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Electoral Reform and the Fate of New Democracies: Lessons from the Indonesian Case

Sarah Shair-Rosenfield 2019
When and why do democratic political actors change the electoral rules, particularly regarding who is included in a country's political representation? The incidences of these major electoral reforms have been on the rise since 1980.

Electoral Reform and the Fate of New Democracies argues that elite inexperience may constrain self-interest and lead elites to undertake incremental approaches to reform, aiding the process of democratic consolidation. Using a multimethods approach, the book examines three consecutive periods of reform in Indonesia, the world's largest Muslim majority country and third largest democracy, between 1999 and 2014. Each case study provides an in-depth process tracing of the negotiations leading to new reforms, including key actors in the legislature, domestic civil society, international experts, and government bureaucrats. A series of counterfactual analyses assess the impact the reforms had on actual election outcomes, versus the possible alternative outcomes of different reform options discussed during negotiations. With a comparative analysis of nine cases of iterated reform processes in other new democracies, the book confirms the lessons from the Indonesian case and highlights key lessons for scholars and electoral engineers.

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Series
  • Weiser Center for Emerging Democracies
ISBN(s)
  • 978-0-472-12585-2 (ebook)
  • 978-0-472-13150-1 (hardcover)
Subject
  • Political Science:Governance
  • Political Science:Comparative Politics
  • Asian Studies:South/Southeast Asia
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  • Table of Contents

  • Resources

  • Stats

  • Cover
  • Title Page
  • Copyright Page
  • Contents
  • Abbreviations
  • Acknowledgments
  • Part I: Setting Up the Puzzle
    • One. Why Reform in New Democracies?
    • Two. Constrained Strategies: The Effects of Inexperience and Time
  • Part II: Lessons from the Indonesian Experience
    • Three. Indonesian Democratization and the Party System
    • Four. Early Stage Reforms in a Period of High Inexperience, 1999–2004
    • Five. Reforms under Declining Inexperience and Modest Temporal Constraints, 2004–9
    • Six. Reforms under Severe Temporal Constraints, 2009 and Beyond
  • Part III: Exploring Iterated Reforms in Comparative Context
    • Seven. Changing Rules and Incentives in New Democracies
    • Eight. Extensions and Implications: Lessons for Scholars, Reformers, and Advisers
  • Appendixes
  • Appendix A. Referenced Interviews
  • Appendix B. Reform Codes by Case and Observation
  • Appendix C. Additional Iterated Electoral Reform Cases
  • Footnotes
  • Bibliography
  • Index

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Figure 1.1. This barchart shows the annual count of major electoral reforms around the world each year between 1980 and 2010. There is variation between 0 and 5, with high points of 5 reforms coming in the years 1993 and 1995.

Barchart of reform adoptions by country-year

From Chapter 1

Fig. 1.1. Major Reform Adoptions by Country-Year: 1980–2010

Figure 2.1. This plane depicts interparty electoral rules on the x-axis and intraparty electoral rules on the y-axis. In the center are mixed electoral rules, signifying balance between the ideal points of each dimension. Electoral thresholds move a system from right to left on the x-axis.

Examples of electoral reform dimensions

From Chapter 2

Fig. 2.1. Intra- and Interparty Dimensions of Electoral Reform

Figure 3.1. This barchart shows party-specific seats in each Indonesian legislature since democratization. There is substantial variation across parties, with most parties doing best early in 1999 and declining steadily until 2014 when they return to better outcomes.

Barchart of Indonesian party seat distributions

From Chapter 3

Fig. 3.1. Percentage of National Legislative Seats by Party, 1999–2014

Figure 4.1. This barchart shows three categories of parties, large, medium, and small, arranged by how much they benefit from the formula that translates votes into seats. Medium parties do much better in 2004 than 1999, while large and small parties stay relatively the same.

