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  3. The Dictator's Dilemma at the Ballot Box: Electoral Manipulation, Economic Maneuvering, and Political Order in Autocracies

The Dictator's Dilemma at the Ballot Box: Electoral Manipulation, Economic Maneuvering, and Political Order in Autocracies

Masaaki Higashijima
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  • Overview

  • Contents

  • Funder Information

Contrary to our stereotypical views, dictators often introduce elections in which they refrain from employing blatant electoral fraud. Why do electoral reforms happen in autocracies? Do these elections destabilize autocratic rule? The Dictator's Dilemma at the Ballot Box argues that strong autocrats who can garner popular support become less dependent on coercive electioneering strategies. When autocrats fail to design elections properly, elections backfire in the form of coups, protests, and the opposition's stunning election victories. The book's theoretical implications are tested on a battery of cross-national analyses with newly collected data on autocratic elections and in-depth comparative case studies of the two Central Asian republics of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.
  • Cover
  • Title Page
  • Copyright Page
  • Dedication
  • Contents
  • Acknowledgments
  • Figures
  • Tables
  • Abbreviations
  • Note on Translation and Transliteration
  • Part I. Puzzles and Arguments
    • One. Introduction
    • Two. A Theory of Autocratic Elections
  • Part II. Cross-National Explorations
    • Three. Blatant Electoral Fraud
    • Four. Institutional Manipulation
    • Five. Economic Maneuvering
    • Six. Backfiring at the Ballot Box
  • Part III. Comparative Case Studies
    • Seven. From Electoral Manipulation to Economic Maneuvering
    • Eight. From Electoral Manipulation to Autocratic Breakdown
    • Nine. Conclusion
  • Appendix
  • Footnotes
  • References
  • Index
This open access version is made available thanks in part to the support of libraries participating in Knowledge Unlatched.
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Published: 2022
Publisher: University of Michigan Press
License: Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International license
ISBN(s)
  • 978-0-472-07531-7 (hardcover)
  • 978-0-472-05531-9 (paper)
  • 978-0-472-90275-0 (open access)
Series
  • Weiser Center for Emerging Democracies
Subject
  • Political Science:Political Behavior and Public Opinion
  • Political Science:Political Economy
  • Political Science:Comparative Politics

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Chart summarizing the arguments. Mobilization capabilities decide election strategies. Conflicts occur when election design deviates from the equilibrium.

Overview of the Argument

From Chapter 1

Fig. 1.1. Overview of the Argument

Graph showing proportions of democracies and autocracies. Autocracies still occupy 40 percent of countries by the early 2010s.

Democracies and Autocracies in the World (1946-2010)

From Chapter 1

Fig. 1.2. Democracies and Autocracies in the World (1946–2010)

Graph displaying three types of dictatorships. The number of autocracies with elections increased after the end of the Cold War.

Elections in Authoritarian Regimes (1946-2008)

From Chapter 1

Fig. 1.3. Elections in Authoritarian Regimes (1946–2008)

Scatter plots showing the relationship between election margins and extent of blatant electoral fraud in dictatorships.

Blatant Electoral Fraud and Electoral Margins in Authoritarian Regimes

From Chapter 2

Fig. 2.1. Blatant Electoral Fraud and Electoral Margins in Authoritarian Regimes

Scatter plots showing the relationship between election margins and electoral systems in dictatorships.

Institutional Manipulation and Electoral Margins in Authoritarian Regimes

From Chapter 2

Fig. 2.2. Institutional Manipulation and Electoral Margins in Authoritarian Regimes

Chart summarizing how dictators’ mobilization capabilities can be measured and are related to electoral manipulation.

Distribution of Mobilization Capabilities and Choices of Electioneering Strategies

From Chapter 2

Fig. 2.3. Distribution of Mobilization Capabilities and Choices of Electioneering Strategies

Chart summarizing how dictators’ mistakes in designing elections activate anti-regime threats and lead to protests, coups, and opposition wins.

