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Committees and the Decline of Lawmaking in Congress

Jonathan Lewallen
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  • Overview

  • Contents

The public, journalists, and legislators themselves have often lamented a decline in congressional lawmaking in recent years, often blaming party politics for the lack of legislative output. In Committees and the Decline of Lawmaking in Congress, Jonathan Lewallen examines the decline in lawmaking from a new, committee-centered perspective. Lewallen tests his theory against other explanations such as partisanship and an increased demand for oversight with multiple empirical tests and traces shifts in policy activity by policy area using the Policy Agendas Project coding scheme.

He finds that because party leaders have more control over the legislative agenda, committees have spent more of their time conducting oversight instead. Partisanship alone does not explain this trend; changes in institutional rules and practices that empowered party leaders have created more uncertainty for committees and contributed to a shift in their policy activities. The shift toward oversight at the committee level combined with party leader control over the voting agenda means that many members of Congress are effectively cut out of many of the institution's policy decisions. At a time when many, including Congress itself, are considering changes to modernize the institution and keep up with a stronger executive branch, the findings here suggest that strengthening Congress will require more than running different candidates or providing additional resources.

  • Cover
  • Title Page
  • Copyright Page
  • Contents
  • Preface and Acknowledgments
  • One. Committees and Congress in the Policy Process
  • Two. Myths and Realities of Congressional Lawmaking
  • Three. The Effects of Centralized Agenda Setting
  • Four. Partisanship and Committee Activity
  • Five. Demand for Committee Oversight
  • Six. The Stratified Congress
  • Seven. The Costs of Doing (Legislative) Business
  • Appendix
  • Notes
  • References
  • Index
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Published: 2020
Publisher: University of Michigan Press
ISBN(s)
  • 978-0-472-12699-6 (ebook)
  • 978-0-472-13206-5 (hardcover)
Series
  • Legislative Politics and Policy Making
Subject
  • Political Science:American Politics
  • Political Science:Governance

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Panel A shows trends in the average number of bills marked up and reported in each chamber. Panel B shows trends in the proportion of marked up and reported bills in each chamber.

Figure 2-3. Committee Reported Bill Trends, 1981-2018. Panel A: Average Counts of Reported Bills

From Chapter 2

Fig. 2.3. Committee Reported Bill Trends, 1981–2018. (Source: THOMAS/Congress.gov, calculated by the author. Panel A (top) displays the data as counts, Panel B (bottom) as proportions. The points represent the averages in each congress, the gray shaded areas represent a standard deviation above and below the averages.)

Panel A shows trends in the average number of bills marked up and reported in each chamber. Panel B shows trends in the proportion of marked up and reported bills in each chamber.

Figure 2-3. Committee Reported Bill Trends, 1981-2018. Panel A: Average Proportions of Reported Bills

From Chapter 2

Fig. 2.3. Committee Reported Bill Trends, 1981–2018. (Source: THOMAS/Congress.gov, calculated by the author. Panel A (top) displays the data as counts, Panel B (bottom) as proportions. The points represent the averages in each congress, the gray shaded areas represent a standard deviation above and below the averages.)

The left panel shows the average ratio of referred bills that were marked up by each House committee from 1981 to 2018, ordered from highest to lowest ration. The right panel shows the average ratio of referred bills that were marked up by each Senate committee from 1981 to 2018, ordered from highest to lowest ratio.

Figure 2-5. Committee Markup Averages, 1981-2018

From Chapter 2

Fig. 2.5. Committee Markup Averages, 1981–2018. (Source: THOMAS/Congress.gov, calculated by the author. House markup ratios are displayed in the left panel and Senate markup ratios in the right.)

Each House committee’s trend in the ratio of referred bills that were marked up from 1981 to 2018.

Figure 2-8. House Committee Reported Bills Trends, 1981-2018

From Chapter 2

Fig. 2.8. House Committee Reported Bills Trends, 1981–2018. (Source: THOMAS/Congress.gov, calculated by the author.)

Each Senate committee’s trend in the ratio of referred bills that were marked up from 1981 to 2018.

Figure 2-9. Senate Committee Reported Bills Trends, 1981-2018

From Chapter 2

Fig. 2.9. Senate Committee Reported Bills Trends, 1981–2018. (Source: THOMAS/Congress.gov, calculated by the author.)

Trends in the average number of legislative committee hearing sessions, panels, and witnesses from 1981 to 2012.

Figure 2-10. Average Workload in Legislative Hearings, 1981-2012

From Chapter 2

Fig. 2.10. Average Workload in Legislative Hearings, 1981–2012. (Source: Policy Agendas Project Congressional Hearings dataset, compiled by the author. The 112th Congress was the last complete set of hearings when these data were collected.)

The percentage of House debate rules classified as open from 1981 to 2016.

Figure 3-4. Open Debate Rules in the House of Representatives, 1981-2016

From Chapter 3

Fig. 3.4. Open Debate Rules in the House of Representatives, 1981–2016. (Source: Sinclair 2007 [97th–108th Congresses] and Congress.gov [109th–114th Congresses]; the former calculated by Donald Wolfensberger, the latter calculated by the author. The Wolfensberger calculations only refer to “restrictive” rules that include closed, modified closed, and modified open rules in the same statistic.)

The number of cloture motions filed in the Senate from 1981 to 2018 separated by whether the motions were sponsored by party leaders and whips or not.

