of the Kurdistan region have been foreign interventions and private interests alike consistently and intensively engaging with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in what amount to processes of state- and nation-building; this even while the international community continues to assert the political integrity of Iraq as a whole.

In what follows I focus on data derived from my own fieldwork in Iraqi Kurdistan between 2007 and 2010,¹³ also drawing on comparative material

from Sri Lanka and Latin America, in exploring, via several inter-related themes, the ethnographic site of peacebuilding. My own situatedness within this site stems from my initial role as a teacher of sociology to students in Iraq, and later to my observation and evaluation of numerous local peacebuilding initiatives funded by such actors as USAID, UN Assistance Mission for Iraq/UNDP, and the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), for which the university where I worked was asked to provide on-site programme assessment, and for which I subsequently acted as a freelance consultant. This in turn led to my academic research on the place of trauma work within wider peacebuilding agendas. This straddling of two perspectives—of critical analysis from the point of view of academic distance, and of praxis on the ground—not only allowed me to observe at close range the everyday practices and processes of peacebuilding. That I myself occupied some of the roles which I interrogate herein has also allowed me to problematize the subjectivities (my own and those of others) formed through interpersonal relations, practices of “professionalism,” and local logics of dependence and need. I contend that the underlying but pervasive state-centric approach of peacebuilding conceives of a particular social and political landscape that has its corollary in geographic and material landscapes in the post-conflict environment. That is, the available roles for social actors, or at least those roles that gain recognition and legitimacy within peacebuilding in the broadest sense, effectively promote the transformation of post-conflict societies—and the peoples that make them up—along Neoliberal lines which simultaneously uphold as desirable “Western” forms of modernity, while emphasizing the supposedly endemic inability within post-conflict societies to achieve those forms without external interventions. Instrumental in this is a frequent ignorance of the role of cultural, social, and community dynamics, which are not absolutes but continually shifting, in the implementation of peacebuilding initiatives. Recognition that communities and individuals within these cultural spaces shape practices and meanings of peacebuilding in important and shifting ways is also forgotten or ignored. Even where such awareness is ostensibly taken into account, the interpretation of fixed positions as opposed to social roles for actors within peacebuilding can exacerbate if not lead to further tensions and forms of structural violence in stages of “post-conflict.” Thus both peacebuilding and the post-conflict environment come to be represented and understood as reified absolutes, rather than as ideas or cultural spaces constantly in the process rendering meaning through relations of inter-subjectivity. The current and

pervasive representation of peacebuilding as a universalist “model” clearly invests these meanings with Neoliberal (political, economic) intent—not as contingent and culturally derived, but as absolute.

With reference to Iraqi Kurdistan, I look at the ways in which these issues impinge on the notion of the Self promoted in peacebuilding, and consider this in the context of trauma work. I argue that the conception of the Self promoted in Western psycho-social readings of human development (and trauma) are congruent with conceptions of the Self necessary for the advancement of a Neoliberal economic model, in which growth and consumption are seen as the panacea for post-conflict recovery. Indeed, I view the proliferation of peacebuilding NGOs, and their increasingly competitive bids for (Western) funding, as emblematic of this coalescence of conceptions of the traumatized Self on the one hand, and of the citizen-as-consumer on the other. These tendencies are to be observed, in Iraq as elsewhere, in myriad discursive and political practices in which “neoliberal policies and ideologies have generally called for the subjugation of political and social life to a set of processes termed ‘market forces.’”¹⁴

My eleven months of intensive ethnographic fieldwork in hospitals in Erbil, Kurdistan region, observing the performance,¹⁵ treatment, and attitudes towards women sufferers of “hysteria” provided ample opportunity to observe these inter-subjective constructions of the post-conflict environment, the social roles which populate it, and the political economy of trauma at work in Iraqi Kurdistan. Dichotomized representations of “Western” modernity as a sought-after ideal to be mimetically performed and inculcated by indigenous, educated modernizers, are reflected in both the treatment of patients and the changing attitudes of doctors to the illness categories surrounding “mental health.” Thus, young women who express unrestrained despair in their performances of trauma are often casually denigrated¹⁶ as coming from “traditional,” poor, or “village” families (and therefore as lacking the skills necessary to present their trauma in “appropriate” ways—despite the fact that my observations suggested a great deal more diversity to the patient profile), while those who self-identify as “traumatized” or “depressed” are seen as having legitimate ailments worthy of “real” therapeutic response, but also as being imbued with the tools to engage in inter-subjective relations of rehabilitation along rational, bureaucratized, lines. The ways in which such rationalizing inter-subjectivities are shaping post-conflict responses to trauma, as well as marginalizing as “traditional” or “irrelevant” other forms of expression or response, were made more apparent to me in

my work with older generations of medical practitioners. Although previous systematic work on the topic is absent, my enquiries suggest that not only do women's expressions of social suffering reflect pervasive conditions of inequality, and may in any case have roots in cultural practices of lamentation,¹⁷ but also that both points may have been readily recognized in therapeutic settings in earlier generations where today they are silenced or denigrated as "backward" or anti-modern, a further site of intervention to be "rehabilitated" by local medical staff and those in the NGO sector, both Kurdish and foreign. Despite the fact that even in the contemporary context "hysterical" episodes may be treated effectively (providing relief to patients and families) through recourse to local folk explanations—that is, exorcism of malevolent spirits by local religious specialists—such practices fall outside the realm of linear, modernizing progression in the post-conflict space. In other words, medical professionals in Iraq, often in collaboration with those in the international peacebuilding sector, increasingly subscribe to normative ideas about "appropriate" expressions of, sources of, and treatments for suffering which call on new ideas of the Self, subscribing to explanations of post-traumatic stress wrought by finite events in Iraq's political history, and identifying the solution in large-scale, externally funded and conceived, interventions. Patients, young women in particular, are also becoming (consciously or otherwise) engaged in these shifting beliefs, structures, and inter-subjectivities, the social and political efficacy of which is apparent. Resources and attention are available to those who are traumatized by finite events, who find a rational language for narrating this (in contrast to the wailing and often incoherent suffering of "hysterics"), and above all, who present their ills within sanctioned (medical) spaces that draw on "the use of rationalized, bureaucratic techniques of assessment to authenticate, categorize, and legitimize particular forms of suffering."¹⁸

Emerging explanatory models coalesce around these supposedly neutral practices of peacebuilding in medicine, reconstruction, and the rational technologies of both. Ryad, a recent graduate of Erbil Medical College who now works in the emergency hospital, treating women's breakdowns on a daily basis, explained to me, "Every Iraqi patient, every Iraqi person [. . .] they have a lot of problems, conflict [. . .] we have been through so much [. . .] so no one of us are normal."¹⁹ Like many Iraqi professionals working in the area, the means by which to advance social and political stability for Ryad rests partially in an identification of the ways in which Iraqi society is pervasively pathological. For local practitioners and international NGO workers,

remedying this trauma, this “abnormality” is part and parcel of advancing Neoliberal political structures, particularly economic practices. For example, Heartland Alliance, a mental health organization working with US Agency for International Development (USAID) funding across the Kurdistan region, identifies its aim “to develop a cost-effective, efficacious treatment intervention for traumatic stress specifically focusing on victims of torture”²⁰ indicating the assumed presence of a normative “traumatic stress” in relation to political violence, the efficacy of an external (US) treatment intervention model, and the benefits of aligning these with wider market forces of cost effectiveness. While these initiatives have been partial in terms of reaching therapeutic spaces in Kurdistan as a whole (indeed, while several of the doctors I worked with were aware of the existence of Heartland Alliance, none had had any direct contact with their programs, leaving me to wonder about their reach), local doctors increasingly employ tropes of trauma in explaining social behaviors and link these more explicitly to political violence and the Kurds’ role as victims of finite, culturally specific historical events. The place of Kurdish cultural identity within this dynamic both shapes and is refracted back through, for example, the ways in which trauma is conceptualized and treated primarily through a distancing from “backward” and “indigenous” attitudes and practices. This discourse, for practitioners and beneficiaries, is rife with symbols of the backward character of traditional Kurdish society which is both irremediable after traumatic exposure to conflict but can be elevated through education (by outsiders) and intervention, brought into a universal realm of post-conflict order, progress, and growth so central to a global political economy.

Through large international apparatuses managed by the likes of USAID and International Organization for Migration (both big players in the Kurdistan region), the establishment and funding of local peacebuilding and other reconstruction activities—taking place in a competitive free market in which recipients of service become merely bidders for and consumers of a product—increasingly not only serves corporate interests²¹ but emulates those very corporate structures that facilitate entrenched inequalities in bringing about “peace” or “rehabilitation.”²² Local NGO initiatives and individual beneficiaries among the population are called upon to demonstrate the efficacy, efficiency, and deliverability of these strategies, while “state-sponsored and non-state interventions [. . .] contributed to the commoditization of suffering.”²³ Before turning to a more detailed discussion of the ways in which these processes in Kurdistan region place trauma work within

a Neoliberal political economic model, I turn briefly to a discussion of the shortcomings in the literature on peacebuilding which have prevented such observations and critiques.

THEORIES OF PEACEBUILDING: CONCEPTIONS OF “LOCAL,” “UNIVERSAL,” AND THE LEGITIMIZATION OF INTERVENTION

The extant literature in peace and conflict studies, even while informed by various disciplinary trajectories in the social sciences, has been reticent to address the tangible consequences of protracted conflicts at the community level, and their relationships to changing social relations wrought by trauma and loss of basic trust.²⁴ This practice of “seeing like a state,” even in conditions which help to exacerbate historic conflicts, not only serve to “flatten” complex on-the-ground diversities (as well as potential sites of violence)²⁵ but can be instrumental in shaping new forms of identity. Peacebuilders may scramble eagerly, in the wake of violent conflict, to identify social categories of protagonists and antagonists,²⁶ or the “worthy” recipients of their interventions. The Kurds in Iraq, strong allies of the Americans as well as foreign investors more generally, have joined this cast in the Iraqi context as the requisite victims of the Ba’athist regime.²⁷ If Saddam’s *Al Anfal* campaign had genocidal intent, peacebuilding initiatives in the post-Saddam era have adhered just as stringently to fixed readings of ethnicity and its place in the new Iraq. At the same time, local populations, embedded as they are within the inter-subjective relations of this context, are instrumental in shaping post-conflict societies’ own conceptions of themselves on the world stage and in grounded social relations.

Rarely do such narratives critically consider the ways in which the privileging of reified identities and the groups they are said to represent may exacerbate inter-communal tensions and existing conflicts, or contribute to new forms of violence at the interpersonal, community, and state levels. In part, this shortcoming is explained by the “standard operating procedure” approach taken by peacebuilders, and the fact that the literature still emphasizes pragmatic dimensions of peacebuilding at the expense of theoretical or ideological considerations.²⁸ Further, while the literature within peace and conflict studies has increasingly engaged with the notion of non-state actors as important units of analysis (and prescriptive intervention) in the global

terrain of so-called new wars, on the whole theorists and observers alike have been slow to consider the ways in which this diffusion of conflict dynamics penetrates everyday experiences at the interpersonal level in post-conflict societies—in the form, for example, of spiraling levels of gender violence²⁹ or “lawlessness.”³⁰

The fact that peacebuilding paradigms tend to be uncritical of the ideological stances and assumptions they promote, as well as ignoring the ways in which peacebuilding *practices* help to measure, label, and thus (as in a feedback loop) shape the very conditions of conflict they seek to remedy, is certainly tied with their UN heritage.³¹ Despite assertions to the contrary, individual and institutional actors in the cultural terrain of peacebuilding seek to quantify “war-torn societies” or “post-conflict environments” as sites of objective knowledge, reifying and locating them geographically, historically, and culturally, without much consideration for the ways in which our active relations and negotiations with these sites is instrumental in *producing* that knowledge, as much as our notions of intervention or “rehabilitation” are shaped by the knowledges of those actors who occupy this space. As the main proponents of and actors in peacebuilding in the 1990s, the UN, prompted by the political will of its member states, continued to promote its agenda tied to ideas about sovereign states. At the same time, in attempting to operationalise lessons from earlier forms of peacekeeping which called for the strengthening of “civil society,” that mandate was at times effectively undermined.³² The UN peacebuilding paradigm has been, from its inception, split at its very root; through the UN promotion and strengthening of entities that look like states, together with the advancement (and formalization) of social and political processes which may run counter to this.

Overall, the favored Neoliberal approach supports the “universal” status quo rather than acknowledging the “crucial uncertainty and indeterminacy”³³ entailed by an analysis which might incorporate an awareness of the inter-subjectivities which shape the post-conflict environment as a cultural terrain. At the same time, through the promotion of particular kinds of personhood implied within the identification and treatment of trauma, a statist, collective, and generic approach is complemented by its antithesis, in the form of the emphasis on the individual Self in both therapeutic and economic dimensions of peacebuilding. A notion of the Self at the core of assumptions about the therapeutic and economic remaking of societies, this is a decidedly Western, middle-class, invocation³⁴ inhabiting

a world divided between the “enemy-other” (of the past, fundamentalist ethics, and ethnic identity) and an “ideal-other” (of the future, rationalist ethics, and civic identity). The ideal-other is similarly reproduced via the “us”/“them” boundary where “they” should become what “we” imagine ourselves to be.³⁵

This version of the Self promoted in (dichotomized) intervention strategies (and echoing the ideas of the Kurdish professionals cited above) is situated within the same temporal reading of societies transformed through conflict, in which peace is seen as a “logical” and inevitable outcome of modernization and development interventions.

Significantly, much peacebuilding fails in diverging from older, explicitly imperialist paradigms of foreign intervention in its portrayal of war-torn peripheral societies as passive, simply waiting for foreign intervention and the development of democratic, peaceful institutions.³⁶ Even where agency is afforded to people in post-conflict environments, as with research on “perceptions” of peacebuilding intervention,³⁷ it is often done as a means to identify this as a challenge to operations, and thus determine effective strategies for managing or overcoming, rather than incorporating, local views.³⁸ In this it does not differ significantly from the “hearts and minds” doctrine³⁹ of the George W. Bush Administration in Iraq and Afghanistan.⁴⁰ Local populations, while being mined for “indigenous” capacities that might assist peacebuilders in their task, are effectively written out of the process, as well as the reflections on practice which might improve peacebuilding initiatives overall. Although for some “what is needed is a close, hard look at this new form of peacekeeping, at the challenges it poses for the United Nations both in principle and in practice, and at the patterns of success and failure on the ground,”⁴¹ no comparable process of reflection on local voices, culturally contingent strategies, or collaborative practices within peacebuilding is seen as necessary. This attitude is co-opted at the social level in Iraq, as local people respond to and incorporate themselves into these paradigms as a means both to make sense of rapid social and economic change in the course of peacebuilding, and in pragmatic terms, to gain the visibility that will privilege them in this system. This is evident in the practices around and performance of post-conflict trauma; both discourses and practices of trauma are embedded within global markets of meaning and money,⁴² and in the same way that a state-driven Kurdish self is shaped by and shapes Western ideas of and strategies for the Iraqi state, so too the individual, passive self—

victimized, traumatized, without agency—gains legitimacy in the international community and local peacebuilding through the performance of these post-conflict inter-subjectivities by local populations.⁴³

Thus, while preaching a novel humanist transformation from militarized *peacekeeping* to civil society-oriented *peacebuilding*, we are often presented with a narrative “mystified in the language of emancipation,”⁴⁴ employing these tropes to legitimize ongoing intervention. Much literature now focuses on “participatory decision making,” “local knowledge,” “indigenous leadership,” and a host of other opaque terms designed to empower and involve the recipients of peacebuilding interventions. However, in keeping with global trends in the privatization of social responsibility, an overarching assumption places the *onus* for “failure” of the state, and the pathology of political and cultural processes, squarely in the social realm, with few accompanying *rights* to self-determination. In other words, global inequalities are naturalized as being inherent to cultural forms, and with them the idea that the development of effective political structures is only possible through the intervention (and charity) of those few with the capacities for recognizing and building these.

In order to explore how these normative structures are promoted via peacebuilding interventions and local/global inter-subjectivities, and to illustrate how this can in turn contribute to structural violence, I discuss below how peacebuilders and KRG government actors re-imagine Iraqi Kurdistan as a temporally and spatially “post-conflict environment.” In so doing, I further develop a focus on the performance of individual inter-subjectivities embedded within trauma, and link this with processes of free market economic liberalization, considering how in both instances a universalized notion of the individual Self is a central feature.

PROCESSES OF VIOLENCE AND PERFORMANCES OF TRAUMA IN IRAQI KURDISTAN

For nearly forty years, the Kurdish population in northern Iraq has experienced continual instability and exposure to various forms of protracted violence in campaigns organized by the Ba’athist regime, due to the machinations of American intervention in the region, through uneven, factious participation in the Iran-Iraq war, and finally through the factional violence sparked by internecine rivalries between the two dominant Kurdish guerrilla

groups operating in Iraq throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP).⁴⁵ While throughout the 1980s this inter-state war visited regular bloodshed and instability on the Kurdish population in northern Iraq, it was the *Al Anfal* campaign which most spectacularly devastated the Kurdistan region, and solidified collective internal sentiments amongst the Kurds as a threatened minority nation within Iraq's borders.

During this period in Iraqi history, village destruction, forced relocations, mass executions, disappearances, and rapes by the Ba'athist regime became routine experiences for people living in the Kurdistan region, whether or not they had actively participated in the guerrilla insurgencies. Although the *Al Anfal*, and particularly the Halabja massacre—in which 5,000 civilians were killed in a single morning of gas attacks on the town not far from the Iranian border—were later cited as justification for US-led incursions into Iraq, the international community had little comment at the time these atrocities were taking place. The Halabja massacre has crystallized in Kurdish popular consciousness and social memory as one form of expressing suffering and commemoration as sanctioned by official voices, both those of Kurdish nationalist interests and the international community. This official sanctioning does not, of course, prevent contestations over the subject of Halabja either, particularly in relation to the alleged participation of KDP *peshmerga* (rebel forces), and later to the healthcare and provisions for livelihood made by the KRG for the survivors of the gas attacks.⁴⁶

In 1991, in the wake of the massive refugee crisis among Kurds in the first Gulf War, the Americans undertook *Operation Provide Comfort*, which later led to the establishment of the northern Kurdish region of Iraq as an official “safe haven” within the country. Although little actual government support was provided by the US, this twelve year period in Iraqi Kurdistan initially allowed for the establishment of a relative degree of stability, the decline of open political violence, and a massive influx of aid money from Western countries, leaving the Kurdistan region in a unique, liminal position between conflict zone and peaceful society within the wider fortunes of Iraq. This unique status and the long series of political processes in which it was embedded lend a certain absurdity to the task of pinpointing the moment when conflict “ended” in Iraqi Kurdistan, marking the temporal beginning of a *post* phase.

While for the most part the KRG has been highly successful in stabilizing its territorial integrity and the safety and security of its people, this integrity

and separation is not absolute or without cost, and the more heated continual conflict still visiting southern Iraq manifests in various ways in the Kurdistan region. For example, huge numbers of Iraqi Arabs seeking refuge have crossed the KRG border, particularly Christians from Baghdad, settling in Ainkawa, the Christian Quarter in Erbil. This means ongoing exposure to the social and personal realities of conflict, and in many respects a heightened awareness of potentially antagonistic religious, ethnic, and regional identities.⁴⁷ Even during the period of my own fieldwork in 2007 to early 2008, Turkish military incursions into Iraqi airspace served to psychologically destabilize the population and threatened real political confrontation. Here too conflicts cannot be viewed or analyzed in isolation, but are embedded in complex and often convoluted global and regional realities. For its part, the KRG, given its “head start” in processes of reconstruction and peacebuilding, has been relentless in its drive, exploiting the status of model democracy in Iraq, at the same time as the region continued to be implicated in contradictory processes of ongoing violence, economic and political consolidation, and contestations over memories of its traumatized past.

Excluded from the officially sanctioned record, however, are forms of everyday suffering that nonetheless pervade social life; they do not adhere to the modernist reading of Iraqi Kurdistan as a beacon of progressive democracy in an otherwise chaotic political landscape. Nor do they register with the wider priorities of peacebuilding or its generic rendering of the post-conflict environment. Instead, narratives of both ongoing suffering and residual violence which I observed, and which co-exist with both the mundane and euphoric characterizations of what in many respects represents an ideal of post-conflict recovery, are sidelined.

As discussed previously, this is aptly demonstrated in the performance, treatment, and increasing attention paid to trauma and mental health in normative practices that de-legitimize systemic forms of (gendered) suffering, “resignifying post-conflict violence as noncritical,”⁴⁸ *post-traumatic*, something to be rehabilitated through cost-effective, efficient means, with patients and sufferers themselves often treated as nothing more than consumers in a marketplace of peacebuilding services. While women may act in compliance with or resistance to the social roles made available within the terrain of the post-conflict environment and the trauma work of such organizations as Heartland Alliance, their “choices” in this regard can certainly be said to influence the extent to which their experiences gain recognition.⁴⁹ Women I spoke with might describe their torment as emanating from *dil*

grana (literally a “tight heart”), and cite myriad, interconnected forms of social suffering from the domestic (abusive husbands or in-laws, confinement in the home) to governmental (lack of basic resources or livelihoods), all of which they feel are ignored by local medical practitioners, NGOs, and the international media. Such relatively powerful actors, in fulfilling their roles in the post-conflict environment, are likely to consign this female suffering to a simplified, one-size-fits-all category of either hysteria or trauma/PTSD.⁵⁰ Recalling Benjamin’s critique of the state of exception, but also echoing the complaints of women in Kurdistan, Summerfield points out that “the danger of the medicalisation of everyday life is that it deflects attention from what millions of people worldwide might cite as the basis of their distress—for example, poverty and lack of rights.”⁵¹ In other words, it pathologizes as “cultural” (and therefore naturalizes as endemic) what may be pervasive social and economic conditions.

The deterministic character of much post-conflict reconstruction, directed towards particular visions of and desires for modernity, further ignores ongoing expressions of violence which permeate society as a whole. Instead of recognizing the ways in which conflict trajectories and political/interpersonal violence can be seen as points on a continuum, embedded within ongoing political and economic processes, such patchy memorialisation and selective forgetting in the context of continued suffering relegate subjectively experienced trauma to the realm of the “uncanny,”⁵² casting it as something outside the frame of national memory, irrelevant, exceptional, without a “function.” Articulating explicitly the notion that individual expressions of trauma represent a kind of deviance, one Kurdish diaspora returnee discussed with me the relationship between levels of domestic violence and the political history of Kurdistan. “Has Europe overcome its experience of WWII?” she asked, somewhat rhetorically. Without waiting to be answered she said, “so it will be at least two generations before we can even think about being normal again.”⁵³ In seeking to address these realities, much research on violence and collective trauma suggests that true recovery necessarily involves the incorporation and reconciliation of experiences from a diverse range of actors, including those cast as “enemies,” external, marginal, or antagonist to the national memory.⁵⁴ The imagining of the post-conflict environment advanced via peacebuilding initiatives often prescribes a script by which those collective traumas are performed and which identify fixed social roles, of “perpetrator”/“victim,” “male”/“female,” etc. For example, gendered readings of Iraqi society in the run-up to and since

the 2003 invasion often cast Iraqi women as perpetual victims, not of foreign occupiers, but of Iraqi *men* and their patriarchal societal norms, a narrative to which many elite Kurdish feminists (usually from the position of exile, and highly criticized by female activists in Kurdistan itself) have heavily subscribed.⁵⁵ Recognition of the social complexity of grounded relations is selective, often diverted into simplistic narratives.⁵⁶

TRAUMA, GENDER, AND RESISTANCE

In Iraqi Kurdistan discursive practices of post-conflict modernity and the performance of trauma they facilitate inscribe gender and power in particular ways. The discourse surrounding PTSD and the “global flow of knowledge on war trauma”⁵⁷ are misleading, because they seem to suggest that individuals and communities who do not or cannot fruitfully seek and be treated for their traumas in such a way that aligns with Western notions of the Self, “appropriate” interventions, and the Neoliberal global system more generally are simply irremediable. The ideal subject of military, peacebuilding, or therapeutic interventions responds favorably to *post*-conflict, *post*-trauma rehabilitation, while those who do not are ascribed with atavistic tendencies inherent to the society in question. The linear temporal trajectory of post-conflict is echoed in discourses of the post-trauma character of stress, in which, in psychosocial understandings, the subject compulsively revisits a traumatic event in a kind of meaning-making exercise. And like the intractable and mentally unsound patient dealing repetitively with their initial trauma, conflict-ridden societies may compulsively and uncontrollably return again and again to their historical conflicts, dysfunctional and atavistic as they are.

The increasing awareness of war trauma and the concomitant importance of PTSD discourses have become a central feature of both the management of refugee populations in Western states⁵⁸ and in peacebuilding work in war-torn societies,⁵⁹ and have led to an overall reduction of “analysis of war to an unexplained spectacle of horror.”⁶⁰ This emphasis on (social and cultural) pathologies, and the accompanying portrayal of violence as causeless, or emanating from the general lawlessness of conflict-ridden societies,⁶¹ effectively overwrites the forms of structural violence at the heart of the global relations which also serve to legitimize foreign intervention and/or peacebuilding initiatives.⁶²

Even assuming we ignore the violence at the heart of the Neoliberal citizen-as-consumer ideal, and underscored by the same notion of the self as that promoted in Western therapeutic norms, there remains a substantial problem in the pragmatic application of war trauma discourses and therapeutic interventions within the PTSD trope in such a way that often ignores the “new languages and social and cultural differences which likely script traumatic injury, resilience, and healing very differently from western middle class, white, Anglo points of view.”⁶³ Beyond the obvious cultural limits of this construct, the emphasis on “war trauma” present in such discourses propound a “war begets trauma” perspective the corollary of which is “peace begets recovery.” A logical follow-on from this is the view that, when the wider peacebuilding initiatives associated with PTSD programs do not yield observable, efficient results within a linear conflict trajectory, they can be understood as having “failed.” This line of thinking reiterates the failed states discourse in psychosocial terms, and its contribution to “perceptions of the need to discipline damaged and culturally mal-programmed citizens into appropriate behavioral norms,”⁶⁴ highlighting the ways in which social and community dynamics come to subtly reiterate the concept of the state as central.

But on the contrary, “irremediable” suffering, where present, can equally be understood as a form of resistance to the (often violent) therapeutic interventions of the state, and its Neoliberal expectations surrounding social life, selfhood, and the body.⁶⁵ In the broadest sense, the “insurgency”⁶⁶ of trauma as expressed by hysterical women, in its very incoherence, renders chronological readings of post-conflict prosperity equally meaningless, such that “power, after investing itself in the body, finds itself exposed to a counter-attack in that same body.”⁶⁷ Medical anthropologists have identified ways in which culturally contingent practices may serve to contain rather than promote violence in conflict-ridden societies,⁶⁸ as well as noting the efficacy of seemingly “irremediable” post-conflict trauma in asserting ongoing suffering in the face of portrayals of societal recovery, stability, and security in the post-war era.⁶⁹

For example, resisting a characterization of post-conflict peace which appears meaningless in the face of ongoing social, psychological, and physical violence, for widows in Guatemala the psychological illness that accompanies pervasive fear and trauma, “rather than an acute reaction [it] is a chronic condition.”⁷⁰ In such circumstances, the efficacy of peacebuilding initiatives that might “remedy” such ailments is drawn into question. This chronic

state of fear is, in addition to being a source of suffering, also a form of resistance against these prescriptive attempts at linear temporal meaning-making by peacebuilding (and state) narratives. Local medical practices too, eager to demonstrate their “modern” credentials on the one hand, and systematically oriented to patriarchal structures that habitually violate and degrade experiences of female suffering—irrespective of “war”—on the other, feed into this repression of agency or “insurrection,” as doctors’ narratives described above demonstrate. In acts which belie a denied agency and that rile against normative readings of post-conflict, traumatized people and societies, “through their bodies also chronicle the social, cultural and political transgressions that have been perpetrated against them,”⁷¹ in such a way that belies the efficacy of liberal peacebuilding in the post-conflict era, and offers instead a vision of daily life in which conflict is still present, and linked backwards and forwards to structural and systemic violence in community life and the international system. My own work with female hysteria sufferers in Iraq suggests similarly that women’s sickness which remains “irremediable” despite the post-conflict security now enjoyed in Kurdistan region,⁷² and its attendant peacebuilding developments particularly in PTSD, works for these women to “(re)present through their bodies the horrors that they had experienced, and as such illness has become a powerful communicative force.”⁷³

Foucault’s seminal studies of madness⁷⁴ remind us of the intimate link between violence and mental illness. For Iraqi women, this was particularly true in two senses: hysterical episodes of mental ill health perform and record realities of physical, structural, military, or political violence witnessed or directly experienced. These non-normative expressions of trauma are threatening to the ideal (and gendered) Self, to grand narratives of a stable, peaceful society in a phase of statebuilding, and thus to the symbolic and social underpinnings of the nation itself, and consequently must be subdued. They also belie the uncritical investment and faith in technological modernity—both within Iraq and amongst international peacebuilders—as a means by which the post-conflict society recovers. Taken from this point of view, Iraqi women’s embodied suffering serves as a kind of living archive which brings the profound and psychic trauma of years of exposure to violence, war, and oppression into daily lived realities, and whose outbursts of illness assert a kind presence,⁷⁵ a visibility in the face of the denial and forgetting that many see as the work of peacebuilding, reconciliation, rehabilitation, and reconstruction; a very real and “permanent visibility” which none-

theless exerts power over and defines ideas of the self and individual behavior.⁷⁶ Thus in a very real sense hysterical outbreaks among Iraqi women are a deviant form of protest against both the quotidian daily realities of oppression, surveillance, and threats of violence under which women in Iraq live, and of the grand narratives of gender and ethnic identity and state-building with which they interact. This is not to uncritically portray Kurdish women as victims of processes larger than themselves. Indeed, it is precisely the sorts of inter-subjectivities discursively structured by and within the imagined post-conflict environment, which have created spaces where such dispossessed voices participate in global political economic realities involving processes of modernity, intervention, reconstruction, and peacebuilding; what Argenti-Pillan calls “the global flow of trauma discourse.”⁷⁷ Herscher, elsewhere in this volume, has demonstrated how the conception of “local” and “external” actors in reconstruction agendas not only casts the former as passive recipients of the aid of the latter, but equally positions local forms of agency and power as marginal and deviant. Likewise, in relations laden with power, collective and individual expressions of trauma (in Iraq and elsewhere) shape and are shaped by peacebuilders’ notions of “the healthy society,” and with it, “the pressure for evidence from the body”⁷⁸ in the global marketing of trauma, intervention, and rehabilitation.

A tension exists, however, in these discursive practices of meaning making. As an alternate reading of the post-conflict environment and an embodied record of ongoing violence, these unsanctioned performances of trauma also represent a deviation from the grand narratives of post-conflict Iraqi Kurdistan, touted as “the other Iraq” in KRG promotional materials, and portrayed as a

joyful, peaceful place [. . .] where Arabs, Kurds and westerners all vacation together [. . .] that has practiced democracy for over a decade, a place where the universities, markets, cafes and fairgrounds buzz with progress and prosperity.⁷⁹

Hughes and Pupavac demonstrate how such narratives promoted by foreign peacebuilders and local elites characterize “the powerlessness of ordinary people, manifested as passivity interspersed with bouts of destructive rage, [such that] that foreign intervention must act not only upon the state but upon society also, to create new individuals with the capacity for self-government.”⁸⁰ Taken to its conclusion, these assertions form the underly-

ing logic of and justification for peacebuilding as governance. That is to say that peacebuilding, while not having the same official mandates as *peace-keeping* operations, has more far-reaching, social aims at its heart, and is therefore of necessity an ideological venture akin to “winning hearts and minds.” In any case, military interventions and those of peacebuilding increasingly bleed into one another in contemporary conflict management; they are present in

attempts to police the collective action of civil society and, most intrusively, to reconstruct culture and the very personality of individuals through psychosocial intervention involving both formal and informal education, from parenting classes to relationship counselling.⁸¹

The kind of advancement of the individual Self as understood in PTSD discourses and their operation within peacebuilding, in addition to being potentially damaging to local apprehensions of self, community, and society,⁸² are also those that fit most conveniently into the kind of consumer-as-citizen ideology of post-conflict peace embedded within reconstruction efforts involving the development of commercial spaces and heritage/leisure parks.⁸³

Another striking example of the ways in which subaltern voices run counter to official narratives of progress can be seen in the “rehabilitation” of “heritage” architecture in Erbil. The historic *Qalat*, or Erbil Citadel, is the central landmark of the urban landscape. Until 2003, it was also home to a large community of displaced Kurds whose homes and land had been confiscated in the Ba’athists’ Arabization policy which formed part of the demographic battle for the oil-rich Kirkuk region. The regime forcibly removed many Kurdish families, and of those who were not offered land in neighboring regions, many found themselves in Erbil, where they soon occupied the disintegrating old dwellings atop the citadel, building lives and homes at the time unimpeded by local authorities. With few material resources at their disposal, most eked out an existence selling cigarettes or toiletry items in the nearby bazaar, with young children aiding in the family livelihood. Shortly after the invasion, as the KRG set to consolidate its cultural as well as political presence on the new mapping of the region, plans were made to declare the *Qalat* a UNESCO world heritage site and renovate the historic buildings at its summit; this decision involved the removal of the Kirkuki families who had resettled there in previous years. Although the KRG made official provision assistance for the relocation of these families, in practice such support rarely

reached its targets. When I began work with an NGO providing mobile health services in some of the more impoverished shanty towns on the outskirts of Erbil, I met many such people. Forced from their already tenuous existences and fragile sense of community they had managed to build in their dwellings atop the *Qalat*, they had now become doubly displaced. Disenfranchised from the national narratives of progress and peacebuilding quickly laid out in the wake of the allied invasion, many suffered from an acute sense of hopelessness and an apathy towards the promises of the increased autonomy of the KRG. Dilkhosh, a thirty-nine-year-old mother of five whom I came to know, explained to me flatly:

I am useless now. No home, I cannot feed my children, who will surely have to leave this country to survive [. . .] The life here [in the shanty town] is nothing, it can bring nothing but shame. Once I hoped the new Kurdistan would look after her people, but the government does not care for people like us [. . .] they promised us many things when they came to take us from our homes [in the *Qalat*]*—that was long ago now. We are dying here, with nothing. What shall I do Sarah khan? I might as well die, at least my children would be free to leave easily then [. . .]*⁸⁴

This narrative of an alternate and forgotten suffering in contemporary Kurdistan constitutes a form of “structural violence” on the part of political actors and an international system, one on which new economic paradigms of development in the KRG are predicated. In this way, pervasive conditions of misery and marginalization are a daily experience for those on the lowest ranks of an increasingly affluent society in which the new infrastructure is ill equipped for distribution of basic resources.

Such realities raise questions concerning the extent to which the mere *conception* of the post-conflict environment (to say nothing of its inclusion in myriad policy-oriented documents) is involved in constitutive relation with what effectively *becomes* a reified entity. In this context, “seeing like a state” is, in fact, complicit in the kind of “euphemized violence” engaged in “the forcible definition of social units as bureaucratic categories to be administered and controlled.”⁸⁵ These initiatives of administration and control may effectively worsen the already degraded social fabric, such as norms of family interaction and integrity,⁸⁶ and thereby further advance in the post-conflict environment the conditions of *disintegration* in society that were

present in the conflict itself. For example, talking of the intimate relationship between cultural notions of self, family, and community, and political violence in Argentina, Robben illustrates how

these assaults transgressed the deep-seated opposition between the public and the domestic domain [. . .] the disturbing intrusion of a threatening outer world, and lasting damage to the self by the transgression of deep-seated cultural values.⁸⁷

However, similar processes may equally be observed in post-conflict as well, set in motion as much by peacebuilding as by the “traditional” perpetrators of political violence. In Iraqi Kurdistan, where the devolution of security into the hands of the local *peshmerga* forces was touted as a positive step in the demobilization of guerrilla forces and the wider peacebuilding agenda for the northern Iraqi provinces, the use of family members as informants for each other’s activities for the sake of “security” effectively advanced pervasive conditions of mistrust and loss of social, psychological, and familial security in the name of a peacebuilding agenda. This kind of “violation of the home by the State, and the invasion of the inner by the outer reality”⁸⁸ is in many respects merely the flip side of the coin that disregards culturally contingent notions of Self and community, in favor of the generic psychosocial relations propounded for the recovery of the universal post-conflict environment. These social and political relations involve dynamics of power that are embedded in and draw on both “local” and “foreign” subjectivities.

For example, an increasingly salient articulation of pervasive structural violence is the perception amongst the general population of a continual surveillance by government operatives and society at large, implied in intertwined discourses about interpersonal gossip and official intelligence gathering. In a society reeling from decades of rule by a repressive police state, and in which marginal voices continued to be silenced by various and sometimes coercive means, these discourses had very real implications for the levels of trust in the authorities and community, and in personal feelings of safety. Feldman argues that the recourse to discussions about gossip and belief in its power are articulated ways of making sense of the incomprehensible in war in a situation where surveillance and constant threats of violence are pervasive features of political control and repression.⁸⁹ In Iraqi Kurdistan, widespread perceptions of almost continual monitoring by the govern-

ment security services have become features of lived experience in the post-conflict setting. Or, as one young man put it to me somewhat ironically, “*gossip is a national sport here in Kurdistan; but it is a very dangerous one.*”⁹⁰

THE SPATIALIZATION OF TRAUMA, CONSUMPTION, AND “RECOVERY”

Although pervasive in the cultural terrain of peacebuilding, these narratives of post-conflict, like the non-normative expressions of trauma to which they are often connected, are marginalised within hegemonic accounts of the post-conflict environment. While official forms of memorialisation were now being undertaken, particularly focussing on the Kurds as victims of the *Al Anfal*, these often serve the purpose of eliding recognition of *Kurdish* state perpetrators of violence within larger narratives of an oppressive Arab state.⁹¹ Beyond official remembrances of the *Al Anfal*, the rush towards outward, Western-directed displays of post-conflict modernity in the immediate post-conflict context contribute to erasure of the physical and spatial reminders of trauma at the collective level. In 2006 construction work began on the lavish and impressive Sami Abdul-Rahman Park on the outskirts of Erbil, partly incorporating the site of a Ba’athist prison where Kurdish dissidents were imprisoned, tortured, and executed in the 1980s. While this is widely recognised amongst the generation of Iraqi Kurds old enough to remember the years of Ba’athist oppression, it is reported privately, in hushed tones, while any recovery of traumatic memories which may accompany this has been sidelined by more public proclamations, and the branding of the leisure park as a marker of prosperity and peace. Incorporating an outdoor cinema, exhibition centre, cafés and restaurants, a man-made boating lake and extensive gardens, as well as statues and monuments to various historically important Kurdish folk figures, Sami Abdul-Rahman Park is indeed a respite from the often oppressive crowding, noise, heat, and general sense of surveillance which often permeates Erbil’s city centre. Families, groups of young, unaccompanied women, and older people mingle in the shade of its lawns, and while a general sense of convivial ease pervades the locale, elliptical references to the site’s more malevolent past in the social memory lead one to wonder at what may become of these memories in the face of such progress, what appears as almost careless denial.