Electoral Manipulation and Post-Electoral Political Order

From Chapter 2

Fig. 2.4. Electoral Manipulation and Post-Electoral Political Order

Kernel density plots showing how each element of mobilization capabilities is correlated with margin of ruling parties’ votes.

Correlates of Electoral Margins in Authoritarian Elections

From Chapter 2

Fig. 2.5. Correlates of Electoral Margins in Authoritarian Elections

Violin plots displaying the distribution of blatant electoral fraud in dictatorships. Dictatorships also have much variation in fraud.

Violin Plots of Variation in Blatant Electoral Fraud

From Chapter 3

Fig. 3.1. Violin Plots of Variation in Blatant Electoral Fraud

Coefficient plots showing how the effect of natural resource wealth on fraud changes depending upon the presence of party-based regimes and strong EOP.

Conditional Marginal Effects of Natural Resource Endowment on Blatant Electoral Fraud (Dominant Party and EOP)

From Chapter 3

Fig. 3.2. Conditional Marginal Effects of Natural Resource Endowment on Blatant Electoral Fraud

Kernel density plots showing that ruling parties tend to gain seat bias in SMD, whereas opposition parties tend to lose seats in SMD.

Pro-Regime SMD Seat Premiums in Parliamentary Elections of Electoral Autocracy

From Chapter 4

Fig. 4.1. Pro-Regime SMD Seat Premiums in Parliamentary Elections of Electoral Autocracy

Kernel density plots showing variations in electoral systems in electoral autocracies of each region.

Patterns of Electoral Systems in Electoral Authoritarian Regimes

From Chapter 4

Fig. 4.2. Patterns of Electoral Systems in Electoral Authoritarian Regimes

Line graph showing larger EET tends to provide more seat premiums to ruling parties as they gain more votes.

Pro-Regime Seat Premiums and Ruling Parties’ Vote Shares

From Chapter 4

Fig. 4.3. Pro-Regime Seat Premiums and Ruling Parties’ Vote Shares

Line graph showing pre-electoral opposition coalitions are more likely to form when EET becomes larger.

Electoral Systems and Predicted Probabilities of Pre-Electoral Opposition Coalitions

From Chapter 4

Fig. 4.4. Electoral Systems and Predicted Probabilities of Pre-Electoral Opposition Coalitions

Line graph displaying EETs in electoral autocracies tend to fluctuate more than those in democracies.

Time-Series Change in the Effective Electoral Threshold

From Chapter 4

Fig. 4.5. Time-Series Change in the Effective Electoral Threshold

Coefficient plots showing how the effect of natural resource wealth on EET changes depending upon the presence of party-based regimes.

Natural Resources, Party-Based Regimes, and Electoral System Choice

From Chapter 4

Fig. 4.6. Natural Resources, Party-Based Regimes, and Electoral System Choice

Violin plots showing the distributions of fiscal revenues, expenditures, and deficits in dictatorships.

Violin Plots of Variation in Fiscal Policies (Revenues, Expenditures, and Fiscal Balance)

From Chapter 5

Fig. 5.1. Violin Plots of Variation in Fiscal Policies

Coefficient plots showing that election-year fiscal deficits are more likely to occur in electoral autocracies.

Competitive Elections and Economic Maneuvering in Dictatorships

From Chapter 5

Fig. 5.2. Competitive Elections and Economic Maneuvering in Dictatorships

Coefficient plots showing election-year fiscal deficits are more likely to occur in autocratic elections with less electoral fraud.

Blatant Electoral Fraud and Economic Maneuvering in Dictatorships

From Chapter 5

Fig. 5.3. Blatant Electoral Fraud and Economic Maneuvering in Dictatorships

Coefficient plots showing election year fiscal deficits are more likely to occur in autocratic elections with PR systems.

Electoral Systems and Economic Maneuvering in Dictatorships

From Chapter 5

Fig. 5.4. Electoral Systems and Economic Maneuvering in Dictatorships

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