Barchart of 1994-2004 vote to seat differentials

From Chapter 4

Fig. 4.1. Change in Vote-to-Seat Differentials, 1999–2004

Figure 4.2. This barchart shows how each party does regarding how many of its candidates would have been elected out of list order. The average is around 30 percent.

Barchart of percent legislature 2004-2009 out of list order

From Chapter 4

Fig. 4.2. Percentage of DPR Representatives Elected out of List Order, 2004

Figure 5.1. This map of Indonesia shows in which provinces small parties would have won seats if they had not failed to reach the national threshold.

Map of small parties excluded by threshold

From Chapter 5

Fig. 5.1. Small Party Seat Representation with No Electoral Threshold, 2009

Figure 5.2. This barchart shows how each party does regarding how many of its candidates would have been elected out of list order. The average is around 18 percent.

Barchart of percent legislature 2009-2014 out of list order

From Chapter 5

Fig. 5.2. Percentage of DPR Representatives Elected out of List Order, 2009

Figure 6.1. This barchart shows how each party does regarding how many of its candidates would have been elected out of list order. The average is around 30 percent.

Barchart of percent legislature 2014-2019 elected from open lists

From Chapter 6

Fig. 6.1. Percentage of DPR Representatives Elected Because of Open Lists, 2014

Figure 7.1. This plane depicts interparty electoral rules on the x-axis and intraparty electoral rules on the y-axis. More inclusive reforms move a system right-ward on the x-axis, less inclusive reforms move a system left-ward on the x-axis. Party-centric reforms move a system upwards on the y-axis, candidate-centric reforms move a system downwards on the y-axis.

Dimensions of electoral reform

From Chapter 7

Fig. 7.1. Dimensions and Directional Movement of Electoral Reform

Figure 7.2a. This shows Bolivia's four episodes of electoral reforms on the plane. Figure 7.2b. This shows Guatemala's three episodes of reform on the plane. Figure 7.2c. This shows Indonesia's two episodes of reforms on the plane. Figure 7.2d. This shows Mexico's four episodes of reforms on the plane.

Bolivia electoral reform dimensions

From Chapter 7

Fig. 7.2. Centrally Oriented Iterated Reform Cases

Figure 7.3a. This shows Albania's four episodes of reforms on the plane. Figure 7.3b. This shows Croatia's two episodes of reforms on the plane. Figure 7.3c. This shows Macedonia's two episodes of reforms on the plane. Figure 7.3d. This shows Ukraine's two episodes of reforms on the plane.

Albania electoral reform dimensions

From Chapter 7

Fig. 7.3. Non–Centrally Oriented Iterated Reform Cases

This shows Poland's three episodes of reform on the plane.

Polish electoral reform dimensions

From Chapter 7

Fig. 7.4. Polish Iterated Reform Stages

Figure AppC.1. This shows Bulgaria's two episodes of reform on the plane.

Bulgaria electoral reform dimensions

From Appendix

Fig. Appendix C.1. New Democracies with Noncontiguous Iterated Reform Periods

Figure AppC.2. This shows Colombia's two episodes of reform on the plane.

Colombia electoral reform dimensions

From Appendix

Fig. Appendix C.2. Long-Standing Democracies
with Contiguous Iterated Electoral Reform Periods

Figure AppC.3. This shows Dominican Republic's two episodes of reform on the plane.

Dominican Republic electoral reform dimensions

From Appendix

Figure AppC.4. This shows Honduras' two episodes of reform on the plane.

Honduras electoral reform dimensions

From Appendix

Figure AppC.5. This shows Romania's two episodes of reform on the plane.

Romania electoral reform dimensions

From Appendix

Figure AppC.6. This shows the early France two episodes of reform on the plane.

France I electoral reform dimensions

From Appendix

Figure AppC7. This shows the later France two episodes of reforms on the plane.

France II electoral reform dimensions

From Appendix

Figure AppC8. This shows Germany's two episodes of reform on the plane.

Germany electoral reform dimensions

From Appendix

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