These spatial transformations in the post-conflict environment are sig-

nificant as a key feature in the impetus towards a free-market economic version of modernity at the heart of post-conflict peacebuilding. The material dimensions of this environment then entail the construction of Western-style spaces of consumption, notions about “good” citizenship emplaced therein, and “healthy” rehabilitation, rather than creating spaces for the airing of historical traumas and non-normative expressions of that trauma that do not fit statist goals of economic expansion. The post-conflict environment should ideally be connoted by—alongside buzzing markets, cafés, and fairgrounds—contained memorialisation of trauma, if not its ongoing, lived experience, in such a way that speaks materially and socially of “the mechanisms through which these agencies have attempted to transform war-shattered states into liberal market democracies”⁹² and the new forms of sociability these entail. Indeed, in Iraq as elsewhere, many peacebuilding initiatives have come to replicate the kind of competitive, free-market norms associated with capitalist enterprise, as peacebuilding NGOs take on a kind of corporate form and operating principles, battling it out for UN and USAID funding therein, demonstrating the increasing “NGOism” of such ventures. In a perfect merging of economic liberalization with the peacebuilding “industry” in Iraq, the KRG has instituted a policy in which all petroleum companies conducting exploration in Kurdistan engage in “corporate social responsibility” programs which see them providing healthcare services for victims of chemical attack, building rural schools and water supplies, or sponsoring “peace training” in government offices. Most of this work goes to NGOs whose employees hold stakes in the same petroleum companies, and in effect, the majority of on-the-ground peacebuilding work is in some respect undertaken by private companies, whose “social responsibility liaisons” often take a direct hand in management and evaluation of specific projects. Much as Goetze’s observations of statebuilding highlight the ways in which state actors and corporate interests have been privileged and essentially come to define notions of stability in the post-conflict environment, the on-the-ground operation of a peacebuilding industry in Iraq challenges underlying assumptions about a supposedly universal ethic and speaks to its challenges of legitimacy, recalling the cynical words of Chidi Anselm Odinkalu:

local human rights groups exist to please the international agencies that fund or support them. Local problems are only defined as potential pots of project cash, not as human experiences to be resolved in just terms, thereby

delegitimizing human rights language and robbing its ideas of popular appeal.⁹³

Despite this potential lack of popular appeal among its beneficiaries in the post-conflict environment, the economic liberalization continues apace, with political, material, and social ramifications. It formed an important aspect of Boutros-Ghali's original *Agenda for Peace* document, which explicitly centered these concerns in its new notion of peacebuilding; item 7 recognizes that "many States are seeking more open forms of economic policy, creating a world wide sense of dynamism and movement."⁹⁴ This ethos was recently echoed in the words of Iraqi president Jalal Talabani (himself a Kurd and founding member of the PUK), who stated in a recent edition of British newspaper *The Guardian*:

Now that he [Saddam] is gone we have a great opportunity to overcome our *isolation from decades of modernity* [. . .] We value the ability of British business to unlock our resources through increased investment and by trading with us. Iraq is becoming increasingly open to commerce, which is a means of giving our people the better way of life that they seek and deserve.⁹⁵

Perhaps here we see most clearly the kinds of co-constitutive inter-subjectivities discussed; oppositional assumptions about the societies of the world are implied in a language that otherwise suggests universals—states that actively seek open and dynamic forms of economy stand in contrast to those passive, closed, fixed societies traumatized and maladjusted by conflict, and awaiting Western intervention, the imposition of this dynamism and movement, the "unlocking" of resources. There can be no doubt about the dimensions of this "better way of life" as promoted by the often converging policies within the KRG and wider processes of peacebuilding. This vision of the recovered post-conflict space—and its supposed evidence of successful peacebuilding interventions—as being marked by the emergence of a liberalized free market flooded with consumer products and experiences also speaks powerfully to desires amongst private citizens and the population as a whole. Particularly for the nearly half of the Kurdish citizenry under the age of thirty, whose sole exposure to Western-style free-market democracy comes in the form of American television and other popular culture, such possibilities for consumption, and to express Self and identity therein, are intertwined with often nebulous ideas of political and social freedom and

consequently compellingly represent the promise of modernity. In a similar fashion, the emerging discourse around PTSD, medical attention, and the modernization of services encourages a system in which patients are also consumers, in which experiences of trauma and suffering are articulated according to finite, rational scripts which simultaneously pander to deeply held cultural thinking about the authority and legitimacy of the (male) biomedical purview as intrinsically “modern.” Thus to engage in practices of material consumption, as to engage in the performance of trauma, equally invokes this notion of modernity as a recuperative influence, and thus contributes to the subjectivities of consumption.

In this volume, both Herscher and Hourani (dealing with Kosovo and Lebanon respectively) have invoked the notion of drama—prescribed narratives, stage sets, actors—in elucidating how global corporate capitalism has come to represent the inevitable economic paradigm promoted through reconstruction and aid efforts. My own ethnographic observations detail how these same processes and representations have penetrated not only policies of recovery but the social attitudes of individual citizens in the formation of these subjectivities of consumption.

In Iraqi Kurdistan, there is also a link between the kinds of economic liberalization under way and the kinds of “nation-building” projects they undertake as a previously persecuted ethnic minority and which peacebuilding also increasingly sees as its remit. This entails the elision of social and material dimensions of peacebuilding, to the extent that the built environment comes to stand for the collective will and identity of the people; a people cast as the ideal recipients of benevolent Western peacebuilding initiatives by virtue of their minority status, the Kurds exemplify the “other-ideal” in a dichotomous process of meaning making; the essentialist “good guys” in peacebuilders’ readings of post-conflict restitution. As public space is being redefined, those voices marginalized within liberal economic policies of the KRG and its Western allies are silenced; this includes not only locals seen as representing a “backward” version of ethnic identity and Kurdish culture, but those whose ongoing suffering refuses to adhere to the official narrative of Kurdistan region Iraq as being a success story in the midst of occupation, a beacon of hope for the wider Middle East, the triumph of the modern. Increasingly, being a good citizen means being a good consumer, of products and images fusing a pristine and essentialist ethnic identity and heritage, with its liberation by Western modernities. This can be linked to biomedical discursive practices in that both regimes serve to contain, regulate, and re-

duce the body to a mere space on which a rational vision of the Self can be exerted. In many respects, however, this push towards material modes of modernity, towards modernization and citizen sociability through acts of consumption, comprises an attempt to overwrite histories of collective violence and trauma, which conversely are implicated in the perpetration of further symbolic and structural violence.

This merging of recovery-from-trauma and citizen-as-consumer discourses was brought powerfully to life in an article that appeared in the *Kurdish Globe*, Erbil's English language weekly, in October 2009. Entitled "The Future of Erbil Is in Nishtiman Mall: The Construction Boom in Kurdistan," the article states:

Since the war in Iraq ended in 2003 a large amount of money has been injected into Iraqi Kurdistan. Prior to the war in Iraq, Kurdistan was a region lacking many of the basic necessities that are needed for a well functioning society. No proper water supply. No proper supply of electricity. No proper order.⁹⁶

The article, while ignoring the fact that as of 2010 the majority of households still do not enjoy electricity and that many rural communities have no safe water supplies, goes on to talk of the "modernized" roads of "new and international standards" and the proliferation of "new Western shopping malls" that would "rival the most luxurious shopping malls of Dubai." The most telling feature of the article, however, is a photograph that appears midway down the column. It is a generally non-descript image of Erbil's skyline, on which are visible the many cranes hoisting the building blocks of recovery, the shopping malls and gated housing developments; these new, generic structures of concrete that will usher in for the eyes of the world, the international community, and especially the people of Iraq, their recovery, their reconstruction in the post-conflict era. The caption reads "This is what nation-building looks like." In this reading, the post-conflict environment is characterized by new roads, new houses, new shopping malls—the harbingers of liberal peace. The post-conflict environment imagined by the builders of this peace elides commercial development and modernization with post-conflict recovery.

An ideally imagined post-conflict environment—or at least, a successfully recovering post-conflict environment—is characterized by these elements of the new economic zone as an alternative to the conflict zone. Indi-

viduals in the post-conflict environment, we are led to believe, achieve *self-realization* through therapeutic interventions helping them to deal with their post-traumatic stress, and *self-fulfillment* through acts of consumption and general participation in the post-conflict ideal of the consumer-as-citizen. All this is delivered via the benevolent hands of Western intervention, to a passive and waiting population in which “individuals, communities and whole societies are traumatised from war, and trapped in cycles of violence perpetuated from generation to generation,”⁹⁷ incapacitated, desperately in need of intervention.

CONCLUSIONS

The literatures on landscape,⁹⁸ embodiment,⁹⁹ and medical anthropology¹⁰⁰ all provide important signposts to the ways in which the cultural practices and social roles that populate this space may be further, fruitfully interrogated to form a better understanding of how such practices help shape and imagine the post-conflict environment. The narrative devices and social roles which characterize the cultural terrains of the post-conflict environment and of peacebuilding, particularly through selective recognition of suffering, the promotion of normative psycho-social practices of personhood and rehabilitation, and the marginalization of non-normative practices in these areas as cultural appendages of “backwardness,” imply an absolute, neutral, and linear process of modernization. Economic liberalization, increasing medicalization, and notions of the Self, which underpin both, are central to these supposedly neutral performances and processes. Nonetheless, the prevailing lack of critical attention to these ethnographic spaces of inter-subjectivity has meant the agency of “traumatized” peoples and communities has been overlooked in their co-constitutive role shaping the post-conflict environment together with and as peacebuilders. And in neglecting the inter-subjectivities that emerge from, and are encouraged by, the privileging of certain narratives of trauma and bodily practices of suffering on the one hand, and consumption as a restorative experience on the other, the pragmatic enactments of peacebuilding may serve to advance the very conditions of inequality, violence, and trauma they seek to ameliorate, as well as silencing the diverse ways in which “violence continues to pursue its victims long after the slaughter ends.”¹⁰¹

Notes

1. Eva Bertram, "Reinventing Governments: The Promise and Perils of United Nations Peace Building," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 39, no. 3 (1995): 387–418; John Heathershaw, "Unpacking the Liberal Peace: The Dividing and Merging of Peacebuilding Discourses," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 36, no. 3 (2008): 597–621.
2. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace* (New York: United Nations, 1992), my emphasis.
3. Heathershaw, "Unpacking the Liberal Peace," 599.
4. *Ibid.*, 599.
5. Paul F. Diehl, "Paths to Peacebuilding: The Transformation of Peace Operations," in *Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding in Post-War Societies*, ed. Thomas D. Mason and John A. Booth (London: Routledge, 2006).
6. Roland Paris, "International Peacebuilding and the 'Mission Civilisatrice,'" *Review of International Studies* 28, no. 4 (2002): 637–56.
7. Michael Gilsenan, "On Conflict and Violence," in *Exotic No More: Anthropology on the Front Lines*, ed. Jeremy MacClaincy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), 102.
8. James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 87.
9. Cf. E. C. James, "Ruptures, Rights and Repair: The Political Economy of Trauma in Haiti," *Social Science and Medicine* 70, no. 1 (2010): 106–13.
10. *Ibid.*; cf. Slavoj Žižek, *Violence: Six Sideways Reflections* (London: Profile Books, 2009).
11. Gareth Stansfield, *Iraqi Kurdistan: Political Development and Emergent Democracy*, RoutledgeCurzon advances in Middle East and Islamic studies (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003).
12. Although this view prevails within scholarly writing as well, including the works of Stansfield (2003) and Gunter (Michael Gunter, *The Kurds Ascending: The Evolving Solution to the Kurdish Problem in Iraq and Turkey* (New York: Macmillan, 2008), this pervasive portrayal of the Kurds as a kind of idealized, worthy, perpetual "victim" is encapsulated beautifully in a *Vanity Fair* article by liberal polemicist Christopher Hitchens in April 2007: Christopher Hitchens, "Holiday in Iraq," *Vanity Fair* (April 2007), <http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2007/04/hitchens200704>, accessed December 2012.
13. This fieldwork was part of a British Academy grant funding a wider project looking at the ways in which Neoliberal notions of Selfhood are advanced via the increasing medicalisation of governance in post-conflict reconstruction agendas.
14. Paul Farmer, *Pathologies of Power: Health, Human Rights, and the New War on the Poor* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 5.
15. I employ the term *performance* here not to diminish what are very real expressions of trauma and hysterical episodes of despair for the women of Kurdis-

tan, but to highlight the ways in which the wider “post-conflict environment” creates an imperative for *normative expressions* of that trauma, which both legitimises a standardised, chronological view of violence in the Kurdistan region, and conditions the legitimacy of foreign interventions and the progression of Kurdish society in keeping with those imperatives (cf. James, “Ruptures, Rights and Repair”). This is elaborated in the remainder of the text.

16. The contempt with which “village” families are held, though commonplace among educated urbanites, was most profoundly demonstrated to me on one occasion when I asked a doctor to seek permission for me to observe a young girl’s treatment in the emergency room. He looked at me laughingly and replied “Why do you ask their permission? They are idiots!” Though dramatic, this is not unusual in reflecting the social category of “traditional” or “uneducated” in contrast to those educated urban elites, particularly those who work or have connections with foreigners (among both NGO workers and local practitioners). As a researcher and “Dr.,” I myself was always placed in the latter category, from which point it was assumed I would share such an assessment of social categories.

17. Veena Das, “Language and Body: Transactions in the Construction of Pain,” in *Social Suffering*, ed. Arthur Kleinman, Veena Das, and Margaret M. Lock (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997).

18. James, “Ruptures, Rights and Repair,” 106.

19. Personal communication, June 2009, Erbil, Iraq.

20. Heartland Alliance, “Iraq: Community Mental Health Worker Program” (Chicago: Heartland Alliance for Human Needs and Human Rights, 2010), <http://www.heartlandalliance.org/international/wherewework/project-pages/iraq-community-mental-health.html>, accessed January 21, 2011.

21. Farmer, *Pathologies of Power*, 154.

22. Stephen Hopgood, “Saying ‘No’ to Walmart? Money and Morality in Professional Humanitarianism,” in *Humanitarianism in Question: Politics, Power, Ethics*, ed. Michael N. Barnett and Thomas George Weiss (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008), 106.

23. James, “Ruptures, Rights and Repair,” 107.

24. For example, the “sanctity” of the female body, as both ideal and reality, takes on new significance in discourses of identity at the level of family and state politics, and can become a site for these ongoing and dissipated forms of residual violence to which I refer. The same can be said for the formation of ethnic identities.

25. Michael T. Taussig, *Shamanism, Colonialism, and the Wild Man: A Study in Terror and Healing* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 132.

26. See Goetze in this volume.

27. This role for the Iraqi Kurds in the international arena stands in stark contrast to the portrayal of their co-ethnics in neighbouring Turkey, where the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) insurgency throughout the last thirty years, as well as the very ethnic identity of the Kurds, has been brutally suppressed by the Turkish state, with the aid of their Western allies. Within the wider “Good Kurds/Bad

Kurds” trope then, Iraqi Kurds are cast as the ideal, malleable benefactors of Western neo-liberal political and economic interventions, while engagement with Turkey’s Kurdish population has been couched in terms of securitization and the war on terror. See Gunter, *The Kurds Ascending*, 69.

28. Paris, “International Peacebuilding and the ‘Mission Civilisatrice.’”

29. Amnesty International, “Women in Post-conflict Situations: A Fact Sheet” (Amnesty International, London, 2005).

30. Ellen Moodie, “Critical Code-Switching in Postwar El Salvador,” in *Violence: Probing the Boundaries* (Salzburg, Austria: Inter-disciplinary.net, 9th Global Conference, March 2010).

31. Diehl, “Paths to Peacebuilding”; Heathershaw, “Unpacking the Liberal Peace.”

32. Bertram, “Reinventing Governments.”

33. Veena Das and Arthur Kleinman, “Introduction,” in *Violence and Subjectivity*, ed. Veena Das, Arthur Kleinman, Mamphela Ramphele, and Pamela Reynolds (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 17.

34. Alex Argenti-Pillen, *Masking Terror: How Women Contain Violence in Southern Sri Lanka* (Philadelphia: Pennsylvania University Press, 2003).

35. Heathershaw, “Unpacking the Liberal Peace,” 603.

36. Micaela di Leonardo, *Exotics at Home: Anthropologies, Others, American Modernity* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998); Philippe Bourgois, “The Power of Violence in War and Peace: Post-Cold War Lessons from El Salvador,” *Ethnography* 2, no. 1 (2001): 5–34; Paris, “International Peacebuilding and the ‘Mission Civilisatrice’”; Heathershaw, “Unpacking the Liberal Peace.”

37. Andrea Kathryn Talentino, “Perceptions of Peacebuilding: The Dynamic of Imposer and Imposed Upon,” *International Studies Perspectives* 8, no. 2 (2007): 152–71; cf. Hopgood, “Saying ‘No’ to Walmart?”

38. Scott, *Seeing Like a State*; Gilsenan, “On Conflict and Violence.”

39. Jeffrey A. Sluka, “Losing Hearts and Minds in ‘The War on Terrorism,’” in *Iraq at a Distance: What Anthropologists Can Teach Us About the War*, ed. Antonius C. G. M. Robben (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010).

40. This approach recalls the introduction of the US Military’s Human Terrain System of “embedding” social scientists for campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. The issue sparked a lengthy debate in the pages of *Anthropology Today* in 2007, with David Kilcullen (David Kilcullen, “Ethics, Politics, and Non-state Warfare: A Response to González,” *Anthropology Today* 23, no. 3 (2007): 20), a counterinsurgency adviser to General David Petraeus in Iraq, advocating for “instances where ethnographic knowledge significantly ameliorated the effect of conflict on populations in Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Horn of Africa as well as Iraq,” while anthropologist Hugh Gusterson (2007), echoing the views of a great many within anthropology’s professional body, stated that “what is advocated here amounts to a social science inspired approach to Empire, using ‘information warfare,’ ‘ethnographic intelligence’ and culturally informed soldiers as a velvet glove around the brute fist of military might that Empire requires” (Hugh Gusterson, “Anthro-

pologists and war: A response to David Kilcullen," *Anthropology Today* 23, no. 4 (2007): 23.)

41. Bertram, "Reinventing Governments," 390.

42. Laura Edmondson, "Marketing Trauma and the Theatre of War in Northern Uganda," *Theatre Journal* 57, no. 3 (2005): 451–74.

43. L. Polman, *War Games: The Story of Aid and War in Modern Times* (London: Viking Press, 2010).

Polman (63) offers a highly cynical account of how these inter-subjectivities played out in the performance of suffering at a camp for war amputees in Sierra Leone, citing that victims "didn't want to return to a normal life" facilitated by medical/humanitarian initiatives, but would "rather stumble around dramatically without their prostheses." This seemingly determined victimology, popularised in hegemonic narratives of peacebuilding, is also present in historicised accounts of the Kurds in the Middle East, where the old adage of having "no friends but the mountains" is stringently asserted, even in the face of international interest, a booming economy, and recognition and support from the international community.

44. Caroline Hughes and Vanessa Pupavac, "Framing Post-Conflict Societies: International Pathologisation of Cambodia and the Post- Yugoslav States," *Third World Quarterly* 26, no. 6 (2005): 873–89.

45. Stansfield, *Iraqi Kurdistan*, 45–49.

46. In the aftermath of the allied invasion of Iraq in 2003, when the now ruling KRG failed to deliver on the hopes for democracy and prosperity nurtured within the population as a whole, the local monument built to commemorate Halabja's victims was destroyed by angry protestors.

47. I frequently heard mixed Arab/Kurdish families relate to me that they now felt anxious and marginalized in both Erbil and Baghdad due to their mixed heritage, and subtle forms of discrimination and racism in this context were not uncommon. For example, I witnessed fights break out between young men in the main Erbil bazaar due to a customer's inability to address the shopkeeper in Kurdish.

48. Moodie, "Critical Code-Switching," 3.

49. Cf. James, "Ruptures, Rights and Repair."

50. Whether outdated or contemporary, both diagnoses function to limit the social dimensions of this suffering; indeed the preferred expression of female suffering in Kurdistan is that of widows of men killed in the *Al Anfal* (Tanyel Taysi, "The Post Anfal 'No-Woman's Land,'" in *Sixth International Conference on New Directions in the Humanities* (Istanbul: Fatih University, July 2008)), such a powerful designation that women often joked with me that they "wished their husbands were dead" so that they could benefit and gain attention (cf. Lucy Brown and David Romano, "Women in Post-Saddam Iraq: One Step Forward or Two Steps Back?," *National Women's Studies Association Journal* 18, no. 3 (2006): 51–70).

51. Derek Summerfield, "How Scientifically Valid Is the Knowledge Base of Global Mental Health?," *British Medical Journal* 336, no. 7651 (2008): 992–94.

52. Yolanda Gampel, "Reflections on the Prevalence of the Uncanny in Social Violence," in *Cultures Under Siege: Collective Violence and Trauma*, ed. Antonius C. G. M. Robben and Marcelo M. Suárez-Orozco (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 48–69.

53. Personal interview, November 2008, Erbil, Iraq.

54. Antonius C. G. M. Robben, "The Assault on Basic Trust: Disappearance, Protest and Reburial in Argentina," in *Cultures Under Siege: Collective Violence and Trauma*, ed. Antonius C. G. M. Robben and Marcelo M. Suárez-Orozco (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Antonius C. G. M. Robben, "How Traumatized Societies Remember: The Aftermath of Argentina's Dirty War," *Cultural Critique* 59, no. 1 (2005): 121–64; Bourgois, "The Power of Violence in War and Peace"; Mark Phelan, "Not So Innocent Landscapes: Remembrance, Representation and the Disappeared," in *Violence Performed: Local Roots and Global Routes of Conflict*, ed. Patrick Anderson and Jisha Menon (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).

55. See, for example, Nazand Begikhani, "Honour-Based Violence Among the Kurds: The Case of Iraqi Kurdistan," in *'Honour': Crimes, Paradigms and Violence Against Women*, ed. Lynn Welshman and Sara Hossain (London: Zed, 2005); C. Hardi, *Killing in the Name of Honour: Patriarchal Community Power and Violence* (London: Honour Based Violence and Women's Rights in Iraq/Kurdistan, 2007).

56. Lila Abu-Lughod, "Do Muslim Women Really Need Saving? Anthropological Reflections on Cultural Relativism and Its Others," *American Anthropologist* 104, no. 3 (2002): 783–90. Nadje Al-Ali, "The War on Terror and Women's Rights in Iraq," in *Iraq at a Distance: What Anthropologists Can Teach Us About the War*, ed. Antonius C. G. M. Robben (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010).

57. Argenti-Pillen, *Masking Terror*, 170.

58. Liisa Malkki, "Refugees and Exile: From 'Refugee Studies' to the National Order of Things," *Annual Review of Anthropology* 24 (1995): 495–523.

59. Paul Stubbs, "Transforming Local and Global Discourses: Reassessing the PTSD Movement in Bosnia and Croatia," *Forced Migration and Mental Health: Rethinking the Care of Refugees and Displaced Persons* (2004): 53–66.

60. Hughes and Pupavac, "Framing Post-Conflict Societies," 875.

61. Moodie, "Critical Code Switching."

62. Farmer, *Pathologies of Power*; Nancy Scheper-Hughes, *Death Without Weeping: The Violence of Everyday Life in Brazil* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992); Hughes and Pupavac, "Framing Post-Conflict Societies."

63. Stevan M. Weine and Sae-Rom Chae, "Trauma, Disputed Knowledge, and Storying Resilience," in *Trauma, Development and Peacebuilding* (New Delhi: International Conflict Research Institute and International Development Research Centre, September 11, 2008), 7.

64. Hughes and Pupavac, "Framing Post-Conflict Societies," 883; cf. Weine and Chae, "Trauma, Disputed Knowledge, and Storying Resilience."

65. Michel Foucault, *Psychiatric Power: Lectures at the College De France 1973–1974*, ed. Jacques Lagrange, trans. Graham Burchell (Basingstoke: Palgrave Mac-

millan, 2006); Vaheed K. Ramazani, "The Mother of All Things: War, Reason, and the Gendering of Pain," *Cultural Critique* 54, no. 2 (2003): 26–66.

66. Foucault, *Psychiatric Power*.

67. Michel Foucault, *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972–1977*, ed. and trans. Colin Gordon (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), 56.

68. James Quesada, "Suffering Child: An Embodiment of War and Its Aftermath in Post-Sandinista Nicaragua," *Medical Anthropological Quarterly* 12, no. 1 (1998): 51–73; Argenti-Pillen, *Masking Terror*; Weine and Chae, "Trauma, Disputed Knowledge, and Storying Resilience."

69. Sarah Keeler, "First Do No Harm: Female Hysteria, War Trauma and the (Bio)Logic of Violence in Iraq," *Medical Anthropology* 31, no. 2 (2012): 132–48; Thomas J. Csordas, *Embodiment and Experience: The Existential Ground of Culture and Self* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Linda Green, *Fear as a Way of Life: Mayan Widows in Rural Guatemala* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999).

70. Green, *Fear as a Way of Life*.

71. Green, *Fear as a Way of Life*, 112.

72. Keeler, "First Do No Harm."

73. Green, *Fear as a Way of Life*, 117.

74. Foucault, *Psychiatric Power*.

75. Cf. S. Mentzos, *Hysterie: Zur Psychodynamik Unbewusster Inszenierungen* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1980).

76. Foucault, *Psychiatric Power*, 77.

77. Argenti-Pillen, *Masking Terror*.

78. Didier Fassin and Richard Rechtman, *Empire of Trauma: An Inquiry into the Condition of Victimhood* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 242.

79. Kurdistan Regional Government, *Kurdistan: The Other Iraq* (2006), <http://www.theotheriraq.com/>.

80. Hughes and Pupavac, "Framing Post-Conflict Societies," 882.

81. *Ibid.*, 884.

82. Argenti-Pillen, *Masking Terror*. Weine and Chae, "Trauma, Disputed Knowledge, and Storying Resilience."

83. See Hourani in this volume.

84. Personal interview, May 2009, Erbil, Iraq.

85. Gilsenan, "On Conflict and Violence," 107; cf. Scott, *Seeing Like a State*.

86. Robben, "The Assault on Basic Trust"; Weine and Chae, "Trauma, Disputed Knowledge, and Storying Resilience."

87. Robben, "The Assault on Basic Trust," 74.

88. *Ibid.*, 70.

89. Allen Feldman, "Violence and Vision: The Prosthetics and Aesthetics of Terror," in *Violence and Subjectivity*, ed. Veena Das, Arthur Kleinman, Mamphela Ramphele, and Pamela Reynolds (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000).

90. Personal interview, December 2007, Koysanjaq, Iraq.

91. This practice is indeed supported by official and vociferously defended dis-

courses arguing, in the interests of Kurdish security and integrity, that such violence perpetrated by Kurds against Kurds must *not* be openly discussed at this stage of nation building, for fear that it may be used by “the enemies” of the Kurds—i.e., occupying and neighbouring states—as ammunition in further projects of occupation.

92. Paris, “International Peacebuilding and the ‘Mission Civilisatrice,’” 639.

93. Chidi Anselm Odinkalu, “Why More Africans Don’t Use Human Rights Language,” *Human Rights Dialogue* (December 5, 1999), http://www.carNEGouncil.org/resources/publications/dialogue/2_01/index.html (accessed March 2011).

94. Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace*.

95. Jalal Talabani, “‘We Are Proud to Be Your Friends’: Iraq’s President Shares His Thoughts About the Old Regime and His Hopes for the Future,” *The Observer* (January 31, 2010), <http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2010/jan/31/iraq-prime-minister-jalal-talabani-chilcot-inquiry>, accessed March 2011, my emphasis.

96. M. F. Salihi, “The Future of Erbil is in Nishtiman Mall: The Construction Boom in Kurdistan,” *Kurdish Globe* (October 24, 2009).

97. Hughes and Pupavac, “Framing Post-Conflict Societies,” 879.

98. Phelan, “Not so innocent landscapes”; Feldman, “Violence and Vision.”

99. Taussig, *Shamanism, Colonialism, and the Wild Man*; Margaret Lock, “Cultivating the Body: Anthropology and Epistemologies of Bodily Practices and Knowledge,” *Annual Review of Anthropology* 22 (1993): 133–55; Csordas, *Embodiment and Experience*; Edmondson, “Marketing Trauma.”

100. Scheper-Hughes, *Death Without Weeping*; Green, *Fear as a Way of Life*; Argenti-Pillen, *Masking Terror*; James, “Ruptures, Rights and Repair.”

101. Robben, “The Assault on Basic Trust,” 5.

CHAPTER 3

Transitional Justice

Algeria and the Violence of National Reconciliation

JACOB MUNDY

ABSTRACT

Transitional justice co-constitutes the space and time of the late post-conflict environment, as well as the subjectivities that populate it. Among the various strategies, techniques, and institutional forms of transitional justice today, the truth commission has become one of the premier technologies in the toolkit of Neoliberal post-conflict managers. Deviating from this trend, the Algerian polity has seemingly refused on several occasions to allow the enactment and deployment of a truth commission to promote national reconciliation after the intense violence of the 1990s. Algeria's reticence to follow standardized models of transitional justice has elicited criticism from post-conflict experts, human rights organizations, and governmental bodies. The basis of this criticism, however, is curious insofar as it is either highly speculative about Algeria's future or it is premised upon a limited understanding of the histories, contingencies, and inefficacies of the ensemble of post-conflict mechanisms we now call the truth commission. A fuller account of the emergence and functions of the truth commission within the late post-conflict environment reveals the extent to which it is not the violence in Algeria that necessarily warrants a truth commission. It is, in fact, the technology of the commission that manufactures the conditions of its own necessity. An important function of the truth commission is to render the late post-conflict environment as a space that is both intelligible and intervenable to those who would manage it as such.

INTRODUCTION

Algeria's approach to national reconciliation after the bloody decade of the 1990s stands in sharp contrast with the increasingly routinized practices of transitional justice that have been prescribed and deployed elsewhere in the wake of civil conflict and violent authoritarianism. Critics allege that the Algerian government, at the behest of a notoriously opaque and authoritarian regime, has chosen amnesty over accountability, indemnity over truth, appeasement over justice. Algeria's reconciliation policies have been strongly rebuked by actors in the international human rights, post-conflict mediation, and reconciliation communities,¹ not to mention domestic victims' rights groups. The putative architect of these policies, Algerian president Abdelaziz Bouteflika, has done little to assuage these concerns. When Algeria's national reconciliation policies began to take shape in 1999, the recently elected president justified them to *El País* in these terms:

The situation [in Algeria] is far more complex than it was in South Africa. [. . .] The Truth Commission would be justified in a relationship of colonizer to colonized, such as France to Algeria or Spain to Western Sahara. [. . .] And if my memory does not betray me, you [i.e., Spain] have never needed a commission to achieve democratic transition.²

At home, Bouteflika was more blunt in his praise of forgetting: "How are you going to leave this war behind if you don't forget?" he reportedly told a group of mothers of disappeared persons.³

While it is easy enough to find domestic critics of Algeria's reconciliation policies, there are those Algerians who also support these measures despite their drawbacks. In Raïs, the site of one of the conflict's largest massacres in 1997, the Associated Press spoke with a man in charge of a polling station during a 2005 referendum on a new national reconciliation charter. This poll manager told the reporter, "People who have been so hurt hesitate to pardon [. . .] It is so easy to say 'sorry' but in reality here it is difficult to swallow." Yet pardon is exactly what Algerians have apparently opted for in two national referenda held in September 1999 and September 2005. Both of these votes approved Bouteflika's reconciliation measures by convincing majorities. Though these plebiscites have elicited serious domestic and foreign accusations of fraud and weak turnout, together they suggest that not

all Algerians buy into the amnesty-versus-accountability, indemnity-versus-truth, appeasement-versus-justice tropes that frame the transitional justice paradigm today.

Key players in the transitional justice and human rights movement, as well as some academic observers, have nevertheless lambasted the Algerian government for failing to recognize the alleged necessity of a truth commission, for failing “to learn from the experiences from other countries.”⁴ The predicted⁵ or declared⁶ failure of Algeria’s national reconciliation initiatives is not only attributed to the continued existence of armed violence,⁷ albeit at levels far below the 1990s, but it is often attributed to Algeria’s stated and manifest unwillingness to follow the truth commission model of other countries. Algeria’s evolving and contingent experiment in national reconciliation has even been deemed unsuccessful regardless of its effects in the domains of peace (proper regulation of direct political violence), truth (the generation of an official history), and justice (accountability for all criminal acts). Yet these *a priori* dismissals of Algeria’s approach rest upon an assumption that previous models of national reconciliation have been successful and thus provide a desirable template. This assumption is, at best, a weak inference and, at worst, pure assertion.

The first goal of this chapter is thus to map the standard model against which Algeria is simultaneously being judged and advised to follow. What emerges is an account of the rise of a technology, the truth commission, whose broader functions in the post-conflict environment spread far beyond its institutional goals. This account begins with an exploration of the imagined geographies and histories of the truth commission, its emergence out of an unlikely ensemble of unique and contingent experiments in national reconciliation. A key inflection point in the genealogy that now legitimates the truth commission as the premier technology of transitional justice is South Africa, which has not only become the standard model but also the frame through which the past, present, and future of transitional justice is now understood and regulated. Looking beyond the ways in which post-conflict managers attempt to account for the role of truth commissions in the production of transitional justice, a more agnostic assessment reveals the extent to which the realization of truth, dignity, peace, and justice are ancillary to the broader functions of the truth commission. Like other transitional justice mechanisms, the truth commission works by affecting space, time, and subjectivities through its transient nature and the staged performance of constrained and simulated acts of justice. Algeria’s national recon-

ciliation initiatives have attempted to achieve the same ends (that is, to produce a post-conflict environment) but without adopting the internationally recognized technological form of the truth commission. Criticism of Algeria's approach to national reconciliation can thus be understood as a reflection of the extent to which the late post-conflict environment is only intelligible as such when it is managed by the self-legitimizing technologies and institutions of Neoliberal peacebuilding.

TRUTH, JUSTICE, AND RECONCILIATION IN THE LATE POST-CONFLICT ENVIRONMENT

The final quarter of the twentieth century witnessed the increasing deployment of semi- and non-traditional justice mechanisms into post-conflict environments. These environments, whether constituted by the experience of mass armed conflict or by excessively violent authoritarianism, span the globe. Attending to the epistemic and practical management of these mechanisms, the paradigm of transitional justice now claims sovereignty over seventy-five such instances, occurring in dozens of countries since the end of World War II.⁸ The vast majority of such initiatives have come into place after 1980, the exceptions being Idi Amin's 1974 Commission of Inquiry into Disappearances and the 1976 World Council of Churches' attempt to document the abuses of Alfredo Strössner Matiauda in Paraguay. Explicitly or implicitly, the Nuremburg and Tokyo tribunals after World War II nonetheless function as the touchstones for most of the thought and work that has gone into transitional justice over the past three decades.⁹

While the end of the Cold War has contributed to the florescence of transitional justice, the changing geographies of conflict since World War II also account for the changing shape of post-conflict management witnessed in these new approaches to national reconciliation. In line with Mary Kaldor's "new wars" thesis, there is no longer any meaningful distinction to be made between civil and international conflict in the age of global Neoliberalism.¹⁰ To this we might add the contention that there is no such thing as an exclusively domestic authoritarianism that does not benefit from foreign networks enabling its tyranny. Moreover, recent transitional justice practice has slowly corroded any distinction between internal, international, and transnational justice. Witness the indictment of former Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet, the international criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and

post-genocide Rwanda, and the establishment of the International Criminal Court.¹¹

Looking at the specific mechanism of the truth commission (the mechanism Algeria has been criticized for failing to adopt), there have been thirty to sixty such procedures adopted since mid-1970s depending on the operational definition used. These are then often divided into more ambitious truth commissions and less extensive inquiry initiatives.¹² One definition of a truth commission advanced by a prominent practitioner-theorist, Mark Freeman of the International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ), highlights the domestic, transitory, and advisory characteristics of truth commissions:

A truth commission is an *ad hoc*, autonomous, and victim-centred commission of inquiry set up in and authorized by a state for the primary purposes of (1) investigating and reporting on the principle causes and consequences of broad and relatively recent patterns of severe violence or repression that occurred in the state during determinate periods of abusive rule or conflict, and (2) making recommendations for their redress and future prevention.¹³

Priscilla Hayner, who likewise bridges the observer-advocate divide, claims that there are four shared attributes of truth commissions: They investigate previous events; they investigate patterns of abuse rather than specific events; they exist for a limited period; and they are granted powers by some authority that provides them with legitimacy and efficacy.¹⁴ It should come little surprise that these attempts to define truth commissions are at odds with the very history they claim to represent. Each case could be said to challenge these efforts to corral them into a generic category. After all, only that which has no history can be defined.¹⁵ But definition is not the primary process we need to witness here. More important than definition is the process of reification, the attempt to make real what must first be imaginatively constellated. The reality of transitional justice partially emerges out of the entirely technical discussions that occasion analyses of truth commissions.¹⁶

Looking more closely at the self-legitimizing genealogy of truth commissions, most of these mechanisms have tended to follow armed conflict, constitutional transitions, or a resumption of multi-party electoral processes. The majority of truth commissions fall in the latter two categories, patronizingly termed “fledgling democracies” in some accounts.¹⁷ Only five truth commissions were the apparent result of a negotiated agreement be-

tween warring parties: El Salvador, Guatemala, Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Liberia.¹⁸ Like the distinction between internal and international conflict, the distinction between transition to democracy and cessation of hostilities is another difficult bifurcation to maintain, as such sequences are often very intertwined or based upon unstable categories demarcating untenable borders between violent authoritarianism and formal armed conflict. Consider, for example, the four truth commissions Hayner classifies as paradigmatic. In El Salvador, its truth commission (1992–93) was one aspect of the peace agreement between the *Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional* (FMLN) and the government, signed under the auspices of the United Nations. Likewise in Guatemala, its commission (1997–99), inspired by El Salvador's model, was the outcome of United Nations–led peace negotiations between *Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca* (URNG) and the government. On the other hand, the commissions in Argentina (1983–84) and Chile (1990–91) followed the end of authoritarianism yet sought to address “dirty wars,” steeply asymmetric armed conflicts marked by intense state terror. The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, or TRC (1995–2000), similarly followed a monumental change in governance yet the TRC addressed what could be described as a long-running low-intensity conflict, if not outright civil war according to certain definitions of the term.

As the specific practice of truth commissions and the more general practice of transitional justice have expanded in recent years, so have the number of descriptive, prescriptive, and theoretical accounts. The literature on South Africa's TRC alone represents a self-sustaining academic sub-discipline at this point. Yet the productivity of transitional justice's knowledges issues not only from the increasing circulation of its constituent practices but also from putative theoretical impasses the genre generates for itself. One of the key drivers in the assembly of knowledges related to transitional justice is the alleged tension between the imperatives of peace, truth, and justice that form the stays of national reconciliation.¹⁹ Unpacking the term *peace*, we often find deference to notions of stability or the absence of violence and conflict. Truth and justice allegedly threaten peace insofar as either total histories or perfect justice (utopian and superhuman projects to begin with) do not create space for political compromise. This even puts democracy in jeopardy, according to some arguments, because the demand for perfect justice limits the space available for the deliberative political processes wherein the polity mediates its socio-economic conflicts nonviolently. An irony in such

critiques is their failure to acknowledge that non-prosecutorial truth commissions have been put on the table in internationally mediated negotiations to entice warring parties to peace.

