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  3. Formal Modeling in Social Science

Formal Modeling in Social Science

Carol Mershon and Olga Shvetsova
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  • Overview

  • Contents

A formal model in the social sciences builds explanations when it structures the reasoning underlying a theoretical argument, opens venues for controlled experimentation, and can lead to hypotheses. Yet more importantly, models evaluate theory, build theory, and enhance conjectures. Formal Modeling in Social Science addresses the varied helpful roles of formal models and goes further to take up more fundamental considerations of epistemology and methodology.

The authors integrate the exposition of the epistemology and the methodology of modeling and argue that these two reinforce each other. They illustrate the process of designing an original model suited to the puzzle at hand, using multiple methods in diverse substantive areas of inquiry. The authors also emphasize the crucial, though underappreciated, role of a narrative in the progression from theory to model.

Transparency of assumptions and steps in a model means that any analyst will reach equivalent predictions whenever she replicates the argument. Hence, models enable theoretical replication, essential in the accumulation of knowledge. Formal Modeling in Social Science speaks to scholars in different career stages and disciplines and with varying expertise in modeling.

 

  • Cover
  • Title Page
  • Copyright Page
  • Dedication
  • Contents
  • Acknowledgments
  • One. Introduction
  • Two. Epistemology
  • Three. Methodology
  • Four. Community Effort
  • Five. Industry Regulation
  • Six. Setting the Agenda to Manipulate the Outcome (with Benjamin Farrer)
  • Seven. Games and Uncertainty in U.S. Criminal Justice Systems (with Andrei Zhirnov)
  • Eight. The Role of Modeling in How We Know What We Know
  • Notes
  • References
  • Author Index
  • Subject Index
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Published: 2019
Publisher: University of Michigan Press
ISBN(s)
  • 978-0-472-12586-9 (ebook)
  • 978-0-472-05423-7 (paper)
  • 978-0-472-07423-5 (hardcover)
Subject
  • Political Science:Political Theory
  • Political Science:Political Methodology

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Figure 5.0.1. Figure 5.0.1 presents baseline, extant knowledge about the behavior of members of the commons (here, fishers) with no regulation in place.

Figure 5.0.1. Extant knowledge: Members of the commons without regulation

From Chapter 5

Figure 5.0.1. Extant knowledge: Members of the commons without regulation

Figure 5.0.2. Figure 5.0.2 presents baseline, extant knowledge about members of the commons who create regulations. The regulations transform the game, and cooperative behavior becomes individually rational.

Figure 5.0.2. Extant knowledge: Members of the commons opt for regulation

From Chapter 5

Figure 5.0.2. Extant knowledge: Members of the commons opt for regulation

Figure 5.0.3. Figure 5.0.3 presents baseline, extant knowledge about members of the commons who operate under regulations and who are monitored. With fines, members of the commons have the incentive to cooperate and protect the future of the commons.

Figure 5.0.3. Extant knowledge: Members of the commons opt for regulation and establish the level of punishment F=6

From Chapter 5

Figure 5.0.3. Extant knowledge: Members of the commons opt for regulation and establish the level of punishment F = 6

Figure 5.1. In Figure 5.1, the commercial fisher is depicted as the key decision maker, choosing between Conservative and Aggressive technologies.

Figure 5.1. A commercial fisher's choice of technology

From Chapter 5

Figure 5.1. A commercial fisher’s choice of technology

Figure 5.2.1. Figure 5.2.1 portrays the commercial fisher's choice of technology under status quo regulation. It is equivalent to Figure 5.1: no change to regulation has occurred.

Figure 5.2.1. A commercial fisher's choice of technology under status quo regulation

From Chapter 5

Figure 5.2.1. A commercial fisher’s choice of technology under status quo regulation

Figure 5.2.2 portrays the commercial fisher's choice of technology under amended regulation.

Figure 5.2.2. A commercial fisher's choice of technology under amended regulation

From Chapter 5

Figure 5.2.2. A commercial fisher’s choice of technology under amended regulation

Figure 5.3. Figure 5.3 shifts to the regulator as the decision-maker, choosing whether to issue a recommendation to change existing regulation or leave the status quo in place.

Figure 5.3. Balancing conflicting preferences when making a decision

From Chapter 5

Figure 5.3. Balancing conflicting preferences when making a decision

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