Figure 3-5. Senate Cloture Motions and Majority Party Leader Involvement, 1981-2018

From Chapter 3

Fig. 3.5. Senate Cloture Motions and Majority Party Leader Involvement, 1981–2018. (Source: Senate.gov, calculated by the author.)

The left panel shows the number of bills in each congress from 1981 to 2018 with resolved intercameral differences. The right panel shows the percentage of these bills resolved via conference committee.

Figure 3-6. Resolving Intercameral Differences Through Conference Committee, 1981-2018

From Chapter 3

Fig. 3.6. Resolving Intercameral Differences through Conference Committee, 1981–2018. (Source: Congress.gov, calculated by the author.)

The panels on the top row show the total number of subcommittees in each chamber from 1981 to 2018, with House subcommittees on the left and Senate subcommittees on the right. The bottom row shows the number of oversight subcommittees in each chamber, with House subcommittees on the left and Senate subcommittees on the right.

Figure 3-7. Total Subcommittees and Oversight Subcommittees in Congress, 1981-2018

From Chapter 3

Fig. 3.7. Total Subcommittees and Oversight Subcommittees in Congress, 1981–2018. (Source: Congressional Directory, history.house.gov, www.senate.gov/committees/committee_assignments.htm; compiled by the author.)

The left panel shows predicted values for House legislative hearing ratios based on multiple referral percentages before and after 1995. The right panel shows predicted values for House markups.

Figure 3-8. Predicted Values for House Legislative Activity, Multiple vs. Primary Referral Era

From Chapter 3

Fig. 3.8. Predicted Values for House Legislative Activity, Multiple vs. Primary Referral Era. (Note: Y-axes are on the logarithmic scale due to transforming beta regression results.)

The left panel shows predicted values for Senate legislative hearing ratios based on the number of cloture motions filed the previous congress. The right panel shows predicted values for Senate markups.

Figure 3-9. Predicted Values for Senate Legislative Activity from Previous Cloture Motions

From Chapter 3

Fig. 3.9. Predicted Values for Senate Legislative Activity from Previous Cloture Motions. (Note: Y-axes are on the logarithmic scale due to transforming beta regression results.)

Predicted values for House committee legislative hearing ratios based on federal budget outlays in the prior Congress.

Figure 5-4. Predicted Values for House Legislative Hearings from Federal Outlays

From Chapter 5

Fig. 5.4. Predicted Values for House Legislative Hearings from Federal Outlays. (Note: Y-axes are on the logarithmic scale due to transforming beta regression results.)

Predicted values for Senate committee markup ratios based on federal budget outlays in the prior Congress.

Figure 5-5. Predicted Values for Senate Reported Bills from Federal Outlays

From Chapter 5

Fig. 5.5. Predicted Values for Senate Reported Bills from Federal Outlays. (Note: Y-axes are on the logarithmic scale due to transforming beta regression results.)

The left panel displays the slope coefficients for a time trend counter from a bivariate regression on House legislative hearing ratios in each policy area. The right panel displays the same data for Senate legislative hearing ratios.

Figure 6-5. Linear Trends in Legislative Hearings by Policy Area

From Chapter 6

Fig. 6.5. Linear Trends in Legislative Hearings by Policy Area. (Source: Policy Agendas Project Congressional Hearings dataset, compiled by the author.)

The left panel displays the slope coefficients for a time trend counter from a bivariate regression on House reported bill ratios in each policy area. The right panel displays the same data for Senate reported bill ratios.

Figure 6-6. Linear Trends in Reported Bills by Policy Area

From Chapter 6

Fig. 6.6. Linear Trends in Reported Bills by Policy Area. (Source: Congressional Bills Project, compiled by the author.)

The left panel displays the slope coefficients for a time trend counter from a bivariate regression on House reported bill ratios in each policy area. The right panel displays the same data for Senate reported bill ratios.

Figure 6-7. Categories of Committee vs. Chamber Floor Legislating

From Chapter 6

Fig. 6.7. Categories of Committee vs. Chamber Floor Legislating.

The x-axis represents linear trends in House roll-call votes for each policy area from 1981 to 2012. The y-axis of the top panel represents the linear trend in House legislative hearing ratios by policy area. The y-axis of the bottom panel represents the linear trend in House reported bill ratios by policy area.

Figure 6-8. Trends in House Committee Lawmaking vs. the Floor

From Chapter 6

Fig. 6.8. Trends in House Committee Lawmaking vs. the Floor. (Source: Policy Agendas Project, calculated by the author.)

The x-axis represents linear trends in Senate roll-call votes for each policy area from 1981 to 2012. The y-axis of the top panel represents the linear trend in House legislative hearing ratios by policy area. The y-axis of the bottom panel represents the linear trend in Senate reported bill ratios by policy area.

Figure 6-9. Trends in Senate Committee Lawmaking vs. the Floor

From Chapter 6

Fig. 6.9. Trends in Senate Committee Lawmaking vs. the Floor. (Source: Policy Agendas Project, calculated by the author.)

The x-axis represents the linear trend in public law titles devoted to each policy area from 1981 to 2012. The y-axis of the top panel represents the linear trend in House reported bill ratios by policy area. The y-axis of the bottom panel represents the linear trend in Senate reported bill ratios by policy area.

Figure 6-10. Trends in Committee Lawmaking vs. Enacted Law Titles

From Chapter 6

Fig. 6.10. Trends in Committee Lawmaking vs. Enacted Law Titles. (Source: Congressional Bills Project, Michelle Whyman’s law titles dataset [housed at the Comparative Agendas Project]; calculated by the author.)

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