Truth, on the other hand, represents the claims of aggrieved individuals and interest groups to establish certain narratives of violence and repression (often dubbed “remembering”) over the claims of others to alternative narratives (regularly dismissed as “forgetting”). In this fashion, truth allegedly threatens justice (or accountability) because it compels justice to act; if a crime is exposed, then the warrant for legal prosecution becomes unbearable to resist (hence the amnesty measures following El Salvador’s truth commission). The tension between these three stays of transitional justice is reproduced in Carlos Nino’s response to the demands of the Madres de la Plaza de Mayo, the mothers of Argentina’s “disappeared.” Nino, one of the intellectual architects of Argentina’s truth commission, thought the Mothers’ demand to see every culpable state agent held to account would bring their society to “the brink of dissolution.”²⁰ A more recent example can be found in arguments against the ICC’s indictment of Sudan’s President Omar Al-Bashir—vis-à-vis alleged war crimes in Darfur—on the grounds that the peace process in Southern Sudan would have been put in jeopardy.²¹

South Africa’s TRC famously attempted to dissolve the alleged tensions between truth, justice, and peace by aiming for a different conception of justice altogether, what the TRC’s chair Archbishop Desmond Tutu trumpeted as restorative justice. Tutu re-encoded the TRC in a Christian vocabulary of “repentance and forgiveness”²²—reconciliation over retribution. One prominent scholar saw such restorative measures as “welcoming the wrongdoer into the circle of humanity.”²³ But what exactly does restorative justice restore? Only an ahistorical account of South Africa could ever maintain that the TRC somehow restored the broken polity to some pre-conflictual state. Mahmood Mamdani’s more historical distinctions between “survivors’ justice” and “victors’ justice” are used respectively to legitimate apparent magnanimity of the TRC and to criticize the putatively neo-colonialist agenda of ICC, given its overwhelming focus on war crimes in Africa.²⁴ For Mamdani, who is normally keenly aware of naming politics, it never strikes him as rhetorically problematic to frame justice with such morally loaded terminology as *survivor* and *victor*. Much the same could be said for *restorative*, with all its positive connotations when specifically contrasted with the term *retribution*. The point here, however, is not to ask whether or not we can ever conceptually and practically reconcile truth,

justice, and peace. Rather, the simple point is to demonstrate the ways in which the play between and across each constituent term is an important basis for the astounding productivity of the literature on transitional justice and national reconciliation processes.

The political contingencies of each experiment in national reconciliation are another co-generator of transitional justice's self-knowledge and practices. To say that all processes of national reconciliation are negotiations between competing claims to truth, justice, and peace should not be a novel or provocative point by now. Truth commissions are as much processes of national reconciliation as they are manifestations of the politics of national reconciliation. Morocco's recent *Instance Équité et Réconciliation* (IER), which has received significant international praise—praise far more positive than Algeria's national reconciliation policies—by explicitly mimicking the performative aspects of other truth commissions, is illustrative. A report by the ICTJ celebrates what might be called the *positive* space of the IER's public hearings as “solemn” and “victim-centered”:

All public hearings were held in auditoriums and meeting halls. They were widely attended, in some cases by senior advisers to the King, government ministers, opposition party leaders, diplomats, international press, and representatives from the country's major human rights NGOs. Hearings were initially broadcast live on Moroccan television and radio, with highlights beamed throughout the Middle East by Al-Jazeera. Subsequent hearings were taped and excerpts televised afterward.

Typically, testifying victims sat on stage directly facing the audience, flanked in silent solidarity by roughly 30 additional victims and commissioners. Each witness was given approximately 20 minutes to speak. By design, commissioners refrained from asking questions of the witnesses during or after their testimonies. Anyone called to testify was asked not to invoke the name of persons deemed responsible for the violations in question.²⁵

The last sentence points to the *negative* space of the IER's public hearings: victims were not allowed to name their persecutors. The fact that the hearings were spatially victim centered (vis-à-vis the arrangement of audience and speaker) emphasized the testimonials of the victims by marking them as the focal point of the IER's transient space. What the IER's hearings lacked, but was certainly manifest in their negative space, was any resemblance to a courtroom. In South Africa's TRC, by contrast, the spatial configuration of victims, perpetrators, commissioners, and audience more closely resembled

that of a formal legal proceeding. In the case of Morocco, the pre-vetted victims, rather than commissioners, literally took centre stage. There they read twenty-minute pre-approved statements; no questions were allowed, and perpetrators were not allowed to be mentioned, much less seen. The current regime, as audience rather than judge or defendant, becomes a passive, self-silenced witness to select and censored narratives of the legacies it inherited. Such positive and negative spatial features helped to obfuscate any impression that the hearings amounted to an extra-legal process. They nonetheless reinforced the intended impression of transparency and accountability without actually offering a modicum of due process or even letting victims identify those that had tortured, imprisoned, disappeared, or killed, as such persons, particularly high-ranking officials, those who actualized the tyranny of the late monarch, King Hassan II, who continue to inhabit key positions within the regime or live in quiet retirement.²⁶

This aspect of Morocco's reconciliation commission earned Rabat much criticism for silencing the testifying victims' ability to offer a full account and to demand accountability. But it is arguable that there was a more profound absence in both the case of South Africa's TRC and Morocco's *Instance* (as with most truth commissions that hold public hearings): the vast exclusion of most victims. Less than 1 percent of the thousands of plaintiffs on record with the IER were actually allowed to speak at the stage-managed hearings. The criteria used to select public testimonies attempted to balance gender, the nature of the violation, its historical import, and the geographical distribution of wrongs.²⁷ Still, the IER's low percentage of public testimonials (compared to the number volunteered) is relatively within the practiced norm, though at the lower end of the spectrum. Truth commissions in Nigeria and Sierra Leone only offered public space to less than 5 percent of the victims on file; the well-financed South African TRC, though it held eighty hearings, allowed less than 10 percent to speak. The usual reason given for the absence of most victims from ostensible truth commissions is procedural; an alleged need to "balance" a country's "ethnic, racial and religious diversity," to achieve "gender parity," to screen out false accusations, and, in the case of Morocco, to make sure that personal narratives overlapped as little as possible.²⁸ In short, most truth commissions exclude the vast majority of victim narratives in their public hearings. This observation raises some questions as to what exactly is meant by any claim—espoused by the theorists, practitioners, and proponents of national truth commissions—of victim centeredness.²⁹

While public hearings are considered a finite space for select victim testi-

monials, final reports are often seen as the vehicle through which all narratives can find voice. Yet even in its six-volume report, the South African TRC could not re-print every victim's testimony verbatim. At best, actual and complete statements of victims (and perpetrators) are resigned to commission archives, if made public at all. Technical, logistical, and political efficacy, again, determine what testimonies can be committed to the public page. Amnesty International, for example, criticized the approach of the Liberian TRC for creating a "fragmented truth" in its focus on spectacular violence. From Amnesty's point of view, the problem was not that certain voices were being excluded but that, in focusing on famous acts of violence, Liberia had failed to follow Hayner's prescribed logic of the truth commission; it failed to "find patterns or common features."³⁰ Yet the balance between providing a global account versus the need to highlight exemplary cases is difficult to find. To avoid the "psychic numbing" of overly comprehensive commission reports, one theorist recommended the antidote of "carnivalization," borrowing from Bakhtin; that is, a process that weighs the voices of a small number of illustrative individuals over an anonymous and compendious narrator. Argentina's *Nunca Más* report is said to have taken this route with some success.³¹ The point being, however, that as with the public hearing, the truth commission report also raises questions as to what exactly victim centered is. For the most part, it seems that the majority of real victims must be de-centered for truth commissions to be "victim centered."

Despite these inconsistencies, elisions, and paradoxes in the constitution of post-conflict transitional justice vis-à-vis truth commissions, Algeria's policies have been judged as inadequate for not adhering to these best practices. Where then do these implicit best practices come from if the truth commission model is first made within techno-political discourse of post-conflict managers, and then found in an imaginative geography of post-conflict environments? Just beneath the surface of most criticisms of Algeria's approach to national reconciliation—as even Bouteflika acknowledged to *El País*—is the South African experience, which is now widely viewed as paradigmatic rather than extraordinary. Most truth commissions, after all, have proceeded soon after their instantiation and last, on average, no more than three years; a significant number have completed their investigative work in a year or less. South Africa's TRC took a year and a half just to negotiate its parameters; its mandate required intensive parliamentary debate; and the actual work of the TRC took three years to complete with two years of follow-up. Prior to South Africa, truth commissions operated in various

ways. El Salvador's *Comisión de la Verdad* functioned under UN supervision with an international staff component to help carry out its mandate of investigating only "serious acts of violence."³² It conducted private interviews with two thousand individuals and did not hold any public hearings. Its final report, however, was lauded for its willingness to "name names," particularly given that 90 percent of its recorded abuses were attributable to state agents.³³ The Salvadorian government then quickly passed amnesty measures.³⁴ Like El Salvador, Guatemala's post-conflict truth commission was one aspect of the UN-mediated settlement signed at the end of 1996. However, the *Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico*, which held no public hearings, was designed so that it would not lend itself to judicial prosecution, particularly in that it could not name names.

The effect of South Africa on the practice of truth commissions is striking. It was not until Peru established its own *Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación* in 2001 that Latin America saw the first public hearings in a truth commission. Explicitly following the South African model, both Sierra Leone (2002–3) and Liberia (2008) initiated post-conflict truth commissions with public aspects, particularly as interface between perpetrator and victim in the case of the former. Sierra Leone even followed the South African model of having a leading figure in its church, Bishop Joseph C. Humper, chair its TRC. However, the final report, released two years later, only provided a non-partisan history of the conflict, directing attention away from culpability and instead towards the underlying conditions that gave rise to the war (e.g., corruption and bad governance) while making general recommendations to alleviate them. Needless to say, Sierra Leone's national reconciliation processes have been heavily supplemented by formal and hybrid domestic-international tribunals. First was the Special Court for Sierra Leone, established by the government and the UN Security Council in 2000; proceedings for its most high-profile target, former Liberian President Charles Taylor, eventually moved to The Hague for security reasons. Liberia's TRC, which took three years of political wrangling over its enabling legislation, perhaps became the first virtualized truth commission, insofar as the internet played a role in the diffusion of its hearings held in 2008.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo, however, possibly stands as a cautionary tale when it comes to the uncritical application of truth commission models, South African or not, to new contexts. *La Commission vérité et réconciliation* (CVR) was founded in March 2003, several months after the Sun City (South Africa) peace agreement attempted to end a half-decade of

internationalized armed conflict in the DRC that has left millions dead (and counting) and countless thousands of women brutalized by femicidal sexual violence, which is still ongoing as of late 2013. The CVR, however, collapsed in 2006—as a 2004 report of the ICTJ had warned—given the project’s structural, logistical, political, and financial problems.³⁵ The ICTJ likewise warned that proposals for a new CVR in 2008 face similar challenges because, in part, it had simply been “graft[ed]” from the South Africa mold.³⁶ Meanwhile, the DRC’s furtive efforts towards national reconciliation were being eclipsed by the trans-nationalization of justice, in which the ICC began investigating and even arresting suspected war criminals in 2005.

From this heterogeneous set of countries and experiments in truth commissions, it is difficult to see where either the practical or moral warrant for a truth commission issues from. The now routine prescription of truth commissions by international conflict managers and theorists takes as an article of faith the necessity of such procedures. Such is clearly implicit in the criticisms of Algeria’s recent experiments with national reconciliation, as when Dick Oosting of Amnesty International’s Europe office claims, “[N]ational reconciliation processes are difficult challenges but as we have seen in Chile and South Africa, they have to start by acknowledging the facts.”³⁷ Putting aside questions about what such an unproblematised conception of “truth” actually means (e.g., whose truth?), the basis of this imperative is a selective and even Pollyannish understanding of how truth commissions have evolved. Truth commissions often do not utter “truths,” insofar as perpetrators often go unnamed, public testimonies are pre-censored, or the majority of victims are excluded so that the hearings and the final report is not a boring or numbing catalogue of quotidian horrors and systemic violence. That Algeria seemingly prioritized peace over the other stays of national reconciliation—truth and justice—is not so out of the norm as critics allege. Moreover, the assertion that truth commissions produce more stable post-conflict or post-authoritarian systems is just that: assertion. Take, for example, Judge Richard Goldstone’s assessment of South Africa’s TRC: “It will take many decades for the effects of the TRC’s activities and recommendations to be appropriately analyzed and appreciated. In my opinion, however, it can safely be said that South Africa is a better country.”³⁸ Critics might suggest that such an assessment cannot be uttered so “safely,” insofar as there is a strong argument to be made that South Africa appears to have become a neo-apartheid state economically while barely becoming a post-apartheid state politically.³⁹ More generally, a correlative relationship—less causal—

between, on the one hand, truth commissions and, on the other, (non)recidivism, durable peace settlements, or transitions to democracy has yet to be scientifically demonstrated.

A LOGIC OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION IN ALGERIA

The Algerian government began pursuing reconciliation measures at the height of the violence in the mid-1990s. Algeria's recent armed conflict escalated steeply in 1993 and 1994 following two years of mutually reinforcing acts of terrorism and repression.⁴⁰ Observers often located the conflict's trigger event in the military-led regime's decision to annul the impressive electoral victory of the *Front islamique du salut* (FIS, Islamic Salvation Front) following the first round of national elections in December 1991. The FIS had already taken over a large number of municipalities and provinces in the 1990 local elections, and seemed set to win a clear majority in the parliament in the early 1992 runoff. However, violence between supporters of the Islamist movement and state security forces had been present before the December 1991 vote, including acts and accusations of armed resistance and repression coming from all camps. A brief yet weak Islamist insurgency had already challenged the regime in the mid-1980s. Following the abrupt, and perhaps coerced, resignation of President Chadli Bendjedid in mid-January 1992, a coterie of high-ranking military officers and supporting political elites filled the void they had helped create. Anti-regime and pro-FIS demonstrations followed, escalating into a situation where the government declared a state of emergency, imprisoned hundreds (eventually thousands) of FIS activists and supporters, and then outlawed the FIS outright in March 1992. But locating the precise spark that set off the conflict is problematic because every possible event is contingent upon those that came before it; the criteria for designating any moment, choice, policy, or even a small series of these as constituting sufficient proximate causation will either deploy an implicitly partisan logic or engage in a gross and contestable decontextualization. Minimally, we can say that Algeria's brief experiment in multi-party democracy began with a new constitution in 1989, passed in the shadow of massive riots in October 1988 that had been violently repressed by the military. The global oil price collapse in 1986 had exacerbated an already troubled social, financial, and political picture in Algeria.⁴¹ Often depicted as regionalistic, oligarchic, and clientelist, as well as dominated by the military

and the intelligence services, the Algerian regime, with their easy access to hydrocarbon rents, ruled through the *Front de libération nationale* (FLN, National Liberation Front) as a kind of single-party state for almost three decades following independence from France in 1962.⁴²

Algeria's new yet internally divided insurgency of the 1990s seemingly waged *jihad* for a number of causes, whether for the restoration of the FIS as a legal party, for an Islamic republic, for the institution of full *Shari'ah* law, or for the reconstitution of the Islamic nation from West Africa to Southeast Asia. Just as often it seems that they fought for quotidian, personal, and economic reasons as well.⁴³ The regime, likewise, seemed internally divided on the question of whether or not the FIS should be allowed back into the democratic game or if a military solution was possible against the multiplying heads of the hydra-like insurgency.⁴⁴ There were often suspicions that elements within the state and those aligned to key players in it were exploiting and exacerbating the domestic and international opacity of the armed conflict for their own ends.⁴⁵ Given the multiple, obfuscated, interpenetrating, and interchangeable politics and subjectivities of the armed violence in 1990s Algeria, the motives and identities of violent actors and acts were frequently met with suspicion, cynicism, and counter-intuitive theorizations. In Algeria and abroad, this became known as the "*Qui tue?*" (Who kills?) or "*Qui tue qui?*" (Who kills who?) debate.⁴⁶ The assassination of interim president Mohamed Boudiaf in mid-1992, with its (still) contested accounts, was neither the first story in this genre nor the last. Boudiaf's assassination only added more fuel to the fire. While significantly less violent than the depths of horror witnessed in 1996–98, armed violence in Algeria continued into its third decade, most visibly with an international hostage crisis at a Saharan natural gas extraction facility in January 2013.

From early in the conflict, the Algerian regime launched several initiatives to end the fighting. After three years of sustained and increasing violence following Bendjedid's resignation in 1992, Algeria's president Liamine Zeroual—given the post by the interim junta—initiated the first national reconciliation policy in February 1995 with his Clemency Law (*La loi sur la rahma*), known as simply *al-Rahmah*. The framework of this law was later adopted under the *Concorde civile*, launched by President Bouteflika following his election in April 1999. Both the *Rahmah* and the *Concorde* provided amnesty for any insurgent that was willing to lay down his or her arms.⁴⁷ Exceptions were ostensibly in place for those rebels who had engaged more egregious acts (e.g., murder, rape, or bombings), though they were promised

reduced sentences. Rebels and sympathizers already in prison for lesser charges would be released. But the years following the initiation of the *Rahmah* actually witnessed dramatic increases in the levels and intensity of the violence, notably the wave of civilian massacres that began in late 1996, peaked in late 1997 and early 1998, and then subsided through the years 1999 to 2002. With the achievement of a truce between the regime and the armed wing of the FIS, the *Armée islamique du salut* (AIS, Islamic Salvation Army), in September 1997, the conditions for a more robust amnesty seemingly improved. Meanwhile, the more infamous *al-Jama'ah al-Islamiyyah al-Musallahah* (Armed Islamic Group or GIA) continued its dirty war against civilians, the government, and state-armed militias for several years to come, though it is now clear that the GIA, along with other insurgent groups, had been deeply infiltrated and manipulated by Algeria's military intelligence since their inception.⁴⁸

The *Concorde*, which was enacted in July 1999 as the Civil Harmony Law and overwhelmingly endorsed in a national referendum that September, was positively received across much of the political spectrum, most importantly by leading figures in the FIS.⁴⁹ Victims of armed groups and secularist opponents of the Islamists voiced strong feelings that the amnesty was too generous, was being applied in a blanket manner, and so was allowing killers and rapists to re-enter society. Indeed, a loophole in the Law allowed the president to make exceptions on a case-by-case basis. Under this provision, all members of the AIS and a smaller armed group were granted total amnesty in January 2000.⁵⁰ By the end of the initial six-month amnesty window (July 1999 to January 2000), the Algerian government claimed that over 5,000 guerrillas had surrendered.⁵¹ Whether these measures had an effect on the violence is undecided. In early 2001, an alleged secret report prepared by the Algerian military was leaked to the French press. It indicated that there had been 9,006 total casualties in the year 2000, including 1,025 insurgents, 603 government forces, and 117 civilian militia members. If true, the year 2000—the first full year after the adoption of Bouteflika's *Concorde*—had perhaps been one of the most violent of the conflict.⁵² The GIA continued for several years until collapsing in 2002; a rival splinter, *al-Jama'ah al-Salafiyyah li-l-Da'wa wa al-Qital* (Salafi Group for Preaching and Combat or GSPC) has continued to fight the government and reportedly became an official branch of the Al-Qa'idah network in 2007.

The persistence of armed violence beyond the scope of the 1999 *Concorde*, the continued pressure asserted by other stakeholders in the national

reconciliation process (e.g., families of the “disappeared,” pro-government militia members, victims of non-state terrorism), and the need to immunize state actors from domestic and international prosecution helped engender a second initiative. Talk of a more general, wide-ranging, and comprehensive amnesty and compensation measure surfaced in late 2004 following Bouteflika’s contested yet convincing re-election to a second term that April. The *Charte pour la paix et la réconciliation nationale* (Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation) passed a less enthusiastic national referendum in September 2005 than its predecessor, and was enacted into law by a special session of the Presidential Cabinet in February 2006 while Parliament was in recess.⁵³ The *Charte* not only updated the deadline for insurgent amnesty (from January 2000 to August 2006), it also amnestied all state agents, including government-armed militias (articles forty-four and forty-five),⁵⁴ and made criticism of government policy during the conflict a crime (article forty-six). Domestic and foreign monitoring groups warned that this latter measure would, in effect, render the work of victims’ advocacy and human rights associations a crime. While the Algerian government has refrained from excessively applying this clause, government relations with victims’ advocacy organizations remain troubled.⁵⁵ Another controversial provision seemingly provided the president with *carte blanche* powers to bring about reconciliation; that article, forty-seven, allows the president to take any measures deemed necessary to implement the *Charte* “by virtue of the mandate given to him by the 29 September 2005 referendum.”⁵⁶

Criticisms of Algeria’s reconciliation approach have also focused on the amnesties afforded by the *Concorde* (for insurgents) and the *Charte* (for state agents), which allegedly come at the expense of truth and justice for survivors victimized by state and non-state terror. What has received less scrutiny are the indemnity measures the Algerian government has used to entice rebel demobilization and to meet the claims of bereaved and victimized survivors. Paying restitution, as an aspect of national reconciliation, is not new; both Chile and Argentina, for example, offered compensation to the victims of state terrorism.⁵⁷ In Algeria, the *Charte* outlined compensation packages for the families of persons disappeared by state agents (6,146 government-recognized cases as of March 2005);⁵⁸ families of rebels killed by the government but only where such losses have left surviving immediate relatives destitute (roughly 17,000 cases); and for persons who lost their means of employment due to their alleged ties to either the FIS or other illegal opposition movements. Presidential Decree 06–93 set the rate of compensation for

these groups between US\$15,000 and US\$25,000, though in practice the average seemed to be €10,000.⁵⁹ Some families of the “disappeared” refused to accept the compensation; some took it but still demanded truth and justice.

One prominent constituency that was surprisingly not addressed in either initiative is civilians victimized by the armed opposition groups that fought the state. A special fund was created in 2008 to provide social assistance to the survivors of “terrorism,” though it also covered persons victimized during anti-government demonstrations in Kabylia in 2001. The latter would mostly consist of persons killed by the gendarmerie and police (local and national) during several weeks of intense clashes.⁶⁰ What is much less clear are the levels of compensation given to the “*repenti*” (penitent insurgents), which were frequently described as monthly stipends rather than single payments. According to one Algerian journalist, the payment is two times the national minimum wage or roughly \$300 US dollars per month (using 2008 exchange rates), though with higher-profile rebel leaders reportedly receiving more than the average insurgent.⁶¹ Some insurgents, however, have complained of never receiving any compensation for their surrender in 2000.⁶² According to government figures, as of May 2008, the *Charte* seems to have allowed some 2,226 “terrorists” to receive amnesty while 300 were referred to the courts for prosecution.⁶³ Accusations of insurgent recidivism marred the *Charte* though it nonetheless helped Bouteflika secure the right to a third term in 2008, and then an actual third term in 2009.

Given these policies (the apparent prioritization of peace and stability over truth and justice, to the benefit of entrenched elite stakeholders and to the detriment of victimized populations), it is not difficult to construct a cynical account of the master logic driving Algeria’s national reconciliation policies. The logic of national reconciliation in Algeria, however, shifts depending on the framework through which these policies are viewed. From an exclusively juridical point of view (the one often adopted by international human rights organizations and other critics of the regime), national reconciliation in Algeria has been a kind of “victor’s justice” designed and implemented to maintain an authoritarian regime at the expense of the general population’s right to truth and accountability.⁶⁴ But when viewed through an exclusively political lens (i.e., as measures adopted towards a political settlement between the government and the armed opposition), the logic of Algeria’s national reconciliation seems like a fairly routine, almost banal set of compromise measures on the part of the government: amnesty and compensation in exchange for a laying-down of arms and a guided re-

turn to democracy where certain Islamist parties are allowed to participate and others are not (the latter being the FIS or any perceived successor such as the Wafa Party). Instead of restorative justice, Algeria's policies could be described as a kind of restorative politics designed to end the mediation of social conflict through violent means. Nonetheless, the Algerian government's approach to reconciliation, as with most domestic political matters, remains within the well-understood authoritarian and rentierist mode: buy off and divide the opposition.

What is perhaps most remarkable about Algeria's experiment with post-conflict national reconciliation is that members of the outlawed Islamist opposition, those likely to be the natural enemies of these policies (as given by the assumptions of cynical critics), have not championed the cause of a truth commission with the same vigor or same numbers as either secular victims' rights group and, more importantly, foreign human rights and monitoring organizations. Given the apparent democratic blessing both the *Concorde* and *Charte* have received, not to mention the reelection of Bouteflika (both initiatives being the main pillars of his electoral campaigns in 2004 and 2009), the actual constituencies pressing for a truth commission in Algeria are quite small. This is not to build an argument against minority or victims' rights, or a utilitarian justification for Algeria's approach. It is to suggest that Algeria's national reconciliation policies cannot be understood as driven by cynical top-down imperatives exclusively.

An important consideration in any assessment of Algeria's national reconciliation policies has to be the nature of the violence in Algeria since 1988. If we assume that Algeria's civil war was composed of neatly bifurcated politics and clearly delineated actor-identities (as is assumed in formalist studies of civil war), then it is just as simple to construct a clear picture of victims, perpetrators, victors, and survivors (as is assumed in formalist studies of transitional justice). However, it is extremely difficult to render such an account of the Algerian conflict given the extent to which much of the violence is undetermined and possibly (and ultimately) indeterminate in terms of its agency, logic, or both. *Undetermined violence* would be violence whose actors and motives have yet to be sufficiently described though there are grounds to believe that an account can be constructed. *Indeterminate violence* means the idea that there are certain acts of violence where the motives and identities, particularly of the perpetrators, cannot be recovered. To make these claims is, of course, fraught with a series of problematic onto-political assumptions. These claims also seem to constitute a strong *prima facie* argu-

ment for a truth commission in Algeria. But the point is neither to present a definitive counter-narrative of the Algerian conflict nor to suggest that opaque violence undermines the warrant for a truth commission. Rather it is to entertain the idea that there are possibilities of violence that not only supplement our understanding of a potential bottom-up logic of national reconciliation in Algeria but also challenge the conceptual frameworks of identity that govern prevailing approaches to transitional justice.

As noted above, one of the constitutive domestic and international discourses of the Algerian violence is the *Qui tue?* (Who kills?) debate. In brief, this stood for the array of questions about the identity of killers and their motives that often followed acts of violence in Algeria, whether famous, quotidian, spectacular, or banal. It also found numerous modes and outlets of expression. Perhaps the most powerful comes from French scholar Luis Martinez, who had managed to get closer to the violence, albeit during its early stages, than any other researcher. In 1995, he admitted, “In the majority of cases, we no longer know who kills who.”⁶⁵ More specifically, there is perhaps no clearer indication of the fact that much of the violence in Algeria since 1992 remains undetermined and possibly indeterminate than the questions of agency and politics surrounding the dozens of large-scale massacres of 1997 and 1998 where at least 50 people were killed in each episode. Never mind the much more frequent and numerous massacres of less than 50 persons that largely occurred between 1996 and 2002, that is, at a time when the political conflict was ostensibly subsiding.⁶⁶

We might also look to Algeria’s contested casualty figures as suggestive of the as-yet-undetermined violence, and perhaps the impossible-to-determine violence, during the past two decades. Currently, the Algerian government has settled upon a figure of 150,000 to 200,000 conflict-related deaths since the beginning of the “national tragedy” in 1992.⁶⁷ Yet the reconciliation measures have, so far, only recognized some 17,000⁶⁸ claims of government responsibility for rebel fatalities, 25,000 claims from victims of terrorism (i.e., direct and indirect survivors of insurgent violence) and 8,024 cases of civilians “disappeared” by state agents.⁶⁹ The number of persons considered possibly “disappeared” by armed opposition groups ranges between 4,000 and 10,000.⁷⁰ Given that 25,000 cases⁷¹ were considered falling out the purview of the 2005 reconciliation measures, that still leaves a majority of casualties—if we accept the 150,000 to 200,000 range—unaccounted for; that is, roughly 75,000 to 125,000 deaths for which there is no accounting. As Algerian government figures are seemingly based upon claims for compensation

(either by victims or surviving relatives), it is possible that many victims were either formally or informally excluded by the provisions of the national reconciliation policies (beyond the 25,000 mentioned) or chose not to apply for compensation out of fear, shame, pride, what have you. But then how does the Algerian government know about these 100,000 additional deaths where there have been no other formal civilian inquiry measures and the military has suggested far lower figures?⁷² The exact number of soldiers, gendarmes, police, and pro-government militias killed in the fighting has never been clear, though disputed figures from Algeria's military do not suggest that more than 20,000 combined civilian and security forces were lost as of the year 2000. Regarding civilian casualties only, the most inclusive (and highly contestable) database of massacres and bombings can only account for roughly 8,000 casualties between December 1993 and December 1998.⁷³ As the violence seems to have peaked in late 1997 and declined since then, nobody is likely to maintain that Algeria has accrued 50,000 to 100,000 additional deaths since President Bouteflika claimed 100,000 in 1999. Certainly poor reporting on the part of the Algerian security forces and interne-cine fighting between guerrilla groups could account for more insurgent deaths. Yet the highest estimates for total armed opposition strength never surpassed 30,000. Other forms of privatized violence could also possibly account for this deficit but suggesting that they compose a significant portion of these missing thousands implies some knowledge about the basic extent of such violence. Privatized and parallel violence—violence that is partially or entirely disarticulated from the putative master logic of the conflict and instead derives its motives from intimate local, familial, and personal factors—remains the least understood aspect of the Algerian conflict, if not contemporary armed conflicts generally.

Though not necessarily, the Algerian conflict can be as much defined by the breakdown in clear categories of identity—civilian, combatant, insurgent, incumbent, guerrilla, militia—as it can be defined in the collapse of a coherent logic to the violence, whether political, personal, local, national, international, economic, or criminal. With this background, one marked by extensively undetermined, indeterminate, and privatized violence, it seems increasingly difficult to maintain strict categories such as victim, perpetrator, bystander, victor, and survivor. Yet such categories are necessary for the actualization of prevailing approaches to the implementation of transitional justice. Indeed, it is only with a clear sense of who constitutes a victim and who occupies the position of perpetrator that we can begin to have a process

of transitional justice in the first place. To speak of survivors' justice is to know already who are the survivors. So the processes of transitional justice have already been completed before the initial steps are taken. Algeria's national reconciliation policies are at least provocative in their refusal—regardless of the cynical or expedient politics of that refusal—to predetermine guilt and innocence in the name of restoring dignity to the nation. We can certainly question whether or not dignity has been distributed evenly across the spectrum of constituencies in Algeria's post-conflict environment, yet the same could and should be asked of more formal transitional justice practices, especially the truth commission. Functionally speaking, there is little difference between the effects of Algeria's approach and cases where more recognizable models of transitional justice have been adopted. So what then renders Algeria's efforts a failure *a priori* within the technopolitical discourse of transitional justice? This is the question we will turn to next.

THE FUNCTIONS OF TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE

Truth commissions are ostensibly about victims. It has even been suggested that truth commissions restore the voice of the victim that has been robbed from them by repression and violence.⁷⁴ Dumisa Ntsebeza, a South African lawyer who worked as an investigator with the TRC, recalls how one of the testifiers later told the press that “she finally felt relieved. The TRC environment had been friendly. For the first time, she felt dignified and honored [. . .] The TRC seemed to believe her, which was a new experience.”⁷⁵ Others, however, have noted that truth commissions are often more exclusive than inclusive in their treatment of victims. Remarking on the South African TRC's narrative selectivity and partiality, Castillejo-Cuellar concluded, “The TRC was simultaneously a technology that rendered visible certain forms of violence while obliterating others.”⁷⁶ Here he is underscoring the TRC's focus on famous acts—for example, Biko's assassination, the Winnie Mandela football murder-conspiracy, St James Church massacre, the Gugulethu Seven, and Cradock Four—to the detriment of the generalized and structural violence of apartheid. Marlin-Curiel reminds us what is obfuscated: “With ‘victims’ and ‘perpetrators’ cast in the leading roles, everyone else became the audience. ‘Everyone else’ included bystanders of apartheid who had benefited from an unjust system.”⁷⁷ While the victim might seem central in the-

ory, in practice truth commissions, national reconciliation, and transitional justice more broadly de-center the victim in order to construct a post-conflict environment. This is not so different from Foucault's observation that the public execution of criminals had less to do with justice or the condemned and more to do with the evolving power of the sovereign state.⁷⁸ Truth commissions are not simply about the truth or victims; they are about the production of post-conflict spaces, times, and subjectivities. They work by working on the audience.

In so doing, these performances of truth and victimhood help constitute the space-time of the post-conflict environment.⁷⁹ The relationship between the spatial practices of truth commissions and the production of the post-conflict environment is acutely manifested along the temporal dimension. Truth commissions specifically and transitional justice more generally are, first and foremost, markers in time that delineate different periods. While the habits of war and authoritarianism might die hard,⁸⁰ the spaces of hope called peace and democracy can be partially constructed by erecting clear markers in time. Just as peace treaties and elections serve to bound space and time into discrete pockets, transitional justice mechanisms likewise play a role in the constitution of the post-conflict environment by inhabiting the non-space of the imaginary plane separating past (conflict, authoritarianism) and future (peace, justice). Transitional justice re-encodes space and time as peaceful by presenting itself as an institutional bulwark against the past. A tactic in transitional justice's production of post-conflict environments is its spatial and temporal transience. The limited existence and spatial impermanence of the transitional justice mechanism is dictated by its role as an institutional bridge between the alleged gap separating conflict and authoritarianism, on the one hand, and peace and democracy, on the other. It must be crossed and, once through, there is supposed to be no going back.

What is then curious about the criticisms of Algeria's approach to national reconciliation is that, functionally speaking, the various mechanisms put in place there since 1995 have all aimed at accomplishing the same effects as a truth commission (to delineate conflict/post-conflict space-time). Algeria's crime seems to have been the refusal of the government and the polity to adopt the institutional form of an internationally recognizable truth commission. From the accounts above of truth commissions and Algeria's national reconciliation policies, one could make the case that Algeria's approach is no more effective and no more flawed than any of the other con-

tingent experiments that now form the imagined, teleological history that produced the truth commission as an inevitable technological form. But this is exactly where the imperative for Algeria to adopt a truth commission comes from, from the technology itself, and not from the effects that it necessarily produces or does not. For the late post-conflict environment to be intelligible to the communities of managers whose careers are dedicated to regulating it, the late post-conflict environment must be one produced by specific technologies and institutional forms. That transitional justice and national reconciliation must take the form of a truth commission is not truly necessary except in the eyes of the technology itself and those who claim mastery over it.

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Notes

1. E.g., Amnesty International, “Algeria: Truth and justice obscured by the shadow of impunity” (Amnesty International, London, 2000). Human Rights Watch, “Impunity in the Name of Reconciliation: Algerian President’s Peace Plan Faces National Vote September 29” (Human Rights Watch, New York, 2005). Amnesty International and others, “Algeria: Amnesty Law Risks Legalizing Impunity for Crimes Against Humanity” (International Center for Transitional Justice, New York, April 14, 2005). Amnesty International and others, “Algeria: New Amnesty Law Will Ensure that Atrocities Go Unpunished” (Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, International Center for Transitional Justice and the International Federation for Human Rights, London, Paris, and New York, March 1, 2006).

2. Juan Carlos Sanz, “Abdelaziz Buteflika, presidente de Argelia: ‘No soy un dictador,’” *El País* (July 28, 1999), 4–5.

3. Quoted in Human Rights Watch, *World Report 2000: Events of 1999 (November 1998–October 1999)* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999), 336.

4. International Center for Transitional Justice, *Algerian Charter Risks Reinforcing Impunity and Undermining Reconciliation* (New York: International Center for Transitional Justice, September 26, 2005), <http://www.ictj.org/en/news/press/release/275.html>, accessed August 2010.

Western governments, on the other hand, have appeared more tolerant of Al-

geria's national reconciliation policies. In the run-up to the vote on Algeria's 2005 Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation, the EU Commission said that it "hopes that the charter process will be conducted in such a manner that the final result will pave the way towards stability and renewed prosperity in the country" ("EU/Algeria: Amnesty International in Fresh Appeal Against Human Rights Abuses," *European Report* (September 3, 2005), retrieved from Lexis-Nexis).

Following the referendum the US State Department spokesperson said, "Each individual country has to find its own pathway [. . .] This is one particular pathway that, if the Algerian people approve it, will be one best suited for Algeria" (quoted in Elaine Ganley, "Algerian voters overwhelmingly back plan to end Islamic insurgency in boost for president," *Associated Press* (September 30, 2005), retrieved from Lexis-Nexis). Russia's Foreign Ministry seemed more enthusiastic: "We hope that the referendum will usher in an important stage in Algeria's progress towards eradicating all manifestations of terrorism" ("Russia sees Algerian referendum as step towards eradicating terrorism," *BBC Worldwide Monitoring* (September 30, 2005), retrieved from Lexis-Nexis).

5. Abderrahmane Moussaoui, "Algérie, La Réconciliation Entre Espoirs Et Malentendus," *Politique étrangère*, no. 2 (2007): 339–52.

6. International Crisis Group, "The Civil Concord: A Peace Initiative Wasted" (International Crisis Group, Brussels, July 9, 2001). Valerie Arnould, "Amnesty, Peace and Reconciliation in Algeria," *Conflict, Security & Development* 7, no. 2 (2007): 227–53. George E. Joffé, "National Reconciliation and General Amnesty in Algeria," *Mediterranean Politics* 13, no. 2 (2008): 213–28.

7. The 2010 US State Department global human rights report claimed that Algerian government forces had killed 518 "suspected terrorists," while armed groups allegedly killed 220 security forces and 66 civilians in 2009. This reportedly represented a 66 percent increase on the total for 2008.

8. According to the South African Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation's "Justice in Perspective" website, <http://www.justiceinperspective.org.za> (accessed August 2010). The number could be much higher if one adds initiatives without government or international legal sanction.

9. Looking well outside of the twentieth century, Elster provides a historical reconstruction of transitional justice in Ancient Greece (ca. 2500 BP) and the French Restoration (1814 and 1815): Jon Elster, *Closing the Books: Transitional Justice in Historical Perspective* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

For other historical perspectives, and the specific phenomenon of "historical" truth commissions (commissions whose focus is less contemporary), see John Laughland, *A History of Political Trials: From Charles I to Saddam Hussein* (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2008). Jeffrey K. Olick, *The Politics of Regret: On Collective Memory and Historical Responsibility* (London: Routledge, 2007). Alexander M. Karn, "Depolarizing the Past: The Role of Historical Commissions in Conflict Mediation and Reconciliation," *Journal of International Affairs* 60, no. 1 (2006): 31–50. Elazar Barkan and Alexander M. Karn, *Taking Wrongs Seriously: Apologies and Reconciliation* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006). *Politics and the Past: On Repairing His-*

torical Injustices, ed. John C. Torpey (Lanham, MD, and Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003). Elazar Barkan, *The Guilt of Nations: Restitution and Negotiating Historical Injustices* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001).

10. Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era*, 2nd ed. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007).

11. The recent trend in such practices has been towards “hybridized” domestic-international courts, as in Cambodia and Sierra Leone, which are currently prosecuting cases of gross human rights violations and crimes against humanity. In 2006, the Security Council also ordered another special tribunal for assassinations, including former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, to be based in The Hague. The United Kingdom’s 1998 detention of General Augusto Pinochet, and the threat of extradition to Spain for charges of genocide, became a watershed for the idea of universal jurisdiction and a broadening of the scope of transitional justice; see Kingsley Chiedu Moghalu, *Global Justice: The Politics of War Crimes Trials* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006).

Notably, there have also been Spanish attempts to apply this precedent to General Efraín Ríos Montt of Guatemala for similar charges (on the “Pinochet effect” see Naomi Roht-Arriaza, *The Pinochet Effect: Transnational Justice in the Age of Human Rights* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006). *Prosecuting Heads of State*, ed. Ellen L. Lutz and Caitlin Reiger (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009)).

Founded in 2002, the permanent International Criminal Court in The Hague is currently pursuing cases related to recent or ongoing conflicts in Uganda, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan (Darfur), and the Central African Republic. The recent indictment of Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir by the ICC brought significant international attention to the court’s processes and politics.

12. As of 2007, according to Amnesty International, there have been a total of thirty-two truth commissions in twenty-eight different countries, starting with Uganda in 1974. The United States Institute for Peace, however, claims forty-one, dividing these into twenty-six truth commissions and fifteen lesser “commissions of inquiry.”

13. Mark Freeman, *Truth Commissions and Procedural Fairness* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), xiii–xiv.

14. Priscilla B. Hayner, “Fifteen Truth Commissions—1974 to 1994: A Comparative Study,” *Human Rights Quarterly* 16, no. 4 (1994): 597–655.

15. Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, *Basic Writings of Nietzsche*, ed. and trans. Walter Arnold Kaufmann (New York: Modern Library, 1992).

16. Still, within the normative literature, whether academic or non-governmental, comparative studies, procedural discussions, and ethical debates are most dominant: e.g., *Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes* [3 volumes], ed. Neil J. Kritz (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1995). Nicole Ball, “The Challenge of Rebuilding War-Torn Societies,” in *Managing Global Chaos*, ed. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela R. Aall (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace

Press, 1996). Priscilla B. Hayner, "International Guidelines for the Creation and Operation of Truth Commissions: A Preliminary Proposal," *Law and Contemporary Problems* 59, no. 4 (1996): 173–80. John Paul Lederach, *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1997). *Burying the Past: Making Peace and Doing Justice After Civil Conflict*, ed. Nigel Biggar (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2001). Andrew Rigby, *Justice and Reconciliation: After the Violence* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, March 2001). *Reconciliation After Violent Conflict: A Handbook*, ed. David Bloomfield, Terri Barnes, and Lucien Huyse (Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2003). David A. Crocker, "Reckoning with Past Wrongs: A Normative Framework," in *Dilemmas of Reconciliation: Cases and Concepts*, ed. C. A. L. Prager and Trudy Govier (Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2003). *The Politics of Past Evil: Religion, Reconciliation, and the Dilemmas of Transitional Justice*, ed. Daniel Philpott, Kroc Institute series on religion, conflict, and peace building (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2006). *After Mass Crime: Rebuilding States and Communities*, ed. Béatrice Pouligny, Simon Chesterman, and Albrecht Schnabel (New York: United Nations University Press, 2007).

17. Crocker, "Reckoning with past wrongs." Teresa Godwin Phelps, *Shattered Voices: Language, Violence, and the Work of Truth Commissions* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004).

18. Rwanda's National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC) came out of the 1993 Arusha Accords but did not become operational until 1999; it is a permanent commission within the government rather than an independent ad hoc body.

19. And thus endless efforts to reconcile these tensions; e.g., Helena Cobban, *Amnesty After Atrocity?: Healing Nations After Genocide and War Crimes* (Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2007).

20. Quoted in Greg Grandin and Thomas Miller Klubock, "Editor's Introduction," *Radical History Review*, no. 97 (2007): 1–10.

21. E.g., Julie Flint and Alex de Waal, "To Put Justice Before Peace Spells Disaster for Sudan," *The Guardian* (March 6, 2009), <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/mar/06/sudan-war-crimes>, accessed August 2010.

22. Annalise E. Acorn, *Compulsory Compassion: A Critique of Restorative Justice* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2004), 10–11.

23. Martha Minow, "Breaking the Cycles of Hatred," in *Breaking the Cycles of Hatred: Memory, Law, and Repair*, ed. Martha Minow and Nancy L. Rosenblum (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 17.

24. For Mamdani's statement on survivors' and victors' justice, see Mahmood Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2001), 270–73. For Mamdani's critique of the ICC's intervention in Sudan, see Mahmood Mamdani, *Saviors and Survivors: Darfur, Politics, and the War on Terror* (New York: Pantheon Books, 2009).

25. Veerle Opgenhaffen and Mark Freeman, "Transitional Justice in Morocco: A Progress Report" (International Center for Transitional Justice, New York, November 2005), 18.

26. Aboubakr Jamaï, "Les Survivants De Hassan II," *Le Journal Hebdomadaire* (August 4, 2006), http://www.lejournal-hebdo.com/article.php3?id_article=8960, no longer accessible; on file with author. The government closed down *Le Journal*—arguably the most important magazine of dissent in Morocco—in 2009.

27. Opgenhaffen and Freeman, "Transitional Justice in Morocco: A Progress Report," 17–18.

28. Freeman, *Truth Commissions*, 227–28.

29. Another way in which victims are often spoken for (particularly by post-conflict experts) occurs in the exhumation of mass graves. One forensic anthropologist conceived of her work as having "helped [victims'] voices be heard in the courtroom and the history books": Clea Koff, *The Bone Woman: A Forensic Anthropologist's Search for Truth in the Mass Graves of Rwanda, Bosnia, Croatia, and Kosovo* (New York: Random House, 2004), 226.

As with the role of the truth commission, legal scholar Anne Orford notes that processes such as "the mass exhumation of bodies from unmarked graves" becomes "a performance that generates meaning and allocates guilt and innocence": Anne Orford, *Reading Humanitarian Intervention: Human Rights and the Use of Force in International Law* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 195.

30. Amnesty International, "Liberia: Towards the final phase of the truth and reconciliation commission" (Amnesty International, London, July 2008), 21.

31. Phelps, *Shattered Voices*, 124–27.

32. Quoted in Hayner, "Fifteen Truth Commissions," 628.

33. United Nations Security Council, "From Madness to Hope: The 12-year war in El Salvador. Report of the Commission on the Truth for El Salvador" (United Nations, New York, 1993), Annex.

34. See Priscilla B. Hayner, *Unspeakable Truths: Facing the Challenge of Truth Commissions* (London: Routledge, 2002), 38–40. Thomas Buergenthal, "The United Nations Truth Commission for El Salvador," *Vanderbilt Journal of International Law* 27, no. 3 (1994): 497–544.

35. Federico Borello, "A first few steps: The Long Road to a Just Peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo" (International Center for Transitional Justice, New York, October 2004), 14.

36. Laura Davis and Priscilla B. Hayner, *Difficult Peace, Limited Justice: Ten Years of Peacemaking in the DRC* (International Center for Transitional Justice, New York, March 2009), 21–22.

37. Quoted in "EU/Algeria: Amnesty International in Fresh Appeal Against Human Rights Abuses" (September 3, 2005), retrieved from Lexis-Nexis.

38. Richard J. Goldstone, *For Humanity: Reflections of a War Crimes Investigator* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 71.

39. E.g., Klein, *The Shock Doctrine*, 194–217.

40. For more background, recent narratives of colonial and post-colonial Algeria have been produced by Martin Evans and John Phillips: *Algeria: Anger of the Dispossessed* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008). Jonathan N. C. Hill, *Identity in Algerian Politics: The Legacy of Colonial Rule* (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, 2009). James D. Le Sueur, *Between Democracy and Terror: Algeria Since 1989* (New York: Zed, 2010).

41. On Algeria's economy and the economic aspects of Algeria's conflict, see Bradford Louis Dillman, *State and Private Sector in Algeria: The Politics of Rent-Seeking and Failed Development* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2000). Abdelaziz Testas, "The Economic Causes of Algeria's Political Violence," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 13, no. 3 (2001): 127–44. Luis Martinez, "Why the Violence in Algeria?," *Journal of North African Studies* 9, no. 2 (2004): 14–27. Miriam R. Lowi, *Oil Wealth and the Poverty of Politics: Algeria Compared* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

42. A detailed examination of Algerian elites and structures of rule can be found in Isabelle Werenfels, *Managing Instability in Algeria: Elites and Political Change Since 1995* (London and New York: Routledge, 2007).

A shorter analysis of intra-regime dynamics can be found in Hugh Roberts, *Demilitarizing Algeria* (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC, May 2007).

43. For an analysis of the insurgency's various motives, see Luis Martinez, *The Algerian Civil War, 1990–1998*, trans. Jonathan Derrick, The CERI series in comparative politics and international studies (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000).

More recent attempts to understand the conflict can be found in Abderrahmane Moussaoui, *De La Violence En Algérie: Les Lois Du Chaos* (Algiers: Barazakh, 2006), and Salma Belaala, "Ethnicité, nationalisme et radicalisation islamiste violente. Etude culturelle du djihadisme en Algérie (1989–2007)" (Institut d'Études Politiques de Paris, Paris, 2008).

An account of the insurgency from the Algerian regime's point of view can be found in Liess Boukra, *Algérie: La Terreur Sacrée* (Lausanne: Favre, 2002).

44. For an analysis of Algerian politics at this precise historical moment, see Hugh Roberts, "Algeria's Ruinous Impasse and the Honourable Way Out," *International Affairs* 71, no. 2 (1995): 247–67.

45. For example, Fayçal Karabadji, "L'Économie Algérienne Menacée Par La Mafia Politico-Financière," *Le Monde diplomatique* (1998).

46. One account analyzes the "Qui tue?" discourse from the perspective of a specific and generic cultural propensity towards conspiracy theorizing: Paul A. Silverstein, "An Excess of Truth: Violence, Conspiracy Theorizing and the Algerian Civil War," *Anthropological Quarterly* 75, no. 4 (2002): 643–74.

47. While women were more often portrayed as the victims of the Islamist rebels only, two infamous cases in Algeria demonstrated that women also participated in the insurgency: Zohra "Nacéra" Ould Hamrane, a publicly accused par-

ticipant in the Bentalha massacre of September 1997, and GIA leader Antar Zouabri's sister, Nacera "Khadidja" Zouabri. See also the memoir of "Nadia," an anonymous and somewhat ambivalent female participant in the GIA: Baya Gacemi, *Moi, Nadia, Femme D'un Emir Du GIA* (Paris: Seuil, 1998). It is available in English with an Americanized title: Baya Gacemi, *I, Nadia, Wife of a Terrorist*, trans. Paul Cote and Constantina Mitchell (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2006).

48. See particularly Mohammed Samraoui, *Chronique Des Années De Sang. Algérie: Comment Les Services Secrets Ont Manipulé Les Groupes Islamistes* (Paris: Denoël, 2003). Abdelkader Tigha and Philippe Lobjois, *Contre-Espionnage Algérien: Notre Guerre Contre Les Islamistes* (Paris: Nouveau monde, 2008).

Martinez even jokingly calls the GIA the "Groupe infiltré armé" (Armed Infiltrated Group); see Luis Martinez, "Algérie: Les Massacres De Civils Dans La Guerre," *Revue Internationale de Politique Comparée* 8, no. 1 (2001): 43–58.

49. International Crisis Group, "The Civil Concorde," 6, 8.

50. Amnesty International, "Algeria: Truth and Justice Obscured," 4.

51. Mohammed M. Hafez, "Armed Islamist Movements and Political Violence in Algeria," *Middle East Journal* 54, no. 4 (2000): 572–91. Amnesty International, "Algeria: Truth and Justice Obscured," 4–5.

52. Florence Aubenas, "Plus de 9 000 morts cette année en Algérie," *Libération* (January 5, 2001).

Based on press accounts, the 2001 State Department's global human rights report only recorded 2,500 deaths in Algeria during the year 2000.

53. Taking issue with the vocabulary of "civil concord," Hadj Moussa criticized the Algerian government for not deploying the terminology of "national reconciliation" because the latter would imply an effort to give voice to the various narratives of suffering. While the majority of Hadj Moussa's argument still stands, the passage of the 2005 *Charte* perhaps shows that there is no essence to the term *reconciliation* that necessarily demands polyvocality. See Ratiba Hadj Moussa, "The Imaginary Concord and the Reality of Discord: Dealing with the Algerian Civil War," *Arab World Geographer* 7, no. 3 (2004): 135–49.

54. Algeria's pro-government civilian militias are another legacy issue of the 1990s that has received little attention internationally, particularly their possible role in any atrocities (e.g., disappearances and massacres). The number of self-forming and government-sponsored civilian militias in Algeria in the 1990s remains unclear; figures range between tens of thousands to half a million; see Salah-Eddine Sidhoum and Algeria Watch, "Les milices dans la nouvelle guerre d'Algérie" (Algeria Watch, Berlin, December 2003). The latter estimate would make self-defense, anti-Islamist and pro-government militias the most well-manned fighting force in the country, far ahead of the combined national army, intelligence, gendarmerie, police, and other security forces.

The alleged excesses of Algeria's state-armed and state-financed civilian counter-insurgency forces briefly came to international attention in April 1998 when two militia leaders were charged with committing serious crimes, includ-

ing a number of disappearances and summary executions. However, they were quickly released and never faced subsequent criminal proceedings; see Human Rights Watch, "Time for Reckoning: Enforced Disappearances in Algeria" (Human Rights Watch, New York, 2003), 27–28. Mohamed Smaïn, *Relizane Dans La Tourmente: Silence! On Tue* (St. Denis: Bouchène, 2004). Subsequent efforts to hold these militia leaders and their relatives accountable in French courts have also failed; see José Garçon, "La 'sale guerre' algérienne rebondit en France," *Libération* (March 31, 2004).

Unlike the contingent amnesty for insurgents, the 2005 *Charte* provided blanket amnesty for all pro-government militias, not to mention members of the security, intelligence, and defense forces, for crimes that they, of course, had never committed in the first place.

55. For a recent example of such state-society tensions, see Human Rights Watch, "Algeria: Stop Suppressing Protests" (Human Rights Watch, New York, May 3, 2010).

56. Quoted in Amnesty International, *Algeria: Briefing to the Human Rights Committee* (London: Amnesty International, October 1, 2007), 7.

57. Hayner, *Unspeakable Truths*, 328–32.

58. Due in part to the international pressure concerning the specific question of Algerians disappeared by state agents in the 1990s, the government launched a new initiative in September 2003 to address this issue. The *Commission d'enquête ad hoc chargée de la question des disparus* (known as the *mécanisme ad hoc*), headed by the national human rights monitoring body (attached to the presidency), was charged with an eighteen-month mandate to act as an interface between the government and the families of the disappeared, to gather all available information on each case and propose solutions to the issue.

See Human Rights Watch, "Truth and Justice on Hold: The New State Commission on "Disappearances" (Human Rights Watch, New York, 2003), 3–5. Fédération Internationale des Ligues des Droits de l'Homme, "Les commissions de vérité et de réconciliation: l'expérience marocaine" (Fédération Internationale des Ligues des Droits de l'Homme, Paris, July 2004), 53. Freeman, *Truth Commissions*, 19–20.

When the *mécanisme's* mandate expired in March 2005, President Bouteflika reportedly received its final report, though it was never made public. However, on national radio, it was publicly disclosed that the *mécanisme* had arrived at a figure of 6,146 persons disappeared by government forces and that its recommendation was to offer compensation, though without formal inquiries or accountability (Interview, SOS Disparus, Algiers, May 26, 2008). In March 2009, the Algerian government, at a meeting of human rights NGOs, gave a new figure for the disappeared: 8,023 (Agathe Duparc, "Les familles algériennes de disparus en quête de justice," *Le Monde* (March 11, 2009)).

59. Andrew England, "Algerians count cost of burying the past with their missing sons," *Financial Times* (July 3, 2007), accessed March 2011.

By the end of 2008, the Ministry of National Solidarity, which handles civil

compensation, reported doling out \$120 million in packages covering 12,000 cases "Réconciliation nationale: Plus de 12 000 dossiers réglés au 31 décembre 2008," *Liberté (Algiers)* (February 26, 2009).

60. Samira Belamri, "Algeria: Government Creates Special Fund for Terrorism Victims," *Echorouk (Algiers)* (May 15, 2008), <http://www.echoroukonline.com/eng/index.php?news=852>, accessed March 2011.

61. Interview, journalist with *El Watan*, Algiers, May 25, 2008.

62. Lamine Chikhi, "Algeria Ex-Rebels Say Cash Key to Weakening Qaeda," *Reuters* (July 15, 2009), <http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSLF115023>, accessed March 2011.

63. Salima Tlemçani, "Application De La Charte Pour La Réconciliation Nationale: 300 Dossiers De Terroristes Ont Été Rejetés," *El Watan (Algiers)* (May 11, 2008), <http://www.elwatan.com/archives/article.php?id=93925>, accessed July 2010.

64. For example, see Souâd Belhaddad, *Algérie, Le Prix De L'oubli. 1992-2005* (Paris: Flammarion, 2005), and the collection of essays by Algerian dissidents, *Quelle Réconciliation Pour L'Algérie?* (Geneva, Switzerland: Hoggar, 2005).

65. In Simon Catherine, "Vertiges meurtriers en Algérie," *Le Monde* (September 14, 1995), retrieved from Lexis-Nexis.

Martinez, it should be noted, published the only monograph on the Algerian conflict during the 1990s that was based upon extended field research: Martinez, *The Algerian Civil War*. That he came to this conclusion after interviewing several actor types (e.g., participants and profiteers) is highly indicative of the opacity of the violence.

66. The internationalized debate surrounding the questions of agency and motive behind the Algerian violence generally and the 1997-98 massacres specifically are examined in Jacob Mundy, "Expert Intervention: Knowledge, Violence and Identity During the Algerian Crisis, 1997-1998," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 23, no. 1 (2010): 25-47; Jacob Mundy, "Deconstructing Civil Wars: Beyond the New Wars Debate," *Security Dialogue* 42, no. 3 (2011): 279-95; Jacob Mundy, "'Wanton and Senseless' Revisited: The Study of Warfare in Civil Conflicts and the Historiography of the Algerian Massacres," *African Studies Review* 56, no. 3 (2013): 25-55.

67. "Algérie: entre 150.000 et 200.000 morts depuis 1992 dans les violences (Ksentini)," *Agence France-Presse* (March 18, 2006), retrieved from Lexis-Nexis.

68. Nazim Fethi, "National Reconciliation Moves Forward in Algeria," *Magharebia* (October 1, 2009), http://www.magharebia.com/cocoon/awi/xhtml1/en_GB/features/awi/features/2009/10/01/feature-01, accessed March 2011.

69. Adlène Meddi, "Gouvernement-familles des disparus: La rupture" (March 26, 2010).

The highest official estimate for civilians who were "disappeared" by security forces and allied militias is 12,000. See Human Rights Watch, "Time for Reckoning," 15.

70. Human Rights Watch, "Truth and Justice on Hold: The New State Commission on 'Disappearances,'" 11-12.

71. Fethi, "National Reconciliation."

72. In 2002, General Abderrezak Maïza, then heading Algeria's primary military command, seemingly contradicted President Abdelaziz Bouteflika's 1999 claim of 100,000 (which has since become 150,000 to 200,000). Maïza stated that the conflict had claimed 37,000 lives between 1992 and 2000; of those, more than 15,200 had been insurgents: "Algeria: Army general says there are 650 terrorists 'all groups included,'" *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts* (October 27, 2002), "Fewer than 650 Islamic extremists active in Algeria: general," *Agence France-Presse* (October 27, 2002), both retrieved from Lexis-Nexis.

When asked about the higher figures maintained by Bouteflika, Maïza said, "100,000 dead, that's a political number. [. . .] Me, I have the names" (quoted in Hugué Vincent and Baya Gacemi, "Algérie: les généraux sabre au clair," *L'Express* (November 7, 2002)).

73. See Aït-Larbi and others, "An Anatomy of the Massacres," in *An Inquiry Into the Algerian Massacres*, ed. Youcef Bedjaoui, Abbas Aroua, and Méziane Aït-Larbi (Geneva: Hoggar, 1999): 13–195.

74. Phelps, *Shattered Voices*, 5–6.

75. Dumisa B. Ntsebeza, "The Uses of Truth Commissions: Lessons for the World," in *Truth v. Justice: The Morality of Truth Commissions*, ed. Robert I. Rotberg and Dennis F. Thompson (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 160.

76. Alejandro Castillejo-Cuellar, "Knowledge, Experience, and South Africa's Scenarios of Forgiveness," *Radical History Review*, no. 97 (2007): 11–42.

77. Stephanie Marlin-Curiel, "Re-Collecting the Collective: Mediatized Memory and the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission," in *The Image and the Witness: Trauma, Memory and Visual Culture*, ed. Francis Guerin and Roger Hallas (London: Wallflower Press, 2007), 69.

78. Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage, 1995).

79. To use Judith Butler's sense of the performative; see Judith Butler, *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity* (New York: Routledge, 2006), 34.

80. Brandon Hamber, "Living with the Legacy of Impunity: Lessons for South Africa about Truth, Justice and Crime in Brazil," *Latin American Report* 13, no. 2 (1998): 4–16.

CHAPTER 4

Refugees

The Work of Exile

Protracted Refugee Situations and the New Palestinian Normal

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ABSTRACT

Protracted refugee situations are becoming increasingly important to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and other UN and aid agencies. This is because protracted refugee situations not only signal the failure of a universal human rights regime but also compel the UNHCR to become a quasi-state structure providing emergency aid to chronic refugee crises. This chapter looks at Palestinians under the mandate of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency. This has been the longest protracted refugee situation in the world and yet by virtue of being outside the mandate of UNHCR has been marginalized in the regimes of knowledge and practice that manage refugees. The chapter argues that while increasing attention is being provided to protracted refugee situations, it may be useful to draw the Palestinian case more centrally into this discussion because UNHCR's involvement in such situations is making it evolve towards an UNRWA model. In other words, UNRWA is becoming the norm not the exception to refugee studies and can offer valuable insights into the politics of protracted refugee situations of today.

INTRODUCTION

In December 1949, the United Nations General Assembly voted to establish the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)

for an initial period of three years. Today around 42.5 million people in the world are “persons of concern” to the UNHCR, still the lead international agency that manages refugees, as well as Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), asylum seekers, stateless persons, persons in refugee-like conditions, and so forth.¹ Asia and Africa have the largest numbers of refugees and persons in refugee-like conditions that the UNHCR handles; Asia has approximately 18 million while Africa has 10 million persons that are of concern, according to UNHCR statistics. Of these, 7 million refugees are in protracted refugee situations.² According to Gil Loescher and James Milner, “This estimate does not include many of those long-term displaced in urban settings around the world or smaller residual displaced populations who remain in exile after others have returned home. Nor does it include the millions of Palestinian refugees throughout the Middle East under the mandate of UNRWA, the UN Relief and Works Administration.”³

In the beginning, the primary task of UNHCR was to provide protection and solutions to European refugees displaced due to World War II who had still not been resettled. They had been temporarily housed in camps, and these lasted through the 1950s. Liisa Malkki points out that it was at this time that the refugee camp “became emplaced as a standardized, generalizable technology of power in the management of mass displacement,” and it was also in this time that an entire apparatus of administrators, social scientists, journalists, and refugees themselves defined the refugee as a knowable figure and refugee relief as a standardized practice.⁴ It was only after the Hungarian uprising in 1956, and the appeal by UNHCR to major Western governments to provide funds and resettlement quotas, that this protracted refugee situation was finally resolved by the mid-1960s.⁵

Among UN agencies, the UNHCR is unique in that it is both an individual represented by the High Commissioner as well as a bureaucracy with its specific culture and value system.⁶ The organization has built its legacy and expanded its operations through long political and financial struggles with various states in developing and developed countries.⁷ It has also had to overcome (i.e., through the 1967 Protocol) the early geographical and temporal restrictions of being limited to post-World War II Europe inscribed in its foundational mandate. None of this has been without cause. While European refugees received assistance and protection from UNHCR, refugees from the developing world were excluded from its mandate. However, as a result of de-colonizing processes, UNHCR found itself getting increasingly involved in the developing world, compelling the United Nations to expand

and renew its mandate. It is important to note here what exactly constitutes a refugee in UN terms. The specific definition of refugees covered under the UNHCR mandate are those who are fleeing due to a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership of a social group. In other words, the Convention definition of a refugee favored a person or persons who were being persecuted because of political values. This definition reflected the Cold War rivalries of that period but did not suit the changing realities of the world, particularly in the Global South where large numbers of people fled due to civil wars and other disturbances.⁸

In the 1960s, for example, de-colonization led to large refugee movements in Africa. Unlike the refugee crises in Europe, the African context appeared to be more complex as instabilities appeared in many, often neighboring countries. By the end of the 1960s, two-thirds of UNCHR's budget was focused on operations in Africa, prompting a call for revisions to the organization's mandate and hence the adoption of the 1967 Protocol. In the 1970s, UNHCR refugee operations continued to spread around the globe, catering to, amongst others, refugees from the Vietnam War.⁹ Regional conventions such as the Organization of African Unity Refugee Convention of 1969 and the Cartagena Declaration of 1984 have expanded the definition of refugees to incorporate the changing demographics of forced migrants.

Meanwhile, the end of the Cold War and more recently the post-9/11 landscape prioritize security over human rights. Unsurprisingly, sympathy and protection for refugees has increasingly turned into suspicion, rejection, and an attempt to contain and control refugee crises and populations in countries and regions where they occur rather than allowing refugees to seek asylum in First World countries.¹⁰ This has led to the re-development of protracted refugee situations, which has become a growing concern for scholars and practitioners alike. Protracted refugee situations are among some of the most complex humanitarian situations. These crises have consequences for the human rights of refugees including their right to mobility, to seek paid employment, and so forth. Refugees living in "chronic exile" are often compelled to live in camps or move discreetly to urban areas.

This chapter argues that the protracted refugee crises are evolving towards conditions of Palestinian refugees living under the administration of UNRWA. Palestinian refugees are the oldest protracted refugee situation in the world today, but because they are under the mandate of UNRWA not UNHCR, they are seen as being the exception to the norm of refugee studies.

However, given the changing nature of protection towards refugees today, it might be more useful to think of how UNRWA has become the new normal mode of refugee protection and assistance. This chapter draws upon field-work conducted in Palestinian camps in Beirut, Lebanon in 2006–7 and compares their socio-political and spatial conditions with those of other protracted refugee crises to draw insights from and linkages with each other.¹¹

PLANNING FOR PROTRACTION

The focus on protracted refugee crises is quite recent. Milner and Loescher point out that in 2009, the Executive Committee (Excom) of the UNHCR adopted an ExCom Conclusion on protracted refugee crises after a decade of discussion amongst refugee policy, search, and advocacy communities. While the conclusions are not binding they reflect a broad consensus with regard to international protection.¹² Protracted refugee crises affect developing countries disproportionately as they host considerably higher numbers of refugees. In many host countries governments prefer putting refugees in camps for security reasons. Host governments claim it makes aid delivery and protection of refugees easier, but actually putting refugees in camps is meant to control them and separate them from the local population.¹³ In fact, protracted refugee crises can pit refugee populations against host populations as they compete with each other over scarce resources over time. Additionally, the militarization of several refugee populations provides adequate cause for concern amongst host countries attempting to protect their sovereignty.¹⁴ Nevertheless, the response to protracted refugee crises through encampment serves to disenfranchise refugees as they are denied basic rights they are entitled to under UNHCR's guidelines, such as the right to mobility and the right to access paid employment as mentioned earlier.¹⁵ Prolonged incarceration puts a variety of different pressures on refugees that range from human rights violations to struggles over adequate space and shelter, especially as populations grow and change in camp spaces. Years spent in “temporary quarters” give rise to the need for more permanent structures, infrastructure and employment needs, social services, and so forth. Refugee camps that begin as tents evolve into sites filled with semi-permanent or permanent structures often resembling squatter settlements and slums of developing countries.

The development of refugee camps over the years into settlements of thousands of people has raised the question of whether they can be considered “emergency urbanism,” or “exigent cities.”¹⁶ While some scholars have argued that refugee camps can be viewed as *camp-villes* (city camps), a stunted city-to-be but not as full cities, others have argued that eventually refugee camps can present the features of a virtual city.¹⁷ While there are many camps for which such descriptions may be appropriate, refugees and refugee camps are not generalizable. Further, it is unclear as to what city is being used as the “model” against which these camps or “cities-to-be-made” are being compared. Agier’s description of refugee camps as naked “city-to-be-made” rests on the notion that camps are constantly managed and people are forever in a state of quarantine, thus transposing the legal nature of the camp on the physical space itself.¹⁸ Yet, the complexity of camp planning can show that nothing can be further from the truth. Many different kinds of camps exist ranging from self-settled to planned camps in a variety of locations that make “management” of camps a varied experience.¹⁹

Planning by international aid and humanitarian agencies for displaced populations has traditionally attempted to create settlements that provide emergency shelter and limited development. However, the realities of refuge have changed to more prolonged exile. The term *transitional settlement* attempts to capture the complexity of displacement by defining it as “settlement and shelter resulting from conflict and natural disasters, ranging from emergency response to durable solutions.”²⁰ There is thus a growing recognition that perhaps settlements are not so temporary anymore, and in fact steps need to be taken to ensure that they cooperate and coordinate appropriately with local governments and communities. Various handbooks ranging from the United Nations Handbook for Emergencies, the Sphere Project and the *Transitional Settlements, Displaced Populations* book by Tom Corsellis and Antonella Vitale lay out guidelines for planning different types of camps for displaced people.²¹

Such planning guidelines are largely aimed towards non-urban, planned camps. The logic for this is obvious as urban self-settled refugees are much more difficult for humanitarian organizations to cater to. As Corsellis and Vitale point out, refugees often settle in the urban periphery along with “squatters” and other slum dwellers whose shelter practices are often viewed by the state as illegal and deviant. While refugees are treated as victims of persecution and deserving victims, often slum dwellers and squatters, many of whom are migrants who came to the city for similar reasons, are treated

differently. As Ranabir Samaddar points out, while there are no discernible differences between the two groups, there has been an artificial divide created between them. Perhaps the only distinguishing feature between the two groups is that while migration due to structural violence is endemic, refugee movements can at best be categorized as climactic.²² However, dividing migrants into these categories (refugee: good, migrant: bad) allows states to exert some control over migration and how rights and privileges can be distributed between groups. For aid agencies, addressing the needs of refugees in such settlements thus becomes tricky as “slums” of the developing world experience housing and shelter practices that are far below international standards.²³ Yet, increasingly, refugees are moving to urban centers as they provide better opportunities for jobs.²⁴ Planning for refugees at the interface of urban poverty thus raises challenges for international organizations who expect higher standards for displaced populations yet have to contend with urban practices in which the poor live in far more abysmal conditions.

Planning camps for long-term displacement can help refugees survive, but does so by continuing the marginalization of refugee populations. Ultimately, there is a real danger that camps in protracted refugee situations can turn into spaces of despair with refugees languishing in them for decades with no solution in sight and few meaningful ways for them to engage with the host society.²⁵

The humanitarian administration of camps by UNHCR and other humanitarian organizations while critical and laudable can have an uncomfortable technocratic element to it. Scholars have argued that populations are reduced to bare life where they are subject to control, order, and discipline by humanitarian organizations. Their political lives are stripped away, and they are reduced to populations that can be counted, classified, and managed.²⁶ In this unfortunate turn in refugee affairs, humanitarian organizations that should be fighting against the powers that produce such conditions became, by default, their handmaidens. By submitting to a liberal humanitarian regime, they depoliticize the politics of exile and the people suffering through it.²⁷

UNRWA AND THE POLITICS OF REFUGE

Of all the protracted refugee crises, Palestinians living under the mandate of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the

Near East (UNRWA) are the oldest. The mandate of UNRWA, although a temporary one at its conception, attempted to provide shelter and protection for the Palestinians until a solution was found for their situation. It has been over sixty years since the Palestinians have been displaced, and their situation has remained the same. UNRWA has found its mandate continuously renewed every three years, and the Palestinian camps under its protection have grown and evolved in different ways.²⁸ The spatial development of Palestinian refugee camps provides a way of understanding the politics and spatial outcomes of protracted refugee crises.

Palestinian refugee camps were born out of the Arab-Israeli conflict in 1948. The conflict began largely with the second wave of Jewish immigration into Palestine between 1904 and 1914. In contrast with earlier Jewish migration, these newer immigrants insisted on Jewish labor on Jewish land, which stemmed from a socialist ideology and was quite unlike their predecessors who hired and got along with the Arab population. Their political ambitions to establish a separate Jewish identity led to hostility among Arabs who also lived on the land.²⁹ Eventually clashes between the two communities began to take place and intensified over time. The UN General Assembly's Resolution 181 of November 1947 recommending the partition of Palestine led to armed clashes between Arabs and Jews. The first exodus of Arabs out of Palestine took place between December 1947 and March 1948 from areas earmarked for Jewish statehood and areas adjacent to them. Most of those who fled were from the Arab upper and middle classes. Most of the rural population from what was to later become the heartland of the Jewish state (the coastal plain between Tel Aviv and Hadera and smaller evacuations from other rural areas faced with fighting) also left.³⁰

The conflict, which lasted from November 1947 to July 1949, led to the expulsion or flight of some 750,000–900,000 people from Palestine, the vast majority of them Arabs. The General Assembly's subsequent Resolution 194 of December 1948 stating that those "refugees wishing to return to their homes and live in peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss or damage to property," was never implemented. Israel refused to allow the repatriation of Arab refugees, most of whose villages had been destroyed.³¹ Palestinians who had fled the fighting were scattered over a number of different Arab states and territories within what was once the British Mandate of Palestine. Several aid agencies such as the Red Cross and the American Friends Service Committee

amongst others provided emergency provisions and care. This included setting up camps, registering refugees, and providing tents and rations. UNRWA took over these operations once it began its operations and inherited the refugee registration records from the International Red Cross.³² The agency began its operations on May 1, 1950, and has had its mandate renewed every three years until today. As UNRWA was established a few days before the UNHCR Statute took effect and well before the 1951 Geneva Convention, it resulted in Palestinians from UNRWA's areas of operations being excluded from UNHCR's mandate.³³

UNRWA's operations have evolved from 1949, from providing emergency services to Palestinian refugees, to becoming a quasi-welfare state structure that provides education, health, relief, and social services inside and outside the camps. It maintains records and archives of Palestinian refugees within its fields of operations. This it does while frequently struggling to meet budgetary needs and being accused from both the Palestinian and Israeli sides, as not doing enough for the refugees, colluding with the enemy, and being inefficient and supporting terrorism respectively.³⁴ However, the agency continues its operations, and as a resolution between the Palestinians and Israelis appears dim, UNRWA's presence remains important to both sides of the dispute. For Palestinians in particular, its presence is seen as a sign of their political rights.

In Lebanon, the condition of Palestinian refugees is indicative of the complex politics of various stakeholders in the creation and sustenance of a particular post-conflict environment. Here, a variety of different "sovereigns" intervene in the control of Palestinian camps. Palestinians themselves respond to these "sovereigns" in different ways, taking advantage of the slip-pages that may exist between the different powers to be able to create livable conditions for themselves. The relationship between all of these different factors leads to a particular urbanism within refugee camps that is complex and varied.

Like many host governments, Lebanon preferred to have Palestinians living in refugee camps after their expulsion from Israel/Palestine in 1948. Lebanon is a particularly sensitive nation-state with approximately eighteen different religious confessional groups, and a deeply divided society. A massive influx of thousands of Sunni Muslim Palestinian refugees naturally raised alarm to a precariously constructed political system, and efforts were made to not only sequester much of the population but place them under the oppressive surveillance of the dreaded *Maktab Thani*, Lebanese internal secu-

riety.³⁵ The camps are dispersed throughout the country not only as a reflection of the movement of people from the south to the north in search of economic opportunities, but also possibly because, as Julie Peteet has pointed out, it was meant to prevent “the emergence of a geographically contiguous, cohesive Palestinian sociopolitical entity.”³⁶ As the Palestinian situation evolved into a protracted refugee situation, many refugees attempted to move to the camps in Beirut as employment was more readily available in the capital. Although restrictions had been placed on work Palestinians could do, these were never enforced until after the end of the civil war in 1990. Nevertheless, many Palestinians worked in the informal economy. The lack of protection of their rights and inability to collectively bargain for better wages and working conditions meant that many refugees were reduced to a condition of being lumpenproletariates.³⁷

Initially, Palestinian refugees—those who went into camps—survived in tents and on rations provided by the Red Cross and later UNRWA. In order to encourage Palestinians to resettle into various countries where they had fled including Lebanon, UNRWA tried to provide a “works” aspect. Palestinian refugees and Arab states that hosted them were fully aware of the intentions behind these programs, and both parties were insistent instead to have the refugees repatriated.³⁸ Meanwhile Palestinian refugees struggled with living in camps under often adverse conditions. In Lebanon in particular, there were restrictions on building permanent structures because they signaled a more permanent presence in the country, which the Lebanese were averse to. On the other hand, increasing demographic pressure coupled with the discomfort of living in a tent for prolonged periods of time made life difficult for refugees, and they strove to produce semi-permanent structures covertly and gradually squatted inside camps to expand their spaces. The Lebanese government attempted to curtail this and other potentially political activities among refugees by installing police and *Maktab Thani* officers to monitor the sites and populations. Harassment was thus a common feature in the everyday lives of refugees.³⁹ It is yet another example of how humanitarian spaces, meant to extend the generosity and benevolence of people, can turn into sites of oppression where basic human rights are revoked in the name of security.

In 1970 the Palestine Liberation Organization moved from Jordan to Lebanon, and this arrival had significant repercussions for Palestinians living in camps. The earlier 1969 Cairo Accords between the Lebanese army commander Emile Bustani and the PLO allowed armed Palestinian guerrillas to

exist on Lebanese soil to manage the camps and to engage in guerilla warfare against the state of Israel.⁴⁰ As the PLO gained control of the camps and began military training in them, and the Lebanese state retreated, the camps became states-within-a-state.⁴¹ This speeded up the spatial development of the camps. Houses could now be built out of solid materials, and institutional offices could be created in addition to the development of various organizations such as camp committees and women's organizations.⁴² Essentially, what the PLO managed to do in Lebanon was run a self-government in exile quite successfully for a few years.⁴³ Simultaneously, the city, Beirut, continued to expand and engulfed the camps such as Shatila that were once away from the urban center. The Lebanese civil war began in 1975 and continued until 1990. This fifteen-year war involved Palestinians along with a host of other actors in armed confrontations and had significant impacts on the fabrics of the camps. Camps such as Shatila and Tal al-Zaatar went through a number of different changes. Tal al-Zaatar, which was in East Beirut near the Maronite strongholds, was razed to the ground and its inhabitants displaced to other camps and parts of the country.⁴⁴ Shatila bore the brunt of much damage to its population and infrastructure, through various sieges and through the infamous Sabra-Shatila massacre in 1982.⁴⁵ The camp was rebuilt and damaged repeatedly as a result of battles that raged between militias and Palestinian fighters who sought to protect it and its people from destruction. UNRWA could not at this time do much beyond what was part of its mandate—to provide humanitarian aid to Palestinian refugees such as medical help, food, and other emergency supplies. At a time of war, humanitarianism had not only helped nurture an insurgent movement but also provided the means by which refugees, many of whom were innocent, lost their human rights, and in many cases their lives.⁴⁶

The 1989 Taif Agreement brought a tenuous peace to the Lebanese civil war. At the same time, the Palestinians were held responsible for many of the country's problems.⁴⁷ With the PLO removed from the country, various Palestinian political factions vied for dominance in the camps. Regulations in Lebanon restricted Palestinians from owning or inheriting any property in the country. Further, they were banned from practicing in over seventy-two different professions.⁴⁸ They are largely restricted to their refugee camps due to such oppressive Lebanese laws. In essence, Palestinians are stripped of many of their human rights and treated largely as humanitarian subjects able only to access aid. The consequences of this are significant as Lebanon has the largest number of hardship cases in all of UNRWA's areas of opera-

tions.⁴⁹ At the same time, their camps have become more mixed as many other nationalities also live in the camps, taking advantage of the cheap rents.⁵⁰ Palestinian camps have gone through a variety of different stages in Lebanon through their very long and tenuous protracted refugee situation. Throughout it, Lebanon and much of international politics have largely been hostile to the Palestinians' presence. The various stages in camp life in Lebanon have been results of different approaches Palestinians have had to their conditions in exile and the possibilities of political action. As years have passed, Palestinians have found different ways to be politically engaged, and the acts of building, both in the past and today, against the laws of the state can be seen as acts of resistance and the engagement of a political community. This has included cooperating or challenging the host state on security matters, tapping into its infrastructure, and continuing to be patronized by some of its political parties such as the Hizbullah.⁵¹ The status as refugees in fact allows Palestinians to co-opt the oppression of the state and engage in politics on a global scale.⁵²

READING CAMP SPACE

Palestinians have been the longest protracted refugee situation in the world, and indeed the largest. It would be useful as a starting point to in fact bring them squarely into refugee studies literature instead of leaving them out, as clearly their condition that dates back over sixty years is less exceptional today. In other words, the current refugee regime, as it heads towards dealing increasingly with protracted refugee situations could possibly be seeing the Palestinian case as the norm, not the exception to refugee studies. Such a move—to bring Palestinians into the mainstream of refugee studies—is useful because by bringing Palestinians squarely into the discussion of protracted refugee situations, we can understand better how geopolitics, humanitarianism, and development issues collide with each other and how refugees cope through them.

For example, Amy Slaughter and Jeff Crisp outline why protracted refugee situations lie at the intersection of geopolitics, development issues, and new thinking on humanitarianism. They argue that there have been attempts by UNHCR to provide a development- and solutions-oriented approach to refugee assistance, but this was met with little success. According to them, host governments were eager to retain the visibility of refugee pop-

ulations they hosted and were not keen on having them settle permanently or indeed show any signs of doing so either.⁵³ Such a scenario, prevalent in much of the developing world, is not fundamentally different from that faced by Palestinians in Lebanon for most of their presence there. Lebanon has largely struggled with its Palestinian population and has resisted attempts at resettling them in the country urging instead their return or resettlement in other countries.⁵⁴ Part of the reason why they reject resettlement of refugees in Lebanon is because it would skew the delicate demographic balance in the country in favor of Muslims and disrupt the Lebanese formula.⁵⁵ This has clear repercussions for the refugees, and such a lesson should not be lost on UNHCR and other agencies dealing with other refugee crises. It is difficult to convince host states to take on more responsibility towards protecting and supporting their refugee populations, particularly when they are poor countries or countries where state sovereignty hangs precariously. This is even more problematic if refugee populations living in them have been politically disruptive. Furthermore, in an era when commitments towards refugees and the humanitarian project at large appears to be in flux, there seems to be no reason for host states to honor such requests. Slaughter and Crisp reiterate the call to reorient the role of UNHCR during protracted refugee crises, where the agency makes clear the limits of its humanitarian role. The hope is that by acknowledging its limitations, UNHCR would be able to draw upon other actors within both the UN and the host state to play their parts, political or otherwise, in protecting refugees. Such a move is important because UNHCR cannot become a surrogate state to the world's protracted refugee situations, as is increasingly becoming the case,⁵⁶ but what if host states do not respond favorably to the diminishing role of humanitarian bodies? In UNRWA camps for example, the cuts to funding have meant fewer and more limited services provided to refugees and less support to those who are hardship cases. Ultimately, the populations that suffer the most from such struggles between host states and humanitarian organizations are the refugees themselves.

An important insight to take perhaps from an analysis of Palestinian refugees, and particularly from Palestinians in Lebanon, is that they are not passive recipients of aid. Even though they have, for the most part of their exile in Lebanon, been subject to a hostile environment, a sequestered existence in camps, and few economic, social, and political opportunities (except when the PLO were present), Palestinian refugees in Lebanon have found ways to make their lives more bearable. Often these ways have meant

subverting and negotiating the control and hegemony of the host state and society through covert means and sometimes through armed confrontation as discussed above.

The Palestinians are not the only group of refugees in the world who are able to engage in negotiations and exercise agency within a system of control. There are other examples of refugees who have circumvented the oppression of the state and dependency on humanitarian aid and international NGOs.⁵⁷ Forms of resistance amongst refugees contradict much of academic scholarship and theorization on camps that define refugee camps as *camp-villes*, “abject spaces.”⁵⁸ Many of these theorizations draw upon the work of Giorgio Agamben who argues that sovereign power is that which has the capacity to reduce political life into bare life or *homo sacre* (one who can be killed but not sacrificed).⁵⁹ Agamben argues that “bare life” (*zoe*) is one who is stripped of political life (*bios*) and rendered “humans as animals.”⁶⁰ This legal abandonment is an active, relational process, in that one is included through exclusion.⁶¹ The refugee camp for Agamben is the quintessential zone of indistinction where refugees can be reduced to “bare life” and be subjected to various forms of violence without legal consequences.⁶² In these spaces and through new forms of control, the sovereign strips refugees of human rights and value and reduces them to bare lives.

Such renditions of camps that are an increasingly common feature of protracted refugee situations are intriguing as they provide seductive explanations for geographies that are so difficult to explain. However, as Ensin Igin and Kim Rygiel point out, Agamben’s theorizations of camps are insufficient in accounting for novelty of spaces that are created. They argue that Agamben’s focus on the logic of the camp is ahistorical and essentializing because he does not investigate the diverse ways in which the camp functions (e.g., materially and experientially).⁶³ Agamben sees camps as being spaces of pure biopolitics where anything is possible because everything is permissible. However, such a reading of camps fails to account for how camps came to acquire such power in the first place. Did people willy-nilly hand over the capacity to reduce life to bare life to the sovereign without any protest? And what part does geography play in the production and existence of camps?⁶⁴ For example, the presence of camps for refugees marks the limits of both humanitarian and sovereign power. Stuart Elden remarks:

What we have in humanitarian spaces of exception is an intervention from beyond, where the international community takes the role of the state away

from it, while preserving the localization. In this way, then, Agamben's description of the logic of the camp as a particular instance of a space of exception is productive in understanding the way humanitarian spaces operate both within the existing state—thus allowing territorial preservation—but as a limit to the sovereign power of the state—thus limiting the extent of its power and its territorial sovereignty.⁶⁵

Thus, refugee camps symbolize exception because they operate both within the host state (and with its permission) and outside it and its laws (by having their own rules, administrative structure, and budgets), thus simultaneously challenging and upholding state sovereignty.⁶⁶

Furthermore, in commenting on the nature of a particular space, Agamben unfortunately empties space of what makes it *spatial*: social relations. As Doreen Massey points out, space and social relations are intimately linked to each other such that the uniqueness of each space is determined by the specificity of the social relations that occur within it.⁶⁷ Spaces of asylum and refuge are similarly produced out of relations between those who are being “protected” and those who “are protecting.” This is not a one-way relationship in which the sovereign merely reduces the refugee/asylum seekers to bare life, but one in which the sovereign has to also adjust its practices according to the resistance it faces. If the sovereign can reduce refugees and asylum seekers to bare life, then the latter can also engage in acts that constitute “bioagency.”⁶⁸ Such acts challenge the sovereign's capacity to reduce a subject to bare life devoid of politics. Thus attempts at trying to change the conditions of camps themselves need to be handled in a way that recognizes that such sites go beyond simply being sites of incarceration for refugees.

Returning to Massey's point, that space and social relations are intimately linked to each other, here the space of the refugee camp and the refugees co-constitute each other. The specificity of the camp defines the refugees geographically, reminds the international community of their exile spatially and materially, while the presence of refugees and their relationships with each other, with UNRWA, the Lebanese state (in this case), and the larger international community makes the refugee camp unique. The politics of producing space and the politics of being refugees (being stateless, being exiled for generations, demanding the right of return, refusing to integrate into the host community) are intimately linked to each other. Refugees could not claim their demands as forcefully as they can with concrete spatial proof of their exile. Refugee camps are thus carefully produced through po-

litical and spatial negotiations which makes the act of “building in camps” a form of insurgency against the larger agenda of possibly reducing refugees to bare life. Camps that are planned technocratically with little or no input from refugees and which, in fact, treat refugees as developmental problems run the risk of undermining the agency and political struggles refugees may be undertaking in such spaces.⁶⁹

While it is important to consider the ways in which refugees play a significant role in *producing* camps through various forms of resistance, it is also important to consider the limits of such actions. While refugees may engage in everyday forms of resistance against various sovereign powers that control their lives, they are ultimately bound by the conditions of statelessness and displacement that mark their lives. A nuanced approach that understands the complexity of resistance on the ground and limits of such actions at a meta-scale is necessary in order to grasp at the possibilities and limitations of refugees living in protracted refugee situations.

As James Milner and Gil Loescher point out, increasing numbers of long-staying refugees and internally displaced persons are located in urban areas. This issue has also been raised by UNHCR itself as a new and growing challenge for effective protection and aid delivery. Looking back at the Palestinian case, such an urban outcome of a protracted refugee situation does not seem unusual. With increasing years spent in displacement and continued dependence on aid with its concomitant sense of desperation, it is not surprising that refugees would attempt to move to urban areas where they can blend into the local environment and more easily access jobs. The urbanization of refuge is a challenge for practitioners and scholars alike because the different legal statuses between refugees and other kinds of migrants render the execution of humanitarian work and the theorization of refugees as a “special case” more difficult. For example, organizations have to struggle with whether they need to create a parallel set of institutions that refugees can draw upon specifically, such as schools and medical care. In urban areas, where the urban poor and refugees live cheek by jowl, this is not a sustainable model. Yet, it is precisely in these kinds of dilemmas and this interface between the urban and the humanitarian space that the work of UNHCR of protecting the rights of refugees becomes even more significant and urgent. Without this protection, refugees can be subject to the kinds of exploitation that Palestinian refugees have faced through much of their history in Lebanon and other countries.

Finally, in drawing all of these points together, the study of Palestinian

refugee camps reveals how the proliferation and prolonged nature of protracted refugee crises are simultaneously products of benevolence and protection of refugees on the one hand, and the manipulations and shifts in contemporary geopolitics that involve a range of actors, from donor and host countries, to UNHCR and other humanitarian NGOs to refugees themselves on the other. Through these negotiations, the essence of the contemporary system of states is not just maintained but fetishized. In the case of Palestinian refugees, not only do they desire the right of return to their homes, but this right is also linked to the right to return to Palestine as a clear, bounded nation-state. As the Arabs of Palestine do not have such a state to turn to, they depend on whatever political rights they can achieve in host countries in order to survive. This includes the struggle to achieve rights to the city such as in Beirut, where they are largely marginalized.⁷⁰ This raises the question of whether camps resulting from protracted refugee situations can in any meaningful way protect the human rights of refugees. The very existence of such protracted refugee situations—conditions where there is a continuous need to provide basic emergency services and help people survive prolonged political impasses—arguably signals the lack of upholding fundamental human rights of stateless people. Refugee camps—the sites that exemplify protracted refugee crises—are used by the protector and protected to struggle for rights to this state system and by doing so, inadvertently uphold the liberal peace that exacerbates this condition today.

CONCLUSION: SYMBOLISM, POLITICS, AND THE POSSIBILITIES OF PROTRACTED REFUGEE SITUATIONS

In concluding, we return to the question of *why camps*? While camps are but one manifestation of protracted refugee situations, they are perhaps its most problematic. Camps are planned to protect and provide for refugees and yet, in the words of the High Commissioner in the 1950s and 1960s Gerrit van Heuven Goedhart, the UNHCR and other humanitarian agencies are finding themselves “simply administering human misery.”⁷¹ Host states prefer camps to separate refugees from local populations, and humanitarian agencies have argued that in many ways they allow for better and more efficient delivery of emergency aid. Planning for emergencies and for humanitarian crises thus faces many of the same dilemmas as planning for cities in that they both pursue order, control, and discipline. In so doing they expect that their

technocratic management of space and policy will benefit their subjects at large. But while subjects do in fact benefit from such interventions, there are also consequences that exceed and/or elide the imagination of planners and technocrats. For example, it can be argued that while camps are meant to protect the dignity and safety of refugees, they do, by virtue of their existence, precisely the opposite as is evidenced by refugee populations developing their own economies and means of securing livelihoods and often camp security as well. By sequestering populations in camps, particularly in protracted refugee situations, the humanitarian machinery infringes on the human rights of refugees by restricting their ability to move beyond the confines of their spaces and to meaningfully engage with their host societies. Humanitarianism, however benevolent, ultimately is also hegemonic as it also curtails the possibility of politics for refugee populations. By reducing refugees to populations that are meant to be calculated, managed, and warehoused, aid agencies effectively de-politicize people and conditions. It can be argued that in fact for humanitarian intervention to operate effectively, refugees need to be kept in a condition—in camps—where their human rights are not fully realized. Thus, the production of the refugee regime is a self-perpetuating condition where the invention of chronic refugees and the intervention of humanitarian aid allows protracted refugee crises to proliferate and continue. This in turn, allows for a particular Neoliberal peace to manifest itself—one that attempts to bring about peace through technocratic means but is unable to reconcile the contradictions that this approach in fact produces.

Finally, the very agencies involved in the protection and welfare of refugees are complicit in the continuity of their exile. Scholars have argued that the increasing securitization of Western nation-states and restrictions on immigration and asylum have played a key role in perpetuating an impossible situation for refugees today as they seek safe asylum away from conflict zones. The development of safe third countries, the shift from emphasizing human rights to providing humanitarian aid, are ways in which First World countries not only keep the “problem of refugees” away from their shores but allow it to fester for prolonged periods of time. Providing aid to keep people alive while avoiding the responsibility of attending to their basic human rights essentially allows states to show their benevolence on the one hand and extricate themselves from the messiness of post-conflict peacebuilding. Aid agencies on the other hand find their mandates evolving to increasingly becoming middlemen between states and refugees, donors, and

recipients. As the editors of this volume point out in their introductory comments, “the post-conflict environment that is acted upon by this new international technocracy of peacebuilding is in fact an extension of the politics from which that technocracy seeks to distinguish itself.”⁷² Indeed, UNHCR, UNRWA, and aid agencies that work alongside them enable protracted refugee situations to linger by virtue of acting as surrogate states. The very powers they seek to challenge through their expertise and their intervention become entrenched more deeply. Protracted refugee situations thus cannot be understood without a deeper engagement with global politics and, as scholars, practitioners, and others working on refugee conditions today argue, is an issue that needs greater attention than it is currently given.

Notes

1. See United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “UNHCR Facts and Figures About Refugees,” <http://www.unhcr.org.uk/about-us/key-facts-and-figures.html>, accessed October 27, 2012.

2. Protracted refugee situations are defined as situations where refugees have been in exile “for 5 years or more after their initial displacement, without immediate prospects for implementation of durable solutions.” Protracted refugee situations do not always contain static populations as there are often periods of increase and decrease in the numbers of people displaced and changes within the population itself. See United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Executive Committee (ExCom), “Conclusion on Protracted Refugee Situations,” ExCom No. 109 (LXI) 2009, <http://www.unhcr.org/4b332bca9.html>, accessed January 2013; James Milner and Gil Loescher, *Responding to Protracted Refugee Situations: Lessons From a Decade of Discussion*, Forced Migration Policy Briefing 6 (Oxford: Refugee Studies Centre, University of Oxford, 2011).

Note that in 2004, UNHCR had defined a major protracted situation as having over 25,000 refugees who had been in existence for more than five years with no immediate prospect of a durable solution. This definition then was used to describe all protracted refugee situations which was problematic as many protracted situations such as those of the Rohingyas in Bangladesh or Rwandans in Uganda among others would have been excluded. This definition has been refined to eliminate the population amount.

3. Gil Loescher and James Milner, “Understanding the Challenge,” *Forced Migration Review* no. 33 (2009): 9–10.

4. Liisa Malkki, “Refugees and Exile: From ‘Refugee Studies’ to the National Order of Things,” *Annual Review of Anthropology* 24 (1995): 498.

5. Milner and Loescher, *Responding to Protracted Refugee Situations*, 7.

6. Gil Loescher, “UNHCR at Fifty: Refugee Protection and World Politics,” in

Problems of Protection: The UNHCR, Refugees, and Human Rights, ed. Niklaus Steiner, Mark Gibney, and Gil Loescher (New York: Routledge, 2003), 3–18.

7. Ibid.

8. James C. Hathaway, "A Reconsideration of the Underlying Premise of Refugee Law," *Harvard International Law Journal* 31, no. 1 (1990): 129–84.

Hathaway argues that while the temporal and geographical restrictions were lifted, the fundamental structure and biases of refugee law remained, i.e., only refugees who had convention-like conditions (persecution on one of five enumerated grounds) could claim asylum in First World countries. This essentially excluded the vast majority of refugees in Third World countries who fled because of natural disasters or civil war and unrest.

9. See United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, "An Introduction to International Protection: Protecting Persons of Concern to UNHCR. Self Study Module 1" (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Geneva, August 1, 2005).

10. Eleanor Acer, "Refuge in An Insecure Time: Seeking Asylum in the Post-9/11 United States," *Fordham International Law Journal* 28, no. 5 (2004): 1361–96.

11. The fieldwork for this study was conducted between 2006 and 2007 and was part of a larger research project that compared the urbanization of refugee spaces in Lebanon and India. My own positionality is important to consider in this research. I do not claim to be an objective observer. I came first to Beirut as a PhD student studying Arabic over the summer in 2005 while engaging in a scoping exercise for my research project. I subsequently came back to conduct my fieldwork in 2006 and again in 2007. I developed friendships with NGOs and with families and have had to use my judgement in interpreting their histories. I was also acutely aware that Beirut camps, particularly Shatila, are over-researched sites, and my own interviews with residents only adds to the production of the camp as a unique site of research, with all its attendant consequences. However, this was in some ways an unavoidable choice; I was particularly keen to study urban camps as I came from an urban planning/urban history background, and it was the underlying theoretical framework of my research. However, I would argue that it would be particularly important to study rural camps and other sites in Lebanon and other countries to get a more nuanced picture of refugee camp life.

12. Milner and Loescher, *Responding to Protracted Refugee Situations*.

13. Richard Black, "Putting Refugees in Camps," *Forced Migration Review*, no. 2 (1998): 4–7.

14. Sarah Kenyon Lischer, *Dangerous Sanctuaries: Refugee Camps, Civil War, and the Dilemmas of Humanitarian Aid* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005).

15. See for example some of the guidelines on what rights refugees are supposed to have access to in host states: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, "Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status: Under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees," in *Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status: Under*

the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (Geneva: Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 1979).

16. Jim Lewis, "Phenomenon: The Exigent City," *New York Times Magazine* (June 8, 2008), <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/08/magazine/08wwln-urbanism-t.html>, accessed March 2011.

17. Agier, *On the Margins of the World*. Marc Antoine Perose de Montclose and Peter Mwangi Kagwanja, "Refugee Camps or Cities? The Socio-Economic Dynamics of the Dadaab and Kakuma Camps in Northern Kenya," *Journal of Refugee Studies* 13, no. 2 (2000): 205–22.

An early example of the argument for planning camps like planning the layout of cities was made by Frederick C. Cuny. See for example Cuny, "Refugee Camps and Camp Planning: The State of the Art," *Disasters* 1, no. 2 (1977): 125–43.

18. Agier, *On the Margins of the World*.

19. Romola Sanyal, "Refugees and the City: An Urban Discussion," *Geography Compass* 6, no. 11 (2012): 633–44.

20. Tom Corsellis and Antonella Vitale, *Transitional Settlement, Displaced Populations* (Oxford and Cambridge: Oxfam and University of Cambridge Shelterproject, 2005), 7.

21. See the design for a "self-contained community" in United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, *Handbook for Emergencies*, 3rd ed. (Geneva: Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2007), 214.

22. Ranabir Samaddar, *The Marginal Nation: Transborder Migration From Bangladesh to West Bengal* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1999), 65, 66.

23. Corsellis and Vitale, *Transitional Settlement, Displaced Populations*.

24. See for example UNHCR's website and pages on "Urban Refugees" (<http://www.unhcr.org/pages/4b0e4cba6.html>, accessed March 2011) and Media Advisory notes on conditions of urban refugees, such as "Media Backgrounder: Responding to a growing challenge—protecting refugees in towns and cities" (December 7, 2009), <http://www.unhcr.org/4b1cbbda9.html>, accessed March 2011.

25. Not all refugees suffer from such severe deprivations. Depending on the relationship with the host state, many, such as the Sahrawi refugees in Algeria, are politically active, gaining significant educational and other qualifications. See Jacob Andrew Mundy, "Performing the Nation, Pre-Figuring the State: The Western Saharan Refugees, Thirty Years Later," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 45, no. 2 (2007): 275–97.

26. See Michel Agier, *Managing the Undesirables: Refugee Camps and Humanitarian Government* (Malden, MA: Polity, 2011); Jennifer Hyndman, *Managing Displacement: Refugees and the Politics of Humanitarianism* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000).

27. Jenny Edkins, "Sovereign Power, Zones of Indistinction, and the Camp," *Alternatives* (2000), 3–25; Michael Dillon and Julian Reid, "Global Governance, Liberal Peace, and Complex Emergency," *Alternatives* (2000): 117–43; Gil Loescher, "UNHCR at Fifty."

28. Are Knudsen, "Widening the Protection Gap: The 'Politics of Citizenship'

for Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon, 1948–2008,” *Journal of Refugee Studies* 22, no. 1 (2009): 51–73. Robert Bowker, *Palestinian Refugees: Mythology, Identity, and the Search for Peace* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003).

29. Charles D. Smith, *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A History with Documents* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 33–38.

30. Benny Morris, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947–1949* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 59.

31. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, *The State of the World's Refugees 2006: Human Displacement in the New Millennium* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 113.

32. Julie Marie Peteet, *Landscape of Hope and Despair: Palestinian Refugee Camps* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005).

33. Article 1D of the 1951 Geneva Convention and paragraph 7(C) of the UNHCR Statute exclude Palestinian refugees under UNRWA's mandate and refugees who had taken protection and assistance from the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency, which stopped its operations a long time ago, while UNRWA continues its operations until today. Lex Takkenberg argues that that Article 1D of the Refugee Convention and paragraph 7(C) of the UNHCR statute were written with Palestinians in mind with the intention of excluding them. However, there is a debate that rather than being an “exclusion” clause, Article 1D is more of a “suspension” clause. This leads to not only a marginalization of UNRWA's role and the place of Palestinians in refugee studies, but also an operations issue in the coordination between UNRWA and UNHCR when protecting refugees seeking asylum. See Randa Farah, “The Marginalization of Palestinian Refugees,” in *Problems of Protection: The UNHCR, Refugees, and Human Rights*, ed. Niklaus Steiner, Mark Gibney, and Gil Loescher (New York: Routledge, 2003), 155–74.

34. Benjamin N. Schiff, “Between Occupier and Occupied: UNRWA in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 18, no. 3 (1989): 60–75.

35. Bowker, *Palestinian Refugees*, 133.

36. Julie Marie Peteet, *Gender in Crisis: Women and the Palestinian Resistance Movement* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 24.

37. *Ibid.*

38. Farah, “The Marginalization of Palestinian Refugees.”

39. Romola Sanyal, “Squatting in Camps: Building and Insurgency in Spaces of Refuge,” *Urban Studies* 48, no. 5 (2011): 877–90.

40. Yazid Sayigh, *Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949–1993* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 192.

41. Rex Brynen, “The Politics of Exile: The Palestinians in Lebanon,” *Journal of Refugee Studies* 3, no. 3 (1990): 204–27.

42. Peteet, *Gender in Crisis*; Julie Marie Peteet, *Landscape of Hope and Despair: Palestinian Refugee Camps* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005).

43. Rashid Khalidi, “The Palestinians in Lebanon: Social Repercussions of Israel's Invasion,” *Middle East Journal* 38, no. 2 (1984): 255–66.

44. Mahmoud Abbas, Hussein Shabaan, Bassem Sirhan, and Ali Hassan, “The

Socio-Economic Condition of Palestinians in Lebanon,” *Journal of Refugee Studies* 10, no. 3 (1997): 378–96; Peteet, *Landscape of Hope and Despair*.

45. Bayan Nuwayhed al-Hout, *Sabra and Shatila: September 1982* (Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto Press, 2004).

46. In addition to al-Hout, see also Leila Shahid, “Testimonies—the Sabra and Shatila Massacres: Eye-Witness Reports,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 32, no. 1 (2002): 36–58.

47. Peteet, *Landscape of Hope and Despair*.

48. Knudsen, “Widening the Protection Gap.”

49. Rebecca Roberts, *Palestinians in Lebanon: Refugees Living with Long-Term Displacement* (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2010).

50. Peteet, *Landscape of Hope and Despair*.

51. See for example the discussion by Laleh Khalili, “‘Standing with My Brother’: Hizbullah, Palestinians, and the Limits of Solidarity,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 49, no. 2 (2007): 276–303.

52. In an interview with an UNRWA field worker in 2007, he discussed in detail that the Lebanese government had started to reverse many of the restrictions they had placed on Palestinian camps, allowing them to upgrade their infrastructure and cooperating with them to improve their living conditions. This was a reversal of the Lebanese position that had previously banned any building material from entering the camps, particularly in the south. Interviews with refugees in camps such as Dbayyeh reconfirmed that these projects were indeed being envisioned as several camp residents agreed that they had been asked to give feedback on issues in the camps that needed resolutions.

53. Amy Slaughter and Jeff Crisp, *A Surrogate State? The Role of UNHCR in Protracted Refugee Situations*, New Issues in Refugee Research 168 (Geneva: Policy Development and Evaluation Service, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2009).

54. Rosemary Sayigh, “Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon: Implantation, Transfer or Return?” *Middle East Policy* 8, no. 1 (2001): 94–105.

55. Knudsen, “Widening the Protection Gap.”

56. Slaughter and Crisp, *A Surrogate State?*

57. In India for example, in the aftermath of the partition violence, refugees came pouring into the country. In Calcutta, refugees used their status as displaced individuals to claim preferential treatment from the government while demanding equal rights as citizens. This was done while displacing local people from their homesteads in the fringes of the city, leading to long-standing tensions between local people and the refugee population.

58. Michel Agier, *On the Margins of the World: The Refugee Experience Today*, trans. David Fernbach (Malden, MA: Polity, 2008). Engin Isin and Kim Rygiel, “Abject Spaces: Frontiers, Zones, Camps,” in *The Logics of Biopower and the War on Terror: Living, Dying, Surviving*, ed. Elizabeth Dauphinee and Christina Masters (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).

59. Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 9.

60. Patricia Owens, "Reclaiming 'Bare Life'? Against Agamben on Refugees," *International Relations* 23, no. 4 (2009): 567–82.
61. Agamben, "Homo Sacre"; Geraldine Pratt, "Abandoned Women and Spaces of Exception," *Antipode* 37 (2005): 1052–37.
62. Owens, "Reclaiming 'Bare Life.'"
63. Isin and Rygiel, "Abject Spaces," 184.
64. Raffaella Puggioni, "Resisting Sovereign Power: Camps In-Between Exception and Dissent," in *The Politics of Protection: Sites of Insecurity and Political Agency*, ed. Jef Huysmans, Andrew Dobson, and Raia Prokhovnik (New York: Routledge, 2006), 71.
65. Stuart Elden, "Spaces of Humanitarian Exception," *Geografiska Annaler B: Human Geography* 88, no. B4 (2006): 483.
66. Hyndman, *Managing Displacement*.
67. Doreen B. Massey, "A Place Called Home?" in *Space, Place and Gender*, ed. Doreen B. Massey (Cambridge: Polity, 1994), 168.
68. Peter Nyers, "Taking Rights, Mediating Wrongs: Disagreements Over the Political Agency of Non-Status Refugees," in *The Politics of Protection: Sites of Insecurity and Political Agency*, ed. Jef Huysmans, Andrew Dobson, and Raia Prokhovnik (New York: Routledge, 2006), 52.
69. Linda Tabar, "The 'Urban Redesign' of Jenin Refugee Camp: Humanitarian Intervention and Rational Violence," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 41, no. 2 (2012): 44–61.
70. Romola Sanyal, "Urbanizing Refuge: Interrogating Spaces of Displacement," *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* (2013), doi: 10.1111/1468-2427.12020.
71. Goedhart cited in United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, *The State of the World's Refugees 2006*, 105.
72. See Monk and Mundy, "Introduction," this volume, 2.

CHAPTER 5

Reconstruction

Constructing Reconstruction

Building Kosovo's Post-conflict Environment

ANDREW HERSCHER

ABSTRACT

After the Cold War, “post-conflict reconstruction” emerged as a particular form of humanitarian and development assistance, both extending and transforming the “post-war reconstruction” that was carried out after the Second World War. Rather than analyzing post-conflict reconstruction as a response to the destruction of the post-conflict environment, I explore it as a means of constituting that environment as an object of knowledge and action in the first place. This constitution takes place in what I term “reconstruction space” and “reconstruction time,” each seemingly objective dimensions of the post-conflict environment. “Reconstruction space” is a location where “external” actors make “interventions” in relation to “local” communities or publics; “reconstruction time” is a temporal period of clearly divided “phases” which move from emergency, through transition, to physical reconstruction as such.

While reconstruction space and reconstruction time frame knowledge of and action in the post-conflict environment, they also structure that environment in accordance with the Neoliberal politics and ideologies of the stakeholders invested in reconstructing it. I investigate this structuring through an examination of the reconstruction of housing in Kosovo after 1999. This reconstruction was staged by reconstruction’s stakeholders as rehousing Kosovo’s homeless and displaced population. More precisely, housing reconstruction incorporated post-conflict Kosovo into global systems of

capitalism, governance, and ordering. I discuss four dimensions of this incorporation. First, housing reconstruction projects equated *re-housing* with *repatriation*, an equation that advanced the immigration and asylum policies of stakeholder nations more than it responded to the housing needs of the homeless and displaced. Second, assessments of post-conflict housing conditions measured *lacks* and *needs* rather than *capacities* and *resources*, thereby withholding agency from post-conflict communities and endowing stakeholder institutions with that agency. Third, housing assistance took the form of the distribution of relief supplies and the construction of shelter repairs; the precise measurement of these activities allowed stakeholders to know and manage housing reconstruction, despite the imprecise relation of these activities to the re-housing of the homeless and displaced. Fourth, the very provision of relief and repair allowed stakeholders in post-conflict reconstruction to stage themselves as such, an allowance that displaced stakeholder attention from the conflicts that emerged and intensified during post-conflict reconstruction itself.

Post-conflict reconstruction, then, is less a response to a post-conflict environment that exists prior to and separate from itself than it is a discursive, institutional, and practical production of that environment. Consideration of this production foregrounds the importance of stakeholders in fabricating the environments they imagine themselves to simply and merely reconstruct, a foregrounding that augments critical analysis of post-conflict knowledge and action.

INTRODUCTION

The ruin of architecture and infrastructure is one of the post-conflict environment's most obvious and evident dimensions. The typical claim that "the leveling of buildings and cities had always been an inevitable part of conducting hostilities" gestures towards the self-evidence of destruction in conflict.¹ This self-evidence has only intensified with the formulation of post-modern "new wars" fought in terms of identity politics; these politics are understood to yield "conflicts where the erasure of memories, history and identity attached to architecture and place . . . is the goal itself."² Thus, whatever else the contemporary post-conflict environment may or may not be, it is, almost always, an environment that is defined by physical destruction: "as with the aftermath of a traditional war, the identification of recon-

struction needs following new wars starts by assessing the scale of material damage inflicted upon a country's physical infrastructure, housing stock and economic assets."³ Accordingly, the amelioration of that damage typically comprises a primary post-conflict task.⁴ To investigate the post-conflict reconstruction of the built environment, then, is to study one of the fundamental ways in which the post-conflict environment is epistemologically constituted as an empirical reality in the first place.

In the following, I will examine housing reconstruction in Kosovo after 1999 as one of a constellation of ritualized post-conflict practices that, seemingly invoked as responses to the post-conflict environment, more precisely serve to reify that environment as an objective reality in the first place. The reconstruction of the built environment reifies the post-conflict environment in multiple guises: it is imagined and practiced as if the environment it takes place in is characterized by exceptional forms and levels of destruction; as if it is a component of a whole range of other forms of reconstruction, social, economic, political, and cultural alike; and as if it marks or even furthers a shift from a space and time *of* conflict to a space and time *after* conflict.

The case of Kosovo is of particular importance in the context of post-conflict reconstruction because that case has been understood to be both exceptional and exemplary. "Kosovo is a special case arising from Yugoslavia's non-consensual breakup and is not a precedent for any other situation."⁵ So it was observed in the preface to Kosovo's 2008 Declaration of Independence. This declaration was intended to end Kosovo's almost eight-year-long administration by the United Nations—an administration that began with a United Nations Security Council resolution guaranteeing Yugoslavia's sovereignty and territorial integrity.⁶ If the affirmation of exceptionality in the "Kosovo Declaration of Independence" was not scripted by Kosovo's international patrons in European and North American governments, then those patrons took pains to quickly emphasize exactly the same point. US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice pointed out, for example, that "we've been very clear that Kosovo is *sui generis*."⁷ Others argued for Kosovo's exceptionality so strongly as to make the *sui generis* condition itself generic; for UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon, for example, "each situation needs to be examined based on its unique circumstances."⁸

Yet these arguments for Kosovo's *exceptionality* came after and reversed arguments for Kosovo as an *exemplary* site, a site of an internationally administered post-conflict reconstruction that was conceived on the basis of a wide set of precedents and also formative of still more precedents. These prece-

dents established conditions for the compromise of state sovereignty at moments when a state bore—or was said to bear—responsibility for perpetrating “grave humanitarian situations,” to use the language of UNSC Resolution 1244. Thus, “‘Kosovo’ has been cited as an exemplar for a new broader trend in international relations,” according to Aidan Hehir.⁹ Many “have begun to see the international response to the Kosovo crisis as a new paradigm of international relations, a blue print for a new world order,” Marc Weller similarly affirms.¹⁰

Identified as an *exemplary* post-conflict environment, Kosovo was treated as an object of knowledge and site of action for post-conflict reconstruction—a place, that is, where generic principles of post-conflict reconstruction could be applied, tested, and reformulated. By contrast, as an *exceptional* site (a polity declaring an independent state), Kosovo was posited outside of precedent application and establishment. The seeming dialectic between example and exception, however, actually retained both terms on each of its sides. Thus, while Kosovo could be posed as an exemplary post-conflict environment, that environment itself comprises an exceptional condition, a space where the seemingly normal forms of sovereignty and governance are held in suspension. Similarly, while Kosovo could be posed as the outcome of an exceptional instance of state-making, the state itself comprises an exemplary condition, the typical form of political order. The relationship of example and exception in the case of both the post-conflict environment and the incipient state suggests that exemplarity and exceptionality ought to be regarded less as objective characteristics of Kosovo than as characteristics within a dramaturgical order in which they are to some degree constitutive of the phenomena they seem to merely describe.¹¹

The shift of Kosovo from an exemplary post-conflict environment to an exceptional incipient state from 1999 to 2008 has typically been studied in terms of its planned and contingent dimensions, its beneficiaries and victims, and its precedents and consequences. More salient questions, however, concern the mechanisms by which example and exception become understood as objective features of the post-conflict environment in the first place. That is, rather than asking who or what causes, acts upon, occupies, or is affected by the post-conflict environment, it is possible to ask how that environment appears as such—how it comes to be seen, thought, lived, experienced, and manipulated as a particular sort of political, economic, social, and spatial situation. These questions presume that the post-conflict environment is not simply an empirical reality that solicits the intervention of

stakeholders but is also an object that is constituted by the knowledge and actions of those stakeholders themselves.¹² Following from this presumption, the post-conflict environment can be understood to appear most self-evidently and objectively precisely where the knowledge and action of its stakeholders is least self-conscious and unreflexive. In what follows, I pose the physical reconstruction of the post-conflict environment as organized and manifested by just such unself-conscious and unreflexive knowledge and actions. As such, physical reconstruction offers a useful view of the conceptual and practical reifications through which the post-conflict environment comes into being.¹³

Kosovo's post-conflict reconstruction is both an object of my study and a site of my past work. The institutions I worked with included the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, for which I did research in 1999 and 2000; the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, for which I served as a cultural heritage officer and department co-head in 2001; and the Transitional Institutions of Self-Government in Kosovo, for which I served as a consultant in 2006 and 2007. Though I worked with stakeholder institutions, my position is not that of one or a combination of these stakeholders. At stake for me is critical analysis of post-conflict knowledge and action rather than the advancement of a given position or judgment of an extant opinion; what follows here is intended to further such critical analysis.

RECONSTRUCTION AS EXPERTISE AND ACTION

Since the end of the Second World War, the reconstruction of war-damaged buildings and cities has been posed as a mode of political action, a form of capital expenditure, and an object of professional expertise and academic study. The key event motivating this investment in reconstruction was the massive destruction of European cities carried out via new forms of industrialized warfare in the course of the Second World War.¹⁴ Architecturally and otherwise, the labor underwritten by the US-sponsored Marshall Plan was usually posed simply as "reconstruction"; that this reconstruction occurred after and as a response to war was perhaps so obvious as to require no explicit acknowledgment. Yet this reconstruction did not involve only or even primarily the physical rebuilding of damaged and destroyed architecture and infrastructure; it was focused, rather, on the political, social, and economic

rebuilding of the European nations. This rebuilding was shaped by an intention to ensure national, European, and global political order through the formation of an open international market economy structured according to liberal economic precepts.¹⁵

The perceived success of the Marshall Plan's reconstruction of Europe contributed to the subsequent afterlife of the plan in US responses to other global crises.¹⁶ Throughout the wave of post-Second World War decolonizations in Africa, East Asia, the Middle East, and South America, then, US governments undertook aid and development projects that were similar to the Marshall Plan in their conceptualization of order and stability as products of free-market capitalism.¹⁷ Carried out as "development assistance" or "nation-building" under the guise of the Truman Doctrine, these projects were also shaped by Cold War tensions between the US and the Soviet Union. By the 1970s, as the Cold War developed, international assistance provided by both the US and international financial organizations (IFOs) focused on aid and development through the foundation of free-market economies achieved via "structural adjustments" in the economies of aid recipients.¹⁸ Some scholars have viewed this form of assistance as a direct legacy of the Marshall Plan, a view that has also prompted the Marshall Plan to be re-conceived as the ur-form of the structural adjustment program.¹⁹ Yet equivocations between the Marshall Plan and structural adjustment programs also reflected a perception that reconstruction could be thought and carried out without a great deal of focus on the particular situation which invoked it; these situations, which ranged from political conflicts, through disasters, to underdevelopment, were all posited as problems that could be ameliorated in some way by the activities of a robust free market.

After the Cold War, political conflicts in the former Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia led to a renewed attention to the specificities of reconstruction after conflict, especially in relation to humanitarian aid and development. This attention led to the framing of "post-conflict reconstruction" as a discrete form of humanitarian and development assistance.²⁰ The shift from the implicit "post-war" dimension of Marshall Plan-era reconstruction to the explicit "post-conflict" dimension of post-Cold War reconstruction reflected the perceived salience of "new wars," encompassing intra-state, informal, and partially privatized conflicts, which were understood to have emerged and proliferated in the post-Cold War world.²¹

This salience has played itself out in multiple formats: after the end of the Cold War, post-conflict reconstruction has become the focus of depart-

ments or units in international organizations; national ministries or departments dealing with foreign aid or assistance; and non-governmental organizations dealing with humanitarian issues.²² IFOs, founded in the context of post-war European reconstruction but subsequently refraining from involvement in post-conflict situations, also expanded their mandate to cover these situations in the years after 1989. In 1995, the International Monetary Fund established the Emergency Post-Conflict Assistance program, dedicated to providing assistance to countries in “post-conflict situations,” and, two years later, the World Bank created a Post-Conflict Unit to extend its work to the newly formulated “post-conflict environment.”²³ Some scholars have posed the subsequent focus of the World Bank on the rebuilding of physical infrastructure and on the formation of an open, market-based economic system in this environment as a legacy of Marshall Plan policies carried out in post-war Europe, as well as of Neoliberal economic doctrine.²⁴

In addition, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have comprised particularly important new actors in post-Cold War post-conflict reconstruction. In the post-Second World War era, NGOs assumed increasing influence by taking on responsibility for humanitarian tasks and situations that Neoliberal states disavowed or refused.²⁵ Thus, while the reconstruction facilitated by the Marshall Plan functioned primarily through state-to-state relationships, reconstruction in the post-Cold War context has been mediated through an increasingly complex network of local and global NGOs that receive funds from donor states and IFOs and that work with aid recipients, from individuals and communities, through private and public institutions, to national governments. Many NGOs originated in response to relief issues, and many in response to development issues; with the emergence of post-conflict reconstruction as a fundamental mode of humanitarian assistance, NGOs of each of these types have become involved in reconstruction, adapting their mandate and expertise in the process. In addition, a new type of NGO specializing in country-specific post-conflict assistance has also emerged in the 1990s, in response to the increasing political, economic, and social significance accorded to post-conflict reconstruction.

A body of conventions, charters, standards, and best practices has emerged to plan, manage, and evaluate this reconstruction, while an interdisciplinary discourse has developed to analyze and critique the results of reconstruction projects.²⁶ The preceding represents not simply a response to the emergence of the post-conflict environment as an objective geopolitical reality, but also, and more profoundly, a conceptual fabrication of the post-

conflict environment as such a reality in the first place. That is, the status of the post-conflict environment as a space with particular and defining characteristics is at least partially an effect of discourses, institutions, and practices dedicated to ameliorating that environment.

The reification of the post-conflict environment can also be understood as part of a more general post-Cold War incorporation of the global periphery into an array of systems of global capitalism, governance, and ordering.²⁷ In this sense, “post-conflict reconstruction” serves as a name for one aspect of this incorporation, an inscription of this incorporation into seemingly apolitical contexts of humanitarianism and development, and a depoliticization of the Neoliberal political economy whose logic drives humanitarian and development projects.²⁸ Thus, as capitalism has been understood to routinize “creative destruction” as part of the process of capital expansion, so too does it routinize violent destruction by encompassing it, via a concept of “post-conflict,” in larger processes of reconstruction. Post-conflict reconstruction therefore comprises a procedure of Neoliberal capitalist development, as suggested by recently coined terms such as *disaster capitalism*.²⁹

Stakeholders in post-conflict reconstruction are stakeholders in the Neoliberal economy, on the level of states attempting to maintain and strengthen global or regional hegemony, multinational corporations attempting to further capital accumulation, IFOs, and national and local elites. Each of these stakeholders is reliant on knowledge of and expertise in post-conflict reconstruction, as the normative literature routinely, albeit uncritically declares. “Knowledge on both sides is a key to successful reconstruction. Familiarity with the country, its laws, traditions, and culture is crucial for the external actors, while an understanding of the dynamics of the international-donor world and its mechanisms is useful to the beneficiaries”: the apparent symmetry in these sort of claims, with each “side” deemed dependent on knowledge of the other, belies the asymmetrical fabrication of the post-conflict environment, and the positions of the stakeholders within it, by only one of those sides.³⁰

RECONSTRUCTION SPACE AND RECONSTRUCTION TIME

Post-conflict reconstruction is typically framed as a process that is at once objective—a particular form of action in the contemporary global context—and generic—a form of action that is the same across that context. The ob-

jective and generic nature of post-conflict reconstruction places a premium on knowledge of that reconstruction that can be “translated” or “transferred” from one post-conflict environment to another.³¹ This knowledge has both spatial and temporal dimensions; study of and discourse on post-conflict reconstruction have thus formulated what may be regarded as normative conceptions of “reconstruction space” and “reconstruction time.”

The space of reconstruction is invoked by and responds to a posited space of destruction. The destruction in reconstruction space is ostensibly of an exceptional scale or intensity; reconstruction is defined and naturalized with reference to the destruction it responds to. The concept of “new war,” which proceeds not between states on formally defined battlefields, but in and against civilians in towns and cities, has provided an often-cited contextual rubric for the physical destruction that the space of reconstruction emerges around.³² A basic assumption is that the space of reconstruction is opposed to and ameliorative of destruction; this assumption shapes perception of the reconstruction space and of what is characteristic and exceptional in that space.

Reconstruction space also tends to be the space of the other insofar as reconstruction tends to occur at a remove from the places where it is conceived, organized, funded, and studied. Discourse on reconstruction is thus organized around “interventions” made by external actors in distant contexts: “The scale of damages, the need for specialized advice, and the weakness of native response mechanisms caused by warfare usually make external support for recovery necessary.”³³ “Distance” and “proximity,” however, are less geographical concepts than ideological ones organized according to concepts of development, governance, and globalization, the unfolding of which serve to render the distant proximate.

One outcome of the distance between the space to be reconstructed and the space to conceive, organize, fund, and study reconstruction is the focus, in normative literature on reconstruction, on relations between “interventions” made by “external” actors and “local” communities or publics. Actors in reconstruction are defined in terms of their proximity to or distance from the site of reconstruction: “local community,” “local authorities,” “local enterprise,” and “national government,” on the one hand, and “external agencies” on the other.³⁴ Much of the normative literature on reconstruction thus focuses on the articulation of relations between “local” and “external” actors. Privileged forms of these relations are “supportive,” “enabling,” “empathetic,” “participatory,” and “collaborative,” with external actors posited

in a position of strength and local ones in a position of weakness: “post-war reconstruction . . . has to be grounded in supporting conflict affected communities to organize themselves and start to regain control over their own environment as soon as possible.”³⁵ What may be regarded as local forms of agency, order, and power—clientist and patrimonial systems of social stability, clan-based social structures, and shadow and informal economies, for example—tend to be consigned, then, to an *a priori* marginality.

The desired outcome of the external-local relationship is the return of external actors to their “own” space: “Successful reconstruction is characterized by decreasing levels of external manpower and funding over time . . .”³⁶ This dramaturgy of actors in reconstruction space posits “locality” in terms of a fixed relationship to the post-conflict environment and “externality” in terms of a flexible relationship to that environment, a capacity to enter and exit that environment at will. While this dramaturgy brackets both the transnationality of local actors and the localities of putatively “transnational” or “international” actors, it also establishes a seemingly generic feature of the post-conflict environment.

Given that stakeholders in post-conflict reconstruction understand reconstruction to be successful when it is no longer necessary to undertake, the time of reconstruction is structured according to a strictly teleological sequence of clearly divided “phases.”³⁷ These “phases” are defined according to the tasks and roles of the external actors who assume responsibility for shaping reconstruction. The sequence of phases typically moves from a time of emergency, through a time of transition, to a time of reconstruction-as-such, when permanent repairs are made to architecture and infrastructure.³⁸ This “relief-to-development” continuum thus posits reconstruction as an advance along a line of developmental criteria. A critique of these criteria has recently emerged in the normative literature on humanitarian assistance and post-conflict reconstruction.³⁹ This critique, however, has not taken on the phasing, sequencing, and teleology of reconstruction time as much as the particular identity of its presumed phases and the process by which those phases are moved through.

The duration of reconstruction time, as well as its particular phases, has also been the object of quantitative and qualitative modeling. A typical quantitative model posits the duration of reconstruction as a function of the length of the “emergency phase” and a constant determined by pre-disaster trends, scale of damage suffered, and resources available for recovery.⁴⁰ A typical qualitative model posits the duration of reconstruction in terms of a

“potlatch effect,” when rapidly rising aid enters the post-conflict environment in the first three years after conflict, and a succeeding “late awakening,” when aid levels drop after those first three years.⁴¹ At stake here is the status of reconstruction time as predictable—a time that can be known and shaped before it begins, rather than a time that can be discerned only after it has fully emerged. This temporal predictability provides another putatively generic feature of the post-conflict environment.

“CRISIS” AND “RELIEF”

In its role as an exemplary post-conflict environment, post-1999 Kosovo provides a vivid example of the positing of post-conflict reconstruction as an objectively necessary response to a humanitarian emergency. The 1998–99 conflict between NATO and Serbia over Kosovo formally concluded on June 9 and 10, 1999, with the signing of a cease-fire agreement and then, on the following day, the passage of UNSC Resolution 1244 stipulating the international interim administration of Kosovo, an administration undertaken by the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). The motivating context of this administration was defined in Resolution 1244 as a “grave humanitarian situation,” a definition that invoked reconstruction space and time as precise and crucial responses.

The United Nations’ administration mission was organized according to a “pillar” structure in which each pillar corresponded to both an organization involved in reconstruction and a phase of the reconstruction process. In Pillar I, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) was put in charge of “humanitarian assistance”—the task of emergency relief. The tasks of transition were assigned to Pillar II, under the United Nations Department for Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO), which was given charge of “civil administration,” and Pillar III, under the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), which was given charge of “democratization and institution building.” Finally, in Pillar IV, the European Union (EU) was put in charge of “economic development and reconstruction.” In UNMIK’s pillar structure, then, reconstruction time was divided into phases correlating with the institutional division of reconstruction labor.⁴²

Stakeholders in Kosovo’s reconstruction initially studied reconstruction space via assessments of housing conditions; unless ameliorated through “humanitarian relief,” the apparently massive wartime destruction of hous-

ing was forecast to prevent large numbers of people from obtaining adequate shelter after the onset of winter. The un-housed and underhoused population of Kosovo was conceived in terms of the categories of “refugees” and “internally displaced people” (IDPs). These terms conflated the problem of *homelessness* with the process of *repatriation*. Thus, for UNMIK, “organized return will be to the place of origin constituting the optimal durable solution to the current displacement (and) . . . resources are to be focused on the conditions at the location of origin.”⁴³

With repatriation posed as a solution to the problem of post-conflict homelessness, the position of the national governments that were invested in Kosovo’s reconstruction was reified as a condition of the post-conflict environment itself. For these governments, many of which were located in the destination-nations of Kosovar migrants and refugees, the significance of repatriation to post-conflict Kosovo was tied to a reluctance to admit these migrants and refugees.⁴⁴ This dynamic was typical in Europe in the 1990s, which saw the tendency to exclude migrants extended in various ways to exclude refugees, especially those from the former Yugoslavia.⁴⁵ The “homelessness” of refugees and IDPs, as well as the very separation of the displaced into these two categories, thus involved fabrications of subject-categories and corresponding subjects, which then became the responsibility of international organizations concerned with refugees and IDPs rather than national institutions concerned with migration and asylum.⁴⁶

At the end of August 1999, two comprehensive assessments of housing in Kosovo had been completed. These assessments, too, were also reifications of the post-conflict environment, assisting in the formation of that environment as an objective reality and object of reconstruction labor, expertise, and capital. First, assessments typically posited *lack*—lack of materials, lack of technical abilities, lack of capacities to meet needs—in the post-conflict environment, over and against that environment’s particular capacities and resources. This positing would serve to reflexively corroborate top-down and professionalized models of relief and reconstruction over the furthering of local competencies and agencies, or what is often termed *self-help* or *community-driven reconstruction* in humanitarian discourse. Second, discrepancies in the seemingly objective results of assessments led to an atmosphere of mistrust between the agencies conducting the assessments and between those agencies and their intended beneficiaries, as if the post-conflict environment would be easily modeled in quantitative formats. Third, the seeming objectivity of assessment classifications bracketed other data from con-

sideration, a bracketing that prevented the physical relief and reconstruction of housing from responding to the social needs of the homeless. And fourth, assessments of the destruction of conflict served to displace attention from the post-conflict destruction that was occurring in the very midst of those assessments.

Humanitarian relief for Kosovo's refugees and IDPs was the responsibility of the UNHCR. In June 1999, weeks after the arrival of the United Nations to Kosovo, the UNHCR's Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) set up a Humanitarian Community Information Center which, in turn, organized a "Rapid Village Assessment" to determine "humanitarian needs" in such areas as housing damage, sanitation facilities, and access to water, food, and medical care.⁴⁷ The focus of the assessment was to survey immediate needs for shelter and the other basic services that the "humanitarian community" was organizing to meet.

In the "Rapid Village Assessment," damage was documented using a set of criteria developed by the UNHCR in work in Africa and South and Central America. The use of these criteria in Kosovo exemplifies the generic dimensions of the post-conflict environment. With this environment posed as a condition that is common the world over, the technocracy of post-conflict reconstruction processes its particular interventions as universal knowledge and know-how that can be subsequently applied to other particulars. In the UNHCR's damage assessment, housing damage was divided into five categories, ranging from one (undamaged or slightly damaged) to five (totally destroyed). With damage documented via both satellite imagery and on-site surveys, the "Rapid Village Assessment" was completed in July 1999. It described an environment in which 68 percent of the housing stock fit within category four or five. According to the typical interpretation, this could become the environment of a "humanitarian crisis" when refugees and IDPs returned to damaged houses and winter set in. Thus, the assessment motivated a humanitarian relief effort focused on shelter "rehabilitation" and "winterization."

At the same time, however, another humanitarian organization was also determining housing needs, but the metrics and results of its assessment would prove to be significantly different. This assessment was made by the International Management Group (IMG), an intergovernmental organization established by the UNHCR in 1993 to address technical and infrastructural tasks of post-conflict reconstruction. The European Union had responsibility for physical reconstruction in Kosovo, including the reconstruction

of housing, and in June 1999 the European Commission (the executive branch of the European Union) contracted the IMG to document housing and village infrastructure in Kosovo.⁴⁸ Completed in July 1999 on the basis of extensive on-site inspections, the IMG assessment used its own metric, developed in Bosnia, for categorizing damage—a use which also posed the post-conflict environment as a generic condition whose architecture could be evaluated according to a single set of abstract criteria. According to the IMG's criteria, levels of damage were divided into four categories, from one (slightly damaged) to four (very seriously damaged). In Kosovo, the IMG assessment described an environment in which 32 percent of the houses were seriously or very seriously damaged.

The different assessments of the housing crisis in Kosovo itself provoked problems, if not their own crisis. On one level, it was difficult to co-ordinate the findings of each report so as to accurately determine needs for shelter relief. On another level, if the categories of each assessment were coordinated, then each assessment described, at times, very different situations. In the municipality of Klina, for example, the UNHCR "Rapid Village Assessment" found 2,408 damaged houses (categories 2, 3, and 4) and 1,235 destroyed houses (category 5), while the IMG "Emergency Assessment" found 3,362 damaged houses (categories 2 and 3) and 3,579 destroyed houses (category 4). On the part of donors, this discrepancy led to confusion about how much shelter relief was necessary to provide, what sort of relief was necessary, and where this relief should be allocated.⁴⁹ On the part of many UNMIK officials administering the municipalities where housing was evaluated, there was a mistrust of each assessment and a felt need to produce new, "official" assessments through their own offices.⁵⁰ These latter assessments, which simplified the survey metric into the categories of "damaged" and "destroyed," soon arrived at a third set of results.⁵¹

Distinctions in level of damage also mediated other distinctions, particularly those related to socio-economic class, that nevertheless remained unmarked in damage assessments. In Kosovo, middle-class families and families who benefited from foreign remittances often lived in houses constructed after the Second World War with concrete frames and concrete block infill walls. When these houses were burned, the resulting damage was to internal finishes and fixtures but not to structural elements—an intermediate level of damage in the housing assessments. Lower middle-class and impoverished families often lived in houses constructed prior to the Second World War with rubble masonry and wooden floors and ceilings. When these houses

were burned, the wooden floors often collapsed and pulled the surrounding walls down with them—the most severe level of damage in each of the various housing assessments. Because emergency housing relief concentrated on providing relief to as many families as possible, it focused on houses with intermediary levels of damage; this relief strategy thus resulted in assistance going to relatively privileged families in communities, with less privileged families offered alternative temporary accommodation instead of repairs to their severely damaged or destroyed homes.⁵² Here, in the guise of restoring pre-existing conditions, post-conflict relief inadvertently functioned to intensify socio-economic stratifications.

Shelter relief efforts in the fall and winter of 1999 were primarily undertaken by some 30 international NGOs, from the approximately 300 that were active in Kosovo by the fall of 1999, along with USAID's Office for Disaster Assistance and the European Community Humanitarian Office.⁵³ The architecture of interest here was primarily "shelter": an elemental protection against the elements. The vast scale at which such protection had to be instituted for returning refugees and IDPs led international actors to standardize and professionalize shelter relief efforts. The post-conflict environment was qualified as *domestic*, a site of residence; *elemental*, a site for the accommodation of basic human needs; and *pacified*, a site where violence had been eliminated.⁵⁴ In this environment, the capacities of local actors to participate in relief and reconstruction efforts were neglected, as was the emergence of post-conflict violence against Kosovar Serbs, which manifested in part against architectural targets.

Displaced Kosovar Albanians quickly began to return to Kosovo after June 1999.⁵⁵ Based on its assessments of shelter needs, on the one hand, and the capacities of NGOs and IGOs, on the other, the UNHCR allocated to NGOs and IGOs a certain number of homes to reconstruct or winterize in specified villages or towns. A premise, shared by all institutions and organizations involved in housing relief and reconstruction, was that the return of Kosovar refugees and IDPs implied a return "to their homes" or "to their place of origin."⁵⁶ The asserted equivalence between the "return" of displaced populations and their "homecoming" at a particular architectural point of origin served to focus great effort and major resources on the architectural reconstruction of homes; it also, however, denied the transformed meaning, value, and status of those homes, and of dwelling more generally, wrought both by conflict and by post-conflict reconstruction itself. Conflict, that is, often converted a home from a site of family life, patrimonial inheri-

tance, or sanctuary into one of dispossession, displacement, or violence. With the rendering of the Kosovo conflict in ethnic terms, moreover, neighbors of other ethnicities became dangerous enemies, and village and towns of mixed ethnicities became contact zones between communities at war. The post-conflict program to return Kosovar refugees and IDPs to their pre-conflict homes, however, ignored these dynamics. Homes were thus sometimes reconstructed in places and situations where their occupants could no longer be at home, a factor that contributed to the often low occupancy rate of reconstructed homes.

The post-conflict environment was also reified through the provision of shelter relief; the provision of this relief was, at once, measurable and knowable to stakeholders and indeterminately related to the re-housing Kosovo's of homeless and displaced population. The instruments of shelter relief consisted of the distribution of relief supplies or the construction of shelter repairs. Relief supplies consisted of winter tents with stoves for heating and cooking; "dry room kits" or "emergency shelter kits" with plastic sheets for roof cover, windows, doors, carpet, and stove; "warm room kits" with stove and carpet; "roof kits" with concrete ring-beam base, timber roofing members and plastic cover; and "emergency kits" containing plastic sheeting, winter clothes, and cooking supplies. Shelter repairs were focused on the wooden roofs of mud-brick or concrete frame houses that were destroyed by fire; these roofs were rebuilt and covered either temporarily, with plastic sheeting, or permanently, with roof tiles.⁵⁷

Supplies were distributed and repairs made according to efforts to maximize the "relief" they provided; this relief was calculated in terms of, on the one hand, the amount of supplies distributed and the number of repairs made and, on the other hand, the number of houses "winterized," "rebuilt," or "reconstructed." The relationship between "supplies distributed" and houses "rebuilt" or "reconstructed" was imprecise, with different agencies using different standards to measure the effect of their work. In March 2000, around six months after shelter relief assistance was under way, UNMIK introduced guidelines for housing reconstruction.⁵⁸ These guidelines stipulated the level of repair that was to constitute "reconstruction," as well as criteria for the selection of houses to be reconstructed; by this time, however, the implementation of housing reconstruction projects was already under way, with the organizations involved using their own, self-defined standards.⁵⁹

An imprecise relationship also obtained between the number of houses

winterized or reconstructed and the number and type of people provided shelter. While relief assistance was premised on refugees and IDPs returning to their pre-conflict places of residence, in fact there were significant shifts in settlement in the post-conflict period, especially from rural areas to urban areas, and to Prishtina/Priština, Kosovo's capital city. Shelter relief, however, was consistently described in terms of spaces that were winterized or reconstructed and supplies that were distributed. Thus, many NGOs simply did not monitor the *occupancy* of houses that they reconstructed.⁶⁰ Further, some post-assistance surveys that did monitor the work of NGOs involved in shelter relief and reconstruction found that as little as 40 percent of winterized spaces were actually occupied in the winter of 1999–2000.⁶¹

While emergency housing relief was distinguished, temporally and institutionally, from the permanent housing reconstruction that was to succeed it, the border between housing relief and housing reconstruction was never clearly defined in post-conflict Kosovo. At the very inception of emergency housing relief, aid agencies faced the question of whether to provide temporary shelter relief, in the form of warm room kits, warm roof kits, plastic roofs, or permanent shelter reconstruction, in the form of tiled roofs on timber frames; donors made all the preceding available so that some agencies had to choose whether to assist in “relief” or “reconstruction.”⁶² In Kosovo, temporary plastic roofs could be erected at half the cost of permanent tiled ones, and agencies that provided plastic roofs were able to assist around twice as many aid recipients as those that provided tiled roofs.⁶³ Thus, because the distinction between “temporary relief” and “permanent reconstruction” was infrequently marked in assessments, the former was often privileged over the latter. The provision of emergency relief, especially as it occurred during a moment of focused humanitarian attention and assistance, also often displaced subsequent, more complicated and more expensive housing reconstruction projects. “As a result,” Sultan Barakat has noted, “short-term housing measures often mutate into permanent, poor-quality settlements lived in by the poor.”⁶⁴

Yet destruction was not only encountered via its wartime remains in the two-month-old post-conflict environment; it was also inflicted in and on that environment, against new targets and in the name of new constituencies. If international agencies responded to the wartime destruction of Serb forces by *assessing* it, then local groups of Kosovar Albanians, often including former members of the Kosovar Liberation Army, responded to that destruction by *avenging* it, inflicting a counter-destruction against sites associated

with Serbs and Serbia: Serbian-owned or Serbian-occupied houses and Serbian Orthodox churches, monasteries, and graveyards.⁶⁵ What was reified as a “post-conflict environment” by Kosovo’s international sponsors, patrons, and administrators was actually a conflictual environment to many who inhabited that environment. Beginning with the departure of Serb forces from Kosovo in June 1999, buildings owned, inhabited, or associated with Serbs became highly vulnerable to the counter-violence waged against them.⁶⁶ The NATO forces in Kosovo (KFOR), responsible for security and order in the territory, took months to be able to even partially respond to this counter-violence by deploying troops to defend Kosovar Serb residences and monuments.

Meanwhile, by August 1999, almost all Kosovar Serbs had fled Kosovo’s towns and cities, either to the predominantly Serbian north of Kosovo, to enclaves protected by KFOR within Kosovo, or to Serbia itself.⁶⁷ By the same time, hundreds of Serb-owned houses had been damaged or destroyed, along with almost 100 Serbian Orthodox churches and monasteries—a re-destruction occurring at the very initiation of Kosovo’s post-conflict reconstruction.⁶⁸

The ongoing assessments of wartime destruction, however, served to displace attention from the destruction that was occurring in the very midst of those assessments. Perhaps nowhere was this displacement so fraught as in those assessments authored by Kosovar Albanian communities and institutions. Often assigning collective responsibility for wartime destruction to “the Serbs,” these assessments did not simply displace attention from post-conflict destruction but rather legitimized that destruction as acceptable or even necessary revenge. In so doing, those assessments contributed to the formation of a post-conflict environment in which Kosovar Serbs could inhabit few places without fear of conflict.⁶⁹

“DEVELOPMENT” AND “RECONSTRUCTION”

Two years into its unfolding, Kosovo’s post-conflict environment continued to be an amalgam of construction and reconstruction, with building activity inextricably involving each process. The reconstruction that was desired, sponsored, planned, and executed by the international community typically involved the rationalization, modernization, and globalization of extant social and economic structures. In their own terms, these were processes that provided relief from conflict and facilitated development out of con-

flict. In both their success and failure, however, these processes also involved the production of new conflicts, albeit ones invisible in the dominant frames of reconstruction thought and practice.

As housing reconstruction proceeded, the indistinct boundary between temporary “relief” and permanent “reconstruction” that was present from the very inception of relief assistance became ever more prominent. In February 2000, with the intended phasing-out of post-conflict relief in Kosovo, the EU established the European Agency for Reconstruction (EAR) to manage post-conflict reconstruction in Kosovo, as well as in Serbia and Montenegro. In Kosovo, the EAR focused physical reconstruction on the repair of damaged or inadequate energy, water, and transport infrastructure and the reconstruction of damaged housing.⁷⁰ As overseen by the EAR, sponsored by individual states, and carried out by IGOs and NGOs, reconstruction was conducted as a fully globalized activity, and, precisely as such, it involved the conflicts between local and global structures typical of any globalizing enterprise.⁷¹

These conflicts emerged on many levels. The building material with which houses were reconstructed was largely imported into Kosovo, so that the local building material industry, which produced bricks, doors, windows, and other products used in construction, had limited access to post-conflict reconstruction activity as a result.⁷² This reconstruction thereby served to weaken Kosovo’s building industry, along with many other local industries.⁷³ These effects were not aberrant features of Kosovo’s reconstruction; they were, rather, typical and desirable outcomes of a process that posed recovery, stability, and development as products of Neoliberal economic policies and programs. These policies and programs promoted the reach and efficacy of global corporate capitalism over and against the interests of local economies, public authorities, and state institutions; the “order” that they advanced was that of the free market. In this sense, post-Cold War reconstruction has continued and intensified a dynamic that marked reconstruction efforts since the Marshall Plan, a dynamic in which post-conflict reconstruction serves as an opportunity to advance Neoliberal conceptions of peace and prosperity.⁷⁴

Architectural reconstruction in Kosovo comprised a form of compulsory modernization, as well as of forced globalization. The building construction system that was preferred for reconstruction utilized a reinforced concrete frame with brick infill. This system was at once simple to fabricate and utilized a standardized set of components; at the same time, its implementation, especially in rural areas, yielded the rebuilding of damaged houses con-

structed from mud-brick or stone with concrete and brick. While this modernizing housing assistance was intended by the UNHCR and UNMIK to be given to the families most in need of it, in fact the recipients of this assistance emerged out of complex negotiations between local groups and aid agencies. Some villages, for example, privileged families who were understood to have contributed to the insurgency against Serbia as recipients of assistance, so that this assistance intensified the formation of a new post-conflict social hierarchy. Because reconstruction assistance was targeted not only to recipients most in need but also to recipients who were present in Kosovo, the vast preponderance of this assistance was given, from 1999 to 2001, to Kosovar Albanians. The concurrent exclusion of Kosovar Serbs, half of whom left or were expelled from Kosovo after June 1991, from the reconstruction process thus served to concretize Kosovo's post-conflict geography of ethnic separation, this despite the explicit commitment of reconstruction agencies to build a "multi-ethnic" and "multi-cultural" post-conflict Kosovo.

The entire process of reconstruction also introduced new models of community development and new social structures to the post-conflict environment, with inherited family- or clan-based structures of decision-making, land and revenue distribution, and welfare responsibility replaced by more "egalitarian" structures fabricated by post-conflict municipalities under UNMIK guidance.⁷⁵ The assumption was that this was a form of democratization. In the words of one United States Agency for International Development (USAID) initiative to develop civil society in Kosovo, this society was traditionally based on "top-down, hierarchical decision making"; in the words of one EAR report, "the involvement of the Municipal Housing Committees in the selection and approval of beneficiaries has helped to facilitate the emergence of democratic decision-making bodies at municipal level."⁷⁶

Yet civil society in Kosovo was structured in highly effective forms, both before and during the Kosovo conflict. Through the era of socialist Yugoslavia, that society was organized around an inherited clan-based system of social order that regulated the production and distribution of property and various forms of revenue. Moreover, during the socialist era, robust informal economies ("black" or "barter" markets) offered alternatives to highly regulated sanctioned systems of exchange. Finally, after 1989, when Albanians withdrew from Serbian government institutions, an elaborate "parallel society" was founded for the provision of educational, medical, and social services to Kosovar Albanians.⁷⁷ The capacities, functionalities, and legacies of these structures, however, was less an object of post-conflict assessment and

evaluation than of neglect and thus abandonment. Most important of all, the parameters by means of which reconstruction was organized usually did not register any of the above dynamics; they tended to appear, if anywhere, in “lessons learned” sections of post-project assessments. Typically, reconstruction was assessed in terms of “housing units” repaired and “beneficiaries” assisted. By the end of 2001, the EAR was able to report that more than half of the houses damaged or destroyed in 1998 and 1999 were “repaired” or “reconstructed”; the manifold effects of that labor, however, were by and large left unregistered.⁷⁸

The EAR only reported on officially sanctioned reconstruction. In post-conflict Kosovo, however, an enormous portion of construction occurred outside of governmental purview—so-called illegal building. The population of Prishtina, for example, doubled from 250,000 to an estimated 500,000 between 1999 and 2002. Most new building to house that population was done “illegally,” without permits, inspection, or regulation; one estimate suggested that up to 5,000 buildings in Prishtina were constructed “illegally” in 2001, the year of the height of construction in post-war Kosovo, alone.⁷⁹ Part of what rendered this construction activity “illegal,” however, was the assumption that Kosovo’s post-conflict environment would be inhabited in the same way as its pre-conflict environment was. This assumption yielded a neglect of such dynamics as the rural-to-urban population shift, as well as shifts from multi-generational houses to single-family homes and apartments, all characteristic forms of post-conflict residential modernization.⁸⁰

CONCLUSION: CONSTRUCTING RECONSTRUCTION

To the extent that both reconstruction problems and reconstruction solutions in the post-conflict environment are constituted by stakeholder knowledge of that environment, attempts to grasp the “objectively real” conditions of that environment are irrelevant. Rather, the “objective reality” that requires apprehension is that of stakeholder knowledge itself, as it is this knowledge which has decisive political effects and consequences.

These effects and consequences persist even when they are framed as products of a practice that constructs, in texts and spaces, the object that it imagines itself to merely ameliorate. Post-conflict reconstruction comprises just such a practice; part of its unfolding includes the framing of its environ-

ment as a space that requires the concepts and techniques it formulates and the actions it carries out. Stakeholders in post-conflict reconstruction are consistently adjusting these concepts, techniques, and actions, attempting to bring their effects increasingly in line with reconstruction's desired outcomes. These adjustments, in the form of "lessons learned," are typically framed as responses to empirical data on reconstruction, data that document the degree to which reconstruction actually yields the outcomes its stakeholders seek: democratization, good governance, social stability, economic development, reconciliation between conflicting polities, rebuilding of damaged infrastructure, and so forth.⁸¹ The insistent imagination and assessment of architectural reconstruction on the part of its authors in terms of such indices as the number of buildings reconstructed, the number of square meters made habitable, the number of families housed, and so on is absolutely typical of this style of documentation. On its own terms, then, stakeholder knowledge of reconstruction advances as its real-world effects are registered and analyzed.

Yet this advancement of knowledge reproduces that knowledge's fundamental conceit—that it is knowledge of an object, the post-conflict environment, that exists prior to and outside of that knowledge's own formation and unfolding. Formulations of "best practices" in post-conflict reconstruction consistently urge stakeholders to maximize their familiarity with the "cultures," "customs," "communities," and "laws" of the environments in which they intervene. A reflexive apprehension of reconstruction would turn this project of familiarization back towards its very authors and insist on the importance of foregrounding their own role in constructing the environments they imagine themselves to simply and merely reconstruct.

Notes

1. Robert Bevan, *The Destruction of Memory: Architecture at War* (London: Reaktion, 2006), 7.

2. Ibid., 8. On "new war," see Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars*, 2nd ed. (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2006).

3. Vesna Bojčić-Djelilović, "World Bank, NGOs and the Private Sector in Post-War Reconstruction," in *Recovering From Civil Conflict: Reconciliation, Peace, and Development*, ed. Edward Newman and Albrecht Schnabel (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2002), 84.

4. Alcira Kreimer and others, *The World Bank's Experience with Post-Conflict Reconstruction* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1998), 9.

5. Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo, *Kosovo Declaration of Independence*

(Prishtina: Republic of Kosovo, February 17, 2008), <http://www.assembly-kosova.org/?cid=2,128,1635> (accessed March 2011).

6. United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1244, S/Res/1244 (June 10, 1999) (accessed March 2011).

7. Jacquelyn S. Porth, "Rice Addresses Afghanistan, Kosovo, Middle East in Norway," *USINFO* (Washington, DC: Bureau of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State, April 26, 2007), <http://www.america.gov/st/washfile-english/2007/April/20070426170149sjhtrop0.31448.html> (accessed March 2011).

8. "Resolution 1244 Remains in Effect, Ban," *Tanjug* (March 11, 2008), http://www.mfa.gov.rs/Bilteni/Engleski/b110308_e.html#N14 (accessed March 2011). As Thomas Pepper notes, "admonitions towards the specific differences of each text, and against the banality of generalization, are themselves generalities, and fall into well-worn tracks." See Thomas Adam Pepper, *Singularities: Extremes of Theory in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 2.

9. Aidan Hehir, "Kosovo and the International Community," in *Kosovo, Intervention and Statebuilding: The International Community and the Transition to Independence*, ed. Aidan Hehir (New York: Routledge, 2010), 1.

10. Marc Weller, *The Crisis in Kosovo, 1989–1999: From the Dissolution of Yugoslavia to Rambouillet and the Outbreak of Hostilities* (Cambridge: Documents and Analysis Publishers, 1999), 259.

11. This point has also been made by Mariella Pandolfini, who, exploring contemporary states of emergency, has argued that "exemplarity paradoxically resides in particularity"; see Mariella Pandolfini, "From Paradox to Paradigm: The Permanent State of Emergency in the Balkans," in *Contemporary States of Emergency: The Politics of Military and Humanitarian Interventions*, edited by Didier Fassin and Mariella Pandolfini (New York: Zone Books, 2010), 153.

12. This constitution, or reification, is the apprehension of a human creation as an objective reality that comes into being and exists without human agency; on reification, see *A Dictionary of Marxist Thought*, ed. Tom B. Bottomore (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1991), 463–65, and Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1966), 36.

13. This perspective can be situated within an emerging critique of humanitarianism, and specifically humanitarian work in conflict and post-conflict situations; see, for example, *Contemporary States of Emergency: The Politics of Military and Humanitarian Interventions*, ed. Didier Fassin and Mariella Pandolfi (New York: Zone Books, 2010); Dider Fassin, *Humanitarian Reason: A Moral History of the Present* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011); and *Forces of Compassion: Humanitarianism between Ethics and Politics*, ed. Erica Bornstein and Peter Redfield (Santa Fe, NM: SAR Press, 2011).

14. See *Rebuilding Europe's Bombed Cities*, ed. Jeffrey M. Diefendorf (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990), and David W. Ellwood, *Rebuilding Europe: Western Europe, America, and Postwar Reconstruction* (New York: Longman, 1992).

15. See Alan S. Milward, *The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945–51* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), and Barry J. Eichengreen, *Europe's Post-War Recovery* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

16. See, for example, James Dobbins and others, *America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2003) and *The Marshall Plan Today: Model and Metaphor*, ed. John A. Agnew and J. Nicholas Entrikin (New York: Routledge, 2004).

17. See, for example, *The Age of Transition: Trajectory of the World-System 1945–2025*, ed. Terence K. Hopkins (London: Zed, 1996).

18. See, for example, *Structural Adjustment: Retrospect and Prospect*, ed. Daniel M. Schydlowsky (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1995).

19. J. Bradford DeLong and Barry Eichengreen, "The Marshall Plan: History's Most Successful Structural Adjustment Program," *SSRN eLibrary* (November 1991), <http://ssrn.com/abstract=226738>.

20. On post-conflict reconstruction, see, for example, *After the Wars: Reconstruction in Afghanistan, Indochina, Central America, Southern Africa, and the Horn of Africa*, ed. Anthony Lake (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1990). Peter Burnham, *The Political Economy of Postwar Reconstruction* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990). *Rebuilding Societies After Civil War: Critical Roles for International Assistance*, ed. Krishna Kumar (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1997). World Bank, *Post-Conflict Reconstruction: The Role of the World Bank* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1998). *After the Conflict: Reconstruction and Development in the Aftermath of War*, ed. Sultan Barakat (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2005). *Postconflict Development: Meeting New Challenges*, ed. Gerd Junne and Willemijn Verkoren (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2005).

21. Kaldor, *New and Old Wars*.

22. On the relationship between humanitarian initiatives and Neoliberal economics, see Vanessa Pupovac, "Human Security and the Rise of Global Therapeutic Governance," *Conflict, Security, and Development* 5, no. 2 (2005): 161–81; Mariella Pandolfi, "Laboratory of Intervention: The Humanitarian Governance of the Postcommunist Balkan Territories," in *Postcolonial Disorders*, ed. Mary-Jo DelVecchio Good, Sandra Teresa Hyde, Sarah Pinto, and Byron J. Good (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), 157–87; and M. Duffield, *Development, Security, and Unending War: Governing the World of Peoples* (Malden, MA: Polity, 2007).

23. International Monetary Fund, *IMF Emergency Assistance: Supporting Recovery from Natural Disasters and Armed Conflicts* (International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC, September 2010), and World Bank, *Conflict Prevention and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Perspectives and Prospects* (World Bank, Washington, DC, August 1998).

24. Bojčić-Djelilović, "World Bank, NGOs and the Private Sector," 87.

25. Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), and Sidney G. Tarrow, *The New Transnational Activism* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

26. On post-conflict architectural reconstruction, see, for example, Sultan Barakat, *Housing Reconstruction After Conflict and Disaster* (London: Overseas Development Institute; Humanitarian Practice Network, 2003); Tigran Hasić, *Reconstruction Planning in Post-Conflict Zones: Bosnia and Herzegovina and the International Community* (PhD Thesis, Stockholm: Royal Institute of Technology, 2004); *After the Conflict: Reconstruction and Development in the Aftermath of War*, ed. Sultan Barakat (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2005); and Esther Ruth Charlesworth, *Architects Without Frontiers: War, Reconstruction and Design Responsibility* (Burlington, MA: Architectural Press, 2006).

27. Hardt and Negri make a somewhat similar point when they describe humanitarian agencies as the “mendicant orders of Empire”; see Hardt and Negri, *Empire*, 36.

28. See David Moore, “Leveling the Playing Fields and Embedding Illusions: ‘Post-Conflict’ Discourse & Neo-Liberal ‘Development’ in War-Torn Africa,” *Review of African Political Economy* 27, no. 83 (2000): 11–28. *Capitalizing on Catastrophe: Neoliberal Strategies in Disaster Reconstruction*, ed. Nandini Gunewardena and Mark Schuller (Lanham, MD: AltaMira, 2008).

29. Klein, *The Shock Doctrine*.

30. Fredrik Galtung and Martin Tisné, “A New Approach to Postwar Reconstruction,” *Journal of Democracy* 20, no. 4 (2009): 93–107.

31. Thus, according to a typical claim, post-conflict reconstruction data should be placed “in a standard framework that would allow for translation from one post-war scenario to another”; see John Calme, “Post-war reconstruction: concerns, models and approaches” (Center for Macro Projects and Diplomacy, Roger Williams University, Bristol, RI, 2005).

32. Kaldor, *New and Old Wars*.

33. Calme, “Post-War Reconstruction,” 16.

34. Barakat, *Housing Reconstruction after Conflict and Disaster*, 6–7.

35. *Ibid.*, 11.

36. Christopher J. Coyne, *After War: The Political Economy of Exporting Democracy* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008).

37. See, for example, Barry M. Blechman and others, “Effective transitions from peace operations to sustainable peace: final report” (DFI International, Washington, DC, September 1997). Center for Strategic and International Studies and United States Army, “Post-conflict reconstruction task framework” (United States Army and Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, May 2002). United States Agency for International Development Office of Transition Initiatives, “An Introduction to OTI Strategic Planning and Monitoring and Evaluation” (United States Agency for International Development Office of Transition Initiatives, Washington, DC, 2003). *Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations*, ed. Hans Binnendijk and Stuart Johnson (Washington, DC: National Defense University Center for Technology and National Security Policy, November 12, 2003). Low-Income Countries Under Stress (LICUS) group, “An operational note on transitional result matrices: Using results-based frame-

works in fragile states" (United Nations Development Group and World Bank, New York and Washington, DC, January 2005). Craig Cohen, "Measuring progress in stabilization and reconstruction" (United States Institute for Peace, Washington, DC, March 2006).

38. Frederick C. Cuny, *Disasters and Development* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983).

39. For a review of this critique, see Philip White and Lionel Cliffe, "Matching Response to Context in Complex Political Emergencies: 'Relief,' 'Development,' 'Peace-Building' or Something In-Between?," *Disasters* 24, no. 4 (2000): 314–42.

40. Robert W. Kates and Martyn J. Bowden, "From Rubble to Monument: The Pace of Reconstruction," in *Reconstruction Following Disaster*, ed. J. Eugene Haas, Robert W. Kates, and Martyn J. Bowden (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1977).

41. Galtung and Tisné, "A New Approach to Postwar Reconstruction," 95–96.

42. This reification has been subsequently generalized as a principle for post-conflict reconstruction, as in the "Four Pillars of Reconstruction" formulated by the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies; see Center for Strategic and International Studies and United States Army.

43. United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, *The right to sustainable return* (Pristina: United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, May 17, 2002), <http://www.unmikonline.org/press/reports/ReturnsConcept.htm>.

44. James C. Hathaway, "New Directions to Avoid Hard Problems: The Distortion of the Palliative Role of Refugee Protection," *Journal of Refugee Studies* 8, no. 3 (1995): 288–94.

45. A. Herscher, "Urban Formations of Difference: Borders and Cities in Post-1989 Europe," *European Review* 13, no. 2 (2005): 251–60.

46. Roger Zetter thus writes that "there exists the need to establish more precisely the extent to which bureaucratic interests and procedures are themselves crucial determinants in the definition of labels like refugee"; see Roger Zetter, "Labelling Refugees: Forming and Transforming a Bureaucratic Identity," *Journal of Refugee Studies* 4, no. 1 (1991): 39–62.

47. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Geneva, July 26, 1999). See also Paul Currian, "Learning From Kosovo: The Humanitarian Community Information Centre (HCIC), Year One," *Humanitarian Exchange Magazine* (March 2001), <http://www.odihpn.org/report.asp?ID=2278> (accessed March 2011).

48. European Commission Damage Assessment Kosovo and International Management Group, "Kosovo: Emergency assessment of damaged housing and local/village infrastructure" (European Commission, Brussels, July 1999). See also UNEP/UNCHS Balkans Task Force, "The Kosovo Conflict: Consequences for the Environment and Human Settlements" (United Nations Environment Programme and the United Nations Centre for Human Settlements Balkans Task Force, Nairobi, 1999).

49. See, for example, Government of Denmark Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Humanitarian and rehabilitation assistance to Kosovo, 1999–2003" (Evaluation Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Denmark, Copenhagen, 2004), especially Annex V, "Residential Housing Reconstruction Programmes."

50. This dynamic was described in the five municipalities in the Peć/Peja region in Corrado Minervini, "Housing Reconstruction in Kosovo," *Habitat International* 26, no. 4 (2002): 571–90.

51. For a numeric comparison of the UNHCR, IMG, and UNMIK municipal assessments, see *ibid.*, 575.

52. This dynamic is described in Peter Wiles and others, "Independent Evaluation of Expenditure of DEC Kosovo Appeal Funds: Phases I and II, April 1999–January 2000. Volume II: Sectoral Sections" (Overseas Development Institute, Valid International and Disasters Emergency Committee, London, August 2000), 36. Data on the damage level of houses repaired and reconstructed between 1999 and 2002 can be found in Marcy L. Daniel, "The January 2003 Construction Sector Assessment Report for Kosovo" (Cooperative Housing Foundation International, Silver Spring, MD, January 2003).

53. Nick Scott-Flynn, "Coordination in Kosovo: The Challenge for the NGO Sector," *Humanitarian Exchange Magazine* (November 1999), <http://www.odihpn.org/report.asp?id=1039> (accessed March 2011) and Fron Nazi, "Preparing for Winter," *Balkan Crisis Report* (London and Washington, DC: Institute for War and Peace Reporting, October 29, 1999), <http://iwpr.net/report-news/preparing-winter> (accessed March 2011).

54. Approximately seventy schools and medical clinics in rural areas were also "rehabilitated" in 1999 as part of humanitarian relief; see European Commission, *European Commission's Humanitarian Assistance for Kosovo in 1999* (Brussels: European Commission, November 17, 1999), http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/seerecon/kosovo/ec/echo_kosovo_1999.htm (accessed March 2011).

55. On this return, see United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, "The Kosovo Refugee Crisis: An Independent Evaluation of Unhcr's Emergency Preparedness and Response," *The Kosovo refugee crisis: an independent evaluation of UNHCR's emergency preparedness and response* (Geneva: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, February 9, 2000), <http://www.unhcr.org/3ae68d19c.html> (accessed March 2011).

56. United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, *The Right to Sustainable Return*.

57. Wiles and others, "Independent Evaluation," 32–33.

58. United Nations Mission in Kosovo, "UNMIK Guidelines for Housing Reconstruction in Kosovo" (United Nations Mission in Kosovo, Prishtina, March 2000).

59. Government of Denmark Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Humanitarian and rehabilitation assistance to Kosovo, 1999–2003."

60. Wiles and others, "Independent Evaluation," 38–39.

61. Nick Cater, Keith Ashton, and Brenda Puech, "How Kosovo Is Teaching Us the New Economics of Shelter," *Humanitarian Affairs Review* (June 15, 2000),

<http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/OCHA-64D7N3?OpenDocument> (accessed March 2011).

62. Wiles and others, "Independent Evaluation," 33.

63. Government of Denmark Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Humanitarian and rehabilitation assistance to Kosovo, 1999–2003."

64. Barakat, *Housing Reconstruction after Conflict and Disaster*, 15.

65. Human Rights Watch, "Abuses against Serbs and Roma in the new Kosovo" (Human Rights Watch, New York, August 1999). and Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Mission in Kosovo, "Human Rights in Kosovo: As Seen, As Told. Volume II" (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Vienna, November 5, 1999).

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67. Human Rights Watch, "Abuses against Serbs and Roma in the new Kosovo."

68. *Crucified Kosovo: Destroyed and Desecrated Serbian Orthodox Churches in Kosovo and Metohija, June–October 1999*, ed. Lubiša Folić (Prizren: Serbian Orthodox Church Diocese of Raška and Prizren, 2000).

69. See, for example, *Serb Genocide upon Albanian Culture of Gjakova, 24 March–13 June 1999* (Gjakova, Kosovo: Directorate for Education, Culture and Sport, Gjakova, September 25, 1999). *Monuments of Kosova, 1998–1999* (Prishtina: Institute for the Protection of Kosova Monuments, October 1999). *Serbian Barbarities Against Islamic Monuments in Kosova (February '98–June '99)*, ed. Sabri Bajgora (Prishtina: Dituria Islame, 2000).

70. European Agency for Reconstruction, "European agency for reconstruction annual report 2000 to the European Parliament and the Council" (European Agency for Reconstruction, Brussels, March 2001).

71. On these tensions, see Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing, *Friction: An Ethnography of Global Connection* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004).

72. Daniel, "Construction Sector Assessment," 24–26.

73. One exception was the finished wood products industry; because of low barriers to entry and utility of traditional craft skills, a number of carpentry workshops emerged after 1999 to supply doors, windows, and kitchen cabinets to reconstructed houses; see *ibid.*, 27.

74. On Neoliberalism and reconstruction, see *Capitalizing on Catastrophe: Neo-liberal Strategies in Disaster Reconstruction* and Neil Middleton and Phil O'Keefe, *Disaster and Development* (London: Pluto Press, 1998).

75. On prewar social relations, see Ger Duizings, *Religion and the Politics of Identity in Kosovo* (London: Hurst, 2000); on post-conflict "democratization" of social relations, see United Nations Development Programme, "Community Integrated Rehabilitation Programme" (United Nations Development Programme, New York, 2000).

76. European Agency for Reconstruction, "Annual Report 2000," 18.

77. On the “parallel society” of the 1990s, see Howard Clark, *Civil Resistance in Kosovo* (London: Pluto, 2000).

78. European Agency for Reconstruction, “Annual Report 2000,” 19.

79. Nehat Islami, “Mayor to Lift Lid on Kosovo Corruption,” *Global policy forum* (Institute for War and Peace Reporting, April 19, 2002), <http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/172/30197.html> (accessed March 2011).

80. Daniel, “Construction Sector Assessment,” 18.

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CHAPTER 6

Aid and Redevelopment

International Finance and the Reconstruction of Beirut

War by Other Means?

NAJIB HOURANI

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this chapter is to investigate the production of the post-conflict *economy* within the knowledges and practices of the development industry. It examines how international financial institutions (IFIs) render “objective” understandings through which the post-conflict economy can be elaborated. First, this is accomplished by formatting the complex political economy of Lebanon within the domain of normal economic categories. In this fashion, even the war itself—its violence, traumas, and the transformations it wrought—is reduced to a mere “idiosyncratic shock” that may be overcome through the application of conventional development solutions. Second, this is then sustained by the systematic elision of the IFIs themselves—their knowledges and political involvement—from the processes they claim to analyze. Once the economy is constructed as an object in this fashion, the development industry can then set about implementing standardized development projects. One such project, the World Bank’s Revenue Enhancement Project, which is investigated here, sought to liberalize Lebanon’s property regime in line with contemporary Neoliberal thought. A major effect of these interventions is consolidation of power by wartime politico-economic networks, the existence and operations of which are invisible to the very Neoliberal regime that has made it possible. This becomes visible through examination of the network logic underwriting post-conflict

reconstruction in Beirut, a logic at variance with the imagined economy behind Neoliberal prescriptions.

INTRODUCTION

With the rise of the so-called New Wars at the end of the twentieth century, internal conflicts—their prevention, management, and transition toward peace—have become central concerns of the development industry. By virtue of their size and capacity for the production of knowledge, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have been successful in setting the international community's agenda for the prevention and management of civil wars and post-conflict recovery; an agenda in which both institutions play increasingly important roles.¹ Rooted in what Duffield calls the Liberal Peace paradigm, the development industry's understanding of internal conflicts, its humanitarian discourses, and its approach to post-conflict reconstruction and development are increasingly circumscribed by the degree to which they promote, consolidate or defend the institutionalization of a neo-liberal world order.² Accordingly, the IFIs, once loath to explicitly engage in political engineering, are increasingly willing to do so in support of market liberalization, and they view post-conflict environments as especially amenable to such comprehensive projects.³

As the chapters in this volume make clear in relation to questions of trauma, reconciliation processes, and post-conflict nation- and statebuilding, such environments are not simply contexts within which action takes place. Rather, discourses that international institutions and bilateral development agencies deploy in part constitute post-conflict environments themselves. Accordingly, the contributors to this volume, each in his or her own area of expertise, examine the enormous work such institutions put into the very production of the post-conflict environment, and how the particular constructions they produce render some analyses and interventions “reasonable,” “realistic,” and possible, while excluding others. Nowhere is the construction of this environment clearer than in the domain of post-conflict reconstruction and the economic discourse within which it is embedded.

While the World Bank and the IMF increasingly recognize that each context is shaped by its own political peculiarities, they remain primarily concerned with the liberation of what liberalism nonetheless takes to be an eco-

monic realm animated by universal principles, from the contaminants of politics, culture, and violence.⁴ This construction of conflict and post-conflict environments as domains that somehow exist outside processes of universal economic development represents the ontological baseline from which debates about post-conflict reconstruction spring. This chapter, then, focuses specifically upon this reification of the economic, and the factors and forces operant in post-conflict Lebanon that this reification hides from view.

Drawing upon World Bank and IMF studies of Lebanon's transition from war to peace and the results of nearly three years of ethnographic and archival fieldwork in Beirut, I trace the constitution of Lebanon's post-conflict economy and the effects of this construction on politico-economic processes and the possibilities of a positive peace.⁵ First, I examine the IFIs' standard narrative, presented in virtually every IFI report on post-conflict Lebanon, of the country's pre-war free-market miracle, conflict-induced collapse, and the promise of a post-war Neoliberal renaissance. I focus not upon whether this narrative is more or less accurate, but rather examine how this simple drama in part constitutes, or constructs, the post-conflict environment it claims to diagnose. I suggest that the tale of a once and future free-market Lebanon is not meant to be an accurate description of Lebanese history or a depiction of realistic possibility. Rather, I argue, it serves as a framing device that prepares the reader for the discursive production of the post-conflict environment as a particular kind of object.

I then seek to understand how the International Financial Institutions' Neoliberal discourse transforms a war-torn nation, suffering from multiple violences, traumas, dispossessions, and indignities, into an object of development amenable to dispassionate debate and standardized policy initiatives. The second section explores this question through an examination of one World Bank-sponsored technical assistance project intended to liberalize the Lebanese property regime. How did the discourse of post-conflict reconstruction format the problems the project was meant to solve?

The third section examines the resultant property regime transformation and its effects. Through an examination of the networks of provision that produce upscale urban space, I reveal that which was hidden behind the IFIs' allegedly technocratic depiction of the post-conflict environment. More precisely, I show "the market" to be constituted not of liberalism's rational individuals, but rather of powerful politico-economic networks.⁶ These networks, I will argue, working within and alongside the state, were

able to successfully turn the marketization processes to their own decidedly illiberal interests. From where did these networks emerge, and how did the IFIs' Neoliberal approach to reconstruction transform their operations?

As will become clear, the neo-liberalization of the property regime failed to produce the promised prosperity. Was the failure to produce a post-conflict renaissance the result, as the IFIs usually claim when their expertise-driven prescriptions produce catastrophe, of imperfect knowledge, faulty implementation, or political interference with what were otherwise sound economic policies? In this final section I show how that which was suppressed in the discursive construction of the post-conflict environment enabled the continued pursuit of civil war, albeit by other means. The weapons deployed in the post-conflict conflict, I will show, included the international financial institutions themselves, and the market discourse they promote.

CONSTITUTING THE POST-CONFLICT ENVIRONMENT

The opening paragraphs of any IMF or World Bank report on post-conflict Lebanon contain, in a clear and condensed form, what has become the standard account of the country's wartime collapse and peacetime efforts toward recovery. The narrative begins with the assertion that pre-war Lebanon was a *laissez-faire* miracle, marked by openness and minimal regulation. As one of the region's only free-market economies, readers will learn, Lebanon played an important role between East and West, and, by virtue of these policies, rapidly grew into a prosperous regional centre for banking, finance, tourism insurance, and trade.

The account will then introduce the 1975–90 civil war and list its consequences: estimates of the dead and wounded, the damage to infrastructure and industry, the flight of human resources, the decline in investment, and Lebanon's separation from increasingly global flows of labor, goods, information, and capital.⁷ Central to the narrative is the deterioration of public finances. The state's inability to collect revenues even as it maintained "a minimum of public services" produced large debt-financed fiscal deficits. The resulting "erosion of private sector confidence," according to the IMF, "led to continuous pressures on the Lebanese pound" and rampant inflation.⁸

This wartime imbalance worsened despite the formal end of the war and the birth of Lebanon's Second Republic under Prime Minister Omar Karami in 1990. The World Bank, echoing the IMF, locates the problem in out-of-

control state spending. Lebanon's "large, persistent fiscal deficit," according to the Bank, was exacerbated by the government's December 3, 1991, decision to grant a "large, retroactive civil servant pay increase." This fiscal irresponsibility precipitated a crisis and a "speculative attack on the domestic currency." In defense of the currency, the Central Bank, *Banque du Liban* (BdL), "lost about US\$450 million in reserves in two months—January and February 1992."⁹ Poor economic policy had, it seems, sent the economy into a tailspin.

But then, suddenly and quite unexpectedly, "Confidence was restored." According to both IFIs, the first post-war parliamentary elections and the installation of a new government, in October 1992, ended the economic crisis "virtually overnight."¹⁰ According to the World Bank, this surge in "confidence" triggered conversion of dollar deposits to lira and a capital inflow so massive that the BdL was able to increase its US dollar reserves by one billion dollars in the month of November *alone*.¹¹ Yet, despite this reversal of fortune, the IFIs warned, the Lebanese economy remained on a precipice. "Given the speculative nature of these inflows," the Bank cautions, "the current stability is vulnerable to changes in expectations, and will not be lasting until fundamental macroeconomic imbalances, in particular the fiscal deficit, are corrected."¹² Significant economic reforms—rigorous expenditure controls, revenue enhancement, and the privatization of reconstruction itself—would be necessary to ensure sustainable post-conflict recovery.

One could question the accuracy of this narrative. Indeed, the celebratory depiction of Lebanon's pre-war laissez-faire miracle was long ago discredited. More recently, Gaspard, for example, shows that laissez-faire Lebanon performed far less admirably than the IFIs suggest. When compared with other less developed countries at the time, Lebanon's GDP growth reflected "quite an average performance."¹³ True, per capita income was higher—due to Lebanon's position in the regional colonial architecture—but it was highly concentrated in a small group of elite families surrounding an even smaller financial-mercantile oligarchy. Per capita GNP growth was, moreover, lower than all but one of the region's non-oil producing countries. Indeed, since independence in 1948, some 50 percent of the population consistently lived in poverty.¹⁴ Indeed, in contrast to what the IFIs claim, it was precisely this imbalance that led to the civil war in the first place.¹⁵

The World Bank's conclusions diverge not only from scholarly studies, however. They diverge from those of other institutional studies available at

the time. A 1991 Lebanese Central Bank report, for instance, found not a *Livre Libanaise* (LL or Lebanese Pound) in decline as the IFIs claim. Rather, it found a 19 percent increase in its value since the war's end, clearly indicative, in the world of development economics, of improvement.¹⁶ More surprisingly, the Bank's own figures confirm this trend, showing an appreciation from 1,080 to the US dollar in September 1990 to 830 on the eve of the BdL's sudden decision to let the pound float in February 1992.¹⁷

The point, however, is not simply to question statistical evidence or the ideological nature of the conclusions based upon it. Rather, the point is to foreground how this simple drama of pre-war free-market prosperity, war-induced dislocation, and the promise of Neoliberal recovery formats the further construction of the post-conflict environment to follow. Escobar,¹⁸ Ferguson,¹⁹ and Mitchell²⁰ have shown how development economics conceptually produces the "less developed country" as a discretely bounded entity, the internal political and economic components of which can be subjected to techno-managerial interventions toward an imagined universal "development." How do the IFIs, through the knowledge they produce, contribute to the production of the very environments under study?

Expert Knowledge from Above and Outside

The simple drama with which IFI reports begin makes an important contribution to the construction of the post-conflict environment as an object amenable to "objective" study. This objectification, of necessity, requires the constitution of the IFIs' own positions as seemingly outside and above post-conflict Lebanon through the systematic removal of the IFIs from the historical and economic analyses they present. Accordingly, the standard narrative neglects the significant role the IMF and World Bank played in producing the economic crisis of 1992.

For example, barely a month after the war's end on October 13, 1990, the IMF argued that the public deficit "is the primary cause of financial instability" and made reconstruction aid contingent upon an austerity program that froze public sector wages and ended subsidies on the basic foodstuffs and fuels upon which the average Lebanese citizen relied.²¹ Moreover, the narrative neglects the fact that the first post-conflict government acquiesced to these demands in 1991, and in 1992 imposed regressive consumption taxes, such as the 18 percent tax on fuels, in line with IFI prescriptions. Not surprisingly, then, the link between IFI-imposed structural adjustment and

the social instability that it provoked, instability that culminated in popular demonstrations and strikes that brought the first government down and threatened a return to war, is also hidden from view.²²

The IFIs' role was more significant still. Not only did the Bank discourage donors through public criticism of government efforts. It purposely delayed the convention of a donor conference that might have made aid available. In response to then-prime minister Karami's request of 4.45 billion US dollars at the initial international donor meeting in 1991 the Bank lent only tepid support. It endorsed a mere one-fifth of the amount requested, and much of that had already been pledged.²³ Despite Karami's efforts to meet IFI conditions, the Bank postponed the follow-up meeting throughout 1992. Even after the Central Bank allowed the currency to float (and collapse) in line with IMF demands, and as the average Lebanese was pushed further into poverty, reconstruction aid was withheld.²⁴

Clearly, the IFI pressure was central to the 1992 economic crisis and the social unrest that brought down Lebanon's first post-conflict government. Yet of necessity they must absent themselves from the narrative they produce *about* the crisis. To do otherwise, as Mitchell shows, would undermine the imagined exteriority that enables development expertise to present itself as rational and disinterested, generated outside and above the object of study. To do otherwise is to open the door to an investigation of the IFIs themselves and their relations to transnational politics and circuits of power. It is to undermine their claim to objective expertise.²⁵

A Coherent Picture

Once the relation of exteriority is achieved, the narrative seeks to re-locate the "dislocated" Lebanon within the universal realm of development economics. This involves mapping the post-conflict environment within a universal framework of the national economies.²⁶ The post-conflict economy can thereby be analyzed as a discretely bounded object that shares with other like entities the same internal economic organs—individuals, firms, markets, economic sectors, and the administrative institutions and regulations that are said to govern them. It is imagined, too, that the operations of and relations between these internal organs are subject to the same measures of health and ailment—GDP, GNP, inflation rate, budget deficit or surplus, balance of payments—as well. The deployment of standard economic categories and statistical representations, however, does not describe the post-

conflict environment. Rather it *constructs* it through the filtration, simplification, and organization of complex, contradictory, and incomplete information into what the World Bank calls “a coherent picture.”²⁷

This macroeconomic snapshot then lends itself to other normalizing analytical practices that help to re-locate the dislocated economy along an imagined universal trajectory of development. The most important of these is comparison. The IMF, for example, measures the war-induced deviation of “actual real Lebanese GDP” from the “trend real GDP” it assumes would have been attained in the absence of the war.²⁸ Similar abstractions—estimates of population growth and assumptions of annual GDP growth rates plugged into “the conventional framework of neoclassical growth theory”—are used to estimate the time required for Lebanon to catch up to 1974 income levels and then attain the “steady state” income level Lebanese would have enjoyed in the absence of the war. Such procedures, in which an abstract “normal” state of development is extrapolated from a snapshot of the past by means of idealized assumptions, establishes a baseline measure of deviance to be overcome through market-driven development. Indeed, as the title of the generally positive 1999 IMF report on the Lebanese economy, “Back to the Future: Postwar Reconstruction and Stabilization in Lebanon,” suggests, an imaginary past, abstract and imaginary trends, and a-historical analysis form the basis of the Neoliberal promise of prosperity.²⁹

Every act of discursive production, of course, suppresses phenomena that may trouble its analysis and conclusions. The IFIs’ construction of the Lebanese post-conflict environment, however, goes so far as to suppress the war itself. The dramatic politico-economic transformations born of violent transnational struggle for power and position within new Lebanese, regional, and global order vanish behind the Neoliberal economics’ universalizing categories and modes of representation. As such, fifteen years of violence and transformation can be reduced, to use the words of the IMF economists, to a mere “idiosyncratic shock,”³⁰ a temporary derailment of normal development, or an extended episode of “development in reverse.”³¹

Standardized Rationale for Neoliberal Reform: State Spending

The IFIs’ “coherent picture” hides the complexity of wartime politics and power, within which the imaginary line separating politics and economics, so central to development economics’ analyses, is impossible to locate. Consider the IFIs’ central claim: that the major obstacle to Lebanon’s economic

recovery was the “large and persistent fiscal deficit” produced by wartime spending on public services and subsidies on food and fuel, that was then compounded by post-war profligacy. It is a technical tale of internal economic imbalances (deficit) and predictable results (pressure on the currency and high inflation).

The claim to analytical objectivity is bolstered through comparison, in table form, of Lebanon’s budget deficits in 1989 and 1992 with those of Egypt, Jordan, Iran, Morocco, and Tunisia—all of which, in the late 1980s, cut spending as part of their own IFI-forced SAPs. According to the table, Lebanon’s budget deficit as a percentage of GDP was higher than that of all save Egypt.³² Such a comparison, with a series of countries none of which were emerging from a protracted and destructive civil war, only makes sense if the purpose is not to understand the unique experiences and challenges facing Lebanon, but rather to erase them in favor of the standardized and ideological analysis the IFIs produce.

What does this technical tale erase? For starters, that 1989 was one of the most unstable and destructive years of the Lebanese conflict. A 1988 crisis of presidential succession created two rival governments, both of which drew upon government revenue, even as increasing violence closed Lebanon’s revenue-generating ports. As a measure of Lebanon’s deviance from a fiscal norm, the Bank could not have picked a more abnormal year, even in the context of war. Moreover, the financial crisis of 1989–90, from which the country was only beginning to emerge in 1991 (when the IFIs forced structural adjustment upon Lebanon), can be traced to this moment as well, calling into question the standard narrative of collapse and sudden return of confidence. Indeed, economic instability at war’s end was not the result of government spending on food and fuel subsidies, or wage increases to the public sector.

It was precipitated by the fall of the *Kata’ib* Party, the political machine-cum-militia headed by outgoing president Amin Gemayel and the wartime politico-economic network through which it pursued power.³³ The *Kata’ib* was throughout the first decade of the war the most powerful of the self-styled “Christian” militia. Indeed, it provided two of Lebanon’s wartime presidents, the brothers Bashir and Amin Gemayel, and developed or captured a series of financial institutions through which to control the banking sector and thereby, the heights of the Lebanese political economy. Centered on *Banque al-Mashreq* and *Credit Libanais*, two of Lebanon’s largest banks, and the Intra Investment Company, Lebanon’s largest financial institution,

the network was estimated to have directly controlled approximately a quarter of all banking activity in Lebanon at the time of its collapse. Through its connections to other banking institutions and a vast loan portfolio within Lebanon and abroad, however, its weight within the Lebanese political economy was far greater. The network's 1988–89 collapse spurred a cascade of bank failures across Lebanon and the closure of their subsidiaries and sister institutions throughout the Middle East, Europe, and the United States.³⁴ While the true magnitude of the losses will likely never be known, by all indications they were enormous. *Banque al-Mashreq*, alone, suffered losses in excess of 300 million dollars.³⁵ In addition to covering deposits the Central Bank provided liquidity to the commercial banking sector in 1989, 1990, and 1991 to stave off further failures.

One such effort was a program through which the BdL purchased real estate the banks collected from defaulting borrowers. While the BdL bought the properties in dollars, the commercial banks were allowed to repurchase the assets in depreciating Lebanese currency. Sale to the BdL relieved the banks of troubled assets and secured their balance sheets in dollars. More important, the differential in the price paid by the BdL for the distressed loans and the price at which the Banks bought them back in Lira constituted a subsidy reaching as high as 70 to 80 percent.³⁶

According to officials familiar with the program, given the windfall to the banks, the bailout rapidly became a business. Banks extended loans guaranteed by overvalued real estate to connected clients, who then promptly defaulted—sometimes within as little as a week. The bank then promptly turned the troubled asset over to the Central Bank for dollars. While the true scale of the bailout will probably never be known, an IMF report, based upon the 1990 Article IV consultations, estimated Central Bank credit to the commercial banks at approximately 213,235,000 US dollars for the first nine months of 1990 alone.³⁷ According to BdL officials, estimates of the value of real estate held by the Central Bank at the program's end—that is, troubled assets *not* repurchased by the commercial banks—ranged from the highly unlikely figure of “just a few million” to “nearly a billion dollars.”³⁸ These figures seem to give credence to a report in the daily *al-Nahar* that it was such efforts to bail out the wealthiest Lebanese and their banks that led to the 500 million dollar decline in foreign currency reserves during the same period.³⁹

It was this diversion of government resources to bail out the banking sector, not subsidies for basic foods and fuels for the increasingly impoverished Lebanese people, that deprived the government of much-needed resources

for reconstruction. The massive bailout and further subsidies to the financial oligarchy and militia-related financiers remain unexplored within analyses that hide these politico-economic processes behind a technical tale of simple fiscal imbalance. It is the erasure of these dynamics that enables the re-location of the post-conflict environment within the realm of normal economics and universal development, and so converts a public bailout of the wealthiest Lebanese into a mere “idiosyncratic shock” to be overcome by standardized and normalizing development interventions that crushed the average citizen.

STANDARDIZED INTERVENTION: NEOLIBERALIZING THE PROPERTY REGIME

On June 10, 1994, the World Bank president submitted a loan proposal for 19.4 million of a 23.6 million dollar “Revenue Enhancement and Fiscal Management Technical Assistance Project” to the Bank’s Board of Directors.⁴⁰ The president’s supporting memo, of course, begins with the standard narrative. “Fifteen years of conflict in Lebanon have left the economy devastated,” the memo proclaims, prior to the recitation of the war’s consequences: damage of 25 billion US dollars, significant population displacement, a brain drain of 200,000 skilled professionals that left public institutions to suffer from outdated policies and procedures, and a lack of qualified staff. While the memo cites low salaries as the main reason why the public sector cannot attract talent, it presents this as an objective feature of the post-conflict environment. It neglects to mention that the public sector wage freeze, as we have already seen, was itself an IFI condition for the aid for which the memorandum now argues.⁴¹

The following paragraph identifies the “large budget deficit” as the primary obstacle to post-conflict recovery. It asserts the failure of the Karami government’s policies prior to 1992 and introduces the successes of “the new Government,” that of Saudi-Lebanese billionaire businessman Rafik Hariri, and his Neoliberal economic and reconstruction policies. Nonetheless, the memo warns, the 1993 fiscal deficit, at approximately 10.7 percent of GDP, remains “relatively large.” A footnote reminds the Board that “Reliable data on Lebanon’s GDP are not yet available,” and that the report relies upon “rough estimates.”⁴²

The memo identifies the absence of adequate “staffing, procedures and

systems, equipment, statistical data and policy analysis” at the Ministry of Finance as an obstacle to rapid recovery. These institutional constraints undermine the Ministry’s ability to rapidly raise revenue through the customs, the cadastre and land registration administrations, or to manage taxation and public expenditures. Therefore, the Lebanese government was in dire need of the “significant and immediate technical assistance” that only the World Bank and its development-industry partners could offer.⁴³

While the memo foregrounds post-war institution building in the name of strengthening government capacities, the “Technical Assistance Project” was, in fact, a standard development-industry intervention, rooted in the then-novel understanding that institutions—regulatory, administrative, and legal—have an important role to play in generating, channelling, and sustaining successful development. The arguments for such efforts, popularized in Hernando de Soto’s *The Other Path* (1989) and, later, *The Mystery of Capital* (2000), were incorporated into World Bank thinking on institutions and economic development as early as 1991.⁴⁴

According to de Soto, clear, simple, and formal property rights constitute the “hidden architecture” of successful capitalist economies. It is the absence of this architecture that impedes market-driven prosperity in less developed countries.⁴⁵ Therefore, development requires administrative and legal reform to enable the proper circulation of property rights in a market populated by economically rational individuals, firms, and institutions. The clear delineation and inscription of property rights, in the title deed or land registry, for example, constitutes the “visible sign” of material objects that allows property to live a parallel existence within which it might circulate and generate capital.⁴⁶ Equally important, such representations must be convertible, simple, and standardized and, thereby, made *legible* to investors, firms, or institutions that may operate in, link to, or regulate the market. It is precisely such representations that the Revenue Enhancement Project promised to create, and so enable Lebanese real estate to “lead an invisible, parallel life” detached from its corporal existence.⁴⁷

The production of standardized property representations, alone, is not sufficient, however. They must be constantly *in motion*. For de Soto and the development industry at large, this means the erasure of non-economic impediments—political or cultural considerations, state regulation, alternate legal forms, or informal rules and procedures, for example—that might obstruct the free circulation of the property right as a purely economic value.⁴⁸ In other words, the property regime is to guarantee not simply the commoditization of property, an object to be bought or sold, but rather its

transformation into a financial asset for circulation as fictive capital. It is precisely such a property regime that the Revenue Enhancement Program sought to establish.

The attached “Technical Annex” provides more a detailed presentation of the logic behind the Revenue Enhancement Program and its benefits to Lebanon. After rehearsing the standard narrative *yet again*, it links the Project to the Hariri government’s larger Neoliberal program, which, the authors assure the Board, properly “envisages that national reconstruction and development should be guided by private sector initiatives, as Lebanon’s vigorous and dynamic private sector continues to be the country’s main asset.” Indeed, Hariri and the Bank agreed that the role of the government, beyond restoration of basic physical and social infrastructure, is primarily to create “an enabling environment for the private sector.”⁴⁹

The centerpiece of the Project was the creation of new property representations within a new digitized and automated property registry and cadastre. In contrast to the president’s memo, however, improved state capabilities in revenue assessment, collection, and management to meet reconstruction needs are presented as *secondary* to benefits to the “private sector.” The Annex stresses the “adverse impact” of the current system “on the private sector’s land-related investment for housing and other purposes.” Echoing de Soto, the authors argue “private investment depends on a well-functioning land registry and cadastre, including the establishment of a proper land-rights data-base and simplification of the land registration and adjudication system.” It concludes: “The cadastre-based information systems are crucial not only for promoting private investment activity and institutional credit, but also for strengthening the collection of property taxes and for reducing related cumbersome procedures” (6).

Project officials stressed the same priorities. While the new technologies would allow more rigorous administrative control the benefits of digitization and automation to the “private sector” were far more important, and would dramatically expand private investment.⁵⁰ Indeed, they stressed that the new system adopted global standards that would provide regional and global finance, insurance and real estate industries, and large institutional investors with more accurate market knowledge, and the ability to rapidly access and assess that knowledge for investment purposes. The newly digitized administrative architecture would force Lebanon’s economy, once outside the dynamics of universal development, to the regional forefront of universal capitalist globalization.

As already noted, the financial assetization of property requires not sim-

ply the ability to buy and sell rights to a specific building, apartment, or shop. It requires that such rights are constantly in motion and so able to generate and maximize rents to finance capital. Hariri's larger Neoliberal program, anchored by the 1992 Law of Owners and Tenants, sought precisely to remove obstacles to the generation of such rents. The law erased, from that year forward, "traditional" understandings of property that, in the minds of framers, retarded the development of the economically rational market upon which post-war recovery depended. First among these was the institution of *Istithmaar*. *Istithmaar*, a commercial investment contract that essentially divided ownership rights between owner and tenant, was a central means through which small landowners and developers financed the construction of new buildings. The commercial investor (*mustathmir*) pays for the right to occupy and use a premise for a specified period of time, and to transfer that right to another *mustathmir* at a future date. The payment for this temporary sale, known as *Khululu*, often made in advance of construction, financed the production of much of Beirut's built environment. As an investment, the higher the *khululu* paid, the lower the monthly rent.

Khululu also circulated with housing and other commercial forms of tenancy and was transferable by tenants to their heirs. As a figure that rises and falls with the value of the premises, the payment often represented a sizeable investment on the part of tenants, an investment from which they might profit upon vacating a premise. More important to small family businesses, the *khululu* was a value against which shop owners could borrow to finance their own operations.

Development industry understood *khululu* simply as "an unearned rent" that, in accruing to the tenant, prohibited rational operation of the real estate and rental markets.⁵¹ Drawing on this argument, landlords and property developers argued that, like *Istithmaar*, it was an obstacle to reconstruction and market development. The 1992 law did away with *istithmaar* and *khululu* on all contracts signed after 1992. Moreover, it removed other tenant protections in the name of circulation, as well. The new law specified maximum lease duration of three years, eased restrictions on eviction, and abolished rent controls on any contract signed after 1992.

The 1992 reforms sought to erase legal pluralism and local property arrangements in favor of an abstract, purified, conception of property rights and ownership, and to remove regulatory impediments to the private sector's exercise of economic rationality. The World Bank Project sought to represent space with digital precision and speed, and thereby accelerate the

global circulation of these new abstractions, free from the vagaries of human error or corruption. How did this purification of the economic play into the post-conflict environment? How did what was hidden by the IFIs' construction interact with and transform it, and to what effect? The next section answers these questions through an examination of the Beirut City Center, the first area to be re-inscribed by the new property regime.

NEOLIBERAL RECONSTRUCTION: A LANDSCAPE OF COMPETITION?

Solidere, the 1.6 billion dollar real estate holding company charged with planning and profiting from the reconstruction of the Beirut Central District (BCD), was the flagship of Lebanon's promised neo-liberal renaissance. In line with World Bank and IMF arguments, backers claimed that only privatization of reconstruction would ensure global-standard planning and financial management. Moreover, with the newly liberalized property regime in place, private sector initiative—the hidden hand “isolated from politics”⁵²—guaranteed Lebanon's rapid reintegration with universal processes of capitalist globalization and development.

If *Solidere* was the flagship of Neoliberal reconstruction, the new Beirut Souks project, located at the heart of the new city center, was *Solidere's* flagship development.⁵³ Boasting more than 163,000 square meters of retail space and covering an entire urban quarter, *Solidere* presents this heritage-themed shopper-tainment district as the embodiment of globalization's promise. Competition with other developments in Beirut, across Lebanon, and throughout the Middle East required that the new Souks be built to the “highest international standards.” Accordingly designers accommodated the spatial needs not of the thousands of small-scale Lebanese merchants that animated the pre-war city center, but those of Western multinational brands, the “retail professionals.”⁵⁴

The plan combines five programmatic elements within a framework following the classic North American “dumbbell” mall, which locates large “anchor” tenants, such as department stores and cinemas, at the four corners of a rectangular interior space that contains medium-sized and small shops. The *Solidere* plan called for a major department store, such as Saks Fifth Avenue, to be the northwest anchor. The northeast would house a multi-screen Cineplex, and the southwest an inner city supermarket. The

southeastern anchor was a new jewellery market, meant to recall the famous *Suq al-Sagha*, once located on Martyrs Square. The fifth element, the “core,” organized along the historic, pre-war grid of north-south streets and east-west passageways, contained medium-sized “semi-anchor” spaces to accommodate the US-based Gap or the Spanish ZARA, and large tertiary spaces to attract name-brand stores such as Timberland, Guess, and Calvin Klein. By virtue of strict adherence to such international standards, *Solidere* officials argue, there would be no doubt that “the internationals” would come to the new Souks, and the company and its investors would reap handsome rental streams.⁵⁵

Yet even as planning for the new Souks neared completion in late 1995, it was becoming clear that the market reforms, insisted upon by the IFIs, adopted by the Karami government, and rigorously pursued by Hariri since 1992, were not delivering the promised economic renaissance. While the reconstruction of the city center was privatized under *Solidere*, and the property regime liberalized, the Hariri government embarked upon an ambitious program of public investment. Entitled *Horizon 2000*, the national reconstruction plan tapped the private sector to develop infrastructure schemes through “public-private partnerships.” The bulk of the plan, front-loaded both chronologically and financially, was financed through loans from, and the sale of high-interest treasury bills to, local commercial banks.⁵⁶

This restoration of the class power of the financial oligarchy (interest rates on the treasury bills reached 45 percent, even as taxes on bank profits were drastically reduced as part of structural adjustment) imposed severe costs on the average Lebanese. As unemployment pushed 20 percent,⁵⁷ a department of statistics survey, published in 1996, found that more than a third of the population lived in poverty, defined as a family of 5.6 persons earning less than 630 dollars per month, while a full 60 percent were living on less than 800 dollars per month, the minimum required to cover basic needs. In contrast, only 7 percent of the population earned more than \$2,000 per month.⁵⁸

Nor did Beirut’s return to its imagined pre-war status as a center of finance, services, and international trade seem any more likely. Other transit centers, such as Dubai, eclipsed the once-thriving Beirut port. Despite the massive subsidies to the financial sector—Lebanon’s public debt to the commercial banks reached some 17 billion dollars by 1998⁵⁹—technological changes in communication and information management reduced the need for regional financial centers, as well. As one *Solidere* planner put it, the idea

that Lebanon could regain its imagined past was, by 1998, “a lot of crap.” He explained sardonically, “The financial capital of the Middle East is not *in* the Middle East, unfortunately. It’s in London.”⁶⁰

Instead, structural adjustment and liberalization of the property regime, combined with the government-funded expansion of banking sector liquidity, produced an explosion in speculative real estate development. By some estimates real estate accounted for 80 percent of all investment between 1991 and 1996, while job-producing sectors such as agriculture or industry withered with neglect.⁶¹ As property investment grew from two billion dollars in 1993 to three billion in 1995, luxury apartments, hotels, and shopping malls led the way.⁶² New commercial centers in Beirut’s Verdun neighborhood, for example, combined retail malls, luxury apartments, and large office spaces, and a number of new purpose-built shopping malls, such as the ABC Mall in *Achrafiyya*, entered the development pipeline.

It could be argued that, even if Lebanon could not become a regional financial center, the production of Beirut’s new elite urban geography, at least, *was* the result of the market-driven competition between economically rational individuals and firms that the new property regime made possible. Are not shopping malls, after all, the paradigmatic urban form of capitalist globalization? Investigation of the rise of *Verdun*, *Solidere*’s major local competitor, suggests that very different processes, invisible to the IFIs’ Neoliberal imaginary, are at work. Rather than producing a market within which urban property circulates as a financial asset, or, for that matter, a commodity, I suggest that the pursuit of free-market reconstruction enabled the continuation of war by other means.

Verdun

Verdun arose not with Neoliberal reconstruction, but with those politico-economic dynamics of the civil war, which, like the wartime collapse of the *Kata’ib* financial network in 1989–90, were rendered invisible within the IFIs’ construction of Lebanon’s post-conflict environment. Protection by a Lebanese Army barracks and by the presence of UN offices and several foreign embassies, including that of the Soviet Union, ensured that no militia could control this upscale district.⁶³ Indeed, *Verdun*’s upper-class population not only remained intact throughout the Lebanese conflict but grew with property investment by militia-related financial networks.

With the war’s end, investment in the area exploded and Verdun rapidly

became an enclave for wealthy Beirutis and Gulf tourists alike. By the mid-1990s, it boasted a number of shopping malls, such as the Plaza I and Plaza II, the Dunes Center, and Verdun 730 and 732, each of which features an array of Western brand names, from Armani to Valentino, as well as international fast food such as Starbucks, McDonald's, and Mrs. Fields Cookies.

For supporters of the Neoliberal project, the apparent dynamism of Verdun demonstrates the vitality that only private sector competition can produce. Indeed, according to *Solidere* planners, the Verdun retail offer is the competition against which they evaluate all dimensions of their own retail strategy, from brand tenantry to price structure.⁶⁴ But this discourse of market competition between private actors once again hides more than it reveals. Verdun's dynamism has little to do with market mechanisms of neoliberal economic theory and everything to do with the geographic solidification of wartime power relations through cooperation and competition between networks of capitalists, which, like the wartime *Kata'ib* financial network, worked within and alongside militia and state structures in pursuit of politico-economic power.

Wartime Verdun

The wartime destruction of the City Center forced a decentralization of retail throughout Beirut, and, more importantly, gave rise to a new set of retailers.⁶⁵ These new capitalists, many from humble origins, eased into the import and retail businesses through militia connections and the multiplication of militia-run ports. Perhaps the largest of these retailers was a company called Via Spiga, run by two East Beirut brothers. Allegedly through contacts with the right-wing Lebanese Forces (LF) militia, Via Spiga began to register exclusive agency agreements with a number of Western brand names, and to import goods through LF-held ports. In West Beirut another company, Maxima, was also on the rise. The owners, close to the Amal militia, began with the representation of Max Mara and Marella. In the 1980s, Maxima opened its first Benetton, the business practices and expansion of which are considered emblematic of capitalist globalization.⁶⁶

While politically connected fashion upstarts coalesced into business groups, other militia-related capitalists invested in property. These new investor-contractors used political and financial connections to fill the vacuum left by the large, oligarch-connected contractors that left war-torn Lebanon for the oil-rich Gulf states. Through relationships with politico-

military forces that one such investor/contractor called “incestuous,” these new capitalists were able to “virtually monopolize” the production of Beirut’s safe, elite enclaves.⁶⁷

In *Verdun*, the most important of these were either members of or linked to the Amal militia and associated diamond dealers based in Congo, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, such as Jamil Said Mohammed, and bankers such as the now-infamous Ahmad Chalabi, who, prior to working within and alongside the US for the fall of Saddam Hussein, operated the Middle East Banking Company in Beirut, itself a subsidiary of the Jordanian-based Petra Bank. Together, these politically connected capitalists laid the basis for post-war control of this high-rent neighborhood. The operations of Ali Ahmad Group is paradigmatic. Involved in the African diamond trade through Triple-A Diamonds, an Antwerp-registered company, the Group began to purchase Verdun property, including that underneath today’s Verdun 730 mall, during the war.⁶⁸ With the same goal in mind, these networks invested in *Ramlat al-Bayda’*, amongst the most expensive real estate in Lebanon, and *Ayn al-Tine*, where the post-war Speaker of Parliament, Amal militia leader Nabih Berri, would construct a new official Speaker’s residence for himself. By 1994, the price of land in *Ramlat al-Bayda’* had increased to 5,000 dollars per square meter. By 1995, *Verdun* shop space ranged from 8,000 to 14,000 dollars. However, neither the rapid development of this neighborhood nor the increase in land values was the product of private-sector actors making economically rational choices.

Could it not, however, still be argued that, even if investment followed such a network logic, decisions to purchase or rent retail space in Verdun *were* driven by the market rationality the new property regime sought to liberate? An examination of the relations between the firms that produce and populate retail spaces in Verdun suggests otherwise. For example, three interlinked companies purchased the Concord Plaza, the first modern shopping mall to open in post-conflict Verdun. Amal Militia associates with interests in Africa formed United Brothers Holding (UBH), in 1991. UBH partnered with an owner of Maxima Fashion, mentioned earlier, to start Food, Entertainment and Business SAL, which became part owner of the cinemas that anchor the Concord Plaza.⁶⁹ These businessmen were also part owners of the department store anchor and, through a company called *International Cafes SAL*, opened Lebanon’s first Hard Rock Café, located within the mall. Through yet another company, *Zed Co.*, again, they hold Lebanon’s first ZARA franchise, the main semi-anchor in the Concord Plaza.

This vertical integration of the retail venue, from ownership of land to construction of the mall extending to the shops and exclusive agency rights to market the brands they contain, is not unique to the Concord. The Ali Ahmad Group's Verdun 730, which opened in 1996 in a ceremony headlined by Amal MP Mohammad Beydoun, reflects this logic, too.⁷⁰ Land assembly began during the war and ended in 1993. Ahmad Ali Ahmad's son, Ali Ali Ahmad, and his contracting company, Triple-A Team, financed the project from their own wealth and allegedly through militia contacts in the banking sector. Major tenants include Max Mara and Marella, both of which were, at the time, owned by Maxima Fashion, of which the Ali Ahmad group owned 40 percent. According to Real Estate Directorate registries, of 730's sixty-eight sections of retail, luxury apartments, and offices, at least seventeen remained registered in the name of the Ali Ahmads or their companies at the end of the 1990s. The majority serve as collateral for loans ranging from 900,000 to 4,000,000 dollars from some of Beirut's largest banks. These funds, according to knowledgeable real estate professionals, then financed other speculative real estate investments in and around Beirut, including Verdun 732.⁷¹

The vertical integration of the companies that produce and derive rents from this new landscape of consumption confirms the networked nature of property development in post-conflict Lebanon. The inseparability of political and economic dimensions further distances this process from the development industry's Neoliberal imaginary, which cannot recognize the "incestuous" blurring of boundaries except as corruption. Ironically, it is the very process of neo-liberalization of the post-conflict environment that has enabled such illiberal networks to consolidate their power over the production of space in Beirut and elsewhere in Lebanon. More important, however, for the possible consolidation of a positive peace, is the fact that it has also enabled them to hide that power through technocratic analyses in which they appear only as normalized members of "the private sector."

Inqilaab al-Hariri

The free-market ideology of Neoliberalism, anchored in an imaginary "economic sphere," is always able to externalize the reasons for Neoliberalism's failure. Political interference, imperfect implementation, or even vaguely specified notions of culture are deployed to explain the failure of otherwise sound, universal economic policy. Could the failures not be eradicated in

the future through more precise World Bank and IMF studies and more perfect implementation of more perfect technical, institutional, and legal reforms?

Such a defense only makes sense within the discourse that elides the role of the international financial institutions within the post-conflict environment itself. As shown above, however, they actually played a central role in provoking the economic crisis of 1991–92. Yet uncovering this role is not enough. Doing so would simply cover over a deeper involvement—the IFIs’ reliance upon *illiberal* politico-economic networks’ forces to impose *liberalization* in the first place.⁷²

It is this willingness to work through illiberal forces that explains one of the central mysteries of Lebanon’s post-conflict reconstruction: What prompted the unexpected and rapid reversal of economic fortunes that took place in 1992? Was it, as the standard narrative asserts, the “confidence” inspired by post-war elections and the appointment of a new prime minister that “virtually overnight”⁷³ ended the 1992 economic crisis and sparked a rapid appreciation of the Lira and the Central Bank’s miraculous recovery of nearly a billion dollars of foreign exchange reserves in one short month?

The authors of the standard narrative do not tell us how parliamentary elections or the installation of a new prime minister restored “confidence.” What is clear, however, is that the assertion is most certainly wrong. Indeed, not only were the elections neither free nor democratic,⁷⁴ in fact, the majority of Lebanese opposed holding them. A survey conducted in the summer of 1992 by the London-based newspaper *al-Wasat* found that more than 60 percent opposed holding parliamentary elections in the midst of the 1992 economic crisis, and at a time when large portions of Lebanese territory remained under Syrian and Israeli control.⁷⁵

Many amongst the political class and the religious leaderships, too, resisted. Saeb Salam, veteran Sunni politician and a former prime minister, called for postponement of elections in mid-August. His son Tammam, also a seasoned politician, refused to participate. Their opposition followed that of another prominent Sunni, former prime minister Dr. Selim al-Hoss, who argued that holding elections in the midst of the economic crisis was a reversal of priorities. Druze leader Walid Jumblatt concurred. Sheikh Mohammad Mahdi Shamseddine and Sheikh Bahjat Ghayth, important spiritual leaders of the Shiite and Druze communities, respectively, publicly opposed the holding of elections in 1992. So, too, did the Maronite patriarch Nasrallah Boutros Sfeir.⁷⁶

While al-Hoss and others, under heavy Syrian and Saudi pressure, eventually participated, a near complete boycott of the polls obtained in Christian areas of the country. Even in predominantly Sunni West Beirut, no more than 20 percent of the population cast ballots. Prime Minister al-Solh, whose caretaker government organized the elections, won his parliamentary seat on the basis of a mere eleven thousand votes.⁷⁷ If un-popular and anti-democratic elections did not restore confidence, as the standard narrative insists, what did?

These questions remain unanswerable without the introduction of the IFIs, themselves, and their deep engagement with power politics, into the standard narrative's technocratic presentation. "Confidence" then refers to the transformation of the political into an economic power. "Confidence was restored" not by the appointment of a new prime minister, but rather of a particular prime minister, Rafik Hariri, a Saudi-Lebanese billionaire banker with close ties with the Saudi royal family, who spoke the market-friendly language the IFIs and Washington wanted to hear.

As the wartime Saudi emissary to Lebanon, Hariri became skilled at the Lebanese game of oligarchic power, rooted in the decidedly illiberal fusion of political and economic might at the commanding heights of Lebanon's political economy, the financial sector.⁷⁸ Beginning with his 1980 purchase of the Mediterranean Bank, by war's end Hariri commanded the second largest bank group in Lebanon (second only to that of the *Kata'eb*) through which he channelled substantial amounts of his own, and Saudi, money, into the Lebanese political economy. More importantly, through the expansion of his Mediterranean Group and investments in their businesses and banks both in Lebanon and abroad he solidified ties with the pre-war financial oligarchy, wartime militia leaders, and those of the Syrian government that came to control Lebanon at the war's end.⁷⁹

With the collapse of the *Kata'eb* financial network in 1988–89, Hariri's own politico-economic network was clearly dominant. Indeed, just after the 1989 Ta'if negotiations, his network, with allied pre-war oligarchs, took effective control of the institutional expression of oligarchic power, the Lebanese Banks Association.⁸⁰ Shortly thereafter, he gained control of the Central Bank as well, first through his support of Michel el-Khoury for Central Bank Governor in 1990 and then through the appointment of Riyadh Salameh, Hariri's personal portfolio manager at Merrill Lynch, to that powerful position in 1993.

Although the truth will likely never be known, it is widely believed in Beirut that Hariri and his allies in Lebanese and regional financial and political circles, in fact, orchestrated the collapse and sudden recovery of the lira, in what Lebanese call the Hariri Coup (*Inqilaab al-Hariri*), to bring the Karami government down.⁸¹ Partisans argue that Hariri and his allies certainly had the financial muscle to precipitate and reverse the lira's free fall "virtually overnight." And such coordination with Hariri ally and Central Bank president Michel el-Khoury would explain the latter's surprise devaluation of the Lebanese currency despite steady improvement.⁸²

That the standard narrative plays down this possibility and seeks to hide the unprecedented events that brought Hariri to power, however, is not surprising. Rhetoric to the contrary aside, the World Bank views the post-conflict environment as an important "window of opportunity" through which to impose liberal reforms.⁸³ As Klein shows, this view resonates with that of Milton Friedman, who regarded moments of societal trauma as ideal for imposing an otherwise politically impossible agenda.⁸⁴ Such an offensive requires a powerful local force, even if authoritarian, to neutralize opposition and legitimize Neoliberal policies. The Hariri network, with its Saudi and US backing, certainly constitutes such a force.

Although no Pinochet, Hariri certainly deterred democratization of the post-conflict environment and reinforced the consolidation of an illiberal sectarian political system. Along with wartime militia leaders Hariri consolidated the so-called troika system, which vested politico-economic power in the offices of first, the Sunni prime minister, then the Maronite president, and finally, the Shiite Speaker of the House. Though competition between these officeholders and their politico-economic networks often results in gridlock, they cooperate in deterring democratic opposition. A case in point is the troika's passage of a clause in the 1994 law that cut the number of television stations from sixty to four, with each of the surviving franchises owned by members of the regime.⁸⁵

The troika also cooperated to dis-empower the General Confederation of Labor (CTGL), the only non-sectarian civil society institution to survive the war. After efforts to control and silence the CTGL through the manipulation of union elections failed in 1993, Hariri called out the army to enforce a ban on labor demonstrations in 1995, 1996, and 1997. Then, in conjunction with other sectarian leaders the troika created rival labor unions, headed by pliant clients, to divide the confederation and effectively bring labor under regime control.⁸⁶

Hariri further weakened the state, as well. His clientelist networks colonized existing institutions or created new ones to facilitate politico-economic control. In other instances shadow administrations responsible directly to him operated within key line ministries and key administrative departments. As already noted Hariri's personal portfolio manager became Central Bank Governor. The head of Hariri's construction company Oger-Liban presided over the enormously powerful Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR), and Hariri's former lawyer became the minister of justice. The prime minister and his allies created the Central Fund for the Displaced to control reconstruction funds budgeted for the Ministry of Displaced. The Investment Development Authority, like the CDR, answered directly to the PM's office and channeled foreign direct investment to preferred projects.⁸⁷ Finally, after the former chairman of his Mediterranean Group became finance minister, they created a shadow administration within the Ministry to devise and implement—in cooperation with the IFIs—the liberalization of the property regime.⁸⁸

THE SPATIALIZATION OF POWER: THE ILLIBERAL RECONSTRUCTION

It is precisely the operations of such politico-economic networks that transcend and rely upon the supposed boundaries between state and economy that the IFIs' "comprehensive picture" of the post-conflict environment renders invisible. What then of the reconstruction of the city center by *Solidere*, the flagship of Lebanon's Neoliberal rebirth? Was it able to escape the pull of these networks and link itself to universal processes of capitalist rationality and globalization?

A survey of the tenants in the new Beirut Souks, the flagship of the flagship, suggests the answer is no. Of the 125 shops that open by 2010, and for which ownership could be identified, 49 are owned by large Lebanese or regional business groups with extensive holdings in the city center. The Chalhoub Group owns 6, and its Saks Fifth Avenue franchise is slated to become the department store anchor. The Retail Group, a new and rapidly expanding company, accounts for 9 more. The Tony Salameh Group owns 11 shops in the new Beirut Souks, which complement several other Salameh-owned luxury boutiques in the Foch-Allenby district just east of the mall. The Azadea Group, the latest and largest incarnation of the Amal-related Maxima Fashion Group, owns 15 shops in the Souks alone.⁸⁹

Clearly *Solidere's* city building is just as much a network affair as that which produced *Verdun*. A Maxima Fashion Group official confirmed that Maxima/Azadea shops were guaranteed prominent positions within the new Souks by virtue of "a gentleman's agreement" with *Solidere* officials.⁹⁰ In moments of candor, *Solidere* officials, themselves, acknowledge this reality. Coordination with "the competition," according to one, both "directly and indirectly," was meant to ensure a complementary, rather than competitive, retail offer.⁹¹

It could be argued that the presence of such networks is not indicative of the failure of the Neoliberal imaginary but simply the result of politics intruding upon and undermining Hariri's effort toward market-driven integration with capitalist globalization. But Hariri's own networks were leaders in the game. Indeed, a company called the Hamra Shopping and Trading Company, with close ties to Hariri and his minister of justice, not only owns three shops in the new Beirut Souks itself. *Solidere* sold HSTC's owners a large property adjacent to its flagship development, upon which to build their own mall, to house exclusively HSTC-owned brands.⁹² Despite *Solidere's* self-representation as the embodiment of the most sophisticated practices of capitalist economic rationality and despite its claim to be the flagship of market-driven reconstruction, development of the city center remains a highly politicized network affair.

CONCLUSION

The pursuit of power and position by such politico-economic networks, networks that operate through and alongside families, militia organizations, business groups, and government offices, confounds the Neoliberal imaginary. It is not simply a matter of replacing the rational individual of classical economics with a more social conception of the network. As Mitchell points out, this would simply avoid a deeper question: How is it that the demarcation line between the political and economic, impossible to locate within these networks of individuals, families, companies, and political offices, comes to anchor the commonsense ontology of liberal economics?⁹³

For Mitchell, it is economic knowledge production and the practices of governance derived from them that makes this separation between the economic and political seem to be real. Without that boundary, which posits an economic sphere marked by its own universal rationality that pre-exists cul-

ture or politics, the scientific justifications for market society, to say nothing of class privileges within that society, evaporate to reveal a world of political power and predation, the normative defence of which becomes difficult to sustain.

The ontological separation is key to the externalization of liberalism's repeated failures to live up to the promises it makes. In the case of Lebanon, the International Financial Institutions' construction of a post-conflict environment, while creating a coherent picture intelligible only from within the discourse and denying its own participation within the tale it narrates, cannot but set the stage for the failure of Neoliberal reconstruction, and a redoubling of development-industry efforts to format the complex Lebanese political economy into Neoliberal terms. As Ferguson argues, however, failure does not mean that the interventions are without powerful effects. These "instrument effects" are the unintended outcomes that arise from the elisions required by development discourse to make itself whole, and from the ability of powerful forces to work in and through the discourse in pursuit of their own interests.⁹⁴

Three such instrument effects can be identified in the case of Lebanon. First, recall that the analytical construction of the post-conflict environment required the simultaneous presence and absence of politics and violence. The war is represented as the all-important cause of economic collapse, yet at the same time, the particular politico-economic dynamics of the war are hidden within an analytical black box. The war is depoliticized and reduced to an "idiosyncratic shock." The wartime politico-economic processes are hidden. The transnational networks that animated them, in this rarefied discourse, then remain invisible, even as they arise to capture the commanding heights of the newly Neoliberalized post-conflict political economy.

Second, this domestication of politico-economic processes has the further important effect of enabling these illiberal networks to hide their power in and over the state apparatus and economic processes. It enables them to colonize, contour, or bypass the state, and so turn its administration and economic reforms to their own purposes, first of which is the consolidation of their power. This weakening of the state further restricts access to economic opportunity, as would-be entrepreneurs find themselves caught up in network rivalries or blocked by formal and informal monopolies. Moreover this network power combines with progressive impoverishment of the populace to produce increasing political and economic dependence of the latter

upon the former. Indeed, today, sectarian clientelist networks take on the form of civil society NGOs, as elite-funded social welfare/patronage systems or family organizations such as the now famous Hariri Foundation, and political parties such as Hizballah increasingly provide social welfare services and access to education and economic opportunity.⁹⁵

Together these combine to produce a third effect of Neoliberalism's failed promise: the consolidation of wartime social divisions and the deterrence of democracy. In the case of Lebanon, this manifested in the solidification of a sectarian troika that governed throughout the 1990s, that cooperated to expand and protect the network activities of which they were a part, but also to suppress or tame political forces, such as those of the non-sectarian labor movement, that may have challenged their control.

The geography of elite enclaves and the new shopping malls and luxury apartment towers that anchor them are an inscription of this network power and the instrument effects of Neoliberal reconstruction into the social fabric of the city. Neoliberalism's production of the illiberal city is not the result of cultural or political interference with otherwise universal economic rationality or the universally applicable economic policies meant to liberate such rationality. Nor is Neoliberalism's production of the illiberal city simply the accidental result of the misrepresentations that constituted the Lebanese economy-as-picture. It is the product of the systematic removal of the International Financial Institutions' enforcement of aid conditionality, their use of social trauma as an opportunity to impose painful and politically unpopular policies, and their reliance upon, and promotion of, illiberal forces as the means by which to do so. Despite their claim to a privileged position as detached observers, they were active participants in shaping the post-conflict environment itself. The illiberal city, then, is a product, in concrete and glass, in invisible boundaries of reinforced sect and class, of what was absent from the post-conflict environment they produced.

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9. World Bank, "Lebanon: Stabilization and Reconstruction," 1–2.

10. *Ibid.*, 18.

11. *Ibid.*, 2.

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29. Sena Eken and Thomas Helbling, “Back to the Future: Postwar Reconstruction and Rehabilitation in Lebanon” (International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC, 1999).
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32. World Bank, “Lebanon: Stabilization and Reconstruction,” 19.
33. While scholarship on the Lebanese civil war continues to be understood primarily as a conflict between religious groups over the division of political power, the political economy of the conflict was far more complex. The larger and more powerful of the militias were organized around powerful familial networks that utilized militia, state, and business relations to gain, consolidate, or protect position within the institutional interface between the Lebanese and larger, regional, and global political economies: the financial sector. And so each of the major militias was itself a politico-economic network, the connections of which transcended national borders and any imagined boundary between the political and economic spheres. See Najib Hourani, “Transnational Pathways and Politico-Economic Power: Globalisation and the Lebanese Civil War,” in *Geopolitics* (2010).

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62. *Al-Iqtisad wal-'Amal*, April 1994: 42–48; *Al-Mal wal-'Alam*, March 1996: 26. These figures underestimate the extent of the post-war real estate explosion, as they are based on the values declared by the parties to the transaction, who undervalue transactions so as to avoid taxes and fees.

63. Op. cit., interview with Charbel Nahhas.

64. *Solidere* officials argue that the willingness of developers to purchase land at 8,000 dollars per square meter in Verdun and the willingness of local retailers to pay up to 14,000 dollars per meter to purchase ground floor space in Verdun 732 confirms the market can sustain the company's prices. If rents are set by the 10 percent rule-of-thumb, then ground floor space in Verdun 732 would be approximately 1,400 dollars per meter, annually—well above the *Solidere* base rents, which, depending on the location, range from 500 to 1,000 dollars per meter.

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Conclusion

Aftermath

A Speculative Conclusion

DANIEL BERTRAND MONK AND DAVID CAMPBELL

THE ESSAYS ASSEMBLED in this volume seek to lay bare a set of common practices by means of which stakeholders in international peacebuilding effectively construe the same environment they aspire to repair. For this reason, and in a very precise sense, these studies are not only reviews of the “imaginative geography” of a peacebuilding technocracy; no less important, they are also critical ethnographies of the interventionist “habitus” that attends it. Each of the essays lays out in detail how a new technocracy’s rationalizations of self-interest attain the standing of pragmatic knowledge—that is, a species of self-evidence. In the sum of these case studies, the volume negates any complete distinction between ideology and best practices in the identification and management of the post-conflict environment.

The key finding of this work is that the post-conflict environment that is ruminated and acted upon by the policy community and war intellectuals is a reification. In this collection’s discrete analyses of transitional justice, governance, refugee management, and aid and redevelopment, a single constellated image emerges: the imputed object of attentions is one that stakeholders themselves constitute a priori as a site of action and intervention. To put matters very bluntly: the post-conflict environment is, first and foremost, the site of liberal peacebuilding’s own “shock doctrine.”¹

To suggest that the post-conflict environment of the policy intellectuals’ imagination attains a species of “phantom objectivity” is necessarily to raise important epistemological questions, the elaboration of which is the principal aim of this conclusion.² The contributors to this project are confirmed in

their suspicion that the post-conflict environment is a reification of the social relations between those the term *itself* construes and sanctions respectively as subjects and objects of action. At the same time, they reject any conception of reification as a “veil” over the real—that is, that reifications amount to a matter of flawed perspectives that might be adjusted and sharpened incrementally without questioning the historical status of the apparatus of viewing/framing in toto. The post-conflict environment is indeed a phantom object, but its reification is a reality whose career needs to be explored and documented.

If the “ersatz” immediacy of the post-conflict environment cannot be substituted by a more authentic image of it, how is one to assess that same career?³ How, in other words, is one to understand the actuality of reification—of universal mediation—and its political effects? Particularly, when formal political thought has largely reduced the question of mediation to that of an impediment to proper model building rather than as an irreducible *fait social* to be modeled.⁴ The chapters in this collection tentatively point to one possible approach. Catherine Goetze suggests that stakeholders in transitional governance define and treat the post-conflict environment as an absolute value against which political reality falls short. In that process, she argues, a post-conflict technocracy is at the same time “enabling repertoires of action, and assigning roles to international and local actors.” These roles are, in turn, consistent with what Andrew Herscher refers to as “ritualized post-conflict practices” whereby stakeholders “stage themselves” in ways that displace attention from “the conflicts that emerge and intensify during post-conflict reconstruction” (emphasis added). Together, these essays begin to describe a performative order that is similarly corroborated in Keeler’s analysis of peacebuilding regimes in Iraqi Kurdistan, where political grievances must be *enacted* as medical disorders (and more specifically, as trauma) before they can be acknowledged by a post-conflict technocracy at all. Mundy’s assessment of present and absent transitional justice frameworks similarly describes a condition in which advocates of normative national reconciliation models (truth commissions, primarily) engage in a “denial or repudiation of alternative models” and in so doing, “performatively co-constitute the key terrain of operation.” If Sanyal’s assessment of refugee management and Hourani’s analysis of post-conflict reconstruction do not highlight a performative reification of the post-conflict environment directly, they nevertheless confirm it strongly in chilling examples of the way that Palestinian refugees found themselves compelled to build permanent

dwelling behind tent-flaps of emergency housing (to stay in line with the proper “staging” of UNRWA-sponsored aid); and, in accounts of the way that IFI’s “foreground how . . . [a] simple drama of pre-war free market prosperity, war-induced dislocation and the promise of neoliberal recovery . . . [frames] the further construction of the post-conflict environment to follow.”

So, if it is possible to understand this volume’s chapters as “ethnographies of the interventionist habitus” they are at the same time contemporary histories of a dramaturgical order. In them, the post-conflict environment presents itself to view as something that is performed *in*, and *as*, a relation between habitus and reification—between apparent (best) practices, on one hand, and mediating structures, on the other. No one should be surprised by this turn of events. Sociology, in particular, has long understood that the dramaturgy underpins the relational dimensions of conflict, and so has described both the “dynamics of contention” and “strategic interaction” as performances of the political.⁵ Similarly, students of strategy have sought to codify the “rules” governing such performances in their efforts to work through the logic of deterrence, most typically by eliding the very notion of dramaturgy with the concept of “coordination games.”⁶

The contributors to this volume approach the dramaturgical constitution of a reified post-conflict environment obliquely, and to some degree intuitively. But the implications of their insights may be addressed directly in this conclusion. First, to see the post-conflict environment as something that is dramaturgically constituted is to do away with the agentic bias. In the scenarios presented, both the subjects and objects of intervention—stakeholders and the inhabitants of the post-conflict environment—are repeatedly confirmed to be actors rather than self-proximate agents.⁷ (To some degree, this comes with the “territory,” inasmuch as the post-conflict environment is a region defined by stark decisions about giving and taking. And wherever means-testing is an issue, as Goffman and others have noted, performances usually follow.)⁸ These forms of coping notwithstanding, the key finding, here, is clear: while participants in and observers of intervention regimes may have some leeway in playing their own roles and imposing certain roles on others, they are nonetheless compelled to *assume* roles if they are to “qualify” as actors in (staging) the post-conflict arena to begin with.

Second, to understand the post-conflict environment as a dramaturgical order is to begin to approach its normative content. As a reification that is tautologically constituted as “immediate” by the mediating routines of those who perform it, the post-conflict environment advances what The-

odor Adorno once described as a broader “theodicy of conflict”—that is, a perverse and paradoxical belief that human life “could only have been perpetuated by means of conflict” but which treats conflict as an exceptional condition.⁹ The post-conflict environment, in other words, is a stage on which we collectively confer a palliative meaning on violence by showing how what follows somehow makes all that has happened exceptional, just like in Steven Spielberg’s *Schindler’s List* where the progeny of Holocaust survivors happily run through wheat fields, inadvertently stamping an affirmative interpretation upon horror.

In sum, the post-conflict environment is the scenario for a “metaphysics of death,” whereby the assertion of meaning reverts to “mere ideology.”¹⁰ That it has not been previously examined as such—as we have tried to suggest—is partly due to the fact that the normative descriptions of the post-conflict environment in policy and other literatures have not attracted the significant attention of a critical theory of conflict. But there is another reason as well: if a reified post-conflict environment only “appears” in stylized conventions of liberal peacebuilding—that is, in a performance of the political already assessed in sociological and political studies—it also differs from them in a significant sense. Where the former scrutinize how the interactions between players tacitly define the social situation in which they are bound—establish a common “frame,” in Goffman’s language—here, the interaction is effectively between players and the frame itself—that is, between, stakeholders in intervention regimes and the post-conflict environment they make.

And, because one of the actors in this drama is presumed to be “inert”—the post-conflict environment “itself”—a different and unexamined conception of dramaturgy necessarily emerges out of the cases assembled here. If, for students of strategic interaction, the best analogy for the reified social world is a stage, in reviewing the dramaturgical constitution of a reified post-conflict environment we encounter something far closer to the analogy of people’s behavior before a camera. This implies a search beyond Social Science. For example, the connection between post-war conditions and their framing has featured prominently in the analysis of so-called rubble movies of Italian neorealist cinema and German *Trümmerfilme* of the same period.¹¹ But for affirmation of the deeper findings of this volume one would have to turn to the genres of crime scene photography and photojournalism. There, finally, one regularly encounters seemingly unscripted performances whose

unstated purpose is to re-inscribe the social condition of violence within the sociological “frame” of its exceptionalization. This is where our speculation abounds, but the proto-argument is that in the visual realm of the photographic image, the practices of dramaturgy and reification, leading to the production of an *a priori* frame, become visible.

Photographs of violence “after the fact” do possess a forensic character. But not in the sense usually ascribed to things like conventional crime scene photography. What aftermath photography documents and effects at once is not the occurrence of death, but its social re-inscription. This is what makes the so-called Naked City photography of Arthur Fellig (better known as “Weegee”) so critically important to any interpretation of a reified post-conflict environment.¹² In works such as his famed “Drowning Victim,” Weegee’s portrayal of efforts to resuscitate a drowned man at a New York beach actually elicited poses (and even smiles) for the camera by the victim’s girlfriend and bystanders. Similarly, in the body horror genre of photos like “Their First Murder,” “Human Head Cake Box Murder,” and “Balcony Seats at a Murder,” one begins to understand that what Weegee’s camera brought into the open at Coney Island is far from unique.¹³ The photographs themselves, rather than Weegee or his subjects, point to and are part of a new reality in which the social afterlife of death eclipses the fact of dying. It is in this sense of a reification of death that “Horror is beyond the reach of Psychology.”

In contemporary photographic visualizations of violence, Weegee’s legacy continues because the historical conditions that made his work relevant have not gone away. Arguably, they have only intensified. By way of example: The Aftermath Project—founded and run by Sara Terry, who spent ten years producing a visual essay on post-war Bosnia—publishes an annual volume of picture essays produced by photographers who have received new production grants from the Project. Entitled *War Is Only Half the Story*, the fifth of these volumes contained a number of photographs that could have been taken straight from a Weegee album. See, for example, Miquel Dewever-Plana’s images of the urban violence rife in Guatemala as a consequence of its thirty-six years of armed conflict and genocide. A harshly lit photograph shows the bodies of four unnamed young men strewn on the ground in front of a local shop with the numbered tags of investigators marking the presence of evidence around them.¹⁴ Indeed, there is now a recognizable visual genre called “the late photography of war” that is represented in the work of Angus Boulton, Luc Delahaye, Joel Meyerowitz, Richard Mosse, Simon Norfolk, Sophie Ristelhueber, Paul Seawright, and others.¹⁵ As one observer has astutely

observed, what characterizes this genre of image making—as something quite distinct from the heroic allure of combat photography—is that it is “utterly lacking in epic qualities.”¹⁶

Clearly, “aftermath photography” favors the plebeian over the heroic as it attempts to challenge facile distinctions between war and what follows it. As Sara Terry details, the purpose of the entire Aftermath Project itself is to challenge traditional depictions of conflict by disputing the idea that the end of violence necessarily corresponds with the inauguration of peace.¹⁷ However, in favoring the mundane and the everyday as metonyms for quasi-enduring conflict and semi-absent peace, aftermath photography inadvertently surrenders itself to the same theodicy of war under discussion here. In the performances of bathos that it elicits and favors, such photography presents the contours of the “new normalcy” of life under constant threat.¹⁸ Because of this, aftermath photography is perversely palliative. It harmonizes suffering with the inevitability of a new, and violent, status quo.

Assimilating the intolerable as normal, aftermath photography still disaggregates war from the realm of daily existence of political violence. In so doing, it effects a difference without much of a distinction. And this is the precise labor of reification that the aftermath genre shares with all productions of the post-conflict environment itself, and which it refracts so expertly. It is not just that aftermath photographs contort the post-conflict environment into something conforming with its imputed significance, just like the other stakeholder knowledges reviewed in this volume. Instead, we are concerned with the way aftermath photography elicits the participation of the subjects of intervention in the “framing” of their own circumstances. In *that* process we see an allegory of the laborious framing of the post-conflict environment itself—that is, the precise mechanism of the post-conflict environment’s dramaturgical constitution. The post-conflict environment, in sum, is constituted in the extorted performances of those upon whom accommodation to a dramaturgical order becomes the price of survival.

Notes

1. Naomi Klein, *The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism* (New York: Metropolitan, 2007).
2. György Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics*, trans. Rodney Livingstone (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1971), 83.
3. “Reified Consciousness provides an ersatz for the sensual immediacy of

which it deprives people in a sphere that is not its abode.” Theodor Adorno, *Aesthetic Theory*, trans. Robert Hullot-Kentor (London: Continuum, 2004), 16.

4. It largely addressed the question of mediation by repeatedly attempting to rescue transcendence from immanence. A notable exception is Cold War deterrence theory, which considered it a matter of human survival to examine a “logic of images” in international politics. See Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959).

5. Charles Tilly, *Contentious Performances* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008). Erving Goffman, *Strategic Interaction* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1969).

6. Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960).

7. No one would have needed to read a book to know this. Simply witness Pjer Zalica’s brilliant film *Gori Vatra* (2003), a contemporary take on “Waiting for Godot” in which a town in post-conflict Bosnia-Herzegovina scrambles to present itself as an image of reconciliation in preparation for a visit from President Clinton who, in the end, almost arrives but not quite.

8. Erving Goffman, *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life* (New York: Doubleday, 1959). For an interesting confirmation of Goffman’s assessments see Dean Scheibel, “Faking Identity in Clubland: The Communicative Performance of ‘Fake ID,’” *Text and Performance Quarterly* 12, no. 2 (1992): 160–75.

9. Theodor Adorno, *History and Freedom: Lectures 1964–1965*, trans. Rodney Livingstone (Malden, MA: Polity, 2006), 53. Theodor Adorno, *Metaphysics: Concept and Problems*, trans. Rodney Livingstone (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002).

10. See Adorno, *Metaphysics*, lecture seventeen.

11. See, for example, Eric Rentschler, “The Place of Rubble in the *Trümmerfilm*,” in *Ruins of Modernity*, ed. Julia Hell and Andreas Schönle (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010).

12. Working in New York in the 1930s and 1940s, “Weegee,” a *nom de guerre* derived from his allegedly Ouija-board-like ability to divine the presence of a crime scene, produced visceral images of victims dead in the streets. Working freelance, Weegee based himself in police stations, and as the only civilian then to be permitted a police scanner in his car, arrived at crime scenes in next to no time. Through the use of flash, a narrow aperture, and a fast shutter speed, Weegee’s photographs are forensic, stark, and immediate. “I have no inhibitions and neither has my camera,” Weegee maintained (quote from <http://www.amber-online.com/exhibitions/weegee-collection/detail>).

13. Weegee, “Human Head Cake Box Murder” (Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York), <http://www.metmuseum.org/Collections/search-the-collections/190017406>; Weegee, “Their First Murder” (The Getty Museum, Los Angeles): <http://www.getty.edu/art/gettyguide/artObjectDetails?artobj=61129>.

14. *War Is Only Half the Story. Volume V*, ed. Sara Terry (Los Angeles: The Aftermath Project, 2012), 25, 73.

15. Debbie Lisle, "The Surprising Detritus of Leisure: Encountering the Late Photography of War," *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 29 (2011): 873–90.
16. Simon Winchester, *War Is Only Half the Story. Volume I* (Los Angeles: The Aftermath Project, 2008), 6.
17. Sara Terry, *War Is Only Half the Story. Volume I* (Los Angeles: The Aftermath Project, 2008), 2–3.
18. Calvin Woodward, "The Post-9/11 'New Normal' Looks Much Like the Old," *Associated Press* (September 4, 2011), <http://cnsnews.com/news/article/post-911-new-normal-looks-much-old>.

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